BT  21  . S42  1905  v.2 
Seeberq,  Reinhold,  1859- 
1935  . 

Text-book  of  the  history  of 

r}  n  r*  tri  neg _ ,,  

V  \ 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2019  with  funding  from 
Princeton  Theological  Seminary  Library 


https://archive.org/details/textbookofhistor02seeb 


0 


TEXT-BOOK 


OF  THE 

HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES 


BY  v 

Dr.  reinhold  seeberg, 

Professor  of  Theology  in  Ordinary  in  Berlin. 


REVISED,  1904,  BY  THE  AUTHOR. 

TRANSLATED  BY 

CHARLES  E.  HAY,  D.  D. 


COMPLETE  IN  TWO  VOLUMES. 


VOL.  II. 

HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES  IN  THE  MIDDLE  AND 

MODERN  AGES. 


PHILADELPHIA,  PA.: 

LUTHERAN  PUBLICATION  SOCIETY. 


Copyright  1905, 

BY  THE 


LUTHERAN  PUBLICATION  SOCIETY. 


CONTENTS. 


BOOK  II. 

THE  PRESERVATION,  TRANSFORMATION,  AND  FURTHER 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  DOCTRINE  IN  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

PART  I. 

HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES  FROM  THE  SEVENTH  TO  THE  TENTH 

CENTURY. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Introduction.  Theology  of  Gregory  the  Great. 

PAGE 

£  35.  Characteristics  of  this  Period .  15 

$  36.  Theology  of  Gregory  the  Great .  17 

1.  Theology,  Christology,  Councils,  Scripture .  17 

2.  Work  of  Christ .  19 

3.  Doctrine  of  Sin  and  Grace .  21 

a .  Original  Sin .  21 

b.  Grace .  22 

c.  Predestination .  23 

d.  Repentance .  24 

e.  Mass,  Purgatory .  24 

4.  The  Church .  25 

5.  Relation  to  Augustine .  26 

CHAPTER  II. 

Doctrinal  Conflicts  of  the  Earlier  Middle  Ages. 

$  37.  Adoptionist  Controversy .  27 

1.  Migetius,  Elipandus,  Felix .  27 

2.  Alcuin,  Decision  of  the  Controversy .  28 

£  38.  Eastern  Church  and  Worship  of  Images.  Filioque  Controversy .  .  29 

|  39.  Controversy  Upon  Augustiniaii  Doctrine  of  Predestination .  30 

1.  Gottschalk .  31 

2.  Opponents  of  Gottschalk . 31 

3.  Leaders  of  Both  Parties . •. .  32 

4.  Councils  at  Chiersy,  Valence,  Toucy .  33; 

£  40.  Divergent  Views  Upon  Parturition  of  the  Virgin .  33 

sJ  41.  Controversies  Upon  the  Lord' s  Supper .  34 

I.  Popular  Views .  34 


11 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 


2.  Paschasius  Radbertus .  35 

3.  Critical  Estimate .  37 

4.  Rabanus .  37 

5.  Ratramnus .  38 

6.  Result .  39 


CHAPTER  III. 

Hierarchical  Principle.  History  of  Ordinance  of  Repentance. 


$  42.  Papacy  and  Hierarchy. .  . . .  40 

1 .  Situation .  40 

2.  Problems . 40 

3.  Donation  of  Constantine .  40 

4.  Pseudo-Isidore .  41 

§  43.  Repentance  in  Earlier  Middle  Ages .  41 

1.  Limitation  of  Public  Repentance .  42 

2.  Private  Repentance .  42 

3.  Penitential  Praxis  and  Theory .  43 

4.  Historical  Situation .  46 


PART  II. 

HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES  IN  SCHOLASTIC  AGE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Foundations  of  Hierarchical  and  Religious  Ideals  and  of 

Scholastic  Theology. 


$  44.  The  Church  and  the  World. . ! . 

1.  Cluny . 

2.  Humbert,  Gregory  VII .  . 

3.  Canon  Law  and  the  Church . 

£  45.  Christianity  of  Si.  Bernard . 

$  46.  Histo?y  of  Theology  from  Anselm  to  Peter  the  Lombard . 

1.  Methods  of  Treatment . 

2.  Beginnings,  Lanfranc,  Anselm,  Abelard,  Roscellin . 

3.  Abelard’s  Theological  and  Philosophical  Position,  His  Followers. 

4.  Opposition  to  Abelard,  Honorius  Augustodunensis,  Hugo  of 

St.  Victor,  Robert  Pullus . 

5.  Peter  the  Lombard,  Heads  of  Doctrine . 

\  47.  Christology  of  Abelard  and  the  Lombard.  Opposition  of  Gerhoh . 

1.  Christology  of  Abelard . 

2.  The  Lombard,  Nihilianism . 

3.  Christology  of  Gerhoh . 

$  48.  Doctrine  of  Atonement.  Anselm  and  Abelard. . 

\  ji.  Anselm’s  Theory  of  Satisfaction,  Critical  Estimate . 


49 

49 


50 

51 
5* 
5® 
54 


55 

57 


60 

62 

64 

64 

65 

66 
66 
66 


CONTENTS. 


Ill 


PAGB 

2.  Abelard’s  Criticism,  His  Theory  of  Atonement .  70 

3.  Bernard  vs.  Abelard .  72 

4.  Atonement  in  the  School  of  Abelard,  in  Honorius,  Hugo,  Robert.  73 

5.  Atonement  in  the  Lombard . .  73 

$  49.  Berenger  of  Tours  and  Doctrine  of  Lord' s  Slipper .  74 

1.  Berenger .  74 

2.  Opposition  to  Berenger .  76 

3.  Development  of  the  Doctrine,  Transubstantiation .  77 

4.  Honorius,  Hugo,  Robert,  the  Lombard .  77 

5.  Dogmatic  Establishment  of  Transubstantiation .  78 

|  50.  Definition  of  Sacraments.  Seven  Sacraments . .  79 

1.  Origin  of  the  Number  Seven .  79 

2.  Definition .  80 

3.  Baptism .  80 

4.  Confirmation .  8 1 

5.  Lord’s  Supper .  81 

6.  Repentance .  81 

a.  Abelard .  81 

b.  Hugo .  82 

c.  Robert  Pullus . • .  83 

d.  The  Lombard .  83 

7.  Extreme  Unction .  84 

8.  Ordination .  84 

9.  Marriage . 85 

|  51.  Conception  of  the  Church .  85 

•  1.  Hugo,  Robert,  John  of  Salisbury .  85 

2.  Church,  Hierarchy,  Relation  to  State .  85 

CHAPTER  II. 

Development  of  Christian  Doctrine  During  Second  Period 

of  Scholasticism. 

$  52.  Aims  of  the  Church.  Religious  Life.  Efforts  at  Reform .  87 

1.  Innocent  III.,  Boniface  VIII .  87 

2.  Francis  of  Assisi  and  His  Influence .  88 

3.  Popular  Practical  Christianity .  90 

4.  Preaching,  Penitential  Praxis .  91 

5.  Heretical  Movements,  Cathari,  Waldenses,  Begards  .  94 

|  53.  History  and  Characteristics  of  Theology  in  the  Thirteenth  Century.  96 

1.  Scholasticism  and  the  Secularization  of  the  Church .  96 

2.  Development  of  Scholasticism  in  Thirteenth  Century .  97 

Alexander  of  Hales .  98 

Albert  the  Great .  99 

Thomas  of  Aquino,  Divisions  of  the  “  Summa  ” .  99 

Bonaventura .  100 


IV 


CONTENTS. 


PAGH 

3.  Leading  Scholastic  Ideas . . .  100 

a.  Revelation,  Scriptures,  Symbols,  Pope .  100 

b.  Faith .  103 

c.  Reason  Faith .  104 

d.  Universals .  104 

4.  Two  Aspects  of  Scholasticism,  Roger  Bacon,  Lullus,  Henry  of 

Ghent,  Richard  of  Middleton .  105 

§  54-  Doctrine  of  God  and  Christology .  1 06 

1.  Advance  of  Thomas  in  the  Doctrine  of  God .  106 

2.  The  Trinity,  Richard  of  St.  Victor,  The  Lombard,  Joachim  of 

Floris,  Fourth  Lateran  Council . . .  108 

3.  Christology .  109 

$  55.  The  Work  of  Christ .  1 10 

1.  Alexander,  Bonaventura .  no 

2.  Thomas .  113 

|  56.  Doctrines  of  Original  State  and  Sin .  114 

1.  Original  Righteousness,  Synteresis ,  Donum  super  ad ditum .  114 

2.  Original  Sin .  116 

$  57.  Doctrine  of  Grace  and  Human  Freedom .  118 

1.  Man  Cannot  Deliver  Himself .  118 

2.  Gratia ,  creata  and  increata . f .  118 

3.  Grace  and  Free-will .  119 

4.  Justification,  Infusion,  Forgiveness  of  Sins,  Assurance .  120 

5.  Faith  and  Works,  Meritum  de  condigno  and  de  congruo .  121 

6.  Evangelical  Councils  and  Christian  Perfection .  124 

\  58.  Sacraments  and  the  Church.  Dogma  of  Seven  Sacraments .  124 

1.  Dogmatization  by  Eugene  IV .  124 

a.  Nature  and  Number  of  Sacraments .  125 

b.  Definition  of  Sacraments .  125 

c.  Relation  of  Sign  and  Grace .  126* 

d.  Effect,  “  Character” . 127 

e.  Ex  opere  operato .  128 

2.  Baptism .  1 29 

3.  Confirmation .  1 30 

4.  Lord’s  Supper,  Transubstantiation,  Concomitance,  Accidents, 

Bodily  Presence  and  Local  Limitation,  Effect,  Sacrifice  of  the 
Mass,  Definition  of  Eugene  IV .  13 1 

5.  Repentance .  135 

a.  Contrition  and  Attrition,  Confession  and  Absolution, 

Thomas  and  Duns,  Biel .  135 

m 

b.  Satisfaction .  138 

c.  Indulgences .  139 

6.  Extreme  Unction .  140 

7.  Ordination .  141 

8.  Marriage .  142 


CONTENTS. 


V 


PAGE 

9.  The  Church,  In  Thomas,  Current  Definition,  Communio  sancto¬ 
rum ,  The  Pope . .  144 

10.  The  Kingdom  of  God  on  Earth .  146 

CHAPTER  III. 

Gradual  Dissolution  of  Scholastic  Theology.  Religious  and 
Ecclesiastical  Crisis  at  Close  of  Middle  Ages. 

§  59.  Theology  of  Duns  Scotus  and  its  Significance  for  the  History  of 

Doctrines .  147 

1.  Philosophical  Position  of  Duns .  147 

2.  Revelation,  Symbols,  Romish  Church,  Faith .  149 

3.  Conception  of  God,  Predestination .  150 

4.  Sin,  Original  Sin .  153 

5.  Christology .  154 

6.  Mariology .  155 

7.  Redemption,  Criticism  of  Anselm’s  View .  156 

8.  Definition  of  Grace,  Habitus,  Merit,  Justification .  158 

9.  Sacraments . 161 

10.  Significance  of  Duns  in  History  of  Doctrines .  162 

§  60.  Criticism  of  Hierarchical  Conception  of  the  Church .  165 

1.  Situation  of  the  Curia,  Reform  Councils,  Leo  X .  165 

2.  Marsilius  and  Occam,  Separation  of  Church  and  State,  Tasks  of 

Pope  and  Clergy,  Fallibility  of  Pope  and  Infallibility  of  Scrip¬ 
tures,  Rights  of  the  Laity . .  167 

3.  Theory  of  Natural  Right .  170 

g  61.  Church  Life  and  Religious  Agitations  at  the  Close  of  the  Middle 

Ages .  172 

1.  Crisis,  Superstition,  Expectations .  173 

2.  Influence  of  the  Church  Upon  the  Masses,  Penitential  Praxis, 

Attrition,  Indulgences,  Jubilee  Indulgences .  174 

3.  German  Mysticism .  178 

4.  Christian  Socialism,  Wickliffe .  181 

$  62.  Review  of  History  of  Theology  in  the  Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth 

Centuries.  Nominalism  and  Augustinianism .  185 

1.  Duns  and  the  Nominalists .  185 

a.  Nominalists .  185 

b.  Thomists .  186 

c.  Paduan  School .  187 

d.  Augustinian  Eremites .  187 

e.  Return  to  Augustine,  Gerson,  Forerunners  of  the  Reformation  188 

2.  Nominalist  Theory  of  Knowledge .  190 

3.  a.  Criticism  and  Skepticism . ; .  191 

b.  Submission  to  Doctrine  of  Scriptures  and  Church,  Theory  of 

Inspiration . 192 


VI 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 


4.  Faith,  Fides  implicita .  195 

5.  Collapse  of  the  Scholastic  System .  196 

$  63.  Labors  of  Later  Middle  Ages  Upon  Separate  Dogmas  and  Doctrines  197 

1.  Sin,  Human  Freedom .  197 

2.  Atonement,  Redemption .  198 

a.  Aureolus,  Baconthorp,  Durand,  Capreolus .  198 

b.  Biel .  198 

c.  Practical  View  of  Atonement . 200 

3.  Sacrament  of  Repentance,  Attrition,  Justification,  Meritum  de 

congruo  and  de  condigno ,  Assurance .  201 

4.  Lord’s  Supper.  .  . .  203 

a.  Occam,  Durand,  D’Ailli,  Substance  of  the  Bread .  203 

b.  Bodily  Presence,  Ubiquity  in  Occam,  Faber  Stapulensis  ....  204 

c.  Wickliffe’ s  Criticism  of  Transubstantiation .  206 

5.  Augustinian  Tendency .  207 

a.  Bradwardina .  207 

b.  Wickliffe’ s  Doctrine  of  Predestination .  208 

c.  Goch,  Wesel  and  Wessel  upon  Grace .  208 

6.  Criticism  of  Sacrament  of  Repentance  and  Indulgences  by  Wick¬ 

liffe,  Wesel  and  Wessel .  209 

7.  Conception  of  the  Church  in  Wickliffe,  Wesel  and  Wessel .  21 1  •*- 

§  64.  The  Renaissance  and  Humanism  in  their  Significance  for  the 

History  of  Doctrines .  212 

1.  Literary  Agitation .  213 

2.  Lorenzo  Valla,  Religious  Attitude  of  Erasmus .  213 

3.  Lack  of  Reformatory  Elements  in  Erasmus,  Colet,  Review  and 

Prospect .  215 


BOOK  III. 

FURTHER  DEVELOPMENT  OF  DOCTRINE  THROUGH  THE 
REFORMATION  AND  FIXATION  OF  THE  DOCTRINES  OF 
CATHOLICISM. 


PART  I. 

GENESIS  OF  PROTESTANT  DOCTRINE. 

CHAPTER  I. 

The  Views  of  Luther. 

$  65.  Luther1  s  Place  in  the  History  of  Doctrines .  221 

1.  Luther’s  Personality .  221 

2.  Influence  of  Sacramental  Repentance  and  of  Augustine  Upon 

Luther .  222 


CONTENTS. 


Vll 


PAGE 

L  3.  Early  and  Later  Views  of  Luther  Compared .  223 

4.  Luther  and  Scholasticism .  223 

5.  Evangelical  Repentance  as  Central  Point  in  Luther’s  Reformatory 

Views .  224 

6.  Reformatory  Work  of  Luther .  225 

$  66.  Luther3  s  Views  Before  the  Reformation  Period .  227 

1.  External  and  Internal  Word,  Law  and  Gospel .  228 

2.  Original  Sin .  229 

I  /'3.  Christology  and  Redemption .  229 

4.  Grace,  Faith .  231 

5.  Sacrament  of  Repentance .  234 

6.  The  Church . .  234 

7.  Old  Forms  with  New  Content .  235 

l  67.  Criticism  of  Sacrament  of  Repentance.  Evangelical  Repentance. 

Faith ,  Sin,  Grace,  Justification,  Atonement. .  235 

1.  Theology  of  the  Ninety-five  Theses .  235 

2.  a.  Contrition  a  Fruit  of  Faith  and  Love,  The  Law .  237 

b.  Confession  and  Absolution .  240 

c.  Satisfaction,  Advance  Upon  Previous  Theories .  241 

3.  a.  Sin  and  Original  Sin .  242 

b.  Enslaved  Will  and  Predestination .  243 

c.  Wrath  of  God,  The  Devil .  245 

4.  a.  The  Law  as  Natural  Right,  The  Sabbath .  246 

b.  The  Gospel .  248 

c.  The  Law .  249 

d.  The  Law  and  Penitence,  Agricola .  249 

e.  Law  and  Gospel .  251 

5.  Faith .  252 

a.  Its  Origin,  God  Revealed  in  Christ  as  Loving-Will .  252 

b.  Its  Nature — Acceptance,  Trust,  Faith  and  Redemptive 

Realities .  254 

c.  Faith  and  Regeneration .  256 

d.  Feeling,  Experience,  Assurance .  256 

6.  Good  Works.  From  Faith,  through  Christ,  in  Liberty .  258 

7.  Justification  Secured  by  Faith,  Actual  and  Imputed  Righteous¬ 

ness,  Harmony  of  Luther’s  Earlier  and  Later  Teachings .  260 

8.  Grace  and  Gifts .  263 

9.  Work  of  Christ .  265 

a.  Satisfaction,  Payment,  Kingdom  of  God . 265 

b.  Sacrifice,  Satisfaction  Rendered  to  the  Wrath  of  God  and  the 

Law,  Release  from  Dominion  of  Devil .  266 

c.  Intercession . 269 

d.  Christ  the  Second  Adam,  Example,  Following  of  Christ.  . . .  269 
Content  and  Critical  Estimate  of  Luther’s  Doctrine  of  the 

Atonement,  Relation  to  Duns .  271 


Vlll 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

io.  General  Summary .  272 

$  68.  Evangelical  Ideal  of  Life .  273 

1.  Significance  of  Luther’ s  Ideal  of  the  Christian  Life .  273 

2.  Christian  Perfection .  273 

3.  Secular  Callings .  274 

4.  Content  of  the  Christian  Life,  The  Kingdom  of  God .  275 

5.  Luther  and  Social  Problems .  278 

l  %  Word  and  Sacrament .  279 

1.  The  Spirit  and  the  Means  of  Grace .  279 

2.  The  Word  and  the  Spirit  vs.  the  Inner  Word  of  the  Fanatics.. .  .  279 

3.  Conception  of  the  Sacraments .  282 

4.  Baptism,  Infant  Baptism .  283 

5.  Luther’s  Earliest  View  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  Honius  and 

Carlstadt .  285 

6.  Luther  vs.  Sacrifice  of  the  Mass .  289 

„  $  70.  Reformatory  Conception  of  the  Church .  289 

1.  Significance  of  the  Leipzig  Disputation .  289 

2.  New  Conception  of  the  Church .  291^, 

3.  Fundamental  Features  of  the  New  Conception .  292 

a .  The  Communion  of  Saints,  Invisibility  of  the  Church .  292 

b.  The  Church  and  the  Means  of  Grace .  293 

c.  The  Church  as  Seen .  293 

d.  The  Ecclesiastical  Office .  293 

e.  Nature  of  the  Church .  294 

f.  Marks  of  the  True  Church . . .  294 

Jfc  71.  Luther' s  Attitude  Toward  the  Traditional  Standards  of  Doctrine , 

i.  e.y  the  Scriptures  and  the  Dogmas  of  the  Church .  296 

1.  Attitude  of  Luther  Toward  the  Traditional  Standards .  296 

2.  a.  Sole  Authority  of  the  Scriptures .  298 

b.  Difference  as  Compared  with  View  of  the  Later  Middle  Ages, 

Christ  the  Content  of  Scripture,  Biblical  Criticism .  299 

c.  Luther’s  Treatment  of  the  Scriptures .  301 

3.  Attitude  of  Luther  Toward  the  Dogma  of  the  Ancient  Church. .  302 

4.  Attitude  of  Luther  Toward  the  Trinitarian  Dogma .  304 

CHAPTER  II. 

Doctrine  of  Zwingli.  Opposition  of  Luther  and  Zwingli  Upon  the 

Doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper. 

§  72.  Reformatory  Principles  of  Zwingli .  306 

1.  Zwingli’ s  Dependence  Upon  Luther .  307 

2.  Authority  of  the  Scriptures .  308 

3.  Doctrine  of  Sin . 309 

4.  Work  of  Christ,  Its  Objective  and  Subjective  Aspects .  309 

5-  Faith .  310 


CONTENTS. 


IX 


PAGE 


6.  The  Law  of  Christ .  31 1 

7.  The  Ideal  of  Life .  312 

8.  Predestination,  Conception  of  God .  312 

^  9.  The  Church .  315 

10.  The  Sacraments,  Baptism,  Infant  Baptism .  316 

n.  Medieval  Limitations  of  Zwingli .  317 

£  73.  Controversy  Upon  the  Lord' s  Supper .  318 

1.  Origin  of  Zwingli’ s  Doctrine,  Tactics  of  the  Conflict .  318 

2.  Doctrine  of  Zwingli .  320 

3.  Luther  and  the  Words  of  Institution .  322 

4.  Christology  of  Luther  as  Related  to  His  Doctrine  of  the  Lord’s 

Supper .  323 

5.  The  Right  Hand  of  God,  Mode  of  Bodily  Presence,  Relation  to 

Occam .  325 

6.  Reception  and  Blessing  of  the  Sacrament .  327 

7.  Marburg  Colloquy,  Schwabach  Articles .  330 

8.  Wittenberg  Concord,  Bucer,  Schwabian  Compromise .  331 


CHAPTER  III. 
The  New  Dogma. 


£  74.  The  Augsburg  Confession .  332 

1.  Relations  Between  the  Civil  Authorities  and  Theologians  in  the 

Establishment  of  Protestant  Doctrine .  332 

2.  Aim  of  the  Augsburg  Confession . . .  334 

3.  The  Trinity,  Sin,  The  Confutators .  335 

4.  Faith,  Justification,  Doctrine  of  Justification  in  the  Apology .  336 

5.  Good  Works,  Ideal  of  Life .  339 

>  6.  The  Church,  Ministerial  Office .  340  — 

7.  The  Sacraments,  Baptism,  The  Lord’s  Supper,  Repentance  ....  341 

8.  Practical  Demands .  343 

*§  75-  The  Earlier  Reformed  Confessions .  344 

Justification,  Faith,  The  Church,  The  Sacraments .  344 


PART  II. 

THE  FURTHER  DEVELOPMENT  AND  (PROVISIONAL)  COMPLETION  OF 

PROTESTANT  DOCTRINE. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Lutheran  Doctrine  to  the  Adoption  of  the  Formula  of  Concord. 
£  76.  Theology  of  Melanchthon.  Its  Significance  for  the  History  of 

Doctrines .  347 


X 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

1.  Melanchthon  and  Calvin .  347 

2.  First  Edition  of  the  Loci .  348 

3.  Deviation  from  Luther  in  the  Theory  of  Conversion .  349 

4.  Deviation  from  Luther  Upon  the  Lord’s  Supper,  Article  X.  in  the 

Yariata .  350 

5.  Later  Revisions  of  the  Loci ,  Attitude  Toward  the  Scriptures,  the 

Ecclesiastical  Dogmas,  and  the  Authority  of  Luther .  351 

6.  Theology  and  Philosophy .  353 

7.  The  Church,  Visible  and  as  Object  of  Faith,  “  Pure  Doctrine”..  354  — 

8.  Justification,  The  Law  and  Contrition,  The  Gospel  and  the  Atone¬ 

ment,  Forensic  Theory,  Faith  and  Regeneration,  Self-con¬ 
sistency  of  Melanchthon’ s  Theology .  358 

77.  Theological  Controversies  in  the  Lutheran  Church  from  the  Death 

of  Ltither  to  the  Adoption  of  the  Formula  of  Concord. .  362 

1.  Significance  of  Melanchthon  for  the  History  of  Doctrines .  363 

2.  The  Interim,  Adiaphoristic  Controversy .  364 

3.  Majoristic  Controversy,  Menius,  Amsdorf,  Flacius .  364 

4.  The  Antinomistic  Controversy,  Amsdorf,  Poach,  Otto .  365 

5.  Controversy  Upon  the  Lord’s  Supper,  Brenz,  Crypto-Calvinists, 

Consecration  of  Elements .  ....  366 

6.  Synergistic  Controversy,  Pfeffinger,  Strigel,  Flacius .  367 

ff.\  The  Osianarian  Controversy .  36Q 

KJ  a.  Osiander’s  System .  369 

b.  His  Opponents .  373 

c.  Stancar .  374 

8.  Christological  Conflicts .  374 

a.  Brenz .  374 

b.  Chemnitz .  374 

9.  Predestinarian  Controversy,  Aepin  Upon  Descent  into  Hell . 378 

78.  The  Formula  of  Concord . .  ...  378 

1.  Political  Reasons  for  Harmony,  Frankfort  Recess,  Weimar  Con¬ 

futation,  Naumburg  Diet,  Corpora  Doctrinae .  378 

2.  Genesis  of  the  Formula  of  Concord .  380 

3.  Original  Sin  and  Free  Will . 383 

4.  Doctrine  of  Justification .  384 

a.  Obedience  of  Christ .  384 

b.  Imputed  Righteousness . -.  384 

c.  Faith  and  Justification . . .  .  384 

5.  Good  Works .  385 

6.  Law  and  Gospel .  385 

7.  The  Lord’s  Supper .  386 

8.  Christology .  387 

9.  Descent  into  Hell . f .  388 

10.  Adiaphora .  388 

ir.  Predestination .  388 


CONTENTS. 


XI 


PAGE 

12.  Factions  and  Sects .  389 

13.  Critical  Estimate  of  the  Formula. . .  389 

CHAPTER  II. 

Completion  of  Doctrinal  Construction  in  the  Reformed  Church. 

$  79*  Theology  of  Calvin.  Its  Influence  Upon  the  History  of  Doctrines.  390 

1.  Theological  Type  of  Bucer,  Theology  of  Bucer,  Luther,  Bucer, 

*  and  Melanchthon,  Bucer  and  Calvin .  390 

2.  Calvin  as  Theologian  and  Churchman .  394 

3.  Calvin’s  Doctrine  of  the  Scriptures  and  Inspiration .  395 

4.  Conception  of  God . - .  396 

5-  Sin .  398 

6.  Atonement  and  Redemption .  399 

7.  a.  Faith .  40 1 

b.  Repentance .  402 

c.  Justification .  403 

d.  Human  Freedom .  405 

e.  Election .  405 

8.  The  Church  and  its  Organization .  408 

a.  The  Totality  of  the  Predestinated .  408 

b.  The  Visible  Church .  408 

c.  Outward  Organization .  409 

d.  Relation  to  the  State .  410/ 

9.  The  Sacraments .  41 1 

a.  Definition  of  a  Sacrament .  41 1 

b.  Baptism .  412 

c.  The  Lord’s  Supper .  412 

10.  The  Significance  of  Calvin  for  the  History  of  Doctrines,  Medie¬ 
val  Element  in  His  View .  414 

|  80.  Triumph  of  Calvin’ s  Doctrine  of  the  Lord’ s  Supper .  417 

1.  Bullinger’s  Revival  of  Zwingli’s  Theory .  417 

2.  The  Consensus  Tigurinus .  417 

3.  Reformed  Confessions .  417 

\  81.  Fundamental  Evangelical  Principles  in  Later  Reformed  Con¬ 
fessions .  418 

1.  Reformed  Confessions  in  FI armony  with  Calvin .  418 

2.  Atonement,  Faith,  Repentance .  418 

3.  The  Church,  The  Glory  of  God .  4J9i 

\  82.  Triumph  of  the  Doctrine  of  Predestination .  420 

1.  Pighius,  Consensus  Genevensis .  420 

2.  The  Symbols .  421 

3.  Remonstrants  and  Contra-remonstrants,  Decrees  of  Dort .  421 

4.  Place  of  Predestination  in  Doctrinal  System .  423 

5.  Amyraldus,  The  Formula  Consensus  Helvetica .  424 


CONTENTS. 


XI 1 


PART  III. 

COMPLETION  OF  DOCTRINAL  CONSTRUCTION  IN  THE  ROMAN 


CATHOLIC  CHURCH. 

P  AGE 

$  83.  Establishment  of  Medieval  Theology  by  the  Council  of  Trent .  427 

1.  Reformation  and  Counter-reformation .  427 

2.  Jesuitism .  429 

3.  The  Council  of  Trent .  431 

4.  The  Scriptures  and  Tradition .  431 

5.  Original  Sin,  Sin  of  Adam,  Propagation,  Relation  to  Baptism, 

Concupiscence,  Exemption  of  the  Virgin  Mary .  432 

6.  Justification,  How  Attained,  Preserved,  Lost,  Synergism,  Impu¬ 

tation  or  Infusion,  Inherent  Righteousness,  Prevenient  Grace, 
Disposition  Good  Works,  Repentance .  433 

7.  The  Sacraments .  438 

8.  Baptism .  439 

9.  Confirmation .  439 

10.  The  Lord’s  Supper .  439 

a.  The  Dogma .  439 

b.  Withholding  of  the  Cup .  440 

c.  Sacrifice  of  the  Mass .  441 

11.  Sacrament  of  Repentance,  Indulgences,  Purgatory .  442 

12.  Extreme  Unction .  445 

13.  Ordination .  445 

14.  Marriage .  446 

15.  Curialism  vs.  Episcopalism,  Conception  of  the  Church  in  the  Cat- 

echismus  Romanus .  446 

1 6.  Significance  of  theTridentine  Confession  for  the  History  of  Doctrines  448 

I  84.  Revival  of  the  Augustinian  Doctrine  of  Grace  and  its  Eccle¬ 
siastical  Rejection . 449 

1.  Decadence  of  the  Augustinian  Doctrine  of  Grace . 449 

2.  Bajus,  The  Bull,  Ex  omnibus  afflictionibus .  450 

3.  Molina .  451 

4.  Jansen,  The  Bull,  Cu?n  occasione .  452 

5.  Quesnel,  The  Constitution,  Unigenitus .  454 

6.  Immaculate  Conception .  456 

§  85.  Completion  of  the  Romish  Dogma  of  the  Church.  The  Vatican  Council  456 

1.  Episcopalistic  Movements,  Declaration  du  clerge  de  France . 457 

2.  Febronius,  The  Punctation  of  Ems .  457 

3.  Synod  of  Pistoja .  458 

4.  Increased  Respect  for  the  Papacy  in  the  Age  of  the  Restoration..  459 

5.  The  Vatican  Council,  Schema  defide ,  Inspiration .  460 

6.  Infallibility  of  the  Pope .  460 

7.  Present  Significance  of  Dogma  in  the  Roman  Catholic  Church. .  .  462 

Conclusion.  Significance  of  Dogma  in  Protestantism .  464 


BOOK  II. 

THE  PRESERVATION,  TRANSFORMATION,  AND  FUR¬ 
THER  DEVELOPMENT  OF  DOCTRINE  IN  THE 
MIDDLE  AGES. 


PART  I. 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES  FROM  THE  SEVENTH  TO  THE  TENTH 

CENTURY. 

CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTION.  THEOLOGY  OF  GREGORY  THE  GREAT. 

§  35.  Characteristics  of  this  Period. 

1.  Viewed  historically,  this  period  is  characterized  chiefly  by 
the  disintegration  of  the  ancient  world.  New  nations  and  new 
governments  appear  upon  the  scene.  Yet  the  life  of  antiquity 
is  perpetuated  among  the  barbarians  by  the  church.  Theology 
becomes  the  bearer,  not  of  doctrine  alone,  but  of  philosophy 
and  culture  as  well.  For  this  task  it  was  well  fitted  by  the  inti¬ 
mate  connection  of  the  fixed  doctrines  of  the  church  with  the 
ancient  modes  of  thought,  and  by  the  universal  spirit  of  Augus¬ 
tine.  Wisdom  belonged  to  the  past.  “  The  first  precept  of 
safety  is  to  guard  the  rule  of  right  faith  and  to  deviate  in  nowise 
from  the  ordinances  of  the  fathers”  (Vol.  I.,  p.  387) — such  is 
the  motto  of  the  doctrinal  history  of  the  period.  The  only  man 
who  indulged  in  independent  speculations,  the  philosopher  Scotus 
Erigena,  was  misunderstood  by  his  age.  With  Augustine,  he 
recognized  two  sources  of  knowledge,  sound  reason  ( recta  ratio ) 
and  proper  authority  ( vera  auctoritas') .  He  endeavored  from  a 
combination  of  the  two  to  construct  a  speculative  system.  But 
the  speculative-pantheistic  tendency  prevailed,  and  the  Scriptures 
were  subordinated  by  means  of  allegorical  exegesis.  His  specu¬ 
lations  had  no  influence  worthy  of  mention  upon  the  History  of 
Doctrines  (cf.  Christlieb,  Leben  und  Lehre  des  Joh.  Scotus 
Erigena,  i860). 

2.  The  German  nations  received  Christianity  from  the  church 
in  fixed  forms  and  as  a  fixed  formula.  For  them  Christianity 
became  simply  dogma,  and  faith  the  acceptance  of  tradition.1 

1  The  only  “dogmas,”  in  the  full  sense  of  the  term,  in  the  Middle  Ages 
as  for  the  preceding  period,  were  those  of  the  Trinity  and  the  two  natures  of 
Christ.  Cf.  stib.  under  Gregory  the  Great  and  also,  e.  g.,  Agobard,  de  fid. 
verit.  3  (Mi.  104,  269),  and  the  Poenitentiale  of  Theodore  of  Canterbury  (i.  v. 
6,  p.  189,  in  Wasserschleben,  Penances):  “  from  a  heretic  who  should  not 

O5) 


1 6  «  HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 

This,  no  less  than  the  course  of  political  events,  served  to  con¬ 
firm  the  hierarchical  idea  and  the  papal  power.  Rome  planted 
herself  firmly  in  the  new  provinces  of  the  Western  church  (cf. 
the  Christianizing  of  the  Anglo-Saxons,  her  relations  with  the 
Franks,  Boniface),  and,  despite  many  rebuffs,  secured  power  and 
maintained  it. 

3.  Upon  German  territory  Christianity  was,  it  is  true,  con¬ 
ceived  and  publicly  presented  in  a  popular  form  (vid.  the  poetry 
of  Cynewolf,  Caedmon,  the  Heliand,  the  Crist  of  Otfrid.  Cf. 
Seeberg,  Die  German.  Auffassung  d.  Christentums  in  d.  frueh- 
eren  Mittelalter,  Ztschr.  f.  k.  Wiss.,  1888,  p.  91  ff. ,  148  ff. 
Hauck,  KG.  Deutschlands,  ii.  706  ff. ).  The  spirit  of  the  theo¬ 
logians  of  the  period  was  influenced  by  this  (vid.,  e.  g.,  Hauck 
ii.  268,  589  ff.);  but  theology  not  so  much  as  one  should  sup¬ 
pose.  The  development  of  the  practical  life  of  the  church  pro¬ 
duced,  indeed,  new  forms  which  became  influential  in  shaping 
doctrinal  conceptions  (the  church,  repentance,  the  Lord’s  Sup¬ 
per)  and  which  the  church  could  not  ignore  in  her  teaching  ; 
but  even  here  the  old  formulas  were  still  the  sacred  material 
which  lay  at  the  basis  of  all  theological  labors. 

4.  The  Greek  church  knew  no  Middle  Age,  for  it  never  got 
beyond  the  range  of  the  ancient  problems  of  Origen,  i.  e.,  the 
Greek  church  had  no  Augustine.  The  dominant  theological  au¬ 
thority  in  the  Middle  Ages  is  Augustine.  The  entire  doctrinal 
history  of  the  period  may  be  treated  as  the  history  of  Augustin- 
ianism.  His  ideas  controlled  the  leaders  of  the  church  and  the 
unfolding  of  all  ecclesiastical  conceptions  and  institutions.  The 
worst  features  in  this  development  may  be  traced  back  to  him,  as 
well  as  the  best.  The  piety  of  the  age  found  in  his  teachings  an 
unfailing  source  of  inspiration.  They  were  not  the  Light,  but 
they  testified  of  the  Light.  But  while  Augustine’s  formulas  thus 
control  the  theology  of  the  period,  the  theologians  do  not  master  the 
formulas.  They  accomplished  nothing  more  than  the  collection  and 
arrangement  of  the  Sentences  of  Augustine  (Isidore  of  Seville, 
f  636  :  Sententiarum  sive  desummo  bono,  11.  3.  Alcuin,  f  804  : 
De  fide  sanctae  trinitatis,  11.  3.  Rabanus  Maurus,  f  856  :  De 
clericorum  institutione,  11.  3.  Paschasius  Radbertus,  f  865  :  De 
fide,  spe  et  caritate,  11.  3.  Cf.  Thomasius-Seeberg,  DG.  II. 
13  f. ) .  But  even  this  presentation  did  not  faithfully  reproduce 
true  Augustinianism.  It  was  an  Augustinianism  misinterpreted 
in  a  Semipelagian  spirit  and  degraded  to  a  popular  level.  Next 
to  Augustine,  the  determining  authority  is  Gregory  the  Great. 

rightly  believe  the  Trinity.”  To  these  dogmas  the  later  Middle  Ages  added 
only  obedience  to  the  church,  the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments,  and,  particularly, 
repentance  and  the  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper. 


THEOLOGY  OF  GREGORY  THE  GREAT. 


17 


The  former  was  understood  as  interpreted  by  the  latter.  The 
History  of  Doctrines  in  the  Middle  Ages  must,  therefore,  begin 
with  an  outline  of  the  theology  of  Gregory. 

5.  It  follows  from  the  above  that  we  cannot  expect  to  find  any 
real  development  of  dogma  in  this  period.  The  question  in  the 
disputes  of  the  age  concerns  always  the  proper  understanding  or 
misunderstanding  of  the  traditional  formulas,  not  an  actual  de¬ 
velopment  of  them  Significant  as  is  the  period  for  the  History 
of  the  Church,  it  furnishes  very  little  material  for  the  History  of 
Doctrines.  As  in  treating  of  the  history  of  doctrines  throughout 
the  entire  Middle  Ages,  so  especially  during  this  period  the  his¬ 
torian  must  constantly  bear  in  mind  the  task  immediately  before 
him.  He  is  not  to  embrace  the  whole  field  of  theology,  but  only 
to  portray  the  movements  which  prepare  the  way  for  and  make 
possible  the  true  doctrinal  development  of  the  Reformation 
period  (Council  of  Trent  and  Protestant  Confessions).1  The 
great  awakening  of  piety  at  the  close  of  this  period  is  to  be 
studied  in  other  connections. 

§  36.  Theology  of  Gregory  the  Great. 

The  writings  of  Gregory  (f  A.  D.  604)  which  particularly  concern  us  are 
the  following  : 

Expositio  in  1.  lob  sive  Moralium,  11.  35  ;  Homiliae  in  Ezech.,  11.  2  ;  Hom- 
iliae  in  evangelia,  11.  2  ;  Dialogi,  11.  4  ;  Regula  pastoralis,  11.  3  ;  Collection 
of  letters  in  14  volumes.  Of  the  latter,  the  Liber  sacramentorum  and  the 
Expositio  in  1.  I  regum  are  critically  open  to  suspicion.  Editions  :  The  Mau- 
rine  (Sainthe  Marthe),  Paris,  1705,  in  Migne  Lat.  75-79.  Die  Briefe  s. 
Greg,  registr.  epp.  edd.  Ewald  et  Hartmann  (Mon.  Germ.  hist,  epist.  t.  1,  2). 
Cf.  Lau,  Greg.  I.  d.  Gr.,  1845.  Wolfsgruber,  Greg.  d.  Gr.,  1890.  Clau- 
sier,  St.  Gregoire,  Paris,  1886-91.  Upon  the  doctrine  of  grace,  vid.  also- 
Wiggers,  Schicksale  d.  aug.  Anthropol.,  etc.,  in  Ztschr.  f.  hist.  Theol.,  1854, 
p.  7  ff. 

i.  In  theology  Gregory  is  an  Augustinian  in  his  formulas,  and 
something  of  the  spirit  of  the  great  African  is  also  traceable 
in  his  writings.  But  the  ruder  elements  of  the  popular  theology, 
which  in  Augustine  are  kept  in  the  background,  here  come 
again  into  marked  prominence.  To  this  is  added  a  crude  supersti¬ 
tion  and  mythological  speculations  touching  angels,  demons,  etc., 
as  found  especially  in  the  ‘  ‘  Dialogues.  ’  ’  Gregory  is  consciously 
orthodox.  The  Christian  faith  is  for  him  fides  trinitatis  (mor. 
xxxiii.,  c.  10.  n.  20  ;  in  Ezech.  1.  ii.  hom.  4.  11),  but  includes 
also  the  incarnation  (ep.  1.  vii.  15  ;  ev.  ii.  h.  33.  6).  The  term¬ 
inology,  “  trinity  of  persons”  and  “  one  substance”  ( substan - 

1  The  History  of  Doctrines  in  the  Middle  Ages  bears  the  same  relation  to 
that  of  the  Reformation  period  as  does  the  Ante-nicene  to  the  Post-nicene. 
Cf.  Vol.  I.,  p.  23. 


2 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


18 

tia ),  occurs  very  frequently  in  his  writings  (Ez.  ii.  4.  7  ;  ev.  i.  18. 
3  ;  19.  7  fin.;  mor.  xxx.  4.  17). 1  His  Christology  is  just  as  or¬ 
thodox  :  Christ,  the  deus  homo  (Ez.  ii.  1.  4),  or  the  homo  deus 
(mor.  xxii.  17.  42),  is  true  God  and  man  :  “  of  one  (Zinins')  with 
the  Father  and  of  the  same  nature  ’ '  (mor.  iii.  14.26).  But  the 
divine  and  the  human  nature,  united  inconfuse  ac  inseparabiliter , 
constitute  one  person,  unus  in  utraque  natura  (Ez.  i.  8.  24  f. ). 
“  For  we  say  that  he  exists,  of  (ex)  two  natures  and  in  (in)  two 
natures,  but  we  avoid  as  impious  the  statement  tnat  he  is  to  be 
considered  as  composed  (compositum)  of  two  persons”  (ev.  ii. 
38.  3;  mor.  xviii.  52.  85  ;  vid.  also  mor.  i.  18,  26  ;  xxiii.  19. 
35  ;  xxiv.  2.  2  ;  xxix.  1.  if.;  xxxiii.  16.  32  ;  ev.  ii.  22.  8,  etc.).2 
The  Holy  Ghost  is  said  to  be  :  “  of  one  substance  (substantia) , 
with  the  Father  and  the  Son  ”  (ev.  ii.  30.  3). 3  Gregory  knows 
himself  to  be  upon  these  points  in  harmony  with  the  doctrine  of 
the  church  councils.  He  is  orthodox,  he  holds,  who  accepts 
what  sanctae  quatuor  uzziversales  synodi  accepted,  and  rejects 
what  they  rejected  (ep.  vi.  66;  opp.  ii.,  p.  843).  “  I  confess 

that  I  receive  and  venerate  four  councils,  just  as  I  receive  and 
venerate  four  books  of  the  holy  gospel”  (ep.  i.  25,  p.  515; 
also  iii.  10;  v.  51,  54;  iv.  38)/  Thus  the  authority  of  the 
church  is  recognized  as  on  a  par  with  that  of  the  Holy  Scriptures. 
Gregory,  indeed,  sustained  by  the  strictest  theory  of  inspiration,5 
sees  in  the  Holy  Scriptures  the  i  ‘  foundation  of  divine  authority  ’  ’ 
(divinae  auctoritatis  fundamentum ,  mor.  xviii.  26.  39).  God 
through  them  answers  the  1  ‘  open  or  secret  questionings  of  all 
men”  (mor.  xxiii.  19.  34).  They  must  lie  at  the  foundation  of 

1  The  divine  activity  is  described,  e .  g. ,  in  Dial.  iv.  6  :  creantem  et  regen- 
tem,  implentem  et  circumplectentem,  transcendentem  et  sustinentem.  Mor. 
xvi.  37.  45  ;  vid.  Ez.  ii.  5.  10;  mor.  x.  6.  6. 

2  The  birth  from  a  virgin  was  necessary  in  order  to  avoid  original  sin.  Vid. 
mor.  xi.  52.  70  ;  xviii.  52.  84;  xxiv.  I.  3. 

3  Upon  the  procession  of  the  Spirit,  vid.  mor.  xxx.  4.  17  :  “how  the 
spirit  of  both  proceeds  co-eternal  from  both  ;  ”  mor.  xxix.  31.  74  :  “  whose 
(i.  e.,  the  Son’s)  spirit  is  the  same  spirit  who  proceeds  from  the  Father.”  The 
symbol  attributed  to  Gregory  (opp.  ii.  1283):  “proceeding  from  the  Father 
and  the  Son.”  Vid.  further  in  Lau,  p.  459  f. 

4  Gregory  recognizes  also  the  fifth  council,  e.g.,  ep.  i.  25,  p.  515  ;  *x-  52>  P- 
966.  Cf.  Vol.  I.,  p.  276.  The  authority  of  the  four  councils  was  legally  es¬ 
tablished  by  Justinian.  See  Novella  131  :  “  Therefore  we  decree  that  the  holy 
ecclesiastical  rules  which  have  been  announced  or  confirmed  by  the  four  holy 
councils  shall  prevail  instead  of  laws.  For  we  accept  the  doctrines  of  the 
aforesaid  councils  just  as  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and  the  rules  just  as  laws.” 

5  Mor.  praef.  1.  I,  2:  “  Let  it  be  faithfully  believed  that  the  Holy  Spirit 
is  the  author  of  the  book.  He,  therefore,  wrote  these  things  who  dictated  the 
things  to  be  written.”  “  The  writers  of  sacred  eloquence,  because,  filled 
with  the  Holy  Spirit,  they  are  drawn  above  themselves,  become  as  it  were 
(something)  beyond  themselves.”  The  Scriptures  are  “words  of  the  Holy 
Spirit”  (Ez.  ii.  10.  3). 


THEOLOGY  OF  GREGORY  THE  GREAT. 


19 


all  preaching  ;  by  their  study  priests  are  to  be  prepared  for  their 
vocation ;  the  reading  of  them  is  most  urgently  commended  to 
all.1  But  the  force  of  all  this  was  broken  by  the  introduction  of 
allegorical  exegesis  as  of  fundamental  authority  (mor.  i.  24,  33  ; 
xvi.  19.  24).  Thenceforth  it  became  customary  to  laud  the 
Holy  Scriptures,  but  also  to  present  as  scriptural  teaching  the 
‘ ‘  ecclesiastical  ”  doctrines. 

2.  In  treating  of  the  Work  of  Christ,  Gregory  employs  the 
traditional  mode  of  thought  and  expression  (cf.  Vol.  I.,  p. 
361  n. ).  Christ  is  the  Redeemer  and  Mediator  of  fallen  human¬ 
ity.  “  The  Lord  appeared  in  the  flesh  in  order  that  he  might 
arouse  human  life  by  admonishing,  stimulate  it  by  furnishing 
models  {exe?7ipla  j ,  redeem  it  by  dying,  and  restore  it  ( repararet ) 
iby  arising  from  the  dead  ”  (mor.  xxi.  6.  11). 

( a )  This  involves  the  general  conception  that  Christ  sur¬ 
rendered  Himself  to  sufferings  and  death  for  us  and  thereby  deliv¬ 
ered  us  from  them  (Ez.  ii.  4.  20  ;  i.  9;  mor.  xiii.  43.  48).  To 
speak  more  precisely,  this  occurs  in  the  following  way  :  God  is 
angry  with  the  sinner.  Hence  there  is  need  of  a  Mediator,  who 
as  a  “  mediator  of  God  and  man”  must  be  God  and  man — 

‘  ‘  through  flesh  become  redemptor ,  .  .  .  mediator  dei  et  hominis. 2 
Because  he  appeared  as  the  only  righteous  person  among  men, 
and,  nevertheless,  though  without  sin  ( culpa ),  faced  the  pun¬ 
ishment  of  sin,  both  persuading  man  no  more  to  sin  and  hinder¬ 
ing  God  from  smiting,  he  furnished  an  example  of  innocence 
and  received  the  punishment  of  evil-doing.  By  suffering,  there¬ 
fore,  he  who  took  away  the  sin  of  man  by  inspiring  righteous¬ 
ness  and  tempered  the  wrath  of  the  judge  by  dying,  persuaded 
both  and  gave  a  hand  to  each,  because  he  afforded  man  an 
example  which  might  be  followed  and  displayed  to  God  deeds 
wrought  upon  himself  by  which  he  might  be  reconciled  toward 
men  ”  (mor.  ix.  38.  61).  The  appearing  of  Christ  in  our  be¬ 
half  thus  appeases  the  divine  wrath.  Upon  this  conception  of 
the  intercession  of  Christ  Gregory  laid  great  emphasis.  Christ, 

1  Gregory  often  and  energetically  advised  the  reading  of  the  Scriptures,  e.  g., 
mor.  vi.  10.  12  ;  xvi.  19,  24.  Ez.  i.  IO.  I  ff.;  ii.  3.  20  ;  ep.  ii.  52  ;  iv.  31,  p. 
712  :  “The  Lord  of  heaven  has  for  (the  good  of)  thy  life  transmitted  to  thee 
his  epistles.”  Cf.  Vol.  I.,  p.  2980.  Ep.  viii.  17:  “But  I  have  inquired 
who  of  you  belong  to  the  collegium  of  sacred  reading,’ *  points  to  conventicles 
for  the  reading  of  the  Scriptures.  The  Old  and  New  Testaments  differ  essen¬ 
tially  as  presenting  the  lower  ( minora )  and  higher  ( altiora )  precepts,  inasmuch 
as  the  New  Testament  law  addresses  itself  to  the  inner  disposition.  Ez.  ii.  4, 
5,  9;  1.  10  ;  mor.  xviii.  4.  7. 

2  Instead  of  this  exposition  of  the  incarnation  we  find  another  :  “  Because 
there  was  no  one  among  men  who  could  appear  before  God  as  a  righteous 
intercessor,  I  have  made  myself  a  man  in  order  to  make  propitiation  for  men.” 
Mor.  xxiv.  3.  6. 


20 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


as  the  Righteous  One,  makes  his  merit1  available  before  the 
Father.  “  For  to  the  Only-begotten  Son,  to  plead  for  man  is  to 
demonstrate  before  the  eternal  Father  that  he  is  himself  a  man  ; 
and  to  him,  to  have  asked  in  behalf  of  human  nature  is  to  have  taken 
upon  himself  that  same  nature  in  the  altitude  of  his  divinity  ” 
(mor.  xxii.  17.  42).  The  effect  of  the  merit  of  Christ  is,  there¬ 
fore,  that  God  abandons  his  wrath  against  sinners.2 

(<£)  Another  result  of  Christ’s  sufferings  and  death  is  our  de¬ 
liverance  from  the  power  of  the  devil.  Man  was  in  a  state  of 
guilt.  The  devil  had  a  certain  claim  upon  him  (“  held  man,  as, 
it  were,  lawfully  ”).  “  This  guilt  must,  therefore,  be  canceled  ; 

but  this  cannot  be  done  except  through  a  sacrifice  ’  ’  (^sacrificiuni) . 
But  beasts  were  not  sufficient  for  such  a  sacrifice  ;  a  man  was  re¬ 
quired,  and  that  a  sinless  man.  Since  there  was  none  such,  the- 
Son  of  God  became  man  in  order  to  offer  the  sacrifice.  Since 
the  devil  made  a  mistake  in  seizing  the  Innocent  One,  1  1  he  law¬ 
fully  lost  him  whom  he  had,  as  it  were,  lawfully  held  ”  (mor. 
xvii.  30.  46b).  The  divinity  veiled  in  humanity  was  thus  the 
bait  which  God  held  out  to  the  devil  (mor.  xxxiii.  7.  1 4  ff. ) . 

(c)  Of  the  Mediator  it  is  said:  “Who,  although  he  could 
have  striven  in  our  behalf  even  without  dying,  nevertheless  wished, 
to  aid  men  by  dying,  since  he  would  certainly  have  loved  us  less, 
if  he  had  not  taken  upon  himself  our  wounds,  nor  could  he  have 
shown  us  the  power  of  his  love  if  he  had  not  himself  borne  for 
a  time  that  which  he  took  from  us  ”  (mor.  xx.  36.  69).  This 
shows  plainly  where  the  emphasis  falls  in  Gregory’s  theory  of  the 
atonement.  That  Christ  was  a  teacher  and  an  example  appears 
to  him  the  principal  feature  of  his  work.  He  reveals  to  us  the 
invisible  God,  instructs  us  in  regard  to  our  sinful  state,  and 
teaches  us  the  will  of  God  and  his  commandments  (Ez.  ii.  1. 
15  f. ;  ev.  ii.  32.  1  ;  mor.  vii.  2.  2 ;  x.  6.  7  ;  xvi.  30.  37  ;  xxi.  6. 
11  ;  xxii.  17.  42  ;  xxix.  1.  1).  To  the  instruction  thus  given  is 

1  Although  the  expression,  “merit  of  Christ”  (meritum],  is  not  found, 

the  conception  appears  very  plainly :  “  For,  interceding  for  sinners,  he  shows 
himself  the  just  man  who  merited  indulgence  ( indulgentiam  mereretur')  for 
others.”  Mor.  xxiv.  2.  4,  and  ib.  3.  5*  “  But,  because  there  was  no  one  by 

whose  merits  ( meritis )  the  Lord  would  have  been  bound  to  be  reconciled 
with  us,  the  Only-begotten  .  .  .  appeared  as  the  only  righteous  (One), 
in  order  that  he  might  intercede  for  sinners.”  Cf.  ib.  xvii.  30.  46.  The 
term,  “merit,”  thereby  receives  a  new  application.  From  ancient  times  the 
merita  of  men  had  been  spoken  of,  but  the  term  is  now  transferred  to  the 
work  of  Christ.  The  Reformation  shattered  the  whole  conception  as  applied 
to  man,  but  allowed  it  to  stand  with  reference  to  the  work  of  Christ. 

2  It  may  be  well  here  to  note  that  Gregory  speaks  of  the  intercession 
of  the  saints  and  martyrs,  as  well  as  that  of  the  church  with  its  sacrifices  (ep. 
ix.  52,  p.  971  ;  mor.  xvi.  51.  64;  xxxv.  8.  13);  and  also  of  an  intervention 
( intervenire )  of  the  Holy  Ghost  (ev.  ii.  30.  3). 


THEOLOGY  OF  GREGORY  THE  GREAT. 


21 


added  the  incitement  by  example.  “  For  the  incarnate  Lord 
has  displayed  in  himself  everything  which  he  has  inspired  in  us, 
in  order  that  he  might  commend  by  example  what  he  had  uttered 
in  precept  (mor.  i.  13.  17).  The  life  and  active  work  of  Christ, 
as  well  as  his  death,  are  regarded  from  this  point  of  view  (/.  g., 
dial.  i.  9  ;  ev.  i.  18.  4 ;  16.  3  ;  ii.  22.  7  f. ;  32.3;  21.7;  mor. 
xxi.  6.  11  ;  xxviii.  18.  42).  The  purpose  is  :  4  *  That  by  present¬ 
ing  a  form  for  imitation,  he  might  change  the  life  of  previous 
•evil-doing”  (mor.  xxiv.  2.  2).1  Gregory’s  theory  of  redemp¬ 
tion  follows  thus  the  Western  type  (Vol.  I.,  pp.  193,  260,  361), 
since  it  understands  Christ  as  essentially  the  historical  power  of 
goodness  in  the  world,  the  teacher  and  exemplar.  The  idea  of 
outwitting  the  devil  also  appears,  it  is  true,  in  a  terribly  realistic 
form  (cf.  Vol.  I.,  pp.  295,  361  n.).  But  it  is  a  fateful  phenom¬ 
enon  that  Gregory  seeks  to  combine  the  objective  and  subjective 
aspects  of  redemption:  “  Inasmuch  as  Christ  dwelt  among  us, 
he  both  presented  before  the  Father  the  new  humanity  and 
actually  renewed  humanity  by  his  stimulating  influence  ”  (p.  5). 
All  the  Middle  Age  theories  of  the  atonement  find  their  proto¬ 
type  in  Gregory — that  of  Anselm  as  well  as  Abelard’s.2 

3.  In  his  doctrine  of  Sin  and  Grace,  Gregory  reveals  himself 
as  an  Augustinian,  or,  at  least,  a  Semi-Augustinian. 

(#)  The  entrance  of  sin  into  the  world  is  explained  by  the 
weakness  of  man  (mor.  iv.  3.  8). 3  The  first  sin  was  a  free  act 
•of  the  first  man  (mor.  iii.  14.  26).  He  surrendered  his  love  to 
God,  and  hence  was  compelled  to  depend  upon  himself  and  his 
own  flesh  (mor.  viii.  10.  19  ;  6.  8);  he  became  afflicted  with 
spiritual  blindness  (mor.  viii.  30.  49  ;  xi.  43.  59  ;  ix.  33.  50) 
and  spiritual  death.  “  Man  the  sinner  dies  in  sin,  is  deprived 
of  righteousness,  consumed  in  punishment  ”  (mor.  xii.  6.  9). 4 
Through  Adam  all  have  become  sinners  (mor.  iv.  27.  53  ;  ep.  vii. 
14  :  “We  come  to  this  life  with  merit  ( cum  merito )  of  our  death  ’  ’ 
(mor.  iv.  24.  45).  This  is  effected  through  the  medium  of 
conception.  “  For  conception  itself  is  impurity  on  account  of  its 

1  Gregory  often  emphasizes  the  ideas  of  example  and  imitation  in  treating  of 
the  mutual  relations  among  men,  e.  g.,  Ez.  ii.  3.  20  ;  10.  18  ;  ev.  ii.  31.  4  ; 
38.  15  ;  mor.  x.  6.  9.  Vid.  especially  xv.  51.  57,  where  the  sin  of  children  is 
explained  as  an  imitation  of  the  sin  of  the  parents. 

2  Even  the  mystic  view  of  Bernard  is  not  foreign  to  him,  e.  g .,  Ez.  ii.  1.  16  : 

Meditating  upon  his  passion  with  anxious  reflection  ;  ”  mor.  xxxi.  52.  104  : 

“  Because  the  hearers  are  by  no  means  able  to  understand  the  secrets  of  his 
divinity,  they  are  content  to  recognize  the  blood  of  the  crucified  Lord.” 

3  Lau,  p.  376,  has  sought  to  find  in  mor.  xii.  15.  19  and  ix.  49.  73  the  be¬ 
ginnings  of  the  donum  superadditum  ;  but  in  this  he  is  in  error.  Vid.  mor. 
xxiv.  7.  13  ;  viii.  6.  8. 

4  Vid.  in  mor.  xxxi.  45.  87  ff.  the  seven  principal  vices  :  inanis  gloria, 
invidia,  ira,  tristitia,  ventris  ingluvies,  avaritia,  luxuria.  Cf.  Vol.  I.,  p.  313  n. 


22 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


carnal  delight  ”  (mor.  xi.  52.  70;  xviii.  52.  84).  And:  “Because* 
the  human  race  became  corrupt  ( putruit )  in  its  first  parent  as 
in  its  root,  it  has  carried  out  its  barrenness  ( ariditatem )  into  its 
branches”  (ep.  ix.  52,  p.  970;  cf.  mor.  xvii.  15.  21).  Asbe- 
tween  Creationism  and  Traducianism,  Gregory,  like  Augustine 
(Vol.  I.,  pp.  344,  377),  declines  to  decide  (ep.  ix.  52,  p.  970). 
The  consequence  of  Adam’s  sin  as  thus  inherited  is  the  damna¬ 
tion  of  unbaptized  children  dying  in  infancy  (mor.  ix.  21.  324 
xv.  51.  57).  This  has  an  Augustinian  sound,1  but  Gregory  can¬ 
not  make  serious  practical  application  of  such  ideas.  For  him. 
sin  is  still  always  only  weakness  and  disease.  “  We  are  born  with 
implanted  defect  of  infirmity”  (mor.  viii.  6.  8).  Accordingly, 
he  describes  the  human  race  in  its  natural  state  as  :  “this  one- 
great  and  sick  of  very  great  infirmity — this  is  the  human  race 
lying  languid  throughout  the  whole  world  ”  (mor.  xviii.  45.  73  ; 
cf.  xxi.  7.  12).  Yet,  with  all  this,  freedom  (but  not  goodness)' 
of  the  will  seems  to  remain  for  the  natural  man  (Ez.  i.  9.  2): 
“  prevenient  grace  had  transformed  the  free  will  in  him  to  a  good¬ 
will.”  Cf.  mor.  xxxiii.  21.  39;  xvi.  25.  30. 

( b )  In  the  doctrine  of  grace  also  we  find  a  similar  emaciated' 
Augustinianism.  Gregory  emphasizes  the  fact  that  without  grace 
there  can  be  no  salvation,  no  human  merits  (mor.  xxxiii.  21.  38  ; 
xviii.  40.  62  ;  Ez.  i.  10.  45).  Only  grace  as  preveniens  and 
subsequens  makes  us  capable  of  goodness.  Grace,  therefore, 
begins  the  work  :  “  Celestial  piety  in  advance  ( prizes )  effects, 
something  in  us  without  our  agency  (sine  nobis'),  so  that  subse¬ 
quently  it  may  also  effect  with  us  by  our  free  will  the  good  which, 
we  now  seek”  (mor.  xvi.  25.  30).  Prevenient  grace  works  in 
us  the  willing  of  the  good  ;  subsequent  grace,  that  we  are  able  tO' 
do  the  good  (mor.  xxii.  9.  20).  In  the  latter,  the  will  now  be¬ 
comes  a  good  will,  co-operates.  “  For  the  good  which  we  do  is- 
both  of  God  and  of  ourselves,  of  God  through  prevenient  grace,, 
of  ourselves  through  obedient  freewill  ”  ( mor.  xxxiii.  31.  40;  xxiv. 

10.  24;  xviii.  40.  63).  The  first  thing  effected  in  man  by  grace- 
is  faith  (mor.  ii.  46.  71),  as  an  acceptance  of  the  doctrinal 
teaching  of  the  church  (dial.  iv.  1  :  “that  we  should  believe 
the  things  which  we  cannot  yet  know  by  experience”).  This, 
beginning  is  effected  through  baptism,  which  works  faith  and  for¬ 
gives  the  guilt  of  antecedent  sins,  particularly  of  original  sin  (Ez. 

11.  10.  7;  ev.  i.  10.  7;  mor.  ix.  34.  54;  xvi.  51.  57;  xviii.  53.  87). 
The  next  step  in  the  process  is  the  imparting  of  the  good  will,  or 
love  (gratia  spiritus  infusi ,  mor.  xxx.  6.  22;  munus  infusum ,  ib. 

1  Augustinian,  too,  is  the  idea  :  “Evil  is  without  substance  ”  (Mai.  xxvi„. 
37.  68;  iii.  9.  15). 


THEOLOGY  OF  GREGORY  THE  GREAT. 


23 


i.  5).  This  is  accomplished  by  the  preaching  of  the  woid.  A 

sharp  discrimination  is  here  observed  between  the  outward,  aud¬ 
ible,  and  the  inward,  divine  word  (mor.  xxix.  24.  49).  Through 
this  inward  speaking  of  the  word  occurs  the  inspiratio  or  aspiratia 
gratiae  (mor.  xxx.  1.4.  5;  xi.  9.  12  ;  xviii.  40.  63)  and  through 
it  the  good  will  ( '  bonurn  vel/e),  or  love,  is  wrought  (mor.  xxii.  9. 
20  ;  Ez.  i.  9.  2  ;  7.  16).  “  For  to  hear  the  voice  of  the  Spirit  is 

to  mount  up  by  the  power  of  deep  inward  compunction  to  love  of 
the  invisible  Creator”  (mor.  xxvii.  21.  41).  Thus,  after  faith 
comes  love  (Ez.  ii.  4.  13).  This  is  thoroughly  Augustinian 
(Vol.  I.,  p.  347  ff.);  but  how  wavering  Gregory  is  upon  this 
point  is  manifest  from  such  assertions  as  the  following  :  “  For 
the  commandments  of  the  Lord  are  called  justifications  (Ps.  19. 
92),  in  which  he  by  correcting  justifies  us  ”  (Ez.  i.  7.  16  ;  also  ii. 
10.  5).1  According  to  this,  grace  would  consist  in  the  giving  of 
the  commandments ;  and  such  is  accordingly  the  view  of  Faustus. 
And  it  is  to  be  observed  that  Gregory,  in  keeping  with  this, 
lays  great  stress  upon  man’s  co-operation.  Thus  place  is  found 
for  the  merit  ( meritum )  of  man  in  connection  with  the  idea  of 
reward.  If  we  ourselves  co-operate  in  striving  after  the  good, 
then  :  “That  which  is  a  gift  of  the  omniponent  God  becomes 
our  merit  ”  (Ez.  i.  9.  2;  ii.  4.  6;  mor.  xvi.  25.  30;  xviii.  40.  63; 
xxxiii.  21.  40).  In  the  same  line  is  Gregory’s  assertion  that 
man  can  do  more  than  is  commanded  (mor.  xv.  18.  20;  xxvi. 

27-  so- 

(c)  The  doctrine  of  Predestination  is  retained  only  in  form. 
The  irresistibility  of  grace  appears  to  be  taught  (mor.  xi.  9.  13  ; 
cf.  Ez.  ii.  1.  13),  but  it  is  denied  in  mor.  xxx.  1.  5.  So,  likewise, 
predestination  is  taught  as  a  “  secret  counsel  ”  (mor.  xviii.  26. 
43)  in  connection  with  the  “  certain  and  definite  number  of  the 
elect”  (mor.  xxv.  8.  20;  Ez.  ii.  1.  11);  but  it  is,  after  all, 
only  a  result  of  omniscience  :  “  Whom  he  calls  also  elect  (Matt. 
24.  24),  because  he  perceives  that  they  will  persist  in  faith  and 
good  works”  (Ez.  i.  9.  8;  mor.  xxv.  8.  19;  xviii.  29.  46).  The 
idea  is,  therefore,  that  there  is  a  definite  number  of  men  whom 
God  appoints  to  salvation,  because  he  knows  in  advance  that 
they  will  accept  it.  But  no  one  is  able  to  pronounce  a  certain 
judgment  as  to  his  own  election  or  that  of  any  other  person  (ev. 

ii.  38.  14;  mor.  xxv.  8.  19  ff.;  xxiv.  11.  3 2). 2  Here,  too,  Gregory 
wavers,  and  it  is  evident  that  predestination  has  no  important 
place  in  his  religious  convictions. 

1  I  know  of  no  other  reference  to  justification  in  Gregory’s  writings. 

2  But  vid .  Ez.  ii.  5.  22  :  “  but  one  sign  of  election  is  the  firmness  ( soliditas ) 
of  love.” 


24 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


(cl)  Following  the  course  of  the  Christian  life,1  as  depicted  by 
Gregory,  we  find  it  interrupted  by  many  sins.  God  is  thereby 
offended,  but  man  must  “abstain  even  from  some  things  lawful, 
until  by  this  he  may  make  satisfaction  to  his  Creator  ’  ’  in  order 
that  his  sin  may  be  forgiven  him  (ev.  ii.  34.  15  ff. ).  This  is 
repentance.  It  embraces  first  of  all  compunctio ,  or  contritio , 
i.  e.,  contrition,  mourning,  penitence  (mor.  xxiii.  21.  40;  xvi. 
29,  36).  This  is  effected  either  through  fear  of  the  merited 
punishment,  or  through  the  flame  of  love  and  longing  for  the 
heavenly  fatherland  (Ez.  ii.  10.  20  f.;  dial.  iii.  34  ;  mor.  xxiv.  6. 
10).  Secret  sins  in  the  thoughts  are  washed  away  by  the  sin¬ 
ner’s  tears  of  penitence  and  his  good  works  (mor.  ix.  55.  83  f. ). 
But  in  the  case  of  public  repentance,  there  follows  a  confession 
of  sins  (mor.  viii.  21.  37  ;  xxii.  15.  31  ;  xxxi.  46.  93).  When 
grace  has  accomplished  this,  absolution  is  granted  :  “  Whom  the 
omnipotent  God  visits  through  the  grace  of  compunctio ,  them  the 
declaration  of  the  pastor  absolves  ’ ’  (ev.  ii.  26.  6).  But  the  “pas¬ 
tors  of  the  church  ’’  also  lay  a  penalty  ( toena )  upon  those  who 
thus  publicly  confess  their  guilt.2 3  This  is  the  satisfaction  which 
the  sinner  renders  to  God  by  abstaining  from  that  which  is  other¬ 
wise  allowable  (vid.  supra  and  reg.  past.  iii.  30;  opp.  ii.  87). 
Thus  the  sinner  secures  forgiveness  from  God,  who  takes  the 
offering  or  gift  ( munus )  for  the  offense  (culpa)  (dial.  iv.  60). 
We  have  here  essentially  the  fundamental  elements  of  the  Romish 
sacrament  of  repentance  (cf.  Yol.  I.,  pp.  177  f. ,  195  f.,  363  f. ). 
“  For  there  are  three  things  to  be  considered  in  every  one  truly 
penitent,  i.  e.,  the  change  of  the  mind,  the  confession  of  the 
mouth,  and  the  punishments  of  the  sin  ”  ( conversio  mentis ,  con- 
fessio  oris ,  et  vindicta peccati  (in  1  reg.  vi.  2.  33). 4 

( e )  In  closest  connection  with  the  above  stand  Gregory’s 
views  upon  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Mass  and  Purgatory.  The  whole 
significance  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  is  found  in  the  sacrifice  of  the 
mass.  He  maintains  the  real  presence  of  the  body  of  Christ 
(ev.  i.  14.  1  ;  22.  7  ;  also  Libr.  sacr.  post.  Theoph.  dom.  v. 
praef.  opp.  iii.  27).  But  the  principal  thing  is  that  the  appeas- 

1  Upon  the  division  of  Christian  life  into  active  and  conteviplative ,  vid.,  e.g.y 
mor.  vi.  37.  57-61  ;  xxxi.  25.  49;  Ez.  ii.  2.  2ff.  (=Martha  and  Mary);  reg. 
past.  i.  7.  For  a  portrayal  of  the  ideal  of  the  Christian  life,  e.  g .,  Ez.  i.  10.  9. 

2  The  injunction  is  given :  “  But  let  those  who  preside  show  themselves  to 
be  such  that  those  subject  to  them  may  not  blush  to  make  known  to  them  even 
their  secret  ”  (sins)  (reg.  past.  ii.  5.  opp.  ii.  19). 

3  The  execution  of  the  punishments  ( vindicta )  constitutes  the  satisfaction  as 
is  evident  from  ep.  ix.  52,  p.  968  f. 

4  Vid.  also  the  compulsory  penitence  ( Zwangsbusse )  of  clericals,  monks, 
and  nuns,  e.  g.,  ep.  i.  44,  p.  537  f. ;  iv.  9. 


THEOLOGY  OF  GREGORY  THE  GREAT. 


25 


in g  wafer  ( hostia  placationis')  be  so  presented1  that  the  sacrifice 
of  Christ  for  us  be  repeated  :  “  For  as  often  as  we  offer  to  him 
the  hostia  of  the  passion,  so  often  do  we  renew  ( reparamus )  his 
passion  to  ourselves  for  our  absolution,”  and  that  the  church 
may  have  in  it  a  means  of  influencing  God  in  addition  to  prayer 
and  alms  (ev.  ii.  27.  7-9;  dial.  iv.  58).  There  has  thereby 
been  given  to  the  church  a  means  of  enchantment,  which  may 
be  of  great  service,  e.  g.,  breaking  chains  and  extending  help  to 
the  shipwrecked  (dial.  iv.  57).  But  it  is,  above  all,  an  effectual 
means  of  bringing  help  to  the  souls  of  the  departed.  “  That  for 
certain  light  offenses  there  is  to  be  a  purgatorial fire  before  the 
judgment,”  is  to  be  believed,  according  to  Matt.  12.31;  1  Cor. 
3.  12  ff.  (cf.  Vol.  I.,  pp.  159,  197  n.,  363).  Some  sins  can, 
accordingly,  be  forgiven  in  that  world  (dial.  iv.  39).  The  sac¬ 
rifice  of  the  mass  is  particularly  efficacious  for  this  purpose,  free¬ 
ing  souls  from  purgatory  (ib.  iv.  5 5). 2 

4.  We  must  yet  glance  at  Gregory’s  conception  of  the  Church. 
“  The  present  church  is  called  the  kingdom  of  heaven — for  the 
congregation  of  the  saints  is  said  to  be  the  kingdom  of  heaven  ” 
(ev.  ii.  38.  2  ;  32.  6  ;  mor.  xxxiii.  18.  34).  The  church  is  the 
kingdom,  but  primarily  limited  to  the  ecclesia  justorum ,  i.  e.,  the 
elect  (vid.  mor.  xxv.  8.  21).  The  “one,  holy  universal 
church  ’  ’  embraces  angels  and  men — men  from  the  time  of  Abel 
onward,  all  believers  of  the  old  covenant  belonging  to  it  (Ez.  i. 
8.  28;  ii.  3.  17;  ev.  i.  19.  i).3  In  its  concrete  form,  like  its  pro¬ 
totype,  the  ark,  it  embraces  clean  and  unclean.  “  In  this  church, 
therefore,  there  can  be  neither  the  evil  without  the  good,  nor  the 
good  without  the  evil  ”  (ev.  ii.  38 . 7  f. ;  Ez.  ii.  4. 16  f. ).  But  only  in 
the  church  are  truth  and  love  to  be  found,  only  in  it  salvation 

1  Dial.  iv.  58  :  “  Living  in  himself  immortally  and  incorruptibly,  he  is  for 
us  again  immolated  in  this  mystery  of  sacred  oblation.  For  there  his  body  is 
taken,  his  flesh  is  broken  for  the  salvation  of  the  people,  his  blood  is  poured 
out,  not  now  into  the  hands  of  unbelievers,  but  into  the  mouths  of  believers. 
Hence  we  consider  what  is  the  nature  ( qualitas )  of  this  sacrifice  for  us,  which 
always  repeats  ( imitatur )  for  our  absolution  the  passion  of  the  Only-begotten. 
For  who  of  the  believing  can  have  a  doubt  that  in  the  very  hour  of  the  immo¬ 
lation  the  heavens  are  opened  at  the  voice  of  the  priest,  that  the  choirs  of 
angels  are  present  in  that  mystery  of  Jesus  Christ,  that  the  lowest  things  are 
associated  with  the  highest  ?  ”  .  .  .  Also  ev.  ii.  37.  7.  “  The  host  offered  with 
the  tears  and  benignity  of  the  sacred  altar  pleads  in  a  peculiar  way  for  our  ab¬ 
solution,  because  he  who,  arising  by  his  own  power,  now  dies  no  more, 
through  it  in  his  mystery  suffers  again  for  us.”  Then  follows  the  sentence 
above  quoted. 

2  The  fourth  book  of  the  Dialogue  treats  exhaustively  of  conditions  in  the 
other  world.  Vid.  especially  its  conception  of  the  bridge  (iv.  36). 

3  Membership  in  the  church  is  conditioned  upon  faith  in  the  Trinity,  and 
this  the  Old  Testament  believers  possessed.  Ez.  ii.  4.  4,  7,  10  ;  3.  16;  mor. 
xxix.  31.  70. 


26 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


(mor.  xxxv.  8.  13).  The  holy  universal  church  proclaims  that 
God  cannot,  except  within  it,  be  truly  worshiped,  asserting  that 
all  who  are  without  its  bounds  will  by  no  means  be  saved  (mor. 
xiv.  v.  5;  ep.  xi.  46).  Only  the  church’s  sacrifice  avails;  only 
its  members  are  in  the  valid  bond  ( compages )  of  love  ;  only  is  its 
martyrdom  meritorious  (mor.  xxxv.  8.  12;  xviii.  26.  40).  Sep¬ 
aration  from  the  church  proves  lack  of  love  (mor.  xviii.  26.  41  f. ). 
But  everything  upon  which  the  necessity  of  the  church  to  salva¬ 
tion  depends  lies  in  the  hands  of  the  “  officers  ’  ’  (rulers,  regentes , 
and  subjects,  subditi ,  mor.  xxx.  6.  23;  iv.  31.  61;  reg.  past.  ii. 
6;  in  reg.  vi.  2.  21).  Binding  and  loosing  are  prerogatives  of 
the  clericals.  And  “  whether  the  pastor  binds  justly  or  unjustly, 
nevertheless  the  pastor’s  declaration  ( '  sententia )  must  be  revered 
by  the  multitude  ”  (ev.  ii.  26.  5  f. ).  They  watch  over  the  lives 
of  those  under  them  ( subditi ),  lead  them  to  repentance,  dis¬ 
pense  absolution  (mor.  xi.  14.  22  ;  xiii.  18.  21  ;  dial.  ii.  23), 
present  the  sacrifice,  etc.  For  the  accomplishment  of  her  work, 
the  church  lays  claim  to  the  aid  of  the  unchristianized  state. 
“  The  holy  church,  because  she  is  not  sufficient  in  her  own 
strength,  seeks  the  assistance  of  that  rhinoceros”  (Job  39.  9), 
i.  e.,  the  prince  of  this  world  (mor.  xxxi.  5.  7). 

5.  If  we  compare  the  Christianity  of  Gregory  with  that  of 
Augustine,  we  reach  a  remarkable  result.  Almost  everything 
in  Gregory  has  its  roots  in  the  teaching  of  Augustine,  and 
yet  scarcely  anything  is  really  Augustinian.  That  which 
was  un -Augustinian  in  Augustine  becomes  the  vital  element  of 
this  Semi-augustinian.  The  fundamental  spirit  of  Augustine  has 
vanished,  and  superstition  gained  supremacy.  Everything  is 
coarser,  more  fixed,  and  ordinary.1  The  controlling  motive  is  not 
the  peace  of  the  heart  which  finds  rest  in  God ;  but  the  fear  of 
uncertainty,  which  seeks  to  attain  security  through  the  institu¬ 
tions  of  the  church.  “  For  thus  the  holy  church,  in  the  course 
of  her  preaching  to  the  faithful  concerning  the  piety  and  right¬ 
eousness  of  the  Redeemer,  nvingles  hope  and  fear ,  in  order  that 
they  may  neither  incautiously  trust  in  his  mercy  nor  in  despair 
fear  his  righteousness  ”  (mor.  xx.  5.  13).  There  are  some  rays 
of  light  in  this  dark  picture  (e.g.,  the  initiative  of  grace,  the 
emphasis  laid  upon  preaching,  incidental  remarks  touching  the 
nature  of  the  church);  but  the  crude  Christianity,  which  is  its 
characteristic,  overshadows  them  with  its  sacramental  magic,  its 
ghostly  miracles,  its  priestcraft,  its  superficial  conception  of  sin, 
and  its  intoning  of  merit  and  reward.  And  even  where  Gre- 

1  Cf.  the  opinion  of  Melanchthon  :  “Gregory,  whom  they  call  the  Great, 
I  call  the  dancer  and  torch-bearer  of  the  theology  now  passing  away  n  (Corp. 
Ref.  xi.  16). 


ADOPTIONIST  CONTROVERSY. 


27 


gory’s  teaching  was,  in  itself  considered,  more  correct  than  that 
of  Augustine,  as  upon  predestination,  the  better  was,  as  matters 
then  stood,  arrayed  against  the  good.  Such  is  the  form  in  which 
the  legacy  of  Augustine  was  preserved  to  the  church — even  thus 
a  rich  inheritance. 


CHAPTER  II. 

DOCTRINAL  CONFLICTS  OF  THE  EARLIER  MIDDLE  AGES. 

§  37.  Adoptionist  Controversy . 

Sources.  The  letters  of  Elipandus,  Espana  sagrada  v.  524  ff.  Migne 
Lat.  96.  Etherii  et  Bead  adv.  Elipandum,  11.  2.  Alcuinus  adv.  Elipandum  ; 
adv.  Felicem  (Opp.  ed.  Frobenius,  1777,  and  Migne  100,  101).  Paulinus,  11. 
3,  c.  Felicem,  Migne  99.  Benedict  of  Aniane,  Testimoniorum  nubecula, 
Migne  103.  Agobard,  Liber  adv.  dogma  Felicis,  Migne  104.  Cf.  Mansi 
xii.,  xiii.  Gams,  KG.  Spaniens,  ii.  2,  p.  261  ff.  Hefele,  CG.  iii.,  ed.  2, 
642  ff.  Werner,  Alkuin,  1881,  p.  54  ff.  Moller,  PRE.  i.,  ed.  3,  180 ff. 
Grossler,  Ueber  die  Ausrottg.  des  Adopt,  im  Reich  Karls  des  Gr.,  1879 
(Jahresbericht  d.  Gymn.  zuEisleben).  Hauck,  KG.  Deutschlands  ii.,  251  ff. 
Bach,  DG.  des  MA.  i.,  p.  103  ff.  Thomasius-Seeberg,  DG.  ii.,  15  ff. 
Harnack,  DG.  iii.  248  ff. 

The  great  Renaissance  of  the  Carlovingian  age  was  of  the 
profoundest  significance  for  Church  History.  Its  results  for  the 
History  of  Doctrines  were  comparatively  small.  So  great  de¬ 
pendence  was  placed  upon  antiquity  that  no  advance  was  made 
in  dogmatics  beyond  the  interpretation  of  the  Fathers.  This  is 
attested  by  all  the  controversies  of  the  age,  which  were  essen¬ 
tially  disputes  about  misunderstandings  of  the  accepted  teachers 
of  the  church. 

1.  In  Spain,  a  crude  attempt  was  made  by  a  certain  Migetius 
to  solve  the  problem  of  the  Trinity.  God,  he  affirmed,  has  re¬ 
vealed  himself  in  a  three-fold  form  :  as  the  Father  in  David,  as 
the  Son  in  Christ,  as  the  Holy  Ghost  in  Paul  (Elip.  ad  Miget.  3. 
Esp.  sagr.  v.  526).  He  was  opposed  by  the  aged  bishop,  Eli¬ 
pandus  of  Toledo.  His  Christological  theory  was  championed 
especially  by  Bishop  Felix  of  Urgellis.  The  watchwords, 
adoptio ,  filius  adoptivus ,  are  taken  from  the  Spanish  so-called 
Mozarabic  liturgy  (  per  adoptivi  ho  minis  passionem  ;  adoptivi  hom- 
inis  vestimentum  carnis ,  etc.  Vid.  Hefele,  iii.  651,  and  also 
Hauck  ii.  257  n.).  The  theory  was  that  Christ,  as  the  second 
person  of  the  Trinity,  was  the  “  only-begotten  of  the  Father 
without  adoption  ;  ’  ’  but  that  the  Son  of  God  assumed,  or 


28 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


adopted,  the  Son  of  man,  who  is  thus  adoptivus  and  called  God 
(Alcuini  opp.  ii.  568.  Esp.  sagr.  v.  536.  Gallandi  xiii.  407. 
Ale.  adv.  Fel.  i.  1).  The  unity  of  person  is  thought  to  be  pre¬ 
served  in  this  process,  inasmuch  as,  from  the  time  of  his  concep¬ 
tion,  the  Son  of  man  was  taken  up  into  the  unity  of  the  person 
of  the  Son  of  God  (Ale.  1.  c.  v.  1).  He  suffered,  indeed,  only  as 
the  adopted  ( adoptivus )  man  and  was  buried  in  his  “  adopted 
flesh”  only  (Elip.  iv.  16;  Mi.  xevi.  879).  The  doctrinal 
type  of  the  Adoptionists  is  in  the  line  of  the  Western  Chris- 
tology,  which  aimed  to  secure  fuller  recognition  of  the  humanity 
of  Jesus.1  They  proved  the  necessity  of  this  upon  religious 
grounds,  adducing  the  resemblance  of  believers  to  Christ,  their 
relations  to  him  as  members  of  his  body,  and  his  human  charac¬ 
ter  (Ale.  c.  Fel.  ii.  4.  14;  v.  9;  Paulin,  iii.  3,  4).  Only  if  an 
actual  man  should,  with  his  untainted  blood,  blot  out  the  deadly 
handwriting,  could  we  become  free  from  bondage  (Elip.  ep.  4. 
14;  Mi.  96.  878.  As  every  man  is  according  to  the  flesh 
born  from  Adam,  so  everyone  obtains  the  “  grace  of  adoption,” 
who  receives  it  in  Christ,  the  second  Adam,  born  of  the  virgin 
( Ale.  adv.  Fel.  ii.  16,  also  Agob.  adv.  dogm.  Fel.  37).  This 
theory  was  not  really  Nestorian,  but  it  was  possible  to  deduce 
from  it  consequences  which  led  in  that  direction.  It  is  scarcely 
justifiable,  therefore,  to  attribute  it  to  the  influence  of  oriental 
Nestorians  (e.  g. ,  Gams,  ii.  2,  p.  264  b).  “  Adoptionism  is 

to  be  accounted  for  by  the  continued  influence  of  old  religious 
theories,  the  dependence  upon  ecclesiastical  formulas,  and  the 
defective  theological  culture  ”  (Hauck,  ii.,  p.  258 n.). 

2.  This  doctrine  was  vigorously  assailed  by  the  Asturians, 
Beatus  and  Etherius  •  then  particularly  by  the  Frankish 
church.  Among  its  literary  opponents  the  most  prominent  was 
Alcuin.  The  first  charge  against  the  Spaniards  was  that  they 
are  led  to  teach  a  double  person  ( alter  et  alter')'.  “  Just  as  the 
Nestorian  impiety  divided  Christ  into  two  Persons  on  account  of 
the  two  natures,  ...  so  also  your  untaught  temerity  divides  him 
into  two  Sons,  one  a  true  and  the  other  an  adopted  Son  ”  (Ale. 
adv.  Fel.  i.  11).  Attention  was  then  called  to  the  inconsistency 
of  Adoptionism  with  the  teaching  of  the  Fathers  and  the  church.2 
These  attempted  refutations  display  a  remarkably  defective  con- 

1  Assumtio  illim  ho  minis  ;  verbum  habens  hominem ,  says  Augustine  (Vol. 
I.,  pp.  260  n.,  360.  Cf.  Hilar,  upon  Ps.  138.  2.  To  assume  man  ( hominem 
suscipere )  is  the  standing  formula  in  the  Spanish  Confession  (vid.  Hahn,  Bibl. 
d.  Symbole,  ed.  3,  pp.  21 1,  236,  237,  245  f. ).  The  Synod  of  Toledo,  A.  D. 
675,  says  in  regard  to  the  Logos — not  the  Son  of  man —  “  He  is  a  son  by  na¬ 
ture,  not  by  adoption”  (vid.  Hahn,  p.  243,  also  Hefele,  iii.  1 1 5 ) . 

2  For  special  instances,  vid.  Bach,  i.  u6ff. 


EASTERN  CHURCH  AND  THE  WORSHIP  OF  IMAGES. 


29 


ception  of  the  real  problem  at  issue.  Their  authors  were  con¬ 
tent  to  rest  in  the  simple  thought :  Christ  was  God,  and  as  God 
he  has  delivered  us.1  Yet  they  understood  that:  “In  the  as¬ 
sumption  of  the  flesh  by  God,  the  person,  not  the  nature,  of  the 
man  perishes  ’  ’  (Ale.  adv.  Fel.  ii.  12).  Adoptionism  was  con¬ 
demned  at  Regensburg,  A.  D.  794  ;  at  Frankfurt,  A.  D.  794  ; 
at  Aachen,  A.  D.  799.  Pope  Hadrian  I.  had  already  rejected  it 
as  Nestorianism and  blasphemy  (Cod.  Carol.  99,  p.  294.  Mansi, 
xiii.  865  ff.).  Under  Leo  III.  it  was  again  condemned  by  a 
Roman  Council  (Mansi,  xiii.  1031,  probably  in  A.  D.  799). 
Nothing  was  gained  as  a  result  of  the  controversy.  The  oppo¬ 
nents  of  the  Adoptionists  could  not  refute  them  because  they 
were  themselves  too  orthodox  to  understand  them. 

§  38.  Eastern  Church  and  the  Worship  of  Images.  Filioque 

Controversy. 

Libri  Carolini,  ed.  Heumann,  1731  ;  in  Migne,  98.  999  ff.  Alcuin,  de 
processione  spiritus  sancti,  Migne,  101,  63  ff.  Hefele,  CG.  iii. ,  ed.  2,  694  ff., 
749  ff.  Hauck,  KG.,  Deutschl.  ii.  276  ft'.,  299  ff. 

i.  During  the  controversies  concerning  images,  the  popes  arrayed 
themselves  on  the  side  of  the  image-worshipers  (Vol.  I.,  p.  304). 
The  Frankish  church  had  assumed  the  same  position.  Delegates 
of  Pope  Hadrian  had  taken  part  in  the  Council  at  Nice,  A.  D. 
787,  and  it  had  not  been  thought  necessary  to  take  special 
measures  to  protect  the  Frankish  church.  But  Charlemagne 
took  hand  in  the  controversy.  The  Libri  Carolini  contain  a 
keen  criticism  of  the  worship  of  images.  God  alone,  they  de¬ 
clare,  is  to  be  adored  and  worshiped  {adorandus  et  colendus); 
the  saints  are  only  to  be  venerated  (yenerandi) .  Images,  on 
the  other  hand,  are  only  ornamental  objects  and  reminders.  It 
is,  therefore,  folly  to  render  them  worship.  The  Council  of  A. 
D.  754,  which  was  hostile  to  image-worship,  and  the  Council  of 
Nice  were  both  pronounced  infamous  and  most  incompetent  (fnep - 
tissimae).  No  attention  whatever  was  given,  it  is  true,  to  the  dis¬ 
tinction  between  veneration  (tt p 0 a xo vagus')  and  worship  (karpeia), 
the  former  word  having  been  represented  by  the  term  adoratio  in 
the  Latin  translation  of  the  acts  of  the  Council  which  was  for¬ 
warded  to  Charlemagne.  Accordingly,  the  second  canon  of  the 
Council  of  Frankfurt,  A.  D.  794,  decided  that  all  adoratio  and 
servitus  are  to  be  withheld  from  images,  and  that  the  Nicene 
Council  is  to  be  condemned  (Mansi,  xiii.  909). 

1  It  is  possible  that,  as  Hauck  maintains  (ii.,pp.  268,  271,  275),  the  Ger¬ 
manic  conception  of  Christ  as  the  rich  God,  our  God,  had  something  to  do  with 
this. 


3° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


2.  The  Augustinian  theology,  as  is  well  known,  teaches  the 
procession  of  the  Holy  Spirit  from  the  Father  and  the  Son  ( Vol.  I. , 
p.  239  f. ).  The  formula,  a  patre  filioque  procedens ,  first  meets 
us,  excepting  in  the  Athanasian  Creed  (Vol.  I.,  p.  241),  in  Leo  I. 
(ep.  15.  1  :  de  utroque  processit ,  in  opposition  to  Priscillian’s 
Sabellianism,  e.  g.,  tract  1);  then  in  the  confession  of  faith  of  a 
Council  at  Toledo  (in  Hahn,  ed.  3,  p.  210,  probably  about  A. 
D.  444);  also  in  the  confession  of  Reccared  and  the  Gothic 
bishops  (A.  D.  589,  Hahn,  p.  232  f.);  in  Gregory  the  Great 
(p.  4);  and  in  A.  D.  633,  638,  and  675,  in  confessions  of 
Toledo  (Hahn,  p.  236,  237,  243).  From  Spain  the  term 
reached  the  Franks.  A  council  at  Gentilly,  so  early  as  A.  D. 
767,  appears  to  have  pronounced  in  its  favor  (Hefele,  iii.  432). 
In  the  Confession  of  Reccared  it  already  appears  inserted  in  the 
Constantinopolitan  Creed  (Hefele,  iii.  48).  In  this  enlarged 
form,  the  confession  was  used  under  Charlemagne  in  the  Frankish 
church.  Certain  Frankish  monks  were  called  to  account  for  this 
at  Jerusalem.  As  Charlemagne  had,  at  an  earlier  day,  instructed 
his  theologians  to  advocate  the  filioque  (Alcuin,  de  processione 
spiritu  sancto;  Mi.  101.  Libri  Carol,  iii.  3.,  p.  269  ff. ),  soTheo- 
dulf  of  Orleans  now  wrote  a  defense  of  it  (de  spiritu  sancto  ; 
Mi.  105,  239  ff. ),  and  the  Council  at  Aachen,  A.  D.  809, 
adopted  the  doctrine  and,  most  probably,  also  the  term  itself. 
But  Pope  Leo  III.  opposed,  not  indeed  the  doctrinal  position, 
but  the  unauthorized  enlargement  of  the  symbol  (Mansi,  xiv. 
19  ff. ).  The  latter,  however,  despite  the  opposition,  main¬ 
tained  its  place  even  at  Rome. 


§39.  Controversy  Upon  Augustinian  Doctrine  of  Predestination. 

Sources.  Gottschalk’s  (f  A.  D.  868)  utterances  upon  the  subject  are 
collected  in  Migne,  121,  345  ff.  Vid.  further  especially  Rabanus,  the  let¬ 
ters  to  Noting,  Eberard,  and  Hincmar  in  Migne,  112.  Hincmar,  de 
praedest.  dei  et  lib.  arb.,  Migne,  125.  Joh.  Scotus  Erigena,  de  div. 
praedest. ,  Migne,  122.  Florus,  sermo  de  praed.,  Migne,  119.  Amolo  in 
the  Bibl.  max.  patr.  xiv.  For  Gottsclialk,  Remigius,  de  tribus  epistolis 
and  Libell.  de  tenenda  immobiliter  scripturae  veritate,  Migne,  121.  Pruden- 
Tius,  ep.  ad.  Hincm. ,  Migne,  1 1 5.  Servatus  Lupus,  libell.  de  tribus 
quaestionibus,  Migne,  1 19.  Ratramnus  de  praedest.,  Migne,  121.  Mau- 
guin  published  a  collection  :  Vet.  auctor.  qui  sec.  ix.  de  praed.  scrips,  opera 
1650;  cf.  Hefele,  CG.,  iv.,  ed.  2,  130 ff.  Borrasch,  der  Monch  Gottsch., 
1868.  Schrors,  Hincmar,  1884.  J.  Weiszacker  in  Jahrbb.  f.  deutsche 
Theol.,  1859,  p.  527  ff.  Bach,  DG.  des  MA.  i.  220  ff.  Reuter,  Gesch.  d. 
rel.  Aufklarung  im  MA.,  1875,  i.  43  ff-  Thomasius-Seeberg,  DG.,  ii.  24 ff. 
Harnack,  DG.,  iii.  261  ff. 

1.  Augustine  had  incidentally  spoken  of  a  double  predestina¬ 
tion  (Vol.  I.,  p.  352  n.).  Isidore  of  Seville  yet  wrote  :  “  Pre- 


CONTROVERSY  UPON  PREDESTINATION.  3 1 

destination  is  two-fold,  either  of  the  elect  to  (heavenly)  rest,  or 
of  the  wicked  to  death  ”  (Sentent.  ii.  6).  But  in  this  also  the 
Augustinians  of  the  Carlovingian  age  understood  their  master  in 
the  same  sense  as  had  Gregory  the  Great  (cf.  p.  22).  Then  arose 
a  man  who,  in  a  checkered  career,  had  found  peace  for  his  soul 
in  the  Augustinian  doctrine  of  election  (Mi.  121,  362  and 
363).  The  monk,  Gottscha.lk  of  Orbais,  had  met  with  the 
writings  of  Augustine,  although  he  did  not  have  the  whole  Au¬ 
gustine.  His-  thought  and  emotions  centered  in  the  unchange¬ 
able  God,  who,  of  his  own  good  will,  elects  men  or  rejects  them. 
This  “  most  salutary  truth  ’’was  his  strength  and  stay.  He  paid 
no  attention  to  the  ecclesiastical  machinery,  the  system  of  good 
works  (  “  not  by  merits,  indeed,  but  by  the  gift  of  the  Father,” 
Mi.  121,  372).  “  Just  as  the  immutable  God  before  the 

foundation  of  the  world  through  his  gratuitous  grace  immutably 
predestinated  all  his  elect  to  eternal  life  ;  so  in  like  manner  all  the 
reprobate  who  will  in  the  day  of  judgment  be  condemned  on 
account  of  their  evil  deserts  has  this  same  immutable  God 
through  his  righteous  judgment  immutably  predestinated  to 
death  justly  everlasting”  (in  Hincm.  de  praed.  5).  God  has 
not  foreordained  the  evil,  but  the  immutable  God  has  ordained 
salvation  for  the  one  class  and  them  for  salvation — a  gift  of 
grace  {beneficium  gratiae ) — and  for  others  through  a  decision 
of  justice  ( judicium  justitiae ),  the  merited  punishment,  and 
them  for  it  (Mi.  121,  350).  Each  of  these  is  a  good  act 
( bonum ,  ib.  358).  Hence  it  is  said  that  God  “has  predes¬ 
tinated  only  good  things  ( bona ,  ib.  349).  This  cannot  be  based 
upon  the  divine  prescience,  since  God  would  then  be  mutable 
and  dependent  upon  the  temporal  (Mi.  121,  353).  Presci¬ 
ence  merely  accompanies  praedestination  ;  by  it  the  justice  of 
the  latter  is  attested.  With  Augustine,  Gottschalk  regarded  the 
redemptive  work  of  Christ  as  having  reference  only  to  the  pre¬ 
destinated  (Hincm.,  de  praed.  27,  29,  34,  35,  and  Mi.  121. 
367,  372).  That  this  is  genuine  Augustinian  doctrine  cannot  be 
questioned.  It  became  the  criterion  for  the  “  Augustinianism  ” 
of  the  period.1 

2.  Gottschalk’s  opponents  did  not  understand  him.  They 
pressed  home  upon  him,  as  the  “destroyer  of  the  faith,”  the 
familiar  brutal  consequence  :  “  God  makes  man  sin  against  his 
will,”  and  is  the  author  of  evil,  as,  e.  g.,  Rabanus,  to  whose 
attention  the  matter  was  first  brought  by  Noting  of  Verona.  At 
Mayence,  A.  D.  848,  Gottschalk’s  doctrine  was  condemned  and  he 

1  Even  the  expression,  trina  unitas  (Mi.  121,  364)  employed  by  Gotts¬ 
chalk,  which  harmonizes  with  the  Augustinian  conception,  was  assailed  by 
Hincmar  :  de  una  et  non  trina  deitate  ;  cf.  Hefele,  iv.  220  f. 


32 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


himself  delivered  for  punishment  to  Hincmar,  in  whose  district 
his  cloister  lay.  At  Chiersy,  A.  D.  849,  he  was  terribly 
scourged  and  condemned  to  life-long  imprisonment. 

3.  But  the  matter  now  only  assumed  wider  dimensions.  In¬ 
fluential  theologians,  such  as  Prudentius  of  Troyes,  Remigius 
of  Lyons,  Ratramnus  in  Corbie,  Servatus  Lupus  in  Ferrieres, 
defended  the  theory  of  a  two-fold  ( gemina )  predestination  as  the 
Augustinian  doctrine,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  Rabanus  and 
Hincmar  further  assailed  it.1  Amolo  and  Florus  M agister 
pointed  to  its  disastrous  consequences.  There  was  a  possibility 
of  reconciliation  between  these  opponents,  for  they  were  con¬ 
tending  more  or  less  about  words  ;  but  the  controversy  between 
Gottschalk  and  his  adversaries  could  not  be  compromised,  for 
he  was  an  Augustinian  and  they  were  Semi-augustinians.  Such, 
indeed,  were  also  Gottschalk’ s  defenders  at  heart.  Between 
them  and  his  opponents  the  final  contention  was  only  in  regard 
to  formulas.  The  latter  would  apply  the  concept  of  predestina¬ 
tion  only  to  the  election  to  life,  and  base  reprobation  upon  pre¬ 
science  (Hincm.,  de  praed.  16;  Mi.  125.  424;  Raban.,  Mi.  112, 
155);  the  former  spoke,  with  Augustine,  of  a  double  predestina¬ 
tion,  but  likewise  based  reprobation  upon  prescience.  But  both 
agreed  that  the  baptized  and  believers  are  predestinated,  which 
Gottschalk  denied.  _  The  controlling  consideration  for  the 
former — but  no  less  for  the  latter — was  that  of  the  dangerous 
consequences  for  the  church  involved  in  the  strict  theory  of  pre¬ 
destination.  The  sacraments  would  thus  be  robbed  of  their 
value,  becoming  a  mere  form  and  trifling ;  the  motive  to  good 
works,  i.  e.,  the  thought  of  rewards  and  punishment,  would  be 
removed,  and  thus  the  moral  life,  as  they  understood  it,  would 
be  destroyed.  The  terrible  bugbear  of  the  predestination  sect  is 
exposed  for  the  execration  of  the  age  (Amolo  bibl.  max.  xiv. 
333  f.  Raban.,  Mi.  112.  1554,  1562.  Hincm.,  de  praed.  2. 
15,  18  ff. ,  24  ff.  The  5th  Canon  of  Valence  in  Hefele  iv.  195  ; 
cf.  Bach  i.,  235  ff.).  Kurz  says  :  “  The  spirit  of  Gregory  for 
the  first  time  joined  issue  with  the  spirit  of  Augustine,  and  it 
carried  the  day.”  The  will  of  man  has  been  wounded  by  sin. 
When  grace  heals  it,  it  is  free  to  perform  good  works.  Hincmar 
asserts,  with  Gregory,  that  the  good  (which  we  do)  is  ours  and 
God’s  :  “  God’s,  through  prevenient  grace  ;  ours,  through  obedi¬ 
ent  free  will  ”  (de  praed.  37.  21). 

* 

1  Scotus  Erigena  also,  though  in  his  own  way,  opposed  Gottschalk  :  Sin 
and  punishment  are  nonentities,  and  as  such  cannot  be  objects  of  the  divine 
will,  and  hence  there  is  only  one  predestination,  i.  e.,  to  life.  His  contem¬ 
poraries  do  not  seem  to  have  fully  understood  him,  but  they  suspected  his 
criticism  as  an  “ invention  of  the  devil”  (Flor.  Mag.,  Mi.  119,  101). 


PARTURITION  OF  THE  VIRGIN  MARY. 


33 


4.  The  decisions  rendered  at  the  two  Councils  of  Chiersy  and 
Valence,  A.  D.  853,  were  in  harmony  with  these  views.  The 
four  chapters  of  Chiersy  accurately  reproduce  Hincmar’s  position. 
(1)  The  race  became  through  the  fall  a  massa  perditionis. 
“  But  a  good  and  just  God  elected  from  this  same  mass  of  perdi¬ 
tion  according  to  his  prescience  those  whom  he  through  grace 
predestinated  to  life,  and  predestinated  eternal  life  to  them.  He 
foreknew  that  the  others,  whom  by  the  judgment  of  righteous¬ 
ness  he  left  in  the  mass  of  perdition,  would  perish ;  but  he  did 
not  predestinate  that  they  should  perish,  but  because  he  is  just  he 
predestinated  to  them  eternal  punishment.  Hence,  they  ac¬ 
knowledge  but  one  predestination.  (2)  Grace  has  made  our 
will  ( arbitrium )  free,  “  by  grace  set  free  and  by  grace  healed 
from  the  corrupt  state.”  (3)  God  wishes  all  men  to  be  saved  : 
“  that  some  perish  is  the  desert  ( meritum )  of  those  who  perish.” 
(4)  Christ  died  for  all.  That  his  death  does  not  set  all  free  “  is 
the  fault  of  those  who  are  unbelieving,  or  who  do  not  believe 
with  the  faith  that  works  by  love.  ’  ’  The  Augustinian  party  at 
Valence,  on  the  other  hand,  adopted  the  following  statement  : 
“  We  confess  a  predestination  of  the  elect  to  life,  and  a  predes¬ 
tination  of  the  wicked  to  death ;  but  that,  in  the  election  of 
those  who  are  to  be  saved,  the  mercy  of  God  precedes  good 
merit  ( meritum  bonum ),  and  in  the  condemnation  of  those  who 
will  perish,  evil  merit  ( meritum  malum )  precedes  the  righteous 
judgment  of  God.  But  that  in  predestination  God  has  deter¬ 
mined  only  those  things  which  he  himself  would  do,  either  from 
gratuitous  mercy  or  in  righteous  judgment  .  .  .  But  that  in  the 
wicked  he  foreknew  the  wickedness  because  it  comes  from  them  ; 
and  did  not  predestinate  it,  because  it  does  not  come  from  him.” 
Those  are  condemned  who  think  that  “  some  are  predestinated 
to  evil  by  divine  power,  i.  e. ,  so  that,  as  it  were,  they  cannot  be 
anything  else.”  The  work  of  Christ  is  held  to  apply  to  all  who 
believe  on  him.1  At  Toucy,  A.  D.  860,  the  controversy  was 
abandoned  without  any  decision  having  been  reached  (Hefele, 
iv.  217  f. ).  No  decision  was  needed  after  Gottschalk  was  re¬ 
moved  from  the  field. 

§  40.  Divergent  Views  Upon  Parturition  of  the  Virgin  Mary. 

Sources.  Ratramnus,  de  eoquodChr.  ex  virg.  natus  est,  Migne,  121. 
Radbertus  Paschasius,  de  partu  virginis,  Migne,  120.  Cf.  Bach,  DG.  i., 
152  ff.  Steitz,  PRE.  xii.  482  f. 

Various  views  were  expressed  during  this  period  in  regard  to  the 

1  These  declarations  were  repeated  at  Langres,  A.  D.  859,  when  they  seem 
to  have  been  confirmed  by  Nicholas  I.  Vid.  Moller,  PRE.  v.  327. 

3 


34 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


partus  virginis ,  which  attest  the  growing  disposition  toward  the 
worship  of  Mary.  Ratramnus  taught  that  the  corporeal  virginity 
was,  indeed,  preserved  before,  in,  and  after  the  birth  of  Christ ; 
but  that  he  nevertheless  entered  the  world  by  way  of  birth, 
through  a  being  born  ( nasci ),  but  not  through  a  being  brought 
forth  ( erumpi ).  Radbert  explained,  in  reply  to  the  question  of 
certain  nuns,  that  it  would  be  presumptuous  to  say  that  Christ 
was  born  according  to  the  common  law  of  nature.  Such  partu¬ 
rition  rests  under  the  curse  of  sin,  and  the  “  authority  of  the 
church,”  upon  the  contrary,  teaches  through  the  universal 
( ubique  ab  omnibus')  worship  of  Mary  that  she  remained  free  from 
sin  in  the  womb,  and,  therefore,  entered  the  world  without  sin 
(Mi.  120,  p.  1371  f.).1  Yet  this  was  by  no  means  a  universally 
accepted  doctrine.  Anselm  still  spoke  of  the  original  sin  of  the 
Virgin  (cur  deus  homo?  ii.  16). 


§  41.  Controversies  Upon  the  Lor o' s  Supper. 

Sources.  Of  the  writings  of  Radbertus  Paschasius,  vid.  Liber  de 
corpore  et  sanguine  domini  (A.  D.  831)  and  his  commentary  on  Matt.  xxvi. 
Mi.  120.  Ratramnus,  de  corpore  et  sanguine  domini,  Mi.  121.  Cf.  Steitz, 
PRE.  xii.  474  ff.,  535  ff.  Ruckert,  der  abendmalsstreit  des  MA.  in  Ztschr.  f. 
wiss.  Theol.  1858,  p.  22  ff.  Dieckhoff,  Ev.  Abendmalsl.  im  Ref.  Ztalter, 
1851,  p.  13  ff.  Bach,  DG.  i.,  159 ff.  Thomasius-Seeberg,  DG.  ii.,  33 ff. 
Harnack,  DG.  iii. ,  275  ff.  Ernst,  d.  Lehre  d.  h.  Pasch.  R.  v.  d.  Eucha- 
ristie,  1896. 

1.  The  Ancient  Church  produced  no  dogma  of  the  Lord’s 
Supper.  Two  methods  of  presenting  the  subject  are  found  side 
by  side  without  any  attempt  at  discrimination.  They  are  com¬ 
monly  spoken  of  as  the  metabolic  and  the  symbolic  views  (Vol. 
I.,  pp.  196,  301,  323).  Pope  Gelasius  I.  taught  that  “the 
substance  or  nature  of  the  bread  and  wine  does  not  cease  to  exist, 
although  the  elements,  the  Holy  Spirit  perfecting  them,  pass 
over  ( transeant )  into  a  divine  substance,  as  was  the  case  with 
Christ  himself.  And  certainly  the  image  and  likeness  ( imago  et 
similitudo)  are  honored  ( celebrantur )  in  the  observance  ( actione ) 
of  the  mysteries”  (de  duabus  naturis  in  Christo,  Thiel.  Ep. 
pontif.,  p.  541  f. ).  The  theologians  of  the  Carlovingian  period, 
as  Augustinians,  were  fond  of  emphasizing  the  symbolic  charac¬ 
ter  of  the  ordinance,  presenting  it  as  a  memorial  and  a  symbol 
(vid.  Ruckert,  1.  c.,  pp.  25,  53).  On  the  other  hand,  as  a 
result  of  the  growing  religious  materialism,  which  . found  in  visi¬ 
ble  miracles  the  characteristic  trait  of  religion,  and  of  the  widen¬ 
ing  influence  of  the  sacrificial  idea,  the  conception  of  a  transfor- 


1  Cf.  already  Augustine,  de  nat.  et.  grat.  36.  42. 


CONTROVERSIES  UPON  THE  LORD’S  SUPPER.  35 

mation  of  the  elements  became  more  and  more  clearly  defined. 
All  manner  of  miraculous  occurrences  in  connection  with  the 
celebration  were  related,  as  that  the  Christ-child  had  been  seen 
at  the  consecration  of  the  elements  in  the  form  of  a  lamb,  and 
his  appearance  had  led  many  a  doubting  Thomas  to  faith  (Ger- 
manus  in  Martene  Thes.  anecdot.  v.  96,  95.  Radbert,  c.  14. 
Cf.  Bach,  p.  1 66  If.).  And  even  the  theologians  in  their  tech¬ 
nical  discussions  spoke  of  a  “  consecrating  into  ( consecrare  in) 
the  substance  of  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  ”  (Alcuin,  ep.  41, 
163,  90,  in  Mi.  100,  203,  423,  289). 

2.  A  decisive  step  was  taken  in  the  first  monograph  upon  the 
subject  which  we  possess.  It  was  written  by  a  monk  of  Corbie, 
Paschasius  Radbertus.  In  his  book,  De  corpore  et  sanguine 
domini ,  the  attempt  is  made  to  combine  the  religious  concep¬ 
tions  of  the  church  at  large  with  the  theory  of  Augustine,  as  fol¬ 
lows  :  ( a )  The  omnipotent  God  does  whatever  he  wishes  to  do. 
A  miracle  of  divine  omnipotence  occurs  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  ; 
there  is  a  creative  act,  a  creari  (4.  1  ;  15.  1,  upon  Matt.  26,  Mi. 
895).  The  God  who  created  Jesus  in  the  womb  of  the  Virgin 
without  seminal  infusion,  4 ‘to-day,  through  the  consecration  of 
his  sacrament  by  his  invisible  power,  effects  ( operatur )  in  the 
substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  the  flesh  and  blood  of  Christ  ’  ’ 
(3.  4).  Through  this  miracle  the  daily  sacrifice  for  the  benefit 
of  the  world  is  made  possible  (4.  1).  The  inference  is:  4 ‘so 
that,  immediately  after  the  consecration  of  Christ,  the  true  body 
and  blood  are  truly  believed  (8.  2).  The  body  of  Christ  is, 
therefore,  really  present,  and  this  body  is  in  substance  the  same 
body  in  which  Christ  was  born,  suffered,  rose  from  the  dead,  and 
which  he  still  possesses  in  heaven  (1.  2;  4.  3;  21.  9).  The 
question  as  to  the  relation  existing  between  the  body  now  really 
and  locally  present  in  heaven  (in  this  following  Augustine)1  and 
the  body  present  at  all  places  in  the  Lord’s  Supper,  is  not  dis¬ 
cussed  by  Radbertus.  He  speaks  of  the  fruits  of  the  flesh  of 
Christ,  and  cites  in  illustration  the  multiplying  of  the  loaves  and 
increase  of  the  meal,  oil,  etc.,  in  scriptural  miracles  (7.  2). 
“  From  which  wholesome  field  (/.  e.,  the  body  of  Christ)  the 
living  bread  of  flesh  and  the  drink  of  blood  daily  grow  abun¬ 
dantly  for  believers,  and  are  reaped  by  the  faithful  ”  (Ez.  21.3. 
2).  According  to  this,  the  body  is  present,  and  yet  there  is 
present  only  a  something  effected  by  the  body.  To  the  objec¬ 
tion,  that  as  a  fact  that  the  bread  and  wine  can  be  recognized  as 
such  by  the  senses  (taste,  color,  form),  Radbertus  replies,  that 

1  Vid.  Vol.  I.,  p.  323;  also  civ.  dei  xxii.  29.  4;  in  Joh.  tr.  50.  4;  de  agone 
chr.  20.  28;  serm.  ad  catech.  4.  11. 


3^ 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


the  actual  eating  of  body  and  drinking  of  blood  would  be  contrary 
to  human  custom,  and  that,  just  because  of  the  difficulty  in  ques¬ 
tion,  belief  is  meritorious  (io.  i  ;  13.  1,  2  ;  1.  5  ;  8.  1,  2). 
The  effect  of  participation  consists  in  a  deliverance  “  from  daily 
faults  and  slight  sins  ”  (19.  3),  in  the  testing  and  confirming  of 
faith  in  the  presence  of  the  “  visible  sacrament”  (4.  2  ;  1.  5), 
and  in  a  bodily  unification  with  Christ:  “but  even  our  flesh 
also  is  through  it  restored  to  immortality  and  incorruption  ”  (19. 
1;  21.  2).  (b)  Realistic  as  this  sounds,  Radbertus  yet  moves  in 

Augustine’s  sphere  of  thought  when  treating  of  the  reception  of 
the  sacrament.  He  pronounces  it  a  “  spiritual  thing,  ”  which 
must  be  understood  in  spirit u  (5.  1).  Only  those  who  have 
spiritually  apprehended  Christ  receive  the  body  and  blood  (8.  3  ; 
6.  2).  To  the  unbelieving  they  are  only  apparently  offered. 
“  Unless  through  faith  and  knowledge  ( intelligentia ) ,  of  what 
does  it  taste  but  of  bread  and  wine  to  those  who  eat?  ”  (8.  2). 
(V)  This  line  of  thought  seems  quite  out  of  harmony  with  the 
views  noted  under  (a)  above.  Upon  the  one  hand,  we  receive 
actually  “nothing  else”  than  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ 
(20.  3  ;  1.6;  4.  3);  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  spiritual  partici¬ 
pation  of  faith.  But  we  have  here  to  do  with  a  “mystery.” 
Hence  figura  and  veritas  must  be  side  by  side:  “because 
the  sacrament  is  mysterious  (mysticum) ,  we  cannot  deny  that 
it  is  a  figure ;  but  if  it  is  a  figure,  we  must  inquire  how  it  can 
be  verity.  For  every  figure  is  a  figure  of  another  thing  and 
is  always  referred  to  that  other  thing  as  being  the  real  thing  of 
which  it  is  a  figure.”  In  this  case  there  is  a  figure ,  in  so  far  as 
we  have  to  do  with  the  sacraments  as  evident  to  the  senses  ;  and 
there  is  verity  in  so  far  as  through  the  word  of  Christ  “the body 
and  blood  of  Christ  are  made  ( efficitur )  from  the  substance  of 
the  bread  and  wine.”  This  verity,  however,  only  faith  appre¬ 
hends  ( inter ius  recte  intelligitur  aut  creditur) .  The  relationship  is 
like  that  between  the  outward  appearance  of  Christ  and  his 
divine  nature — or  like  that  between  the  letter  and  the  word. 
The  visible  is  present  in  order  that  we  may  through  faith  attain 
to  the  invisible  (4.  1,  2).  The  idea  of  Radbertus  is  :  In  the 
Lord’s  Supper  there  is  both  a  symbol  and  a  reality.  The  outward 
visible  and  sensible  forms,  which  remain  despite  the  transforma¬ 
tion,  make  it  a  symbol ;  the  body  of  Christ,  which  is  present,  is 
the  verity.  But  only  he  receives  the  body  who  believes  that  it  is 
offered  in  these  symbolic  forms.  It  is,  therefore,  through 
(meritorious)  faith,  or  the  right  understanding  of  this  symbol, 
that  the  body  is  received.  Subjectively  considered,  everything 
depends  upon  the  merit  of  faith  and  the  spiritual  understanding 
of  the  ordinance.  The  latter  may  thus  be  considered  the  prin- 


CONTROVERSIES  UPON  THE  LORD’S  SUPPER. 


37 


cipal  thing.  We  must  not  overlook,  however,  the  re-enforcement 
of  the  idea  of  faith  with  that  of  merit,  and  the  thoroughly  un¬ 
evangelical  conception  of  faith. 

3.  This  book  of  Radbertus  might  have  been  written,  in  its 
principal  parts  at  least,  several  centuries  earlier ;  for  its  leading 
ideas  are  those  of  the  ancient  church.  It  does  not  lead  us  be¬ 
yond  the  obscurity  which  marked  the  teaching  of  the  earlier  age. 
And  yet  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance.  It  is  the  merit  of 
Radbertus,  that  he  preserved  the  eucharist  from  being  entirely 
lost  in  the  sacrifice  of  the  mass,  that  he  attached  to  its  reception 
some  sort  of  personal  moral  effect.1  It  is  true,  upon  the  other 
hand,  that  his  statement  of  the  problem  proved  portentous 
for  the  development  of  dogma.  Without  concerning  himself 
about  the  historical  circumstances  connected  with  the  institu¬ 
tion  of  the  ordinance  or  about  its  religious  effects,  he  understands 
the  words  of  institution  as  a  legal  charter2  (cf.  in  Matt.,  in  Mi. 
120,  890  f. ).  But  the  questions  which  he  raised  have  never 
since  ceased  to  agitate  the  church.  We  may  find  much  in  the 
doctrine  to  criticize,  but  we  should  not  forget  that  the  first  at¬ 
tempt  to  formulate  these  problems  might  have  proved  different, 
and  might  easily  have  been  worse. 

4.  The  views  of  Radbertus  met  with  opposition.  Some 
thought,  he  reports  (in  Matt.,  p.  8 90  f. ),  that  only  the  efficacy 
( virtus )  of  the  flesh,  and  not  the  flesh — only  the  figura,  and  not 
the  veritas — is  present  in  the  sacrament.  Against  these  he 
maintains  his  position,  appealing  to  the  words  of  institution 
and  the  fact  that  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  (to  be  found)  only 
in  the  very  blood  of  Christ.  A  new  turn  of  thought  was 
given  by  Rabanus  (vid.  ep.  ad  Egilonem,  Mi.  112,  1510  ff. ). 
He  too  maintains  that  the  true  body  of  Christ  is  daily  created 
by  divine  power  ( potentialiter  creatur ,  p.  1512)  out  of  the 

1  Apart  from  all  other  considerations,  this  is  attested  by  his  assigning  to  the 
eucharist  a  place  by  the  side  of  baptism  and  the  word  :  “  For  Christ  has  left 
to  his  church  nothing  greater  in  mystery  than  this  and  the  sacrament  of  bap¬ 
tism,  and  also  the  sacred  Scriptures,  in  all  of  which  the  Holy  Spirit  ...  in¬ 
wardly  works  the  mysteries  of  our  salvation  unto  immortality  ”  ( 1.  4  ;  cf.  Vol. 
I.,  pp.  196  n.,  189,  320  f. ).  Upon  the  number  of  the  sacraments,  vid. 
3.  2  :  “  But  the  sacraments  of  Christ  in  the  church  are  baptism  and  unction, 
and  also  the  body  and  blood  of  the  Lord.”  Cf.  Agobard,  De  privil.  et  jur. 
sacerdotii,  *5‘ 

2  The  external  conception  of  the  miraculous  element  in  the  sacrament 
should  not  be  overlooked.  It  is  in  keeping  with  the  general  conception  of  God, 
which  was,  no  doubt,  largely  due  to  Germanic  influences.  The  doing  of 
wonders  is  the  chief  prerogative  of  God.  Creation  is,  properly  speaking,  the 
only  form  of  activity  that  is  worthy  of  him.  Everything  connected  with  re¬ 
ligion  is  miraculous  because  brought  about,  or  created,  by  God.  God  is 
power. 


3» 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


bread ;  but  he  denies  the  absolute  identity  of  the  sacramental 
and  the  historical  Christ.  They  differ  not  in  nature,  but 
in  the  form  of  their  appearance:  “  Not  indeed  in  nature 
( naturaliter )  but  in  form  fpecialiter) ,  that  body  of  the  Lord 
which  is  daily  .  .  .  consecrated  from  the  substance  of  the 
bread  and  wine  for  the  life  of  the  world,  and  which  is  .  .  . 
offered  by  the  priest,  is  one  thing,  and  the  body  of  Christ  which 
was  born  of  the  Virgin  Mary  and  into  which  the  former  is 
changed,  is  in  form  ( specialiter )  another  thing”  (p.  1514). 
Thus  an  idea  of  great  importance  for  the  future  was  injected  into 
the  new  dogma. 

5.  Against  the  view  of  Radbertus  appeared  Ratramnus  of 
Corbie  in  a  publication  addressed  to  Charles  the  Bold.  He  un¬ 
dertakes  to  answer  two  questions  :  Whether  the  Lord’s  Supper 
contains  a  mystery  which  only  faith  can  recognize,  and  whether 
it  is  the  historical  body  of  Christ  (5).  ( a )  The  bread,  he 
maintains,  remains  externally  what  it  is,  but,  inwardly  consid¬ 
ered,  it  is  for  faith  something  higher,  heavenly  and  divine,  which 
is  seen,  received,  eaten,  only  by  the  believing  soul  (9).  There 
occurs,  indeed,  a  change  into  something  better  (ycom?nutatio  in 
melius ),  but  this  is  to  be  understood  spiritually  and  figuratively. 
“  Under  the  veil  of  the  corporeal  bread  and  the  corporeal  wine, 
the  spiritual  body  and  the  spiritual  blood  of  Christ  exist.  ’  ’  Out¬ 
wardly  considered,  it  is  bread  and  wine  ;  for  the  eye  of  the  spirit, 
it  is  body  and  blood  (16.  21).  “  They  are  figures  according  to 

the  visible  form  ;  but  according  to  the  invisible  substance,  i.  e., 
the  power  of  the  divine  word  [the  Logos] ,  the  true  body  and 
blood  of  Christ  truly  exist”  (49).  The  Lord  is  spiritually 
present  through  the  symbol.  “  The  Lord  is  known  to  be  present 
in  some  manner,  and  that  manner  is  in  figure  and  in  image,  in 
order  that  the  verity  may  be  felt  to  be  the  real  thing  ”  (84). 
This  is  evidently  the  view  entertained,  despite  the  occasional  use 
of  such  terms  as  converti,  commutari ,  confici  (13,  15,  28,  30,  42, 
43).  (V)  The  second  question  Ratramnus  answers  in  the  nega- 

ative.  “In  appearance  ( specie )  it  is  bread,  but  in  the  sacrament 
the  true  body  of  Christ”  (57).  “  What  appears  outwardly  is 

therefore  not  the  thing  itself \ipsa  res),  but  an  image  of  the  thing 
( imago  rei);  but  what  is  felt  and  known  by  the  mind  is  the  reality 
of  the  thing  ”  (gveritas  rei)  (77.  88).  Therefore  bread  and  cup 
are  memorial  signs,  likenesses  of  that  which  we  spiritually  receive 
(73  ff.,  96,  98  ff. ,  86/88).  (V)  What  then  does  the  sacrament  be¬ 
stow  ?  The  answer  can  only  be  :  The  invisible  bread,  the  spirit  of 
Christ,  the  power  of  the  Logos  (22,  26,  44,  64,  83  f. ).  Christ, 
the  Word,  is  therefore  spiritually  imparted  to  us  through  the  mystic 
form  of  the  sacrament.  This  is  the  Augustinian  view,  adapted  to 


CONTROVERSIES  UPON  THE  LORD'S  SUPPER. 


39 


meet  the  statement  of  the  problem  by  Radbertus.  The  religious 
element  which  it  contains,  the  spiritual  fellowship  of  Christ,  can¬ 
not  be  overlooked.  Perhaps  Ratramnus  would  have  been  able 
to  furnish  a  more  profound  and  lucid  exposition  if  the  problem 
had  not  been  forced  upon  him  from  without  and  the  direction  of 
his  thought  thus  determined  for  him.  The  question  which  he 
sought  to  answer  was  not,  how  we  apprehend  Christ  in  the  Lord’s 
Supper,  but  whether  the  historical  body  of  Christ  constitutes  the 
Lord’s  Supper. 

6.  The  future  belonged  to  Radbertus,  for  he  had  the  praxis  of 
the  church  upon  his  side.  His  theory  did  not,  indeed,  as  a 
theory  secure  general  adoption  ;  but  the  Lord’s  Supper  had  be¬ 
come  a  subject  of  theological  discussion,  and  the  theologians  of 
the  age  did  not  get  beyond  the  obscure  position  of  Radbertus. 
Some  already  distinctly  taught  the  theory  of  transubstantiation, 
as  Haimo  of  Halberstadt  (f  A.  D.  853):  “  That  the  substance, 
i.  e.,  of  bread  and  wine — that  is,  the  nature  of  the  bread  and 
wine — is  substantially  changed  into  another  substance  ( substan - 
tialiter  convertatur  in  alicun  substantiam ),  viz.,  into  flesh  and 
blood  ”  (Bach,  i.  2 13  n.  ).  Others  clung  to  the  symbolic  view  of 
Ratramnus,  e.  g.,  the  author  of  an  anonymous  tract  (Bach,  i.. 
203  ff. ):  “Thou  receivest  the  sacrament  indeed  in  a  similitude, 
but  thou  obtainest  the  grace  and  efficacy  of  the  real  nature  ”  (ib. 
205  n.  Cf.  the  “some  ”  who  are  said  to  deny  the  identity  of 
the  sacramental  and  the  historical  body,  in  a  tract1  attributed  to 
Gerbert,  De  corpore  et  sanguine  domini,Wli.  139,  p.  179).  Still 
others,  as  the  author  of  the  last  named  tract,  called  in  question 
the  distinction  between  veritas  and  jigura  (c.  4).  Essentially 
( naturaliter )  it  is  the  one  body  of  Christ;  in  appearance  (sfie- 
cialiter )  we  must  discriminate  it  from  the  latter  (5).  It  is  a 
figura ,  in  so  far  as  we  see  the  external  bread  and  wine,  but  a 
verity  when  in  truth  the  body  and  blood  are  inwardly  believed 
(4).  The  effect  of  participation  is  a  quickening  of  our  flesh 
through  the  spiritual  and  bodily  substance  of  Christ  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  its  resurrection  (9  and  8).  It  is  the  position  of  Raba- 
nus  (supra,  p.  38)  which  is  here  maintained,  and  it  could  be 
easily  combined  with  that  of  Ratramnus.  The  discussion  did  not 
lead  to  the  final  adoption  of  any  form  of  dogmatic  statement. 

1  Upon  the  question  of  its  authorship,  vid.  Hauck,  KG.  Deutschlands,  iii. 

302  f 


40 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  HIERARCHICAL  PRINCIPLE.  HISTORY  OF  THE  ORDINANCE 

OF  REPENTANCE. 

§  42.  Papacy  and  Hierarchy . 

Sources.  Decretales  pseudoisidorianae  ed.  Hinschius,  1863  :  cf. 
Wasserschleben,  PRE.  xii.  367  ff.  Donatio  Constantini,  especially 
edited  by  Zeumer  in  d.  Festschrift  fiir  Gneist. ,  1888.  Cf.  Friedrich,  die 
const.  Schenkung,  1889,  also  Krueger  in  Theol.  Litztg.,  1889,  nn.  17,  18. 
Seeberg  in  Theol.  Littbl.,  1890,  n.  3-5. 

1.  To  complete  our  review  of  the  dogmatic  history  of  the 
period,  we  must  (1)  observe  in  what  particular  the  hierarchical 
conception  of  the  Western  church  was  extended  and  modified, 
and  (2)  note  the  influence  exerted  upon  the  Christianity  of  the 
world  by  the  church  through  the  ordinance  of  repentance,  whose 
history  we  must  trace  in  outline,  leaving  details  to  the  province 
of  Church  History. 

2.  Charlemagne  wielded  supreme  authority  over  the  Western 
church,  and  he  recognized  the  primacy  of  the  pope.  These  two 
facts  are  the  roots  from  which  sprung  the  great  conflict  between 
pope  and  emperor.  This  relation  was  not  changed  essentially  in 
principle,  but  it  was  changed  in  fact,  under  the  immediate  fol¬ 
lowers  of  Charlemagne.  Especially  did  Pope  Nicholas  I.  (A. 
D.  858-67)  assert  in  unheard-of  fashion  the  claim  of  papal 
power,  of  dominion  over  bishops  and  metropolitans,  of  authority 
over  princes  and  the  imperial  crown.  Although  his  successors 
did  not  always  maintain  his  position  ;  although  weak  and  un¬ 
worthy  popes,  devoid  of  all  political  influence,  sat  after  him  in 
the  chair  of  Peter  ;  although  powerful  emperors  enforced  their 
edicts  upon  the  church  and  made  popes  prisoners — yet  something 
remained  as  a  permanent  gain  to  the  church.  The  church  in 
general  believed  in  the  papal  idea,  and  the  popes  themselves  be¬ 
lieved  in  it.  The  pope  stood,  in  his  sphere  as  sovereign,  on  an 
equality  with  the  emperor.  The  kingdom  of  God  stands  alongside 
of  and  above  the  kingdom  of  the  world.  This  was  not  changed 
when,  in  A.  D.  982,  Otto  the  Great  secured  the  rank  of  Roman 
Emperor.  Cf.  Hauck,  KG.  Deutschl.  iii.  206  ff.,  239  ff. 

3.  How  high-strung  were  the  papal  claims  is  attested  by  the 
Donatio  Constantini ,  which  appeared  about  A.  D.  754.  The 
spiritual  emperor  is  here  presented  in  contrast  with  the  secular 
emperor,  sharing  the  latter’s  glory  and  dominion,  and  even  de¬ 
manding  and  receiving  service  at  his  hands.  To  him,  as  the  sue- 


PAPACY  AND  HIERARCHY. 


41 


cessor  of  the  prince  of  the  apostles,  belongs  the  primacy  over  the 
church  of  the  whole  world — and  secular  power  as  well  (c.  1 1  ff. ). 

4.  But  the  hierarchial  ideals  were  carried  out  to  their  most 
extreme  details  in  the  Pseudo-Isidorian  decretals.  It  will  be 
necessary  for  us  to  note  scattered  utterances  occurring  in  the  doc¬ 
ument  and  gather  a  general  impression  from  them  taken  as  a 
whole.  The  priestly  estate,  particularly  the  bishops,  is  exalted 
in  unmeasured  terms  above  the  laity.  No  one  should  venture  to 
prosecute  them  before  the  law,  for  it  is  the  prerogative  of  Christ 
alone  to  pass  judgment  upon  them  (Clem.  ep.  1.  32b,  p.  40. 
Anaclet.  ep.  i.  3,  p.  62  f.  et  pas.).  Christ  is  the  head  of  the 
church,  “but  the  priests  act  by  legation  instead  of  Christ  in  the 
church.”  And,  just  as  his  church  is  joined  to  him,  so  are  the 
churches  joined  to  the  bishops,  to  everyone  according  to  his 
portion  (Evarist.  ep.  2.  4,  p.  90).  The  bishops  open  and  close 
the  gates  of  heaven,  and  their  decision  is,  therefore,  to  be 
accepted  even  if  they  be  in  error  (Clem.  ep.  1.  39,  p.  43). 
This  applies  with  especial  force  to  the  pope,  for  it  is  the  Lord’s 
will  that  the  church  at  large  shall  be  governed  in  doctrine  and 
life  by  the  Romish  church  (Anacl.  ep.  3.  34,  p.  84;  ep.  2.  24, 
p.  79.  Zephyrin.  c.  10,  p.  133,  etc.).  Accordingly,  no  one  but 
God  or  the  bishop  of  Rome  can  sit  in  judgment  upon  a  bishop 
(Melchiad.  ep.  1.  2  f. ,  p.  243  et  pas.).1  For  a  fuller  discussion 
see  Thomas. -Seeberg,  DG.  ii. ,  ed.  2.,  p.  187  ff.  It  was  thus 
definitely  settled  that  the  popular  catholic  conception  of  the 
church  should  prevail,  and  not  the  higher  ideal  of  Augustine, 
although  the  latter  was  still,  as  a  definition,  employed  until  even 
a  later  period.  The  church  is  the  hierarchy,  or  the  subjects 
(sulditi),  who  obey  the  prelates  (praelati') .  It  is  the  province 
of  the  hierarchical  state  to  direct  the  secular,  since  its  rulers 
have  the  truth  and  the  keys  of  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  There 
remained  some  elements  of  truth  in  these  theories  also,  but  the 
falsehood  in  them  was  more  potent  than  the  truth. 

§  43.  Repentance  in  Earlier  Middle  Ages. 

Literature.  Wasserschleben,  Die  Bussordnungen  der  abendl.  Kirche, 
1851.  Regino,  De  synodalibus  causis  et  disciplinis  ecclesiasticis,  11.  2.  ed. 
Wasserschleben,  1840.  Ps. -Augustin,  de  vera  et  falsa  poenitentia,  Aug.  opp. 
xvii.  i849ff.2  Schmitz,  Die  Bussbuecheru.  die  Bussdisciplin  d.  K.  1883.  Hil- 

1  The  fraudulent  tendency,  afterward  so  prominent,  is  manifest  in  these 
claims  (cf.  the  removal  of  the  episcopacy  from  the  jurisdiction  of  civil  and 
metropolitan  courts).  But  the  chief  gain  was  to  the  papacy.  Nicholas  I. 
accepted  the  new  theory  :  “The  decretal  letters  of  the  Roman  pontiff  are  to 
be  accepted,  although  they  are  not  joined  to  ( compaginatae )  the  codex  of 
the  canons.”  Mansi  Coll.  cone.  xv.  695. 

2  As  to  the  date  of  this  document,  which  Gratian  and  the  Lombard 


42 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


DEFRAND,  Unters.  iiber  d.  germ.  Poenitenzbb. ,  1851.  Morinus,  Comment, 
hist,  de  disci plina  in  administr.  sacr.  poenit.  Paris,  1651,  and  Venet.  1702. 
Steitz,  Das  rom,  Bussakr.  1854.  V.  Zezschwitz,  System  d.  kirchl.  christl. 
Katechetik  i.  485  ff.  K.  Muller,  Der  Umschwung  in  d.  Lehre  v.  d.  Busse, 
warend  d.  12  Jahrh.,  in  den  Abhandl.  f.  Weizsacker,  1892,  p.  289  ff. 
Hauck,  KG.  Deutschlands,  i.  212  ff.,  252b,  ii.  223 ff.,  664  ff.  Funk,  in 
Kirchenlexikon  ii.  1561  ff.  Loofs,  DG. ,  ed.  3,  p.  258  ff.  Moeller,  KG. 
ii.  105  ff. ,  206  ff. 

1 .  The  praxis  connected  with  public  repentance  in  the  ancient 
church  had  already  in  the  days  of  Augustine  been  to  some  extent 
abridged. 1  Upon  Germanic  territory  it  had  been  introduced,  both 
in  the  episcopal  courts  established  by  Charlemagne  and  in  a  strict 
{e.  g.,  Regino  ii.  1.  ff. )  ecclesiastical  form  (Morinus,  1.  vii.  c. 
2  ff. ) .  But  this  public  process  was  distasteful  to  the  Germans. 
In  England  it  could  not  be  introduced  at  all  (Theodor,  Poeni- 
tentiale  i.  13.  4,  p.  197,  Wassersch.),  and  even  in  the  Frankish 
empire,  despite  various  admonitions,  it  constantly  lost  ground 
(Hauck,  ii.  224  f. ).  It  became  practically  limited  by  the 
general  adoption  of  the  principle  that  ‘ ‘  the  repentance  of  those 
whose  sins  are  in  public  {in  publico')  should  be  in  public 
(Hraban.  de  clericor.  instit.  ii.  30  ;  cf.  decrees  of  the  Councils  of 
Rheims,  Mainz,  Chalons,  A.  D.  813.  Hefele,  iii.  758,  759,  765  ; 
De  vera  et  fals.  poen.  11.  26).  It  was  accordingly  only  gross 
actual  sins  which  were  regarded  as  demanding  public  repentance. 

2.  The  custom  of  Private  Repentance  now  arose  and  soon 
largely  usurped  the  place  of  the  public  ordinance.  It  was  a 
form  of  cloister  discipline  originating  in  Ireland  and  England, 
and  introduced  into  the  Frankish  empire  chiefly  through  Columba 
(about  A.  D.  700),  whence  it  spread  to  other  countries.  It 
was  at  first  not  required,  but  only  urgently  recommended 
(Counc.  of  Chalons,  813,  c.  33.  Hefele,  iii.  765);  but  as  it  grew 
customary,  it  became  also  a  positive  requirement  of  the  church. 
The  penitential  books  gave  directions  to  the  clergy  for  interro¬ 
gating  the  wrongdoer  concerning  his  sins,  and  determining  the 
appropriate  works  of  satisfaction  to  be  performed  by  him.  The 
system  was  certainly  not  without  beneficial  results  in  that  age. 
The  sinner  was  compelled  to  scrutinize  his  whole  life  in  search 
of  his  sins ;  he  was  induced  to  look  for  and  to  recognize  and 

already  cite  as  Augustinian,  vid.  Muller,  p.  292  ff.  10.  25  seems  to  prove 
that  the  author  was  acquainted  with  the  33d  canon  of  Chalons  (A.  D.  813). 
From  various  indications  I  would  assign  it  to  the  end  of  the  ninth  or  begin¬ 
ning  of  the  tenth  century.  Its  spuriousness  was  detected  already  by  the  criti¬ 
cal  eye  of  Busch  (Erl.  ed.,  27.  344.  Letters  i.  34). 

1  Vid.  Vol.  I.,  p.  364 n.  Cf.  Aug.  serm.  82,  7,  10 f . :  “Those  sins  are  to 
be  reproved  before  all  which  have  been  committed  before  all ;  those  are  to  be 
reproved  more  secretly  which  have  been  more  secretly  committed.”  For  fur¬ 
ther  details,  vid.  Morin,  v.  9. 


REPENTANCE  IN  EARLIER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


43 


mourn  as  sins,  not  only  gross  outward  offenses,  but  also  the  in¬ 
ward  evil  desire  itself  (Vinniaus,  poen.  2  ff. ,  17.  Columba,  poen. 
23,  35-  Theod.  poen.  i.  2.  21  f.  Halitgar,  poen.,  in  Morin, 
append.,  p.  8a.  Reg.  i.  304,  p.  147),  not  only  mortal  sins,  but 
their  ramifications  (Poen.  Merseb.  Wasserschl.,  p.  387  ff. 
Regino  i.  292,  304,  p.  146  f.  Corrector  Burchardi,  c.  181,  p. 
665  ).*  And  the  advice  was  given,  that  not  only  mortal  sins,  but 
every  sin  by  which  God  is  offended,  be  confessed  to  the  priest 
(Reg.  i.  292).  If  this  involves  a  deepening  of  the  religious  life, 
it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  closely  allied  to  a  lamentable  superficial¬ 
ity,  as  will  appear  if  we  examine  in  detail  the  practical  application 
of  the  system. 

3.  The  following  outline  of  the  theory,  while  keeping  private 
repentance  primarily  in  view,  is  applicable  also,  with  such  modi¬ 
fications  as  are  involved  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  to  the  public 
administration  of  the  ordinance  (vid.  Morin,  vii.  1.  21).  (<2) 

The  benignant  God  is  offended  by  sin  (de  ver.  et  fals.  poen.  8. 
20 ;  14.  29).  Venial  sins  are  absolved  (gelost)  by  the  use  of 
the  Lord’s  Prayer  (Vol.  I.,  p.  364  n.);  mortal  sins,  through  the 
fruits  of  repentance  {fructus  poenitentiae ,  de  ver.  et  fals.  poen., 
v.  10).  It  is  necessary  now  to  make  satisfaction  ( satisfacere ) 
through  suitable  repentance  ( condignam  poententiatn ,  Reg.  ii. 
429;  i.  303  :  condigna  satisfaction .  The  satisfaction  consists  in 
bearing  the  penalty  :  “  whatever  of  punishment  I  may  be  able  to 
devise,  that  may  suffice  for  thee”  (de  ver.  et  fals.  poen.  2.  4). 
Hence,  to  do  penance  is  to  bear  penalty  (poenitere  est  poenatti 
tenere ,  ib.  xix.  3 5).1  2  This  penalty  consists  in  sorrow  ( dolor )  of 
heart  on  account  of  sin,  which  should  continue  throughout  life 
(dolorem  cum  vita  finiat,  ib.  13.  28);  then  in  the  confessio  before 
the  priest  (or  even  before  a  layman),  which  in  itself  brings  a  large 
measure  of  satisfaction  (jnultum  satisfactionis,  ib.  10.  25);  and, 
finally,  in  the  performance  of  the  appointed  works  of  penance. 
He  who  has  done,  or  endured,  this  is  worthy  of  divine  mercy, 
since  he  has  rendered  satisfaction  to  the  divine  righteousness  (it 
is  necessary  ( oportet )  in  order  that  the  righteous  One  may  right¬ 
eously  show  mercy,  ib.  10.  25).  Reconciliation,  therefore,  can¬ 
not  really  occur  until  after  the  performance  of  the  works  of 
penance  (vid.  Vinn.  poen.  1.  35.  Benedikt  Lev.  c.  i.  116. 
Hraban.  de  cler.  inst.  ii.  30  ;  cf.  de  fals.  et  ver.  poen.  15.  31). 


1  Vid.,  e.  g.,  the  confessional  formula  in  Reg.  i.  304,  p.  147  ;  cf.  Alcuin, 
de  psalm,  usu,  pp.  2,  9  ;  Mi.  101,  p.  498  ff. 

2  In  addition  to  this  vindicative  character,  the  works  of  penance  have  also 
a  niedicinalv  alue.  Vid.,  e.  g .,  Vinn.  28  :  “So  that  it  cures  and  corrects  con¬ 
traries  by  contraries.”  Reg.  i.  292,  304,  p.  148:  retnedia  peccatorum  ;  cf. 
Alcuin,  de  confess,  peccator.  3. 


44 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


But  this  rule  was  not  observed.  On  the  contrary,  it  became  cus¬ 
tomary  to  admit  penitents  before  the  expiration  of  the  peniten¬ 
tial  period  to  the  “  fellowship  of  prayer”  ( communio  orationis ), 
and  also  to  full  fellowship  plena  communio')  (Theod.  poen.  i.  12. 
4,  and  many  citations  in  Morin,  ix.  16).  It  might  even  be 
granted  immediately  after  the  confessio  and  the  assignment  of  the 
works  of  penance  to  be  performed  (Morin,  ix.  1 7.  7  f. ).  In  such 
cases,  however,  the  subsequent  performance  of  the  required  pen¬ 
ances  was  taken  for  granted,  for  the  sinner  was  not  pardoned 
through  his  confession  alone  (dever.  et  fals.  poen.  18.  34).  The 
motives  for  this  hastening  of  the  process  were  of  a  practical 
nature,  i,  e .,  that  the  penitent  might  not  be  driven  to  despair  or 
alienated  from  the  church,  etc.  They  are,  of  course,  evident 
enough  in  the  case  of  those  who  secured  immediate  release  from 
the  penalties  imposed  by  the  payment  of  money.  He  who  thus 
experiences  sorrow  for  sin  and  confesses  the  same  to  the  priest 
has  changed  his  ?nortal  into  a  venial  sin  (de  ver.  et  fals.  poen. 
10.  25),  and  is  in  consequence  no  longer  subject  to  the  punish¬ 
ments  of  hell.  But  if  he  do  not  now  bring  forth  the  “  fruits  of 
repentance  ’  ’  in  works  of  penance,  he  will  have  to  endure  the 
fires  of  purgatory  ( ignis  purgatorius)  (ib.  18,  34).  f)  The 
sinner  applies  to  the  priest ;  the  latter  examines  him  strictly  in 
regard  to  his  sins,  assigns  the  atoning  works  to  be  performed,  and 
wishes  him  forgiveness.  The  sinner  confesses  his  sin  and  begs  for 
the  intercessio  of  the  priest,  as  well  as  of  Mary  and  the  saints 
(Alcuin,  de  psalm,  usu,  p.  2.  9.  Reg.  i.  304,  p.  147.  Halitgar 
in  Morin,  app.,  p.  6b.  Corrector  Burchardi,  182,  p.  666. 
Beichtanweisg.  Othmars,  Wasserschl.,  p.  43 7 ).1  The  priest 
prays  to  God  ( ‘ 4  Mayest  thou  deign  to  be  appeased,  ’  ’  placatus 
esse  digneris)  and  pronounces  the  absolution  :  “  God  Omnipo¬ 
tent  be  thy  helper  and  protector  and  grant  indulgence  for  thy 
sins,  past,  present,  and  future’  ’  (Reg.  i.  304,  p.  148.  Corr.  Burch., 
182,  p.  667.  Further  particulars  in  Morin,  viii.  8.  1  f. ,  c.  10  f. ). 
The  absolution  always  bears  this  deprecatory  character,  partly  in 
recognition  of  the  traditional  idea  that  God  alone  can  forgive 
sin  (August,  serm.  99.  9),  partly  in  view  of  the  immediate 
situation,  inasmuch  as  the  pardon  ( purgatio )  of  sins  could  not 
really  be  secured  until  the  works  of  penance  should  be  actually 
performed  (e.  g.,  Reg.  i.  304  fin.).  ( c )  An  important  feature 
of  the  system  is  seen  in  the  rede?nption  of  penances .  The  works 

1  The  way  was  prepared  for  later  theories  in  the  thesis:  “It  is  to  be 
believed  .  .  .  that  all  the  alms  and  prayers  and  works  of  righteousness  and 
mercy  of  the  whole  church  combine  ( succurrant )  ...  to  effect  conversion. 
Therefore,  no  one  can  worthily  repent  ( poenitere )  whom  the  unity  of  the 
church  does  not  sustain”  (de  ver.  et  fals.  poen.  12.  27  ;  11.  26). 


REPENTANCE  IN  EARLIER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


45 


of  penance  are  chiefly  :  Fasting  (bread  and  water  on  Monday, 
Wednesday,  and  Friday),  discarding  of  linen  clothing,  going 
barefoot,  pilgrimages  {peregrinatio) ,  entering  a  cloister,  scourg- 
ings  (introduced  by  Dominicus  Loricatus,  Petrus  Damiani, 
vid.  Morin,  vii.  13b).  It  became  customary  at  a  very  early 
period  to  substitute  other  good  works  for  the  required  penances. 
These  consisted  commonly  in  prayers  and  alms,  as  also  scourg¬ 
ing,  pilgrimages,  striking  the  hands  upon  a  pavement,  etc.  The 
German  system  of  legal  composition  for  crime  opened  the  way 
for  the  adoption  of  a  definite  system  for  such  “redemptions.” 
There  were  tariffs  fixing  the  character  and  amount  of  the  works 
of  substitution.  It  was  considered  a  special  advantage  of  the 
system  that  the  penitential  period  could  be  thus  shortened.  For 
example,  instead  of  one  day’s  fasting,  fifty  psalms  might  be  sung, 
or  three  denarii,  or  perhaps  one,  be  given  to  a  poor  person  ; 
for  one  year’s  fasting  there  must  be  twenty- two  solidi  given  in 
alms,  etc.  (Corr.  Burch.,  187  ff. ,  p.  671  ff.;  poen.  Merseburg, 
41.  Canones  Hibern.,  p.  139  f.  Beda,  poen.  10.  229  b 
Egbert  poen.  15  f.,  p.  246).  Worst  of  all,  it  was  considered 
allowable  to  hire  some  righteous  person  to  perform  these  works 
(Beda,  8,  p.  230.  Cummean.  poen.,  p.  463;  cf.  especially 
Morin,  x.  1 6  ff . ).  But  the  most  convenient  form  of  “redemp¬ 
tion  ”  was  by  the  payment  of  money,  which  had  a  precedent  in 
Germanic  law  (“  Wergeld,  ”  vid.  Schroeder,  Lehrb.  d.  deutsch. 
Rechtsgesch.,  1889,  pp.  75  f.,  330  ff.,  707). 1  Fixed  taxes  were 
imposed,  the  payment  of  which  exonerated  from  liability  to  pen¬ 
ance,  'e.g.:  “  If  anyone  is  not  able  to  fast  and  does  not  know 
the  psalms,  let  him  give  one  denarius  per  day  ;  and  if  he  has 
not  the  money,  let  him  give  as  much  food  as  he  eats.  For  one 
year  upon  bread  and  water  let  him  give  twenty-six  solidi  ’  ’  (  Poen. 
Merseberg.  42  ;  cf.  148.  Columba,  25.  Vinn.  35.  Poen. 
Vindob.  43.  Correct.  Burch.,  2  ff.,  50,  190,  195,  198).  The 
Council  of  Tribur,  A.  D.  895,  first  recognized  redemption  by 
money  also  for  public  penances  (vid.  Hefele,  iv.  558).  This  praxis 
was  extended  through  the  Crusade  movement.  The  journey  to 
the  holy  sepulchre  was  regarded  as  the  required  work  of  pen¬ 
ance  {iter  illud  pro  omni  poenitentia  reputetur ,  Council  of  Cler¬ 
mont,  A.  D.  1095,  vid.  Hefele,  v.  222).  But  not  only  such  as 
actually  took  the  journey  were  credited  with  the  performance  of 
this  penance,  but  also  any  person  who  furnished  the  necessary 
equipment  for  a  crusader.2  Since  great  multitudes  now  received 

1  On  the  other  hand,  it  was,  in  any  case,  but  a  step  from  penance  by  alms¬ 
giving  to  redemption  of  penance  by  money. 

2  The  comments  of  a  contemporary,  Leo  Cassinensis  in  his  chronicle  (iv. 
1 1 ),  are  worthy  of  note.  He  attributes  the  First  Crusade  directly  to  the  “  pen- 


46 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


absolution  immediately  after  confession,  this  became  everywhere 
the  usual  praxis  (Morin,  io.  20,  22).  But  inasmuch  as,  by  the 
fixed  rule  of  the  church,  the  forgiveness  of  sins  depended  upon 
penitence  and  confession,1  new  problems  arose  leading  to  further 
doctrinal  definitions.  It  was  necessary  particularly  to  clearly 
prove  the  legality  of  the  works  of  penance  as  required  after  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  had  been  already  granted,  as  also  the  right  of 
the  church  to  substitute  money  for  such  works  of  penance  and  to 
insist  upon  confession  to  the  priest  as  well  as  to  God.  To  these 
problems  Scholasticism  turned  its  attention  (vid.  sub.). 

4.  Both  the  best  and  the  worst  elements  in  the  Christianity  of 
the  Earlier  Middle  Ages  come  to  view  in  the  history  of  the  ordi¬ 
nance  of  repentance  :  on  the  one  hand,  the  vivid  sense  of  sinful¬ 
ness  (cf.  Hauck,  ii.  700  f. ;  iii.  289),  which  made  the  whole  life 
of  the  believer  a  perpetual  penitence  (de  ver.  et  fals.  poen.  12. 
28)  /  and  the  confidence  reposed  in  the  living  God  as  the  only 
One  who  is  able  to  help  ;3  on  the  other,  the  complete  external¬ 
izing  of  religion  by  the  theory  of  the  opus  operatum.  Com¬ 
pared  with  the  ancient  penitential  praxis,  there  are  here  new  fea¬ 
tures  of  great  importance  :  (a)  The  substitution  of  private  for 
public  penance.  (^)  The  extension  of  the  sphere  of  peniten¬ 
tial  discipline  to  a  wider  range  of  outward  conduct  and  into  the 
realm  of  inner  experience.  (<r)  The  consequent  representation 
of  man’s  relation  to  God  as  a  legal  one.  ( d )  The  introduction 
of  “redemptions”  for  penalties  prescribed.  But  just  at  this 
point  the  logical  sequence  of  the  theory  was  broken,  inasmuch  as 
( e )  the  reconciliation  of  the  sinner  was,  in  course  of  time,' made 
more  and  more  dependent  solely  upon  penitential  sorrow  and  con¬ 
fession.  (/)  This  led  to  a  transformation  of  the  conception  of 
repentance,  the  forgiveness  of  sins  being  associated  with  a 

itents”  of  the  age  who  were  unwilling  to  forego  the  carrying  of  arms  (Morin, 
x.  19.  7). 

1  Thus,  for  example,  in  Anselm,  Meditat.  4  fin.,  “  to  be  cleansed  ( mun - 
dart)  by  repentance  and  confession.”  But  forgiveness  is  located  in  the  con¬ 
fession  since  the  latter  embraces  in  itself  the  intention  of  the  repentant  one, 
e.  g.,  homil.  13  :  “  They  are  cleansed  in  the  very  confession  on  account  of 
the  repentance  which  they  are  about  to  exercise,  .  .  .  they  begin  to  work 
righteousness,  and  the  working  of  righteousness  i's  their  purification  ”  ( mun - 
datio  ) . , 

2  This  conception  is  frequently  met  with,  as  already  in  Eligius  of  Noyon  : 
omnis  vita  christiani  semper  hi  poenitentia  et  co?npunctione  debet  consistere 
(in  Hauck,  i.  289  n.  1). 

3  In  contrast  with  the  unevangelical  conception  of  repentance,  it  may  be 
well  to  call  attention  to  the  emphasis  laid  upon  faith  ( fiducia )  in  the  peniten¬ 
tial  praxis,  e.  g.,  Otmar  of  St.  Gall  in  Wasserschl.,  p.  437  :  “  swell  (surge) 
with  faith  and  true  credulity  cf.  de  ver.  et  fals.  poen.  5.  15  ;  7.  18.  Sor¬ 
row  for  sin  is  attributed  to  a  divine  inspiration  (ib.  17,  33  ;  cf.  Otmar,  1.  c., 
P-437)- 


REPENTANCE  IN  EARLIER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


47 


penitent  frame  of  mind  and  confession,  and  the  works  of  satis¬ 
faction  with  deliverance  from  purgatory.  It  was  only  after  this 
idea  had  become  prevalent  that  (g)  repentance  could  become  a 
sacrament  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term,  for  only  then  was  there 
thought  of  a  special  divine  gift  imparted  to  the  penitent,  whereas 
repentance  had  hitherto  consisted  merely  in  a  series  of  human 
transactions. 

Such  was  the  history  of  the  ordinance  of  repentance  from  about 
A.  D.  700  until  about  A.  D.  1100.  The  History  of  Doctrines 
must  present  it  with  clearness,  as  an  accurate  knowledge  of  it  is 
essential  to  a  correct  understanding  of  the  dogmas  formulated  in 
the  Reformation  period.  As  the  permission  of  the  redemptions 
gave  occasion  in  that  age  for  a  certain  evangelizing  of  the  con¬ 
ception  of  repentance,  so,  four  hundred  years  later,  opposition  to 
them  led  to  an  evangelizing  of  the  church. 


/ 


Tor  other  foundation  can  no  man  lay  than  that  i$  laid,  which  i$  3e$u$ 
Christ  How  if  any  man  build  upon  this  foundation  sold,  silver,  precious 
stones,  wood,  hay,  stubble;  every  man's  work  shall  be  made  manifest: 
for  the  day  shall  declare  it,  because  it  shall  be  revealed  by  fire ;  and  the 
fire  shall  try  every  man’s  work  of  what  sort  it  is.—/  Cor.  ///.  11-13. 


PART  II. 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES  IN  SCHOLASTIC  AGE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

FOUNDATIONS  OF  HIERARCHICAL  AND  RELIGIOUS  IDEALS  AND  OF 

SCHOLASTIC  THEOLOGY. 

§  44.  The  Church  and  the  World. 

1.  The  historical  result  of  the  movements  and  tendencies  within 
the  church  from  the  end  of  the  tenth  to  the  close  of  the  thirteenth 
century  is  found  in  the  reformatory  ideas  which  centered  at 
Cluny,  and  which  gradually  brought  the  church  under  their  con¬ 
trol.  It  was  an  ethical  reformation  which  was  sought.  A  check 
was  to  be  placed  upon  the  secularizing  of  the  cloisters,  the  rude¬ 
ness  and  immorality  of  the  clergy,  and  the  anarchy  which 
marked  the  social  life,  especially  under  the  domination  of  the 
robber-nobility.  It  was  a  genuinely  reformatory  idea — the  world 
was  to  adopt  the  principles  of  the  church,  and  the  church  was  to 
be  free  from  the  world.  But  both  objects  were  sought  in  the 
spirit,  and  by  the  means,  of  the  prevalent  type  of  piety.  The 
conception  of  the  “City  of  God  ”  ( civitas  dei )  began  to  be  re¬ 
garded  in  a  practical  way,  and  the  “  State  ”  of  Charlemagne  was 
abandoned.  Many  measures  were  employed,  such  as  the  revival 
of  the  religious  practices  of  Mysticism,  increased  severity  in 
cloister  discipline,  celibacy  of  the  priesthood,  repression  of 
simony,  i.  e. ,  investiture  by  civil  authorities,  the  complete  inde¬ 
pendence  of  church  property.  But  the  movement  was  soon 
combined  with  the  effort  to  realize  the  pseudo-Isidorian  ideals 
(p.  41),  which  were  interpreted  entirely  in  the  interest  of  the 
papal  power.  The  mystical  piety  of  the  ancient  Monasticism, 
the  pseudo-Isidorian  writings,  and  the  church  property  were  the 
ruling  motives  in  the  attempted  Reformation.  The  church  was 
actually  reformed  by  it ;  but  in  the  line,  of  course,  of  the  motives 
indicated.  It  promoted  the  religious  life  of  the  individual,  partly 
by  giving  a  marked  impulse  to  the  worship  of  saints  and  relics, 
the  craving  for  miracles,  superstition,  asceticism,  pilgrimages, 
etc.,  but  also  by  a  real  deepening  of  the  religious  sensibility. 


A 


5° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Cf.  Sackur,  Die  Cluniacenser  in  ihrer  kirchl.  u.  allgemeingesch. 
Wirksamkeit,  2  vols.,  1892-94 ;  Hauck,  KG.  Deutschl.  iii. 

445  459 

2.  The  movement  for  reform  opened  and  smoothed  the  path 
to  the  realization  of  the  pseudo-Isidorian  ideals  by  the  papacy. 
This  can  be  studied  to  advantage  in  the  work  of  Cardinal  Hum¬ 
bert :  Libri  tres  adv.  Simoniacos  (Mi.  143),  in  which  the  fol¬ 
lowing  line  of  progress  is  manifest :  Independence  of  the  civil 
authority  on  the  part  of  the  church,  its  officials  and  property  (iii. 
3,  5,  10),  and  therefore  of  the  investiture  by  secular  rulers, 
which  is  simony  (iii.  6,  11  f. );  denial  of  the  efficacy  of  the  sac¬ 
raments  when  administered  by  simonists,  since  simony  is  heresy 
and  can  bring  only  ruin  (ii.  20  ff.,  26  ff.,  34)  ;  summons  to  in¬ 
surrection  against  the  civil  government  (iii.  16). 1  The  life-work 
of  Gregory  VII.  aided  in  the  attainment  of  these  ideals.  His 
ideas  form  the  classical  expression  of  the  claims  of  the  papacy  in 
the  Middle  Ages.  In  the  twenty-seven  propositions  of  the 
Dictatus  attributed  to  him,  they  are  presented  with  precision 
(cf.  especially  Ep.  ad  Herimannum,  Registrum  viii.  21;  Jaffe 
Monum.  Gregoriana,  Mi.  148  ;  also  in  Mirbt,  Quellen  zur  Gesch. 
d.  Papsttums,  1895,  pp.  47-64):  The  Roman  church  has  never 
erred  and  never  will  err.  Only  he  is  catholic  who  agrees  with  it. 
Accordingly,  only  the  Roman  bishop  is  universa  /is;  he  has  author¬ 
ity  over  all  other  bishops,  whom  he  can  appoint  and  remove;  his 
legates  outrank  all  bishops.  The  other  bishops  are  only  his  substi¬ 
tutes  (registr.  i.  12,  60;  iv.  1 1 ),  and  it  is  their  duty  to  support  him 
even  to  the  extent  of  furnishing  soldiers  when  required  (reg.  vi.  17a; 
ep.  collectae  13  fin.).  “  To  him  alone  it  is  permissible  to  estab¬ 
lish  new  laws  according  to  the  need  of  the  time.  ’  ’  All  the  graver 
matters  of  dispute  in  any  portion  of  the  church  are  to  be  brought  be¬ 
fore  his  tribunal  (cf.  reg.  i.  17;  iv.  27).  “No  section  [of  a  law] 
nor  book  may  be  regarded  as  canonical  without  his  authority.”2 
The  pope  alone  decides  matters  at  councils  (reg.  iii.  10).  Only 
his  foot  is  kissed  by  the  princes.  He  can  remove  emperors,  but 
can  himself  be  judged  by  no  one.  The  canonical  ordination 
gives  him  sancity  :  “by  the  merits  of  the  blessed  Peter  he  is  in¬ 
fallibly  made  holy.  ”  He  is  not  only  the  lord  of  the  church, 

1  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  two  conceptions  of  the  relation  of  church  and 
state  existing  side  by  side.  On  the  one  hand  :  “  That  the  laity  are  forbidden  to 
take  charge  of  ecclesiastical  affairs  just  as  they  conduct  secular  affairs’ ’  (iii. 
9  in. );  on  the  other  hand  :  “Just  as  the  soul  is  higher  than  the  body  and 
instructs  it,  so  the  sacerdotal  dignity  excels  and  instructs  the  regal,  as,  e.  g.y 
the  celestial  the  terrestrial.  ...  It  is  the  duty  of  kings  to  obey  ecclesiastics” 
(iii.  21 ).  This  is  Augustinian,  but  Gregory  VII.  still  holds  the  same  position. 

2  In  Gratian  the  inscription  of  Part  I.  dist.  19,  c.  6  reads  :  “  The  decretal 
letters  are  counted  among  the  canonical  scriptures.” 


THE  CHURCH  AND  THE  WORLD. 


51 


but  universal  dominion  ( universale  regime n)  has  been  committed 
to  him,  and  he  is  “  prince  (brinceps )  over  the  kingdoms  of  the 
world”  (reg.  ii.  51,  75;  i.  63).  Upon  this  is  based  the 
supremacy  of  the  pope  over  civil  governments  and  their  princes. 
The  latter  are  to  receive  their  authority  in  trust  from  him 
(reg.  viii.  26,  23  ;  iv.  28).  They  stand  related  to  him  as  the 
moon  to  the  sun  (reg.  vii.  25  ;  iv.  24).  Independent  dominion 
on  their  part  is  based  on  sinful  pride.  As  they  are  notoriously 
dependent  upon  the  priests  in  spiritual  things,  since  they  cannot 
administer  ( conficere )  the  communion,  and  do  not  have  the 
power  of  the  keys,  so  it  is  a  valid  maxim  that  in  secular  affairs 
they  are  subject  to  the  pope  alone.  He  who  can  bind  and  loose 
in  heaven  can  surely  do  so  on  earth  (reg.  viii.  21).  “  But  if 

the  holy  apostolic  chair  judicially  determines  spiritual  things  by 
the  original  authority  divinely  granted  to  it,  why  not  also  sec¬ 
ular  things  ?  ”  (reg.  iv.  2).  The  power  of  the  keys  is  therefore 
the  magic  key  which  opens  up  to  the  pope  all  authority  (cf.  iii. 
10a;  vii.  14).  Gregory  indeed  allows  to  the  state  a  relative  in¬ 
dependence  (reg.  i.  19  ;  vii.  25  ;  cf.  Mirbt,  Stellg.  Aug.  inder 
Publicist,  desgreg.  Kirchenstreites,  1888,  pp.  91,  94  k ,  96),  but  it 
presupposes  the  willingness  of  the  state  to  serve  the  church  and 
obey  the  pope.  Thus  Gregory  had  given  currency  to  an  ideal  of 
the  papacy  whose  assumptions  could  not  be  surpassed.  The  in¬ 
fallible  pope  has  authority  over  body  and  soul,  the  world  and  the 
church,  time  and  eternity.  To  this  extreme  was  the  Augustinian 
idea  of  the  civitas  dei  carried.  He  who  opposes  the  pope  is  a 
heretic  (e.  g.,  Henry  IV. ;  vid.  reg.  iv.  7,  12  ;  viii.  21).1  All  these 
claims  rested,  in  the  last  analysis,  upon  the  objective  effect  of  the 
sacrament  of  ordination.  But  the  hierarchical  idea  was  carried 
too  far  by  Gregory  (cf.  Cyprian,  Vol.  I.,  p.  184)  when,  in  his 
struggle  against  the  marriage  of  priests  and  simony,  he  denied  the 
efficacy  of  the  consecration  of  schismatics  and  of  the  sacraments 
administered  by  them  (vid.  reg.  vi.  5b  ;  v.  14a  ;  iv.  2  and  ii).2 

3.  The  reform,  as  Gregory  regarded  it,  brought  the  church 

1  This  is  a  new  conception  of  heresy.  In  Irenseus,  heresy  was  the  denial  of 
the  ecclesiastical,  biblical  doctrine  ;  in  Cyril,  rebellion  against  the  ecclesiasti¬ 
cal  organization  (schism).  Now  it  is  opposition  to  the  hierarchy. 

2  Vid.  upon  these  conflicting  views  during  the  great  conflict  the  exhaustive 
discussion  of  Mirbt,  Publicistik  in  Ztalt.  Greg.  VII.,  pp.  378-446.  The  ac¬ 
ceptance  of  the  ecclesiastical  or  of  the  sacramental  conception,  alliance  with 
the  reformatory  movement  or  adherence  to  the  hierarchical  tradition,  deter¬ 
mined  the  position  taken  in  each  case  as  to  the  efficacy  of  the  simonistic  sacra¬ 
ments.  “  In  the  later  sects  which  rejected  the  sacraments  administered  by 
unworthy  priests  was  reaped  the  harvest  of  the  seed  which  the  popes  of  the 
eleventh  century  had  helped  to  sow.”  Mirbt,  p.  445  f.  As  to  Gregory’s  use 
of  the  ban  and  interdict,  vid.  ib.  pp.  202  ff.,  219  ff. 


52 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


into  the  most  intimate  relations  with  secular  life.  He  exalted 
the  hierarchical  idea  as  no  one  before  him  had  done,  but  at  the 
expense  of  reducing  the  church  to  the  position  of  a  political  fac¬ 
tor  in  worldly  affairs.  “  The  more  completely  the  religious 
spirit  of  the  Middle  Ages  subdued  the  world,  the  more  entirely 
must  the  church  become  the  world”  (vid.  Eicken,  Gesch.  u. 
Syst.  d.  mittellalt.  Weltanschauung,  1887,  p.  741).  Well  did 
Bernard  write  to  Eugene  III. :  “  To  evangelize  is  to  pasture  ;  do 
the  work  of  an  evangelist,  and  thou  fulfillest  the  work  of  a  pastor  ’  ’ 
(de  considerat.  iv.  3.  6).  Even  he  acknowledged  :  “  Some  are 
called  to  the  lot  of  care  ;  thou  to  plenitude  of  power  ”  (ib.  ii.  8. 
16),  and  this plenitudo  potestatis  was  the  dominion  over  church 
and  world.  Nowhere  is  the  secularization  of  the  church  in  this 
age  more  clearly  seen  than  in  the  impress  given  to  the  papal 
canon  law.  The  church  is  to  be  governed  by  the  laws  of  the 
papal  decretals.  They  have  binding  authority.  Collections  of” 
them  are  made,  and  they  constitute  the  law  of  the  church.  The 
body  of  laws  which  had  been  historically  developed  was  increased 
by  fraudulent  additions.  But,  in  the  last  resort,  above  this  posi¬ 
tive  law  stood  the  natural  law  of  reason  (vid.  supra,  Gregory’s 
argument  for  the  authority  of  the  pope  over  worldly  affairs).1 
The  legal  manuals  (Gratian’s  Decretal,  etc.)  were  the  control¬ 
ling  authority  for  the  theologians  of  the  day  upon  the  nature  and 
mission  of  the  church.  Since  the  church  had  become  the  world, 
it  was  to  be  governed  by  the  “  divine  ecclesiastical  law.”  To 
portray  the  struggles  between  the  papal  and  the  national  concep¬ 
tions  of  fundamental  law,  which  continued  until  the  Concordat 
of  Worms  (A.  D.  1122),  is  not  the  province  of  the  History  of 
Doctrines. 

Cf.  upon  paragraphs  2  and  3,  Mirbt,  Die  Publicistik  im  Ztalt.  Greg.  VII., 
1894.  Martens,  Greg.  VII.,  2  vols.,  1894.  Hauck,  KG.  Deutschl.  iii. 
752  ff.,  844  ff.  Von  .Schulte,  Gesch.  derQuellend.  Ivirchenrechts  i.,  1875. 
Von  Doellinger,  Das  Pabsttum,  1892,  p.  40  ff.  Moeller,  KG.  ii.  283  ff.. 
Mueller,  KG.  i.  436  ff.,  447  ff. 

§  45.  Christianity  of  St.  Bernard. 

But  the  agitation  for  reform  became  the  occasion  also  of  an 
actual  revival  and  deepening  of  personal  piety.  The  best 
thoughts  of  Augustine  were  revitalized.  Reverent  speculation 
(Anselm)  drew  inspiration  from  his  writings,  as  well  as  that  mys¬ 
tical  absorption  in  Christ  which  Bernard  of  Clairvaux  (f  A.  D. 
1153)  so  vividly  portrayed  to  the  piously  inclined  in  the  Middle 

1  Cyprian  already  appealed — when  it  suited  his  purpose — to  the  “sound 
mind”  in  opposition  to  tradition  (Vol.  I.,  p.  184). 


CHRISTIANITY  OF  ST.  BERNARD. 


53 


Ages.  To  gain  a  knowledge  of  the  compass  of  his  religious 
thought,  we  must  study  his  homilies  upon  the  Song  of  Solomon 
(Mi.  182).  (0)  The  strongest  feature  of  Bernard  is  the  energy 

with  which  he  leads  the  souls  of  his  hearers  and  readers  to  immerse 
themselves  in  the  contemplation  of  the  humanity  of  Jesus,  par¬ 
ticularly  his  passion.  “  For  what  is  so  efficacious  for  the  curing 
of  the  wounds  of  conscience,  and  for  the  clarifying  of  the  vision 
of  the  mind  as  sedulous  meditation  upon  the  wounds  of  Christ?  ” 
(sermo.  62.  7).  We  should  allow  the  contemplation  of  his 
passion  to  lie  upon  our  breast  like  a  bundle  of  myrrh  (43.  1  ff. ). 
Thus  God  draws  near  to  us  in  the  man  Jesus,  and  his  love  is  re¬ 
vealed  to  us  (61.  4;  20.  2  ;  11.  9).  (6)  This  love  now  awakens 
a  responsive  affection  in  our  hearts  (20.  7;  11.  7).  Devout 
contemplation  of  the  man  Jesus  leads  us,  further,  to  a  blessed 
union  with  his  divinity.  It  is  the  “  outgoing  of  a  pure  mind  into 
God,  or  a  pious  descent  of  God  into  the  soul.  Let  it  receive 
him,  gliding  from  heaven,  with  the  deepest  emotions  and  with 
the  very  marrow  of  the  heart”  (31.  6).  Ecstatic  contemplation 
is  the  personal  experience  ( proprium  expervnentum')  (3.  1.)  of 
the  soul.  It  is  a  blessed  and  delightful  embrace  between  the 
loving  soul  and  its  beloved  (7.  2  ;  73.  10;  75.  1  ;  74.  4.).  The 
heavens  are  opened,  new  ideas  flow  down  from  above  into  the 
heart,  which,  like  a  fountain,  pours  forth  from  within  the  words 
of  wisdom.  There  is  the  bridegroom  present  (74.  5  ;  69.  6). 

( c )  But  only  he  can  obtain  this  goal  who  produces  the  fruits  of 
repentance  in  pious  works  (3.  2-4;  18.  5  f. ;  67.  8;  11.  2), 
who  follows  Jesus  as  his  teacher,  and  seeks  to  follow  his  example 
beneath  sufferings  and  the  cross  (22.  7;  21.  2;  61.  7;  47.  6; 
20.  7).  He  himself  gives  the  needful  power  to  this  end  :  ‘‘I 
thus  receive  examples  for  myself  from  the  man  and  aid  from  the 
MightyOne”  (15.6).  “  If  I  with  the  name  call  to  mind  Jesus  the 
man,  meek  and  lowly  of  heart,  kind,  sober,  chaste,  merciful,  and 
conspicuous  for  everything  honorable  and  holy,  and  the  same  as 
the  omnipotent  God,  who  both  restores  me  by  his  example  and 
strengthens  me  by  his  aid.”  (<rf)  But  Bernard  does  not  himself 
attain  to  a  regular  and  constant  life  with  Christ.  The  enchant¬ 
ing  blessedness  of  pious  contemplation  gives  place  to  hours  of 
poverty,  vacuity,  and  obtuseness  of  spirit  (9.  3  ;  14.  6  ;  32. 
2,  4;  74.  4).  From  this  Bernard  did  not  draw  the  inference 
of  Quietism,  but  emphasizes  the  truth  that,  in  addition  to  the 
contemplative  life,  the  active  life  with  the  good  works  of  love  is 
also  necessary  (58.  3;  85.  13;  cf.  de  diligendo  deo  10): 
Martha  is  the  sister  of  Mary  (51.  2).  This  is  all  purely  a  gift  of 
grace.  “  Grace  restores  me  to  myself,  justified  freely  and  thus 
liberated  from  the  service  of  sin  ”  (67.  10  ;  cf.  Ritschl,  Rechtf. 


54 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


u.  Vers.  i.  mfF. ).  But  Christ  has  two  feet,  mercy  and  judg¬ 
ment.  If  we  were  to  cling  only  to  the  first  or  the  second,  the 
result  would  be  most  injurious  security  or  despair.  We  should, 
therefore,  grasp  both  feet  at  once  (6.  8,  9).  (<?)  Bernard  here 

follows  a  suggestion  found  in  Augustine  :  ‘  ‘  The  humanity  of  Jesus 
is  a  way  to  (his)  divinity”  (vid.  Vol.  I.,  p.  361  n.);  but  when 
he,  the  preacher  of  Crusades,  makes  the  entire  practical  knowl¬ 
edge  of  God  dependent  upon  the  contemplation  of  the  good 
deeds  of  the  historical  Christ,  he  goes  beyond  Augustine.  For 
him — and  in  this  he  fixes  the  type  of  piety  for  the  Middle  Ages — 
the  whole  of  Christianity  is  an  imitation  of  Christ.  His  Christ 
is  not  merely  a  dogmatic  formula,  not  only  the  eternal  judge  of  the 
world,  but  the  actual  historical  Christ,  the  personal  revelation  of 
God,  and  he  led  the* way  in  apprehending  this  Christ  in  a  relig¬ 
ious  way.  But  these  ideas  were  interspersed  with  the  demands 
of  the  Areopagite  Mysticism.  Communion  with  Christ  is  at  best 
attainable  only  in  the  ecstatic  state.  Hence,  in  the  contempla¬ 
tion  of  the  historical  Christ,  the  soul  does  not  after  all  experience 
a  revelation  of  the  living  and  present  Lord,  and  such  contempla¬ 
tion  is  only  the  bridge  by  which  to  reach  the  ecstatic  union. 

Cf.  Neander,  D.  h.  Bern.  u.  s.  Ztalter  ed.  Deutsch,  1889-90.  Reuter, 
Ztschr.  f.  KG.,  1877,  36  ff.  Ritschl,  Geschichte  d.  Pietism.,  p.  46  ff. 
Seeberg-Thomas.,  DG.  ii.  2,  p.  267  ff. 

§  46.  History  of  Theology  front  Anselm  to  Peter  the  Lombard. 

Bulaeus,  hist,  universit.  Paris,  1655.  Denifle,  die  Universitaten  d.  MA.  i. 
1885.  Kaufmann,  Gesch.  d.  deutsch.  Univ.  i.  1888.  Haureau,  Hist,  de 
la  philosophic  scolastique,  2  parts  in  3  vols.,  ed.  2,  1873.  NlTSCH,  Art. 
Scholastik,  PRE.  xiii.  Reuter,  Gesch.  d.  rel.  Aufklarung  im  MA.,  2  vols., 
1:875-77 .  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik  im  Abendlande,  4  vols.,  1855  ff.  Ueber- 
weg-Heinze,  Gesch.  d.  Philos,  ii.,  ed.  7,  1883.  Ritter,  Gesch.  d.  Philos., 
vols.  vii.  and  viii. ,  1844-45.  Erdmann,  Gesch.  d.  Philos.  1,  ed.  4,  1896. 
Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos,  d.  MA.,  2  vols.,  1864!.  Willmann,  Gesch.  d. 
Idealism.,  vol.  ii.,  1896,  p.  321  ff.  Lowe,  der  Ivampf.  z.  d.  Nominalism,  u. 
Realism.,  1876.  Schwane,  DG.  d.  mittleren  Zeit,  1882.  Thomasius- 
Seeberg,  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  55  ff.  Harnack,  DG.  iii.  512  ff.,  419  ff. 

1.  The  term,  Scholasticism,  is  used  to  designate  the  theology 
of  the  period  from  Anselm  and  Abelard  to  the  Reformation,  i.  e. , 
the  theology  of  the  Later  Middle  Ages.  Its  peculiarity,  briefly 
stated,  consists  in  the  logical  and  dialectical  working  over  of  the 
doctrine  inherited  from  the  earlier  ages.  The  History  of  Doc¬ 
trines  cannot  attempt  to  present  an  exhaustive  history  of  the 
genesis  and  progress  of  the  scholastic  method,  nor  to  note  in  de¬ 
tail  all  the  doctrines  espoused  by  the  scholastics,  as  it  would  thus 
invade  the  domain  of  the  History  of  Theology.  It  is  our  task 
simply  to  trace  the  scholastic  theology  in  so  far  as  it  was  influen- 


FROM  ANSELM  TO  PETER  THE  LOMBARD. 


55 


tial  in  the  creation  of  new  dogmas  (the  sacraments)  or  in  the 
modification  of  the  traditional  dogma  (Augustinianism).  The 
material  to  be  selected  must  be  such  as  will  illustrate  the  influence 
exerted  by  the  reformatory  and  anti- reformatory  movements 
(Councils  of  Trent  and  the  Vatican)  in  the  moulding  of 
dogmas. 

As  to  the  arrangement  of  the  material,  the  question  arises 
whether  we  shall  present  the  scholastic  doctrines  as  a  whole  in 
the  various  stages  of  their  development  (Harnack,  Loofs),  or 
trace  each  separate  doctrine  in  its  historical  development  through¬ 
out  the  entire  scholastic  period  (Schwane,  Thomasius).  Much 
can  be  said  in  favor  of  either  method  ;  but  we  decide  upon  the 
former,  although  in  pursuing  it  we  can  scarcely  avoid  some  repe¬ 
titions,  for  the  reason  that  the  historical  development  can  be  thus 
so  much  more  clearly  seen.  The  method  cannot,  of  course,  be 
carried  out  to  its  full  extent,  as  the  result  would  be  a  history  of 
scholastic  theology. 

2.  The  beginnings  of  Scholasticism  were  closely  associated 
with  the  pedantic  methods  employed  in  the  study  of  theology  in 
the  cloister  schools  (the  schools  of  Tours  and  of  Bee  were  of 
great  importance)  and  in  the  universities,  which  began  to  appear 
in  the  early  part  of  the  thirteenth  century.  It  received  an  im¬ 
pulse  from  the  revival  of  interest  in  philosophy,  and  particularly 
in  dialectics,  which  was  enkindled  and  sustained  by  the  study  of 
Aristotle,  as  from  the  middle  of  the  twelfth  century  onward,  and 
especially  since  the  thirteenth  century,  theologians  became, 
partly  through  Arabian  literature,  better  acquainted  with  all  the 
works  of  Aristotle.  But  it  was  also  in  no  small  degree  the 
natural  logic  of  the  situation  which  led  to  Scholasticism.  If  the 
traditional  dogma  was  an  inviolable  legacy,  the  spirit  of  the  age 
could  be  exercised  upon  it  in  no  other  way  than  in  presenting  by 
dialectic  methods  the  evidence  of  its  harmony  with  sound  reason. 
This  tendency  first  arrested  the  attention  of  the  church  at  large 
in  the  controversy  of  Berenger  (f  A.  D.  1088). 1  He  appealed 
in  arguing  to  the  ratio ,  and  denounced  the  senselessness  (vecor- 
dia')  of  his  opponents ;  but  the  latter  met  him  with  arguments 
based  likewise  upon  reason  (<?.  g.9  Lanfranc).  There  was  an 
ever-widening  circle  of  disputants  who  either  depended  solely 
upon  rational  arguments  or  held  that  faith  should  at  least  find 
confirmation  in  the  deductions  of  reason.1 2  And  although  there 
may  have  been  some  theologians  who  were  content  to  simply  ac- 

1  As  to  earlier  instances,  vid.  Hauck,  KG.  Deutschl.  iii.  331  f.,  935,  952  f. 

2  Anselm  :  cur  deus  homo  ?  i.  2  fin. :  “  They  ask  the  reason  because  they  do 
not  believe,  but  we  because  we  believe  ;  yet  that  which  we  ask  is  one  and  the 
same  thing.” 


56 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


cept  the  doctrines  received  by  tradition,  theirs  was  not  the  future 
(vid.  Hauck,  iii.  956  b ,  963  f. ). 

Two  theologians  are  to  be  considered  as  the  founders  of 
Scholasticism,  Anselm  of  Canterbury  (f  A.  D.  1109)  and  Peter 
Abelard  (f  A.  D.  1142). 

The  contributions  of  Anselm  to  the  general  history  of  Scholasti¬ 
cism  consist  in  the  following  particulars  :  ( a )  He  possessed  a  great 
talent  for  formulation,  having  the  ability  to  express  the  traditional 
ideas  in  forms  which  would  arrest  the  attention  of  his  own  age. 
His  work,  Cur  deus  homo  ?  is,  e.  g.,  a  masterpiece  in  this  respect, 
since  Anselm  here  taught  his  contemporaries  to  apprehend  the 
meaning  of  redemption  under  the  conceptions  of  the  then  prev¬ 
alent  penitential  praxis  (satisfaction),  {b)  He  maintained  the 
realism  of  universals.  Boetius  had,  in  the  commentary  accom¬ 
panying  his  translation  of  the  Isagoge  of  Porphyry,1  left  the  ob¬ 
jective  existence  of  universalia ,  or  genera  and  species,  an  open 
question  ;  but  in  the  commentary  accompanying  his  translation  of 
Victorin  he  pronounced  in  its  favor.  The  so-called  Nominalis¬ 
tic  view,  according  to  which  the  general  conceptions  are  not 
realities  ( res ),  but  only  sounds  ( voces )  and  names  ( nomina ), 
was  derived  also  from  a  passage  in  Boetius,  in  which  the  latter 
asserts  that  the  reality  {res')  is  apprehended  by  the  mind  ( intel - 
lectus),  and  given  expression  by  means  of  the  voice  {vox). 
These  problems  were  discussed  at  an  early  period.2  Anselm 
became  involved  in  the  controversy  through  Roscellin  of  Com- 
piegne,  who  applied  the  Nominalist  theory,  that  universals  are 
merely  subjective  conceptions  (breaths — flatus  voct),  to  the 
Trinity,  and  thus  approached  Tritheism  (vid.  Anselm,  ep.  ii.  35. 
41  ;  de  fid.  trin.  2.  3).  This  Anselm  considered  simply  foolish¬ 
ness.  To  him  universal  conceptions  appear  as  presenting  truth 
and  reality,  and  the  individual  species  as  simply  manifestations  of 
the  ge?iera.  Thought  is  trustworthy  only  as  it  looks  to  the  uni¬ 
versal  (vid.  dial,  etverit.).  But  Anselm  did  not  further  develop 
these  ideas.  W e  have  an  evidence  of  his  view  in  the  Proslogium 
(cf.  c.  Gannilanum),  which  presents  the  ontological  proof  of  the 
existence  of  God,  i.  e.,  from  the  idea  of  God  his  real  existence  is 
inferred.  The  highest  can  be  thought  of  only  as  existent ;  therefore 
God  cannot  be  imagined  as  non-existent.  Existence  belongs  abso- 

1  The  passage  of  Porphyry  is  as  follows :  Concerning  genera  and  species  I 
decline  to  say,  indeed,  whether  they  subsist  or  are  located  in  the  bare  intel¬ 
lect  alone  ;  whether  they  are  corporeal  or  incorporeal  substances  ;  and  whether 
they  are  located  apart  from  sensible  things  or  insensible  things,  and  existing  in 
connection  with  them.v 

2  Vid.  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik,  ii.  n8ff.,  41  ff.  Barach,  Zur  Gesch.  d. 
Nominalism,  vor  Roscell.,  1866;  also  Gunzo  v.  Novara,  Mi.  136.  1294;  cf. 
Hauck,  iii.  331. 


FROM  ANSELM  TO  PETER  THE  LOMBARD.  57 

lutely  to  the  highest  being  (c.Ga/fnil.  3  ff . ) .  (V)  The  object  of  theo-  \ 
logical  research  is  faith,  of  which  Anselm  has  a  two-fold  concep¬ 
tion.  He  first  interjects  into  subjective  faith  the  idea  of  a  striv¬ 
ing  after  knowledge,  which  leads  to  the  rule  :  “  The  Christian 
ought  to  advance  through  faith  to  knowledge,  not  to  come 
through  knowledge  to  faith,  nor,  if  he  cannot  know,  recede  from 
faith.  But  when  he  is  able  to  attain  to  knowledge  he  rejoices  ; 
and  wrhen  unable  he  reveres  that  which  he  is  unable  to  grasp  ’  ’  (ep. 
ii.  41).  Faith  is  always  the  necessary  beginning  of  knowledge. 

We  must  always  first  of  all  grasp  the  object  as  such.  Only  then 
can  an  experience  ( experientia )  of  it  be  attained,  and  this  then 
leads  to  a  knowledge  ( intelligere )  of  it  (de  fide  trinit.  2).  This 
is  the  familiar  “  faith  seeking  knowledge  :  I  believe,  in  order  that 
I  may  know”  (proslog.  1  ;  meditat.  21  ;  cur  deus  homo?  1.  2). 

It  is  a  tending  toward  God  {tender e  i?i  dewn,  monolog.  75  f. ). 

Just  what  Anselm  meant  by  this  faith  becomes  evident  when  we 
consider  the  other  requirement  associated  with  the  above,  that 
the  faith  of  the  Catholic  church,  i.  e.,  the  faith  of  the  three 
symbols  (Apostolic,  Constantinopolitan,  and  Athanasian,  vid.  ep. 
ii.  41),  is  to  be  maintained  (de  fide  trinit. 2  in.),  and  this  even 
though  knowledge  (the  intelligere')  in  the  matter  be  denied  to  the 
intellect  (monolog.  64).  This  faith,  accordingly,  which  reaches 
a  higher  stage  in  knowledge,  is  the  acceptance  of  the  teachings 
of  the  church  as  true,  which  is  at  the  same  time  a  “tending 
toward  God,”  and,  just  on  this  account,  attains  its  summit  in  love 
(monolog.  76  f. ).  This  is  the  Catholic  conception,  {d)  With  • 
this  conception  of  faith,  it  is  easy  to  comprehend  how  Anselm 
could  undertake  (cur  deus  homo?  i.  1  fi,  10,  20,  25  ;  ii.  9,  11, 

15  ;  de  fide  trinit.  4)  to  establish  the  faith  of  the  church  (incar¬ 
nation,  existence  of  God,  Trinity)  “  by  reason  or  necessity,”  and 
could  believe  that  he  had  “  by  reason  alone  made  manifest  not 
only  to  Jews  but  even  to  pagans  ”  (ib.  ii.  23)  the  necessity  for 
the  incarnation.  The  speculative,  rationalistic  character  of 
Scholasticism  is  here  betrayed.  The  intellectual  independence 
of  the  system,  the  energetic  penetration  into  the  nature  of 
things  which  we  observe,  for  example,  in  Duns  Scotus,  has  its 
first  great  representative  in  Anselm.  Cf.  Reuter,  Gesch.  d. 
Aufkl.  im  MA.  i.  297  ff.  R.  Seeberg,  Die  Theologie  des  Duns 
Scotus,  1900,  pp.  3  ff. ,  599  ff.  Ans.  Werke,  ed.  Gerberon,  1675, 
in  Mi.  158-59;  cf.  Hasse,  A.  v.  C.,  2  vols.,  1843-52.  Rule, 

Life  and  Times  of  St.  Ans.,  2  vols.,  1883. 

3.  Anselm  is  commonly  called  the  father  of  Scholasticism,  but 
if  we  regard  the  entire  movement,  the  title  of  honor  belongs 
rather  more  fully  to  Abelard.  *  This  wide-awake,  richly  endowed, 
and  keen  spirit  furnished  a  wealth  of  suggestions,  both  positive 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


58 

and  negative,  which  continue  to  exert  a  marked  influence  upon 
the  development  of  Scholasticism,  whereas  Anselm’s  views  upon 
particular  points,  even  his  discussions  of  the  atonement,  seldom 
find  an  echo  in  the  subsequent  periods.  At  one  time,  indeed, 
in  the  history  of  English  theology,  the  spirit  of  Anselm  exerted 
an  important  influence.  (#)  When  Abelard  in  his  Sic  et  Non 
(ed.  Henke  et  Lindenkohl,  1851)  collected  a  number  of  mu¬ 
tually  contradictory  passages  from  the  Bible  and  patristic  litera¬ 
ture,  he  introduced  the  method  by  which  Scholastic  dialectics 
sought  to  reconcile  these  discrepancies  (Sic  et  Non,  pro|. ,  p. 
1349,  Mi.).  (^)  He,  too,  placed  ratio  beside  jides.  He  op¬ 

poses  as  well  the  “  pseudo-dialecticians  ”  who  think  that  they 
can  prove  everything  (theol.  christ.  iii. ,  p.  1226  f. ,  1212  f., 
1218)  as  the  mere  authority-faith,  which  makes  faith  rest  only 
in  the  mouth  and  not  in  the  heart.  ‘  ‘  Not  because  God  said 
anything  is  it  believed,  but  because  it  has  been  proved  to  be  so 
it  is  accepted”  (introductio  ad  theol.  ii.  3,  p.  1050).  Faith 
is  the  foundation.  Faith,  particularly  the  trinitarian  faith,  is, 
according  to  Athanasius,  necessary  to  salvation  (ib.  i.  4  ff. ). 
Faith  is  not  to  be,  properly  speaking,  proved,  but  only  made 
clear  and  probable  to  reason  (ib.  ii.  2,  p.  1040;  theol.  christ. 
iii. ,  p.  1227).  Yet  there  was  in  this  thinker  an  independent  atti¬ 
tude  toward  tradition  which  was  foreign  to  his  age.  The  writ¬ 
ings  of  the  fathers  are  to  be  read  ‘  ‘  not  with  the  necessity  of  be¬ 
lieving,  but  with  the  liberty  of  judging.  ’  ’  Inquiry  is  the  chief 
key  of  knowledge,  “for  by  doubting  we  come  to  inquiry,  and 
by  inquiring  we  discover  the  truth.”  He  halts  only  when 
brought  face  to  face  with  “  the  excellency  of  the  canonical  au¬ 
thority  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments.”  Here  no  error  is 
possible.  If  it  appears  so,  either  the  codex  or  the  interpretation 
must  be  defective.  The  opinions  of  later  writers  may  be  errone¬ 
ous  “unless  it  can  be  defended  either  by  sure  reason  ( certa 
ratione )  or  that  canonical  authority  ,J1  (Sic  et  Non,  prol.  Mi.,  p. 
1347).  These  principles  are  not,  however,  always  adhered  to. 
In  his  expositions  of  the  Trinity,  as  well  as  in  his  theory  of  the 
atonement,  there  is  a  very  prominent  rationalistic  tendency,  as 
judged  by  the  prevailing  view  of  the  age.1  2  An  illustration  of  his 

1  Cf.  Reuter,  Aufklar,  i.  224  ff.,  326  ff.  His  judgment  of  Abelard  is,  how¬ 
ever,  in  keeping  with  the  tendency  of  the  book,  one-sided.  He  has  no  sym¬ 
pathy  with  the  healthful  tone  in  Abelard’s  theology,  but  sees  him  too  largely 
through  the  spectacles  of  Bernard.  Vid.,  on  the  other  hand,  Deutsch, 
Pet.  Ab.,  1883,  p.  173  ff. 

2  Vid.  Abelard’s  tract,  condemned  at  Soissons,  A.  D.  1121,  De  unitate  et 
trinitate  dei,  ed.  Stolzle,  1891,  and  also  the  Theologia  christ.  The  leading 
proposition  reads  :  “  Thus  it  is,  therefore,  that  God  is  three  persons,  ...  as 
if  we  say  that  the  divine  substantia  is  powerful,  wise,  good  ;  or,  rather,  that  it 


FROM  ANSELM  TO  PETER  THE  LOMBARD. 


59 


intellectual  independence  is  seen  in  his  expositions  of  the  Trinity. 
He  maintains  the  unity  of  substance  and  the  personal  trinity. 
He  teaches,  in  full  harmony  with  Augustine,  ‘  ‘  each  one  of  the 
three  persons  is  the  same  substance”  (de  un.  et  trin.  32,  36, 
76),  and  he  rejects  Sabellianism  ;  but  he  thinks  that,  although 
the  divine  attributes  and  works  belong  without  division  to  the 
entire  Godhead,  yet  in  a  special  and  peculiar  way  ( specialiter 
et  proprie')  power  pertains  to  the  Father,  wisdom  to  the  Son, 
goodness  to  the  Spirit.  That  this  attempt  to  interpret  the 
Trinitarian  idea  was  essentially  inferior  to  the  method  in¬ 
herited  from  Augustine  will  scarcely  be  affirmed.1  (/)  It  is 
to  be  remarked,  further,  that  Abelard  proposed  a  new  method 
of  dividing  systematic  theology.  In  the  Tntroductio  ad  theolo- 
giam  has  been  preserved  for  us  only  a  fragment  of  his  dogmatic 
scheme.  This  great  work  was  arranged  under  the  headings : 
fides ,  sacr amentum,  caritas  (introd.  i.  init. ).  Four  works  have 
been  preserved  whose  intimate  dependence  upon  Abelard  is  evi¬ 
dent  from  the  adoption  of  this  scheme  and  from  many  internal 
indications  :  The  Epitome  theol.  christ.  (first  edited  by  Rheinwald 
in  1835);  the  anonymous  Sentences  of  the  Convent  Library  at  St. 
Florian ,  preserved  only  in  manuscript ;  the  Sentences  of  Mag- 
ister  Omnebene ,  likewise  only  in  manuscript ;  and  the  Sentences 
of  Roland  (afterward  Pope  Alex.  III.,  ed,  Gietl,  1891;  cf. 
Denifle,  Ab.  Sentenzen  u.  die  Bearbeitungen  seiner  Theol.  in 
Archiv  f.  Litt.  u.  KG.  d.  MA.  i.,  402  ff. ,  584  ff. ,  especially 
419  ff.,  603  ff. ).  Among  the  disciples  of  Abelard  was  Peter 
the  Lombard,  of  whom  further  notice  must  betaken.  Abelard’s 
arrangement  of  topics  preserved  in  a  very  marked  way  for  the 
doctrine  of  the  sacraments  the  position  which  that  doctrine  held 
in  the  religious  life  of  the  Middle  Ages.  In  correcting  the 
scheme  of  Augustine’s  Enchiridion  by  substituting  the  sacra¬ 
ments  for  the  second  heading  of  the  latter,  i.  e.,  hope,  he  proves 
his  dogmatic  talent.  It  is  this,  too,  which,  to  a  great  extent  has 


-is  power  itself,  wisdom  itself,  goodness  itself”  (de  unit,  et  trin.,  pp.  3,  2, 
62). 

1  At  the  basis  of  Abelard’s  theory  lies  the  correct  conviction  that  the  inter¬ 
pretations  of  the  Trinity  must  set  forth  the  three-fold  life  as  personal,  which  is 
not  the  case  in  the  analogues  of  subject  and  object,  appointer  and  appointed. 
But  Abelard  himself  falls  into  the  same  error  when  he  compares  the  Trinity 
with  matter  and  object  formed  of  matter  ( materia  et  materiatuni) ,  and  with 
wax  and  waxen  figure  (theol.  chr.  iv. ,  p.  1288,  Mi.);  whilst,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  declarations  that  the  persons  of  the  Trinity  are  related  to  one  an¬ 
other  as  different  names  for  the  same  object,  e.  g.,  mucro  and  gladius  (de 
unit,  et  trin.,  pp.  51,  6),  as  attributes  to  the  soul  (p.  68),  as  the  three  gram¬ 
matical  persons  when  applied  to  the  same  individual  (pp.  63,  70),  lie  very 
close  to  the  Sabellian  theory. 


6o 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


given  him  such  an  important  influence  upon  the  development  of 
Christian  doctrine.  (d)  We  must  note,  finally,  the  place  of 
Abelard  in  discussions  of  the  theory  of  perception.  His  teacher, 
William  of  Champeaux,  had  advocated  an  extreme  Realism, 
maintaining  that  universals  are  the  true  realities,  which  are  present 
entire  and  undivided  in  all  individuals,  so  that  the  latter  do  not 
differ  essentially,  but  their  differences  are  produced  simply  by 
the  variety  of  their  accidents  (Abal.,  hist,  calamitatum,  2,  Mi. 
178,  119).  Abelard  forced  his  instructor  to  a  modification  of 
this  view  (vid.  Deutsch,  p.  103  f. ,  n.).  His  own  utterances 
upon  the  question  are  not  entirely  clear.  On  the  one  hand, 
general  conceptions  not  only  have  a  subjective  existence,  but 
they  are  called  into  being  as  thus  subjective  by  virtue  of  the 
nature  of  things.  They  are  thus  objective  in  so  far  as  begot¬ 
ten  of  objective  things  and  subjective  in  so  far  as  existing 
only  in  the  subject  (cf.  Glossulae  super  Porphyr.  opp.  ed.  Cousin 
ii.  761).  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  Abelard  deduces  the  species 
from  the  genus  through  the  influence  of  the  form,  according  to 
the  common  realistic  theory  (cf.  Prantl,  ii.  177  ff. ).  There  are 
not  wanting  in  his  writings,  however,  utterances  which  betray  a 
certain  mistrust  of  the  conception  of  universals  (vid.  Deutsch,  p. 
106  ff. ).  His  view  cannot  now  be  reproduced  with  certainty, 
but  his  limitations  of  Realism  were  not  lost  upon  succeeding 
ages.  Works  of  Abelard,  edited  by  Cousin,  1849-59,  Mi. 
178.  Cf.  Deutsch,  Pet.  Abalard,  1883. 

4.  The  first  half  of  the  twelfth  century  witnessed  a  remarkable 
intellectual  activity.  On  the  one  hand  were  those  professores  di- 
alecticae ,  whose  arrogance  was  so  great  that,  “  despising  the  uni¬ 
versal  authorities,”  they  thought  themselves  able  to  comprehend 
everything  by  their  little  reasonings  ( ratiunculis )  (Ab.  theol. 
christ.  iii.,  pp.  1218,  1212  f.);  on  the  other  hand,  the  the¬ 
ology  of  Abelard  and  his  widespread  following  (Denifle,  Archiv. 

i.  613  f. ).  A  storm  of  opposition  now  arose  against  the  Master. 
It  was  charged  that  the  faith  of  simple  believers  was  ridiculed  by 
him,  the  mysteries  of  God  emptied  of  their  meaning,  the  Fathers 
scorned — that  “  human  genius  was  usurping  all  things  to  itself,” 
that  Abelard  proclaimed  a  new  “  fifth  Gospel  ”  (Bernh.  deerrori- 
bus,  Abael.  5.  12;  cf.  Wilhelm  v.  St.  Thierry  in  Mi.  180.  249  ff. ). 
Dialectics  was  declared  to  be  useless  and  foolish,  ridiculous,  and 
even  Satanic  (Joh.  of  Salisbury,  Walther  of  St.  Victor; 
vid.  Bulaeus,  hist.  univ.  Paris,  ii.  402,  629  ff.  Reuter,  1.  c., 

ii.  16  f.  Bach,  DG.  d.  MA.,  ii.  384  ff.).  Similarly  spoke 
Gerhoh  and  Arno  of  Reichersberg.  The  former  especially 
charges  Nestorianism  upon  the  dialectics  of  his  time  (vid.  De  in- 
vestigatione  Antichristi,  ed.  Scheibelberger,  1875,  and  Bach, 


FROM  ANSELM  TO  PETER  THE  LOMBARD.  6 1 

ii.  390-7 2 2 ).x  Abelard  was  confessedly  vanquished  by  his  oppo¬ 
nents  at  Soissons  (A.  D.  1 1 2 1 )  and  Sens  (A.  1).  1141).  The  agi¬ 
tation  led  to  various  attempts  to  present  the  “positive  theology” 
in  systematic  form.  The  work  of  Honorius  Augustodunensis 
(Augsburg  or  Autun),  in  which  he  undertakes  to  embrace  in  a 
short  compass  the  entire  Christian  doctrine  (vid.  Elucidarium 
sive  dialog,  de  summa  totius  christ.  theol.  in  Mi.  172,  1109  ff.) 
seems  to  have  appeared  even  before  the  outbreak  of  the  contro¬ 
versy,  i.  e.,  about  A.  D.  1120.1  2  Then  came  Hugo  of  St. 
Victor  (f  1141)  with  his  great  work,  De  sacramentis  and  the 
Summa  sententiarum  (Mi.  176).  The  chief  content  of  the  Holy 
Scriptures  consists  of  the  the  works  of  human  restoration  ( opera 
restaurationis  humanae) ,  but  for  the  proper  understanding  of  these 
the  work  of  the  natural  state  (< opus  conditionis')  must  first  be  pre¬ 
sented  (de  sacr.  prolog.  2,3).  From  this  soteriological  point  of 
view  are  the  doctrines  of  Christianity  presented  for  the  purpose 
of  promoting  a  right  understanding  of  the  Scriptures.  Having 
first  treated  of  creation,  the  fall,  original  sin,  etc.  (lib.  i.  pars 
1-7),  he  comes  to  reparatio  (p.  8),  and  presents  the  work  of  re¬ 
demption  in  harmony  with  the  ideas  of  Anselm.  The  great 
Physician  has  appointed  the  sacraments  as  means  of  healing 
(c.  12).  These  therefore  constitute  the  chief  part  of  the  work. 
The  principal  sacraments  are  baptism  and  the  Lord’s  Supper 
(6,  7).  But  since  the  sacraments  are  sacramenta  fidei ,  and 
since  fides  belongs  to  salvation  (8),  part  10  treats  of  faith; 
then  part  11  of  natural  law,  and  part  12  of  the  written 
law.  The  Second  Book  begins  with  a  discussion  of  Chris- 
tology,  followed  by  a  section  upon  the  church,  the  ecclesiastici 
ordines ,  etc.  The  author  then  turns  to  the  sacraments,  “bap¬ 
tism,  confirmation,  body  and  blood,  and  the  minor  sacraments 
and  sacred  things”  (ii.  9),  simony,  marriage,  vows,  vices  and 
virtues ;  then  treats  of  confession  and  repentance  and  remission 
of  sins  (ii.  14),  and  finally  of  the  anointing  of  the  sick  and  of 
eschatology.  Hugo  professes  to  be  guided  throughout  only  by 
the  authority  of  the  Scriptures  (summ.  praef. )  Only  the  faith 
that  has  no  experience  ( experimentum ) ,  and  no  reason  ( ratio ), 

1  Vid.  also  Rocholl,  Rupert  of  Deutz,  1886,  p.  189  ff. 

2  He  treats  first  of  God,  creation,  the  devil  and  the  fall  ;  then  of  the  neces¬ 
sity  of  satisfaction  (here  using  Anselm,  vid.  I.,  8,  16  f.,  21),  then  of  Christ’s 
life  and  activity,  the  mission  of  the  Spirit,  the  church  as  the  mystical,  and  the 
eucharist  as  the  actual  body  of  Christ.  The  Second  Book  treats  of  sin,  predes¬ 
tination  (9),  the  origin  of  the  soul,  marriage,  ranks,  and  orders  (18),  the  for¬ 
giveness  of  sin  through  confessio  and  baptism  (20),  the  prophets  and  the  Holy 
Scriptures  (27),  guardian  angels  and  demons,  anointing  of  the  sick  (30)  and 
death.  In  the  Third  Book  he  treats  exhaustively  of  blessedness,  perdition, 
and  purgatory  (3).  Does  i.  2  betray  an  acquaintance  with  Abelard  ? 


62 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


is  meritorious  (ib.  i.  n,  part  59). 1  However  little  we  may  be 
impressed  with  the  systematic  arrangement  of  this  great  work,  it 
is  very  instructive  to  observe  the  subordination  of  the  entire 
structure  to  the  sacramental  idea  and  the  disregard  of  the  ratio. 
But  already  in  the  Sentences  of  Robert  Pullus  (f  ca.  1150, 
in  Mi.  186),  which  were  accepted  by  Bernard,  the  ratio  asserts 
its  claim  along  with  the  auctoritas  ( e .  g. ,  i.  12  ;  iii.  23),  and 
dialectic  investigation  begins  to  appear  in  the  midst  of  the  posi¬ 
tive  presentation  of  traditional  doctrine.  The  modern  spirit 
carries  the  day,  but  it  does  so  only  by  making  concessions  to 
the  ancient  spirit. 

5.  This  is  most  plainly  evident  in  the  compendium  of  a  dis¬ 
ciple  of  Abelard,  which  became  the  manual  of  dogmatic  study 
in  the  Middle  Ages.2  Peter  the  Lombard  (f  1160  ;  accord¬ 
ing  to  some  authorities,  1164)  in  his  Quatuor  libri  sententiarum 
furnished  a  work  which,  by  virtue  of  its  wealth  of  materials,  its 
adaptation  to  the  times,  and  the  prudent  withholding  of  the  author’ s 
own  opinions,  was  admirably  fitted  to  become  the  basis  of  further 
dogmatic  labors.  The  author  proposes  to  set  forth  faith  and  the 
sacraments  of  the  church.  He  rejects  the  .  .  .  garruli  ratioci- 
natores  (i.  dist.  4  B)  and  a  “  new  dogma  of  their  own  desiring.” 
He  says  in  the  prologue  :  “We  have  by  the  aid  of  God  brought 
together  this  volume,  in  which  thou  wilt  find  examples  and  the 
doctrine  of  the  greater  teachers.  ’  ’  His  book  is,  accordingly,  a 
great  collection  of  citations  from  the  Fathers.  None  the  less, 
however,  it  is  dominated  by  the  ratio  and  the  dialectic  method. 
Reason  is  recognized  along  with  authority  (<?.  g.,  iv.  dist.  4 
E;  15  B).  Questions  are  raised,  authorities  collected,  and  a 
result  reached  by  dialectic  treatment ;  but  in  the  end  the  author 
refrains  from  a  positive  solution  of  the  problem  in  hand  ( e .  g., 
i.  dist.  19  O  ;  iii.  d.  7  N).  He  crosses  swords  with  Abelard, 
yet  constantly  reveals  the  influence  of  his  method  and  his  teach¬ 
ing.  In  his  positive  presentations  the  Lombard  frequently,  often 
in  the  very  terms  employed,  avails  himself  of  the  writings  of 
Hugo  of  St.  Victor  and  Gratian.  Between  the  Sentences  of  a 

1  The  genuineness  of  the  Sentences  ascribed  to  Hugo  has  been  assailed  by 
Denifle  (vid.  Arch.  f.  Litt.  u.  KG.  d.  MA.  iii.  634  ff. );  but  see,  on  the 
contrary,  Gietl,  Die  Sentenzen  Rol.  S.  xxxiv.  ff.  A  part  of  Hugo’s  Sen¬ 
tences  have  come  down  to  us  as  the  tract,  theologic.  of  Hildebert  of  Lavardin 
(Mi.  17 1,  1067  ff.  Col.  1150  closes  with  the  passage  found  in  Sent.  iv.  3, 
Mi.  176,  121).  Cf.  Haureau,  Les  oeuvres  de  Hug.  de  St.  Viet.,  1886,  p. 
71.  As  to  the  spuriousness  of  the  seventh  tractate  (de  coniug. ),  see  Gietl, 
1.  c.,  S.  xl.  f. 

2  Gerhoh  opposed  the  Lombard,  and  Walther  of  St.  Victor  counted 
him  among  the  ruinous  dialecticians.  His  orthodoxy  was  even  assailed  at 
Synods  (Hefele,  CG.  v.,  ed.  2,  616  ff.,  719  f. ). 


FROM  ANSELM  TO  PETER  THE  LOMBARD. 


63 


certain  Master  Gendulph  and  those  of  the  Lombard,  there  is  a 
manifest  relationship.  Already  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  Lom¬ 
bard  was  declared  to  be  the  borrower — whether  justly  or  not, 
cannot  be  certainly  known  until  the  appearance  of  the  work  of 
Gendulph,  which  is  still  preserved  in  manuscript.  The  Lom¬ 
bard  closes  the  first  period  of  Scholasticism.  His  dogmatic  sys¬ 
tem  is  that  of  the  future,  i.  e .,  Abelard’s  method  combined  with 
the  traditional  reverence  for  authorities. 

The  Lombard  was  familiar  with  the  dogmatic  works  of  the 
Damascene  and  made  use  of  them. 1  The  arrangement  of  the  latter 
had  great  influence  upon  him  (Vol.  I.,  p.  285  f. ),  but  he  labored 
also  with  the  Augustinian  problems,  and  treated  exhaustively  the 
doctrine  of  the  sacraments.  His  arrangement,  briefly  stated,  was 
as  follows:  Book  I.  treats  of  God,  his  existence,  trinity,  and  attri¬ 
butes;  Book  II.,  of  the  creation,  man,  sin,  liberty,  and  grace;  Book 
III.,  of  Christology,  the  work  of  redemption — and,  incidentally, 
whether  Christ  had  faith  and  hope  as  well  as  love — of  the  cardi¬ 
nal  virtues,  the  gifts  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  the  commandments  ; 
Book  IV.,  of  the  seven  sacraments  and  eschatology.  If  we 
take  a  general  view  of  this  scheme,  its  similarity  to  that  of  the 
Damascene  will  be  as  evident  as  its  variations  from  the  latter  are 
characteristic.  Imperfect  as  is  the  plan,  defective  as  its  develop¬ 
ment,  and  loose  its  structure,  there  is  yet  a  decided  advance 
upon  the  dogmatic  system  of  the  Damascene.  True,  we  will 
seek  in  vain  in  either  for  a  real  comprehension  of  the  gospel. 
The  Augustinian  elements  are  presented  with  the  Semipelagian 
interpretation  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Really,  the  only  feature  which 
challenges  our  admiration  is  the  consistent  development  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  sacraments,  and  here  Gratian  had  al  ready  led  the 
way.  But  it  was  not  only  the  commendable  features  of  the 
work,  but  in  even  greater  degree  its  faults,  that  won  for  it  the 
unique  historical  position  which  it  came  to  occupy.  It  has  been 
printed  times  without  number.  The  Franciscans  have  furnished 
a  critical  edition  in  the  publication  of  the  works  of  Bonaventura, 
vid.  vols.  i.,  iv.,  Quarrachi,  1882  if.  Cf.  R.  Seeberg,  PRE.  xi. 
630  ff. ;  O.  Baltzer,  Die  Sentenzen  des  Petrus  Lombardus  (in 
Bonwetsch-Seeberg,  Studien  zur  Gesch.  derTheol.  u.  der  Kirche, 
viii. ,  1902.  Protois,  Pierre  Lombard,  1881.  Vid.  also  the 

1  It  is  said  of  him  in  i.  dist.  19  N  :  “  The  greatest  among  the  teachers  of 
the  Greeks  in  the  book  which  he  wrote  concerning  the  Trinity,  and  which 
Pope  Eugene  (iii.  v.  1145-53)  caused  to  be  translated.”  Another  translation 
is  mentioned  by  Duns  Scotus  in  Sent.  iii.  dist.  21.  quaest.  unica,  $  4.  Then 
follow  citations  from  the  De  fide  ortho,  iii.  6,  4.  As  to  the  time  of  composi¬ 
tion  of  the  Sentences,  we  may  accept  the  years  between  A.  D.  1147  and  1150 
(vid.  Seeberg,  PRE.  xi.,  ed.  3,  631). 


6  4 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Sentences  (5  books)  of  Petrus  Pictaviensis  (f  1205)  in  Mi.. 
211). 

The  separate  doctrines  of  the  period  under  review  must  now 
be  examined  in  so  far  as  they  exerted  an  influence  in  moulding 
the  forms  of  doctrinal  statement.  Such  are  the  following  :  1. 
Christology.  2 .  Doctrine  of  the  Atonement.  3.  Berenger’s  theory 
of  the  Lord’s  Supper  and  the  fixing  of  the  church’s  doctrine  upon 
that  subject.  4.  Doctrine  of  the  Sacraments.  5.  Conception 
of  the  Church.  A  few  further  doctrines  will  be  reserved 
for  treatment  in  another  connection,  i.  e.,  Sin,  Grace,  Liberty, 
Faith,  Works.  It  is  proper  for  us  at  this  point  to  call  attention 
to  the  fact,  that  the  real  theological  work  of  the  church  in  the 
Middle  Ages  was  not  performed  by  the  masters  of  dialectics  who 
followed  Thomas  Aquinas,  but  was  done  in  the  present  period  by 
Anselm,  Abelard,  Hugo,  and  the  Lombard. 

§47.  Christology  of  Abelard  and  the  Lombard.  Opposition  of 

Gerhoh. 

Bach,  DG.  des  Mittelalters,  ii.  390 ff.  O.  Baltzer,  Beitrage  zur  Geschi- 
chte  des  christologischen  Dogmas  im  nth  and  1 2th  centuries  (Bonwetsch- 
Seeberg,  Studien  zur  Gesch.  der  Theol.  u.  der  Kirche,  iii.  1,  1898). 

1.  The  Christology  of  Abelard  follows  the  Western,  or  Augustin- 
ian,  type  (vid.  Vol.  I.,  p.  259  f. ).  Its  fixed  premise  is  :  One  per¬ 
son  in  two  substances,  or  natures  (puna  in  dualms  substantiis  vel 
naturis personal).  In  connection  with  this,  it  is  maintained  with 
special  emphasis,  that  the  immutability  of  God  remains  unim¬ 
paired.  The  incarnation  does  not  involve  for  God  the  introduc¬ 
tion  of  a  new  element,  “  but  we  indicate  a  certain  new  effect  of 
his  eternal  will  ”  (introd.  ad  theol.  iii.  6,  p.  1104  f. ,  Mi.).  So 
also  the  becoming,  in  his  becoming  man,  is  not  to  be  understood 
in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word.  There  is  in  the  incarnation  no 
vmtatio  of  the  divine  nature,  and  the  proposition,  God  is  man, 
can  be  understood  only  in  a  unliteral  sense  :  nec  homo  esse  proprie 
dicendus  est  (ib.,  p.  1107  f. ,  1106).1  As  to  the  mode  of  union 
of  the  divine  and  the  human  natures  in  Christ,  Abelard  repro¬ 
duced  the  orthodox  formulas,  but  yet  gave  a  peculiar  turn  to  the 
thought.  Christ  is  the  man  assumed  by  the  Word  ( assumptus  a 
verbo);  this  man  now  fulfills  in  all  things  the  will  of  the  divinity 
dwelling  within  him.  “  That  this  assumed  man  never  sought  to 
do  anything  because  he  hoped  that  it  would  be  agreeable  to  him- 

1  Abelard  makes  the  remark  that  “  transfers  of  names  are  often  made  from 
the  whole  to  the  parts,  or  from  the  parts  to  the  whole,  e.  g.,  when  it  is  said  of 
the  Son  of  God  that  he  is  born  (exposit.  symb.,  p.  626,  Migne);  cf.  Deutsch, 
Abelard,  p.  302  n. 


CHRISTOLOGY  OF  ABELARD  AND  THE  LOMBARD. 


65 


self,  but  because  he  believed  that  it  would  be  pleasing  to  God 
(expos,  of  Rom.  v.  15,  p.  963 ).1  Thus,  at  this  point  also,  the 
keen-witted  man  indicated  a  needed  modification  of  the  church’s 
teaching  by  locating  the  union  of  the  divine  and  human  natures 
in  the  sphere  of  the  will  or  person.2  Yet  he  might,  not  without 
reason,  be  charged  with  Nestorianism. 

2.  The  Lombard,  of  course,  adopts  the  formulas  of  the  church. 
The  second  person  of  the  Godhead  assumed  the  impersonal  hu¬ 
man  nature  (sent.  iii.  dist.  5  C)  :  “  he  assumed  the  flesh  ( carnem ) 
andsoul  (animam),  but  not  the  person  (personam),  ofaman.”  But 
he  was  greatly  exercised  over  the  question,  whether  the  humanity 
of  Jesus  was  not,  after  all,  to  be  conceived  of  as  a  persona ,  de¬ 
ciding  in  the  negative,  because  at  the  time  of  the  assumption 
body  and  soul  had  not  yet  been  combined  into  one  person  (in 
unam  personam),  (iii.  d.  5,  A,  D,  E;  d.  10  C).  “  The  intel¬ 

lectual  development  of  Jesus  was,  accordingly,  only  apparent,” 
not,  indeed,  in  himself,  but  in  others  (in  aliis)  (iii.  d.  13  B). 
In  treating  of  the  question,  whether  the  Son  in  the  incarnation 
became  anything,  the  Lombard  betrays  his  affiliation  with  Abe¬ 
lard,  since  he,  though  only  by  silence,  indicates  his  preference 
for  the  view,  that  the  Logos  merely  assumed  human  nature  like 
a  garment  in  order  that  he  might  be  visible  to  human  eyes.  Thus 
the  Logos-person  remains  “  one  and  the  same  unchanged  ”  (iii. 
d.  6  F  ;  d.  10).  God  has  become  man,  because  he  “  has  a  human 
nature  ”  (est  habens  hominem ,  iii.  7  K).  Since,  in  this  case,  the 
human  nature  is  not  to  be  conceived  as  personal,  it  was  inferred 
by  some  that  ‘  ‘  Christ,  according  to  his  human  nature,  is  not  a 
person  nor  anything”  (iii.  10  A,  see  also  Gietl,  p.  179),  but 
not  a  word  can  be  cited  from  the  Lombard  in  support  of  this 
absurd  proposition.  The  view,  which  was  called  Nihilianism, 
was  disapproved  by  Alexander  III.,  A.  D.  1163  and  1179. 3  As 
a  consequence  of  the  sharp  discrimination  between  the  divinity 

1  This  way  of  regarding  the  relationship  became  current  in  the  school  of 
Abelard.  Christ  is  “  The  Word  possessing  the  man  ”  and  “  the  man  possess¬ 
ing  the  Word”  ( verbum  habens  hominem  and  homo  habens  verbum),  (epitome 
24  extra  Rol.  sent.,  p.  171k,  180.  Omnebene  in  Denifle,  Archiv.  i.  466k). 
Roland  here  further  appeals,  and  rightly,  to  Augustine  (against  Gietl,  p.  175  n., 
vid.  Aug.  in  Joh.  tr.  19,  15  ;  cf.  Hilarius,  de  trin.  x.  22,  Mi.  10,  360, 
supra,  p.  28).  The  view  is  clearly  stated,  Epit.  24,  p.  1733*  Mi.:  “Thus 
that  soul  was  subject  to  the  Word,  so  that  it  could  give  no  motion  to  the  body 
except  as  far  as  the  Word  inspired.”  Vid.  also  c.  25,  de  volunt.  assumpti 
ho?nin. 

2  The  problem  of  Christology  is  to  be  solved,  not  in  the  sphere  of  nature, 
nor  oTattributes,  but  of  the  person. 

3  Not  condemned.  Vid.  Reuter,  Gesch.  Alex,  iii.,  vol.  iii.  703  fk  He- 
FELE,  V.  618,  719. 

5 


66 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


and  humanity,  it  was  held  that  divine  worship  (/atria)  was  not  to 
be  rendered  to  the  human  nature  of  Christ,  but  only  servitude 
(, dulia )  (iii.  d.  7),  and  that  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were,  as  to 
substance,  limited  to  his  human  nature  (iii.  d.  15  D).  This 
formally  orthodox  conception  of  the  subject  receives  its  peculiar 
coloring  on  the  one  hand  from  the  difficulty  of  a  rational  combi¬ 
nation  of  the  divine  and  the  human,  and  on  the  other  hand  from 
the  influence  of  the  Augustinian  Christology. 

3.  But  contemporaries  felt  bound  to  condemn  these  views  as 
Rationalism  and  Adoptionism.  The  most  elaborate  presentation 
of  the  subject  in  opposition  was  made  by  Gerhoh  of  Reichers- 
berg.  He  follows  in  the  path  of  Cyril.  He  starts  with  the  con¬ 
crete  God-man,  in  whom  divinity  and  humanity  are  united,  in 
nature  as  well  as  in  person.1  This  union  is  not  impossible,  since 
the  finite  is  capable  of  comprehending  the  infinite.2  Gerhoh 
proves  the  importance  of  his  view  by  its  practical  bearing 
upon  the  doctrine  of  salvation.  Since  God  became  man,  human 
nature  has  been  raised  to  the  right  hand  of  God,  and  a  fire  has 
entered  human  nature  which  destroys  sin.  The  God-man  is  as 
man  our  way  and  example,  and  as  God  the  truth  and  the  life 
(e.  g. ,  de  investig.  antichr.  ii.  1,  p.  190  f. ).  According  to 
this  view,  the  Nestorianism  of  the  age  is  a  curse.  Christ,  the 
one  God-man,  is  “  to  be  adored  with  one  adoration  ”  (de  glor. 
et  honore  fil.  hom.  12.  3,  Mi.  194.  1114).  Another  inference 
relates  to  the  presence  of  Christ  in  the  Lord’s  Supper.  Christ 
can  at  the  same  moment  be  in  a  thousand  places  at  once.  ‘  ‘  And 
whence  this  unless  because  the  same  spiritual  body  has  risen 
above  all  limitation  of  places  and  times  .  .  .  For  neither  is 
Christ,  who,  just  as  he  wishes,  is  everywhere,  to  be  thought  of 
as  corporeally  in  one  place,  however  beautiful  or  desirable  ”  (de 
invest,  ii.  51,  p.  299  f.  Similarly,  Arno  of  Reichersberg,  vid. 
Bach,  ii.  685).  Thus  the  balder  Western  theory  was  in  the  early 
stages  of  Scholasticism  opposed  by  the  ancient  Alexandrian 
Christology.  See  the  writings  of  Gerhoh  cited  p.  60,  and  Mi. 
194.  Cf.  Bach,  DG.  ii.  390  ff. 

§  48.  Doctrine  of  Atonement.  Anselm  and  Abelard. 

1 .  In  his  work,  Cur  deus  homo  ?  Anselm  made  the  first  attempt 
to  present  in  a  harmonious  and  consistent  way  the  doctrine  of 

1  The  one  and  the  same  Christ  is  “at  the  same  time  a  divine  and  a  human 
person,”  in  proof  of  which  it  is  naively  argued  that,  as  when  a  person  be¬ 
comes  good  he  is  not  thereby  doubled,  so  also  Christ  did  not  duplicate  his 
person  when  his  divine  person  became  the  human  person  (de  investig. 
antichr.  ii.  40,  p.  278). 

2  The  perfectly  pure  humanity  in  Christ  was,  as  a  white  cloud,  capable  of 


DOCTRINE  OF  ATONEMENT. 


67 


the  work  of  redemption  (salvation).  He  seeks  to  prove  upon 
'  rational  grounds  the  necessity  of  the  incarnation  and  redemption, 
although  the  omnipotence  of  God  could  have  stood  in  no  need 
of  these  (i.  6).  Of  any  claim  of  the  devil  upon  man,  he  knows 
nothing  (i.  7;  cf.  medit.  ii.).  In  addressing  himself  to  the 
solution  of  the  problem,  he  proceeds  upon  the  assumption  that 
man  can  attain  salvation  only  through  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
(i.  10,  extr. ).  Sin  consists  in  the  creature’s  withholding  from 
God  the  honor  which  is  his  due.  “  He  who  does  not  render  to 
God  the  honor  due,  robs  God  of  that  which  is  his  and  dishon¬ 
ors  God,  and  this  is  to  sin”  (i.  11).  Man  has  thus  violated 
the  obligation  laid  upon  him  as  a  rational  being.  The  expecta¬ 
tion  sometimes  cherished,  that  the  divine  mercy  will  remit  sins, 
cannot  be  met,  because  the  non-punishment  of  sin  unatoned  for 
would  bring  disorder  into  the  kingdom  of  God,  “  but  it  is  not 
proper  that  God  should  overlook  anything  disorderly  in  his  king¬ 
dom  ”  (i.  12).  But  order  is  preserved  by  righteousness. 
“  Nothing  is  less  to  be  tolerated  in  the  order  of  things  than  that 
the  creature  should  withhold  the  honor  due  to  the  Creator — 
should  not  render  that  which  he  withholds  ”  .  .  .  “  God  there¬ 
fore  preserves  nothing  with  more  just  cause  than  the  honor  of 
his  majesty.”  From  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the  order  of 
the  divine  government  and  the  honor  of  God  is  deduced  the 
rule  :  “  It  is  therefore  necessary,  either  that  the  honor  withheld 
be  rendered,  or  that  punishment  follow”  (i.  13).  By  either 
means  the  divine  honor  is  vindicated — in  the  one  case,  since  God 
thus  displays  himself  as  the  Lord  of  the  rebellious  man  (i.  14); 
in  the  other,  in  that  the  guilty  one  by  a  willing  satisfaction  for 
his  offense  re-establishes  the  violated  order.  Thus  the  above- 
cited  rule  assumes  the  form  :  It  is  necessary  that  satisfaction 
or  punishment  follow  every  sin  (i.  15).  But  God  has  not  pur¬ 
sued  the  way  of  punishment,  or  man  would  have  gone  to  ruin  and 
God  would  not  have  accomplished  his  purpose  (ii.  4).  God 
chose  the  way  of  satisfaction.  Since  men  are  to  fill  up  the  num¬ 
ber  of  the  angels  who  fell  (i.  16  ff. ),  God  cannot  accept  them  as 
sinners  (i.  19).  Satisfaction  must  however  be  subject  to  the  rule  : 
“  It  does  not  suffice  merely  to  restore  that  which  was  withheld; 
but,  for  the  contumely  inflicted,  he  ought  to  restore  more  than  he 
withheld”  (i.  11).  But  since  the  most  trifling  sin,  as  an  im¬ 
proper  glance,  weighs  more  than  the  whole  world,  a  satisfaction 
must  be  rendered  to  God  which  is  more  than  all  things  outside 
of  God  (i.  20  ;  ii.  6).  And  since  man  dishonored  God  by  sub¬ 
receiving  the  divine  light,  and  that  light  was  capable  of  imparting  itself  to  it. 
Bach,  DG.  ii.  425. 


68 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


^7 

\ 


mitting  to  the  devil,  satisfaction  in  this  case  must  include  the 
conquest  of  the  devil  by  man — under  more  trying  circumstances 
(i.  22  f.;  ii.  ii).  As,  on  the  one  hand,  the  satisfaction  required 
is  so  great  and  comprehensive,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  man  is  ab¬ 
solutely  incapable  of  rendering  it,  for  whatever  good  he  may  do 
he  is  already  under  obligation  to  render  to  God,  and  it  cannot 
therefore  be  taken  into  consideration  as  satisfaction.  20).  Satisfac¬ 
tion  of  the  character  demanded  only  God  can  render.  But  a  man 
must  render  it,  one  who  is  of  the  same  race,  in  kindredship  with 
humanity  (ii.  8):  (Unless  there  be  a  satisfaction),  “  which  no 
one  except  God  can  render  and  no  one  but  man  owes :  it  is 
necessary  that  the  God-man  render  it.”  The  God-man  must  do 
for  the  honor  of  God  something  which  he  is  not  already  under  ob¬ 
ligation  to  do.  This  cannot  be  the  obedient  fulfilling  of  the  will 
of  God,  since  this  every  rational  creature  is  under  obligation  to- 
render.  But  the  free  surrender  of  his  infinitely  precious  life  to 
death  will  suffice  (ii.  11).  The  infinite  value  of  this  life  is  more 
than  sufficient  as  a  payment  of  all  the  sins  of  the  whole  world 
(ii.  14  fin.;  17).  Thus  the  incarnation  and  sufferings  of  the 
God-man  are  necessary  as  a  satisfaction  rendered  to  the  divine 
honor.  Only  incidentally  does  Anselm  indicate  a  connection  of 
Christ  with  humanity,  speaking  (ii.  11  fin.;  19  init. )  of  the  in¬ 
struction  and  example  which  Christ  was  able  and  desired  to  give 
to  men  ;  but  the  two  points  of  view  are  not  expressly  and  clearly 
^combined.  This  oversight  explains  why  Anslem  is  so  lacking  in 
clearness  when  he  attempts  to  show  how  the  result  of  the  work 
/  of  Christ  inures  to  the  benefit  of  mankind.  The  Father  cannot 
suffer  the  meritum  of  Christ  to  go  unrewarded,  or  he  would  be 
either  unjust  or  impotent.  Since  he  cannot  give  anything  to  the 
Son,  who  needs  nothing,  the  reward  accrues  to  the  advantage  of 
those  for  whom  the  Son  died.  “  To  whom  should  he  more  ap¬ 
propriately  attribute  the  fruit  and  reward  of  his  death  than  to 
those  .  for  whose  salvation  ...  he  made  himself  man  and  to 
whom  by  dying  ...  he  gave  an  example  of  dying  for  right¬ 
eousness  ;  for  in  vain  will  they  be  imitators  of  him  if  they  shall 
not  be  participants  in  his  merit  ?  ”  (ii.  20).  “  Thus  the  sins 

of  mankind  are  remitted  ’  ’  (ib. )  In  this  way  the  divine  justice  is 
preserved  as  well  as  mercy  (ii.  21).  And  thus  also  the  doctrine 
of  the  Scriptures  is  proved  “  by  reason  alone”  (so/a  rati one  r 
ii.  23). 

This  discussion  is  of  importance  as  the  first  attempt  to  present 
a  connected  view  of  the  work  of  Christ.1  It  is  a  master- 


1  Gregory  the  Great  is  to  be  specially  mentioned  as  a  forerunner  of  Anslem 
(p.  19).  As  to  Augustine,  vid.  Vol.  I.,  p.  361  n. 


DOCTRINE  OF  ATONEMENT. 


69 


piece,  because  the  author  really  understands  the  subject  under 
discussion  and  makes  it  intelligible  to  others.  The  cross  of  Christ, 
which  was  so  often  mentioned  in  pretentious  phrases,  was  here 
recognized  in  clearly  defined  language  as  a  means  of  salvation. 
Anslem  anticipates  the  scholastic  method,  combining  logical  dem¬ 
onstration  with  juristic  principles.  The  argument  is  based  upon 
the  (Germanic)  legal  maxim,  which  dominates  the  book:  pun¬ 
ishment  or  satisfaction  ( poena  aut  satisf actio)  }  Of  special  inter¬ 
est  is  the  attempt  of  Anslem  to  deduce  the  divinity  of  Christ 
from  his  work.  Whereas  the  ancient  Greek  theology,  when  speak¬ 
ing  of  the  work  of  Christ  in  such  connections,  had  in  mind  his 
‘‘deifying”  activities,  Anselm  sought  to  prove  the  necessity  of 
his  divinity  from  his  sufferings  and  death.  At  all  events,  a 
proper  recognition  must  be  given  to  the  effort  of  Anselm,  not 
simply  to  accept  the  divinity  of  Christ  in  a  merely  external  way 
as  a  dogma,  but  to  understand  it  in  its  inner  necessity,  and  none 
the  less  to  his  tact  in  bringing  the  matter  home  to  the  hearts  of 
his  generation  by  connecting  it  with  the  penitential  practices  of 
the  day.  On  the  other  hand,  the  serious  faults  of  the  treatment 
of  the  subject  are  very  apparent  :  (a)  Anselm  recognizes  onlyT  ’ 
a  legal  relationship  between  God  and  man — not,  indeed,  a  per¬ 
sonal  legal  relationship,  but  that  of  a  subject  to  his  legal  ruler. 

(i>)  Redemption  is  based  in  a  very  one-sided  way  upon  the  death 


1  Cf.  Cremer,  Die  Wurzeln  d.  anselm.  Satisfactionsbegr.,  Stud.  u.  Krit., 
1880,  7  ff.,  and  ib.  1893,  316  if.  The  attempt  is  here  made  to  trace  the  depend¬ 
ence  of  Anselm’s  theory  upon  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  Germanic  legal 
system,  poena  aut  satisfactio ,  showing  that  the  principle  of  a  substitution  for 
penitential  penalties  was  transferred  from  the  penitential  discipline  (supra,  p.45 ) 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement.  Cf.  Brunner,  Deutsche  Rechtsgesch.  i. 
163:  “The  right  of  challenge  belonged  only  to  the  offended  party  or  his 
blood  relative.  It  depended  upon  the  choice  of  the  relative,  whether  the 
offender  with  his  relatives  should  respond  to  the  challenge  ( die  Feindschaft 
tragen ),  or  render  the  compositio  fixed  by  law.”  The  validity  of  this  associa¬ 
tion  of  ideas  has  indeed  been  recently  called  in  question  from  the  juristic 
point  of  view  (vid.  Von  Moller,  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1899,  p.  627  ff. ).  Moller 
shows  that  the  Germanic  penance  through  money  has  itself  a  primitive  char¬ 
acter,  and  that  the  idea  of  substitution  is  not  embodied  in  German  jurispru¬ 
dence.  According  to  this,  the  parallelism,  “  aut  poena  aut  satisfaction  is 
not  specifically  German.  Nevertheless,  the  general  conception  of  the  subject 
may  be  characterized  as  Germanic.  It  is  only  in  the  light  of  this  system  of 
procedure  that  we  can  understand  the  inner  harmony  of  the  transaction  as 
viewed  by  Anselm,  the  emphasis  laid  upon  the  divine  honor,  the  princely 
mildness  in  the  conception  of  God  (ii.  16),  the  substantial  character  of  the 
service  rendered  by  Christ  (cf.  Wergeld),  the  importance  attached  to  the 
racial-relationship  of  Christ  to  mankind,  since  only  a  relative  could  perform 
specific  works  of  satisfaction.  The  introduction  of  the  idea  of  meritum  is 
beset  with  difficulties  (cf.  Gregory,  p.  20).  In  other  connections  also 
Anselm  attributes  to  the  sinner  the  obligation  of  rendering  satisfaction  ( deb - 
Hum  satis faciendi)\  vid.  De  conceptu  virginal.  2. 


70 


HISTORY.  OF  DOCTRINES. 


of  Christ,  the  latter  being,  under  the  influence  of  the  juristic  con¬ 
ception  of  the  satisfaction  regarded  as  a  material  contribution. 

( c )  The  connection  between  the  active  life  and  the  sufferings  of 
Christ  is  not  made  clear.  (V)  The  transfer  of  the  benefits  of 
the  work  of  Christ  to  the  church  is  not  intelligibly  stated.  (<f) 
Above  all,  the  change  in  the  attitude  of  God  toward  the  sinner 
which  Anselm  maintains  cannot  be  made  intelligible  from  a  re¬ 
ligious  point  of  view  by  the  means  which  he  employs,  etc. 

Cf.  Baur,  D.  chr.  Lehre  v.  d.  Versong.,  p.  155  ffi.  Hasse, 
Ans.  ii.  485  ff.  Cremer,  1.  c.  Ritschl,  Rechtfertigung,  u. 
Versonung.  i.  ed.  2,  33  ff.  Harnack,  iii.  341  ff.,  as  also  the 
presentation  of  the  subject  by  Duns  Scot,  in  Sent.  iii.  dist.  20 
qu.  un. 

2.  If  we  leave  out  of  the  account  the  theory  of  redemption 
as  a  ransoming  from  the  devil,  which  Anselm  rightly  disowned, 
we  will  find  in  the  theological  contributions  of  the  West,  in  ad¬ 
dition  to  the  soteriological  construction  of  Anselm,  especially 
that  conception  of  the  divinity  of  Christ  in  which  he  ap¬ 
pears  as  revealing  the  love  of  God,  and,  by  teaching  and  example, 
leading  to  responsive  love  and  piety.  It  was  perfectly  natural 
that  this  view  should  soon  assert  itself  in  opposition  to  the  theory 
of  Anselm,  as  it  did  in  the  person  of  Abelard  (vid.  Ritschl,  1.  c. , 
i.,  ed.  2,  48  ff.  Seeberg,  Die  Versonungslehre  Ab.  u.  ihre 
Bekampfgung  durch  Bernh.  in  Mitteil.  u.  Nachr.  f.  d.  ev.  K.  in 
Russl.  1888,  121  ff. ;  also  in  Thomas,  ii.,  ed.  2,  i24ff.  Mourier, 
Abel,  et  la  redemption,  these  Montaub.  1892).  In  his  com¬ 
mentary  upon  Romans  (under  Rom.  3.  22  ff.),  Abelard  de¬ 
velops  his  doctrine  of  the  atonement.  He,  too,  rejects  the 
theory  of  a  meeting  of  the  claims  of  the  devil.  Redemption  has 
to  do  only  with  the  elect,  over  whom  the  devil  never  had  any  power. 
Furthermore,  the  devil  cannot  by  the  wrong  perpetrated  upon 
mankind  have  gained  any  right  over  them.  He  can  be  re¬ 
garded  only  a  jailer  and  torturer,  to  whose  power  God  commits 
men.  God  could  before  the  death  of  Christ  forgive  the  sins  of 
men,  as  he  did  in  the  case  of  the  Virgin  Mary.  To  what  end  then 
did  the  Son  of  God  take  upon  himself  the  burden  of  his  sufferings  ? 
If  Adam’s  slight  offense  required  so  great  an  atonement,  what 
atonement  will  the  slaying  of  Christ  demand  ?  Shall  we  think 
that  God  was  pleased  by  the  death  of  his  Son,  that  he  on  account 
of  this  greater  sin  forgave  the  less  ?  And  to  whom  should  the 
ransom  of  the  blood  of  Christ  be  paid  ?  Not  to  the  devil  ; 
hence,  to  God.  But  is  it  not  improper  that  the  blood  of  the 
innocent  should  be  demanded  as  a  ransom  ?  Can  God  have 
pleasure  in  the  death  of  his  Son,  so  that  through  it  he  should 
be  reconciled  to  the  whole  world?  (Mi.  178.  833-36).  There- 


DOCTRINE  OF  ATONEMENT. 


71 


fore  the  opinion  of  Anselm,  that  God  is  reconciled  by  the  death 
of  Christ,  is  disproved. 

Abelard’s  positive  statement  of  the  doctrine  is  as  follows: 
Through  the  works  of  the  law  no  one  could  have  become  right¬ 
eous.  But  in  Christ  the  love  of  God  was  made  manifest,  in  that 
he  assumed  our  nature,  and,  as  our  teacher  and  example,  re¬ 
mained  faithful  unto  death.  This  love  of  God  admonishes  us  to 
an  answering  love  toward  God  and  awakens  it  in  us.  By  virtue 
of  our  faith  in  the  love  of  God  made  manifest  in  Christ,  we  are 
united  with  Christ,  as  with  our  neighbor,  by  an  indissoluble  bond 
of  love.  The  love  thus  awakened  in  our  hearts  is  the  ground  of 
the  forgiveness  of  sins,  according  to  Lk.  7.  47.  The  phrase  in 
Rom.  3.  25,  “for  the  display  of  his  righteousness,”  Abelard 
understands  as  referring  to  the  righteousness  imparted  to  men, 
that  is,  “of  the  love  which  justifies  us  before  him”  (p.  833). 
Thus  we  are  redeemed  from  sin  and  from  fear,  since  Christ  works 
love  in  us.  \Our  redemption,  therefore,  is  that  supreme  love 
in  us,  through  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  which  not  only  liberates 
from  the  servitude  of  sin,  but  acquires  for  us  the  true  liberty  of 
the  sons  of  God,  so  that  we  fulfill  all  things  from  love  rather 
than  from  fear  of  him  who  has  shown  to  us  such  grace  that,  as 
he  himself  declares,  no  greater  can  be  conceived”  (pp.  836, 
832  f.  ).*  Side  by  side  with  this  line  of  thought  we  find  another. 
Under  Rom.  5.  12  ff.,  Abelard  declares  that  Christ,  in  becoming 
man,  subjected  himself  to  the  commandment  of  love  for  others. 
This  law  he  fulfilled  4  4  both  by  instructing  us  and  by  praying  for 
us.  ”  It  is  in  this  way,  since  his  prayers  must  on  account  of  his 
righteousness  be  heard,  that  Christ  “  supplements  from  his  merits 
what  was  lacking  in  ours”  (p.  865).  As  instruction  is  still 
given  by  Christ  (p.  859),  so  also  his  mediation  through  prayer 
in  behalf  of  his  followers  continues  (cf.  serm.  10,  p.  449).  We 
are,  therefore,  redeemed  through  Christ,  4  4  dying  once  for  us  and 
very  frequently  praying  and  diligently  instructing  us”  (p.  861).1  2 
The  view  of  Abelard  is  thus  evidently  :  God  sent  his  Son  to  the 
sinful  human  race  as  a  revelation  of  his  love,  and  as  a  teacher 

1  Cf.  836  :  But  to  us  it  seems  that  by  this  means  we  are  justified  in  the 
blood  of  Christ  and  reconciled  to  God  ;  that  through  this  particular  favor 
manifested  toward  us,  that  his  Son  assumed  our  nature  and  persisted  even 
until  death  in  instructing  us  both  by  word  and  by  example,  he  has  very 
strongly  drawn  us  to  himself  through  love,  so  that,  inflamed  by  this  great 
benefaction  of  divine  grace,  true  love  now  shrinks  not  from  the  endurance  of 
anything  whatsoever. 

2  The  other  passages  which  claim  attention  in  this  connection  (serm.  5,  p. 
419  f. ;  serm.  12,  p.  481  ;  serm.  10,  p.  452,  in  Com.  to  Romans,  p.  860)  all 
fall  into  place  naturally  in  this  line  of  thought,  as  shown  in  my  comments,  1.  c., 
p.  1 31  ff. 


72 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


and  example.  By  this  means  faith  and  love  are  aroused  in  sinful 
men.  This  love  becomes  the  ground  of  the  forgiveness  of  theirsins. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  love  of  Christ  leads  him  to  continue  to 
teach  men  and  to  intercede  for  them  before  God.  Thus  their  in¬ 
sufficient  merits  are  completed.  But  when  Abelard  now,  in 
response  to  the  inquiry,  why  it  was  the  Son  and  not  the  Father 
who  became  man,  declares  that  the  Son,  or  the  divine  Wisdom 
(supra,  p.  59),  became  man,  in  order  to  instruct  us  by  word 
and  example  (theol.  christ.  iv.  p.  1278  f.  Cf.  serm.  5,  p.  423), 
it  would  seem  that  the  former  line  of  thought  was  the  dominat¬ 
ing  one  in  his  theology  (cf.  Seeberg,  1.  c.,  p.  136  ff. ).  This 
theory  derives  from  the  treasures  preserved  in  the  traditional 
theology  of  the  church  certain  views  which  serve  to  coun¬ 
terbalance  the  one-sidedness  of  Anselm.  It  was  in  harmony 
with  the  medieval  form  of  piety,  since  it  represented  the  pious 
walk  of  love  as  the  aim  of  redemption.  There  is  lacking, 
indeed,  as  in  Anselm,  the  association  of  the  work  of  Christ  with 
the  institution  of  the  sacraments.  If  the  latter  were,  in  the 
medieval  conception,  the  vehicles  of  salvation  for  the  regenerate, 
then  must  they  be  expressly  made  obligatory  as  a  product  of  the 
work  of  salvation.  But  as,  in  Abelard’s  expositions  of  the  sub¬ 
ject,  no  specific  importance  attached  to  the  death  of  Christ,  he 
fell  into  the  error  of  one-sidedness  in  the  opposite  direction. 

3.  Abelard’s  doctrine  of  the  atonement  was  in  turn  assailed  by 
St.  Bernard  (vid.  ep.  190, and  Seeberg,  1.  c.,  p.  143  ff.).  Abe¬ 
lard,  he  contended,  curtails  Christianity,  making  Christ  only  a 
teacher.  In  reality,  Christ  brings  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and 
justification,  and  releases  from  the  bonds  of  the  devil  (7.  17  ;  8. 
20).  Just  as  little  as  the  example  of  Adam  made  us  sinners  does 
the  example  of  Christ  suffice  for  our  redemption  (8.  22  ;  9.  23). 
No  place,  he  holds,  is  reserved  for  the  blood  and  the  cross  of 
Christ  in  the  system  of  Abelard,  “who  attributes  everything 
pertaining  to  salvation  to  devotion  {devotione') ,  nothing  to  regen¬ 
eration,  ...  he  locates  the  glory  of  redemption,  .  .  .  not  in 
the  value  of  the  blood,  but  in  its  effects  in  our  walk  and  conver¬ 
sation  ”  (9.  24).  It  is  certain,  indeed,  that  the  example  of  the 
love  of  Christ  is  great  and  important,  “but  they  have  no  foun¬ 
dation,  and  hence  no  tenable  position,  if  the  foundation  of  redemp¬ 
tion  be  wanting.  .  .  .  Therefore  neither  examples  of  humility 
nor  proofs  of  love  are  anything  without  the  sacrament  of  redemp¬ 
tion  ’ ’  (9.  25).  Instruction  ( institutio )  or  restoration  ( resti¬ 
tutio ),  that  is  the  question  (9.  23).  Bernard  made  practical  use, 
perhaps  to  a  greater  extent  than  Abelard  himself,  of  the  latter’s 
method,  maintaining  that  we  should  meditate  upon  the  love  of 
Christ  in  order  to  be  incited  to  a  responsive  love  toward  him  (in 


Cant.  serm.  16.  5;  43.  1-3).  He  is  our  teacher  and  example 
(ib.  serm.  15.  6  ;  43.  4  ;  22.  7  ;  21.  2  ;  61.  7  ;  47-  6  1  2°-  7  j 
24.  8).  But  the  other  aspect  of  the  doctrine  is  also  made  prom¬ 
inent.  The  blood  of  Christ  is  the  “  price  of  our  redemption. 
Unless  he  had  tenderly  loved,  his  majesty  would  not  have  sought 
me  in  prison.  But  to  affection  he  joined  wisdom,  by  which  he 
might  ensnare  the  tyrant,  and  suffering,  by  which  he  might  ap¬ 
pease  the  offended  God  the  Father”  (vid.  20.  2).  Bernard 
constructed  no  theory  ;  but  the  association  of  the  two  concep¬ 
tions — the  love  of  Christ  begets  love  in  response,  he  is  teacher 
and  example  ;  the  blood  of  Christ  redeems  us  from  sin,  death, 
and  the  devil,  and  effects  the  reconciliation  of  the  Father — pre¬ 
sents  the  general  view  of  the  subject  which  prevailed  in  the 
Middle  Ages. 

4.  The  central  thought  of  Abelard  was  perpetuated  in  his  fol¬ 
lowers.  Thus,  the  author  of  the  Epitome  answers  the  question, 
Cur  deus  homo  ?  with  a  reference  to  true  love  and  a  good  exam¬ 
ple  (chap.  23,  p.  1731,  Mi.).  And  the  Sentences  of  St.  Florian 
assert  that  redemption  was  wrought  “  in  the  person  of  the  Son  ’  ’ 
in  order  that,  as  often  as  we  should  recall  the  love  which  he  has 
shown  for  us,  we  might  abstain  from  sin.  We  have  ourselves, 

‘ £  on  account  of  the  wonderful  love  which  he  has  shown  toward 
us,”  freed  ourselves  from  our  subjection  to  the  devil  ( Denifle , 
archiv.  i.  431).  But  the  other  contemporary  theologians  share 
the  attitude  of  Bernard,  i.  e .,  of  Anselm.  Honorius  Augusto- 
dunensis  repeats  the  thoughts  of  Anselm  (elucidar.  i.  8,  16,  17, 
21).  Hugo  likewise  reproduces  him.  It  is  necessary  to  “  ap¬ 
pease  God,  ’  ’  and  this  is  accomplished  by  making  good  the  dam¬ 
age  ( damnum  restaurare )  and  making  satisfaction  for  the  insult 
(de  contemptu  satisfacere') .  This  the  God-man  does.  Even  if 
this  method  of  redemption  cannot  be  shown  to  be  necessary,  yet 
it  is  the  most  appropriate,  inasmuch  as  the  magnitude  of  our 
guilt  and  of  the  future  glory  is  thus  set  forth  (de  sacr.  i.  8.  4,  6, 
7,  10;  ii.  1.  6).  Robert  presents  both  views.  Christ  has  freed  us 
by  his  sacrifice  rendered  to  God,  not  to  the  devil  (sent.  iv.  14). 
This  was  the  most  appropriate,  though  not  the  only  possible,  way 
of  effecting  redemption  (iv.  15).  It  is  an  appropriate  way,  be¬ 
cause  it  makes  known  to  us  the  magnitude  of  our  sin  and  of  the 

-divine  love  (iv.  13).  The  work  of  redemption  is,  here  too, 
presented  under  the  aspect  of  instruction  and  example  (iii.  28). 

5.  Peter  Lombard,  in  his  discussion  of  the  problem  in  the 
1 8th  and  19th  Distinetio?7s  of  his  third  book,  betrays  as  well  his 
dependence  upon  Abelard  as  his  correctness  from  the  ecclesias¬ 
tical  point  of  view.  His  starting  point  is  the  merit  of  Christ. 
By  his  pious  life  Christ  merited  for  himself  glorification  and  free- 


74 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


dom  from  suffering  (18  A,  B).  His  death  occurred  therefore 
“  for  thee,  not  for  himself  ”  (18  E).  And  by  it  he  merited  for 
us  admittance  to  paradise  and  redemption  from  sin,  punishment, 
and  the  devil.  “  Christ  the  man  was  a  sufficient  and  perfect 
hostage,”  i.  e .,  for  our  reconciliatio  (18  E)  According  to  this, 
it  may  be  asked  how  this  deliverance  from  the  devil,  sin,  and 
punishment  is  effected  by  his  death.  To  this  it  is  replied,  first 
of  all,  with  Abelard,  that  the  death  of  Christ  reveals  to  us  the 
love  of  God.  “  But  so  great  a  pledge  of  love  toward  us  being 
displayed,  we  also  are  moved  and  inflamed  to  love  God  .  .  . 
and  through  this  we  are  justified,  i.  e.,  being  released  from  sins 
are  made  righteous.  Therefore  the  death  of  Christ  justifies  us> 
since  through  it  love  is  excited  in  our  hearts.  ’  ’  But  this  occurs 
also,  according  to  Paul,  through  faith  in  the  Crucified.  When 
we  are  thus  freed  from  sin,  we  become  free  also  from  the  devil. 
But  this  thought  is  defaced  by  the  reminiscence  from  an  earlier 
age,  that  the  cross  became  a  mousetrap  and  the  blood  a  bait  for 
the  devil  ( 1 9  A) .  The  fundamentally  Abelardian  tendency  of  the 
author  is  revealed  also  in  the  remark  ( 1 9  F) ,  that  we  are  reconciled 
to  God,  who  has  always  loved  us,  by  the  removal  of  our  sins  and 
hostility  toward  God.  Prominence  is  also  given  to  the  objective 
aspects  of  redemption.  God  became  man  in  order  to  overcome 
the  devil,  because  a  man  or  an  angel  might  easily  have  himself 
fallen  into  sin  (B).  It  is  further  held  that  Christ  delivers  us  from 
everlasting  punishment  by  remitting  our  debt  ( relaxando  de- 
bituni )  (C),  and  also  from  temporal  punishment,  which  is  re¬ 
mitted  in  baptism  and  ameliorated  in  repentance  :  “  For  that 
penalty  could  not  suffice  by  which  the  church  binds  penitents, 
unless  the  penalty  of  Christ,  who  absolves  for  us,  co-operates  ’  ’ 
(D).  Thus,  according  to  the  Lombard  :  ( a )  Christ  has  merited 
deliverance  for  us  through  the  meritum  of  his  death,  since  the 
suffering  endured  by  him  works  for  our  deliverance,  (b)  He 
has  overcome,  i.  e.,  captured  the  devil.  (V)  His  death  has 
awakened  us  to  love  and  thereby  made  us  righteous  and  delivered 
us.  Of  especial  interest  for  us  is  the  prominent  introduction  of 
the  conception  of  the  merit  of  Christ  and  of  his  endurance  of 
punishment,  and  we  are  particularly  impressed  by  the  lack  of 
clearness  in  the  adjustment  of  the  ideas  presented  in  their  mutual 
relations.  Thus  the  idea  of  redemption  did  not  attain  a  fixed 
or  complete  form  in  the  present  period,  but  the  component  ele¬ 
ments  were  distinctly  wrought  out. 

§  49.  Berenger  of  Tours  and  Doctrine  of  Lord1  s  Supper. 

Sources.  Berenger  (f  1088)  wrote  :  Epistola  ad  Adelmannum'and  Liber 
de  sacra  coena  adv.  Lanfrancum  (ed.  A.  and  F.  Vischer,  1834).  Lanfranc 


DOCTRINE  OF  LORD’S  SUPPER. 


75 


(f  1089):  De  corp.  et  sang,  domini  adv.  Ber.  Tur.,  in  Migne  150.  407  ff. 
Cf.  Sudendorf,  Berangarius  Tur.,  1850.  Schnitzer,  Ber.  v.  Tours,  1890. 
Diecichoff,  Abendmalslehre  im  Ref.-zeitalter,  i.  44  ff.  Reuter,  Gesch.  der 
rel.  Aufklarung  im  MA.  i.  91  ff.  Schwabe,  Studien  zur  Gesch.  des.  2. 
Abendmalsstreites,  1886.  Bach,  DG.  i.  364  ff.  Thomas. -Seeberg,  DG.  ii. 
43  * 

1.  The  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  received  its  scholastic 
form  as  a  result  of  the  assaults  which  a  forerunner  of  Scholasti¬ 
cism  directed  against  the  (Radbertian)  theory  which  was  at  the 
time  gaining  general  acceptance  in  the  church.  Berenger 
taught  as  follows  :  Bread  and  wine  become  through  consecra¬ 
tion  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ,  i.  e .,  they  become  a  “sacra¬ 
ment  of  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ.  ”  Bread  and  wine  signify 
(. significant )  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ ;  they  are  a  similitude 
{similitudo') ,  sign  ( signum ),  figure  ( figura ),  pledge  (pignus) . 
The  reality  involved  comes  not  into  the  hand  nor  into  the  mouth, 
but  into  the  thought  {in  cognitionem ,  de  s.  coena,  pp.  431,  223, 
ep.  ad  Adelm. ) .  The  elements  therefore  remain  what  they  were; 
but  something  new  is  added  to  them  through  the  consecration, 
i.  e .,  the  spiritual  significance,  which  is  apprehended  by  the 
spirit  of  the  communicant  (<?.  g.,  p.  125).  We  appropriate  the 
sufferings  and  death  of  Christ,  so  that  they  become  inwardly 
directive  for  us  (p.  194).  According  to  this  conception,  only 
believers  receive  Christ’s  body.  In  support  of  his  view,  Berenger 
appeals  to  the  Scriptures  (Jn.  6),  and  to  the  Fathers,  especially 
Augustine.  He  regards  the  teaching  of  his  opponents  as  silli¬ 
ness  ( vecordia )  ;  his  own,  as  the  only,  logical  and  reasonable 
view,  required  by  the  proposition  :  Bread  and  wine  are  body  and 
blood — in  which  the  former  remains  what  it  is  in  order  that  it 
may  be  the  latter  (pp.  50,  161).  Since  the  body  of  Christ 
exists  in  heaven  impassible  and  indivisible,  how  can  the  attempt 
be  made  to  distribute  particles  of  the  flesh  in  the  separate  com¬ 
munions  in  various  places  (p.  199)  ?  And  did  not  Christ  prom¬ 
ise  to  give  himself  entire  to  believers,  not  only  parts  of  him¬ 
self?  Finally,  the  doctrine  of  his  opponents  leads,  as  he 
acutely  perceives,  to  two  kinds  of  flesh  {duae  carncs ,  p.  200),  a 
heavenly  and  a  sacramental  body(cf.  Dieckhoff,  p.  50  ff. ).  To 
estimate  Berenger  correctly,  it  is  necessary  to  bear  constantly  in 
mind  the  theory  in  opposition  to  which  his  views  were  devel¬ 
oped,  and  to  remember  also  that  he  had  a  deeper  interest  than 
his  opponents  in  the  religious  bearing  of  the  subject.  He  was 
concerned  to  maintain  the  idea  of  personal  fellowship  with  Christ.1 

1  A  group  of  the  followers  of  Berenger  taught  that  bread  and  wine  indeed 
remain  after  consecration,  but  that  “the  body  and  blood  of  the  Lord  are  there 
contained,  truly  but  latently  (iatenter) ,  and  so  that  they  may  be  understood  in 
some  such  way  as  though  I  should  say  that  they  are  impanated  (impanari)  ” 


76 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


2.  The  teaching  of  Berenger  awakened  opposition  from  many 
quarters.  The  keenness  with  which  he  expounded  the  Lord’s 
Supper  as  a  figura ,  and  the  rationalistic  method  of  his  argument 
(Reuter,  i.  112,  293.  Bach,  i.  387  if.)  caused  alarm.  The 
“  multitude  of  incompetents”  were,  as  he  declares,  against  him, 
and  even  Gregory  VII.  was  unable  to  protect  him.  He  was  con¬ 
demned  at  Rome  and  at  Vercelli  in  A.  D.  1050.  Although  the 
Papal  legate,  Hildebrand,  at  Tours  (A.  D.  1054),  declared  him¬ 
self  satisfied  with  the  teaching  of  Berenger,  he  was  still  regarded 
with  suspicion.  At  Rome,  A.  D.  1059,  he  was  compelled  to 
assent  to  a  confession  which  presented  transubstantiation  in  the 
crassest  form :  “  That  bread  and  wine  .  .  .  after  consecration 
are  not  only  a  sacrament,1  but  also  the  true  body  and  blood  of 
our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  and  are  not  only  in  a  sacrament,  but  in 
truth  handled  in  the  hands  of  priests,  broken  and  torn  by  the 
teeth  of  the  faithful  ”  (Hefele,  iv.  826).  Having  at  a  later  day 
again  advocated  his  view  in  France,  where  he  wrote  his  treatise, 
De  sacra  coena,2h.Q  was,  in  A.  D.  1079,  again  compelled  to  recant 
at  Rome.3  But  his  views  still  remained  unchanged.  “  In  fact, 
Berenger  was  an  acute  theorizer  of  the  Illumination,  but  a  hero 
in  its  defense  he  was  not”  (Reuter,  i.  126). 

3.  As  a  result  of  these  controversies,  the  Lord’s  Supper  be¬ 
came  a  favorite  topic  of  theological  discussion  and  the  doctrine 
of  Radbert — in  a  grosser  form — the  doctrine  of  the  church. 
Lanfranc,  Hugo  of  Langres  (de  corp.  et  sang,  christi,  c.  Ber¬ 
enger,  Mi.  142.  1325  ff. ).  Alger,  of  Liittich  (de  sacramentis 
corp.  et  sang,  dom.,  Mi.  180.  743  If.).  Durand  of  Troanne 
(de  corp.  et  sang,  dom.,  Mi.  149.  1375  if.),  and  especially 
Guitmund  of  Aversa  (de  corp.  et  sang.  chr.  veritate  in  euchar. , 
Mi.  149.  1427  ff. )  appeared  in  behalf  of  either  the  old  or  the  new 
teaching.  (Cf.  Bach,  i.  385  ff.).  Guitmund  (Mi.  149.  1469 ff.) 
maintains  that  there  is  a  change  ( mutatio )  in  the  elements,  as  is 
proved  by  the  words  of  institution,  which  speak  of  the  body  of 
Christ,  not  figuratively,  but  substantively  {substantive) .  Thus  the 
church  had  taught  from  the  earliest  times  (Lanfr.  c.  18),  and  a 
whole  series  of  miraculous  appearances  confirm  it  (Guitm.,  p. 

(Guitmund,  De  corp.  et  sang.  chr.  i. ;  Mi.  149,  1430;  cf.  Alger,  De  sacr.  i. 
6;  Lombard,  sent.  iv.  dist.  ii.  D). 

1  Thus  the  word  “  sacrament”  is  no  longer  regarded  as  satisfactory;  and 
in  reality  the  Lord’s  Supper  was,  according  to  this  theory,  not  a  sacrament 
in  the  ancient  sense  of  the  term.  The  conception  of  the  mystery  had  become 
quite  different. 

2  Written  A.  D.  1077-78.  Vid.  Brocking,  Ztschr.  f.  KG.  1892,  p.  177  ff. 

3  Great  prominence  was  here  given  to  the  identity  of  the  sacramental  body 
with  that  born  of  the  virgin  and  dying  on  the  cross.  Vid.  Lanfr.,  De  corp.  et 
sang.  dom.  c.  2. 


DOCTRINE  OF  LORD'S  SUPPER. 


77 


1479  f- >  Durand,  Mi.  149.  1418).  After  the  transformation, 
the  properties  of  the  elements  (color,  odor,  taste)  remain,  in  order 
that  participants  may  not  be  horrified,  and  in  order  that  believers 
may  receive  the  fuller  rewards  of  faith  (Lanfr.  18).  In  every 
wafer  the  entire  body  of  Christ — yea,  more,  the  entire  Christ — - 
is,  by  virtue  of  his  omnipotence,  present  (Guitm.  1434,  1480. 
Alger,  i.  15).  Anselm  of  Canterbury,  ep.  iv.  107,  Mi.  159, 
255.  Believers  and  unbelievers  alike  receive  him,  the  latter  not 
with  saving  efficacy  {non  salubri  efficientia )  (Lanfr.  20.  Alger  i. 
20).  With  reference  to  the  question  concerning  the  relation  of 
the  sacramental  to  the  historical  body,  Lanfranc  declares  :  4  ‘  Both 
the  same  body  which  was  received  from  the  Virgin  .  .  .  and  yet 
not  the  same — the  former,  so  far  as  relates  to  essence ;  the  latter, 
if  thou  regardest  the  appearance  {specieni)  of  bread  and  wine  ” 
(Lanfr.  18).  Alger  endeavored  to  meet  the  difficulty  thus 
arising  by  maintaining  that  Christ  can,  by  virtue  of  his  omnip¬ 
otence,  be  even  bodily  omnipresent :  “In  heaven  and  on  earth 
he  can  be  corporeally  present  everywhere,  in  whatsoever  way  it 
may  please  him — contrary  to  the  nature  of  flesh — always  the 
same  and  entire”  (i.  15,  Mi.  785).  The  term  transubstantio  is 
first  found  in  Petrus  Comester  (f  1 1 79) ,  in  the  sermons  of  Hilde- 
bert  of  Lavardin  (f  1134),  sermo  93,  Mi.  171.  776  p  cf.  PRE. 
viii.,  ed.  3,  69. 

4.  Even  in  the  early  days  of  Scholasticism  the  theory  of  tran- 
substantiation  was  everywhere  advocated.  Thus  in  the  school  of 
Abelard,1 2  we  note  especially  Roland’s  Sentences,  p.  223  ff.,3  as 
also  passages  from  the  Florian  Sentences  and  Omnebene,  as  pre¬ 
sented  by  Gietl  (in  his  edition  of  Roland,  pp.  223,  227,  233, 
234),  and  the  Epitome,  29.  Also  in  Honorius  Augustod. 
(elucid.  i.  28,  30).  Hugo  is  particularly  clear:  “Through 
the  words  of  consecration  the  true  substance  of  the  bread  and 
the  wine  is  changed  {conv ertitur)  into  the  true  body  and  blood 
of  Christ,  the  appearance  only  of  bread  and  wine  remaining, 
substance  passing  over  into  substance  {substantia  in  substantiam 
transeunte') ,  (de  sacr.  ii.  8,  9).  Since  the  body  of  Christ  isnot 

1  But  we  find  already  in  Germanus  Paris,  in  Martene  Thes.  v.  95  : 
u  transformatur."  Haimo  of  Halberstadt,  supra,  p.  39.  HONORIUS  Au¬ 
gustod.  Eucharistion,  c.  3:  “in  substantiam  translation'''  (5,9,  Mi.  172. 
1252,  1255).  Stephan  Augustodunens.  (ca.  A.  D.  1120),  De  sacr.  altaris  c. 
16:  “  in  corpus  meum  transsubstantiari  (Mi.  172.  1293).  Wilhelm  of  St. 
TJflerry,  De  corp.  et  sang.  dom.  c.  3. 

2  We  have  no  discussion  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  by  Abelard  himself,  but  the 
harmonious  utterances  of  his  followers  reproduce  his  view. 

3  Roland  here  proceeds  already  in  true  scholastic  fashion.  He,  like  the 
other  followers  of  Abelard,  discusses  the  question  whether  a  wafer  eaten  by  a 
mouse  is  the  body  of  the  Lord  (ed.  Gietl,  p.  234). 


7« 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


omnipresent  (cf.  ii.  2,  13),  he  is,  therefore,  only  for  the  time 

ad  tempus ),  so  long  as  he  will,  now  present  in  the  Supper  as 
once  on  earth  (ii.  8,  13  ;  cf.  summ.  6.  2).1  As  Robert  Pul- 
lus  (sent.  viii.  5),  so,  too,  Peter  Lombard  advocated  the  trans¬ 
formation  theory  :  ‘  ‘  It  is  certain  that  the  true  body  and  blood 
of  Christ  are  upon  the  altar ;  rather  that  the  whole  Christ  is 
there  under  both  the  forms,  and  that  the  substance  of  the  bread 
is  converted  into  (his)  body,  and  the  substance  of  the  wine  into 
(his)  blood’ ’  (sent.  iv.  dist.  10  D).  The  accidents  of  the 
earthly  substance  remain  for  the  familiar  reasons  (dist.  11  A  E). 
But  as  to  the  manner  of  the  conversion  he  declines  to  attempt  any 
further  explanation  (11  C).  He  regarded  the  effect  of  the  sac¬ 
rament  as  consisting  in  the  forgiveness  of  venial  sins  and  in  the 
perfection  of  virtue  {perfectio  virtutis,  dist.  12  G;  infusion  of 
grace,  Hugo,  sacr.  ii.  8.  7).  Finally,  he  considers  the  Lord’s 
Supper  under  the  aspect  of  a  sacrifice.  It  is  a  daily  sacrifice  : 
“  But  he  is  daily  immolated  in  the  sacrament,  because  in  the  sac¬ 
rament  there  is  a  commemoration  of  that  which  was  once  done.  ’  ’ 
The  sacrifice  is  repeated  on  account  of  our  daily  sins.  “  Christ 
was  both  once  offered  and  is  daily  offered  ;  but  then  in  one  way, 
now  in  another”  (dist.  12  G).  This  sacrifice  represents  that 
upon  the  cross  only  as  a  picture  of  the  latter  (Petr.  Pictav.  sent, 
v.  13).  Here,  as  often,  theory  tardily  followed  praxis.2 

5.  The  doctrine  thus  elaborated  by  the  theologians  was  exalted 
to  the  position  of  a  fixed  dogma  by  Pope  Innocent  III.  at  the 
Fourth  Lateran  council  (A.  D.  1 2 1 5  ) :  4  4  The  body  and  blood  are 
truly  contained  in  the  sacrament  of  the  altar  under  the  forms 
(. speciebus )  of  bread  and  wine,  the  bread  transubstantiated  into 
the  bodyand  the  wine  into  the  blood  by  divine  power.  .  .  .  And 
this  sacrament  no  one  can  in  any  case  administer  except  a  priest  who 
has  been  properly  ordained”  (Mansi,  xxii.  982.  Vid.  already 
Can.  6  of  the  Council  of  Piacenza,  A.  D.  1095,  Hefele,  v.  216). 

1  But  side  by  side  with  these  fruitful  ideas  stands  the  barren  suggestion 
that,  at  the  first  celebration  of  the  Supper,  Christ  for  a  time  laid  aside  his  mor¬ 
tal  nature,  and  as  mortal  bore  his  immortal  self  in  his  hands  :  “In  that 
which  gave  he  was  mortal,  and  in  that  which  was  given  he  was  immortal  ; 
and,  nevertheless,  he  who  as  mortal  gave,  and  he  who  as  immortal  was  given, 
were  not  two  but  one  self”  (de  sacr.  ii.  8,  3). 

2  Other  theologians  of  the  twelfth  century  also  treated  exhaustively  of  the 
Lord’s  Supper.  Vid.  Bach,  i.  392  ff.  Special  mention  may  be  made  of  the 
theory  of  Rupert  of  Deutz.  If  Radbert  understood  the  transformation  of 
the  elements  as  a  creative  act,  Rupert  conceived  it  as  analogous  to  the  incar¬ 
nation.  As  the  divine  nature  assumed  the  human  without  destroying  it,  “  so 
it  does  not  change  nor  destroy  the  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  according 
to  outward  appearance  subject  to  the  five  senses,  when  by  the  same  Word  he 
unites  the  latter  in  the  unity  {in  unitatem )  of  the  same  body  which  hung 
upon  the  cross”  (in  Exod.  ii.  c.  10,  Mi.  167,  617  f. ). 


DEFINITION  OF  SACRAMENTS. 


79 


The  11  multitude  of  incompetents,”  the  logic  of  the  theologians, 
and  the  hierarchy  combined  in  the  production  of  this  dogma. 
It  was  a  corruption  of  the  church’s  best  possession  ( corruptio 
optimi~) ;  yet  it  served  at  least  to  preserve  one  article  of  religion 
to  the  Christian  world. 

§  50.  Definition  of  Sacraments .  The  Seven  Sacraments. 

1.  The  significance  of  Scholasticism  for  the  History  of  Doc¬ 
trines  consists  chiefly  in  the  establishment  of  the  Catholic  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  sacraments.  The  decisive  steps  in  this  direction  also 
were  taken  during  the  present  period.  The  divine  efficiency  is 
located  in  the  sacraments,  not  in  the  word.  Augustine,  as  we 
have  seen,  had  a  much  more  profound  conception  of  the  signifi¬ 
cance  of  the  word.  The  definition  of  a  sacrament  was,  to  begin 
with,  by  no  means  clear,  largely  because  of  uncertainty  as  to  the 
number  to  be  recognized.  Bernard  still  speaks  of  many,  and 
enumerates  ten  (Mi.  183,  271  f.).  Hugo  of  St.  Victor  recog¬ 
nizes  among  the  sacraments  the  sign  of  the  cross,  the  invocation 
of  the  Trinity  (de  sacr.  i.  9.  6),  and  all  manner  of  ecclesiasti¬ 
cal  symbols  and  formulas  (ib.  ii.  9).  Roland  thus  designates 
the  incarnation  (p.  157).  But  in  the  twelfth  century  the  con¬ 
stant  tendency  was  to  give  prominence  to  certain  definite  sacra¬ 
ments.  Robert  (sent.  v.  24)  contrasts  the  unrepeatable  (bap¬ 
tism,  confirmation)  and  the  repeatable  (repentance,  the  Lord’s 
Supper).1  Hugo  treats  in  his  Summa  of :  baptism,  confirma¬ 
tion,  the  eucharist,  extreme  unction,  marriage,  but  also  repent¬ 
ance  (6.  10  ff. ;  cf.  de  sacr.  ii.  14),  and  the  power  of  the  keys, 
which  is  conferred  through  ordination  (6.  14).  This  is  practi¬ 
cally  a  recognition  of  the  number  seven.  Here,  too,  the  influ¬ 
ence  of  the  school  of  Abelard  was  felt.  The  Epitome  has  :  bap¬ 
tism,  confirmation,  the  Lord’s  Supper,  extreme  unction,  mar¬ 
riage  (similarly  the  sentences  of  St.  Florian,  Denifle,  archiv.  i. 
432);  repentance  is  treated  of  in  the  third  section  of  the  system 
under  the  heading  of  “  love  ”  (c.  35  ff. ).2  Roland  and  Om- 
nebene,  on  the  other  hand  (vid.  Denifle,  1.  c.,  p.  467),  have  : 
baptism,  confirmation,  Lord’s  Supper,  repentance,  extreme  unc¬ 
tion,  in  connection  with  which  the  power  of  the  keys  and  ordi¬ 
nation  (Rol.,  p.  267  f. )  are  spoken  of,  and  marriage.  Since 
Omnebene  appears  to  have  made  use  of  Roland  (vid.  Gietl, 
Sent.  Rol.,  p.  54),  Hugo  and  Roland  must  be  regarded  as  the 

1  It  is  not  correct  in  view  simply  of  the  incidental  utterance  at  vii.  14  to  re¬ 
gard  him  as  including  ordination  as  a  fifth  sacrament. 

2  Abelard  himself  appears  to  have  divided  in  the  same  way.  Vid.  Ethica, 
c.  23. 


8o 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


first  to  have  placed  the  number  of  sacraments  at  seven.  But  not 
until  we  reach  Peter  Lombard  do  we  find  this  number  clearly 
and  definitely  fixed  (sent.  iv.  2  A).1  It  was  even  then  still  cus¬ 
tomary  to  speak  of  baptism  and  the  Lord’s  Supper  as  the  chief 
sacraments,  which  were  said  to  have  flowed  from  the  side  of 
Christ  (Lomb.  sent.  iv.  8  A;  Hugo,  de  sacr.  i.  9.  7  ;  ii.  2.  1). 

2.  The  old  (Angustinian)  definition  of  a  sacrament,  as  the 
“  sign  of  a  sacred  reality”  ( sacrae  rei  signum')  or  a  “visible 
sign  of  invisible  grace,”  was  still  in  vogue  (Roland,  p.  155; 
epit.  i. ).  But  the  conception  was  gradually  becoming  more 
precise  :  “  God  instituted  the  remedies  of  the  sacraments  against 
the  wounds  of  original  and  actual  sin  ’  ’  (Lomb.  iv.  1  A;  Hugo,  de 
sacr.  i.  8.  12).  They  are  not  merely  signs,  and  were  instituted 
not  only  for  the  sake  of  signifying  {signiftcandi gratia) ,  but  for  the 
sake  of  sanctifying  ( sanctificandi  gratia )  (ib.  B).  Faith  and 
repentance  are  mentioned  as  the  subjective  condition  required 
for  a  profitable  reception  (ib.  iv.  4  B).  But  no  one  so  clearly 
expressed  the  controlling  thought  as  Hugo  :  “A  sacrament  is  a 
corporeal  or  material  element,  openly  (and)  sensibly  presented, 
representing  by  similitude  and  signifyingby  institution,  and  con¬ 
taining  by  consecration,  some  invisible  and  spiritual  grace  (de 
sacr.  i.  9.  2).  Thus,  e.  g.,  it  may  be  said  of  the  water  of  bap¬ 
tism  :  “  By  consecration  ( sanctificatione )  it  contains  spiritual 
grace”  (ib.  ii.  6.  2).  This  fully  expresses  the  sacramental  con¬ 
ception  which  dominates  the  Middle  Ages.  The  sensuous  ele¬ 
ments  somehow  contain  grace ;  with  them  grace  is  infused  into 
the  recipients.  There  are,  indeed,  differences  between  the  vari¬ 
ous  sacraments  :  “  Some,  as  baptism,  offer  a  remedy  for  sjn  and 
confer  assisting  grace ;  others,  as  marriage,  are  for  remedy  only ; 
others,  as  the  eucharist  and  ordination,  strengthen  us  with  grace 
and  virtue  ”  (Lomb.  iv.  2  A).  As  we  shall  have  occasion  here¬ 
after  to  discuss  each  sacrament  separately,  we  here  offer  but  a  few 
brief  comments. 

3.  Baptism  accomplishes  man’s  renewal  by  a  putting  off  of 
vices  ( depositio  vitium ),  and  a  contribution  of  virtues  ( collatio 
virtutum )  (Lombard  iv.  3  L).  Original  sin  is  remitted,  because 
(1)  through  the  grace  of  baptism  the  vice  of  concupiscence  is 

1  According  to  the  above,  my  statement  in  Thomas.  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  216, 
must  be  modified.  It  is  inaccurate  to  say  that  the  Lombard  was  led  to  enume¬ 
rate  seven  sacraments  by  combining  those  acknowledged  by  Hugo  and  Robert 
(see  note  1,  p.  79).  It  seems  chronologically  impossible  that  the  Lombard 
should  have  been  influenced  by  Roland  (vid.  Gietl,  1.  c.,  p.  l6f.).  The 
Lombard  started  out  with  the  enumeration  customary  in  the  school  of  Abe¬ 
lard  (vid.  the  Epitome),  and,  following  Hugo,  added  to  these  repentance  and 
ordination.  But  this  was  a  natural  result  of  the  theological  tendencies  of  the 
age. 


DEFINITION  OF  SACRAMENTS. 


81 


weakened  (debilitatur') ,  and  (2)  guilt  ( reatus )  is  abolished 
(( aboletur )  in  baptism  (ib.  ii.  32  B). 

4.  Confirmation  works  the  bestowal  of  the  Holy  Spirit  for 

strengthening  (ib.  iv.  7  A.;  infusion  of  grace,  Hugo,  de  sacr.  ii.  7. 
1).  “  Confirmation  is  as  much  worthier  than  baptism,  as  it  is 

worthier  to  be  made  an  athlete  than  to  be  cured  of  disease. 

.  .  .  Wherefore  confirmation  is  now  granted  only  by  a  bishop  ’  ’ 
(Robert,  sent.  v.  23  ;  Hugo,  1.  c.,  ii.  7.  4).  Roland,  on  the 
other  hand,  declares  that  baptism  is  the  worthier  in  its  effect, 
and  that  confirmation  can  be  called  worthier  only  because  it 
ought  to  be  administered  by  a  worthier  person  (p.  213). 1 

5.  As  to  the  Lord’s  Supper,  see  Section  49,  3,  4. 

6.  We  must  examine  the  discussions  of  repentance  somewhat 

more  fully,  since  the  theologians  of  the  period  attempted  to 
justify  upon  theoretic  grounds  the  advances  made  in  the  statement 
of  this  doctrine.  Here,  too,  Abelard  and  his  school  exerted  a  great 
influence.  He  taught  that  ( 1 )  True  repentance  consists  in  contri¬ 
tion  of  the  heart  ( co7itritio  cordis') . 2  Where  this  exists,  God  grants 
the  forgiveness  of  sins  (ethica  19).  Also  the  Epitome  (35)  and 
Roland  (sent.,  pp.  243,  245).  Usually  confessio  will  immediately 
follow  contrition  (eth.  24;  epit.  36;  cf.  praxis,  serm.  8  fin.); 
it  is  not,  however,  a  condition  required  for  the  forgiveness  of 
sins,  but  “  a  large  part  of  satisfaction  ”  (eth.  24).  (2)  But  this 

forgiveness  has  reference  only  to  the  eternal  punishments  of  sin  : 
“  For  God,  when  he  pardons  sin  to  the  penitent,  does  not  remit 
all  penalty  to  them,  but  only  the  eternal”  (eth.  19  ;  epit.  35). 
The  “penalty  of  satisfaction,”  on  the  other  hand,  was  held  to 
release  from  all  temporal  punishment  of  sin,  either  in  this  life  or 
in  purgatory.  If  these  works  of  repentance  are  not  sufficient,3 
God  will  complete  the  punishment  “by  afflicting  with  purga¬ 
torial  punishments  either  in  this  or  in  a  future  life”  (expos, 
in  Rom.  2.  4,  p.  840  ;  eth.  25  ;  cf.  epit.  37 ;  Roland,  p. 
248).  (3)  Roland  established  the  necessity  of  confession  and 

works  of  satisfaction  as  follows  :  “We  offend  God  by  thinking 
wickedly,  and  we  scandalize  the  church  by  acting  perversely  : 
and  just  as  we  offend  both,  we  owe  it  to  both  to  render  satisfac¬ 
tion — to  God  through  contrition  of  heart,  to  the  church  through 
confession  of  the  mouth  ahd  satisfaction  by  works,  if  the  nature 

1  Vid.  also  Petr.  Piet.  sent.  v.  9  :  “  Baptism  ...  is  more  useful  .  .  . 
confirmation  better  and  worthier  and  more  precious,  just  as  water  is  more  use¬ 
ful  than  wine,  but  wine  more  worthy  and  excellent.” 

2  According  to  the  Epitome,  5,  it  arises  “  not  from  fear  of  punishment,  but 
from  love  of  righteousness.” 

3  Observe  the  keen  remarks  of  Abelard  concerning  “  some  of  the  priests 
.  .  .  entrapping  those  under  their  care  in  order  that  for  the  oblation  of  coins 
they  may  condone  or  relax  the  penalties  of  the  enjoined  satisfaction  ”  (eth.  35). 

6 


8  2 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


of  the  time  demands”  (p.  249).  Abelard  thus  deduced  the  pro¬ 
priety  of  works  of  satisfaction  from  the  necessity  of  expiating 
the  temporal  penalties  of  sin,  and  by  this  means  solved  a  prob¬ 
lem  raised  by  the  new  penitential  praxis.  But,  as  he  made  the 
remission  of  the  eternal  penalty  dependent  solely  upon  contri¬ 
tion,  he  increased  the  difficulty  attaching  to  another  problem  of 
the  same  praxis,  i.  e.,  that  absolution  seems  to  be  robbed  of  its 
chief  significance  and  the  office  of  priest  becomes  merely  to 
give  advice  in  reference  to  works  of  satisfaction  for  temporal 
penalties. 

(£)  Hugo  of  St.  Victor,  controverting  the  views  of  Abelard, 
becomes,  upon  the  doctrine  of  repentance  as  elsewhere,  the  rep¬ 
resentative  of  the  hierarchical  orthodoxy.  For  him  the  confes¬ 
sion  is  the  chief  thing  in  repentance,  as  was  doubtless  the  case  in 
the  prevalent  praxis  (cf.  supra,  p.  46).  It  presupposes  contri¬ 
tion  and  the  willingness  to  render  satisfaction  (de  sacr.  ii.  14. 

1  ;  summa  6.  10).  He  who  will  not  make  confession  is  a  de- 
spiser  of  God  (sacr.  ii.  14.  8).  But  repentance  is  actually 
secured  only  through  confession  and  satisfaction  :  “  He  confesses 
his  sin  to  the  priest,  who  imposes  upon  him  a  just  satisfaction, 
for  he  is  bound  to  make  satisfaction,  not  according  to  his  judg¬ 
ment,  but  according  to  the  judgment  of  the  priest,  and  the?i  the 
priest  releases  him  from  the  debt  of  future  damnation  ”  (summ. 
6.  n).1  Absolution  accordingly  follows  confession,  but  it  is 
granted  in  view  of  the  satisfaction  imposed  in  connection  with 
the  former  (see  foot-note).  Hugo  thus  theoretically  comes  to 
the  support  of  the  theory  of  the  older  penitential  praxis  (p.  43  f. ). 
Finally,  he  vigorously  assails  the  opinion  that  priestly  absolution 
has  only  an  ecclesiastical  and  declaratory  signification.  Against 
this  he  argues  :  The  sinner  is  bound  in  a  two-fold  way  :  “by  ob- 
duration  of  the  mind  and  by  the  debt  of  future  damnation.  ”  The 
former,  God  removes  through  the  grace  which  works  penitence  in 
us,  “so  that  .  .  .  penitent  we  merit  to  be  absolved  from  the 
debt  of  damnation”  (sacr.  ii.  4.  8,  p.  565).  As  the  resusci¬ 
tated  Lazarus  was  by  the  apostles  “loosed”  from  his  grave- 
clothes,  so  the  priests,  by  means  of  a  power  divinely  conferred, 
release  the  penitent  sinner  from  eternal  perdition  (ib.  p.  565  f. , 

1  It  is  necessary  to  observe  that  Hugo  is  aware  that  forgiveness  depends 
upon  contritio  and  confessio  :  “  But  there  is  this  remedy,  that  he  repent  of  his 
fault  in  his  heart  and  confess  it  with  his  mouth  ;  which,  when  he  has  done, 
he  will  then  no  longer  be  a  debtor  of  damnation”  (sacr.  ii.  14.  8,  p.  567). 
The  passage  above  cited  does  not  exclude  this  view,  as  the  “then”  refers 
only  to  the  imposing  of  the  satisfaction.  Cf.  somewhat  later  (p.  1 49). 
“  The  priest  releases  .  .  .  from  the  debt  of  future  punishment  by  absolving 
through  the  satisfaction  which  he  imposes.” 


DEFINITION  OF  SACRAMENTS.  83 

568,  and  summ.  6.  ii).1  In  this  idea  lies  the  dogmatic  signifi¬ 
cance  of  Hugo’s  teaching. 

(V)  Robert  Pullus,  on  the  other  hand,  locates  the  essence 
of  the  sacrament  in  absolution  and  confession.  “Absolution, 
which  is,  in  confession,  pronounced  above  the  penitent  by  the 
priest,  is  a  sacrament,  since  it  is  the  sign  of  a  sacred  reality  ’  ’ 
(sent.  vi.  61).  But  the  priestly  absolution  is  only  the  announce¬ 
ment  of  the  forgiveness  which  God,  upon  the  ground  of  peni¬ 
tence,  imparts  to  the  sinner  (ib.;  likewise  Petr.  Piet.  sent.  iii. 
1 6).  But  after  absolution  it  remains  necessary  to  perform  the 
penitential  works  (vi.  52).  If  the  latter  be  not  rendered,  they 
will  be  completed  by  the  penalties  endured  in  purgatory  (ib.  and 
vii.  1  ;  vi.  59). 

(#)  The  Lombard  betrays  also  here  the  influence  of  Abelard. 
Repentance  embraces  the  usual  three  parts  (sent.  iv.  16  A).  It 
is  a  punishment,  and,  as  such,  of  a  satisfactory  nature  ( poena 
satisfacit ,  iv.  14  A,  B,  15  C).  The  admission  (iv.  17  C), 
that  forgiveness  presupposes  only  contrition  and  confession  be¬ 
fore  God,  is  supplemented  by  the  declaration  :  “  Confession 

ought  to  be  offered  first  to  God  and  then  to  the  priest,  nor  if 
there  be  opportunity  for  this  can  entrance  to  paradise  be  other¬ 
wise  attained  (ib.  D),  since  the  latter  is  a  kind  of  punishment 
of  sin”  (ib.  F).  This  does  not  involve  any  divergence  from 
Abelard.  Confession  is  then  followed  by  absolution  (dist.  18). 
The  question,  whether  God  or  the  priest  forgives,  is  thus  decided  : 
“  That  God  only  remits  and  retains  sins,  and  nevertheless  he  has 
conferred  upon  the  church  the  power  of  binding  and  loosing ; 
but  he  absolves  in  one  way  and  the  church  in  another  ”  (18  E). 2 
The  priests  decide  whether  the  sinner  ‘  ‘  is  regarded  as  released 
in  the  view  of  the  church  ”  (F).  But  the  priests  further  bind 
and  loose  by  imposing  and  mitigating  the  satisfaction ,  and  by 
the  admission  to  participation  in  the  sacrament  of  those  who 
have  been  purified  by  rendering  the  required  satisfaction.  But 
since  this  was,  in  fact,  dependent  upon  absolution,  the  Lombard 
further  interprets  his  language  :  It  is  to  be  observed  that,  be¬ 
cause  they  bind  some  with  the  satisfaction  of  repentance,  by 

1  The  practical  frame  of  mind  which  harmonizes  with  this  theory  cannot  be 
better  expressed  than  by  Hugo  :  “  How  can  I  know  when  my  repentance  is 
sufficient  ( amdigna )?  Because  thou  canst  not  know  this,  therefore  thou  hast  need 
always  to  repent.  Thou  canst  make  satisfaction  ;  thou  canst  not  do  too  much.  It 
is  better  to  do  more  than  less  .  .  .  Nevertheless,  in  order  that  the  conscience  of 
the  sinner  may  sometimes  find  comfort,  the  mode  and  measure  of  external  repent¬ 
ance  has  been  appointed,  so  that  when  the  latter  has  been  completed  and 
perfected,  thou  mayest  begin  to  have  confidence”  (de  sacr.  ii.  14.  2  fin.). 

2  Here,  as  often  in  the  Lombard,  we  have  the  theology  of  “Yes  and  No.” 
In  iv.  18  D  the  views  of  Hugo  and  Abelard  are  cited. 


84 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


that  very  act  they  show  such  to  be  released  from  their  sins,  since- 
penitential  satisfaction  is  not  imposed  upon  anyone  except  such 
as  the  priest  judges  to  be  truly  penitent.  But  upon  any  other 
they  do  not  impose  it,  and  by  that  very  act  they  adjudge  that 
his  sin  is  retained  by  God  (G).  A  defective  exercise  of  re¬ 
pentance  results  in  the  tortures  of  purgatory  :  “  And  they  are 
more  severely  punished  than  if  they  had  fully  completed  their 
repentance  here  ’  ’  (  2  o  B ) . 1  The  Lombard  advanced  the  doctrine 
of  repentance  by  assuring  to  absolution,  by  virtue  of  its  close  con¬ 
nection  with  confession,  a  secure  place  in  the  sacrament,  follow¬ 
ing  in  this  in  the  footsteps  of  Hugo.  The  dogmatic  contribu¬ 
tion  of  the  present  period  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  began  to  estab¬ 
lish  a  connection  between  confession  and  priestly  absolution, 
and  to  argue  the  necessity  of  satisfaction  in  view  of  the  tem¬ 
poral,  i.  e.,  purgatorial,  punishment  of  sin. 

7.  The  custom  of  Extreme  Unction,  based  on  Jas.  5.  15, 
was  in  the  present  period  included  among  the  sacraments.  It 
serves  a  double  purpose  :  “  for  the  remission  of  sins  and  for  the 
alleviation  of  bodily  infirmity  ’  ’  (Lomb.  iv.  23  B  ;  Hugo,  de  sacr. 
ii-  x5-  3> 

8.  The  origin  of  the  sacrament  of  Ordination  has  been 
traced  in  Vol.  I.,  p.  319  f.  A  new  motive  was  furnished 
for  the  careful  statement  of  the  doctrine  by  the  enlargement  of 
the  penitential  system  and  the  sacramental  conception  of  grace. 
The  priest  receives  through  ordination  the  two  keys,  discretio  and 
potestas.  “  In  consecration  these  two  are  given  to  all,  i.  e.,  the 
office  of  exercising  discretion  and  the  office  of  exercising  power.  ’  *' 
Binding  and  loosing  are  thereby  committed  to  them  (Hugo,, 
summ.  6.  14;  cf.  Roland,  p.  264  ff.;  Lomb.  sent.  iv.  19  A-C). 
Yet  this  is  only  one  aspect  of  the  matter.  Through  ordination, 
is  imparted  a  more  abundant  grace  ( amplior  gratia ,  Lomb.  iv. 
24  AjJ  as  well  as  a  spiritual  power  {spirituals potestas')  and  spiritual 
character  {character  spiritualist  (ib.  K).  To  it  those  are  to  be 
admitted  “who  may  be  able  worthily  to  administer  the  Lord’s  sac¬ 
raments  ”  (ib.  B).  If  this  applies  to  all  the  seven  orders  (ostiarii, 
lectores,  exorcistae,  acolythi,  subdiaconi,  diaconi,  presbyteri), 
it  has  yet  special  reference  to  the  priesthood.  “The  word  priest 

( 'sacerdos )  is  derived  from  the  Greek  and  Latin,  i.  e. ,  sacrum  dans , 
or  sacer  dux.  For  just  as  a  king  {rex)  receives  his  title  because  he 
reigns  ( a  regendo ),  so  a  priest  ( sacerdos )  receives  his  because  he 
consecrates  {sacrando) ,  for  he  consecrates  and  sanctifies”  (ib.  J). 
In  the  conception  of  this  sacrament,  as  elsewhere,  no  full  and 

1  The  Council  at  Aachen,  A.  D.  836,  mentions  it  among  the  duties  of  the 
spiritual  adviser  (Mansi,  xiv.  681).  Item,  at  Pavia,  A.  D.  850  (Hefele,  iii. 
177).  The  custom  is  first  met  with  among  the  Gnostics  (vid.Vol.  I.,  p.  99).- 


CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


85 


-clear  conclusion  was  attained  in  the  present  period,  but  the  con¬ 
trolling  thought  is  clear  enough.  Ordination  imparts  the  spiritual 
authority  to  administer  the  sacraments,  and  through  them  to  sanc¬ 
tify  the  laity  (cf.  Greg,  vii.,  supra,  p.  51). 

9.  The  sacrament  of  Marriage  betrays  the  juristic  origin  by 
the  form  of  statement. 

It  is  clear  from  the  evidence  above  adduced  that  the  theolo¬ 
gians  of  the  twelfth  century  had  already  clearly  wrought  out  the 
materializing  of  grace  through  the  sacraments.  The  theologians 
of  the  thirteenth  century  inherited,  indeed,  a  number  of  un¬ 
solved — and  insoluble — problems,  but  also  the  firmly  established 
fundamental  conception  which  proved  the  regulating  force  of 
medieval  Christianity,  i.  e.,  Grace  is  the  power  efficaciously 
manifested  in  the  sacraments,  whose  administration  belongs  by 
■  divine  right  to  the  priesthood. 

§51.  Conception  of  the  Church. 

1.  The  task  of  the  present  chapter  would  be  imperfectly  per¬ 
formed  if  we  should  fail  to  note  the  acceptance  by  the  theolo¬ 
gians  of  the  day  of  the  conception  of  the  church  which  Gregory 
VII.  introduced  (supra,  p.  50  ff. ).  The  utterances  of  the 
Scholastics  upon  the  subject  are  confessedly  meagre.  Neither 
the  system  of  Abelard  nor  that  of  the  Damascenes  gave  occasion 
for  its  discussion.  The  conception  was  a  self-evident  premise, 
whose  application  must  be  made  practically  by  the  canonical 
laws  and  theologically  in  the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments. 
It  is,  therefore,  all  the  more  significant  that  Hugo  of  St.  Victor 
and  Robert  Pullus  should  have  expressed  themselves  plainly 
upon  the  subject.  We  have  also  discussions  of  the  relation  of 
church  and  state  in  the  Polycraticus  of  John  of  Salisbury  (f 
1180,  opp.  ed.  Giles,  5  vols. ,  1848.  Cf.  Gennrich,  Die  Staats- 
u.  Kirchenlehre  d.  Joh.  v.  Sal.,  1894).1 

2 .  Augustine  indicates  the  starting  point  in  his  query  :  ‘  ‘  What 
is  the  church  except  the  multitude  of  the  believing,  the  whole 
number  of  Christians?”  (ynultitudo  fide lium,  universitas  chris - 
Manor  urn) .  (Hugo,  de  sacr.  ii.  2.  2).  But  inasmuch  as,  ac¬ 
cording  to  this,  believers  are  simply  Christians,  this  definition 
by  no  means  brings  us  “to  the  true  Christian  idea  of  the 
church  ”  (Liebner,  Hugo  v.  St.  Victor,  p.  446);"'  it  only  declares 
that  the  Christian  world  constitutes  the  church.2  The  correct 

1  Vid.  also  Honorius  Augustod.:  “The  highest  glory  composed  of  the 
apostolic  and  the  imperial.”  Mi.  172. 

2  Interesting  is  the  definition  of  Alanus  ab  Insul.:  “  the  church  is  the  con¬ 
gregation  of  believers  confessing  Christ  and  the  guardian  (. subsidium )  of  the 
-sacraments”  (de  articul.  cath.  fid.  iv.  in.,  Mi.  210.  613). 


86 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


conception  is  gained  by  the  division  of  Christians  into  rulers  and 
subjects  (t praelati  et  subjecti')  (Hugo,  ib.  ii.  2.  5  ;  cf.  Robert, 
sent.  vii.  19:  “prelates  governing  the  church”).  This  for¬ 
mula,  frequently  occurring  already  in  the  writings  of  Cyprian 
(Vol.  I.,  p.  180  ff. ),  signifies  that  the  right  side  of  the  church  con¬ 
sists  of  the  clergy  and  the  left  side  of  the  laity  (Hugo,  ii.  2.3). 
There  are,  therefore,  two  lives  or  two  nationalities,  of  which  one 
ministers  to  temporal  necessities,  and  the  other  administers  what 
pertains  to  the  spiritual  life  (ib.  3).  Each  of  these  nationalities 
is  subject  to  a  ruler,  i.  e.,  the  king  and  the  pope  (ib.  4).  The 
nature  of  the  church  is  in  harmony  with  this  idea,  and  there  are 
discussions  of  its  orders ,  sacra?nents,  and  precepts.  The  grada¬ 
tion  of  the  orders  is  then  treated  of.  The  special  privileges  of 
bishops,  as  compared  with  priests,  are  placed  upon  the  ground 
that  otherwise  the  subjects  might  take  advantage  of  their  superi¬ 
ors  and  forget  the  obedience  due  the  latter  (ib.  ii.  3.  12).  The 
archbishops  and  the  four  patriarchs  stand  above  the  bishops,  and 
over  all  is  the  pope  (papa),  i.  e.,  father  of  fathers,  whom,  pre¬ 
siding  in  place  of  Peter,  the  chief  of  the  apostles,  every  ecclesi¬ 
astical  order  is  bound  to  obey,  who  alone  has  as  prerogatives  of 
his  high  rank  the  keys  of  binding  and  loosing  all  things  upon 
earth  (ii.  3.  5).  No  one  but  God  may  pass  judgment  upon  him 
(Johann.  Polycr.  viii.  23;  opp.  iv.  363).  According  to  the  in¬ 
terpretation  of  the  Augustinian  conception  of  the  two  states 
which  dominates  Hugo,  it  is  but  a  self-evident  conclusion  that  the 
spiritual  power  stands  far  above  the  secular  ;  it  is  the  older  and 
has  authority  to  institute  the  latter  and  sit  in  judgment  upon  it 
(ii.  2.  4;  cf.  Robert,  vii.  7):  “This  sword,  therefore,  the 
prince  receives  from  the  hand  of  the  church.  .  .  .  The  prince 
is,  therefore,  a  minister  of  the  priesthood,  and  one  who  exercises 
that  part  of  the  duties  of  the  priests  which  seems  unworthy  of 
the  hands  of  the  priesthood  ”  (Polycr.  iv.  3  in.).1  Yet  the  state 
is  also  to  be  regarded  as  a  divine  institution  (Polycr.,  1.  c.,  iv. 
1),  but  must  be  subject  to  spiritual  (clerical)  direction.  Robert 
'Expresses  the  opinion  that,  according  to  Matt.  22.  21  :  “The 
priesthood  is  superior  to  the  kingdom  in  those  things  which  it 
administers  for  God,  and  the  kingdom  to  the  priesthood  in  those 
things  which  pertain  to  the  world  ”  (vii.  7,  p.  920  f.  Cf.  Hugo, 
ii.  2.  6,  7  ;  Gregory  VII.,  supra,  p.  50Y  These  utterances 
furnish  a  precise  outline  of  the  Gregorian  conception  of  the 

1  John,  says:  “Therefore  the  prince  is  a  minister  of  the  public  utility  and 
a  servant  of  equity”  (Polycr.  iii.  2).  The  gravest  crime  is  tyranny,  which  is 
directed  “against  the  very  body  of  justice.”  From  this  is  deducted  the  right 
of  slaying  tyrants:  “  To  kill  a  tyrant  is  not  only  allowable,  but  right  and  just  ” 
(ib.  iii.  15  ;  viii.  17  in.,  18  fin.). 


AIMS  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


87 


church  :  ( 1 )  The  clergy  are  related  to  the  laity  as  a  government 
to  its  subjects.  (2)  This  exalted  position  of  the  clergy  is  ex¬ 
plained  by  their  authority  to  dispense  the  sacraments.  (3)  The 
clergy  is  a  graded  organism,  whose  summit  is  the  pope.  (4) 
The  secular  power  is  by  divine  right  subject  to  the  spiritual. 


CHAPTER  II. 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE  DURING  THE  SECOND 

PERIOD  OF  SCHOLASTICISM. 

§52.  Aims  of  the  Church.  Religious  Life.  Efforts  at  Reform. 

1.  We  are  now  standing  upon  the  summit  of  the  Middle  Ages. 
The  cornerstone  and  foundation  of  their  theological  structure 
were  laid  in  the  former  period,  its  scope  and  tendency  deter¬ 
mined.  The  decisive  work  was  not  done  by  the  leaders  of  the 
thirteenth  century,  but  by  their  forerunners  in  the  eleventh  and 
twelfth  centuries.  This  is  true  of  the  theologians  no  less  than 
of  the  ecclesiastics  and  the  reformers  of  the  church’s  devotional 
life. 

We  must  first  of  all  trace  the  development  of  the  hierarchical 
ideas  and  the  religious  ideals,  whose  introduction  was  noted 
in  Sections  44  and  45.  We  recall  the  firm  adherence  of  the 
later  popes  to  the  principles  of  Gregory  VII.  Innocent  III. 
claims  special  attention.  He  held  that  11  The  pope  is  the  vicar 
( vicaiius )  of  Christ,  placed  midway  between  God  and  man,  be¬ 
neath  God  and  beyond  man,  less  than  God  and  greater  than  man, 
who  judges  concerning  all  and  is  judged  by  none  (Mi.  217. 
658).  Thus  Aristotle  once  spoke  of  the  genie  as  “  O,  thou  to 
men  divine!  ”  (Pol.  iii.  13.  8).  Not  only  the  whole  church,  but 
the  whole  world,  is  subject  to  the  sway  of  the  pope  :  “  James,  the 
brother  of  the  Lord  .  .  .  left  to  Peter  not  only  the  whole  church, 
but  the  whole  world,  to  be  governed  ”  (registr.  ii.  209).  Inno¬ 
cent  accordingly  sought  to  adminster  the  affairs  of  the  church  as 
its  sole  ruler  (cf.  the  confirmation  of  bishops,  their  oath  of  obe¬ 
dience,  their  being  called  to  the  duty  of  solicitudo ,  appellation  to 
Rome,  the  Roman  land  titles,  etc.  Vid.  the  bull  of  Eger.,  A. 
D.  1213,  in  MG.  leg.  ii.  224  b;  reg.  i.  495,  496),  and  claimed 
also  supremacy  over  states.  As  the  moon  receives  its  light  from 
the  sun,  “  so  the  royal  power  receives  the  splendor  of  its  dignity 


88 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


from  the  pontifical  authority”  (reg.  i.  401,  Mi.  217.  1180.  Cf. 
Dollinger,  Papsttum,  p.  401  f.  ).1  These  ideas  were  most  abruptly 
expressed  in  the  bull  ‘  ‘  Unam  Sanctam,  ’  ’  issued  by  Boniface  VIII. , 
A.  D.  1302,  whose  leading  declarations  are  as  follows:  “We 
are  compelled  by  the  faith  to  believe  .  .  .  one  holy  catholic 
church  .  .  .  outside  of  which  there  is  neither  salvation  nor  the 
remission  of  sins.  ...  In  which  there  is  one  Lord,  one  faith, 
one  baptism.  .  .  .  Therefore  of  this  one  and  only  church 
there  is  one  body  and  one  head,  not  two  bodies,  as  though  it 
were  a  monster,  viz. :  Christ  and  the  vicar  of  Christ,  Peter  and 
the  successor  of  Peter.  .  .  .  That  in  this  and  in  its  power  are 
two  swords,  viz.,  the  spiritual  and  the  temporal.  .  .  .  There¬ 
fore  both  are  in  the  power  of  the  church,  viz.,  the  spiritual  and 
the  material  sword  ;  but  the  latter  to  be  exercised  for  the  church, 
the  former  by  the  church.  The  one  is  in  the  hand  of  the  priest ; 
the  other  in  the  hands  of  kings  and  soldiers,  but  at  the  command 
and  permission  (ad  nutuni  et patientia?ii)  of  the  priest.  But  it  is 
fitting  that  sword  be  under  sword,  and  that  the  temporal  author¬ 
ity  be  subject  to  the  spiritual.  .  .  .  But  that  the  spiritual  power 
excels  both  in  dignity  and  nobility  any  earthly  power  whatsoever. 

.  .  .  For,  truth  being  the  witness,  the  spiritual  power  has  (the 
right)  to  establish  the  earthly,  and,  if  it  have  not  been  good,  to 
judge  it.  .  .  .  Whosoever,  therefore,  resists  this  power  thus  or¬ 
dained  of  God  resists  the  ordinance  of  God,  unless,  like  Mani- 
chaeus,  thou  dreamest  that  there  are  two  principles.  .  .  .  More¬ 
over,  to  every  human  creature  we  declare,  say,  define  and  pro¬ 
nounce,  that  to  be  subject  to  the  Roman  pontiff  is  absolutely 
necessary  to  salvation  ”  (de  necessitate  salutis'). 

2.  The  writings  of  St.  Bernard  exerted  a  profound  influ¬ 
ence  upon  the  devout  speculation  of  the  following  period,  but  it 
does  not  lie  within  the  province  of  the  History  of  Doctrines  to 
follow  them  in  detail.2  We  must  not,  however,  overlook  the 
protest  against  the  secularization  of  the  church  which,  at  the 
time  when  the  hierarchy  was  at  the  summit  of  its  power,  and 
when  even  ideas  of  reform  had  become  merely  a  means  for 
further  secularization,  was  raised  by  the  Brethren  of  the  Poor 
Life  of  Christ.  The  power'  of  love  was  revealed  in  Christ  to 

1  Innocent  maintained  that  the  popes  had  in  the  time  of  Charlemagne 
transplanted  the  Greek  Empire  to  Germany,  and  that  in  consequence  the 
“  right  and  authority  of  examining  the  person  elected  to  be  king”  belonged 
to  them  (de  elect.  34,  in  Mirbt,  Urkunden,  p.  78). 

2  Vid.  the  mystical  writings  of  Hugo  (f  1141)  and  Richard  (f  1173)  of 
St.  Victor;  also  Bonaventura,  Itenerarium  mentis,  as  presented  in  detail  in 
Thomasius,  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  272  ff.  Religious  mysticism  is  here  systematized 
and  developed  into  a  philosophy.  These  writings  may  be  described  as  the 
beginnings  of  theological  ethics. 


AIMS  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


89 


Francis  of  Assisi.  The  poor  life  of  Christ  overwhelmed  his 
soul ;  the  imitation  of  Christ  became  his  ideal.  He  became  the 
knight  of  4 11  holy  poverty.”  Poverty  set  him  free  from  the 
world.  As  he,  surfeited  with  the  old  life,  shook  off  his  relations 
with  the  world,  he  soon  found  something  else  and  more  than  his 
ideal  had  promised — he  found  himself  and  individuality.  He 
did  not  clothe  his  thoughts  in  doctrinal  statements.  The  gospel 
frame  of  mind  was  everything  to  him.  The  love  of  Christ  kept 
his  tears  of  joy  ever  flowing  and  taught  him  to  perform  miracles 
of  love.  The  whole  creation  testified  to  him  of  the  love  of  God, 
and  all  living  things  demanded  of  him  love.  “Everything 
temporal  ’  ’  was  to  him  ‘  ‘  only  an  image,  ’  ’  the  image  of  the  soul, 
which  belongs  to  its  God.  Thus  his  life,  and  with  it  the  whole  crea¬ 
tion,  became  a  hymn  of  praise  to  God,  for  the  service  of  free  love. 
“  Praise  and  bless  the  Lord,  and  render  thanks,  and  serve  him 
with  grand  humility  ”  (Song  of  the  Sun).  “  My  God  and  all,  who 
art  thou,  sweetest  Lord,  my  God  ;  and  who  am  I,  an  insignificant 
worm,  thy  servant?  Most  Holy  Lord,  that  I  might  love  thee  !  ” 
(opp.  Franc,  ed.  v.  d.  Burg,  1849,  P*  44)-  “  May  the  glow¬ 

ing  and  mellifluous  power  of  thy  love  absorb,  I  pray,  O  Lord, 
my  mind  from  all  things  w'hich  are  under  heaven,  that  I  may  die 
from  love  of  thy  love,  who  hast  deigned  to  die  from  love 
of  my  love”  (ib.  p.  43).  Or,  as  Jacopone  sings:  “Make 
me  truly  to  rejoice  with — cling  to  Jesuline ;  then  at  length 
shall  I  have  lived.”  Francis  was  made  the  founder  of  an  order 
by  the  church  of  his  age.  But  he  sought  and  attained  more  than 
this.  He  discovered  human  individuality  and  opened  to  it  an 
immediate  intercourse  with  God.  It  may,  perhaps,  be  correct 
to  say  that  he  wished  to  make  all  men  monks ;  but  he  did  cer¬ 
tainly  also  teach  the  children  of  men  to  become  Christians  and 
men.  As  he  found  God  and  love  in  the  Jesus  of  the  gospels, 
and  attained  liberation  from  the  world  in  the  following  of  Jesus, 
he  exerted  a  powerful  stimulus  upon  his  contemporaries.  He 
taught  the  world  the  directly  individual  character  and  the  present 
blessedness  of  the  religious  life,  and  he  led  men  to  look 
upon  the  world  and  mankind  simply  and  without  dogmatic 
spectacles.  He  glorified  poverty  and  love,  and  taught  men  to 
realize  in  them  the  sense  of  personal  perfection.  His  influence 
can  be  easily  traced  in  the  religious  life,  as  well  as  in  the 
art  and  literature,  of  the  following  period.  This  is  especially 
true  with  reference  to  the  direct  and  loving  appreciation  of  the 
human  life  of  Jesus  which  was  manifested  in  the  ensuing  age. 
The  one  precious  pearl  of  the  church’s  tradition  was  thus  found 
anew.  How  exhaustively  and  how  lovingly  have  not  Bonaven- 
tura  (Meditationes  vitae  Chr.  opp.  vi.)  and  Ludolf  of  Saxony 


9° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


(Vita  Christi ;  vid.  also  De  vita  et  beneficiis  salvatoris  Jesu  Chr. 
devotissimae  meditationes)  portrayed  the  human  life  of  Jesus  : 

‘ 1  in  order  that  in  all  places  and  deeds  thou  mayest  be  in  mind, 
as  though  thou  wast  present  in  body  ”  (Bonav.  c.  88  fin.).  Into 
the  heart  of  him  who  thus  regards  the  life  of  Jesus  there  comes 
a  certain  “  familiarity,  confidence  and  love  ”  for  the  Lord  (ib. 
proem.).  He  is,  as  is  constantly  emphasized,  for  us  the  good 
example  :  “  Who  to  this  end  was  sent  from  heaven  to  us  in  order 
that  he  might  go  before  us  in  the  path  of  virtues,  and  might  give 
to  us  in  his  example  a  law  of  life  and  discipline  ”  (Ludolf,  pro- 
log.).  This  is  the  way  “  to  behold  him  inspirit  ”  fib.  ii.  c.  89). 
Upon  this  point  cf.  Seeberg,  in  Ztschr.  f.  K.  Wiss. ,  1888,  p. 
163  If.  The  lessons  taught  by  St.  Francis  were,  thanks  to  his 
monastic  order  and  despite  it,  not  lost  upon  the  Christian 
world.  He  was  a  “  pioneer  of  the  reformers.” 

Cf.  Hase,  Fr.  v.  Ass.  1856.  Sabatier,  Leben  d.  h.  Fr.,  German  trans¬ 
lation,  1895.  Hegler,  Ztschr.  f.  Theol.  u.  K.  1896.  K.  Muller,  Die 
Anfange  des  Minoritenordens,  etc.,  1885.  Thode,  Fr.  v.  Ass.  u.  die 
Anfange  der  Kunst  d.  Renaissance  in  Ital.,  1885.  Ehrle,  in  Archiv.  f.  Litt. 
u.  Kirchengesch.  d.  MA.  iii.  554  ff. 

3.  The  reformatory  agitations  very  naturally  exerted  a  marked 
influence  upon  the  piety  of  the  laity.  This  was  especially  true  in 
regard  to  the  penitential  brotherhoods  attaching  themselves  to  the 
third  order  of  St.  Francis.  But  it  must  be  acknowledged,  further, 
that  among  the  great  masses  of  the  population  an  external  eccle¬ 
siastical  religious  life  was  perpetuated.  The  people  believed  in 
God,  Christ,  the  Virgin  Mary,  and  the  saints.  They  believed 
just  “  what  the  church  believes.”1  “  There  is  a  certain  body  of 
the  faith  to  which  everyone  is  bound,  and  which  is  sufficient  for 
the  simple  and,  perhaps,  for  all  laymen,  i.  e.,  that  every  adult  be¬ 
lieve  that  God  is,  and  that  he  is  a  rewarder  of  all  the  good. 
Likewise  must  all  believe  the  other  articles  implicitly ,  that 

everything  which  the  universal  church  believes  is  true.  ’  ’  These 
words  of  Innocent  IV.2  justly  represent  the  actual  state  of  things.3 
Faith  in  God  consists  in  the  conviction  that  he  guides  the  for- 

1  The  “faith”  is  the  Apostles’  Creed,  e.  g.,  Schonbach,  Altdeutsche  Pre- 
digten  i.  41,  46.  Its  essential  content  is  the  Trinity,  ib.  i.  4;  ii.  1 1 5  ;  iii. 
1 14.  It  includes  also  the  divinity  of  Christ  and  the  seven  sacraments  (vid. 
Altdeutsch.  Pred.  ed.  Wackernagel,  p.  77  fif. ).  Vid.  also  i.  42  :  “I  believe  all 
that  which  I  as  a  Christian  man  ought  to  believe.”  Compare  Tertullian’s 
“credidi  quod  credere  debui.” 

2  Apparatus  quinque  libror.  decretalium  i.  1.  Vid.  Ritschl,  Fides  impli- 
cita,  1890,  p.  10. 

3  It  was  the  law  for  inquisitors  :  They  have  power  to  excommunicate  laymen 
disputing  publicly  or  privately  concerning  the  Catholic  faith  (Bernard.  Guid. 
practica  inquisit.  iv. ,  p.  207). 


AIMS  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


91 


tunes  of  men,  rewarding  the  good  and  punishing  the  wicked. 
Christ  by  his  death  overcame  the  devil  (<?.  g. ,  Schonbach,  Alt- 
deutsche  Predigten,  iii.  76,  174).  He  became  for  us  an  example 
of  virtue,  humility,  and  poverty  (ib.  iii.  7,  238,  252,  40).  He 
is  “the  heavenly  King”  (ib.  iii.  6).  By  faithful  fulfillment  of 
one’s  duties  in  the  church  the  favor  of  God  may  be  secured. 
Then  comes  the  intercession  of  the  saints,  particularly  of  the 
Virgin  Mary,1  and  the  protective  influence  of  relics,  and,  finally, 
almsgiving.  Life  should  be  spent  in  constant  view  of  the  future 
world.  Every  act  of  the  Christian  has  reference  to  reward  or 
punishment  there.2  And  as  he  thus  stands  in  constant  touch 
with  the  other  world,  so  its  wonders  are  constantly  injected  into 
the  present  life.3  The  providence  of  God,  implicit  faith,  Christ 
the  vanquisher  of  the  devil  and  the  teacher  of  virtue,  ecclesias- 
ticism,  alms,  saints,  relics,  and  the  future  world  constitute  the 
chief  articles  of  practical  Christianity.4  But  in  the  most  culti¬ 
vated  circles  of  the  age  even  the  utterance  attributed  to  Frederick 
II.  concerning  the  three  deceivers  (Moses,  Jesus,  and  Moham¬ 
med)  found  currency  (cf.  Reuter,  Gesch.  d.  rel.  Aufklarung. 
ii.  276  ff. ). 

Vid.  Knobler,  Kathol.  Leben.  im  MA. ,  4  vols. ,  1887  ff.  (after  Digby). 
Foste,  ZurTheol.  d.  Berthold  v.  Regensburg,  Zwickauer  Gymnasialpr. ,  1890. 
Sommer,  Deutsche  Frommigkeit  in  I3ten  Jahrhundert,  1901.  MiCHAEL, 
Kulturzustande  des  deutschen  Volkes  wahrend  des  I3ten  Jahrhunderts,  1903. 

4.  The  means  by  which  the  church  influenced  the  religious  life 
of  the  age  were  chiefly  the  following  :  (<z)  Preaching ,  which  con¬ 
sisted  mainly  of  admonitions  to  a  moral  life,  in  connection  with 
which  doctrine  was  presented  only  in  general  outlines,  the  liturgy 
explained,  and  the  history  of  Christ  and  of  the  saints  repeated.5 

1  Adoration  of  the  virgin  was  rapidly  gaining  in  popularity.  So  early  as 
A.  D.  1 140  an  attempt  was  made  at  Lyons  to  introduce  a  festival  of  the  im¬ 
maculate  conception  of  Mary,  but  Bernard  expressed  himself  positively  against 
the  idea.  Vid.  ep.  174.  For  the  position  of  St.  Francis,  vid.  ep.  11,  12, 
and  p.  400pp.  Konrad  of  Wiirzb.  in  the  Gold.  Schmiede  (especially  210, 
282,  488,  632  :  Du  bist  ein  ewic  fundament — dar  uffe  de  geloube  stat — diu 
Kristenheit  gemuret  hat — ir  zuoversiht  uf  dine  kraft,  1374,  1832,  1992. 
Altd.  Predigten,  ii.  79  :  “  Our  Lord  is  the  King  and  our  lady  the  queen.” 

2  Two  brothers  were  expelled  from  that  monastery.  Unless  these  two  shall 
have  returned,  its  condition  will  never  be  good.  One  of  these  is  called  Give 
{Date');  the  other  Take  ( Dabitur )  (Caesar.  Heisterb.  dial.  iv.  68). 

3  Vid.  especially  the  Dialog,  miraculorum  of  Caesar,  v.  Heisterbach  (ed. 
Strange,  1851),  and  Peter  Venerabil. ,  De  miraculis  sui  temporis,  in  Migne  189. 

4  There  has,  strangely  enough,  been  as  yet  no  systematic  presentation  of  the 
religious  ideas  of  medieval  literature,  although  Schonbach  has  made  a  begin¬ 
ning  :  Uber  Hartmann  v.  Aue,  1894. 

5  Cf.  Linsenmayer,  Gesch.  d.  Predigt  in  Deutschl.,  1886,  p.  157  ff.  Vid.. 
Schonbach,  Altdeutsche  Predigten,  3  vols.,  1886  ff.  Ilonorius  Augustodu- 


92 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Then  came  the  Sacrament  of  Repentance.  The  transformation 
of  the  church’s  teaching  upon  this  point  in  the  twelfth  century 
(supra,  p.  45  )  gave  rise  to  a  number  of  new  questions,  as :  Whether 
contrition  is  sufficient  in  itself,  or  if  it  requires  also  confession 
before  a  priest.  Gratian  still  leaves  it  an  open  question,  whether 
“sins  are  remitted  upon  contrition  of  the  heart,  not  upon  con¬ 
fession  of  the  mouth,”  or  whether  “without  confession  no  par¬ 
don  can  be  merited”  (decret.  pars  ii. ;  causa  33;  quaest.  3 
can.  30,  60,  89).  The  theologians  finally  decided  for  the  latter 
position  (vid.  sub).  Inasmuch  as  confession  before  the  priest 
thus  became  the  controlling  factor  of  the  sacrament,1  the  indica¬ 
tive  form  of  absolution  gradually  supplanted  the  optative.2  It  is, 
therefore,  now  the  church  which,  through  its  representatives, 
grants  “absolution  from  penalty  and  guilt.”  Again,  it  was 
asked  whether  all  sins,  or  only  mortal  sins,  were  to  be  confessed. 
In  general,  it  was  the  rule  that  for  a  multitude  of  lighter  sins  the 
“  general  repentance  in  the  church,  the  Lord’s  Prayer,  fasting, 
and  giving  alms  to  the  poor,  and,  at  most,  the  salutary  host  of 
the  altar,”  were  sufficient  (Hugo,  de  sacr.  ii.  14.  1  ;  Lombard, 
sent.  iv.  dist.  21  E;  an  anoymous  tract  of  the  twelfth  century, 
de  poenit.,  Migne  213.  880.  Cf.  Die  taegeliche  buoze,  Schonb. 
altd.  pred.  iii.  34).  There  wtls  a  constantly  growing  tendency 
to  substitute  indulgences  for  the  actual  performance  of  works  of 
satisfaction,  and  for  this  purpose  various  occasions  and  forms 
were  devised  (opposing  heretics,  jubilee  celebrations,  the  build¬ 
ing  of  churches,  feasts  of  dedication,  festivals  of  Corpus  Christi 
and  the  Virgin  Mary,  canonization  of  saints,  brotherhoods,  gar¬ 
lands,  crucifixes,  etc.  Vid-  Wildt  in  Kirchenlex.  i.,  ed.  2, 
102  ff. ). 3  Thus  repentance  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  chief 
sacrament:  “  Where  there  is  repentance  {poenitentia')  there  is 

nens.,  speculum  ecclesiae  (Mi.  172).  Alanus,  ab  Insulis,  Summa  de  arte 
praedicatoria  (Mi.  210).  Guibert,  de  Novigent.,  lib.  quo  ordine  sermo  fieri 
debeat  (Mi.  156),  col.  26:  “But  by  the  grace  of  God  faith  now  becomes 
known  to  the  hearts  of  all,  and  although  it  has  been  necessary  very  often  to 
inculcate  and  discuss  this  anew,  yet  it  is  none  the  less  proper  to  speak  even 
much  more  frequently  of  those  things  which  may  instruct  their  morals.” 

1  The  new  view  appears  with  peculiar  distinctness  in  Abelard,  Serm.  8  fin., 
and  later,  e.  g.,  Schonbach,  Altd.  Pred.  iii.  88. 

2  Honorius  still  differently,  Specul.  eccl.,  Mi.  172.  826.  The  Synod  of 
Treves,  A.  D.  1227,  already  employs  the  formula  :  ego  te  absolve  (Hefele, 
CG.  v.  948).  Cf.  Lea,  Hist,  of  conf.  and  indulg. ,  i.  48211. 

3  Faith  in  the  virtue  of  indulgences  became  a  special  criterion  of  orthodoxy. 
The  Council  of  Constance  directed  that  those  suspected  of  heresy  should  be 
asked  :  “  Whether  they  believe  that  the  Roman  pontiffs  can  grant  indulgences 
on  reasonable  grounds?  ”  Later,  pilgrimages  were  imposed  upon  those  found 
guilty  of  heresy.  Vid.  Bernard.  Guid.  practica  inquis.,  ii.  5,  II  ;  iii.  I,  8,  13, 
45  fin.  Meanwhile,  the  further  custom  of  commutation  arose  (ib.  ii.  1 1,  22), 
and  for  money  (ii,  23,  25  ;  cf.  iii.  45,  p.  166  f. ). 


AIMS  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


93 


also  indulgence.  ...  As  often,  therefore,  as  God  gives  to  a 
man  repentance,  so  often  does  he  give  also  indulgence  ’  ’  (Mi.  213. 
873).  The  rule,  that  for  public  offenses  there  must  be  also  pub¬ 
lic  repentance,  is  still  maintained  in  theory,1  but,  in  point  of  fact, 
public  repentance  fell  rapidly  into  disuse.  Honorius  Augustodu- 
nensis  already  speaks  of  those  performing  public  penance  as  rid¬ 
iculing  God  ( deum  irridentes ,  elucidar.  ii.  18).  In  the  four¬ 
teenth  century  it  had  been  in  many  places  entirely  abandoned. 
“  In  such  things,  according  to  the  course  of  the  present  age, 
there  is  seen  rather  a  scandal  than  edification  ”  (Durand,  sent, 
iv.  dist.  14  qu.  4  a.  3).  Innocent  III.  established  the  follow¬ 
ing  rule  at  the  Fourth  Lateran  council  (A.  D.  1215):  ‘ ‘  Let 
every  believer  of  either  sex,  after  arriving  at  years  of  discretion, 
faithfully  confess  all  his  sins  alone  at  least  once  a  year  to  his  own 
priest,  and  endeavor  with  all  his  strength  to  observe  the  penance 
enjoined  upon  him,  receiving  at  least  at  Easter  the  sacrament  of 
the  eucharist.  .  .  .  Let  the  priest  be  discreet  and  cautious  .  .  . 
inquiring  diligently  as  to  the  circumstances  of  both  the  sinner 
and  the  sin,  from  which  he  may  prudently  judge  what  counsel  he 
ought  to  give  to  him,  and  what  kind  of  remedy  he  ought  to  im¬ 
pose”  fc.  21,  Mansi  xxii.  1007).  This  law  was  very  often  em¬ 
phasized  and  observed  (Councils  of  Narbonne,  A.  D.  1227,  c.  7  ; 
Treves,  A.  D.  1227,  c.  3  and  4 ;  Canterbury,  A.  D.  1236,  c.  18  ; 
Toulouse,  A.  D.  1229,  c.  13,  where  confession  three  times  an¬ 
nually  is  recommended.  Vid.  Hefele,  v.  943,  946,  1052,  982). 

Cf.  Goetz,  Revue  internat.  de  theol.,  1894,  300  ff. ,  431  ff. ,  and  Ztschr.  f. 
KG.  xv.  321  ff.  Lea,  A  history  of  auric,  conf.  and  indulgences,  3  vols., 
London,  1896. 

(t)  The  other  sacraments  must  also  be  mentioned.  “  And  to 
them  (the  priests)  the  almighty  God  has  committed  the  seven 
sacraments  in  order  that  they  might  with  these  sanctify  Chris¬ 
tians  to  the  world,  as  they  journey  into  the  world,  and  as  they 
journey  through  the  world,  and  as  they  journey  out  of  the  world, 
with  holy  baptism,  and  with  holy  marriage,  and  with  holy  con¬ 
firmation,  and  with  holy  confession  and  penance,  and  with  the 
holy  body  of  God,  and  with  holy  oil,  and  with  the  judgments  ” 
(Berthold  of  Regensb.  ed.  Pfeiffer,  i.  142).  We  postpone  for 
the  present  the  further  discussion  of  these,  stopping  at  present 

1  E.  g.t  Schonbach,  altd.  pred.  i.  36  :  “A  man  does  penance  for  his  sin 
in  two  ways,  public  and  private.”  A  discrimination  was  made  between  poen- 
itentia.  publica  and  poenitentia  solemnis.  The  latter  was  appointed  only  by 
the  bishop,  was  performed  with  peculiarly  solemn  ecclesiastical  rights,  and 
could  not  be  repeated  (Alex.  Hal.  summ.  iv.  quaest.  64  ;  membr.  2.  Thom, 
summ.  iii.  suppl.  qu.  28,  art.  3.  Ricardus  de  Medievilla  in  sent.  iv.  dist.  14, 
princ.  11,  quaest.  i  and  2.  Cf.  Morin,  de  discipl.  v.  25.  2  ff.  Hefele,  vi. 
183,  220,  502). 


94 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


only  to  observe  how  closely  the  whole  course  of  the  Christian 
life  has  been  bound  to  the  church,  i.  e.,  the  hierarchy.1 

5.  Finally,  brief  mention  must  be  made  of  the  heretical  move¬ 
ments  which  assumed  such  large  proportions  after  the  eleventh 
and  twelfth  centuries.  The  controlling  aim  of  Western  Chris¬ 
tianity  was  the  salvation  of  souls  ( salus  animarum )  through  the 
church  (Yol.  L,  p.  192).  It  was  in  consistency  with  this  that 
the  church  of  the  Middle  Ages  expressed  its  characteristic 
thought  in  its  theory  of  the  church  and  the  sacraments,  especially 
the  sacrament  of  repentance  (penance).  The  same  controlling 
aim,  however,  gave  impulse  also  to  the  heresies  and  schisms 
(Novatianism  and  Donatism)  which  arose  in  the  Eastern  church.2 
Even  the  great  heretical  groups  of  the  Middle  Ages  display  their 
essential  characteristics,  not  in  their  divergence  from  the  accepted 
theological  views,  but  in  the  practical  desire  to  secure  liberation 
from  sin  and,  at  least  in  the  conception  of  their  leaders,  to  rein¬ 
state  the  holy  apostolic  church.  We  have  to  do  with  the  two 
great  branches  of  medieval  heresy — the  Cathari  and  the  Wal- 
de?ises.  The  Cathari,  indeed,  in  keeping  with  their  Oriental 
origin,  revived,  with  various  modifications,  almost  the  entire 
Gnostic  system,  i.  e . ,  Manichaeism  (two  Gods,  Gnostic  Christ- 
ology,  Dualism,  etc.).  But  even  these  agitations  culminated 
practically  in  the  ideas  that  the  Romish  church  was  the  whore 
Babylon,  her  hierarchs  Pharisees,  and  her  sacraments  invalid  ; 
whereas  the  Cathari  were  the  only  holy  church,  with  the  true  and 
holy  hierarchy  and  effectual  sacraments.  The  “  good  Christians  ” 
and  “the  true  imitators  of  Christ  ”  are  persecuted  by  the  church 
which  is  not  a  church ;  but  only  they  can  actually  release  from 
sin  by  their  baptism  and  penance  ( consolamentum ,  melioramen- 
tum ).3  Among  the  Waldenses  the  doctrinal  divergence  (denial 
of  purgatory,  opposition  to  the  worship  of  saints  and  images) 
was  given  comparatively  little  prominence  ;  but  practically  these 
preachers  of  apostolic  poverty  rejected  finally  Rome  and  its  hier¬ 
archy  (especially  the  Lombards),  opposed  their  own  hierarchy  to 
that  of  Rome,  and  offered  the  true  sacrament  of  repentance  to  their 

1  This  is  the  medieval  conception  of  the  relation  of  the  individual  believer 
to  the  church.  Vid.  Greg.  VII.,  supra,  p.  51,  and  cf.  Hagen,  Minnesinger, 
iii.  11  a:  “  Wir  waeren  doch  verirret  gar,  unt  heten  wir  der  pfaffen  niht.  ” 
Thom.-Seeberg,  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  214. 

2  The  same  is  true  of  the  Reformation. 

3  Vid.,  e.  g. ,  Reiner’s  Summa  de  Catharis,  etc.  (Martene,  Thes.  anecd. 
v. ) ,  p.  1 764  ff- ,  as  well  as  in  the  original  documents,  published  by  DoLLINGER 
(Beitrage  zur  Sektengesch.  d.  MA.,  vol.  ii.),  e.  g.,  pp.  17,  286,  322,  372 
(church);  188,  6,  39,  280,  295  (hierarchy);  197,  280,  198,  371,  115,  294 
(sacraments);  280,  3 13,  323,  326,  370,  373  (repentance)  ;  and  also  BERNARD. 
Guid.  practica  inq.  iii.  c.  32,  33  ;  iv.,  p.  222  f.;  v.  i.  1.  2,  3,  4. 


AIMS  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


95 


followers.1  Neither  of  these  parties  overstepped  the  bounds  of 
medieval  Christianity.  For  them,  as  in  the  church  at  large,  Chris¬ 
tianity  consisted  in  purification  through  the  sacraments,  obedi¬ 
ence  to  the  hierarchy,  and  good  works  in  imitation  of  Christ. 
The  church,  from  her  point  of  view,  rightly  charged  upon  them  : 
“  they  annulled  the  sacraments  and  made  void  the  priesthood.  ” 2 
The  immediate  result  of  these  agitations,  constituting  as  they 
did  the  most  energetic  assault  upon  the  church  since  the  days  of 
Gnosticism,  was  only  a  more  distinct  assertion  of  the  ecclesiasti¬ 
cal  and  sacramental  character  of  Christianity  (vid.  especially 
chapters  i,  3,  and  21  of  the  Fourth  Lateran  Council,  Hefele, 
v.  878  ff.,  881  f. ,  888).  More  and  more,  for  faith  in  God  was 
substituted  the  summons  to  “obey  the  mandates  of  the  Roman 
church.’’3  On  the  other  hand,  the  “  free  thinking  ”4  heresy  of 
the  Begards,  which  from  the  middle  of  the  twelfth  century  was 
propagated  in  Germany,  presents — with  its  pantheism,  its  ethi¬ 
cal  indifferentism,  and  its  essentially  anti-ecclesiastical  spirit5 — 
a  symptom  of  the  growing  independence  and  discontent  as 
against  the  church  and  her  institutions.  This  is  true  of  the  rad¬ 
ical  Franciscanism6  and  of  the  apocalyptic  speculations  (the 
“everlasting  gospel”),  which  from  the  time  of  Joachim  of 
Floris  (f  1202)  agitated  and  disturbed  the  church. 

Vid.  original  documents  in  Moller,  KG.  ii.  374  f. ,  383  ;  Bernardi  Gui- 
donis  practica  inquisitionis  haereticae  pravitatis  ed.  Douais,  1886;  cf.  Ch. 
Schmidt,  Hist,  et  doctrines  de  la  secte  des  Cathares  ou  Albigeois,  2  vols., 
1849.  Dollinger,  Beitr.  z.  Sektengesch  d.  MA. ,  2  vols.,  1890.  Dieck- 
HOFF,  Die  Wald,  im  MA.,  1851.  K.  Muller,  die  Wald.  u.  ihre  einzeln. 
Gruppen,  1886.  Preger,  Abh.  d.  bayr.  Akad.  d.  Wiss.  xiii.,  xiv.  Preger, 
Gesch.  d.  deutschen  Mystik,  i.  207  ff. ,  461  ff.  Reuter,  Gesch.  d.  rel. 
Auf  kl.  ii.  240  ff.  Jundt,  hist,  du  pantheisme  populaire,  1875.  Denifle, 
Das  ev.  aet.  in  Arch.  f.  Litt.  u.  KG.  des  MA.  i.  49  ff.  Ehrle,  Die  Spiri- 
tualen,  iii.  553  ff;  i.  509 ff.;  ii.  108  ff.,  249  ff.;  vi.  1  ff.  Haupt,  Ztschr.  f. 
KG.  vii.  372  ff 

1  In  Dollinger,  ii.,  pp.  7,  287,  252,  306,  97,  288  f.,  306,  332,  335 
(Romish  and  Waldensian  hierarchy);  256,  1 1 5  (sacraments);  288,  304,  332 
(repentance).  Bernard.  Guid.  pract.  inq.  iii.  34,  35  ;  v.  2,  3,  4,  5,  6. 

2  In  addition  to  the  above  citations,  see  the  collection  of  Seeberg-Thomas., 
DG.  ii.,  p.  192  f. 

3  This  is  the  ever-recurring  formula  in  the  renunciation  of  heresy.  Vid., 
e.  g.,  Bernard,  pract.  inq.  iii.  10  f. ,  14,  46,  p.  168;  v.  6.  2,  4,  8,  11  ;  8.  7,  10. 

4  “  Ein  fry  Geist  ”  (Dollinger,  ii.  386). 

5  Vid.,  e.g.,  Ddllinger,  ii.  pp.  384,  390  (impeccabiles),  417,  384,  385  f., 
390  (one  with  God,  pares  Christo );  390,  416  ( omnia  sunt  deus.  Omnia 
fiunt  a  deo );  386,  387,  403,  416  (ethics);  398,  416,  398  (Christology,  pur¬ 
gatory),  etc. 

6  The  ideals  of  Francis  are  by  this  party  exalted  as  a  “fifth  gospel,”  with  the 
severest  criticism  of  the  church,  which  has  become  Babylon.  Vid.,  e.  g. , 
Bernard,  pract.  inq.  iii.  39  ;  v.  4.  5  ;  v.  3.  2,  3  ;  8.  I  ff.  As  they  very 
often  combined  forces  with  the  Begards,  they  were  also  designated  by  the 
latter  term. 


96 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


§  53.  History  and  Characteristics  of  the  Theology  of  the 

Thirteenth  Century. 

See  Literature  cited  under  Section  46  ;  also  Etole  in  Archiv.  f.  Lit.  u* 
KG.  des  MA.  v.  603  ff.  Thomas. -Seeberg,  DieTheologie  des  Duns  Scotus, 
1900,  p.  600  ff. 

1 .  The  history  of  the  church’s  intellectual  life  from  the  middle 
of  the  eleventh  to  the  end  of  the  twelfth  century  may  be 
depicted  in  the  lives  of  three  men — Pope  Gregory  VII.,  St. 
Bernard,  and  Abelard.  The  thirteenth  century  was  likewise 
characterized  by  the  activities  of  three  great  leaders — Pope 
Innocent  III.  (§  52,  1),  St.  Francis  (§  52,  2),  and  Thomas 
of  Aquino.  The  hierarchy  had  reached  the  zenith  of  its 
power,  and  maintained  its  position  as  against  the  world  and 
the  encroachments  of  heresy.  But  at  the  same  time  there  was 
quietly  inaugurated  a  process  of  liberation  and  refinement  of  the 
inner  life,  and,  simultaneously,  a  fuller  and  more  vigorous  devel¬ 
opment  of  scientific  study  than  had  been  previously  known  in 
medieval  history.  Antiquity  was  again  the  teacher.  Hitherto 
only  the  dialectic  writings  of  Aristotle  had  been  known,  but  to 
them  were  now  added  his  metaphysics,  physics,  psychology,  and 
ethics.1  Their  study  was  pursued  with  eager  interest  and  enthu¬ 
siasm.  Men  like  Albert  the  Great  and  Thomas  of  Aquino  wrote 
commentaries  upon  them.  There  was  a  larger  conception  of  the 
universe,  and  the  sphere  of  thought  was  refined  and  more  ac¬ 
curately  delineated.  Aristotle,  the  “ praecursor  Christi  in  natur- 
alibus ,  ”  became  the  regulating  authority  and  the  master  of 
method.  The  effect  of  the  knowledge  of  Arabic  philosophy 
was  also  manifest.  The  materials  and  the  problems  of  knowl¬ 
edge  were  rapidly  multiplied.  But  all  knowledge  must 
in  the  end  serve  the  church.  Religion  and  secular  learn¬ 
ing  are  not  yet  separated.  Thus  the  dogmatic  systems  con¬ 
tinue  to  grow  apace,  being  presented  partly  in  commentaries 
upon  the  Sentences  of  the  Lombard,  and  partly  in  independent 
works  (summa  theologiae) . 2  The  ancient  dialectic  method  is  still 
followed,  and  the  wider  the  range  of  material  becomes,  the  greater 

1  Vid.  Jourdain,  Recherches  critiques  sur  Page  et  l’origine  des  tra¬ 
ductions  latines  d’ Aristotele,  1843.  Haureau,  hist,  de  la  philosophic 
scolastique,  ii.  I.  1 24  ff.  Upon  the  culture  and  learning  of  the  age,  vid. 
V.  Liliencron,  der  Inhalt  d.  allg.  Bildung  in  d.  Zeit  d.  Schol.  Munich, 
1876.  Cf.  also  Prantl,  in  d.  Sitzungsberichten  d.  Munch.  Akad. ,  1867, 
ii.,  p.  173  ff.  In  the  Chartularium  universit.  Paris  (ed.  Denifle),  i.,  p.  644  ff., 
may  be  found  a  very  interesting  catalogue  of  the  books  which  the  booksellers 
of  Paris  had  for  sale  in  A.  D.  1286,  together  with  the  prices. 

2  The  title,  “  Summa,”  was  employed  before  the  times  of  the  Lombard. 
Vid.  Denifle,  Gesch.  d.  Univ.  i.  46. 


THEOLOGY  OF  THE  THIRTEENTH  CENTURY. 


97 


becomes  the  number  of  proofs  and  authorities  pro  and  con,  the 
keener  the  logical  distinctions,  and  the  more  complicated  the  lines 
of  dialectical  discussion.  Dogmatics  again  became,  as  with  the 
Alexandrines  of  the  second  and  third  centuries,  a  great  system 
of  the  philosophy  of  religion,  appropriating  for  itself  all  the 
learning  of  metaphysics  and  physics,  with  all  the  power  of  the 
church  and  her  institutions,  and  which  must  never  lose  from  be¬ 
neath  it  the  basis  of  the  rule  of  faith  and  the  accredited  dogmas 
of  the  church.  And  yet  it  was  evident  that  the  structure  thus 
reared  must  fall  by  its  own  weight,  for  during  the  very  period  of 
its  construction  it  was  discovered  that  the  elements  here  joined 
together  were  mutually  irreconcilable.  The  secularized  church 
had  a  secular  theology.  Every  church  is  secularized  which 
strives  toward  any  other  goal  than  the  kingdom  of  God  and  its 
gospel ;  and  every  theology  is  secularized  which  seeks  anything 
further  than  a  true  understanding  of  the  gospel.  And  both  alike 
must  come  to  grief — missing  the  gospel,  which  they  do  not  seek, 
and  no  less  the  world,  which  they  seek.  This  was  the  sad  ex¬ 
perience  of  the  medieval  church.  Boniface  VIII.  and  Duns 
Scotus  were  contemporaries.  The  pope,  who  made  the  most 
audacious  claims  for  papal  supremacy  (vid.  §  52,  i),1  aroused 
against  that  theory  the  opposition  which  has  never  since 
been  allayed  ;  and  the  theologian  who  carried  the  dialectic  pre¬ 
sentation  of  the  doctrines  of  the  church  to  the  greatest  extreme 
himself  fell  into  error  as  to  the  proper  relation  of  faith  and  phi¬ 
losophy,  and  gave  the  final  occasion  for  the  severance  of  the 
two  (vid.  sub). 

2.  Taking  a  general  view  of  the  history  of  Scholasticism  in 
the  Second  Period,  we  observe  that  nearly  all  the  theologians 
claiming  our  attention  belong  to  the  Dominican  or  Franciscan 
orders.  A  few  remarks  may  be  necessary  to  insure  a  proper  under¬ 
standing  of  the  historical  course  of  events  before  entering  upon 
the  study  of  the  leading  theologians  of  the  age.  It  is  well 
known  that  there  were  sharp  lines  of  contrast  between  the 
great  leaders  (as,  e.  g. ,  Thomas  and  Duns).  These  find  their 
explanation  in  the  historical  development.  All  received  their 
inspiration  from  Aristotle.  But  this  was  in  the  first  instance 
mainly  formal.  In  the  general  conceptions  of  truth,  the  pre¬ 
dominant  influence  was  chiefly  that  of  Platonic-Augustinian 
Idealism.  The  reality  of  ideas  was  acknowledged,  and  they 
were  regarded  from  a  religious  point  of  view.  From  Augustine 
was  borrowed  the  view  of  the  primacy  of  the  will,  in  contrast 

1  The  chief  thesis  of  the  bull :  Porro  subesse,  etc.,  is  taken  from  the  Opusc . 
c.  error.  Graec .  of  Thomas. 

7 


98 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


with  the  reason.  The  symbolic  conception  of  the  sacraments 
is  also  Augustinian.  Thus,  for  example,  taught  both  Alex¬ 
ander  of  Hales  and  William  of  Auverne.  But  Aristotelian- 
ism  gained  ground.  The  reality  of  ideas  began  to  be  questioned. 
The  Greek  primacy  of  the  intellect  was  reasserted.  Separate 
doctrines  were  more  and  more  subdivided  and  established  upon 
the  basis  of  Aristotelian  dialectics.  It  appeared  to  be  a 
“modern”  theology  which  was  advanced  by  Albert  and 
Thomas  of  Aquino.  The  ecclesiastical  authorities  at  first  met 
these  “innovations”  with  severe  censure  (Stephen,  bishop  of 
Paris,  Robert  Kilwardby  and  John  Peckham,  archbishops  of 
Canterbury,  vid.  Chartularium  universit.  Parisiensis,  i.  543  ff . , 
558  ff.,  624 ff.).  The  Thomistic  doctrine  is  charged  with  con¬ 
tradiction  of  Augustine.  On  the  other  hand,  Alexander  and 
Bonaventura  are  lauded  (chart,  univ.  Paris,  i.  634).  This  ac¬ 
counts  in  part  for  the  attempt  of  the  older  theology  to  maintain 
itself,  not  hesitating  to  employ  to  that  end  the  scientific  means 
furnished  by  the  age,  i.  e.,  Aristotelianism.  In  this  attempt 
Henry  of  Ghent  and  Bonaventura  were  most  prominent.  But 
English  theology  brought  important  aid  to  this  tendency.  The 
traditions  of  Anselm  were  still  influential  in  England.  To  these 
was  added  the  stimulus  of  the  important  work  of  Robert 
Grosseteste  of  Lincoln  (f  1253),  who  combined  the  Augus¬ 
tinian  Realism  with  a  Realism  of  the  empirical  philosophy  as 
applied  to  individuals.  Such  men  as  Richard  of  Middle- 
ton,  and,  above  all,  Duns  Scotus,  as  also  Roger  Bacon,  con¬ 
tinued  to  promote  this  tendency.  Thus  from  various  directions 
the  older  Platonic-Augustinian  theology  antagonized  the  modern 
Aristotelian  dialectic  theology,  but  in  such  a  way  as  to  turn  the 
entire  scientific  fabric  of  Aristotle  against  the  Aristotelians. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  two  tendencies  which  were  once  repre¬ 
sented  by  the  schools  of  Tours  and  Bee,  and  which  then  in  the 
first  period  of  Scholasticism  found  in  Abelard  and  Anselm  typical 
representatives,  i.  e.,  the  rational-critical  and  the  speculative, 
have  been  perpetuated  to  our  own  times.  Upon  one  side  stood 
the  Aristotelians,  and  upon  the  other  the  Platonizing  Augustin- 
ians.  Both  parties  were,  indeed,  dependent  upon  the  scientific 
method  of  Aristotle  ;  but  the  differences  which  separated  them 
may  be  rightly  traced  as  above  to  their  source. 

We  now,  having  gained  a  general  view  of  the  situation,  turn 
to  note  the  individual  theological  leaders  of  the  period. 

At  the  head  of  the  list  we  place  Alexander  of  Hales  ( doctor 
irrefragabilis ,  f  1245).  He  composed  a  Summa  universae  theo- 
logiae.  He  already  betrays  the  influence  of  Aristotle.  In  his 
great  work,  the  problems  and  methods  of  the  later  Scholasticism 


THEOLOGY  OF  THE  THIRTEENTH  CENTURY. 


99 


distinctly  appear,  and  he  exerted  a  controlling  influence  upon 
his  successors,  particularly  in  the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments. 
The  new  spirit  is  yet  more  plainly  manifest  in  Albert  the  Great 
(< doctor  universalis ,  f  1280).  It  was  he  who  first  employed  the 
system  of  Aristotle  in  a  comprehensive  way  in  the  construction 
of  theology.  His  discussions  upon  metaphysics  and  the  theory 
of  knowledge  moulded  the  thought  of  Thomas.  Besides  his 
Paraphrases  upon  Aristotle,  special  mention  must  be  made  of 
his  Commentary  upon  the  Sentences  of  the  Lombard,  a  (not  com¬ 
pleted)  Summa ,  and  a  Summa  de  creaturis  (Opp.  21  vols.,  ed. 
Jammy,  Lyons,  1651  ;  cf.  Bach,  Alb.  Mag.  1881).  In  the 
spirit  of  Albert,  his  greater  disciple,  Thomas  of  Aquino  ( an - 
gelus  ecclesiae ,  f  1274)  toiled  on.  In  him,  with  a  comprehen¬ 
sive  acquaintance  with  Aristotle  and  the  ecclesiastical  writers 
(the  Areopagite  now  comes  into  prominence),  were  combined 
complete  harmony  with  the  teachings  of  the  church  and  a  gen- , 
uinely  religious  spirit,  together  with  pre-eminent  dialectic  talent. 
Thomas  can  scarcely  be  called  a  man  of  genius,  but  he  was  as  , 
great  in  systematizing  as  was  Albert  in  collecting.  Among  his 
writings  we  may  mention  the  Commentary  on  the  Sentences  of 
the  Lombard,  the  Sununa  totius  theologiae ,  the  Summa  de  veri- 
tate  cath.  fidei  contra  gentiles ,  the  Pxpositio  symbolic  and  the 
Compendium  theologiae}  The  systematic  talent  of  Thomas  is  at 
once  manifest  in  the  simple  arrangement  of  the  material  in  his 
Summa:  (1)  Concerning  God.  (2)  Concerning  the  approach 
of  the  rational  creature  toward  God,  or  of  man.  (3)  Concern-' 
ing  Christ,  who,  on  account  of  his  being  man,  is  for  us  the  way 
of  approach  to  God — under  which  he  treats  of  Christ,  redemp¬ 
tion,  and  the  sacraments.  From  God — to  God — through  Christ :  > 
this  is  the  simple  foundation  thought.  The  work  is  confessedly 
unfinished,  closing  abruptly  at  the  doctrine  of  repentance  ;  but 
it  was  completed  by  the  disciples  of  Thomas  from  his  other 
writings.  The  scheme  of  the  work  is  as  follows :  A  question 
( ' quaestio )  is  stated,  and  then  divided  into  a  series  of  articles, 
each  of  which  is  presented  in  an  interrogative  form.  Then, 
with  the  introductory  formula,  videtur  quod  non ,  a  number  of  ar¬ 
guments,  perhaps  from  the  Bible,  the  Fathers,  or  Aristotle,  are 
presented  against  the  question.  Then  are  given,  introduced  by 
a  sed  contra  est,  a  number  of  other  arguments  on  the  affirmative 

1  They  were yoften  edited.  Before  me  lies  the  Antwerp  edition  of  1612.  I 
cite  the  Summa  from  the  edition  of  Frette  and  Mare  (Paris,  1882  ff. ),  and 
the  Compendium  according  to  the  edition  of  Albert,  1896.  The  literature 
connected  with  his  name  is  also  almost  limitless.  Vid.  Werner,  d.  h, 
Thom.,  3  vols.  Wagenmann,  PRE.  xvi.  570  ff.  Portmann,  Das  Syst.  d. 
Summa  d.  h.  Thom.,  1894. 


IOO 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


side.  Upon  this  follows  the  decision,  beginning  with  Responded 
dicendum ,  and  usually  answering  the  question  in  the  affirmative. 
The  supposed  counter-arguments  are  then  answered  under  the 
captions:  Ad  primutn ,  Ad  secundum ,  etc.,  dicendum d  We 
cite  an  illustration.  In  the  First  Part  of  the  Summa  the  fourth 
article  under  the  eighth  question  reads  :  “  Whether  to  be  every - 
'  where  is  an  attribute  of  God  ?  (i)  It  appears  that  to  be  every¬ 

where  is  not  an  attribute  of  God.”  Four  philosophical  argu¬ 
ments  are  adduced  for  this  position,  partly  from  Aristotle,  and 
then  are  added  two  arguments  from  Augustine.  (2)  “But 
upon  the  opposite  side  is  what  Ambrose  says.”  (3)  Here  fol¬ 
lows  the  answer  :  “I  reply  :  It  is  to  be  said,  that  to  be  every- 
.  where  is,  from  the  beginning  and  essentially,  an  attribute  oF 
God.”  Then  we  have  the  establishment  of  this  proposition,  and 
afterward  a  refutation  of  the  six  arguments  for  the  negative  : 
“  To  the  first,  second,  etc.,  it  is  to  be  said.” 

With  Thomas,  the  Aristotelian,  we  here  mention  his  friend,  the 
Franciscan,  Bonaventura  ( doctor  seraphicus ,  f  1274),  who, 
however,  in  theology  maintained  the  old  Augustinian -Platonic 
theories.  Bonaventura  attached  a  greater  importance  to  the 
mystic  element  in  his  theology  than  his  predecessors.  It  is  not 
to  be  inferred,  however,  that  he  pursued  with  any  the  less  energy 
the  dogmatic  and  philosophical  problems  of  his  age.  He  de¬ 
clared  himself,  in  comparison  with  Alexander,  a  “  poor  and  lean 
compiler”  (in  sent.  ii.  declaratio).  Of  his  writings,  we  mention 
his  Commentary  upon  the  Sentences,  his  dogmatic  Compendium 
breviloquium ,  and  also  his  Compendium  theol.  veritatis ,  the 
Declaratio  terminorum  theologiae ,  and  the  mystical  Compendium 
itinerarium  mentis  in  deumd 

3.  Before  scrutinizing  the  teachings  of  the  age  upon  separate 
doctrines,  it  will  be  well  for  us  to  observe,  in  the  case  of  Thomas, 

'  who  was  so  influential  in  determining  them,  the  method  and  aim 
of  scholastic  labors.  (a)  The  Object  of  faith,  and  there¬ 
fore  also  of  theology,  is  supernaturally  revealed  by  God.  The 
necessity  of  revelation  grows  out  of  the  fact  that  human  reason, 
x  cannot  by  the  power  of  nature  recognize  the  nature  of  God, 
e.  g.,  the  Trinity.  But  revelation  extends  also  to  such  matters 

1  This  is  the  treatment  of  material  introduced  by  Abelard.  The  conclusio 
printed  in  most  editions  at  the  end  of  the  separate  articles  is  not  the  work  of 
Thomas  himself. 

2  His  works  were  often  edited  :  At  Rome,  1588  ff.;  Lyons,  1 668  ;  Mayence, 
160');  Venice,  1751  ;  Paris,  1863  f.  The  best  edition  is  that  of  Quaracchi, 
1882  ff.  Hefele  edited  the  Breviloquium  in  1861  and  Vicetia  in  1881.  It  is 
not  to  be  imagined  that  Thomas  held  a  monopoly  of  the  theological  ideas 
in  the  thirteenth  century.  Bonaventura  both  as  a  Mystic  and  as  a  Scholastic- 
followed  to  a  large  extent  an  independent  course. 


THEOLOGY  OF  THE  THIRTEENTH  CENTURY. 


IOI 


as  reason  might  perhaps  by  itself  discover,  but  only  slowly  and 
at  a  late  period  (c.  gentil.  i.  3  ff. ;  summ.  i.  qu.  1,  art.  1).  In 
this  way  man  becomes  absolutely  certain  in  regard  to  his  religious 
knowledge,  since  it  comes  “  immediately  from  God  through  rev¬ 
elation”  (summ.  i.  q.  1,  art.  5).  But  revelation  is  contained 
in  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Their  real  author  is  God  :  auctor  sacrae 
sci'ipturae  est  deus  (ib.  i.  q.  1,  a.  10).  By  inspiration  God  im¬ 
parted  to  the  prophets  definite  items  of  knowledge  by  the  way  of 
transient  impression  ( i?npressionis  transeuntis).  “Prophecy  is 
a  certain  knowledge  ( quaedam  cognitio')  impressed  upon  the  mind 
of  a  prophet  by  divine  revelation  through  some  manner  of  in¬ 
struction  (per  modum  cujusda?n  doctrinae )  (cf.  ii.  ii.  q.  171,  a. 
2,  6;  q.  172,  a.  3).1  God  has  immediately  confirmed  this  by 
the  history  of  the  diffusion  of  faith,  as  well  as  by  miracles  and 
;signs.  And  thus  he  shows  the  teacher  of  the  truth  [to  be]  in¬ 
visibly  inspired  (c.  gent.  i.  6).  It  must  therefore  be  said: 
“  The  authority  of  those  should  be  believed  to  whom  revelation 
has  been  made  ”  (summ.  i.  q.  1,  a.  8).  As  the  Scriptures  must, 
•on  the  one  hand,  be  believed  because  of  their  origin,  they  are,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  only  sure  and  binding  authority.  “  But  one 
uses  the  authorities  of  the  canonical  scripture  properly  and  in 
..arguing  from  necessity  ;  the  authorities  of  other  teachers  of  the 
church  in  arguing,  as  it  were,  from  one’s  own  resources,  but  with 
probability.  For  our  faith  rests  upon  the  revelation  given  to  the 
apostles  and  prophets  who  wrote  the  canonical  books,  but  not 
upon  revelation,  if  such  there  were,  given  to  other  teachers” 
(ib.).2  Thus  did  Thomas  distinctly  proclaim  the  Holy  Scriptures 
as  the  revelation  of  God — as  the  source  and  absolute  authority  of 
Christian  doctrine.  Precisely  so  did  Bonaventura  also  teach  : 
“  Authority  resides  primarily  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  which  have 
been  wholly  established  ( condita  tot  a)  through  the  Holy  Spirit 
for  the  directing  of  the  catholic  faith”  (brevil.  5.  7).  But  reve¬ 
lation  is  a  doctrine.3  Its  necessity  is  deduced,  not  from  the  ex- 

* 

1  Vid.  Bonaventura  in  hexaem  serm.  9  (opp.  i.  35  f. ),  e.  g.,  it  is  proper 
that  faith  be  confirmed,  through  the  inspired  word.  Albert,  summ.  i,  tract.  1, 
qu.  4  ;  qu.  5,  membr.  2.  It  will  be  observed  how  moderate  is  the  view  here 
taken  of  inspiration.  In  the  earlier  Middle  Ages  Agobard  had  rejected  the 
view  which  so  represented  the  matter  as  though  ‘  ‘  the  Holy  Spirit  had  not  only 
breathed  into  them  ( inspiraverit )  the  sense  of  the  preaching  and  the  modes 
or  arguments  of  their  speeches,  but  had  also  himself  from  without  formed  in 
the  mouths  the  corporeal  words.”  Speech  is  not  produced  in  the  prophets  as 
in  Balaam’s  ass  (vid.  adv.  Fredegis.  11,  Mi.  104.  166). 

2  Cf.  Quodlibeta  xii.  a.  26  :  “  The  sayings  of  expositors  do  not  carry  with 
them  necessity,  that  it  should  be  necessary  to  believe  them,  but  alone  the  ca¬ 
nonical  scripture  which  is  in  the  Old  and  New  Testaments.” 

3  The  proper  object  of  revelation,  i.  e.,  of  faith,  is  the  “  first  truth,”  or  God. 
Everything  else  (as  the  divinity  of  Christ,  the  sacraments)  is  entitled  to  con- 


102 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


istence  of  sin,  but  from  the  debilitas  of  the  human  intellect 
(summ.  i  q.  i,  a.  5).  The  lines  of  thought  presented  in  the 
Scriptures  must,  it  was  further  held,  be  supplemented.  It  had 
been  felt  necessary  in  the  church  from  the  beginning,  that  what 
was  contained  in  the  Scriptures  “  diffusedly  and  in  various  forms 
and  in  some  cases  obscurely  '  ’  should  be  plainly  and  briefly  stated 
in  a  connected  way,  i.  e.,  “  what  should  be  proposed  to  all  to  be 
believed.  ’  ’  This  is  furnished  in  the  symbolum  apostolomm ,  which 
contains  the  essence  of  the  Christian  faith  (cf.  also  Bonav. 
breviloq.  5.  7).  But  since  the  heretics  introduced  false  doc¬ 
trines,  it  became  necessary  to  enlarge  and  explain  this  symbol, 
which  was  done  by  the  Nicene  Creed,  the  deliverances  of  other 
councils,  and  the  Fathers.1  The  confession  is  handed  down,  “  as 
it  were,  by  the  personality  of  the  entire  church  which  is  united 
through  the  faith.”  A  “new  edition  of  the  symbol  .  .  . 
for  the  shunning  of  rising  errors  ’  ’  may  yet  be  a  necessity.  Its 
preparation,  in  such  case,  is  within  the  province  of  the  pope. 
The  counsel  given  in  1  Cor.  i.  10  cannot  be  followed  “unless  a 
question  of  faith  arising  concerning  the  faith  should  be  deter¬ 
mined  by  him  who  presides  over  the  whole  church,  so  that  thus 
his  opinion  may  be  firmly  held  by  the  whole  church.  And  there¬ 
fore  a  new  edition  of  the  symbol  pertains  to  the  sole  authority  of 
the  supreme  pontiff,  just  as  do  all  other  things  which  pertain  to 
the  whole  church,  as  the  assembling  of  a  general  council.” 
Hence  :  “by  whose  authority  a  council  is  assembled  and  his 
opinion  confirmed”  (summ.  ii.  ii.  q.  1,  a.  9  and  10;  cf.  q.  11, 
a.  2).  Accordingly,  revelation  is  handed  down  to  the  Christian 
world  in  the  symbols  and  the  decrees  of  councils,  and  by  means 
of  the  papal  definitions  of  the  faith.  It  is  of  course  presumed 
that  these  are  in  harmony  with  the  authority  of  Scripture  ;  but 
in  reality,  side  by  side  with  the  anctoritas  scriptu?'aey  and  above 
it,  stands  the  sola  auctoritas  summi pontificis. 

sideration  “in  so  far  as  through  these  things  we  are  directed  toward  God,  and 
we  assent  to  them  also  on  account  of  the  divine  truth  ”  (summaii.  ii.  q.  1,  a.  i). 

1  In  the  twelve,  or  as  the  Scholastics  commonly  enumerate,  the  fourteen  arti¬ 
cles,  “  are  contained  those  things  which  are  chiefly  to  be  believed  (Bonav.  in 
sent,  iii.,  d.  25,  a.  1,  q.  1 ).  Three  symbols  are  uniformly  acknowledged  :  the 
first  is  for  the  teaching  of  the  faith ;  the  second,  for  the  explanation  of  the 
faith  ;  the  third,  for  the  defense  of  the  faith”  (Bonav.  compend.  theol.  verit. 
v.  21  ;  Centiloq.,  p.  3,  sect.  38.  Anselm,  ep.  ii.  41.  Alex.  Hales,  summ. 
iv.  q.  37,  sect.  9,  names  four,  but  enumerates  only  three  :  Apostolic,  Athana- 
sian,  Constantinopolitan,  for  which  Bonaventura  names  the  Nicene.  So  also 
Richard,  sent.  ii.  d.  25,  principale  2,  q.  1  and  2.  Duns,  sent.  i.  d.  26,  q.  I, 
25.  Durand,  sent.  iii.  d.  36,  q.  2.  Biel,  iii.  25,  qu.  un.  Duns,  sent.  iv.  d. 
43,  q.  1.  11).  To  the  Scripture  and  the  symbols  are  added  the  works  of  the 
teachers  ( documenta  doctorum ),  of  these,  Bonaventura  enumerates  Dionysius, 
Gregory  of  Nazianzen,  Gregory  of  Nyssa,  John  of  Damascus,  Basil,  Athan- 


THEOLOGY  OF  THE  THIRTEENTH  CENTURY.  103 

(h)  Since  revelation  cannot  be  comprehended  by  the  reason, 
it  follows  that  it  must  be  acccepted  in  faith.  This  is  necessary, 
if  for  no  other  reason,  because  otherwise  the  “merit  of  faith 
would  be  made  void”  (summ.  ii.  ii.  q.  2,  a.  9,  10).  Thomas 
was  the  first  to  make  a  careful  analysis  of  the  conception  of  faith , 
(vid.  quaestio  disputata  de  fide,  opp.  viii.  804  ff. ,  and  summ. 

ii.  ii.  qu.  1  ff. ).  He  starts  with  the  Augustinian  formula: 
“To  believe  is  to  think  with  assent.”  The  intellectus  possi-, 
hills,  or  thinking  faculty,  reaches  a  conclusion  in  one  of  two 
ways,  either  that  the  object  impresses  itself  upon  this  faculty  in 
an  intellectual  way  as  true,  or  that  the  faculty  is,  by  thev 
will,  inclined  to  assent.1  “And  thus  also  are  we  moved  to 
believe  things  said,  in  so  far  as  the  reward  of  eternal  life  is 
promised  to  us  if  we  shall  believe,  and  the  will  is  moved  by  this 
reward  to  assent  to  those  things  which  are  said,  although  the  intel¬ 
lect  be  not  moved  by  anything  intellectual  (defide,  art.  1,  p. 
805  b).  That  the  intellect  in  this  way  responds  to  the  impulse 
of  the  will  is  explained  by  the  disposition  ( habitus )  of  faith  ’ 
divinely  infused,”  i.  e.,  infused  into  the  intellect  (a.  4,  p.  812  ; 
cf.  Heinrich,  quodlib.  v.  q.  21).  Faith  is  thus  incited  by 
the  will,  but  it  has  its  seat  in  the  intellect :  “  The  act  of  faith 
consists  essentially  in  cognition,  and  there  is  its  perfection  ”  (a.  2, 
p.  809).  Faith  is  therefore  an  incipient  knowledge  of  divine 
things,  “which  are  above  reason,”  dependent  upon  practical  . 
motives.  It  is  because  of  the  infirmity  of  human  reason  that 
faith  alone  is  possible  in  this  life.  But  the  goal  consists  “  in 
perfect  knowledge  ( cognitione )  of  God  ”  (a.  10,  p.  820  ;  c.  gent. 

iii.  25,  8  ;  26  ;  50,  6  ;  iv.  42,  1),  and  “eternal  life  will  afford 
perfect  knowledge  of  God”  (a.  2,  p.  807b).2  Upon  these 
principles  it  can  be  understood,  on  the  one  hand,  that  faith 
should  be  regarded  as  reaching  its  consummation  in  knowledge,  - 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  faith,  since  it  proceeds  from  the 
will,  should  be  held  to  be  meritorious  (a.  3),  and  also  that  it 
should  receive  its  moral  character  ( formatio )  from  the  will  or 
from  love:  “faith  is  formed  {informatur )  by  love”  (a.  5,  p. 
813  a;  cf.  summ.  ii.  ii.  q.  4,  a.  5  and  3  ;  q.  2,  a.  9).  The 
ordinary  layman,  indeed,  never  attains  an  explicit  faith  ( fides 
explicita')  embracing  all  the  articles  of  faith.  Of  him,  it  is  ever 
to  be  said  :  “  He  believes  implicitly  the  separate  articles  which 

asius,  Chrysostom,  Hilary,  Gregory,  Augustine,  Ambrose,  Jerome  (in 
Hexaem.  vid.  9,  p.  36  a). 

1  Faith  has  to  do  not  with  the  determination  of  the  “simple  natures’' 

( simplex  quidditates )  of  things,  but  with  the  decision.  For  we  believe  the 
true,  and  we  disbelieve  the  false  (de  fide,  art.  i). 

2  According  to  Thomas,  the  will  is  subordinate  to  the  intellect,  and  is 
spiritual  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  dependent  upon  the  latter  (c.  gent.  iii.  26.  1). 


104 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


are  contained  in  the  faith  of  the  church.  ’  ’ 1  But  Thomas  not  only 
expects  of  all  teachers  and  spiritual  advisers  an  explicit  faith ,  but  he 
requires  the  same  from  the  laity  also  in  regard  to  the  Trinity,  the 
incarnation,  death,  and  resurrection  of  Christ,  and  4  ‘  other 
(articles)  of  this  kind,  concerning  which  the  church  appoints 
festivals”  (a.  ii,  p.  822).  This  demand  is  in  harmony  with 
the  fundamentally  intellectualistic  tendency  of  Thomas.  If  final 
salvation  consists  in  perfect  knowledge,  then  a  certain  measure 
of  knowledge  must  be  attained  on  earth  as  a  preparation  (p. 
822  a).  Faith  is,  therefore,  an  incipient  knowledge  of  divine 
revelation  begotten  of  practical  motives  of  the  will.  But  the 
first  subjection  of  man  to  God  is  through  faith  (summ.  ii.  ii.  q. 
16,  a.  1). 

(c)  This  knowledge  is  just  as  little  as  revelation  itself  contrary 
to  reason  ;  it  is  above  reason  (de  fid.  art.  10  ad  7).  It  cannot, 
therefore,  be  the  province  of  theology  to  prove  revelation  by 
human  reason  ( ratione  humana).  This  would  be  impossible, 
since  theology  deals  with  super-reasonable  articles  of  faith, 
receiving  its  principles  from  God  (summ.  i.  q.  1,  a.  5  and  8; 
cf.  q.  32,  a.  1).  It  can  only  elucidate  somewhat  by  adducing 
those  things  which  the  philosophers  can  also  recognize.  The 
reasons  {rati ones')  of  theology  are  not  really  “  demonstrative , 
but  a  kind  of  persuasions,  showing  that  the  things  which 
presented  in  the  faith  are  not  impossible  ”  (ii.  ii.  q.  1,  a.  5). 
They  are  useful  also  in  refuting  opponents  (c.  gent.  i.  9). 
But  inasmuch  as  theology  operates  with  the  principles  of  revel¬ 
ation,  its  knowledge  is  more  certain  and  more  important  than 
that  of  all  other  sciences  (i.  q.  1,  a.  2,  5).  This  is  essentially 
the  position  of  Abelard.  The  great  scholastics  did  not  possess 
the  naive  confidence  of  Anselm.2 * 

{d)  This  was  involved  in  their  relation  to  the  question  of 
Universals.  Thomas  here,  in  almost  the  same  degree  as  Albert 
before  him,  follows  Aristotle  or  his  Arabian  interpreters.  Man 
by  means  of  the  senses  perceives  external  things  separately. 

4 ‘Nothing  is  in  the  intellect  which  was  not  in  the  sense” 
(summ.  i.  q.  85,  a.  3  and  7).  There  thus  arises  from  the 
object  a  particular  form  {forma  particulars).  The  active 

1  Vid.  also  Bonav.  sent,  iii.,  d.  25,  a.  1,  q.  3.  Upon  implicit  faith,  vid.  G. 
Hoffman,  Die  Lehre  von  der  fides  implicita,  1903. 

2  In  the  question,  whether  theology  is  a  scientia  speculativa  vel  pradica , 

Albert  adopted  the  latter  view  (summ.  i.  tr.  1,  q.  3,  memb.  3),  Thomas 
rather  the  former  (summ.  i.  q.  1,  a.  4).  Thomas  argues  that  theology  has  to 
do  not  so  much  with  human  actions  as  with  the  “divine  affairs.”  There  is 

here  no  real  contradiction,  since  this  theology,  which  is  no  more  than 
advanced  knowledge  of  the  faith,  is  after  all  in  the  conception  of  Thomas 
eminently  practical. 


THEOLOGY  OF  THE  THIRTEENTH  CENTURY.  I05 

intellect  ( intellectus  agens')  then  transforms  this  in  the  intellectual 
faculty  ( intellectus  possibilis)  into  an  intelligible  species  ( species 
intelligibilis')  (ib.  i.  q.  79,  a.  3  ;  q.  85,  a.  2).  The  intellect 
accordingly  has  knowledge  of  the  Universal,  but  by  this  it  is  by 
no  means  to  be  understood  that  it  thereby  directly  cognizes  ideas 
actually  existent.  The  general  conception,  which  we  form  for 
ourselves,  is  always  merely  derivative,  a  universale  post  rent. 
The  universal  does  not  exist  as  a  general  idea,  but  it  is  in  the 
objects  of  sense  under  certain  criteria  ( universale  in  re).  Its 
original  type  is  seen  in  the  ideas  of  God  ( universalia  ante  rein ), 
which  eternally  preexist  in  him,  as  the  artist’s  ideas  exist  in  him 
before  he  executes  his  work.  Thus  Albert  held,  and  before 
him  Avicenna.  Accordingly,  the  essential  nature  of  things  is 
dependent  upon  the  divine  idea,  and  in  so  far  Plato  was  right 
(c.  gent.  iii.  24).  Theoretically,  this  Aristotelian  fully  accepted 
the  maxim  :  ‘ {  For  the  present  we  cannot  know  ( cognoscere )  God 
except  through  material  effects”  (summ.  i.  q.  86,  a.  2,  ad.  1). 
But  as  revelation  now  supplies  this  defect,  the  knowledge  of  this 
world  in  its  connection  of  causes  and  effects  becomes  a  knowledge 
of  God  (c.  gent.  iii.  50).  The  ideas  of  God  are  made  manifest 
in  the  order  of  the  world. 

4.  Finally,  it  may  be  said  that  Scholasticism  has  two  aspects. 
It  is  orthodoxy,  maintaining  that  the  teachings  of  the  church, 
the  declarations  of  the  ecclesiastical  canon,  the  customs  and 
practices  of  the  church,  are  absolutely  and  unassailably  true. 
That  which  actually  exists  is  true,  if  it  be  ecclesiastically  sanc¬ 
tioned.  On  the  other  hand,  Scholasticism  has  a  rationalizing 
tendency.  That  which  is  unchurchly  is  condemned  as  being 
unreasonable,  and  that  which  is  churchly  proved  to  be  reason¬ 
able,  by  the  intricate  methods  of  dialectics. 

Here  may  be  mentioned  two  great  philosophic  minds.  Roger 
Bacon  (j~  1294)  emphasized  the  importance  of  experience  and 
the  knowledge  derived  from  it.1  Raymundus  Lullus  (f  1315) 
demanded,  in  opposition  to  the  Averroistic  illumination,2  that 
the  positions  of  the  Christian  faith  be  strictly  proved  :  “We 
propose  to  prove  the  articles  of  faith  by  necessary  reasons.” 
The  understanding  must  follow  the  faith,  and  thus  they  must 
mount  together  to  the  knowledge  of  the  truth,  even  to  the 
mysteries  of  revelation.3  The  joyous  confidence  in  the  omnip¬ 
otence  of  logical  demonstration,  which  marked  the  early  days  of 
Scholasticism,  is  here  revived.  But  from  the  theological  point  of 

1  Vid.  St5ckl.  ii.  916  ff. 

2  Vid.  Reuter,  Gesch.  d.  Aufklarung,  ii.  148  ff. 

3  Vid.  his  Ars  magna  and  cf.  Neander,  Denkwiirdigkeiten  ii.  (1846). 
Stockl.  ii.  924  ff. 


io6 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


view,  Henry  of  Ghent  (f  1293)  is  above  ail  worthy  of  men¬ 
tion  as  a  sturdy  representative  of  the  older  theology  (he  wrote 
Quodlibeta ,  a  Commentary  upon  the  Sentences,  and  a  Sunwia 
theologiae')}  In  his  conception  of  universals,  he  varies  from 
Thomas.  He  held  that  the  patterns  ( exemplaria )  of  things, 
exist  as  independent  entities  in  God  (quodl.  vii.  q.  1,2).  Only 
grace  can  secure  for  us  a  view  of  these  (summ.  i.  q.  2).  He 
also  maintained  an  actual  existence  of  matter,  which  Thomas, 
following  Aristotle,  regarded  as  a  mere  potency  (quodl.  i.  q.  10). 
Body  and  soul  have  not  one,  but  two  forms  (quodl.  iii.  q.  15). 
Everywhere  we  find  the  emphasis  laid  upon  perception  and  the  em¬ 
pirical,  as  well  as  upon  the  religiously-colored  Realism  of  ideas. 
In  this,  as  his  exaltation  of  the  will  above  the  intellect,  Henry  be¬ 
trays  his  Augustinian  character,  since  the  activity  of  the  will  is 
the  dominating  and  controlling  factor  in  life  :  “  The  will  out¬ 
ranks  the  intellect  M  (quodl.  i.  q.  14  and  16).  As  Duns  Scotus 
establishes  the  transition  to  the  last  phase  of  the  scholastic 
theology,  we  reserve  notice  of  his  position  for  our  next  chapter. 
We  can  here  but  refer  also  to  his  contemporary,  Richard  of 
Middletc  ,  who  likewise  strongly  emphasized  the  significance 
of  the  will  in  God  and  in  man.  (His  commentary  on  the  Sen¬ 
tences  was  printed,  Brixen,  1591.)  For  the  doctrine  of  Richard, 
vid.  Seeberg,  Theologie  des  Duns  Scotus,  p.  16  ff. 


§  54.  Doctrine  of  God  and  Christo  logy. 

Baur,  Die  Lehre  v.  d.  Dreieinigket  u.  Menschwerdung,  ii.  1842.  J.  De- 
LITZSCH,  Die  Gotteslehre  d.  Thom.  v.  Aq.,  1870.  Ritschl,  Geschichtl. 
Stud.  z.  chr.  Lehre  v.  Gott,  in  Jarbb.  f.  deutsche  Theol.,  1865,  279  ff.  Wer¬ 
ner,  Thomas,  ii.  619  ff.  Dorner,  Lehre  v.  d.  Person  Christi,  ii.  399  ff.  H. 
Schultz,  Lehre  v.  d.  Gottheit  Christi,  1881,  p.  153  ff. 

i.  The  doctrine  of  the  Nature  of  God  was  not  wrought 
out  by  the  ancient  church,  as  the  entire  interest  of  that  age  was 
absorbed  by  the  Trinitarian  problem.  The  term  “  person” 2 
was  restricted  to  the  Trinitarian  formulae,  the  divine  nature 
being  described  as  1  ‘  substance  ’  ’  or  “essense”  ( substantia , 
essentiaf  And  even  when  this  was  embellished  by  the  predi¬ 
cates  of  eternity  or  of  superessentiality,  it  led  no  further  than  to 

1  Ed.  Venet.  1613.  Cf.  Stockl.  ii.  739  ff.  Werner,  Heinr.  v.  Ghent  in 
Denkschr.  d.  Wiener  Akad.  Phil. -hist,  cl.,  vol.  28,  p.  9 7  ff.  Siebeck, 
Ztschr.  f.  Philos,  u.  phil.  Krit.,  vol.  93,  p.  200  ff.  For  his  biography,  see 
Ehrle  in  Arch.  f.  Litt.  u.  KG.  d.  MA.  i.  366  ff.  For  his  theology,  See¬ 
berg,  Theol.  des  Duns  Scotus,  p.  605-625. 

2  How  persistent  are  such  traditional  usages  is  illustrated  in  the  fact  that 
Jacobi  is  the  first  who  speaks  of  the  “personal”  God.  Vid.  Eucken, 
Grundbegriffe  d.  Gegenw,  ed.  2,  p.  269. 


DOCTRINE  OF  GOD  AND  CHRISTO  LOGY.  I07 

the  unfruitful  abstractions  of  the  conception  of  God  in  Greek 
philosophy.  Even  Augustine  defined  God  as  Essence  ( essentia ), 
and  the  conception  of  the  Areopagite  appeared  to  be  in  harmony 
with  this  (Vol.  I.,  p.  290  f. ).  This  theoretical  deficiency  was 
balanced  practically  by  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  attributes, 
and  theoretically  by  the  wealth  of  personal  analogies,  in  the 
Augustinian  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  and,  still  more,  by  the  rec¬ 
ognition  of  God  as  energetic  Will  in  the  Augustinian  doctrine  of 
predestination.  But  it  was  a  decided  step  in  advance  when 
Anselm  expressly  maintained  that  God  is  a  thinking  Spirit 
(monolog.  27.  7  ff).1  Here,  too,  the  teaching  of  Thomas  is 
very  significant.  He  also  spoke  of  God  in  the  Grecian  way,  as 
the  supremely  Existent  ( maxime  ens ),  the  prime  Mover 
mum  mo  yens'),  and  gave  the  maxim:  “We  cannot  consider 
concerning  God  how  he  is,  but  rather  how  he  is  not  ’  ’  (summa 
i.  q.  2,  a.  3  ;  q.  2  init.;  compend.  3  ff. ).  But  in  such  connec¬ 
tions  he  yet  always  made  it  clear  that  the  being  of  God  is  think¬ 
ing  and  willing  (summ.  i.  q.  19,  a.  1).  Since  now  God  is  the 
prime  Mover,  it  follows  that  he  is  “pure  Action  ( actus  purus) 
and  without  any  admixture  of  potentiality”  (cq  ip.  4,  11  ; 
summ.  q.  3,  a.  1,  u.  7  ;  9,  a.  1  ;  q.  25,  a.  1).  Since  this  absolute 
Activity  is  thinking  and  willing,  it  realizes  a  goal ;  and  since  God 
is  goodness,  His  will  is  moved  only  by  goodness  or — it  is  love 
(ib.  i.  q.  19,  a.  2;  q.  20,  a.  1).  The  final  goal  commensurate  with 
God  is  He  himself.  Everything  occurring  in  the  world  must 
therefore  be  referred  to  this  goal,  since  God  is  the  originator  of 
the  world.  From  this  it  is  inferred  that  the  fundamental  relation¬ 
ship  of  God  to  the  world  is  that  of  love  for  it.  “  When  anyone 
loves  another,  he  wishes  good  for  him,  and  so  treats  him  as 
he  would  treat  himself,  doing  good  to  him  as  to  himself”  (ib. 
q.  20,  a.  1,  ad  3).  The  thought  is  clear:  God  always  desires 
himself  as  the  final  goal.  When  he  establishes  the  world,  he 
desires  it  from  eternity  as  a  means  to  this  end ;  in  other  words, 
he  is  related  to  it  as  to  himself,  i.  e.,  he  loves  it.  This  relation 
of  God  to  the  world  is  manifested  in  that  he  gives  to  the  world 
all  things  needful  and  preserves  it  in  its  course  (this  constituting 
his  justitia  and  veritas  ;  q.  21,  a.  1  and  2),  and,  further,  in  that 
he  banishes  misery.  This  is  done  when  deficiencies  are  over¬ 
come  “through  the  perfection  of  some  good.”  This  is  the 
mercy  of  God  (ib.  a.  3).  God  therefore  loves  the  world,  since, 
in  every  action  of  his  bearing  upon  it,  righteousness  and  mercy 
are  joined  together.  This  classical  argumentation  leads  to  a 
religious  conception  of  God  which  necessarily  includes  the  idea 


1  Cf.  the  Germanic  conception  of  God  in  Cur  deus  homo  ?  Esp.  ii.  16. 


108  HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 

of  a  personal  loving  will.  But  instead  of  resting  content  in  this 
positive  conception,  Thomas  displays  the  influence  of  the  Greek 
apprehension  of  God,  e.  g.,  regarding  redemption  as  merely  the 
best  adapted  means  ‘  ‘  through  which  he  better  and  more  appro¬ 
priately  attains  his  end”  (ib.  iii.  q.  i,  a.  2).  Yet  we  cannot 
fail  to  note  in  Thomas  a  positive  advance  in  the  doctrine  con¬ 
cerning  God. 

2.  This  cannot  be  said  in  regard  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity.  When  the  Lombard,  Alexander,  and  Thomas  cite  the 
spiritual  functions  of  man  as  furnishing  analogies,  or  when 
Richard  of  St.  Victor  (11.  6  de  trin.)  endeavors  to  find  the 
solution  of  the  problem  in  love,  which  requires  a  “mutual 
love  ”  and  a  separateness  ( alietas )  of  the  three  persons,1  they  do 
not  overstep  the  suggestions  of  Augustine.  Only  one  point 
calls  for  our  attention  here.  The  Lombard  (i.  Gist.  5)  dis¬ 
cusses  the  questions,  whether  the  Father  begat  the  divine  essentia , 
or  whether  the  latter  begat  the  Son  or  himself.  He  answers 
them  all  in  the  negative.  Since  the  divine  essence,  or  nature, 
“is  common  to  the  three  persons  and  entire  in  each,”  the 
Father  would  otherwise  have  begotten  himself,  /.  e.,  the  essence 
by  virtue  of  which  he  exists,  which  is  impossible.  Further¬ 
more,  the  divine  essence  would  thus  seem  to  be  degraded  to  a 
mere  relationship  of  the  Godhead.  The  Lombard  decides  that 
the  divine  essence,  which  is  identical  in  the  hypostases,  neither 
begets  nor  is  begotten  ;  accordingly,  the  intertrinitarian  life  is  a 
relation  subsisting  between  the  hypostases.  These  ideas,  which 
were  based  upon  the  Augustinian  premise  of  the  strict  unity  of 
God,  were  assailed  by  Joachim  of  Floris  (f  1202),  who  main¬ 
tained  that  the  discrimination  of  the  divine  substance  from  the 
persons  leads  to  Sabellianism  or  Arianism.  He  himself,  like 
the  Cappadocians,  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  of  the  three 
persons,  who  together  constitute  one  entity  ( unum ),  one  substance 
(una  substantia') ,  or  one  God  ( unus  deus),  but  not  simply  one 
individual  (unus).  Collective  terms,  such  as  “one  herd,  one 
populace,”  are  cited  in  illustration.2  The  Fourth  Lateran 
Council  (A.  D.  1215)  made  the  following  deliverance:  “We 
believe  and  confess  with  Peter  Lombard,  that  there  is  one 
certain  supreme  Entity  ( una  quaedam  summa  res),  incompre¬ 
hensible  indeed  and  ineffable,  which  truly  is  the  Father,  the 

1  Cf.  Meier,  DieLehre  v.  d.  Trinit.  i.  292  ff.  Rich,  exclaims  :  “  Behold, 
how  easily  reason  demonstrates  that  there  must  be  a  plurality  of  persons  in 
the  Godhead !  ” 

2  Vid.  excerpts  from  Joachim  in  the  Protocol  of  Anagni  (A.  D.  1255), 
Denifle,  Archiv.  i.  136  ff.;  cf.  also  the  citation  in  Duns  Scotus,  sent.  i.  d. 

5>  T  3- 


DOCTRINE  OF  GOD  AND  CHRISTOLOGY.  I09 

Son,  and  the  Holy  Spirit,  three  persons  at  once,  and  separately 
either  one  of  them.  And  therefore  in  God  there  is  a  trinity 
alone,  not  a  quaternity ;  because  anyone  of  the  three  persons  is 
that  Entity  ( res ),  viz.,  substance,  essence,  or  divine  nature, 
which  alone  is  the  source  of  all  things,  outside  of  which  nothing 
can  be  found.  And  that  Entity  is  not  begetting  nor  begotten, 
nor  proceeding;  but  is  the  Father  who  begets,  the  Son  who 
is  begotten,  and  the  Holy  Spirit  who  proceeds,  that  there  may 
be  distinctions  in  persons  and  unity  in  nature  (Hefele,  v. 
880  f. ).  The  church  of  the  Middle  Ages  thus  explicitly  adopted 
the  Augustinian  doctrine  concerning  God.1 

3.  The  Christological  discussions  of  the  twelfth  century  were 
not  renewed  in  the  thirteenth.  The  great  Scholastics  present  in 
their  Christology  merely  a  reproduction  of  the  traditional 
dogma,  in  which  we  note  however  the  failure  to  emphasize  that 
contemplation  of  the  Man  Jesus  which  inspired  the  devotional 
ardor  of  the  Imitatio  Christi.  The  fundamental  ideas  are  as 
follows  :  The  Logos-person,  or  the  divine  nature,  takes  the 
impersonal  human  nature  into  unity  with  itself.  There  is  not  ' 
thus  originated  one  nature ,  but  the  union  is  consummated  in  the 
person.  “  The  divine  nature  .  .  .  united  to  itself  human 
nature,  although  not  to  its  very  self,  but  in  one  person  ”  (Bonav. 
iii.  d.  5,  a.  i,  q.  i).  “  The  union  was  made  in  the  person,  not  , 

in  the  nature”  (Thom.  summ.  iii.  q.  2,  a.  2). 2  It  is  the  entire 
human  nature  which  is  here  involved.  But  the  result  is,  after 
all,  not  a  real  combination  of  the  two  natures.  The  union  con¬ 
sists  in  their  common  relation  to  the  Logos-person.  The  union 
...  is  a  certain  relation  which  may  be  considered  between  the 
divine  nature  and  the  human,  according  to  which  they  meet 
in  the  one  person  of  the  Son  of  God.  The  unio  is  real,  not  in 
the  divine,  but  only  in  the  human  nature  (ib.  q.  2,  a.  7). 
Accordingly,  the  incarnation  is  to  be  understood  only  relatively  : 

“  But  God  became  man  in  this,  that  human  nature  began  to  be 
in  the  suppositum  (unoo-raocs)  of  the  divine  nature,  which  pre¬ 
existed  from  eternity”  (ib.  q.  16,  a.  6,  ad  1).  It  is  the  inherited 


1  The  Lombard  introduces  into  theology  the  Cappadocian  terminology  of 
the  Damascene,  and  argues  in  its  support  (i.  d.  19  NO).  But  it  is  important 
to  observe  that,  even  in  the  sermons  of  the  period,  the  Augustinian  type  of  the 
doctrine  is  preserved.  E .  g.,  Schonbach,  Altd.  Pred.  ii.  115,  no;  iii. 
1 1 5  f .  (ein  warer  got  in  der  heiligen  driniisse.  Der  vaterund  sein  wistumund 
sein  minne  ist  neur  ein  got). 

2  Thomas  accurately  defined  both  terms.  “A Tatura  signifies  essence 
( essentia ),  or  that  which  anything  is,  or  the  quiddity  of  a  species  (ib.  q. 
2,  a.  1);  persona ,  the  rational,  individual  substance  of  a  nature  ( rationalis 
naturae  individua  substantial)  (a.  2,  after  Boethius);  hypostasis  is  the  same, 
with  the  omission  of  the  term  rationalist 


iio 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


defect  of  this  Christology,  that  while  divinity  and  humanity  are 
placed  in  opposition  abstractly,  as  infinite  and  finite,  the  Christ 
of  the  Gospels  is  only  depicted  in  empty  words.1  This  drift  is 
clearly  seen  in  the  discussion  by  Thomas  of  the  question,  whether 
there  is  only  one  being  ( esse )  in  Christ.  He  concludes  that,  as 
there  is  no  hypostatic  being  ( Sein )  in  the  human  nature  of 
Christ,  the  question  is  to  be  answered  in  the  affirmative  (ib.  q. 
17,  a.  2).  Finally,  the  communicatio  idiomatum  is  taught,  as 
existing  between  the  concretes,  God  and  man  :  “  They  are  able 
to  impart  to  one  another  the  attributes  ( idiomata  co7?imu?iicare ) 
of  that  nature  according  to  which  they  are  spoken  of  in  con¬ 
crete,”  as  though  it  should  be  said:  God  is  man  and  man  is 
God  (Bonav.  iii.  d.  6,  a.  1,  q.  1  ;  Thom.  iii.  q.  16,  a.  5).  Upon 
the  two  wills  and  two  “operations,”  see  Thom.  iii.  q.  18  and 
19.  The  present  period  displayed  no  independent  interest  in 
questions  of  Christology.2  Theologians  were  content  to  demon¬ 
strate  the  logical  consistency  of  the  traditional  teaching  of  the 
church.  They  learned  nothing — nor  did  they  forget  anything.3 

§  55.  The  Work  of  Christ. 

1 .  The  present  period  produced  nothing  new  touching  the  work 
of  Christ.  The  attempt  was  made,  as  had  been  done  by  the 
Lombard,  to  combine  the  objective  view,  in  which  the  ideas  of 
Anselm  were  accepted,  with  Abelard’s  subjective  interpretations. 
Thus  Alexander  of  Hales,  following  Anselm,  teaches  the 
necessity  of  the  satisfaction  which  Christ  effects  through  his 
“merit”  (summ.  iii.  q.  1,  memb.  4  ff. ;  q.  16,  memb.  3  and  4). 
Bonaventura  states  the  doctrine  with  more  precision.  The 
work  of  reparatio  includes  (1)  That  men  through  Christ, 
especially  through  his  innocent  sufferings,  learn  to  know,  love, 
and  imitate  God,  and  (2)  that  their  sins  be  forgiven  them 
through  a  worthy  ( condign  am )  satisfaction.  This  makes  the  in¬ 
carnation  a  necessity  (breviloq.  4.  1.  9).  “Since  a  simple 
creature  could  not  make  satisfaction  for  the  whole  human  race, 
nor  would  it  be  proper  that  a  creature  of  another  race  be  taken 
for  the  purpose,  it  was  necessary  that  the  person  of  the  one 

1  How  little  the  problem  was  understood  may  be  gathered  from  the  fact 
that  Thomas  declared  that  it  would  have  been  possible  for  the  Logos  to 
assume  two  human  natures  at  the  same  time  (ib.  q.  3,  a.  7). 

2  But  note  the  attempt  of  Bonaventura  in  the  Breviloq.  to  find  for  every 
Christological  proposition  a  ground  in  the  theory  of  redemption. 

3  Luther  charged  upon  the  Scholastics,  that  they  “make  a  wall  between 

the  Son  of  God  and  the  Son  born  of  the  Virgin  Mary”  (Erl.  ed.  47.  362). 
This  charge  cannot  be  brought  against  Bernard,  but  it  is  true  as  applied  to  the 
scholastic  method.  — 


THE  WORK  OF  CHRIST. 


Ill 


rendering  satisfaction  be  God  and  man  ”  (sent.  iii.  d.  20,  a.  1,  q. 
3).  The  satisfaction  is  effected  through  the  merit  of  Christ 
( pro  nobis  mereri  et  satisfacere ,  iii.  d.  18,  a.  2,  q.  2)  which  he 
won  “not  only  in  action  but  also  in  suffering  ”  ( 'passione )  (ib.  a. 
1,  q.  3.  ;  cf.  brevil.  4.  7).  Since  in  the  acting  and  suffering  of 
Christ  there  was  a  “  concursus  of  both  natures  ”  (brevil.  4.  2), 
there  belongs  to  the  “  merit  of  the  God-man — the  perfection  and 
plenitude  of  merit  ”  (ib.  4.  7).  “  But  to  make  satisfaction  is 

to  repay  the  honor  due  to  God  ”  (4.  9).  This  was  done  by  the 
sufferings  of  Christ  as  the  most  appropriate  means  ‘  ‘  for  placating 
God”  (iii.  d.  20,  a.  1,  q.  5).  Herein  is  displayed  the  mercy  as 
well  as  the  righteousness  of  God  (ib.  a.  1,  q.  2).  But  with  this 
Anselmian  view  is  combined  also  the  Abelardian  idea,  that  the 
passion  commended  itself  also  as  the  most  appropriate  means, 
because  suited  to  arouse  men  to  a  responsive  love  toward  God 
(ib.  a.  1,  q.  5).  It  is  to  be  noted,  finally,  that  Bonaventura, 
by  developing  the  thought  of  Christ’s  relation  to  the  church  as 
the  Head  to  the  members,  brought  into  view  the  connection 
between  the  work  of  redemption  and  the  redeemed,  as  Anselm 
was  never  able  to  do.1  Reparation  is  accomplished,  accordingly, 
by  remedying,  satisfying,  and  reconciling  ( remedia?ido ,  satis- 
faciendo ,  et  reconciliando,  Brevil.  4.  2). 

2.  The  noteworthy  discussion  of  the  subject  by  Thomas  fol¬ 
lows  the  same  line.  In  Christ  as  the  Redeemer,  the  human 
nature  comes  into  prominence  ;  but  to  it  belongs,  in  consequence 
of  its  union  with  God,  a  certain  divine  efficacy  ( virtus )  (summ. 
iii.  q.  48,  a.  5,  ad  1  ;  q.  49,  a.  1,  ad  1  and  2).  This  is  not  in¬ 
comprehensible,  when  we  remember  that  the  human  nature 
exists  only  in  the  divine  hypostasis  (vid.  supra).  The  work  of 
redemption  is  thus  presented  :  “  Inasmuch  as  he  is  also  man,  it 

is  competent  for  him  to  unite  men  to  God  by  exhibiting  the  pre¬ 
cepts  and  gifts  (of  God)  to  men  and  by  making  satisfaction  and 
intercession  for  men  to  God  ”  (q.  26,  a.  2).  In  this  summary 
the  leading  ideas  of  the  discussion  are  clearly  expressed.  (<2) 
In  the  human  nature  of  Christ  dwells  the  fullness  of  all  grace 
(ib.  q.  7,  a.  1).  He  is  now  the  Head  of  the  human  race,  or  of 
the  church.  From  the  Head,  rank  ( or  do ),  perfection  and  virtue 
overflow  upon  the  members  (q.  8,  a.  1,  3,  4). 2  On  the  other 
hand,  the  merit  of  the  Head  inures  to  the  good  of  the  members 
(q.  48,  a.  1  ;  q.  49,  a.  1)  in  so  far  as  the  latter  are  willing  to 
belong  to  the  Head.  “  But  the  members  ought  to  be  con- 

1  But  see  Bernard,  De  erroribus  Abael.,  6,  15:  “Therefore  the  Head 
made  satisfaction  for  the  members.” 

2  Thus  even  the  sacraments,  “which  have  their  virtue  from  the  passic^  Qf 
of  Christ”  (q.  49,  a.  I  ad  4). 


1 1  2 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


formed  to  the  Head  ”  (q.  49,  a.  3,  ad  3).  This  great  concep¬ 
tion  establishes  the  proposition,  that  Christ  is  the  new  man,  who 
is  the  leaven  and  principle  of  the  new  humanity.  (<£)  The 
work  of  redemption  is  accordingly  to  be  considered  primarily 
*■  from  the  point  of  view,  that  Christ  by  his  teaching,  his  acts,  and 
his  sufferings  became  the  teacher  and  pattern  of  our  race.  This 
applies  to  his  circumcision  (q.  37,  a.  1),  baptism  (q.  39,  a.  1), 
temptation  (q.  4,  a.  1,  3),  teaching  :  “  By  associating  with  men 
...  he  manifested  to  all  his  divinity  by  preaching  and  per¬ 
forming  miracles  and  by  dealing  innocently  and  justly  among 
men”  (q.  40,  a.  1,  ad  i),1  and  miracles  (q.  44,  a.  3).  It  can 
neither  surprise  nor  give  offense  to  observe  that  Thomas  applies 
this  thought  even  to  the  passion  of  Christ :  ‘  ‘  Through  this,  man 
recognizes  how  much  God  loves  man,  and  through  this  he 
is  provoked  to  the  loving  of  God,  in  which  the  perfection  of 
human  salvation  consists,  ’  ’  and  ‘ ‘  through  this  he  has  given  to 
us  an  example  of  obedience,  humility,  constancy,  righteousness, 
and  other  virtues”  (q.  46,  a.  3  ;  q.  47,  a.  4,  ad  2).  The  love 
( caritas )  to  which  we  thus  attain  serves  also  (according  to  Lk. 
7.  47)  to  secure  the  forgiveness  of  sins  (q.  49,  a.  1).  Even 
the  resurrection,  the  ascension,  and  the  session  at  the  right  hand 
of  God  serve  this  end  of  instruction  and  suggestion,  the  last- 
named  particularly  because  the  exalted  Saviour  4 ‘sends  forth 
thence  divine  gifts  to  men”  (q.  53,  a.  1  ;  q.  55,  a.  3  ;  q. 
57,  a.  6).  This  is  the  first  train  of  thought  :  The  Head  of  the 
church  reveals  God  to  his  followers,  teaches  them,  incites  them 
to  good,  and  bestows  his  gifts  upon  them,  (c)  Then  comes  the 
'  question  of  satisfaction.  The  absolute  necessity  of  this  Thomas 
denies.  Since  there  is  no  one  above  God,  and  he  is  himself  the 
‘  “supreme  and  common  Good  of  the  whole  universe,”  he  could 
even  without  satisfaction  forgive  sin  (q.  46,  a.  2,  ad  3).  But  the 
method  of  satisfaction  would  most  clearly  give  expression  to  his 
'  righteousness  and  mercy,  and  he  therefore  chose  it  (ib.  a. 
1,  ad  3).  At  this  point  Thomas  parts  company  with  the  juristic 
conception  of  Anselm,  a  departure  which  is  further  emphasized 
9  by  his  view  that,  on  account  of  the  greatness  of  Christ’s  love  and 
the  value  of  his  life,  “  the  passion  of  Christ  was  not  only  a  suffi¬ 
cient,  but  also  a  superabundant  satisfaction  ”  (q.  48,  a.  2  and  4). 
Thus  both  the  necessity  and  the  equivalence  of  the  satisfaction 
are  surrendered.  The  satisfaction  consists  in  the  passion  of 
Christ.  He  bore  all  sufferings  “  according  to  genus”  (q.  46, 
a.  5),  anq  the  greatest  possible  grief  (dolor  maximus,  ib.  a.  6). 

.  01  , 

i  r C  q.  42,  a.  2,  an  intelligent  response  to  the  inquiry  why  Christ  did  not 
become?  a  writer. 


THE  WORK  OF  CHRIST. 


IT3 

But  the  passion  of  Christ  is  now  to  be  regarded,  not  from  a 
material,  but  from  a  personal  and  ethical  point  of  view.  It  was 
an  act  of  obedience  and  love  :  “  He  suffered  out  of  love  and 
obedience  ”  (q.  47,  a.  2),  since  God  “  inspired  in  him  the  will 
to  suffer  for  us  by  infusing  love  into  him”  (ib.  a.  3).  His 
death  was  also  a  sacrifice  only  in  so  far  as  it  was  an  act  of  free 
will  (q.  47,  a.  2,ad  2  ;  a.  4,  ad  2  ;  q.  48,  a.  3).  If  the  concep¬ 
tion  of  “  merit”  forms  the  basis  of  man’s  ethical  conduct, 
according  to  the  theory  of  the  Middle  Ages,  it  is  but  consistent 
that  Thomas  should  regard  the  passion  also  from  this  point 
of  view  :  “Through  his  passion  he  merited  salvation,  not  only  w . 
for  himself  but  also  for  his  members”  (q.  48,  a.  1);  for  suffer¬ 
ing  is  meritorious  “only  in  proportion  as  anyone  voluntarily 
endures  it”  (ib.  ad.  1).  The  expiatory  sufferings  of  Christ  are 
the  fundamental  basis  of  our  salvation.  But  that  the  aim  of 
these  is  for  our  justification  and  the  imparting  of  grace,  is  not  . 
clearly  set  forth  by  Thomas.  As  the  stimulating  influence  of 
Christ  continues  in  his  state  of  exaltation,  “his  representation 
from  human  nature,”  in  heaven  is  “a  kind  of  intercession 
( interpellatio )  for  us  ”  (q.  57,  a.  6). 

(^/)  The  Result  of  the  work  of  redemption,  according  to 
Thomas,  embraces  the  following  :  ( 1 )  The  forgiveness  of  sins, 
and  this  through  the  love  begotten  in  us  (vid.  under  (<z)  ),  as 
also  through  redemtio  (cf.  q.  48,  a.  4),  since  the  church  is 
“regarded  as  one  person  with  its  Head”  (q.  49,  a.  1).  This 
applies  not  only  to  original,  but  also  to  actual  sins  (ib.  a.  5). 

(2)  The  releasing  from  sin  releases  also  from  the  devil  (a.  2). 

(3)  Releasing  from  the  punishment  of  sin  (a.  3.).  (4)  The 

sacrifice  of  Christ  has  the  effect  “  that  on  account  of  this  good 
found  in  human  nature  God  is  placated  with  respect  to  every  offense 
of  the  human  race”  (a.  4).  (5)  The  opening  of  the  door 

of  heaven  on  account  of  the  release  from  sin  (a.  5).  This 
genuinely  scholastic  analysis  of  the  material  obstructs  a  clear 
perception  of  the  view  of  Thomas.  But  we  may,  in  harmony 
with  his  spirit,  condense  the  statement  of  his  view  as  follows : 
Christ,  the  Head  of  the  church,  is  by  virtue  of  this  position  our 
Redeemer.  (1)  Because  he  reveals  God  to  us,  and  by  love 
overpowers  us  and  incites  us  to  good,  and  thereby  makes  us  cap¬ 
able  of  securing  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  (2)  Because  he 
through  his  passion  reconciles  God  and  renders  satisfaction  to 
him,  and  thereby  effects  for  us  salvation  and  immunity  from 
punishment.  (3)  Because  he  by  both  these  achievements  de¬ 
livers  us  from  the  power  of  the  devil  and  opens  for  us  the  door 
of  heaven.  In  this  classical  presentation  of  the  subject  are  com¬ 
bined  the  views  of  Anselm  (in  a  fragmentary  way  indeed)  and  ( 

8 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


114 

of  Abelard.1  The  result  is  evidently  that  forgiveness  is  accom¬ 
plished  and  secured  in  a  two-fold  way.  The  theory  before  us  is 
*  the  positive  resultant  of  the  discussion  concerning  the  nature  of 
redemption. 


§  56.  Doctrines  of  the  Origitial  State  and  of  Sin. 

Cf.  Schwane,  DG.  d.  mittl.  Zeit,  p.  334  ff. 

1 .  The  doctrine  of  the  original  state  stands  in  most  intimate 
relations  with  that  of  sin  and  with  the  ethical  ideal,  and  hence 
requires  attention  at  this  point.  It  receives  its  peculiar  scholas¬ 
tic  form  from  Alexander  of  Hales,  whose  ideas  were  per¬ 
petuated  and  modified  by  Bonaventura,  Albert,  and  Thomas. 
Its  chief  peculiarity  consists  in  the  strict  line  of  discrimination 
between  the  original  state  of  the  first  man  and  the  additional 
endowment  bestowed  upon  him  by  grace  (Thom.  sent, 
ii.  d.  20,  q.  2,  a.  3).  (a)  The  inborn,  natural  ethical  state 

( habitus )  of  man  is  by  some  described  as  original  righteousness 
( justitia  origin  a  li s') ,  by  which  is  meant  the  harmony  of  the 
natural  powers  and  the  absence  of  the  concupiscence  which  now 
hinders  their  normal  exercise  (Bonav.  sent.  ii.  d.  19,  a.  3,  q.  1. 
Thom.  1.  c.  ).2  (h)  To  this  is  added  the  donum  superadditum ,  or 

1  This  varies  from  the  usual  presentation  of  the  case.  The  observant  reader 

will  be  disposed  to  make  an  attempt  to  reduce  to  one  the  two  chief  lines  of 
thought — somewhat  perhaps  in  this  way  :  In  becoming  man,  Christ  opened  to 
the  human  race  through  his  life  communion  with  God,  and  in  his  passion 
attested  that  the  men  who  should  follow  him  should,  despite  all  the  sufferings 
of  the  world,  remain  with  God  ;  and  by  this  means  he  became  the  ground  of 
the  forgiveness  of  sins,  inasmuch  as  God  looks  upon  the  men  who  follow  him 
and  who  have  begun  in  the  Christian  life  in  the  light  of  Christ’s  perfection, 
and,  on  the  ground  of  his  guarantee,  passes  upon  them  a  different  judgment 
than  he  has  previously  done.  I  find  some  approaches  to  this  in  Thomas,  e.  g. , 
q.  49,  a.  3,  ad  3  :  “That  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  has  effect  in  us  in  so  far  as 
we  are  incorporated  in  him”  and  ib.  a.  4  :  “  That  on  account  of  this  good 

found  in  human  nature  (i.  e.,  the  work  of  Christ)  God  is  placated  ...  in 
so  far  as  pertains  to  those  who  are  united  to  the  suffering  Christ .”  Not  the 
fact  that  this  good  is  in  Christ,  but  that  it  is  through  him  in  human  nature, 
serves  to  reconcile  God.  But  Thomas  did  not  plainly  teach  this. 

2  Among  the  natural  ethical  powers,  especial  prominence  is  given  to  the 
synderesis ,  or  synteresis.  According  to  Alexander,  who  first  treats  the  con¬ 
ception  exhaustively,  the  Synteresis  is  the  habitual  inclination  toward  the  good 
which,  infallible  and  inalienable,  dwells  in  man,  as  well  in  the  reason  as  in  the 
will  (ii.  q.  76,  m.  I,  2,  3).  Similarly,  Bonav.  ii.  d.  39,  a.  2,  q.  I  ff. ;  vid.  also 
Heinrich,  quodl.  i.  q.  18.  According  to  Thomas,  this  has  its  seat  exclusively 
in  the  reason  :  “A  natural  habitus  of  first  principles  of  action,  which  are 
natural  principles  of  natural  law.  Which  has  an  immutable  rectitude  .  .  . 
whose  office  it  is  to  object  to  evil  and  incline  to  good  ”  (Quaest.  disp.  de  synder. 
a.  1,  2,  opp.  viii.  836-838.  ;  cf.  sent.  i.  q.  79,  a.  12,  13,  and  Alb.,  De  homin. 
tr.  1,  q.  69,  a.  i).  But  the  conscience  ( conscientia )  embraces  the  acts  which 


ORIGINAL  STATE  AND  SIN. 


TI5 


added  gift  of  grace.  According  to  some  theologians,  as,  e.  g., 
Henry  (Quod.  lib.  ii.  q.  ii.  ;  vi.  q.  ii.)  this  donum  super- 
■additum  is  the  first  ground  of  the  original  righteousness  of  man. 
It  embraces,  in  the  first  instance,  the  separate  “  graces  gratuit¬ 
ously  given,”  such  as  the  bestowal  of  the  sciences,  contem¬ 
plation,  and  the  immortality  of  the  body.  Especially  was  there 
given  to  Adam,  as  the  head  of  the  race,  such  a  measure  of 
knowledge,  “  that  he  might  always  be  able  to  instruct  and  gov¬ 
ern  others  ”  (Thom.  summ.  i.  q.  94,  a.  3).  It  was  a  “ knowl¬ 
edge  ( scientia )  illuminating  the  intellect  for  the  recognition 
of  itself  and  its  God  and  this  world  ”  (Bonav.  brevil.  2.  ii).1 
(0)  Yet  the  thing  of  chief  importance  is  other  than  this,  i.  e., 
the  gift  of  “  the  grace  which  makes  acceptable  ”  ( gratia  gratum 
f Odens').  This  supernatural  complementum  (Alex.  ii.  q.  96,  m. 
1.  Bonav.  in  sent.  ii.  d.  29,  a.  1,  q.  1)  consists  essentially  in 
an  indwelling  of  God,  or  an  infused  love,  adapting  the  feeling 
(, caritas  habilitans  affectum)  to  the  loving  of  God  (Bonav.  ii.  d. 
29,  a.  1,  q.  1  ;  brevil.  2.  11).  This  grace  which  sanctifies  man 
is  a  “  universal  habitus,  moulding  ffnfortnans)  both  the  subject 
and  all  his  powers  and  works,  through  which  God,  dwelling  in 
all  his  saints,  infuses  the  power  of  meriting  eternal  life  ”  (Alb. 
summ.  ii.  tr.  16,  q.  98,  m.  4).  This  habitus  of  grace  has  its 
seat  in  the  “  essence  of  the  soul,”  not  in  the  separate  powers 
(Thom.  i.  ii.  q.  no,  a.  4).  According  to  some,  this  grace  is  not 
imparted  to  man  at  the  moment  of  his  creation,  but  at  some 
later  point  of  time  ;  and  hence  man  may  and  should  earn  it  for 
himself  by  a  merit  of  fitness  ( meritum  congrui)  (Alex.  summ. 
ii.  q.  96,  m.  1.  Bonav.  sent.  ii.  d.  29,  a.  2,  q.  2.  Alb.  1.  c. ,  tr.  14, 

in  any  given  instance  impel  to  or  restrain  from  action,  or  pass  judgment  upon 
deeds  performed,  in  either  case  in  accordance  with  the  principles  contained  in 
the  Synteresis  ( Quaest.  de  consc.  a.  1,  ib. ,  p.  840).  According  to  Duns,  the 
Synteresis  is  the  “habitus  of  principles  which  is  always  right,”  resident  in  the 
intellect;  whereas  the  conscience  is  the  “personal  ( proprius )  habitus  of 
practical  decision.”  If  the  former,  therefore,  contains  the  principles  of 
ethical  conduct,  the  latter  applies  these  principles  in  any  given  case  to  the  con¬ 
duct  (Sent.  ii.  d.  39,  q.  2.  4).  The  conception  of  the  ovvvqppciq  dates  back  to 
Jerome  (opp.  ed.  Vallarsi  v.  10)  and  is  further  defined  by  him  as  scintilla 
conscientiae.  Nitzsch  (Jarbb.  f.  prot.  Theol.  1879,  500  ft.)  makes  it  appear 
probable  that  simply  avvetdijaiq  stood  originally  in  the  passages  in  Jerome.  E. 
Klostermann  found  manuscript  evidence  of  this  (Theol.  Littztg.  1896,  637. 
Cf.  Appel,  Die  Lehre  d.  Scholastiker  v.  d.  synt.  1891  and  Ztschr.  f.  KG. 
xiii.  535  ff.  Siebeck,  Gesch.  d.  Psychol,  i.  2,  p.  445  ff.  Seeberg, 
Gewissen  u.  Gewissensbildung,  1896,  p.  69  f. ). 

1  This  gratia  gratis  data  is,  according  to  Thomas,  given  “in  order 
that  another  may  co-operate  in  securing  justification;”  the  gratia  gratum 
faciens ,  that  through  it  “  man  may  be  united  to  God.”  The  former  is  there¬ 
fore  a  kind  of  charismatic  endowment.  Vid.  quaest.  de  grat.  a.  5,  p.  988  ; 
quodlibeta  xii.  a.  96,  ad  1. 


n6 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


q.  90,  m.  1).  According  to  others,  it  is  bestowed  upon  man. 
together  with  original  righteousness  at  his  creation  (Thom,  in 
sent.  ii.  d.  29,  q.  1,  a.  2).  If  the  motive  of  this  new  doctrine 
be  sought,  it  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  desire  to  minimize 
the  distance  separating  the  natural  state  from  the  state  of  sin. 
Such  was  an  incidental  result,  but  not  the  ground  upon  which 
the  doctrine  was  based.  The  motive  lay  in  a  certain  Augustin- 
ian  tendency.  An  end  can  be  attained  only  by  the  exercise  of 
powers  commensurate.  “  But  eternal  life  is  an  end  exceeding 
the  proportion  of  human  nature.  ’  ’  There  is  therefore  granted 
to  man  the  supernatural  power  ( virtus )  commensurate  with  that 
high  end.  The  moral  life,  however,  is  conceived  under  the 
dominating  idea  of  “  merit.”  And,  as  acts  of  merit  are  to  be 
valid  before  God,  they  must  be  wrought  by  him  (vid.  Thom, 

i.  ii.  q.  109,  a.  5  and  6.  Bonav.  in  sent.  iii.  d.  29,  a.  1,  q.  1. 
Alb.  ii.  tr.  16,  q.  98,  m.  4).  Therefore,  man  has  need  of  the 
impelling  power  of  grace  before  as  well  as  after  the  fall  (Thom, 
ib.  a.  2). 

2.  Anselm  already  reproduces  the  Augustinian  conception  of 
sin  as  a  nonentity  ( Nichtsein ).  Evil  is  an  “absence  of  good  ” 
(dial,  de  casu  diabol.  11).  Original  sin  he  defined  as  “the 
lack  ( nuditas )  of  original  righteousness,  caused  by  the  dis¬ 
obedience  of  Adam,  through  which  we  are  all  the  children  of 
wrath”  (de  conceptu  virginal.  27).  The  Lombard  saw  in 
original  sin  a  tinder  {fames')  of  sin  and  an  infirmity  ( languor ) 
of  nature,  its  essence  consisting  in  concupiscence  (ii.  d.  30  F, 
G).  The  great  Scholastics  were  the  first  to  discuss  the  subject 
with  thoroughness,  and  they  agreed  substantially  in  their  views. 
Here,  as  usual,  Alexander  marked  out  the  path,  and  Thomas 
^  drew  the  final  formulas,  (a)  Alexander  presents  original  sin 
under  the  two  aspects  of  guilt  ( culpa )  and  penalty  {poena). 
In  the  former  aspect,  it  is  a  lack  {carentia)  of  original  righteous¬ 
ness  ;  in  the  latter,  concupiscence  (ii.  q.  122,  m.  2,  a.  1).  This 
carentia  embraces  the  loss  both  of  grace  and  of  the  natural 
original  righteousness,  or  order  of  nature,  since  nature  has  been 
sorely  wounded  by  sin.  “  The  natural  powers  in  us  and  in  the 
first  man  .  .  .  are  weakened  and  wounded  and  deteriorated  ’  ’ 
(Bonav.  in  sent.  ii.  d.  24,  p.  1,  a.  1,  q.  2).  Accordingly,  Thomas, 
defines  :  “  Original  sin  is  materially  indeed  concupiscence;  but 
formally  also  a  defect  {defectus)  of  original  righteousness”  (i.  ii. 
q.  82,  a.  3).  {b)  The  possibility  of  the  fall  lay  in  the  fact 

that  the  creature,  “made  from  nothing  and  defective,  was 
capable  of  deficiency  in  acting  according  to  God  ”  (Bonav.  brev. 

3.  1);  its  cause  was  pride  (ib.  3.  9).  {c)  Thomas  carefully 

defines  the  nature  of  original  sin.  It  is,  as  sickness  in  the  body, 


ORIGINAL  STATE  AND  SIN. 


117 

a  state  or  condition  ( habitus )  attaching  itself  to  the  soul  in  its 
essence  (, essentia ),  and  hence  a  languor  naturae.  From  this 
follows  both  that  it  is  a  negation  and  that  it  is  something  positive, 
i.  e .,  the  lack  of  the  original  righteousness  and  the  “unregulated 
disposition  of  parts  of  the  soul”  (i.  ii.  q.  82,  a.  1  ;  q.  83,  a.  2). 
The  powers  of  the  soul  are  robbed  of  their  original  order  and 
wounded,  since  “ignorance,  malice,  infirmity,  and  concupi¬ 
scence  ”  now  rule  in  it  (ib.  q.  85,  a.  3).  But  it  is  not  entirely 
deprived  of  “  the  good  of  nature,”  for  in  that  case  it  would  have 
forfeited  reason,  and  would  then  be  no  longer  capable  of  sin  (ib. 
a.  2).  Man’s  natural  endowment  therefore  remains,  but  it  has 
no  more  the  original  inclination  toward  the  good  (a.  1).  But 
the  latter  was,  properly  speaking,  not  natural.  The  conflict  of 
the  powers  was  involved  from  the  beginning  in  their  multiplicity 
(in  sent.  ii.  d.  32,  q.  2,  a.  1).  (</)  Finally,  the  question  as  to 

the  manner  in  which  the  sin  of  Adam  and  of  parents  is  trans¬ 
ferred  to  their  children  is  answered,  on  the  one  hand,  by  a 
reference  to  the  peculiar  position  of  Adam  as  the  head  of  the 
race  (Alex.  ii.  q.  122,  m.  3,  a.  3.  Thom.  ib.  q.  81,  a.  1),  and, 
further,  by  dwelling  upon  the  corruption  of  carnal  conception 
(Alex.  ib.  m.  4).  Here,  however,  arises  the  difficulty,  that, 
as  the  Scholastics  regarded  Creationism  as  the  only  orthodox 
theory  as  to  the  origin  of  the  soul  (Lomb.  ii.  d.  17  C,  H. 
Bonav.  sent.  ii.  d.  18,  a.  2,  q.  3.  Thom.  c.  gent.  ii.  86.  Duns, 
sent.  iv.  d.  43,  q.  3,  21),  the  connection  between  the  nature 
corporeally  propagated  and  the  soul  infused  by  an  immediate 
creative  act  of  God  is  not  clear.  Bonav.  finds  a  medium  in  an 
inclination  of  the  soul  toward  union  with  the  corrupted  flesh  (ii. 
d.  31,  a.  2,  q.  3).  According  to  Thomas,  the  propagated  bodily 
nature  is  impure  (i.  ii.  81,  a.  1  ;  c.  gent.  iv.  50.  4).  But  the 
nature  is  propagated  by  generation,  and  the  existence  of  the 
soul  begins  only  in  that  act  ;  therefore  the  soul  also  becomes 
sinful  (i.  ii.  q.  83,  a.  1).  But  this  does  not  make  the  matter 
clear.  (<?)  The  results  of  sin  are  sin  as  an  evil,  i.  e.,  the  dis¬ 
ordered  nature  ( natura  inordinata )  and  the  evil  itself — above 
all,  the  liability  to  punishment  ( reatus  poenae ),  or  eternal  death 
(ib.  q.  87  ;  q.  109,  a.  7).  The  punishment  of  children  dying 
unbaptized  is  light — they  are  deprived  of  the  vision  of  God 
( ' visio  dei ,  Lomb.  ii.  33  E).  There  is,  in  their  case,  not  a 
punishment,  but  a  “defect  of  nature”  (Heinr.  quodlib. 
vi.  q.  12).  Thus  they  occupy  a  median  position  :  “They  are 
without  any  outward  or  inward  affliction,”  but  “are  deprived 
of  the  vision  of  God  and  of  corporeal  light  ”  (Bonav.  ii.  d.  33,  a. 
,3,  q.  2.  Thom,  in  sent.  ii.  d.  33,  q.  2,  a.  2). 

If  we  now  review  the  course  of  thought  thus  developed, 


Il8  HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 

we  can  find  no  reason  to  designate  it  as  un-Augustinian.  The 
Scholastics  teach,  with  Augustine,  that  through  sin  man  has 
become  subject  to  ignorance,  lust,  and  death.  And  that  they 
regard  the  natural  endowments  of  man  as  only  wounded  and  dis¬ 
torted,  not  destroyed,  by  sin,  is  also  not  an  un-Augustinian 
idea.  Their  Semipelagianism  first  appears  when  they  attempt  to 
describe  the  state  of  the  natural  man  in  its  relation  to  the  work¬ 
ings  of  grace.  We  must  therefore  suspend  judgment  until  we  shall 
have  examined  their  expositions  of  grace  and  human  freedom. 


§  57.  Doctrine  of  Grace  and  Human  Freedom. 

1.  “  Nevertheless,  because  human  nature  has  not  been  totally 
corrupted  by  sin,  i.  e .,  so  as  to  be  deprived  of  the  whole  good 
of  nature,  but  is  able  even  in  the  natural  state  of  corruption  by 
virtue  of  its  nature  to  do  some  particular  good  thing,  as  to  build 
houses,  to  plant  vineyards,  and  other  things  of  such  sort,  it  does 
not  follow  that  everything  good  is  connatural  to  it  so  that  it  is 
deficient  in  nothing — just  as  a  sick  man  may  of  himself  have  some 
motion,  but  cannot  be  perfectly  moved  with  the  motion  of  a 
whole  man  unless  he  be  made  whole  by  the  aid  of  medicine  ” 
(Thom.  i.  ii.  q.  109,  a.  2).  By  this,  every  thought  of  self¬ 
redemption  is  excluded.  Salvation  must  be  traced  back  simply 
to  God,  for  the  attainment  of  the  final  goal  can  be  secured  only 
through  the  Prime  Mover — in  which  aspect  God  is  constantly 
regarded  in  Thomas’s  doctrine  of  grace  :  “  It  is  necessary  that 
man  be  turned  fonvertatur )  toward  the  final  goal  through 
a  motion  of  the  Prime  Mover”  (ib.  q.  109,  a.  6  and  9).  If 
this  rule  prevailed  before  the  fall,  it  is  thoroughly  applied  only 
after  the  fall  (ib.  a.  2).  This  metaphysical  rule  dominates  the 
doctrine  of  grace  as  held  by  Thomas.  Christ  is  mentioned  in 
this  connection  only  incidentally,  as  the  Head  of  the  church, 
who  was  alone  in  a  position  to  merit  the  “  first  grace  ”  for  others 
(q.  1 1 4,  a.  6  ;  cf.  Bonav.  brevil.  5.  1  init.).  Thus  grace,  and 
with  it  everything  good  in  man,  is  referred  to  the  divine  agency, 
as  indeed  everything  is  the  result  of  his  agency  as  the  Prime 
Mover. 

2.  But  what  is  Grace  ?  The  teachers  of  this  period  did  not, 
like  Abelard  and  the  Lombard  (sent.  ii.  27  C,  F. ;  iii.  4  a.) 
understand  grace,  or  love,  as  being  the  Holy  Ghost  himself 
( e .  g.,  Thom,  in  sent.  i.  d.  17,  a.  1).  The  term  grace  desig¬ 
nates,  according  to  Thomas,  on  the  one  hand,  the  gratuitous 
motion  (motio)  of  God  (ib.  q.  in,  a.  2;  q.  no,  a.  2;  q.  109, 
a.  9,  ad  2);  on  the  other  hand — and  this  is  the  vitally  important 
signification — the  effect  of  this  divine  act  (( gratia  increata  and 


GRACE  AND  HUMAN  FREEDOM. 


TI9 

creata).  “  The  motion  of  the  moving  God  is  itself  an  infusion 
of  grace  ”  (q.  1 13,  a.  8).  Grace,  it  is  expressly  declared,  is  not 
only  God’ s  1 1  eternal  love  ’  ’  and  the  ‘  ‘  remission  of  sins  ”  (q.  no, 
a.  1 ,  ad  1  and  3  ) .  It  is,  in  essence,  ‘ ‘  a  certain  supernatural  thing  in 
man,  coming  into  existence  from  God  ”  (q.  1 10,  a.  1),  an  infused 
condition  ( habitus  infusus'),  which  is  “in  the  essence  of  the 
soul”  (q.  109,  a.  9 ;  q.  no,  a.  4;  cf.  Bonav.  sent.  ii.  d.  26,  a. 

1 ,  q.  5).  “A  certain  gift  of  inward  condition  (Jiabituale  donum') 
is  infused  into  the  soul  by  God  ”  (q,  no,  a.  2).  It  is  “  super¬ 
natural  qualities,”  which  are  infused  into  the  soul,  a  “higher 
nature,  ”  which  pours  forth  from  God  as  multifarious  force  into  the 
“  powers  of  the  soul  ”  and  renews  them  (q.  no,  a.  2,  3,  4,  ad 
1  ;  cf.  Bonav.  brevil.  5.3:  recreare ;  and  5.4,  upon  the  rami¬ 
fication  of  grace').  This  is  the  grace  which  makes  acceptable 
(, gratia  gratum  faciens)  as  a  divine  inflowing,  which  makes 
man  like  God  and  pleasing  to  him  (Bonav.  ii.  d.  26,  a.  1,  q.  2). 
This  supernatural,  ethical  nature  inborn  in  man  embraces  in  itself 
all  virtues,  including  faith,  but  above  all  love,  which  alone,  as 
Bonaventura  says,  infuses  life  into  “  the  whole  spiritual 
machine  ”  (i.  d.  14,  dub.  6.  Thom.  q.  3,  a.  4,  ad  3).  Such  is 
the  conception  of  grace — the  new  nature  created  by  God  in  the 
depths  of  the  soul,  which  makes  man  capable  of  good.  This 
idea  may  find  support  in  Augustine,  but  it  has  no  footing  in  the 
gospel  nor  in  the  moral  conception  of  religion.  Here,  on  the 
contrary,  lies — the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments  being  most 
intimately  associated  with  it — the  deepest  source  of  the  process 
by  which  a  mechanical  character  was  impressed  upon  the  religious 
life  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

3.  Since  man  is  involved  in  this  process,  however,  the  old 
question  of  the  relation  of  human  freedom  to  grace  again  comes 
to  view.  Thomas  maintains  that  “conversion,”  it  is  true,# 
occurs  “through  the  free  will  ( liberum  arbitrium ),  but  the  free 
will  cannot  be  converted  to  (turned  toward)  God,  except  when 
God  himself  converts  it  to  himself  (q.  109,  a.  6,  ad  11).  The 
will  is  moved  by  God.  Every  supposed  preparation  for  the 
reception  of  grace  rests  upon  this  “  free  will  moved  by  God” 
(ib.  a.  7  ;  q.  112,  a.  2,  3,  4).  God  himself  establishes  in  us 
the  disposition  toward  the  reception  of  grace  (q.  113,  a.  7). 
The  divine  causality  alone  effects  moral  impulses  of  the  will  (q. 
hi,  a.  3).  If  we  regard  grace  from  the  point  of  view  of  God  as 
its  cause,  we  must  speak  of  operating  grace  ;  but  if  we  think  con¬ 
cretely  of  the  resultant  movements  of  the  will,  of  the  consent  of 
man,  the  term  co-operating  grace  will  find  its  place  (q.  1 1 1,  a.  2). 
Thomas  is  strictly  Augustinian  in  his  ideas  ;  but,  since  he  assigns 
the  chief  place  to  the  infused  substantial  gift  of  grace  instead  of  to 


I  20 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


the  personal  divine  working,  it  is  necessary — in  order  not  to  lose 
the  personal  element  entirely — to  lay  the  greater  emphasis  upon 
human  freedom,  especially  in  connection  with  the  conception  of 
merit.  This  is  seen  in  Bonaventura,  who  represents  the  impar- 
tation  of  grace  as  having  for  its  end  to  make  men  capable  of 
merit  (brevil.  5.  2),  which  can  be  attained  however  only 
through  the  free  will  (sent.  ii.  d.  26,  a.  1,  q.  5).  Under  this 
practical  view  of  the  matter,  despite  all  emphasizing  of  the 
agency  of  grace,  the  personal  agency  of  man  himself  constantly 
presses  to  the  front,  as  will  hereafter  plainly  appear. 

4.  We  now  turn  to  the  conception  of  Justification,  which  in 
the  thought  of  the  period  embraces  the  following  points  :  4  ‘  Four 
things  are  required  for  the  justification  of  the  wicked,  i.  <?., 
infusion  of  graced  a  movement  of  the  free  will  toward  God 
through  faith,  a  movement  of  the  free  will  toward  sin,  and 
remission  of  guilt’’  (Thom.  q.  ii3,a.  6;  cf.  Bonav.  brevil.  5. 
3:  “  infusion  of  grace,  expulsion  of  guilt,  contrition,  and  a 
movement  of  free  will  ”  ) .  It  must  be  clearly  understood,  first 
of  all,  what  is  the  object  in  view  in  justification.  But  this  is 
“a  certain  transmutation  of  the  human  soul  ”  (Thom.  q.  113,  a. 
3,  ad  3),  or,  “the  reparation  ( reparatio )  of  the  soul  is  called 
justification  ”  (Bonav.  iv.  d.  17,  p.  1,  dub.  1).  It  is  therefore  not 
justification  in  the  Pauline  sense,  which  is  here  altogether  ex¬ 
cluded  by  the  conception  of  grace ;  but  the  making  of  man 
righteous  by  virtue  of  the  supernatural  power  infused.  A  more 
precise  analysis  yields  the  following  :  (#)  If  we  start  with  the 
U  conception  of  grace  as  a  divine  agency,  the  basis  of  justification 
is  the  “  love  with  which  God  loves  us  ”  and  the  “  not  imputing 
sin  to  man,”  but  this  presupposes  upon  his  part  the  infusion  of 
grace  (q.  113,  a.  2,resp.u.  ,ad  2).  But  it  is  the  other  conception  of 
grace  which  dominates,  i.  e.,  a  divine  agency  “by  which  man 
;  is  made  worthy  of  eternal  life”  (ib. ) ,  and  it  is  in  accordance 
with  this  that  justification  is  to  be  understood.  Forgiveness  is 
therefore  the  object  which  is  attained  through  this  means. 
Thomas  has  indeed  also  designated  forgiveness  as  the  means  of 
'renewal  ( transformation ,  q.  113,  a.  1),  but  in  this  case  he  evi¬ 
dently  uses  the  former  term  as  expressing  the  purpose  of  the  divine 
will  which  precedes  the  entire  process  (vid.  Seeberg,  Duns 
Scotus,  p.  328,  n.  1).  (b)  The  chiefathing  practically  is  the 

infusion  of  grace.  Simultaneously  with  this,  the  will  is  moved  to 
its  acceptance.  He  so  infuses  the  gift  of  justifying  grace,  that 
he  also,  at  the  same  time  with  this,  moves  the  free  will  to  the 
accepting  of  the  gift  of  grace  (ib.  a.  3).  (<r)  The  soul  thus  in¬ 

cited  by  grace  attains  first  to  faith:  “The  first  conversion  to 
God  occurs  through  faith.”  This  faith  (vid.  §  53,  3  b)  would 


GRACE  AND  HUMAN  FREEDOM. 


I  2  I 


be  incomplete  unless  it  were  given  form  ( infomnatus )  by  love 
(ib.  a.  4).  But  faith  is  necessary  to  justification,  because  man 
must  by  it  be  convinced  that  4 ‘God  is  the  justifier  of  men 
through  the  mystery  of  Christ.  ”  (V)  Since,  moreover,  “  justifi¬ 

cation  is  a  certain  movement  ( motus )  by  which  the  human  mind 
is  moved  by  God  from  the  state  of  sin  into  the  state  of  righteous¬ 
ness,”  the  will  must  in  justification  turn  away  from  sin  and  toward 
God  (a.  5).  (e)  The  end  in  view  is  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  but 

in  such  a  way  that  it  is  dependent  upon  the  infused  grace  :  “  For 
by  the  selfsame  act  God  both  grants  grace  and  remits  guilt  ”  (a. 
6,  ad  2) — for  by  far  the  most  important  thing  is  the  infusion  of 
grace  (a.  7).  (/")  Thomas  conceives,  too,  of  this  act  of  justifi¬ 

cation  as  occurring  in  a  moment,  and  not  as  a  continuous 
process.  “The  infusion  of  grace  occurs  in  an  instant  without 
progression,”  and  hence  also  :  “the  justification  of  the  wicked’ 
by  God  occurs  in  an  instant  ”  (a.  7).1  Accordingly,  the  succes¬ 
sion  noted  in  the  various  stages  of  the  process  is  to  be  regarded, 
not  as  temporal,  but  as  logical,  (g)  An  actual  certainty  of 
salvation  is  thus  not  attainable,  since  the  grace  of  God  lies 
beyond  the  sphere  of  human  perception,  and  hence  the  possession 
of*  grace  can  only  be  inferred  co?ijecturaliter  from  good  works 
(q.  1 12,  a.  5).  Justification  is  therefore  the  making  of  a  sinner 
righteous.  Since  sin  in  him  has  been  in  principle  destroyed, 
God  regards  it  as  remitted. 

5.  This  view  of  righteousness  makes  its  aim  not  a  personal  in¬ 
tercourse  with  God,  but  the  making  of  man  capable  of  perform¬ 
ing  good  works.  Hence  it  is  not  faith  which  holds  the  central 
place  in  the  religious  life,  but  love  and  good  works.  Perfect 
faith,  or  the  fides  formata ,  is  bound  up  with  love  in  one  :  “  An 
act  of  faith  is  perfected  and  given  form  (j perficitur  ac  formatur ) 
through  love  ”  (summ.  ii.  ii.  q.  4,  a.  3).  But  love  tests  itself  in 
good  works,  which  are  good  in  so  far  as  they  are  in  accordance 
with  the  divine  commandments.  Thus  man  becomes  righteous. 
“But  righteousness  consists  in  conforming  one’s  self  to  the  rules 
of  the  law.”  For  this  purpose  God  gave  the  law,  that  we  might 
obey  it  (Bonav.  brevil.  5.  9).  But,  at  the  same  time,  there  is 
assured  to  man  by  the  obligatory  law  the  possibility  of  meritori¬ 
ous  conduct  (Bonav.  sent.  iii.  d.  37,  a.  1,  q.  1).  This  brings  us 
to  the  important  conception  of  “  merit.”  As  it  was  the  aim  of 
the  bestowal  of  grace  upon  our  first  parents  in  paradise  to  enable 

1  This  is  established  by  careful  argumentation  in  the  Quaest.  disp.  de  justif. 
a.  9:  Whenever  between  “the  two  termini  of  a  change  ”  there  is  neither  a 
local  movement  nor  a  quantitative  decrease  and  increase,  “  then  the  transi¬ 
tion  from  one  terminus  to  the  other  is  not  (accomplished)  in  time,  but  in  an 
instant.” 


122 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


them  to  perform  meritorious  deeds,  this  is  likewise  the  chief 
object  of  the  grace  infused  into  the  sinner.  “  But  grace  is  prop¬ 
erly  called  an  assistance  divinely  given  toward  meriting,  .  .  . 
for  it,  as  the  root  of  meriting,  antedates  all  merits  ”  (Brevil.  5. 

2) .  Grace  is,  therefore,  “  the  source  ( principium )  of  a  meri¬ 
torious  work”  (Thom.  i.  ii.  q.  109,  a.  6).  The  idea  of  merit 
is  not  to  be  regarded  as  really  applicable  between  God  and  man, 
but  only  upon  the  ground  of  a  divine  appointment,  that  God  will 
reward  the  deeds  for  the  performance  of  which  he  has  himself 
given  the  needed  power  (ib.  q.  114,  a.  1).  But,  since  no  merit 
is  conceivable  without  a  co-operation  of  the  free  will  (ib.  a.  4), 
there  is,  after  all,  a  merit  on  the  part  of  man.  Therefore,  all 
human  works  originating  in  the  grace  of  God  are  merits  in  the 
sight  of  God.  By  them  man  merits  for  himself  eternal  life  and 
an  increase  of  grace  (q.  114,  a.  2,  8,  9.  Bonav.  ii.  d.  27,  a.  2,  q. 

3) .  But  he  can  never,  according  to  Thomas,  merit  the  first 
grace  (firima  gratia,  ib.  a.  5);  for  conduct  is  at  any  time  meri¬ 
torious  only  as  proceeding  from  grace  (q.  109,  a.  6  ;  q.  112,  a. 
2,  ad  1).  Discrimination  is  made  between  the  merit  of  worthi¬ 
ness  ( meritum  condigni  or  de  condigno)  and  the  merit  of  fitness 
( meritum  congrui  ox  de  eongruo).  The  former  term  describes 
the  conduct  in  so  far  as  it  is  purely  a  product  of  grace ;  the 
second,  in  so  far  as  it  results  from  the  exercise  of  free-will. 
Under  the  former  aspect  the  conduct  is,  indeed,  worthy  of  eter¬ 
nal  life  ;  whilst,  regarded  under  the  latter,  it  is  to  be  said  of  it : 
“  For  it  seems  fitting  that  to  the  man  acting  according  to  his 
virtue  God  should  give  recompense  according  to  the  excellence 
of  his  virtue  ”  (q.  114,  a.  3.  Bonav.  ii.  d.  27,  a.  2,  q.  3).  But 
this  discrimination  is,  in  reality,  a  mere  abstraction  ;  concretely, 
merits  exist  only  in  the  form  of  free  actions  (Thom.  a.  4).  The 
Augustinian  idealization  of  the  conception  of  merit  (Vol.  I.,  p. 
365),  which  Thomas  follows,  can  scarcely  be  maintained  in 
practice.  This  may  be  strikingly  observed  in  Bonaventura.  Ac¬ 
cording  to  Thomas,  as  we  have  seen,  a  merit  before  justification 

•  is  inconceivable,  but  afterward  man  may  by  worthiness  ( de  con¬ 
digno')  merit  eternal  life.  According  to  Bonaventura,  a  i(  grace 
gratuitously  given  ”  constitutes  the  beginning  of  the  process  of 
salvation,  forming  a  connecting  link  between  the  “  grace  which 
makes  acceptable  ’  ’  and  the  free  will  (<?.  g. ,  servile  fear,  the  piety 
instilled  by  education,  accidental  impressions  or  words).1  This 
is,  therefore,  the  influencing  of  the  man  through  the  word,  or, 
as  Heinrich  says,  the  calling  ( vocatio )  through  the  external  or 

1  Bonav.  here  uses  the  term  in  a  general  way.  His  specific  conception  of 
it  is  the  same  as  that  of  Thomas.  Vid.  p.  1 1 5  n.  Also,  iv.  d.  7,  a.  1,  q.  3, 
ad  2. 


GRACE  AND  HUMAN  FREEDOM. 


I23 


internal  word  (quodlib.  viii.  q.  5).  So  small,  in  comparison 
with  the  sacrament,  is  the  significance  of  the  word.1  This 
general  influence  makes  man  capable  of  meriting  by  fitness  the 
grace  which  makes  acceptable  {gratia  gratum  fact  efts')  (ii.  dist. 
28,  a.  2,  q.  1  ;  d.  27,  a.  2,  q.  2).  Only  after  the  infusion  of  the 
latter  is  a  merit  of  worthiness  ( condigni )  possible  (ii.  d.  27,  a.  2, 
q.  3;  brevil.  5.  2);  butfurther  grace  can  be  merited  only  by  fitness 
{de  congruo')  (ib.  q.  2  ) .  Without  any  grace,  no  merit  at  all  is  possi¬ 
ble  (d.  27,  a.  2,q.  1,  concl. ),  but  to  the  attainment  of  justification 
man  can,  nevertheless,  dispose  himself  by  fitness.  This,  however, 
points  already  toward  the  later  apprehension  of  the  matter,  accord¬ 
ing  to  which  man  merits  the  grace  which  makes  acceptable  even 
by  fitness,  in  so  far  as  he  does  what  he  should  do,  and,  after  its 
reception,  merits  salvation  by  worthiness  (Biel,  in  sent.  iv.  d.  16, 
q.  2,  a.  3,  dub.  4  :  “  Good  works  morally  performed  without  love 
merit  by  fitness  many  spiritual  good  things  ;  which  is  evident, 
because  they  merit  the  grace  of  justification.”  Also,  ib.  dub.  6  : 

‘  ‘  Every  act  proceeding  from  love  and  grace  in  the  pilgrim  merits 
some  grade  of  essential  happiness.  .  .  .  He  who  works,  merits 
such  a  reward  by  worthiness”).  There  are  thus  two  dominant 
elements  in  the  scholastic  conception  of  grace  :  infused  grace  and 
merit.  The  Augustinian  metaphysics  and  religion  here  woven 
together  with  the  ancient  Western  moralism,  when  strictly  inter¬ 
preted,  destroy  one  another  (vid.  the  meritutti  condigni  in 
Thomas);  in  reality,  they  restrained  and  thereby  supplemented 
one  another.  The  idea  of  merit  was  made  tolerable  by  the 
pious  interpretation  given  to  it  in  the  appeal  to  grace,  and  into 
the  conception  of  grace  was  introduced  through  the  scheme  of 
merits  the  element  which  it  lacked,  i.  e.,  that  of  personal' rela¬ 
tion  to  God.  We  can  scarcely  avoid  the  conclusion  that  this 
vulgar  conception  of  merit  furnished  a  kind  of  corrective  of  the 
scholastic  Augustinian  conception  of  grace.2  Cf.  H.  Schultz, 
d.  sittl.  Begr.  d.  Verdienstes,  Stud.  u.  Krit.  1894,  273  ff. 

1  The  development  of  the  mendicant  orders  increased  the  dogmatic  signifi¬ 
cance  of  the  word.  In  his  writing,  De perfectione  statuum ,  Duns  assigns  to 
the  clergy  the  administration  of  the  sacraments,  and  to  the  mendicant  friars 
the  proclamation  of  the  word,  exalting  the  latter  far  above  the  former.  Vid. 
Seeberg,  Duns  Scotus,  p.  474  ff. 

2  That  in  such  a  scheme  justification,  as  connected  with  faith,  could  be 
brought  only  formally  into  consideration  (as  was  the  case  already  with  Augus¬ 
tine)  is  self-evident  (<?.  g.,  Lomb.  iii.  d.  23  D  :  “  Through  this  faith  the 
wicked  is  justified,  so  that  then  faith  itself  begins  to  work  through  love.” 
Cf.  Robert,  sent.  iv.  14,  and  my  remarks  in  Thomasius  ii.,  ed.  2,  179).  In¬ 
stead  of  being  scandalized  at  this,  we  should  rather  note  it  as  an  evidence  of 
religious  tact,  for  to  what  perversions  would  not  a  theory  of  justification  by 
faith  have  led  when  the  latter  was  regarded  as  merely  an  intellectual  assent 
(  cum  assensione  cogitare )  ? 


124 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


6.  Merit  must  in  the  above  system  logically  have  for  its  corre¬ 
late  the  gaining  of  eternal  life  as  a  reward.  But  as  Thomas  held 
it  to  be  possible  that  one  person  might  by  fitness  merit  eternal 
life  for  another  (i.  ii.  q.  114,  a.  6),  it  was  also  regarded  as  possi¬ 
ble  for  a  man  to  earn  more  merit  than  is  necessary  to  the  attain¬ 
ment  of  salvation.  The  Christian  may  not  only  obey  all  the 
commandments  of  the  gospel,  but  also  observe  its  counsels  (coft- 
s  ilia  evangelic  a).  This  occurs  when  he  entirely  renounces  the 
good  things  of  this  world,  i.  e.,  property,  sensual  pleasure  and 
honor,  and  becomes  a  monk:  “in  which  three  things  is 
founded  the  whole  religion1  which  professes  the  state  of  perfec¬ 
tion  ”  (i.  ii.  q.  108,  a.  4.  Bon.  brev.  5.  9).  Evangelical  per¬ 
fection,  or  the  ideal  Christian  life,  is  thus  realized  in  a  monastic 
life,  or  one  of  similar  character  (ii.  ii.  q.  184,  a.  2,  5  and  4;  cf. 
Bonav.  apol.  pauper,  resp.  1,  c.  3).  This  is  the  perfectio  super¬ 
erogations  (Bon.,  1.  c.),  the  justitia  superabundans  (brev.  5.  9 
fin.).  By  this  means  the  treasure  of  superabundant  works  is 
created  (vid.  sub.),  the  multitude  of  saints  placed  beside  Christ 
as  intercessores  and  mediator es  (Thom.  iii.  suppl.  q.  72,  a.  2), 
and  the  monastic  ideal  of  life  brought  within  the  comprehension 
of  the  common  people. 

It  is,  however,  only  the  one  side  of  the  medieval  ideal  of 
Christian  life  which  finds  explanation  in  the  light  of  the  concep¬ 
tion  of  merit  then  prevalent.  Starting  with  the  conception  of 
grace,  we  discover  another  ideal,  that  of  a  supernatural 
“  heavenly  ’  *  life.  If  the  new  disposition  ( habitus )  of  grace  in  the 
soul  is  the  true  life,  it  is  incumbent  to  root  out  and  destroy  the 
old  soul  (heart)  with  all  its  powers.  It  is  by  the  path  of  an  as¬ 
cetic  “  imitation  of  Christ  ”  that  we  are  to  reach  the  enjoyment 
•of  partnership  in  his  divinity.  The  active  life  (vita  activa')  is 
followed  by  the  contemplative  (vita  contemplativa ).  To  give 
vivid  expression  to  this  conception  was  the  task  of  German  Mys¬ 
ticism.  We  therefore  postpone  its  consideration  to  the  follow¬ 
ing  period.  We  desire,  however,  at  this  point  to  direct  special 
attention  to  the  connection  of  this  ideal  of  life  with  the  medie¬ 
val  conception  of  grace. 

§  58.  The  Sacrame?its  and  the  Church.  Fixing  of  Dogma  of 

Seven  Sacraments. 

Cf.  Schwane,  DG.  der  mittl.  Zt.,  p.  579  ff.  Hahn,  Die  Lehre  von  den 
Sacramenten,  1864.  Schanz,  Die  Lehre  von  den  Sacramenten,  1893. 

The  doctrine  of  the  sacraments  received  during  this  period  the 
form  in  which  it  was  afterward  dogmatically  fixed  by  Pope 

1  In  the  medieval  sense,  i.  <?.,  Monasticism,  Order. 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


I25 


Eugene  IV.  at  the  Florentine  Council  of  A.  D.  1439  (vid.  the 
Bull,  Exultate  deo,  in  Mansi  xxxi.  1055  ff. ;  also  Mirbt,  Quellen 
z.  Gesch.  d.  Papstt. ,  p.  100  ff.).  We  shall  be  compelled,  there¬ 
fore,  to  follow  the  development  of  the  doctrine  somewhat  be¬ 
yond  the  limits  of  our  period,  citing  at  once  from  the  definitions 
of  the  bull. 

1.  (a)  The  sacraments  constitute  the  positive  product  of  the 
work  of  Christ.  Since  the  salvation  of  mankind  is  dependent 
upon  the  passion  of  Christ,  and  that  of  the  individual  upon  the 
sacraments,  it  is  clear  “  that  the  sacraments  oi  the  new  law  must 
have  their  whole  efficacy  from  the  passion  of  Christ”  (Thom, 
summ.  iii.  q.  62,  a.  5.  Alex.  summ.  th.  iv.  q.  8,  membr.  3,  a. 
5,  §  7.  Cf.  Biel,  sent.  iv.  dist.  2,  q.  1,  a.  3).  That  the  num¬ 
ber  of  the  sacraments  is  seven  is  considered  self-evident.1  The 
necessity  of  this  is  argued  in  various  ways.  The  Christian  life, 
it  is  said,  is  allied  in  character  to  the  development  of  the  body, 
and,  therefore,  needs  a  sacrament  of  generation  (baptism),  one 
of  growth  (confirmation),  one  of  nourishment  (the  eucharist). 
Then  come  the  healing  of  daily  sins  (repentance)  and  the  removal 
of  the  remains  of  sin  (unction).  From  the  social  nature  of 
men  is  deduced  the  necessity  for  marriage  as  a  means  of  sancti¬ 
fying  the  process  of  propagation,  and  for  ordination  as  empower¬ 
ing  those  who  receive  it  to  lead  the  people  (vid.  Thom.  ib.  q. 
65,  a.  1  ;  and,  further,  in  Bon.  brev.  6.  3.  Cf.  Duns,  sent.  iv. 
d.  2,  q.  1,  §  3.  Biel,  iv.  d.  2,  q.  1,  a.  1).  But  baptism  and 
the  eucharist  are  the  “  most  powerful  sacraments”  (Thom.  q. 
62,  a.  5).  According  to  some,  they  alone  were  instituted  imme¬ 
diately  by  Christ  (Alex.  iv.  q.  8,  membr.  3,  a.  2,  §  3.  Bon. 
iv.  d.  23,  a.  1,  q.  2),  while,  at  a  later  period,  all  the  seven  were 
traced  back  to  a  direct  institution  by  Christ  (e.  g.,  Albert,  sent, 
iv.  d.  23,  a.  13.  Thom.  q.  64,  a.  2.  Duns,  iv.  d.  2,  q.  1,  § 
4,  5.  Biel,  iv.  d.  2,  q.  1,  concl.  2). 

(£)  Thomas  defines  the  sacrament  as  “the  sign  of  a  sacred 
thing,  since  it  is  (a  means  of)  sanctifying  men”  (q.  60, 
a.  2);  Bonaventura,  as  “sensible  signs  divinely  instituted  as 
medicaments,  in  which,  under  cover  of  things  sensible,  divine 
power  very  mysteriously  ( secretius )  acts”  (brev.  6.  1;  cf. 
Augustine,  doctr.  christ.  ii.  1).  The  sensible  sign  becomes  a 
real  sacrament,  however,  only  when  it  is  administered  with  the 
intentio  of  producing  by  it  a  supramundane  effect,  or  at  least  “  to 
do  what  the  church  does,  or,  at  all  events,  what  Christ  has 

1  The  Third  Lateran  Council,  A.  D.  1179,  still  speaks  of  burial,  the  installa¬ 
tion  of  bishops,  and  “  other  sacraments,”  Hefele,  v.  7r3-  A  Council  at  Lon¬ 
don,  A.  D.  1237,  enumerates  the  seven  as  the  “  principal  sacraments,” 
Hefele,  v.  1056. 


126 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


appointed”  (Bon.  sent.  iv.  d.  6,  p.  2,  a.  2,  q.  i).1  The  sen¬ 
sible  elements  {res  sensibiles )  constitute  the  materia  of  the  sacra¬ 
ment ;  the  words  of  institution,  its  forma;  i.  e.,  through  the 
recitation  of  the  words  the  sacrament  is  observed  ( perficitur ) 
(Thom.  q.  60,  a.  7.  Alex.  iv.  q.  8,  m.  3,  a.  2).  Accordingly, 
Eugene  IV.  defines  :  ‘ ‘  All  these  sacraments  are  observed  by 
three  things,  viz.,  by  the  elements  as  the  materia ,  the  words  as 
the  forma ,  and  the  person  of  the  minister  administering  the 
sacrament  with  the  intentio  of  doing  what  the  church  does — of 
which,  if  anyone  be  wanting,  the  sacrament  is  not  observed.” 

{c)  There  are  therefore  together  in  the  sacrament  an  external 
sign  and  grace.  How  are  these  two  related  ?  Hugo  had  framed 
the  formula  which  practically  gave  direction  to  the  solution  of 
the  problem:  “The  sign  contains  the^grace  ”  (supra,  p.  80). 
This  Thomas  recognizes  as  “  not  unsuitably  ”  expressed  (q.  62, 
a.  3,  ad  3).  He  is  also  of  the  opinion  that  a  causation  of  grace 
{gratiam  cans  are')  may  be  predicated  of  the  sacrament  (ib.  a.  1), 
but  he  feels  too  the  difficulty.  If  grace  originated  from  God, 
how  can  it  be  effected  through  created  objects  ?  He  sought  to 
overcome  the  difficulty  by  discriminating  between  the  principal 
and  the  instrumental  cause,  the  latter  (and  thus  the  sacraments) 
being  efficacious  as  set  in  motion  by  the  former.  “And  in  this 
manner  is  there  spiritual  power  in  the  sacraments,  in  so  far  as 
they  are  appointed  by  God  for  (producing)  spiritual  effect.” 
The  words  of  institution  effect  a  spiritual  efficacy  ( virtus )  in  the 
external  sign,  which  resides  in  the  latter  until  this  virtus  has 
accomplished  its  end  (ib.  a.  1  and  4). 2 3  But  over  against  this 
view  stands  another  throughout  the  whole  period  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  It  appears  plainly  in  Bonaventura  (also  in  Richard). 
We  dare  not  say  that  the  sacraments  contain  grace.  This  dwells 
only  in  the  human  soul.  The  sacrament  is  in  itself  a  symbol, 
somewhat  like  a  letter  with  the  royal  seal.  There  exists  how¬ 
ever  a  covenant  ( pactio )  of  God,  that  he  will  accompany  the 
use  of  this  sacrament  with  his  own  working  upon  the  soul  of  the 
recipient.  Thus  regarded,  it  can  be  positively  said  of  the 
sacrament  only  that  it,  by  inciting  faith,  prepares  for  the  recep¬ 
tion  of  grace  ( “  the  motion  of  faith  is  excited  through  the 
exhibition  of  the  sign  ”).  The  infusion  of  grace  results  through 

1  Duns  discusses  this  point  exhaustively.  Report.  Paris,  iv.  d.  6,  q.  6. 

Cf.  Biel,  iv.  d.  6,  a.  2,  concl.  5. 

3  Cf.  Alex,  iv  q.  8,  m.  3,  a.  5>  $  1  :  “  Power  ( virtus )  wonderfully  asso¬ 

ciated  with  (, collata )  the  corporal  agent  itself.”  $  5  :  “Consecration  ( sane - 
tifeatio)  is  something  coming  to  the  water  or  oil,  and  it  does  not  give  sub¬ 
stantial  existence  ( esse  substantiate')  to  the  oil  or  water,  but  it  gives  accidental 
existence”  ( esse  accidentale). 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


I27 


a  directly  creative  act  of  God  in  the  soul,  i.  e.  :  “By  such 
covenant  the  Lord  has  obligated  himself  to,  in  some  way,  give 
grace  to  him  who  receives  the  sacrament  ”  (Bon.  sent.  iv.  d.  1, 
p.  1,  a.  1,  q.  2,  3,  4 ;  brev.  6.  1).  This  view,  through  its 
advocacy  by  Duns  Scotus,  became  the  dominant  one  in  the 
later  Middle  Ages.  Since  God  alone  has  power  to  create,  grace 
can  have  only  ah  act  of  God  as  its  direct  cause.  The  sacra¬ 
ments  are  “sure  signs,”  since  the  divine  covenant  with  the 
church  makes  a  concomitance  of  the  divine  working  certain. 
“The  divine  will  alone  is  the  invisible  cause  of  the  effect 
which  the  sacrament  seals  and  accompanies.  God  therefore  is 
the  immediate  cause  of  such  effect  of  the  sacrament  through  his 
assistance  to  the  sacrament,  upon  which  he  has  arranged  always 
to  bestow  assistance  and  confer  grace  .  .  .  and  thus  his  will 
alone  is  the  prime  and  principal  invisible  cause  of  this  effect  ” 
(report,  iv.  d.  2,  q.  1,  §  2).  We  cannot  say  “that  he  binds 
his  power  to  the  sacraments”  (sent.  iv.  d.  14,  q.  4,  6).  Ac¬ 
cordingly,  the  external  sign  “  signifies”  that  which  the  accom¬ 
panying  grace  inwardly  effects  in  the  recipient,  as,  e.  g. ,  in  the  case 
of  baptism,  purification  :  “  But  the  cleansing  of  the  soul  from  sin 
which  it  certainly  signifies,  it  represents  by  divine  appointment ; 
from  which  (it  follows  that)  God,  who  instituted  baptism, 
assists  his  sign  to  the  producing  of  the  represented  effect  ”  (Biel, 
iv.  d.  1,  q.  1,  a.  1  ;  cf.  Durand,  iv.  d.  1,  q.  4,  a.  1).  This 
view  reminds  us  distinctly  of  the  Augustinian  origin  of  the  defini¬ 
tion  of  a  sacrament,  being  in  reality  a  remnant  of  Augustinianism 
in  the  Franciscan  dogmatics  :  the  external  sacrament  is  in  and 
of  itself  only  an  image  of  that  which  God  works  in  the  soul.1  It 
was  certainly  only  by  artifice  that  transubstantiation  could  be 
maintained  under  such  a  definition.  Of  the  two  views  noted, 
the  church  naturally  chose  the  coarser.  Eugene  IV.  writes  : 
“  They  (the  ancient  sacraments)  did  not  cause  grace  .  .  .  but 
these  of  ours  both  contain  grace  and  confer  it  upon  those  worthily 
receiving  them.  ’  ’ 

(d)  The  sacraments  bring  to  man  justifying  grace  (gratia 
justificans ,  Thom.  q.  62,  a.  6).  “By  sacramental  effect  I 
understand  the  grace  making  acceptable,  which  he  secures  who 
receives  the  sacrament  not  unworthily  ”  (Biel,  iv.  d.  1,  q.  1,  a. 
2).  Thomas  here  discriminated  between  the  “  grace  of  powers 
and  gifts”  and  “sacramental  grace,”  inasmuch  as  the  former 

1  Thomas  had  already  pointed  out  the  possible  consequence  of  this  view  : 
“  According  to  this,  the  sacraments  of  the  New  Testament  would  be  nothing 
more  than  signs  of  grace,  although  it  is  held  by  many  authorities  of  the  saints 
that  the  sacraments  of  the  New  Testament  not  only  signify  but  cause  fausanf) 
grace”  (iii.  q.  62,  a.  i). 


128 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


complete  in  a  general  way  the  nature  and  powers  of  the  sou’ ; 
while  the  separate  sacraments  produce  special  effects  (q.  62,  a. 
2  ;  q.  89,  a.  1  ;  vid.  also  Bonav.  iv.  d.  1,  p.  1,  a.  1,  q.  6). 
Later  theologians  acknowledged  the  essential  identity  of  all  gratia 
gratum  fciciens  :  “  That  there  is  one  and  the  same  grace  in  kind 
in  all  who  have  grace,  whether  this  be  infused  through  partici¬ 
pation  in  the  sacraments,  or  through  merits  acquired,  or,  even 
without  either,  gratuitously  infused.  ’  ’  The  difference  existing  is 
“  only  in  the  mind  {rati one')  and  not  in  reality  nor  in  essence  ” 
(Biel,  iv.  d.  2,  q.  1,  a.  3,  dub.  2  ;  vid.  already  Alex.  iv.  q.  8,m.  4, 
a.  2,  §  1).  But  the  sacraments  impart  not  only  justifying  grace. 
To  those  which  are  administered  but  once  is  attributed  as  a  “sec¬ 
ondary  effect”  the  impartation  of  spiritual  character  {character 
spiritualis)  which  makes  man  continuously  capable  of  honoring 
God  according  to  the  manner  of  the  Christian  religion  (Thom, 
q.  63,  a.  1,  2).  And,  inasmuch  as  this  involves  a  certain 
participation  in  the  priesthood  of  Christ,  which  is  eternal,  this 
“character”  attaches  to  the  soul  “indelibly”  (ib.  a.  5). 
The  “character”  is  therefore  the  indestructible  habitual  dis¬ 
position  of  the  Christian  soul — and  that  “according  to  the  in¬ 
tellectual  part — toward  those  things  which  are  for  the  promotion 
of  divine  worship  ”  (a.  4,  5.  Alex.  iv.  q.  8,  m.  3,  4.  Bonav.  iv. 
d.  6,  p.  1,  a.  1,  q.  3,  5).  Duns  located  the  character  in  the 
will  (iv.  d.  6,  q.  n,  §  4).  But  the  conception  is  so  lacking  in 
clearness  that  we  are  led  to  infer  that  Duns  (iv.  d.  6,  q.  9,  §  13), 
as  well  as  Biel,  still  entertains  serious  doubts  upon  the  point. 
Neither  reason  nor  the  authorities  demand  it,  and  only  one 
passage  of  Innocent  III.1  can  be  cited  in  its  favor,  and  even  this 
Biel  thinks  can  be  differently  interpreted  (Duns,  iv.  d.  6,  q.  9, 
§  13  f.  Biel,  iv.  d.  6,  q.  2,  a.  1,  concl.  2).  But  Eugene  IV. 
elevated  this  point  also  to  the  dignity  of  a  dogma  of  the  church  : 
“Among  these  sacraments  there  are  three  which  imprint  a 
character ,  i.  e.,  a  certain  spiritual  mark  {signum)  distinctive  from 
others,  indelibly  upon  the  soul.  Whence,  they  are  not  repeated 
in  the  same  person.” 

{e)  Only  one  further  question  concerning  the  sacraments  in 
general  remains  to  be  considered — touching  the  worthy  or 
unworthy  reception  of  them.  It  is  involved  in  the  conception 
of  the  New  Testament  sacraments,  that  they  are  effectual  exopere 
operato ,  i.  e.,  through  their  objective  administration.  Thus 
teaches  Alexander  (iv.  q.  8,  m.  4,  a.  1)  and  especially  Albert 
(sent.  iv.  d.  1,  a.  1)  and  all  the  later  writers,  e.  g.,  Bonaven- 

1  Vid.  the  passage  in  Denzinger,  Enchiridion  symbolor.  et  definit.  n.  341, 
342;  cf.  Duns,  1.  c.  :  “Therefore  solely  upon  the  authority  of  the  church, 
running  up  to  the  present  time,  it  is  to  be  held  that  character  is  imprinted.” 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


I29 


tura  :  “The  sacraments  of  the  New  Testament  justify  and  con¬ 
fer  grace  of  themselves  ex  opere  operato  ”  (iv.  d.  1,  p.  1,  a.  1, 
q.  5).  A  certain  disposition  is  indeed  desired  in  the  recipient, 
perhaps  faith  (Lombard,  iv.  d.  4,  B.  Bonav.  iv.  d.  1,  p.  1,  a. 
1,  q.  2);  but  the  later  writers  especially  confined  themselves  to 
the  requirement,  that  there  be  no  obstacle  ( obex )  nor  mortal  sin. 
As  an  opus  operatum ,  the  sacrament  did  not  presuppose  a  good 
inner  motive  ( bonus  motus  interior )  as  necessary  to  a  profitable 
reception.  Precisely  this  was  one  mark  of  distinction  from  the 
Old  Testament  sacraments  (Duns,  iv.  d.  1,  q.  6,  §  10).  With 
this  efficacy  ex  opere  operato  is  contrasted  that  based  upon  the 
personality  or  action  of  the  participant  (ex  opere  operante'). 
That  is  to  say,  if  the  recipient  prepares  himself  for  the  reception 
of  the  sacrament,  he  receives  also  as  a  reward,  upon  the  ground 
of  this  merit,  a  further  gracious  influence.  “  Any  sign  may  be 
understood  to  confer  grace  in  a  two-fold  way.  This  occurs  in 
one  way  by  the  sign  itself  or  the  sacrament,  or,  as  some  say,  by 
the  deed  performed,  ex  opere  operato .  Thus  by  the  very  fact 
that  the  work  (opus'),  i.  e.,  sign  or  sacrament,  is  celebrated 
(exhibetu?') ,  grace  is  conferred  unless  an  obstacle  of  mortal 
sin  hinder ;  because,  besides  the  celebration  (exhibitio)  of  the 
sign  externally  celebrated,  a  good  inner  motive  is  not  required 
in  the  recipient  by  which  he  may  merit  grace  by  worthiness  or 
fitness,  but  it  suffices  that  the  recipient  interpose  no  obstacle. 

.  .  .  In  another  way,  signs  or  sacraments  are  understood  to 
confer  grace  by  the  one  performing  the  work  (ex  opere  operante) 
and  by  the  way  of  merit,  i.  e.,  that  the  sacrament  externally 
celebrated  does  not  suffice  for  the  conferring  of  grace,  but 
beyond  this  is  required  a  good  motive,  or  inner  devotion,  of  the 
one  receiving  the  sacrament,  according  to  whose  intention  grace 
is  conferred  corresponding  to  the  merit  of  worthiness  or  fitness, 
precisely,  and  not  more,  according  to  the  celebration  of  the 
sacrament  ”  (Biel,  iv.  d.  1,  q.  3,  a.  1,  n.  2). 

2.  Turning  to  the  separate  sacraments,  we  begin  with  Bap¬ 
tism.  The  material  (materia)  of  this  sacrament  is  water,  or, 
more  precisely  speaking,  washing  with  water.1  The  form  (forma) 
consists  in  the  words  :  “I  baptize  thee  in  the  name  of  the  Father, 
and  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost.  ’  ’  From  the  time  of  Alexan¬ 
der  the  effects  of  baptism  were  more  precisely  stated  than  had  been 
done  by  the  Lombard.  It  is  said  to  impart  the  grace  making 
acceptable  (gratia  gratum  faciens),  and  this  impartation  effects 
both  a  capacitating  of  the  soul  for  the  doing  of  good  and  the 

1  Duns,  iv.  d.  3,  q.  3,  $  2  :  “  The  first  thing  is  the  visible  washing  itself,  for 
this,  together  with  the  words  as  a  sign,  signifies  the  first  effect  of  baptism.” 

9 


130 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


forgiveness  of  guilt  and  penalty.1  “  He  who  is  baptized  is  freed 
from  the  guilt  (liability,  reatus')  of  the  entire  penalty  owed  by 
him  for  his  sins  ”  (Thom.  summ.  iii.  q.  69,  a.  2),  and  “  through 
baptism  one  secures  grace  and  powers”  ( virtutes ,  ib.  a.  4). 
“  From  all  eternal  (penalty)  baptism  absolves  by  destroying  all 
sin  ( culpa)' '  and  ‘ ‘  grace  has  a  two-fold  action,  viz. ,  to  destroy  sin 
( peccatum )  and  to  make  apt  for  good  ”  (Bonav.  sent.  iv.  d.  4,  p. 

1,  a.  1,  q.  2  and  3).  By  it  there  is  effected  at  the  same  time  a 
restraint  of  concupiscence  (Lomb.  iv.  d.  4  F  ;  ii.  d.  32  A. 
Duns,  iv.  d.  4,  q.  7,  §  1).  Finally,  baptism  imparts  the  spiritual 
li  character,”  which  is  to  be  thought  of  as  an  infused  disposition 
{habitus  inf  usus) .  According  to  this  theory,  in  baptism  grace 
is  infused  into  the  sinner,  and  this  grace  blots  out  the  sins  of  the 
past  and  weakens  the  sinful  impulses  of  the  recipient.  But  as 
these  impulses  still  remain  active,  there  remain  also  for  the  bap¬ 
tized  the  punishments  ( poenalitates )  of  the  present  life  (Thom, 
q.  69,  a.  3).  Both  serve  for  testing  and  attesting.  Precisely 
the  same  gifts  are  granted  in  infant  baptism,  any  difficulties  sug¬ 
gesting  themselves  in  this  case  being  met  by  the  consideration, 
that  baptism  confers  not  separate  virtues,  but  the  habitus  virtu- 
tum  (Thom.  q.  69,  a.  6).  To  secure  the  benefits  of  baptism, 
faith  is  required  in  the  recipient.  In  the  case  of  unbelievers 
( Jictio ),  the  benefit  is  secured  when  they  have  done  penance  for 
their  unbelief  (Thom.  q.  69,  a.  10.  Bonav.  iv.  d.  4,  p.  1,  a. 

2,  q.  2  f . ) .  In  the  case  of  children,  an  obligation  imposed 
upon  the  sponsors  to  see  to  their  instruction  in  the  Christian 
faith  takes  the  place  of  the  yet  lacking  confession  of  faith 
(Lomb.  iv.  d.  6  G.  Bonav.  iv.  d.  6,  p.  2,  a.  3,  q.  i).2 
Eugene  IV.  defines  as  the  effect  of  the  sacrament  :  “  the  remis¬ 
sion  of  all  original  and  actual  sin,  also  of  every  penalty  which  is 
due  for  that  sin.” 

3.  There  is  no  advance  in  the  doctrine  of  later  Scholastics 
upon  the  sacrament  of  Confirmation  ;  for  the  assertion  that  it 
was  instituted  by  Christ  (<?.  g.,  Albert,  iv.  d.  7,  a.  2),  and  the 
attempt  to  justify  the  restriction  of  the  right  of  administering 
this  sacrament  to  the  bishop  by  all  manner  of  fanciful  reasons,  do 

1  Duns,  iv.  d.  3,  q.  2,  $  3  :  “  God  .  .  .  remits  the  sin  of  no  one  except  of 
him  to  whom  he  gives  grace,  for  he  frees  no  one  from  perdition  except  him 
whom  he  ordains  to  be  a  son  of  the  kingdom.”  Also,  ib.  iv.  d.  4,  q.  5,  $  4  : 
(God)  “is  prepared  always  after  the  reception  of  this  sign  to  assist  him  who 
has  received  it  for  the  causing  of  its  effect.” 

2  Baptism  is  preceded  by  catechisation  and  exorcism  (Lomb.  iv.  d.  6  H. 
Thom.  iii.  q.  71,  a.  1,  2).  The  baptism  of  the  children  of  non-Christian 
parents,  without  or  against  the  will  of  the  latter,  was  disapproved  by  Thomas 
(q.  68,  a.  10),  approved  by  Duns  (iv.  d.  4,  q.  9),  and  declared  of  doubtful 
propriety  by  Biel  (iv.  d.  4,  q.  2,  a.  3,  dub.  5). 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


I3I 

not  constitute  an  advance.  Eugene  IV.  designates  the  chrism 
as  the  material ,  and  as  the  form  of  the  sacrament,  the  words  :  “I 
sign  thee  with  the  sign  of  the  cross,  and  confirm  thee  in  the 
chrism  of  salvation  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  ’  ’  etc.  The  proper 
administrator  ( or  dinar ius  minister)  is  the  bishop.  “But  the 
effect  of  this  sacrament  is,  that  in  it  is  given  the  Holy  Spirit  and 
strength.” 

4.  “All  worship  in  the  church  is,  as  it  were,  iif  line  (in 
■ordine)  toward  this  sacrament.”  These  words  of  Duns  (iv.  d. 
8,  q.  1,  3)  spoken  in  reference  to  the  Lord’s  Supper,  express 
the  practical  significance  of  this  sacrament.  The  doctrine  was 
received  in  completed  form  from  the  great  Scholastics.  The 
only  task  remaining  for  the  present  period  was  to  make  the  tra¬ 
ditional  dogma  somewhat  more  acceptable  to  reason  by  the  arts 
of  logic,  and  more  conformable  to  the  spiritual  tastes  of  the  age. 
Here  also,  Alexander  suggested  essentially  the  ideas  and  problems 
which  later  writers  accepted.  The  fixed  basis  of  all  discussion 
was  transubstantiation.  When  the  priest  utters  the  form-giving 
words  of  institution  above  the  materia ,  or  elements,  the  latter 
are  in  their  entirety  transformed  into  the  entire  body  of  Christ. 
“  The  whole  wafer  (Jiostia)  is  actually  changed  into  the  whole 
body  of  Christ”  (Alex.  iv.  q.  40,  m.  3,  a.  5).  This  concep¬ 
tion  may  be  analyzed  as  follows  : 

( a )  The  words  of  institution,  as  they  are  spoken  by  the  priest, 
effect  the  transformation  :  “  Whence  also  the  consecrating  power 
( virtus  consecrativa)  consists  not  only  in  the  words  themselves,  but 
also  in  the  power  conferred  upon  the  priest  at  his  consecration 
and  ordination  ”  (Thom.  summ.  iii.  q.  82,  a.  1,  ad  1).  Thomas 
is  of  the  opinion  “  that  in  the  formal  words  of  this  sacrament  a 
certain  power  ( virtus )  is  created  for  effecting  the  conversion  of 
this  sacrament  ”  (q.  78,  a.  4).  According  to  Duns,  it  is,  in 
reality,  only  the  divine  omn;potence  which  can  effect  the  change. 
But  God  has  appointed  the  priest  as  the  administrator  (Duns,  iv. 
d.  13,  q.  2,  3).  “  This  is  according  to  gospel  law,  and  not  only 

according  to  positive  law”  (Duns,  report,  iv.  d.  13,  q.  2).1 

1  It  is  only  with  great  difficulty  that  a  place  can  be  made  for  transubstantia¬ 
tion  in  the  Scotist  view  of  the  sacraments.  The  “sensible  signs  ”  testify  that 
the  things  signified  are  really  “  contained  under  them.”  Further:  “God 
has  so  established  these  elements  that  after  their  consecration  he  may  assist 
them  to  (the  securing  of)  this  presence  of  Christ”  (iv.  d.  8,  q.  1,  2  ff. ).  But 
for  what  purpose  then  the  transubstantiation  ?  Would  it  not  be  in  keeping 
with  the  general  conception  of  a  sacrament  to  maintain  only  an  accompanying 
of  the  symbol  with  an  exercise  of  divine  power,  either  in  such  a  way  that  a 
divine  influence  be  exerted  directly  upon  the  soul,  or  in  such  a  way  that  Christ 
be  bodily  present  without  affecting  the  continued  existence  of  the  substance  of 
the  bread?  It  was  an  adductive  instead  of  a productive  transubstantiation,  as 


i32 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


(£)  The  transformation  occurs  in  the  moment  when  the  words 
are  spoken  :  “  At  the  end  of  the  utterance  of  the  words  the  sac¬ 
rament  begins  to  be”  (Duns,  iv.  d.  8,  q.  i,  5).  It  is  a  pecu¬ 
liar  advantage  of  this  sacrament  that  it  is  realized  not  only  in 
the  administration  ( in  usu ),  but  already  in  the  consecration  of 
the  elements  (Thom.  q.  78,  a.  1). 

(<r)  The  resultant  of  the  transformation  is  the  presence  of  the 
true  body  and  blood  of  Christ  (Thom.  q.  75,  a.  1),  the  soul  of 
Christ  and  his  divinity  being  present,  not  by  way  of  sacramental 
power  ( ex  vi  sacramentali') ,  but  by  way  of  real  concomitance 
(ex  reali  concomitantia )  (ib.  q.  76,  a.  1.  Alex.  iv.  d.  38,  m. 
5).  On  the  basis  of  this,  justification  was  found  for  the  con¬ 
stantly  extending  custom  of  withholding  the  cup  from  the  laity 
(vid.  Thom.  q.  80,  a.  12.  Alex.  iv.  q.  32,  m.  1,  a.  2). 

(d)  The  accidents  of  the  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine 
still  remain,  which  is,  indeed,  a  new  miracle  (Alex.  iv.  q.  40, 

m.  1,  a.  2.  Thom.  q.  75,  a.  5).1  So  long  as  the  form  ( species )  of' 
the  bread  and  wine  is  retained,  the  sacrament  continues.  Hence 
the  advocates  of  this  theory  did  not  even  shrink  from  the  conclu¬ 
sion,  that  even  if  a  dog  or  a  mouse  should  eat  the  hostia,  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  Christ  would  remain  in  it  (Abelard.  Thom.  q.  8,  a.  3* 

ad.  3.  Cf.,  as  to  the  course  pursued  in  distributing,  Hefele,  CG. 
vi.  203). 

(e)  The  body  which  Christ  gave  to  his  disciples  was  the  im¬ 
mortal  glorified  body,  and  of  this  he  himself  partook  as  an  ex¬ 
ample  for  his  disciples.  “  And,  nevertheless,  he  who  as  mortal 
gave,  and  as  immortal  was  given,  was  not  himself  two,  but  one  ’  ’ 
(thus  Hugo.  Vid.  especially  Alex.  iv.  q.  44,  m.  1  and  3.  Thom, 
q.  81,  a.  1  and  3). 2 

* 

Duns  Scotus  says.  Alexander  already  suggests  the  latter  theory  ( “  That  in  this 
sacrament  there  is  not  any  transformation,  but,  upon  the  utterance  of  the  words, 
without  any  transformation,  it  comes  to  pass  by  divine  power  that  the  body  of 
Christ  is  there  ” ).  He  suggests  as  an  objection,  that  this  view  might  lead  to  a 
worship  of  the  bread,  iv .  q.  38,  m.  I .  Such  was  the  view  also  of  some  followers 
of  Berenger  (vid.  p.  75  n.  Cf.  also  Petr.  Pictav.  sent.  v.  12),  and  Duns  (iv.  d. 
11,  T  3>  3  f-)>  wh°  presents  this  explanation  as  a  possible  one,  and  merely 
says  in  comment:  “Therefore  the  other  way  is  more  suitable  than  this.” 
But  to  this  theory  belongs  the  future,  as  we  shall  see.  Duns  continued  to 
maintain  transubstantiation  only  because  it  was  a  dogma  of  the  church.  See- 
BERG,  Duns  Scotus,  p.  382  ff. 

1  Although  it  is  said  that  the  substance  of  the  bread  and  wine  do  not  re¬ 
main  ( non  jnanere),\.Y\t  term  anmhilatio  was  avoided,  inasmuch  as  the  resultant 
is  the  body  of  Christ.  Vid.  Thom.  q.  75,  a.  2,  3.  Duns,  iv.  d.  11,  q.  4,  14. 
Biel,  iv.  d.  11,  q.  1,  a.  2,  dub.  6.  Occam,  iv.  q.  6,  ad  dub.  7. 

2  Biel  says  that  Christ  gave  to  his  disciples  a  “  body  such  as  he  had,  i.  e.y 
mortal  and  passible,”  without  feeling  the  “  teeth  of  those  eating  it  ”  (iv.  d. 
9,  q.  I,  a.  3,  dub.  3).  From  the  other  view  it  would  follow,  that  if  the  hostia r. 
of  the  first  celebration  had  been  preserved,  Christ  would  have  been,  during  the.. 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


I33 


(/)  But  at  this  point  a  difficulty  emerges  whose  solution  exer¬ 
cised  the  Scholastics  beyond  all  others  :  If  the  body  of  Christ  is,  as 
is  confessed,  present  in  heaven  at  a  particular  place,  how  can  it  be 
received  at  the  same  time  in  the  sacrament  at  various  places?  Alex¬ 
ander’s  opinion  was  that  “  Christ  is  circumscriptively,  or  locally, 
contained  in  heaven,  but  not  contained  circumscriptively,  or 
locally,  under  the  sacrament  ”  (iv.  q.  40,  m.  3,  a.  7).  Thomas 
similarly  taught  “  that  the  body  of  Christ  is  in  this  sacrament  in 
the  manner  of  substance  {per  modum  substantia ),  and  not  in  the 
manner  of  quantity  {per  modum  quantitatis')  ”  (q.  76,  a.  1,  ad  3). 
The  Christ  who  is  locally  present  in  heaven  is,  therefore,  not 
present  in  a  local  manner  in  the  sacrament,  but  only  substantially 
(q.  75,  a.  1,  ad  3  ;  q.  76,  a.  4,  5;  cf.  Richard,  iv.  d.  10, 
princ.  2,  q.  1.  Durand,  iv.  d.  10,  q.  10  fin.;  vid.  also  Carthu¬ 
sian.  iv.  d.  10,  q.  iff.).  Duns  rightly  rejected  this,  since  a 
thing  without  its  properties  is  not  conceivable  (iv.  d.  10,  q.  1. 
12).  Duns  himself  thinks  that  God,  by  virtue  of  his  omnipo¬ 
tence,  which  is  limited  only  by  the  logically  impossible,  can  very 
well  cause  a  body  to  exist  at  different  places  at  the  same  time. 
We  cannot  see,  he  argues,  why  the  relations  of  a  thing  to  space 
may  not  be  multiplied  (ib.  q.  2.  11  ;  q.  3.  5).  Accordingly, 
Christ  can  be  at  the  same  time  in  heaven  and  at  any  number  of 
places.  The  later  writers  disputed  this,  for  its  (realistic)  pre¬ 
mise  is  the  independent  existence  of  space,  while  to  the  Nomi¬ 
nalists  space  is  only  the  object  presented  as  occupying  space, 
upon  which  theory  a  spacial  existence  of  Christ  in  the  Lord’s 
Supper  is  inconceivable.  It  is  rather  to  be  said,  that  quantity 
and  the  property  of  occupying  space  are  accidental  properties  of 
a  thing.  If  the  thing  be  reduced  to  a  point,  it  yet  remains  what 
it  was,  and,  therefore,  still  possesses  the  property  of  occupying 
space,  although  it  no  longer  exists  in  space.  It  is,  therefore,  to 
be  said  that  the  body  of  Christ  is  present  in  the  Lord’s  Supper 
with  the  property  of  quantity,  but  without  existing  therein  as  a 
quantity  (vid.  especially  Occam,  tract,  de  sacr.  altar,  c.  16  ff. 
Biel,  iv.  d.  10,  q.  1,  a  1  and  2.  Cf.  fuller  discussion  at  a  later 
point).  But  these  empty  speculations,  all  combined,  do  not 
prove  the  impossible.  The  body  of  Christ  is  local  in  heaven, 
and  it  is  in  its  entirety  present  in  its  substance  at  every  celebra¬ 
tion  of  the  Lord’s  Supper.  Dogma  stands  over  against  dogma, 
and  all  the  efforts  of  logic  cannot  bridge  the  gulf. 

{g)  Finally,  the  effect  of  this  sacrament  claims  attention.  In 
general,  it  is  to  be  said  :  “  The  effect  which  the  passion  of  Christ 

three  days  after  his  crucifixion,  both  dead  and  alive  at  once  !  (Biel,  exposit. 
canonis  miss.  lect.  46  L). 


I34 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


has  produced  in  the  world,  this  sacrament  produces  in  man 
(Thom.  q.  79,  a.  1).  Regarding  it  more  closely,  we  may  say 
“  that  the  eucharist  was  instituted  to  be  a  sacrifice  and  to  be  a 
sacrament ,  or  food”  (Biel,  exposit.  can.  miss.  lect.  85  D).  As 
the  latter,  it  signifies  a  strengthening  of  the  spiritual  life,  the  im¬ 
parting  of  grace,  and  the  forgiveness  of  venial  sins  (Thom.,  1.  c. ). 
The  later  writers  are  but  logically  consistent  when,  in  accordance 
with  their  interpretation  of  the  work  of  Christ,  they  make  this 
impartation  of  grace  to  consist  in  a  reminding  of  the  love  of 
Christ  and  his  pious  example,  and  in  the  awakening  of  a  respon¬ 
sive  affection  and  inciting  to  good  works.  The  Supper  is  a 
memoriale  divinae  passionis.  This  view  is  instructively  presented 
in  Biel,  exposit.  can.  miss.  lect.  85  B,  O,  V,  X,  Y.1  But,  side 
by  side  with  this  effect  of  the  sacrament,  stands  its  sacrificial 
character.  The  body  of  Christ  is  really  offered  up  :  “  There  is 
not  only  a  representative  (repraesentativa) ,  but  a  real  immola¬ 
tion  ( immolatio  verafi  (Albert,  sent.  iv.  d.  13,  a.  23).  Thesac- 
rifice  benefits  first  of  all  the  participants  in  the  sacrament,  but 
then  also  others  “  in  so  far  as  it  is  offered  for  their  salvation,” 
and  in  so  far  as  they  have  faith  in  the  sacrament  (Thom.  q.  79, 
a.  7,  q.  83,  a.  1).  The  sacrifice  is  also  effectual  for  souls  in 
purgatory.2  The  reality  of  the  sacrifice  does  not  interfere  with 
its  being  at  the  same  time  a  representation  and  reminder  of  the 
passion  (Biel,  1.  c.,  lect.  85  F).  But  the  principal  thing  is  still  : 
“  And  this  sacrifice  is  of  operative  effects  similar  to  those  which 
the  sacrifice  upon  the  cross  itself  produced  ”  (Biel,  ib.  K).  This 
formed  the  basis  of  the  worst  perversions  of  the  practical  life  of  the 
church  (meritoriousness  of  the  mass;  private  masses ;  after  A.  D. 
1264,  the  festival  of  Corpus  Christi).  Here  also,  theology  made 
no  advance. 

We  cite  from  the  definitions  of  Eugene  IV.  the  following  : 
“  For  the  priest,  speaking  in  the  person  of  Christ,  makes  ( conficit ) 

1  Biel  enumerates  the  following  effects:  “  vivificare,  relaxare,  inflammare, 
patientiam  dare,  nutrire,  restaurare,  unire,  copulare,  sanare,  conservare,  robor- 
are,  perducere.”  Vid.  also  sermo46  of  Biel’s  Festival  Sermons. 

2  Vid.  Biel,  sermo  46  R  :  “  It  is  granted  that  the  fruit  of  the  eucharist  is 
more  efficacious  as  a  sacrament,  but  it  is  more  general  as  a  sacrifice,  .  .  . 
because  as  a  sacrament  it  operates  only  in  those  who  take  it,  but  as  a  sacrifice  it 
has  effect  in  all  those  for  whom  it  is  offered.  But  it  is  offered,  not  only  for 
those  who  participate  by  taking  it,  but  also  for  all  who  are  standing  by,  yea, 
even  for  the  absent,  the  living  and  the  dead.  .  .  .  Although  it  is  granted  that 
sinners  are  inflamed  by  partaking  ( perceptione )  of  the  eucharist,  but  not  by 
the  hearing  of  the  mass.  ...  Yet  even  to  sinners  not  contrite  nor  .  .  .  re¬ 
garding  with  displeasure  their  continuing  sins,  it  is  useful  to  frequently  give 
help  ( assistere )  by  the  office  of  the  mass,  and  to  procure  that  it  be  offered  for 
them  in  order  that  they  may  thus  merit  to  be  regarded  by  the  Lord  with  pity,, 
and  may  be  inspired  to  displeasure  in  their  sins  which  they  yet  have.” 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


*35 


this  sacrament  ;  for,  by  virtue  of  the  very  words,  the  substance 
of  the  bread  is  converted  into  the  body  of  Christ,  and  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  the  wine  into  his  blood,  yet  in  such  a  way  that  Christ 
is  contained  entire  under  the  form  of  the  bread,  and  entire  under 
the  form  of  the  wine,  and  under  any  part  whatever  of  the  con¬ 
secrated  wafer  and  consecrated  wine,  when  separated,  is  the  en¬ 
tire  Christ.  ’  ’ 

5.  As  the  Lord’s  Supper  blots  out  venial  sins,  and  baptism  orig¬ 
inal  sin,  so  Repentance  has  been  instituted  to  dispel  mortal  sins. 
It  is  with  mortal  sins  alone  that  confession  and  absolution  have 
to  do,  not  with  so-called  venial  sins.  A  certain  displeasure  in 
view  of  the  failing,  the  repetition  of  the  Lord’s  Prayer,  sprink¬ 
ling  with  consecrated  water,  the  blessing  of  a  bishop,  are  suffi¬ 
cient  for  the  latter,  which  are  not  regarded  as  requiring  an  in¬ 
fusion  of  grace  (Alex.  iv.  q.  77,  m.  2,  a.  5.  Bonav.  iv.  d.  17, 
p.  3,  a.  2.  Thom.  summ.  iii.  q.  87,  a.  1.;  a.  2,  ad  2  ;  a.  3).1 
Thus  the  disastrous  discrimination  between  greater  and  smaller 
sins,2  the  latter  of  which  were  scarcely  regarded  any  longer  as 
actual  sins,  was  justified.  This  discrimination  was  necessary,  as 
only  by  this  means  could  the  petition  for  the  forgiveness  of  sin 
have  any  meaning  after  the  sacrament  of  repentance  had  been  ob¬ 
served. 

Turning  now  to  the  sacrament  of  Repentance,  we  recall  the 
problem  which  the  school  of  Abelard  had  left  unsolved,  i.  e., 
If  divine  forgiveness  follows  contrition ,  what  need  is  there  of 
confession  and  absolution  ?  This  question  was  answered,  as  we 
shall  see,  by  the  Scholastics.  In  this  sacrament  also  materia 
and  forma  are  discriminated.  The  former  consists  in  acts  of  the 
penitent  ( actus  poenitentis );  the  latter,  in  the  words  of  the 
priest  :  I  absolve  thee  (Thom.  q.  84,  a.  2,  3.  Bonav.  iv.  d. 
22,  a.  2,  q.  2.  Biel,  iv.  d.  14,  q.  2,  a.  1).  The  remark,  “that 
in  anything  whatsoever  perfection  is  attributed  to  the  form  ’  ’ 
(Thom.  ib.  a.  3),  fixes  at  once  in  advance  the  position  of  Ab¬ 
solution,  as  constituting  the  essential  element  of  the  sacrament. 

(<2)  According  to  traditional  teaching,  the  first  element  of  the 
sacrament  is  contritio.  To  understand  the  course  of  develop¬ 
ment  here  we  must  constantly  bear  in  mind  that  repentance,  and 
particularly  its  first  part,  contrition,  is  already,  as  an  act 

1  According  to  Duns  not  even  attritio  is  here  necessary  (iv.  d.  17,  q.  1,  25). 

2  Thomas  (q.  86,  a.  4  ;  q.  87,  a.  2)  thus  discriminates:  “In  mortal  sin 
there  are  two  things,  i.  e.,  a  turning  away  ( aversio )  from  immutable  good, 
and  a  turning  [conversion  toward  mutable  good  in  venial  sins,  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  there  is  present  only  “  an  inordinate  turning  to  mutable  good  without 
turningr  away  from  God.  Eternal  punishment,  therefore,  befits  the  former, 
and  only  temporal  punishment  the  latter.”  Upon  this  question,  see  also  Biel* 
iv.  d.  17,  q.  1,  a.  2,  concl.  3.  Cf.  Melanchthon  apol.,  p.  168,  6. 


!36 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


“  formed  ”  by  love  or  as  a  Christian  virtue,  a  product  of  grace. 
From  this  it  follows,  that  contrition  in  itself  merits  and  effects 
the  full  annihilation  of  guilt  and  punishment  (Thom,  suppl.  q. 
5,  a.  2.  Cf.  Wilhelm  v.  Paris,  de  sacr.  opp.  Niirnberg,  1496, 

ii.  fol.  41  v,  44  V,  46  r).  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  sacrament 
of  repentance,  contritio  is  represented  as  an  “inclination  ( disposi - 
tio")  toward  the  receiving  of  grace  ”  (Thom.  ib.  q.  5,  a.  1,  and 

iii.  q.  89,  a.  1,  ad  2).  But  there  is  no  need  of  any  such  dis- 
positio ;  in  fact,  it  makes  the  sacrament  entirely  unnecessary. 
Quite  forced  appears,  therefore,  the  argument  of  Thomas,  that, 
since  no  one  can  know  whether  he  has  a  degree  of  sorrow  sufficient 
to  secure  forgiveness,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  continually  avail 
ourselves  of  the  opportunity  of  confession  and  absolution 
(suppl.  q.  5,  a.  2,  ad  1).  And  it  is  no  more  than  an  opinion, 
that  the  resolution  to  confess  is  always  combined  with  contrition 
(ib.).  When  we  consider,  further,  that  the  individual  concerned 
is  always  one  who  has  fallen  into  a  mortal  sin,  it  is  evident  that 
he  cannot,  without  the  influence  of  the  sacrament  of  repentance, 
even  produce  contrition  in  himself.  To  meet  this  difficulty  a  new 
idea,  that  of  an  attritio ,  or  purely  human  inclination  toward  the  re¬ 
ception  of  grace,  is  introduced  as  being  sufficient.  This  furnishes 
a  key  for  the  solution  of  the  above  problem,  for  this  half-penitence 
does  not  fully  merit  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  and  hence  room  is  left 
for  confession  and  absolution.  The  word,  attritio ,  occurs  first  in 
Alarms  of  Insulis,1 2  then  in  Alexander  of  Hales  (iv.  q.  74)  and 
William  of  Paris  (opp.  1 1.  45  v),  but  it  is  used  by  them  in  such 
a  way  as  to  indicate  that  it  was  already  an  accepted  term  in  the 
language  of  the  schoolmen.  Thomas  defines  it:  “Attritio 
signifies  a  certain,  but  not  perfect,  displeasure  concerning  sins 
committed  ”  (suppl.  q.  1,  a.  2). 2  Its  motive  is  commonly  fear  : 
“  Servile  fear  is  the  source  ( principium )  of  attrition  ’  ’  (Alex.  iv. 
q.  74,  m.  1.  Durand,  iv.  d.  17,  q.  1,  a.  3). 3  If  now  anyone 
has  a  certain  displeasure  toward  his  sin,  he  is  in  suitable  condi- 

1  Vid.  Regul.  theol.  85  (Migne,  210.  665  C):  “is  either  remitted  by  attri¬ 
tion  .  .  .  although  he  have  not  perfectly  repented,  or  dismissed  by  contrition 
when  he  is  fully  converted  from  sin.” 

2  Upon  the  two  terms,  vid.  Biel,  iv.  d.  16,  q.  I,  a.  I,  n.  3. 

3  Cf.  Thomas  (iii.  q.  85,  a.  5),  who,  in  answer  to  the  question,  “Whether 
the  source  of  penitence  is  from  fear,”  replies  that  the  acts  of  the  soul  in  re¬ 
pentance  are  the  following  :  “  Faith,  servile  fear,  by  which  one  is  restrained 
from  sin  by  fear  of  punishments,  hope,  love,  filial  fear.”  Accordingly:  “  It 
is  evident  that  the  act  of  penitence  proceeds  from  servile  fear,  as  from  the  first 
motion  of  the  affection  inclining  toward  it.”  Cf.  also  Biel,  iv.  d.  14,  q.  1,  a.  3, 
dub.  6  :  “In  beginners  not  yet  perfect  ...  it  frequently  arises  from  fear  of 
punishment,  which  arises  from  love  of  self,  but  in  the  perfect  it  arises  from 
the  love  of  God  and  of  righteousness.”  Durand  (vid.  supra):  “  For  peni¬ 
tence  is  conceived  in  fear.” 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


137 


tion  to  make  confessson.  “  But  if  a  penitent,  prepared  ;as  far  as 
in  him  lies,  comes  to  confession,  attrite  but  not  contrite,  I  say 
that  confession ,  with  subjection  to  the  will  of  the  priest  and  sat¬ 
isfaction  of  the  penance  enjoined  by  the  priest,  is  a  sign  and 
cause  of  the  blotting  out  of  guilt  and  penalty”  (Alex.  iv.  q.  60, 
m.  i,  a.  3).  Confession  is  made  before  the  priest,  because  he 
only  who  can  consecrate  the  eucharist  has  authority  over  the 
powers  of  grace  (Thom,  suppl.  q.  8,  a.  1  ;  q.  10,  a.  1.  Alex, 
q.  76,  m.  3,  a.  1).  Then  follows  absolution,  which  brings  the 
divine  forgiveness.  But  it  is  impossible  “  that  God  should  remit 
an  offense  to  anyone  without  any  change  of  the  latter’s  will  ” 
(Thom.  q.  86,  a.  2).  Hence  :  “  There  can  be  no  remission  of 
sins  except  through  infusion  of  grace”  (ib.  q.  89,  a.  1).  Ab¬ 
solution,  therefore,  brings  divine  forgiveness  by  effecting  at  the 
same  time  the  abolition  of  the  mortal  sin  by  an  infusion  of  grace 
(cf.  supra,  p.  120).  If  th z  attrite  person  do  not  now  himself 
interpose  an  obstacle,  he  receives  grace  through  confession  and 
absolution  (Thom,  suppl.  q.  18,  a.  i).1  This  effects  the  for¬ 
giveness  of  the  liability  ( reatus )  to  eternal  punishment,  as  well  as 
“  something  of  ( aliquid de )  the  temporal  punishment.  ’  ’  This  lat¬ 
ter  expression,  which  somewhat  modifies  the  conception  of  Abe¬ 
lard,  is  to  be  attributed  to  a  regard  for  the  “  satisfaction,”  which 
would  otherwise  be  useless  (ib.  q.  18,  a.  2).  Such  is  the  teach¬ 
ing  of  Thomas.2  Duns  gives  a  different  turn  to  the  doctrine. 
Attritio ,  according  to  his  view,  when  it  has  lasted  for  a  definite 
time,  establishes  a  merit  of  fitness  (de  congruo) ,  a  claim  to  the 
favorable  regard  of  God.  The  penitent  must  now  make  his  confes¬ 
sion,  whereupon  grace  is  infused,  or  sin  is  destroyed  by  the  conver¬ 
sion  o i  attritio  into  contritio ,  i.  e. ,  since  love  is  imparted,  and  thereby 
the  informa  attritio  is  transformed  into  the  formirta  contritio  (sent, 
iv.  d.  14,  q.  2,  14  to  16).  The  outcome  of  this  is  essentially  the 
same  as  in  Thomas,  for  since  absolution  infuses  grace,  it  creates 
love,  and  by  this  means  transforms  the  attritio  into  contritio. 
The  infusion  of  grace  takes  place  through  absolution.  For  the 
attrite ,  the  process  takes  the  following  course  :  “  For  it  is  suffi¬ 
cient  that  some  displeasure,  although  imperfect  (informis') ,  pre¬ 
cedes,  and  then  he  is  capable  of  sacramental  absolution,  and 
through  it  contrition  is  awakened  ”  (iv.  d.  16,  q.  1.  7).  And 

1  If  the  confessing  person  is  sufficiently  contrite,  absolution  brings  an  in¬ 
crease  of  grace. 

2  It  became  afterward  the  general  scholastic  doctrine.  Alexander  taught 
differently,  i.  <?.,  that  “  absolution  from  sin  (cuipa)  belongs  to  God  alone  (iv. 
q.  80,  m.  1),  and  that  the  priest  can  only  remit  a  part  of  the  penalty  (m.  2, 
a.  1 ),  and  that  temporal  and  not  eternal  ”  (ib.  a.  2).  Similarly  Bonaventura, 
iv.  d.  18,  p.  1,  a.  2,  q.  1. 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


138 

further  :  “  Thus  the  priest  absolves  what  he  yet  binds.  For  he 
absolves  from  the  debt  of  eternal  penalty  and  binds  to  the  dis¬ 
charge  of  temporal  penalty  ’  ’  (ib.).  It  may,  therefore,  be  said 
that  absolution  transforms  eternal  into  temporal  penalty  (ib.  d. 
17,  q.  1.  23.  Cf.  Durand,  iv.  d.  16,  q.  1,  a.  3),  and  thus  that 
it  forgives  eternal  penalty  (ib.  d.  19,  q.  1.  32).1  We  present  a 
brief  summary  of  the  theory  of  Biel,  as  a  representative  of  the 
later  writers  :  Forgiveness  takes  place  through  the  destruction  of 
sin  by  means  of  an  infusion  of  grace  (iv.  d.  14,  q.  1,  a.  1,  n.  2, 
4).  But  for  this  there  is  necessary  some  preparation  on  the  part 
of  the  sinner.  And  although  this  could  be  done  by  God  with¬ 
out  us,  yet  he  requires  also  something  from  us  ”  (ib.  q.  2,  a.  1); 
man  can  and  should  do  “  what  in  him  is  ”  (ib.  q.  1,  a.  2,  concl. 
2,  3).  He  should  have  a  detestation  of  his  crime  (< detestatio 
criminis')  and  a  displeasure  with  his  sin  ( displicentia  peccati) 
(ib.  concl.  5).  Usually,  repentance  has  its  beginning  in 
servile  fear  ;  ‘  ‘  for  he  who  fears  hell  guards  against  evil  things  ’  ’ 

( mala  cavet )  (ib.  q.  2,  a  3,  dub.  3).  Everything  depends  upon 
the  “vow  to  be  contrite”  ( votum  conterendi} .  “  Where  the 

votum  conterendi  is,  there  is  contrition  To  refuse  to  have  de¬ 
testation  for  sin  is  to  refuse  to  acknowledge  having  sinned  (ib.  a. 
1,  n.  2).  Thus  one  finds  himself  in  the  state  of  attrition ,  and 
merits  grace  by  his  fitness  (de  congruo ,  d.  16,  q.  2,  a.  3,  dub.  4). 

‘ ‘  He  has  appointed  that  he  will  not  be  lacking  to  him  who  does 
that  which  is  in  him,  nor  will  he  withhold  grace  from  him  who  is 
sufficiently  inclined  to  its  reception  ”  (d.  14,  q.  2,  a.  1,  opin.  3). 
Confession  and  absolution,  then,  bring  grace,  and  transform  the  ai- 
tritio  into  contritio.  Despite  the  variations  here  in  separate  points, 
the  general  view  is  the  same.  Confession  and  absolution  are 
necessary  in  order  that  attrition  be  changed  to  contrition,  and 
that  sin  be  blotted  out.  Thus,  the  difficulty  which  cumbered  the 
theory  of  Abelard  was  removed  by  the  introduction  of  the  attri¬ 
tion  Although  in  theory  contrition  was  always  spoken  of  as  the 
chief  thing,  in  practice  it  was  attrition  that  carried  the  day.  It 
is  not  easy  to  say  which  of  the  two  conceptions  was  the  more 
dangerous  :  the  exercise  of  penitential  grief  to  which  was  affixed 
the  reward  of  forgiveness  of  sin,  or  the  sorrow  for  sin  which  was 
to  be  transformed  into  complete  penitence  by  the  solemnities  of 
divine  worship. 

fb')  After  absolution  there  yet  remain  temporal  penalties  for 
the  sinner.  These  are  met  by  the  satisfaction  of  works  {satis- 

1  How  coolly  and  rationally,  but  with  what  fine-spun  theorizing,  is  not 
this  process  conceived  :  A  certain  unrest  on  account  of  sin  is  increased  by 
solemn  confession  and  absolution  to  the  point  of  contrition,  and  thereby  sin  is 
blotted  out  in  a  psychological  way  ! 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


13  9 


f actio  operant).  Such  works,  performed  for  the  re-establishment 
of  the  divine  honor  (Thom,  suppl.  q.  12,  a.  3),  are,  indeed, 
not  an  equivalent  (satisfiactio  aequivalens) ,  but  this  does  not  pre¬ 
vent  their  being  sufficient  (a  sufficiens  fieri)  before  God  (ib.  q. 
13,  a.  1).  They  consist  in  our  denying  ourselves  something  for 
the  honor  of  God.  But  we  possess  goods  of  soul,  of  body,  and  of 
fortune.  The  renunciation  of  these  leads  to  prayer,  fasting,  and 
almsgiving  respectively.  According  to  Duns,  the  sinner  may 
decline  to  accept  the  temporal  penalty  (iv.  d.  19,  §  27  f.).1 
The  failure  to  perform  the  good  works  imposed  at  confession 
brings,  however,  suffering  during  this  life  and  in  purgatory. 

(r)  Very  important  becomes,  therefore,  the  office  of  Indul¬ 
gences.  They  are  justified  as  follows  :  “  It  is  conceded  by  all 
that  indulgences  have  some  efficacy,  because  it  would  be  impious 
to  say  that  the  church  did  anything  in  vain  ”  (ib.  q.  25,  a.  2)! 
The  attempt  was  made  to  draw  an  argument  in  their  favor  from 
the  unity  of  the  church.  The  merits  of  Christ,  as  also  of  the 
saints,  were  greater  than  necessary.  Thus  arose  the  spiritual 
treasury  ( thesaurus )  of  the  church,  which  consists  of  these 
“  works  of  supererogation  ( supererogationes )  of  the  members  of 
Christ, ”  and  of  the  Lord  himself  (Alex.  iv.  q.  23,  m.  3,  a.  1. 
Albert,  iv.  d.  20,  a.  16).  But,  since  the  body  of  Christ  is  one, 
these  deeds  of  some  members  redound  to  the  benefit  of  the  rest 
(Thom,  suppl.  q.  25,  a.  2).  Inasmuch,  further,  as  the  dead  who 
enter  purgatory  are  still  upon  their  journey  heavenward,  and  as 
they  are  yet,  on  account  of  their  sins,  before  the  forum  of  the 
church,  they  also  may  secure  a  share  in  these  treasures  of  grace 
(vid.  especially  Biel,  expos,  can.  miss.  lect.  57).  It  is  under¬ 
stood,  of  course,  that  the  church  expects  in  return  a  work  of 
piety  and  of  profit  to  the  church  ( opus  pium  et  utile  ecclesiae) 
(ib.).  Whilst  indulgences  are  granted  to  the  living,  however,  by 
the  pope  ‘ ‘  by  the  way  of  judiciary  authority,”  they  avail  for  the 
dead  ‘ 4  by  the  way  of  supplication  ’  ’  (  per  modum  suffragii  );  “in¬ 
dulgences  profit  them  by  the  way  of  supplication,  i.  e.,  on  ac¬ 
count  of  some  work  done  by  another  and  applied  to  them  by  the 
way  of  supplication”  (ib.  L.  Cf.  Alex.  iv.  q.  23,  a.  2,  m.  5. 
Bonav.  iv.  d.  20,  p.  2,  a.  1,  q.  5).  By  indulgences  even  the 
entire  penalties  of  purgatory  may  be  averted  (Heinr.  quodl. 
viii.  q.  19).  Authority  over  indulgences  belongs  to  the  pope 
alone,  but  he  may  at  will  permit  the  bishops  to  share  it  with  him 

1  Cf.  Duns,  iv.  d.  15,  q.  I.  12.  Biel,  iv.  d.  16,  q.  2,  a.  1.  In  this  con¬ 
nection  Biel  presents  a  thorough  discussion  of  a  number  of  important  ethical 
questions,  following  in  this  Duns,  dist.  15.  In  general,  it  maybe  said,  there 
is  at  this  point  a  mine  of  ethical  suggestions  in  the  dogmatics  of  the  Middle 
Ages. 


140 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


(Thom,  suppl.  q.  26,  a.  1,  3).  This  is  the  doctrine  taught  also 
by  Eugene  IV. ,  though  not  in  precisely  the  same  words  :  ‘  ‘  Acts 
of  penitence  are,  as  it  were,  the  material  ( materia )  part  of  the 
sacrament.  ’  ’  Then  follows  an  enumeration  of  the  usual  three 
parts.  Of  confession'll  is  said  :  “  To  which  it  pertains,  that  the 
sinner  confess  entirely  to  his  priest  all  the  sins  of  which  he  has 
recollection.  ’  ’  Satisfaction  i  ‘  is  rendered  chiefly  through  prayer, 
fasting,  and  alms.”  The  fomn  of  the  sacrament  consists  of  the 
words  of  absolution ;  its  effect  is  absolution  from  sins.  Thus 
was  completed  the  construction  of  the  sacrament  of  repentance. 
The  elements  composing  it  remained  the  same,  but  they  were 
placed  in  varying  relations  to  one  another.  The  emphasis  was 
at  first  laid  upon  the  satisfaction ;  later,  upon  the  contrition  ; 
and  then  upon  the  confession,  and  by  this  means,  in  order  to 
impress  the  necessity  of  the  latter,  upon  the  attrition.1 2  But 
whenever  one  element  is  thus  emphasized,  questions  and  doubts 
arise  as  to  the  propriety  and  significance  of  the  others.  The 
Scholastics  established  the  propriety  of  confession,  and  thereby 
provoked  a  new  inquiry,  i.  e. :  If  absolution  brings  grace,  what 
is  then  the  need  of  subsequent  works  and  of  indulgences  ?  At 
this  point  was  aimed  the  criticism  of  the  closing  period  of  the 
Middle  Ages. 

6.  The  sacrament  of  Extreme  Unction  received  no  additional 
development  in  this  period.  As  to  its  effect,  opinion  wavered, 
some  attributing  to  it  a  removal  of  venial  sins  (Bonav.  brevil. 
6.  11.  Duns,  report,  iv.  d.  23,  q.  1,  4);  others  the  blotting  out 
of  the  dregs  of  sin  remaining  after  the  observance  of  the  other  sac¬ 
raments  (Albert,  sent.  iv.  d.  23,  a.  1.  Thom.  sent.  iv.  d.  23, 
q.  1,  a.  2).  To  this  must  be  added  also,  when  it  follows 
(( quando  expedit),  bodily  relief  or  healing.  The  doctrine  of  the 
Scholastics  is  clearly  summarized  by  Eugene  IV. :  “  The  material 
is  the  oil  of  the  olive,  blessed  by  a  bishop.”  The  ointment  is 
applied  “  to  the  eyes,  the  ears,  the  nose,  the  mouth,  the  hands, 
the  feet,  the  loins.”  The  form  is:  “  Through  this  sacred 
anointing  and  his  most  pious  mercy  may  the  Lord  pardon 
( indulgeatf  to  thee  whatever  through  the  sight,  etc.,  and  like¬ 
wise  in  other  members,”  etc.  .  .  .  “  But  the  effect  is  the  heal¬ 
ing  of  the  soul  (mentis),  and,  so  far  as  it  succeeds,  even  of  the 
body  itself.  ’  ’ 

1  Durand  directly  denies  that  contrition  and  satisfaction  are  constituent 
parts  of  the  sacrament,  maintaining  that  everything  depends  upon  confession 
and  absolution,  and  that  the  sacrament  should  of  right  be  called  the  “sacra¬ 
ment  of  confession”  (iv.  d.  16,  q.  1,  and  d.  14,  q.  i). 

2  Instead  of  this  deprecative  form,  the  indicative  form  was  in  use  in  some 
-churches,  Thom.  summ.  suppl.  q.  29,  a.  8. 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH.  141 

7.  The  sacrament  of  Ordination  was  more  accurately  defined. 
Its  necessity  appears  from  the  need  of  an  order  of  men  who  may- 
make  application  of  the  medic  amenta  of  the  sacraments  (Bonav. 
brevil.  6.  12).  The  material  is  seen  in  the  symbols,  or  the  ves¬ 
sels  used  in  ordination  ;  while  the  accompanying  words  are  the 
form  (Thom.  iii.  suppl.  q.  34,  a.  5.  Duns,  iv.  d.  24,  q.  1.  8). 
Ordination  embraces  the  seven  orders  Sordines'),  vid.  p.  84. 
Everyone  ordained  receives  thereby  the  spiritual  character 
(Thom.  q.  35,  a.  2).  In  addition,  there  is  granted  to  him  by 
his  ordination  the  grace  making  acceptable  {gratia  gratum 
faciens)  in  view  of  the  administration  of  the  sacraments  en¬ 
trusted  to  him  (Thom.  35,  a.  i).1  The  question  here  arose 
whether  the  episcopacy  is  an  order  by  itself,  or  coincides  with 
the  presbyterial  office.  Thomas  and  Bonaventura  declare  that, 
since  the  eucharist  is  the  highest  sacrament,  and  priest  and  bishop 
have  the  same  authority  for  its  administration,  the  episcopacy 
is  no  separate  order  in  the  proper  sense  of  that  term.  Only 
when  the  term,  ordo,  is  used  in  a  peculiar  sense,  to  indicate  a 
“  certain  office  with  respect  to  certain  sacred  acts,”  or  as  a  “  dis¬ 
tinction  of  dignities  and  offices,”  can  the  episcopacy — speaking 
loosely — be  described  as  a  special  order.  Hence:  “Beyond 
the  priesthood,  there  is  no  degree  of  rank”  (gradus  ordinis), 
and  :  “  The  episcopate,  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  order  of  the 
priesthood,  might  well  be  called  an  order ;  but,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
discriminated  from  the  priesthood,  it  expresses  a  certain  added 
dignity,  or  office,  of  the  bishop”  (Bonav.  iv.  d.  24,  p.  2,  a.  2, 
q.  3.  Thom.  q.  40,  a.  5).  Duns  gives  a  different  turn  to  the 
thought.  He,  too,  in  view  of  the  high  character  of  the  act 
(; nobilitas  actus )  in  the  administration  of  the  eucharist,  regards 
the  priesthood  as  the  highest  rank  {supremus gradus ,  sent.  iv.  d. 
24,  q.  1.  7),  but,  nevertheless,  that  order  ( ordo )  which  has  the 
authority  to  elevate  to  this  lofty  position  stands  upon  a  yet  higher 
plane.  “  But  if  to  simply  administer  the  eucharist  ( conficere ) 
be  not  the  most  excellent  act  in  the  church,  but  to  be  able  to  ap¬ 
point  anyone  to  the  lofty  position  which  befits  such  act,  then  there 
are  not  only  seven  orders,  but  eight,  because  the  episcopate  is 
then  a  special  grade  and  order  in  the  church,  whose  province  it 
is  to  confer  all  orders,  and,  consequently,  to  establish  all  in 


1  All  the  orders  have  a  relation  nearer  or  more  remote  to  the  eucharist. 
The  priest  consecrates  ;  the  deacon  is  permitted  to  distribute  the  blood  ;  the 
sub-deacon  may  bring  the  material  to  be  consecrated.  The  others  are  en¬ 
gaged  in  preparing  for  the  reception  of  the  sacrament :  the  acolyte  illuminat¬ 
ing  for  worship,  the  lector  bringing  the  knowledge,  the  doorkeeper  keeping; 
away  the  unworthy,  the  exorcist  warding  off  demons  (vid.  Duns,  iv.  d.  24,  q. 

I.  7). 


142 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


such  lofty  position  ’  ’  (report,  iv.  d.  24,  q.  1.  9).  This  separa¬ 
tion  of  the  episcopacy  from  the  ordinary  priesthood  found  advo¬ 
cates  in  the  later  Middle  Ages.1  The  administration  of  the  sac¬ 
rament  of  ordination  belongs  only  to  the  bishop.  Heretics  can, 
indeed,  validly  administer  this,  as  the  other  sacraments,2  but  in 
that  case  it  does  not  bring  the  gratia  gratam  faciens ,  on  account 
of  the  sin  of  those  who  receive  the  sacraments  from  them  against 
the  prohibition  of  the  church  (Thom.  q.  38,  a.  2).  In  this 
way  it  was  possible  to  remain  orthodox  and  yet  appropriately 
discredit  the  sacraments  administered  by  heretics.  Eugene  IV. 
designates  as  the  material  of  ordination  :  “  That  through  the  de¬ 
livering  of  which  the  order  is  conferred,  just  as  the  priesthood  is 
conferred  through  the  handing  of  a  cup  with  wine  and  a  plate  with 
bread,”  etc.  .  .  .  The  form  of  the  priesthood  is  :  “  Receive 
authority  for  the  offering  of  sacrifice  in  the  church  for  the  living 
and  the  dead  in  the  name  of  the  Father,”  etc.  .  .  .  The  effect 
is  an  increase  of  grace,  so  that  one  may  be  a  suitable  minister. 

8.  Marriage  consists  in  the  union  for  life  of  man  and  woman 
for  the  purpose  of  begetting  and  rearing  children.  An  addi¬ 
tional  purpose  since  the  fall  is  the  prevention  of  fornication 
(Thom,  suppl.  q.  48,  a.  2).  It  accordingly  embraces  a  con¬ 
tract  ( contractus )  in  respect  to  “the  mutual  giving  of  the  bodies 
for  carnal  copulation  ”  (Duns,  iv.  d.  30,  q.  2.  4 ;  d.  26.  8. 
Thom.  q.  58,  a.  1).  To  its  contraction  belongs  therefore 
mutual  consent  ( mutuus  consensus )  to  the  latter  (Thom.  q. 
45,  a.  1,  2;  q.  48,  a.  1).  The  public  profession  of  this 
consent  constitutes  the  establishment  of  marriage  (gmatrimo - 
nium  ratuni ),  and  by  it  is  given  the  right  to  demand  the 
conjugal  debt  ( debitmn  conjugate').  It  is  only  the  actual 
copula  carnalis  which  constitutes  the  matrimonium  consumma- 
.< turn .  Before  this  consummation,  marriage  may  be  annulled  by  a 
previous  solemn  vow  of  continence  (Thom.  q.  53,  a.  2)  or  by 
entering  an  order  (q.  61,  a.  2).  Marriage  once  consummated 
is  indissoluble  and  monogamistic.3  It  is  forbidden  to  the  holy 
order  ( or  do  sacer ).4  Marriage,  as  a  type  of  the  union  of  Christ 

1  E.  g.,  Durand  in  sent.  iv.  d.  24,  q.  6.  7. 

2  Only  penance  is  excepted  (Bonav.  iv.  d.  25,  a.  I,  q.  2.  Durand,  iv.  d. 
25 >4-  I,  ad  2),  because  the  validity  of  absolution  always  depends  upon  the 
regularity  of  the  priestly  jurisdiction,  and  this  is  wanting  in  the  case  of  here¬ 
tics  and  schismatics  ;  as  in  their  administration  of  all  sacraments.  Cf.  Duns, 
report,  iv.  d.  25,  q.  1,  16. 

3  According  to  Thomas  (q.  65,  a.  1),  polygamy  contradicts  natural  law. 
Duns  denies  this,  and  considers  it  possible  that  after  depopulating  wars  or  pes¬ 
tilences  polygamy  may  be  revealed  by  God  to  the  church  as  allowable  (iv.  d. 
33,  q-  i-  6). 

4  Because  those  established  in  sacred  orders  handle  the  sacred  vessels  and 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


M3 


with  the  church,  is  a  sacrament.  Its  form  consists  of  the  words 
of  consent,  “but  not  the  benediction  of  the  priest,  which  is  sacra¬ 
mental  in  character  ’  *  ( quoddam  sacramenta/e) .  This  sacrament 
is,  therefore,  administered  by  him  who  uses  it  (q.  42,  a.  1).  In 
the  consensus ,  there  is  an  accompanying  divine  agency  which 
hallows  the  married  life  (q.  45,  a.  i).1  Duns  expresses  himself 
most  accurately,  representing  as  the  sacramental  effect  of  mar¬ 
riage  the  gracious  union  of  souls  (gratiosa  conjunctio  animarum , 
iv.  d.  2 6,  §  15,  17).  Inasmuch  as  the  two  persons  desire  to  be¬ 
long  to  each  other,  God  establishes  an  inner  relation  between 
them.  As  separate  effects  are  mentioned  marital  fidelity,  the 
repression  of  lust  during  the  act  of  copulation,  and  the  turning 
of  its  energy  toward  a  useful  union  ( copula  utilis,  Bonav.  iv.  d. 
26,  a.  2,  q.  2),  i.  e.,  the  living  together  of  the  married  pair  and 
their  co-operation  in  the  rearing  of  children  (Albert,  iv.  d.  26, 
a.  14).  To  these  is  to  be  added  what  Christian  marriage  has  in 
in  common  with  the  natural  ordinance,  i.  e. ,  that  the  copulative 
act,  which  is  in  itself  unwortny  of  man,  because  for  the  time 
being  depriving  him  of  reason,  is  in  marriage  legitimized  and 
excused  in  view  of  the  blessings  which  it  brings  (Thom.  q.  49, 
a.  1).  These  blessings  are  progeny  and  fidelity,  to  which  Chris¬ 
tianity  adds  the  sacrament  (thus  Lombard,  iv.  d.  31  A,  follow¬ 
ing  Augustine,  De  genesi  ad  litt.  ix.  7.  12).  We  need  not  enter 
upon  a  discussion  of  the  hindrances  of  marriage,  which  were 
considered  at  length  by  the  Scholastics. 2  Eugene  IV.  describes 
as  the  efficient  cause  of  marriage,  the  “  mutual  consent  expressed 
through  words  concerning  the  person  present.”  As  the  bless¬ 
ings  of  marriage,  he  enumerates  :  ‘ ‘  Children  to  be  received  and 
educated  ;  fidelity,  which  each  of  the  married  pair  ought  to  ob¬ 
serve  toward  the  other,  ’  ’  and  4  ‘  the  indivisibility  of  marriage 
on  account  of  the  fact  that  it  signifies  the  indivisible  union  of 
Christ  and  the  church.”  It  is  very  evident  that  this  last  of  the 
sacraments  attained  but  a  loose  and  unfinished  form.  Neither  is 
there  a  distinct  definition  of  its  material,  nor  is  it  clear  how  or 


sacraments,  and  it  is,  therefore,  becoming  (deceits')  that  they  by  continence 
preserve  bodily  purity  (iv.  q.  53,  a.  3). 

1  Bonaventura  (iv.  d.  26,  a.  2,  q.  3):  “Matrimony  receives  a  reason  of 
spirituality  and  grace  when  consent  is  joined  with  the  benediction,  where  its  sig¬ 
nificance  is  explained  ;  and  sanctification  is  obtained  through  the  benediction, 
and  thus  in  the  sacerdotal  benediction  consists  chiefly  the  spiritual  reason.” 
It  is  remarkable  that  this  idea  is  not,  following  the  example  of  the  sacrament 
of  penance,  crystallized  in  the  formula,  that  the  priestly  benediction  is  the  form, 
and  the  consent  of  the  parties  the  material ,  of  the  sacrament.  This  was  done 
only  in  sporadic  instances  during  the  Middle  Ages,  though  more  frequently  at 
a  later  period.  Vid.  Kirchenlex.  iv.,  ed.  2,  145  f. 

2  Briefly  presented  in  the  Versus  memoriales  in  Bonav.  brevil.  6.  13. 


144 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


whence  the  consent  of  the  contracting  parties  has  a  sacramental 
character.1 

9.  Such  is  the  Catholic  doctrine  of  the  sacraments,  as  it  was 
afterward  adopted  substantially  unchanged  by  the  Council  of 
Trent.  Two  elements  concurred  from  the  beginning  in  its  con¬ 
struction,  the  materializing  of  grace  and  the  hierarchical  concep¬ 
tion  of  the  church  (vid.  Augustine).  The  sacraments  infuse 
grace,  but  the  priests  make  the  sacraments.  We  have  been  con¬ 
sidering  the  conception  of  grace  involved,  and  it  remains  for  us 
to  glance  briefly  at  the  conception  of  the  church,  where  we  will 
find  that  no  advance  has  been  made  upon  the  utterances  of 
Hugo. 

( a )  “  The  Church  is  the  same  thing  as  the  assembly  ( congrc - 
gatio )  of  the  faithful,  and  every  Christian  is,  therefore,  a  mem¬ 
ber  of  the  church.  ”  This  definition  (Thomas,  exposit.  symbol, 
opp.  xvii.  69)  asserts  nothing  more  than  that  the  Christian  com¬ 
munity  is  the  church.  Thomas  employs  also,  instead  of  this,  the 
term  communio fideliwti  (summ.  suppl.  q.  23,  a.  i).2  In  the 
church,  as  in  Noah’s  ark,  there  is  salvation.  That  is  to  say,  in 
the  “communion  of  saints”  is  transmitted,  i.  e.,  participation 
in  the  sacraments,  for  this  is  Thomas’s  conception  of  the  term.3 

1  It  is  true  that,  for  those  who  express  such  consent,  the  creative  benedic¬ 
tion  becomes  effective.  It  may  be  said,  in  case  they  are  Christians,  that  the 
blessing  of  the  kingdom  of  Christ  is  also  theirs  ;  but  can  we  think  of  a  dis¬ 
play  of  grace  here  which  would  not  be  identical  with  that  personally  experi¬ 
enced  ?  The  objection  commonly  urged  by  Protestants  that,  although  mar¬ 
riage  is  acknowledged  as  a  sacrament,  virginity  is  regarded  as  a  higher  state, 
has  no  force,  as  a  parallel  to  this  is  furnished  in  the  case  of  repentance. 

2  This  is  the  current  definition  of  the  church.  Vid. ,  e.  g.,  Duns,  report, 
iv.  d.  24,  q.  I.  5  :  universitasfidelium.  In  sent.  iv.  d.  1 9,  §  15  :  communio 
fidelium.  The  meaning  is  peculiarly  clear  in  De  perfec.  statuum  34.  9  :  the 
church  is  the  congregatio  of  all  believers,  i.  e .,  the  Saracens,  for  example,  do 
not  belong  to  it.  Occam,  dial.  Goldast,  monarchia,  ii.  pp.  402,  503,  471, 
481,  498,  788,  799  :  congregatio  fidelium,  or  communitas  fidelium  or  christia- 
norum,  ib.  p.  788  ff.,  806  f.,  810,  814,  923.  Marsil.  Defensor  pac.  ii.  2,  p. 
193  ;  6,  p.  209,  in  Goldast,  monarch,  ii.  Biel,  expos,  can.  miss.  lect.  22  D. 
Thomas  Motter,  doctrinale,  ii.  9  ff. 

3  The  term,  communio  sanctorum ,  is  very  differently  interpreted  :  of  the 
sacraments ,  e.  g .,  Abelard  (Mi.  178,  p.  629),  Ivo  of  Chartres  (Mi.  162,  606), 
Thom.  1.  c. ;  of  the  saints ,  e.g.,  Bruno  of  Wurzburg  (Mi.  142,  5°°)>  in 
Schonbach’s  Altd.  Predigten,  i.  42  f.  46;  of  the  angels ,  e.  g.,  Alexander 
(summ.  iv.  q.  37,  $  9);  of  the  church  triumphant  (Gerson,  opp.  i.  240);  of 
the  saints  and  the  sacraments,  e.g.,  Bonav.  centiloq. ,  p.  3,  $  38 — worthy  of 
note  is  the  remark  of  Joslenus  of  Soissons  (Mi.  186,  1488),  in  which  the  two 
are  thus  combined:  “I  believe  the  truth  of  the  sacraments,  in  which  the 
saints  took  part,  so  that  I  believe  what  they,  too,  believed  in  regard  to  bap¬ 
tism  and  the  Lord’s  Supper;  ”  cf.  Richard,  iii.  d.  25,  princ.  I,  q.  2.  Thom. 
Motter,  doctrinale,  v.  95  ;  of  fellowship  of  the  saints  and  the  spiritual  bless¬ 
ings  secured  by  them  (vid.  Hasack,  Der  chr.  Glaube  d.  deutschen  Volkes,  etc., 


SACRAMENTS  AND  CHURCH. 


J45 


But  the  sacraments  bring  us  grace.  They  lead  us,  further,  to  the 
ministers  ( ministri )  who  have  received  from  the  apostles  author¬ 
ity  for  the  forgiveness  of  sins  (expos,  p.  70).  Thus  the  defini¬ 
tion  of  the  church  as  the  congregation  of  believers  fits  in  exactly 
with  the  conception  of  it  as  a  body  politic  ( congregatio  politico, > 
Thom,  suppl.  q.  26,  a.  1),  consisting  of  rulers  ( rectores )  and 
subjects  ( subditi ). 

(b)  But  since  the  church  is  an  organized  stat e  (politia  ordi- 
nata ),  there  is  in  it  a  gradation  of  rulers  (Duns,  iv.  d.  24,  §  3). 
In  addition  to  the  lawgivers,  there  must  be  some  whose  office  it. 
shall  be  to  adapt  the  laws  to  circumstances  (Thom,  suppl.  q.  20, 
a.  1).  All  priests  are  authorized  to  administer  the  eucharist, 
but  some  sacraments  are  reserved  for  the  bishop.  In  regard  to 
the  power  of  the  keys,  a  distinction  is  made  between  the  key  of 
the  order  ( clavis  ordinis )  and  the  key  of  jurisdiction  ( jurisdic - 
Homs').  The  former,  which  grants  forgiveness,  belongs  to  the 
priesthood.  The  latter  belongs  to  the  bishop  alone,  and  is  his  power 
of  spiritual  dominion,  the  plenary  authority  (  potestas  plena)  to 
grant  or  refuse  the  sacraments,  and  also  the  jurisdiction  in  the 
administration  of  justice  (in  foro  causarum).  The  bishop  alone 
can  grant  to  the  priest  the  right  to  use  the  key  which  belongs  ta 
the  latter  (Thom.  sent.  iv.  d.  18,  q.  1,  a.  1),  in  doing  which  he 
reserves  special  cases  for  his  own  decision  (Thom,  suppl.  q.  20, 
a.  2).  Hence  :  “  The  bishop  alone  is  properly  called  a  prelate 
( praelatus )  of  the  church,  and,  therefore,  he  alone  has  plenary 
power  in  the  dispensing  of  the  sacraments  and  jurisdiction  in  the 
administration  of  justice,  .  .  .  but  others,  on  account  of  that 
which  is  committed  to  them  by  him.  But  the  priests  who  are  set 
over  the  people  are  not  simply  prelates,  but,  as  it  were,  assistants  ’  ’ 
(ib.  q.  26,  a.  1). 

(c)  But  the  church  is  One  Body.  In  harmony  with  this  is  the 
solitary  power  of  the  pope  (ib.  q.  40,  a.  6).  “The  supreme 
pontiff  is  the  head  of  the  whole  church  ’  ’  (Thom.  summ.  ii.  ii.  q.  1, 
a.  10).  He  possesses  “  plenitude  of  power  over  ecclesiastical 
affairs”  (ib.  q.  89,  a.  9).  He  rules  in  the  church  as  a  king  in 
his  kingdom,  and  the  other  bishops  are  admitted  by  him  to  a 
share  in  his  care  over  the  church  (in partem  sollicitudinis ,  Thom, 
sent.  iv.  d.  20,  q.  1,  a.  4).  How  then  is  the  episcopal  related 
to  the  papal  power?  The  bishops,  too,  have  by  divine  right  the 
plenitudo  potestatis  in  their  own  territories,  but  they  have  it  to¬ 
gether  with  the  pope  and  in  subjection  to  him.  Accordingly, 
the  pope  has  direct  jurisdiction  (regimen  immediatum)  over  all 

1868,  p.  90);  finally,  of  the  fellowship  of  the  pious  of  all  times  and  places , 
Wessel,  opp.  p.  809.  '  Erasm.  opp.  v.  1174. 

IO 


146 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


souls,  and  can  assert  for  himself  episcopal  rights  in  every  terri¬ 
tory.  This  was  of  great  importance  for  the  mendicant  orders 
in  their  preaching  and  confessionals  (Thom.  sent.  iv.  d.  17,  q. 
3,  a.  3.  Bonav.,  Quare  fratres  minores  praedicent  ?  opp.  vii. 
340  ff.  and  Explicat.  regul.  ib.  324  b).  To  the  pope  belongs 
law-giving  and  government  in  the  church.  He  is  to  decide  what 
is  correct  faith,  to  publish  upon  occasion  a  new  symbol  of  faith, 
and  to  summon  general  councils  (Thom.  summ.  ii.  ii.  q.  1,  a. 
10). 1  He  proclaims  indulgences  (ib.  suppl.  q.  38,  a.  1).  He 
stands  above  all  princes  as  the  vicar  of  Christ.  If  they  rebel 
against  him,  he  may  punish  them  by  removal  from  office  and  by 
releasing  their  subjects  from  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  them  (ib. 
ii.  ii.  q.  67,  a.  1  ;  q.  12,  a.  2  ;  sent.  iv.  d.  44,  q.  2).  The 
church  attains  its  summit  in  the  pope.  With  Aristotle,  it  was 
held  :  “But  the  best  government  of  a  multitude  is  that  it  be 
ruled  by  one”  (c.  gentil.  iv.  76). 

As  compared  with  the  leaders  of  the  Gregorian  age,  the  later 
writers  carried  out  many  ideas  to  a  further  extent,  and  supported 
their  views  by  more  painstaking  argument,  but  they  furnish 
scarcely  anything  essentially  new.  The  Second  Council  of 
Lyons  (A.  D.  1274)  accepted  this  view  of  the  Romish  primacy 
(vid.  Hefele,  vi.  139  f. ,  141). 

10.  We  stand  now  at  the  close  of  our  period.  It  had  inher¬ 
ited  an  abundance  of  suggestive  thoughts  from  its  predecessor, 
which  were  all  accepted  and  applied.  Hence  the  wealth  of 
views  and  ideas  in  this  century.  As  in  the  days  of  Origen  and 
Augustine,  all  contradictions  seemed  blended  into  a  higher  har¬ 
mony.  Reason  and  faith  have  entered  into  covenant,  ideal  and 
reality,  religion  and  science,  contemplation  and  speculation,  have 
joined  hands,  and  the  body  serves  the  regnant  spirit.  More  than 
this,  the  world  appeared  to  be  at  length  rendering  due  obedience 
to  the  kingdom  of  God.  The  lord  of  the  church  is  lord  of  the 
world.  Augustine  and  Aristotle,  Anselm  and  Bernard,  Hugo 
and  Abelard,  Gregory  VII.  and  Francis  of  Assizi — all  the  results 
of  their  thought  and  efforts  appeared  melted  into  unity  in  the 
writings  of  Thomas  of  Aquino.  It  was  then  that  Otto  of  Frei¬ 
sing  wrote:  “The  kingdom  ( civitas )  of  Christ  appears  to  have 
received  already  in  the  present  almost  all  things  promised  to  it 
except  immortality”  (Mon.  Germ.  scr.  xx.  198).  And  yet, 
shortly  after  the  year  1300,  premonitions  of  the  coming  crisis 
began  to  appear.  Of  this  our  next  chapter  will  treat. 

1  Upon  infallibility,  vid.,  further,  quodlib.  ix.  a.  1 6  ;  contra  errores  Graecor. 
Also  Albert,  sent.  iv.  d.  20,  a.  17. 


THEOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


147 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  GRADUAL  DISSOLUTION  OF  THE  SCHOLASTIC  THEOLOGY. 
THE  RELIGIOUS  AND  ECCLESIASTICAL  CRISIS  AT  THE  CLOSE 
OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES. 

§59.  The  Theology  of  Duns  Scotus  and  Its  Significance  for  the 

History  of  Doctrines . 

J.  Duns  Scoti,  opp.  ed.  Wadding,  13  vols.,  1639.  Reprinted  in  the  new 
Paris  edition  in  Vives,  1891  ff. ,  26  vols.  We  are  chiefly  interested  in  the 
Commentary  upon  the  Sentences  known  as  the  Opus  Oxoniense  (which  we 
•quote  as  “sent.”),  and  the  abbreviated  copy  of  it  in  the  Reportata  Parisiensia 
(which  we  quote  as  “report.”).  Cf.  Werner,  Duns  Scotus,  1881.  Plezan- 
SKI,  Essai  sur  la  philosophic  de  Duns  Scot.,  1887.  Seeberg,  Die  Theologie 
•des  Duns  Scotus,  1900,  and  in  PRE.  v.,  ed.  3,  62  ff.  Ritter,  Gesch.  d. 
Philos,  viii.  354  ff.  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik,  iii.  202  f.  Erdmann,  Gesch. 
■d.  Philos,  i.,  ed.  4,  446  ff.  Stockl,  Gesch.  d.  Philos,  d.  MA.  ii.  778  ff. 
Baur,  Lehre  v.  d.  Dreieinigkeit,  ii.  448  ff.,  589 ff.,  621  ff.,  642  ff.,  673  ff., 
-690 ff.,  727  ff.,  759 ff.,  823  ft'.,  861  ff.  Ritschl,  Rechtf.  u.  Vers.  i.  73  ff. 
Kahl,  Primat  des  Widens  in  Aug.,  Duns  Scot.,  u.  Descartes,  1886,  p.  76  ff. 
Siebeck,  Die  Anfange  der  neueren  Psychol,  in  d.  Scholast.,  Ztschr.  f.  Philos, 
u.  phil.  Krit.,  vol.  94,  p.  161  ff . ;  95,  p.  245  ff. 

i.  The  history  of  the  dogmatic  movements  at  the  close  of  the 
Middle  Ages  must  begin  with  a  study  of  Duns  Scotus  (f  1308). 
For,  however  true  it  may  be  that  the  masterly  skill  of  this  man  in 
•dialectics  and  his  acuteness  carried  the  scholastic  method  to  its 
point  of  highest  development,  yet  it  is  equally  true  upon  the 
•other  hand — and  this  must  determine  his  historical  position — 
that  the  theological  method  which  he  pursued  became  the  con¬ 
trolling  influence  leading  to  the  dissolution  of  the  scholastic 
theories  and  the  crisis  in  theology. 

We  must  first  briefly  note  the  leading  positions  in  the  general 
■conception  of  the  universe  entertained  by  Duns.  Upon  the 
•question  of  Universals  he  stood  upon  the  basis  of  a  modified 
Realism  (vid.  p.  104).  The  universal  he  held  to  be  as  well 
before  as  in  and  after  an  object.  Everything  which  exists,  exists 
also,  since  everything  comes  from  God,  as  an  eternal  original 
image  in  the  mind  of  God  (sent.  i.  d.  35,  q.  1,  §  12).  Here 
comes  to  light  an  important  variation  from  the  view  of  Thomas; 
as  Duns  lays  the  emphasis  upon  the  singular,  and  no  longer  upon 
the  universal.  The  individual  being,  the  individuitas  or  haeccei- 
tas  is,  according  to  his  view,  the  real  goal  of  nature,  and  is 
therefore,  as  compared  with  the  universal,  the  higher  form  of  ex¬ 
istence  (rep.  i.  d.  36,  q.  4.  14).  There  is  an  ultimate  reality  of 
being  ( ultima  realitas  entis )  which  makes  the  particular  object  to 


148 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


be  just  what  it  is.  From  this  results  the  emphasis  laid  upon  ex¬ 
perience  as  a  ground  of  knowledge  (e.  g.,  de  anim.  q.  15).  In 
the  theory  of  knowledge,  Duns  adopts,  in  a  general  way,  the 
prevailing  Aristotelian  formulas.  The  intellect  apprehends  the 
intelligible  form  ( species  intelligibilis')  which  is  presented  to  it 
in  the  sensible  object,  and  thus  begets  the  conception.  He 
does  not,  like  Thomas,  interject  the  “  intelligible  form”  be¬ 
tween  the  sensuous  perception  and  the  intellect,  but  it  is  already 
present  in  the  perception  and  given  with  it.  Hence,  upon  the 
Scotist  theory  of  knowledge,  the  individual  object  is  as  such  per¬ 
ceptible  (de  anim.  q.  22.  4).  But  he  very  strongly  emphasizes 
also  the  spontaneity  of  the  spirit  in  the  act  of  perception.  The 
object  dtoes  not  beget  the  conception  in  the  (passive)  spirit,  but 
the  intellect  is  the  organ  which,,  apprehends  the  object  and  im¬ 
prints  the  conception.  But  here  the  will  asserts  itself.  It  impels 
to  thought,  or  restrains  from  it ;  it  constrains  to  or  prohibits  agree¬ 
ment  with  the  conception  received  (sent.  ii.  d.  42,  q.  4.  5,  10  f.  ).1 
Thinking  in  itself  occurs  as  a  necessary  and  natural  process  (sent, 
i.  d.  32,  q.  1.  14;  ii.  d.  42,  q.  4.  5).  It  is  only  through  its 
connection  with  the  will,  which  is  free,  as  perception  is  not,  from 
the  necessity  of  the  causal  process,  that  it  receives  a  personal 
and  free  character.  From  this  originates  one  of  the  leading 
thoughts  of  Duns,  i.  e. ,  the  doctrine  of  the  primacy  of  the  will.  The 
entire  inner  and  outer  man,  with  all  his  thoughts,  words,  works, 
and  impulses,  is  subject  to  the  will.  It  is  the  will  alone  which 
makes  human  conduct  good  or  bad  (sent.  ii.  d.  42,  q.  4).  The 
will,  and  not  the  thought,  is  the  organ  for  the  appropriation  of  the 
highest  objects  and  values.  Faith  does  not  arise  without  the  con¬ 
sent  of  the  will  (iii.  d.  25,  q.  1.  11).  Love  is  realized  in  the  will, 
and  blessedness  is  experienced  by  it  (ii.  d.  25,  §13!.,  19; 
iv.  d.  49,  quaest.  ex  latere,  §  10  ff. ).  According  to  Thomas, 
blessedness  consists  in  the  intellectual  contemplation  of  the 
supreme  end,  from  which  contemplation  results  the  joy  of  the 
pacified  will  (Thom.  summ.  ii.  1,  q.  2-5).  According  to  Duns, 
it  consists  in  the  apprehension  of  God,  as  the  present  supreme 
good,  in  the  voluntary  act  of  love,  which  brings  with  it  the  su¬ 
preme  satisfaction  of  man’s  longings.  But  this  joy  is  only  an 
accompanying  experience,  while  the  real  blessedness  consists  in 
the  apprehension  of  God  (iv.  d.  49,  q.  4.  7,  8).  The  will  is 
free,  for  as  touching  the  same  object  the  will  has  the  choice  of 
a  velle  or  a  nolle  (ii.  d.  25,  §  6).  Not  in  the  object  therefore 
lies  the  determining  ground  of  the  will,  nor  in  the  perception, 

1  Except  when  the  conception  carries  its  own  absolute  evidence,  Quaest.. 
subtiliss.  in  metaphys.  9. 


THEOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


149 


which  always  but  reflects  the  object,  but  in  the  will  itself. 
“  Nothing  else  than  the  will  is  the  cause  of  the  entire  volition  in 
the  will  ”  (ii.  d.  25,  §  22).  Only  upon  the  premise  of  freedom 
is  the  possibility  of  meritorious  conduct  intelligible  (ib.).  A 
strict  proof  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  i.  e.,  the  existence  of  a 
contingent  course  of  action,  cannot,  indeed,  be  produced,  but  it  is 
attested  by  immediate  experience.  If  anyone  were  to  cast  doubt 
upon  contingent  conduct  and  events,  he  ought  to  be  flogged  until 
he  should  acknowledge  the  possibility  of  not  being  flogged  (i.  d. 

39.  §  *3)- 

This  brief  summary  must  here  suffice.  The  interest  of  Duns 
centres,  not  in  the  universal,  but  in  the  singular  and  in  the  indi¬ 
vidual.  And  in  his  conception  of  man,  the  chief  thing  is  that 
man  himself  freely  wills.  These  are  ideas  which  foreshadow  a 
new  conception  of  the  universe.  The  emphasis  is  laid,  not  upon 
ideas  nor  the  perception  of  them,  but  as,  on  the  one  hand,  man 
himself  is  nothing  more  than  his  individual  free  will,  so  the  final 
end,  or  goal,  of  the  world  is  to  be  seen  in  the  concrete  separate 
objects  which  it  contains. 

2.  What  then  is  the  task  of  Theology  ?  It  presupposes  revela¬ 
tion.  The  latter  instructs  man  as  to  the  end  which  his  will  should 
pursue  and  the  means  for  attaining  it  (sent.  prol.  q.  1.  6  ff. ). 
These  truths  necessary  to  salvation  are  presented  by  the  Holy 
Scriptures.  The  credibility  of  the  latter  is  exhaustively  proved. 
The  resultant  maybe  stated  in  two  propositions:  “That  the 
doctrine  of  the  canon  is  true,”  and  “that  the  Sacred  Scriptures 
sufficiently  contain  the  doctrine  necessary  to  the  prilgrim  ”  (ib. 
q.  2.  14).  Duns,  like  Thomas,  maintains  that  this  truth  is  sum¬ 
marized  in  the  Apostles’  Creed,  or,  also,  in  the  three  symbols 
of  the  ancient  catholic  church  (iii.  d.  25,  q.  1.4;  i.  d.  26, 
§  25  ;  iv.  d.  43,  q.  1.  11).  He,  however,  placed  beside 
the  authority  of  the  Scriptures  and  these  symbols,  as  of  equal 
value,  the  teaching  of  “the  authentic  Fathers”  and  of  the 
“  Romish  church  ”  (i.  d.  26,  §  26).  “  Nothing  is  to  be  held 

as  of  the  substance  of  the  faith  except  that  which  can  be  ex¬ 
pressly  derived  ( express e  haberi')  from  Scripture,  or  which  is  ex¬ 
pressly  declared  by  the  church,  or  which  follows  evidently  from 
something  plainly  contained  in  Scripture  or  plainly  determined 
by  the  church  ”  (iv.  d.  11,  q.  3.  5).  As  the  church  has  decided 
which  books  belong  to  the  canon,  the  requirement  of  subjection 
to  the  Scriptures  is  equivalent  to  subjection  to  the  church,  which 
“approves  and  authorizes”  the  books  of  Scripture  (iii.  d.  23, 
q.  1.  4  ;  i.  d.  5,  q.  1.  8).  In  the  last  resort,  the  Romish  church 
is  the  only  authority.  Her  utterance  decides  what  is  or  is  not 
heretical.  Even  if  a  doctrine  be  deprived  of  all  other  authority 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


I5° 

and  all  arguments  drawn  from  reason,  it  must  be  accepted  solely 
upon  the  authority  of  the  Romish  church  (iv.  d.  6,  q.  9.  14,  16, 
17).  This  is  the  churchly  positivism  of  the  later  Scholasticism. 
The  ecclesiastical  doctrines  are  employed  as  so  many  legal  pre¬ 
cepts,  and  orthodoxy  receives  a  juristic  flavor.  But,  as  at  a  later 
period,  so  already  in  Duns,  this  positivism  is  only  a  counterpoise 
to  an  unlimited  criticism  of  the  traditional  doctrines.  He  criti¬ 
cizes  not  only  the  contemporary  theologians,  but  even  Augustine 
and  Aristotle  (especially  Thomas  and  Heinrich).  In  regard  to 
many  a  traditional  dogma,  impossibility  of  proof  and  aimlessness 
are  openly  acknowledged  (transubstantiation,  habitus),  or  the 
possibility  of  the  contrary  opinion  granted.  The  decision,  how¬ 
ever,  is  always  in  favor  of  the  Romish  doctrine,  although  under 
the  formal  endorsement  may  lurk  many  a  bold  perversion  of  the 
sense. 

The  complex  of  positive  and  practical  truths1  of  which  theol¬ 
ogy  treats  is  apprehended  in  faith.  Duns  acknowledged  the 
possibility  of  explaining  faith  in  a  perfectly  natural  way,  as  as¬ 
sent  to  tradition  ( fides  acquisita ,  vid.  iii.  d.  23,  §  1,  4  ff. ).  But 
the  “  authority  of  Scripture  and  the  saints”  demands  the  rec¬ 
ognition  of  a  supernatural  habitus,  the  fides  infusa  (ib.  §  14). 
This  is  a  habitus  infused  into  the  intellect,  as  the  habitus  of  love 
is  infused  into  the  will.  To  speak  more  exactly,  it  is  a  habitus 
inclinans ,  which  impels,  but  does  not  compel,  the  intellect  to  as¬ 
sent.  There  is  thus  retained  even  here  some  liberty  of  action 
for  the  will  (§  11).  This  assensus,  as  infused,  has  a  perma¬ 
nence  and  certainty  which  does  not  characterize  acquired  faith 
(§  15  f. ).  In  regard  to  implicit  faith,  his  position  agreed  with 
that  of  Thomas  (supra,  p.  103). 

3.  In  his  discussion  of  separate  doctrines,  we  will  find  almost 
everywhere  in  Duns  suggestions  which  assumed  great  importance 
for  later  ages.  We  note  first  his  conception  of  God.  He  en¬ 
deavors  from  the  principles  of  causality,  finality,  and  eminence 
to  establish  the  necessity  of  an  Infinity  Being,  which  has  its  cause 
or  end  in  nothing  else,  and  which  can  be  outranked  by  nothing 
(i.  d.  2,  q.  2.  10  ff.).  But,  as  in  this  scheme  God  is  viewed 
under  the  aspects  of  the  First  Cause  ( primum  ejficiens')  and  the 
Self-acting  {per  se  agens ),  there  result  a  number  of  valuable 

1  Duns  strongly  emphasized  the  positive  character  of  theology  (sent.  prol. 
q.  2,  lateral.).  It  has  an  independent  sphere,  and,  as  a  number  of  contin¬ 
gent  facts  are  embraced  in  it,  other  principles  than  those  of  metaphysics  (1.  c. , 
$  29).  He  maintains  likewise  the  practical  nature  of  the  propositions  of  the¬ 
ology  ;  for  even  such  doctrines  as  those  of  the  Trinity  or  the  conception  of  the 
Son  are  of  a  practical  nature,  since  their  aim  is  to  awaken  love  for  the  object 
presented  (1.  c.  $  32). 


THEOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


I5I 

positive  ideas.  First  of  all,  “  That  the  first  cause  is  intelligent 
and  volitional  ’  ’  (inte llige ns  et  v olens)  (§  20).  This  is  proved 
as  follows  :  There  is  in  the  world  contingent  causality.  Since 
now  every  second  cause  causes  “  in  so  far  as  it  is  moved  by  the 
first,”  the  First  Cause  must  also  act  contingently,  i.  e.,  it  is  free 
will(ib.).  “Therefore  either  nothing  happens  contingently, 
i.  e .,  is  evitably  caused,  or  the  First  Cause  thus  causes  imme¬ 
diately  what  it  would  be  able  also  not  to  cause  ”  (§  21).  It  is 
utterly  impossible  to  derive  contingency,  with  Aristotle,  from 
second  causes ,  for  the  necessity  of  the  all-embracing  activity  of 
the  First  Cause  would  necessitate  also  the  actions  of  the  second 
causes  (i.  d.  39,  §  12).  God  is,  accordingly,  to  be  represented 
as  free  will.  This  involves,  further,  that  there  can  be  found  no 
reason  for  his  willing  or  not  willing,  since  all  willing  is  abso¬ 
lutely  without  ground  or  reason  :  “  And,  therefore,  there  is  no 
reason  ( causa )  why  his  will  willed  this,  except  that  his  will  is 
will  ”  (i.  d.  8,  q.  5.  24).  God,  then,  wills  this  or  that,  because 
he  wills  it.  Good  is,  therefore,  good  because  God  wills  it  to  be 
so  ;  he  does  not  will  it  because  it  is  good  (iii.  d.  19,  §  7).  All 
things,  considered  in  themselves,  may  be  said  to  be  possible  to 
the  omnipotence  of  the  divine  will.  This  potentia  absoluta  of 
God  has  only  one  limit,  i.  e.,  the  logically  impossible  (iv.  d.  10, 
q.  2,  5,  11).  God  can,  therefore,  according  to  his  absolute 
power,  save  the  already  lost  Judas ;  but  he  cannot  give  eternal 
blessedness  to  a  stone,  nor  make  undone  what  has  been  done. 
But  by  the  side  of  this  absolute  power  stands  the  ordained  power 
( potentia  ordinata')  of  God,  i.  e.y  the  manifestations  of  divine 
power  upon  the  ground  and  within  the  bounds  of  laws  and  ordi¬ 
nances  fixed — arbitrarily — by  God  himself.  God  commonly 
works  according  to  his  ordained  power,  but  it  is  also  conceivable 
that  he  may,  upon  occasion,  by  virtue  of  his  absolute  power, 
vary  from  the  course  of  the  former,  or  entirely  abolish  it.  For 
example,  the  rule  that  no  one  shall  receive  glory  who  has  not  ac¬ 
cepted  grace  might  be  abrogated  (i.  d.  44,  §  1-4).  Duns  con¬ 
ducts  this  whole  discussion  under  the  heading  of  the  conception 
of  God  as  the  absolute  Being ;  but  it  affords  evidence  that  he 
held  ideas  of  God  far  transcending  the  limits  of  such  a  scheme. 
This  is  proved  especially  by  his  important  theory,  that  the  sum 
total  of  the  relations  of  God  to  the  world  is  to  be  described  as 
Love.  This  idea  he  develops  as  follows  :  God  wills,  or  loves, 
himself.  As  now  all  being  originates  in  God,  it  is  subject  to 
God  as  its  final  end,  and  has,  therefore,  a  share  in  the  love 
which  God  exercises  toward  himself  (iii.  d.  32,  §  2).  This  love 
embraces,  accordingly,  the  whole  creation,  its  present  and  its 
future.  But  the  creation  is  a  composite  with  a  gradation  of  its 


J52 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


parts  according  to  their  relations  to  the  final  end.  This  relation¬ 
ship  decides  in  every  separate  case  the  measure  of  the  divine 
love  to  be  bestowed.  This  produces  the  following  scheme  :  (a) 
God  loves  himself.  (6)  He,  therefore,  loves  that  which  has  im¬ 
mediate  relation  to  himself  as  its  final  end,  or  elect  men,  i.  e., 
God  wills  that  there  shall  be  men  who,  with  himself,  love  him, 
and  this  loving  will  is  predestination.  (V)  The  divine  love  then 
directs  itself  upon  the  means  for  the  realizing  of  this  predestina¬ 
tion,  i.  e.f  the  ordinances  of  grace,  (h/)  Finally,  God,  for  the 
sake  of  the  elect,  wills  the  more  remote  means,  i.  e.,  the  visible 
world  (1.  c.,  §  6).1 

The  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  need  not  long  detain  us.  Duns, 
in  the  traditional  way,  deduces  the  Son  from  the  divine  thought, 
and  the  Spirit  from  the  divine  will  (i.  d.  2,  q.  7,  3). 

But  it  is  not  at  this  point  that  the  historical  significance  of 
Duns’  conception  of  God  is  to  be  seen,  but  in  the  fact  that  God  is 
here,  more  clearly  and  distinctly  than  in  the  writings  of  Thomas, 
conceived  as  a  thinking  and  willing  personality,  and  that  love  is 
recognized  as  the  content  of  the  divine  activity  in  the  world. 
But  since  Duns  made  the  arbitrary  will  of  God  the  source  of  all 
things,  faith  in  the  traditional  formulas  concerning  the  harmony 
and  order  of  the  universe  was  shattered.  It  was,  accordingly, 

1  Some  further  remarks  upon  the  views  of  Duns  upon  predestination  are 
needful.  Although  he  did  not  attach  much  practical  importance  to  the  doc¬ 
trine,  he  yet  applied  it  theoretically  with  great  zeal.  The  question,  whether  a 
predestinated  person  can  be  lost,  he  answers  in  the  affirmative,  since  God 
might  have  willed  the  one  as  well  as  the  other  (i.  d.  40,  $  1,  2).  God  can, 
therefore,  predestinate  any  person,  or  he  can  fail  to  predestinate  him.  Duns 
answers  the  objection,  that  predestination  leads  to  immortality,  by  asserting  that 
the  will  of  God  cannot  be  limited  from  without  ($3)-  The  current  concep¬ 
tion,  that  predestination  depends  upon  prescience,  he  refutes  by  observing  that 
God  always  foresees  all  contingent  events  in  their  dependence  upon  the  divine 
will,  and,  therefore,  the  good  deeds  of  men  appear  as  determined  by  the  divine 
will  (i.  d.  41,  $  10).  Besides,  this  would  not  apply  to  children  dying  in  in¬ 
fancy,  who  are,  without  any  deeds  of  theirs,  either  elected  or  reprobated. 
Duns  himself  teaches  that  predestination  has  no  ground  whatever  upon  man’s 
part ;  for  the  divine  will  that  any  creature  be  saved  exists  before  faith  or  good 
works,  and  hence  the  latter  cannot  under  any  circumstances  constitute  the 
ground  of  the  former  (ib.  §  11).  In  reprobation,  it  is  true,  it  appears  neces¬ 
sary  to  grant  such  a  ground  in  man,  the  foreseen  final  sin,  since  otherwise  the 
justice  of  the  sentence  cannot  well  be  conceived  (ib.).  The  difficulties  thus 
remaining  were  not  overlooked  by  Duns.  He  suggests,  further,  that  it  be  sup¬ 
posed  that  God,  while  predestinating  Peter  to  glory  and  then  to  grace,  in  re¬ 
gard  to  Judas,  determined  nothing  at  all,  but,  on  the  contrary,  willed  that  both 
belong  to  the  “mass  of  perdition.”  Inasmuch  as  the  first-named  act  of  the 
divine  will  had  relation  to  Peter,  he  receives  grace  and  eternal  life,  while 
Judas  is  simply  left  to  perdition  (£  12).  The  discussion  closes  with  a  warning 
against  prying  into  such  matters,  and  an  exhortation  that  everyone  be  allowed 
to  hold  his  own  opinion,  only  so  that  the  divine  freedom  be  guarded  against 
any  charge  of  unrighteousness  ($  13). 


THEOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


*53 


no  longer  eternal  ideas  and  laws,  but  the  positive  activity  of  God, 
which  constituted  the  material  of  religious  knowledge.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  powerful  weapon  was,  by  this  new  conception  of 
God,  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  critics  of  the  traditional  teach¬ 
ings  of  the  church.  If  the  illogical  is  to  be  acknowledged  as 
frequently  true,  may  not  the  logical  also  be  false  ?  And  when 
once  the  idea  of  absolute  power  has  been  admitted,  may  not 
anything  be  regarded  asconceivable,  as  possible,  or  as  allowable  ? 

4.  The  sinlessness  of  man  in  paradise  was,  in  and  of  itself,  only 
potential,  since  the  will  as  such  always  involves  the  possibility  of 
sinning.  The  actual  innocence  of  the  first  pair  can,  therefore, 
be  explained  only  by  their  possession  of  their  additional  endow¬ 
ment,  the  donum  supe?'additum  (ii.  d.  23,  §  6,  7).  There  is  in 
man  by  nature,  in  consequence  of  the  existence  of  the  sensuous 
impulses  together  with  the  reason  and  will,  an  inward  rebellion. 
Only  the  imparted  supernatural  habitus  of  grace  is  able  to  sub¬ 
ject  the  lower  forces  to  the  higher  (ii.  d.  29,  §  4).  If,  there¬ 
fore,  concupiscence,  or  the  rebellion  of  the  sensuous  nature 
against  the  spirit,  belongs  to  the  original  human  nature,  original 
sin  cannot  possibly  consist  in  concupiscence.  Original  Sin,  on 
the  contrary,  is  to  be  described  as  only  a  want  ( carentia )  of  orig¬ 
inal  righteousness  (d.  30,  q.  2.  3).  It  has  as  its  material  con¬ 
cupiscence,  but  this  gains  control  and  becomes  sin  only  through 
the  loss  of  the  restraining  rein  ( frenum  cohibens ,  d.  32,  §  7). 
This  view  presents  the  question  of  the  propagation  of  sin  in  a 
new  light.  Duns  opposes  the  theory  of  physical  inheritance. 
If  sin  is  in  the  will,  how  can  the  latter  make  the  whole  body 
sick  ?  And  if  this  were  the  case,  why  should  the  seed  only,  and 
not  the  spittle  and  blood  as  well,  be  infected?  Or  again,  how 
should  the  inherited  physical  condition  transform  the  will?  (d.  32, 
§  4  f. ).  The  solution  must  be  reached  from  another  direction. 
Since  the  original  righteousness  was  bestowed  upon  Adam  for 
himself  and  his  posterity,  it  is  a  righteousness  which  they  now 
owe,  a  justitia  debita.  “By  virtue  of  such  a  gift,  the  will  of 
every  child  of  his  becomes  a  debtor  ”  (ib.  §  8-1 2 ).1  Concep¬ 
tion  demands  attention  in  the  case  only  as  being  that  which 
makes  man  a  child  of  Adam.  Only  as  descended  from  Adam,  is 
he  a  debtor  to  the  righteousness  granted  to  the  latter  (§  17). 
It  is  evident  that  the  Augustinian  theory  of  original  sin  is  here 

1  It  does  not  harmonize  with  this,  that  Duns  asserts  that  our  first  parents 
could  not  have  transmitted  their  righteousness  to  their  posterity  (ii.  d.  20,  q. 
1,3).  He  maintains,  therefore,  in  this  passage  that  had  Adam  not  fallen, 
God  would  by  co-operation  have  regularly  imparted  grace  to  the  children  of 
the  race.  This  is,  however,  nothing  more  than  a  postulate — to  account  in 
some  way  for  the  inheritance  of  sin — in  the  doctrinal  system  of  Duns. 


*54 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


surrendered  in  its  fundamental  principle.  In  place  of  the  phys¬ 
ical  propagation  of  the  original  concupiscence,  is  posited  the 
ideal  obligation  of  every  child  of  Adam  to  the  supernatural  right¬ 
eousness  once  granted  to  Adam.1 

The  teaching  of  Duns  in  regard  to  Actual  Sin  is  in  keeping  with 
this  theory  of  original  sin.  The  former  is  a  defect  in  the  will. 
Instead  of  loving  the  supreme  good,  or  God,  the  will  of  man 
rests  content  with  an  earthly  end  as  its  supreme  good.  He  thus 
offends  also  against  the  divine  law  revealed  to  him  (d.  37,  q.  1, 
6  f. ). 

5.  We  may,  perhaps,  venture  the  opinion  that  the  Christology 
of  Duns  displays  a  higher  appreciation  of  the  human  life  of 
(  Christ  than  is  manifested  by  the  other  great  Scholastics.  This 
is  noticeable  especially  in  his  discussions  of  the  impartation  of 
grace  to  the  soul  of  Jesus  (iii.  d.  13,  q.  1.  3),  and  of  the  knowl¬ 
edge  of  Jesus  (iii.  d.  14),  in  which  he  maintains  that  the  soul  of 
Jesus  by  its  union  with  the  Logos  possessed  at  least  an  in¬ 
herent  ( habituale )  knowledge  of  all  universals,  but  that  it  was 
subject  to  the  necessity  of  gaining  a  progressive  knowledge  of  the 
individual  and  the  contingent,  so  that  Lk.  ii.  40  is  to  be  under¬ 
stood  of  a  real  progress  (1.  c.,  q.  2.  16,  20;  q.  3.  6£f.).  It  is 
granted  also  that  pain  could  penetrate  to  the  higher  part  of  the 
soul  of  Jesus  (ib.  q.  15).  Merit  likewise  is  attributed  to  the 
human  nature  of  Christ.  He  merited  the  favor  of  God,  because 
he  did  not  yield  to  his  sensuous  desires.  He  could  merit  by 
fasting,  watching,  and  prayer  (iii.  d.  18,  §  4-6).  But  all  of  this 
does  not  extend  to  the  experiences  and  visions  of  the  person  of 
Jesus  which  occur  so  abundantly  in  the  devotional  literature  of 
the  Middle  Ages  (supra,  p.  89  f. ).  This  is  to  be  acounted  for  by 
the  fact  that  Duns  clings  unalterably  to'  the  christological  scheme 
of  the  ancient  church,  which  he,  like  the  other  Scholastics,  in¬ 
terprets  after  the  manner  of  Abelard.  The  union  is  a  relation 
of  subordination  ( relatio  ordi?iis ),  a  relation  of  dependence  of 
the  human  upon  the  divine  nature,  a  relation  which  maybe  com¬ 
pared  to  that  between  attribute  and  substance  (iii.  d.  1,  q.  1.  3). 
The  divine  nature  is  in  no  wise  limited  by  its  relation  to  the  hu¬ 
man.  The  latter,  in  the  moment  of  its  genesis,  subordinates 
itself  to  the  divine  nature  and  receives  at  once  and  thereby  from 

1  Duns  abolished  the  conception  of  original  sin,  or  substituted  for  it  that  of 
original  debt.  But  the  substitution,  although  aiming  to  maintain  the  idea  of 
guilt,  or  debt,  cannot  be  regarded  as  satisfactory,  for  it  fails  to  afford  that 
which  it  is  the  province  of  the  theory  of  original-  sin  to  furnish,  i.  <?.,  to  ex¬ 
plain  the  universality  and  depth  of  the  conviction  of  guilt.  If  God  withdrew 
righteousness  from  Adam,  and  this  could  be  bestowed  upon  his  descendants 
only  by  a  special  divine  act,  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the  sense  of  guilt  can  be 
traced  to  the  concupiscence  originally  inhering  in  human  nature. 


THEOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


155 


the  latter  its  personality  (ib.  §9;  d.  2,  q.  2.  12).  A  human 
personality,  or  separate  existence,  of  Jesus  is  in  no  wise  to  be 
maintained  (d.  5,  q.  2.  4).  It  has  not  even  an  independent  ex¬ 
istence  (esse).  It  has  its  existence  from  the  divine  Logos- 
person,  as  my  foot  exists  only  by  virtue  of  my  existence  (d.  6, 
q.  1.  2  ff. ).  The  proposition  :  God  became  man,  is  not  an  ac¬ 
curate  statement.  The  becoming  was  only  an  experience  of  the 
man,  not  of  the  Logos.  To  speak  properly,  we  should  say  : 
“  the  human  nature  is  united  personally  with  the  Word  ’ ’  (d.  7,  q. 
2.  5  ff.  ).  There  is  a  unity  of  the  two  natures,  which  consists  in 
the  union,  i.  e. ,  in  the  relation  of  the  one  to  the  other  (iii.  d.  1, 
q.  2.  io).1  These  conceptions  do  not  indicate  an  advance  in  the 
knowledge  of  the  subject.  The  doctrine  of  Duns  is  certainly 
orthodox,  but  it  is,  in  consequence,  not  clear.  Shall  it  really 
be  thought  possible  for  us  to  think  of  that  human  nature  which 
resists  the  allurements  of  sensuality  in  order  to  merit  the  divine 
favor  as  absolutely  impersonal — as  something  which,  with  no 
existence  of  its  own,  has  been  united  as  an  attribute  to  the  infi¬ 
nite  divinity  of  the  Logos?  The  two  currents  of  medieval 
Christology — as  represented  in  Abelard  and  Bernard — here 
meet,  and  it  is  evident  that  they  will  not  unite — not,  at  least,  in 
the  channel  of  the  traditional  formulas.  The  rational  Chris¬ 
tology  of  Abelard  discriminated  sharply  between  the  finite  and 
the  infinite,  in  order  to  insure  the  independence  of  the  finite ; 
while  the  pious  reflection  of  Bernard  beheld  in  the  human  words 
and  deeds  of  the  finite  Jesus  the  revelation  of  the  love  of  the  infinite 
God.  Abelard  was  mainly  concerned  for  the  humanity  of  Jesus, 
but  he  in  reality  promoted  the  undue  emphasizing  of  his  divinity. 
Bernard  sought  the  ever-present  heavenly  Son  of  God,  and  he 
awakened  and  deepened  appreciation  for  the  humanity  of  Jesus. 
Abelard’s  ideas  adapted  themselves  to  the  traditional  formulas, 
found  a  place  in  the  dogmatic  system  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and 
have  endured  beyond  that  period.  Bernard’s  ideas  were  not  ac¬ 
cepted  by  the  dogmatic  system  of  the  Middle  Ages,  but  they  in¬ 
fluenced  the  life  of  the  age,  and  thus  frequently  made  inroads 
upon  the  logical  consistency  of  the  dogmatic  formulas.  An  illus¬ 
tration  of  this  may  be  seen  in  the  portraiture  by  Duns  of  the  man 
Jesus  as  acting  meritoriously. 

6.  Duns  confessedly  owed  something  of  his  repute  to  his 
championship  of  the  Immaculate  Conception  of  the  Virgin 

1  During  his  stay  in  Hades,  Christ  was  not  a  man,  as,  e.  g.,  the  Lombard 
teaches.  For  in  his  state  of  death  the  various  parts  of  the  human  nature  were 
not  really  united  with  the  divinity  of  Christ,  although  they  may  have  still  ex¬ 
isted.  Vid.  iii.  d.  22,  §  18  ff.  Christ  was,  hence,  in  Hades  only  according 
to  his  divinity. 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


*56 

Mary.  He  casts  doubt  upon  the  then  current  opinion  that,  since 
Mary  was  born  of  sinful  seed,  it  was  necessary  for  Christ  to  be 
her  Saviour  as  well  as  her  Son.  The  argument  drawn  from  the 
sinfulness  of  the  seed  had  no  force  for  Duns.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  would  appear  fitting  that  Christ  should  merit  salvation 
for  the  person  most  nearly  related  to  him  in  an  absolutely  perfect 
way,  i.  e.,  in  such  away  that  she  should  remain  free  from  origi¬ 
nal  sin. 

As  God  blots  out  original  sin  in  baptism,  so  can  he  also  do 
in  the  moment  of  conception.  Christ’s  passion  was  then  accepted 
in  advance  by  God  as  the  means  of  her  salvation  (iii.  d.  3,  q. 
1.  3  f.,  9,  14,  17).  Mary,  therefore,  remained  entirely  un¬ 
tainted  by  sin.  Her  descent  from  Adam  does  not  of  itself  in¬ 
volve  sinfulness.  Even  if  we  should  hold  that  the  soul  origi¬ 
nates  through  generation  in  the  moment  of  conception,  it  would 
not  be  necessary  to  regard  Mary  as  sinful,  since  God  could  in¬ 
fuse  grace  into  the  soul  in  the  very  moment  when  it  comes  into 
being  (ib.  §  17,  20).  Measured  by  the  doctrine  of  Duns  upon 
original  sin,  the  advantage  enjoyed  by  Mary  is  none  too  marked. 
The  whole  subject  in  Duns  is  treated  rather  as  a  theological  hy¬ 
pothesis,  not  at  all  as  a  doctrine  of  any  special  importance. 

7.  We  turn  now  to  the  work  of  Redemption.  Duns  denies 
the  infinity  of  the  merit  of  Christ.  The  merit  of  Christ  is  a  ' 
matter  of  his  human  will ;  it  is  the  obedience  which  he  rendered 
(iii.  d.  19,  §  4  ;  iv.  d.  2,  q.  1.7).  Hence,  as  the  human  will 
of  Christ  is  finite,  so  is  also  the  merit  which  he  gains  through  its 
exercise  (iii.  d.  19,  §5).  This  merit  of  Christ  was  foreseen  by  God 
as  the  means  of  human  redemption.  The  divine  predestination 
embraces  that  merit  as  the  means  of  realizing  its  purpose.  The  pas¬ 
sion  of  Christ  was  therefore  foreordained  from  eternity  by  God  as 
the  means  for  the  salvation  of  the  predestinated.  To  it  belongs 
a  peculiar  value  and  a  special  efficacy,  not  in  and  of  itself,  but 
by  virtue  of  the  foreordination  of  the  divine  will,  which  foreor¬ 
dained  this  means  and  will  accept  it  as  effectual  (1.  c.  ,  §  6).  The 
merit  of  Christ  is  not  of  itself  good,  nor  is  it  of  itself  a  means 
of  salvation,  but  it  is  the  divine  will  alone  that  makes  it  the  one 
or  the  other  (§7).  It  might,  indeed,  of  itself  avail  for  all  men, 
but  it  was  God’s  will  that  its  efficiency  should  be  limited  to  the 
predestinated  (§  14). 

But  was  the  precise  form  of  Christ’s  sufferings,  or  any  render¬ 
ing  of  satisfaction,  necessary  to  man’s  salvation  ?  Duns  raises 
this  question  in  a  criticism  of  Anselm’s  theory.  He  disputes, 
first  of  all,  the  necessity  of  a  satisfaction,  which  he  holds  to  have 
been  necessary  only  because  God  so  willed.  But  it  was  not  nec¬ 
essary  that  God  should  will  it,  just  as  the  salvation  of  men  is 


THEOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


*57 


itself  not  a  necessary,  but  a  contingent,  act  of  God  (iii.  d.  20, 
§7).  But  even  granting  the  necessity  of  satisfaction,  it  would 
still  by  no  means  follow  that  the  one  rendering  it  must  be  God. 
It  is  not  correct  to  say  that  something  greater  than  the  whole  crea¬ 
tion  must  be  offered  up  to  God.  Any  pious  act  of  Adam  would 
have  sufficed  to  atone  for  his  first  sin  (ib.  §  8).  Just  as  little 
can  the  demand  that  satisfaction  must  proceed  from  a  man  be 
strictly  proved.  The  value  (of  the  sacrifice)  does  not  lie  in  the 
offered  object  as  such,  but  in  the  acceptance  by  the  divine  will. 
But  it  is  perfectly  conceivable  that  God  might  will  to  accept  the 
deed  of  an  angel,  or  of  a  sinless  man,  as  a  sufficient  atonement. 
Yea,  it  would  even  be  conceivable  that  every  sinful  man  might 
have  rendered  satisfaction  for  himself,  if  God  should,  by  im¬ 
parting  the  primary  grace  (( gratia  prima ),  qualify  him  for  meri¬ 
torious  action  and  accept  this  as  a  satisfaction  (§9).  In  this  crit¬ 
icism  it  is  plainly  to  be  seen  that  the  conception  of  God  enter¬ 
tained  by  Duns  excludes  all  necessity  for  the  occurrence  of  the 
events  connected  with  the  passion  of  Christ.  That  which  came 
to  pass,  came  to  pass  according  to  God’s  free  will  ;  and  entirely 
different  occurrences  were  in  themselves  conceivable.  That 
which  has  actually  occurred  is,  God  has  willed  ;  but  who  will 
prescribe  to  him  that  he  has  been  compelled  so  to  will  ?  This 
idea  is  a  gain  as  compared  with  the  rationalistic  speculation  of 
Anselm. 

Duns  gave  but  a  brief  positive  response  to  the  above  question. 
Christ  suffered  “  for  the  sake  of  righteousness.”  He  beheld  the 
sins  of  the  Jews  and  their  perverted  adherence  to  the  law. 
Christ  willed  “  to  recall  them  from  that  error  through  his  works 
and  discourses.”  He  declared  to  them  the  truth,  and  died  for 
righteousness.  To  this  is  to  be  added,  that  since  he  offered  his 
passion  in  our  behalf  to  the  Father,  he  bound  us  to  himself,  and 
thus  to  God,  with  fetters  of  gratitude.  “Therefore  he  did  this 
chiefly,  as  I  believe,  to  allure  us  to  his  love,  and  because  he 
wished  man  to  be  more  securely  bound  to  God  ”  (§  10).  This 
theory  of  satisfaction  follows  most  closely  the  type  of  Abelard, 
although  Duns  declares  it  possible  to  make  use  of  Anselm’s  ideas, 
if  “divine  ordination  be  presupposed  ”  (§  10).  From  another 
passage  we  may  gather  how  Duns  conceived  the  objective  side  of 
the  atonement.  God  will  not  forgive  the  sins  of  the  transgressor 
unless  something  be  offered  to  him  which  pleases  him  more  than 
the  sins  of  mankind  displease  him.  This  could  only  be  the  obe¬ 
dience  of  a  person  more  fervently  loved  by  God  than  mankind 
would  have  been  loved  b>Hiim  had  they  not  sinned.  This  was 
the  person  of  Christ,  who  in  his  obedience  offered  the  highest 
love  in  enduring  death  for  righteousness’  sake  (iv.  d.  2,  q.  1.  7). 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


153 

For  the  sake  of  the  obedience  and  the  love  of  Christ,  God  be¬ 
stows  grace  upon  mankind.  There  is  thus  attested  in  the  activity 
of  Christ,  as  in  the  divine  act  of  deliverance,  the  combined  action 
of  mercy  and  righteousness  (ib.  §  8). 

The  theory  of  redemption  held  by  Duns  embraces  thus  two 
leading  thoughts:  (1)  The  pious  obedience,  or  the  love,  of 
Jesus  is,  according  to  the  will  of  God,  acknowledged  as  meri¬ 
torious  and  employed  as  the  means  of  bestowing  grace  upon  man. 
(2)  This  activity  of  Christ,  sealed  by  his  death,  has  conquered 
mankind  and  incited  them  to  love  and  gratitude.  The  obedi¬ 
ence  and  love  of  Jesus  thus  became  the  occasion,  on  the  one 
hand,'  for  the  bestowal  of  grace  by  God,  and,  on  the  other,  for 
the  renewal  of  mankind.1 

8.  The  essential  result  of  the  work  of  Christ  is,  therefore, 
that  he  merited  for  us  the  impartation  of  Grace.  This  leads  us 
to  examine  the  conception  of  grace.  By  this  term,  as  gratia  creata 
(supra,  p.  n8f. ),  Duns  understands  the  habitus  of  love,  created 
in  man,  which  inclines  the  will  to  meritorious  works  (ii.  d.  27, 
§3).  Thi  s  habitus  equips  man  with  a  worthiness  (Kdignitas') ,  “which 
consists  in  a  correspondence  of  merit  to  reward,  ’  ’  by  virtue  of 
which  man  becomes  dear  to  God  (§  4).  Grace  is  a  co-operating 

1  Duns  himself  did  not  effect  a  combination  of  these  two  lines  of  thought, 
having  treated  the  questions  involved  but  briefly.  This  may  be  attempted  in 
various  ways.  It  may  be  said,  for  example,  that  the  love  of  Christ  trans¬ 
formed  the  character  of  men,  and  that  this  became  the  ground  of  God’s  dis¬ 
play  of  grace  toward  them.  If  we  would  gain  a  proper  understanding  of  the 
view  of  Duns,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  he  conceived  the  entire  work  of  sal¬ 
ivation  and  grace  under  the  scheme  of  means  and  end  (supra,  p.  152).  In  the 
will  of  God,  priority  is  given  to  the  glorification  and  gracious  acceptance  of  the 
elect  above  the  mission  of  Christ  as  the  means  of  effecting  grace  and  of  conse¬ 
quent  glory.  If  we  now  apply  this  scheme,  further,  to  the  two  aspects  of  the 
work  of  Christ  in  the  writings  of  Duns,  the  logical  priority  must  be  given  to 
the  manward  aspect,  since  the  object  of  the  work  of  Christ  is  to  win  the  elect. 
From  this  we  might  derive  the  thought :  that,  in  order  to  be  able  to  awaken  love 
and  gratitude  in  men,  Christ  used  his  influence  with  the  Father  to  secure  the  be¬ 
stowal  of  grace.  But  I  doubt  whether  this  was  the  idea  of  Duns,  for  he  does  not  by 
a  single  word  suggest  that  the  granting  of  grace  is  the  condition  upon  which  alone 
the  love  and  example  of  Christ  can  become  effectual.  On  the  contrary,  Christ 
exerted  the  latter  influence  upon  the  Jews — before  grace  had  been  bestowed.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  we  seek  to  combine  the  two  aspects  in  the  activity  of  Christ 
in  the  way  first  suggested,  thus  making  the  influence  exerted  upon  God  de¬ 
pendent  upon  the  result  secured  in  man,  we  come  into  direct  conflict  with  the 
fundamental  tenor  of  the  discussion.  It  follows  that  the  two  conceptions  are 
not  to  be  subordinated  the  one  to  the  other,  but  to  be  co-ordinated — perhaps 
somewhat  as  follows :  Christ  lived  among  men  and  prepared  them  for  the  grace 
which  he  secured  from  the  Father,  or,  Christ  secured  grace  from  the  Father  for 
the  men  whom  he  by  his  life  won  for  the  Father.  Thus,  too,  would  the  rela¬ 
tion  of  Christ  and  his  work  to  the  human  race  become  intelligible.  The  im¬ 
portant  thought,  that  Christ  is  the  head  of  the  race,  which  we  find  in  Thomas, 
is  lacking  in  Duns. 


THEOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


*59 


principle  (principium  co-operans)  beside  the  will  (ii.  d.  7,  §  15). 
Meritorius  conduct  results  therefore  from  the  working  together  of 
the  will-power  and  the  habitus  (i.  d.  17,  q.  2.  8).  Since  the  will 
without  the  habitus  can  produce  an  act,  but  not  the  habitus  with¬ 
out  the  will,  the  leading  part  in  this  co-operation  appears  to  be¬ 
long  to  the  will.  The  habitus  simply  complements  the  act  (ib. 
§  9),  or  it  stimulates  to  its  performance  (§  12).  The  habitus 
is,  therefore,  a  certain  supernatural  influence  which  gives  to  the 
will  an  inclinatio  to  action  and  secures  the  performance  of  the 
action  ‘ 4  with  delight,  promptly  and  expeditiously”  (ib.).  It 
appears,  however,  since  action  without  the  habitus  is  perfectly 
conceivable,  that  the  former  has  no  need  of  the  latter.  But 
then  man  would  act  meritoriously  by  his  natural  powers  alone 
(ex  solis  naturalibus) ,  which  would  be  a  Pelagian  doctrine. 
There  must  therefore  be  a  supernatural  form,  which  shall  imprint 
its  character  upon  man’s  actions  without  limiting  his  own  activity, 
and  thus  also  his  merit !  fib.  q.  3.  18,  19). 

But  it  may  be  urged  against  the  doctrine  of  the  Habitus,  that 
experience  does  not  attest  it,  since  the  moral  acts  referred  to 
may  very  readily  be  realized  without  it  (q.  3.  21).  Dunssilently 
acknowledges  this.  But  it  is  not  only  our  separate  acts,  he  holds, 
which  are  acceptable  to  God,  but  our  whole  nature,  and  the 
ground  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  the  habitus  (ib.  §  22).  Of  the 
habitus  it  is  to  be  said  :  “  That  this  habitus,  beyond  that  which  is 
decorous,  is  a  spiritual  (power)  inclining  to  determinate  actions  ’  ’ 
(§  23).  The  acceptance  of  an  act,  on  the  other  hand,  as  meritor¬ 
ious  is  entirely  a  matter  of  the  divine  will  (iv.  d.  22,  qu.  un.  §  9  ) . 
We  may,  therefore,  discriminate  in  an  act  between  its  substance  and 
its  meritorious  quality.  In  the  former  aspect,  the  will  occupies  the 
place  of  prominence  ;  in  the  latter,  the  habitus  has  greater  influ¬ 
ence,  since  an  act  appears  more  worthy  of  reward  when  begotten 
of  love  than  when  begotten  of  free  will  (§  27).  The  act  re¬ 
ceives  its  value  in  the  sight  of  God — according  to  divine  appoint¬ 
ment — from  the  fact  that  grace  co-operates  in  its  production. 
The  habitus  is  the  rider,  the  will  the  steed.  As  the  steed  can 
have  value  for  anyone  only  in  so  far  as  it  carries  the  rider  to  a 
definite  goal,  so  the  act,  produced  in  the  first  instance  by  the  will, 
is  made  valuable  in  the  sight  of  God  only  through  its  connection 
with  the  habitus  (§  28). 1  It  can  hardly  be  said  that  this  con- 

1  Very  interesting  are  the  remarks  of  Duns,  1.  c.,  $  28  :  As  every  intellec¬ 
tual  capacity  necessarily  bears  within  itself  the  intelligible  object,  so  must 
also  the  moral  habituality,  to  a  certain  extent,  bear  in  itself  the  lovable  good. 
When  now  this  habitus  incites  to  activity,  the  resulting  action  will  be  directed 
toward  the  good  embraced  in  the  habitus.  Since  the  habitus  receives  its 
power  essentially  from  the  object  toward  which  it  is  directed,  its  influence  may 


i6o 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


ception  of  the  supernatural  habitus  has  been  made  perfectly  plain, 
still  less  that  its  necessity  has  been  clearly  demonstrated  !  Duns 
retained  the  traditional  physical  conception  of  grace,  but  he  sub¬ 
limated  it  as  far  as  possible.  Grace  is  for  him  not  the  material 
of  Christian  acts,  but  really  only  a  something  which  gives  to  man 
a  new  direction,  an  inclination  toward  God,  and  a  value  in  his 
sight.  Duns  recognized  the  fact  that  there  was  really  no  need 
of  the  gratia  creata,  and  we  can  easily  understand  why  he  was 
unable  to  make  use  of  it  in  his  expositions  of  the  moral  life. 
Thus  the  will  remained,  after  all,  as  the  chief  cause  of  human  con¬ 
duct.  But  was  not  Duns,  nevertheless,  nearer  in  his  views  to  the 
proper  evangelical  conception  of  the  matter  than  Thomas,  or  even 
than  Augustine  himself? 

And  what  was  his  conception  of  Justification  ?  He  discusses 
it  in  connection  with  the  sacrament  of  repentance.1  We  select 
the  doctrine  of  the  attritio  as  our  starting-point.  This  is  sup¬ 
posed  to  establish  a  merit  of  fitness  (de  co?igruo') ,  as  a  preparation 
for  the  achievement  of  justification.  This  half-penitence  is, 
therefore,  meritorious,  and  through  it  man  merits  justification 
(iv.  d.  14,  q.  2.  14,  15  ;  cf.  d.  19,  §  32).  But  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  the  final  cause  is  not  really  the  human  merit 
as  such,  but  the  will  of  God  which  has  appointed  this  relation¬ 
ship.  Duns  discriminates  in  justification  between  the  infusion  of 
grace  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins  (iv.  d.  16,  q.  1.  4).  The 
former  is  an  actual  change  ( mutatio  realis),  for  before  grace  is 
infused  it  has  no  existence.  The  forgiveness  of  sins,  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  is  only  an  ideal  change,  since  it  calls  into  existence  noth¬ 
ing  essentially  new  in  man  (ib.  §  6),  and  the  guilt  of  man  is  no 
real  entity,  but  only  the  ideal  relationship  to  the  desert  of  pun¬ 
ishment  (§7).  Even  in  God,  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  no  sep¬ 
arate  act,  but  God  never  wills  that  any  man  be  punished  without 
also  willing  that — under  certain  definite  conditions — he  be  no  more 
punished,  and  he,  likewise,  never  wills  that  any  man  be  not  pun¬ 
ished  without  willing  also  that,  under  certain  conditions,  punish- 
ment  be  meted  out  to  him  (ib.  §  12).  If  the  forgiveness  of  sins  thus 
denotes  only  the  ideal  and  conditional  change,  that  the  one  lia¬ 
ble  to  punishment  ( puniendus )  becomes  no  longer  liable  to  pun¬ 
ishment  ( non  puniendus') ,  the  infusion  of  grace  is,  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  a  real  change.  It  is  the  factor  which  really  effects  justifi- 

be  ascribed  essentially  to  the  activity  of  the  said  object.  But  that  is  merely  to 
say,  that  the  direction  of  man’s  activity  toward  God  gives  to  his  conduct  its 
value  and  character. 

1  This  is,  therefore,  the  appropriate  connection  in  which  the  conception  of 
justification  stands.  Cf.,  e.g.,  Carthusian,  iv.  d.  17,  q.  I,  2.  This  corresponds 
with  the  practical  situation  of  the  day. 


THEOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


161 


cation.  And,  as  the  infusion  of  grace  is  more  intimately  related 
to  the  object,  i.  e. ,  to  the  glorification  and  gracious  acceptance 
of  man,  than  is  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  the  former  has  the  priority 
in  the  divine  will ;  but  in  the  actual  execution  of  that  will  in 
time,  the  order  is  reversed,  and  stands  :  first,  forgiveness  of  sins, 
then  infusion  of  grace  (§  19.  Cf.  i.  d.  17,  q.  3.  19  :  “  that 
God  naturally  remits  an  offense  before  he  gives  grace  to  him,  ’  ’  i.  e. , 
the  offender).1  Here,  too,  Thomas  taught  differently  (supra,  p. 

1 21).  Duns  denies  a  causal  connection  of  the  two  processes, 
since  neither  can  be  logically  deduced  from  the  other  (§  19). 

Such  is  the  doctrine  of  grace  according  to  Duns.  By  attrition 
man  secures  the  merit  of  fitness.  He  is  thereby  prepared  for  the 
reception  of  justification,  or  the  infusion  of  grace,  particularly  in 
the  sacrament  of  repentance  ;  and  this  enables  him  to  do  meri¬ 
torious  works.  These  are  ideas  which  became  controlling  forces 
in  the  Scholasticism  of  the  later  Middle  Ages.  But  along  with 
them  we  note,  as  also  characteristic,  the  separation  of  forgive¬ 
ness  of  sin  and  infusion  of  grace,  and  the  spiritualizing  of  the 
conception  of  grace.  The  ideas  of  Duns  served  as  a  support  for 
the  superficial  praxis  of  the  church,  but,  considered  in  their  en¬ 
tire  connection,  they  were  nearly  always  directed  against  the 
Augustinian  foundations  underlying  this  praxis.  In  illustration, 
we  recall  the  statement,  that  there  is  really  no  such  thing  as 
“  merit  ’  ’  in  itself  considered,  but  that  God  accepts  certain  definite 
acts  as  merits  ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  challenge  :  If  every¬ 
thing  depends  upon  the  divine  acceptance,  to  what  end  then  the 
gradation  of  merits  ? 

9.  At  this  point  the  doctrine  of  the  Sacraments  finds  its  place, 
for  it  is  through  the  latter  that  grace  is  infused  into  man.  As  we 
have  already  considered  them  in  §  58,  we  here  recall  only  the  chief 
principle  involved.  The  sacraments  are  symbols,  which  signify  the 
working  of  grace,  and  which,  by  virtue  of  a  divine  covenant,  pro¬ 
duce  in  the  soul  a  creative  act  of  God  concurrent  with  their  re¬ 
ception.  We  may  describe  the  sacrament  as,  to  a  certain  extent, 
a  cause  of  grace  {causa gratiae) ,  inasmuch  as  it,  as  it  were,  com¬ 
pels  the  accompanying  presence  of  grace  (sent.  iv.  d.  i,q.  5.  12). 
The  critical  ability  of  Duns  is  here  also  displayed  (criticism  of 
the  “  character  ”),  as  well  as  a  certain  inclination  to  differently 
interpret  and  refine  the  traditional  conceptions  (repentance  and 
the  Lord’s  Supper). 

1  In  this  order,  Duns  follows,  as  far  as  I  can  see,  the  course  of  Robert 
Grosseteste  in  the  tractate,  De  gratia  et  justificatione  hominis  (in  Brown, 
Fascicul.  rer.  expetendarum  et  fugiendaruni,  1690,  append.  282.  Cf.  Wiclif, 
De  dominio  divin.  iii.  5»  P*  246  £»  ed.  Poole).  So  also  Wilhelm  v.  Paris, 
opp.  ii.  f.,  48  v.  Cf.  also  Carthusian,  iv.  d.  17,  q.  2. 


162 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


io.  It  remains  for  us  to  characterize  the  position  of  Duns  in 
the  History  of  Doctrines.  It  is  hardly  saying  too  much  to  des¬ 
ignate  his  theology  as  the  key  to  the  dogmatic  history  of  the 
fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries.  This  is  true  primarily  in  a 
formal  sense.  The  refinement  of  dialectic  art  to  the  point  of 
hair-splitting,  the  tingling  delight  in  logical  proof  and  disproof, 
the  complicating  of  linguistic  expression — he  wrestles  with  lan¬ 
guage,  and,  instead  of  creating  new  forms  for  new  ideas,  the  old 
forms  are  split  into  shreds, — this  was  learned  by  latter  theologians 
from  Duns.  But  they  also  learned  from  him  to  apply  dialectics 
ruthlessly  and  earnestly  to  even  the  deepest  mysteries  of  reli¬ 
gion.  There  are  no  mysteries  before  which  reason  must  halt. 
Almost  everything  is  for  him  open  to  scrutiny,1  and  the  more 
fully  the  miraculous  can  be  eliminated  the  better.  “  I  concede 
that,  even  in  the  things  believed,  nothing  more  should  be  posited 
without  necessity,  nor  more  miracles  than  necessary”  (sent.  iv. 
d.  ii,  q.  3.  14).  All  this  tended,  on  the  one  hand,  to  hasten 
the  dissolution  and  downfall  of  medieval  thought ;  but  it  was  not 
only  in  view  of  this  that  it  was  “timely.”  It  provided  for 
theology,  at  the  proper  moment,  the  forms  which  assured  and 
directed  to  it  the  interest  of  the  age. 

As  to  the  material  influence  of  the  Scotist  dogmatics,  its  method 
appears  to  be  only  the  direct  continuation  of  that  of  Thomas, 
i.  e.y  the  authorities  and  reason  are  to  be  brought  into  harmony. 
But  with  how  much  greater  enthusiasm  and  fervency  did  not 
Thomas  address  himself  to  the  task  !  For  him,  dogma  and  phi¬ 
losophy  really  coalesced  to  form  one  great  system  of  religious 
philosophy  embracing  heaven  and  earth.  Thomas  yet  believed, 
not  only  in  the  absolute  truth  of  the  church’s  dogma,  but  also  in 
its  agreement  with  scientific  knowledge.  This  second  conviction 
has,  in  Duns,  receded  far  into  the  background.  Theology  and 
metaphysics  are  sharply  discriminated.  It  is  not  the  province  of 
theology  to  construct  a  universally  applicable  philosophical  sys¬ 
tem,  but  a  complex  structure  of  practical  truths,  i.  e. ,  truths  bear¬ 
ing  upon  the  conduct.  Nor  is  it  by  any  means  to  be  taken  for 
granted  that  these  truths  can  always  be  made  clear  to  reason. 
The  criticism  of  Duns  has  a  keener  edge  and  loftier  aim  than 
that  of  Thomas.  In  regard  to  many  a  leading  Romish  doctrine 
he  declares,  that  its  suitability  for  attaining  the  end  in  view  can¬ 
not  be  proved,  and  that  not  much  is  to  be  said  against  the  oppo- 

1  How  much  light  it  casts  upon  the  position  and  tendency  of  Duns  to  ob¬ 
serve  that  he  develops  his  theory  of  knowledge  when  treating  of  the  doctrine 
of  angels  ;  that  he  presents  his  psychology  under  the  heading  of  eschatology  ; 
and  that  the  discussion  of  the  sacrament  of  repentance  gives  him  opportunity 
to  expound  his  theory  of  political  economy  ! 


THEOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


163 


site  opinion.  Duns  is,  indeed,  particularly  fond  of  throwing  out 
hints  of  this  nature,  and  yet  in  the  end  working  out  some  sort  of 
arguments  in  support  of  the  proposition  in  question.  But  the  at¬ 
tentive  reader  will  observe,  what  is  elsewhere  openly  declared, 
that  the  authority  of  the  Romish  church  is,  after  all,  the  deci¬ 
sive  consideration.  Even  the  propositions  incomprehensible  to 
^reason  and  incapable  of  proof  are  true — because  Rome  teaches 
them.  Duns  no  longer  believes  in  the  agreement  of  dogma  and 
philosophy  ;  but  he  believes  in  the  authority  of  Rome.  Like 
Thomas,  and  yet  how  different  !  For,  inasmuch  as  in  Thomas 
these  two  principles  coalesce,  his  faith  in  Rome  retains  a  religious 
character.  But  since,  in  Duns,  even  the  incomprehensible  and 
unreasonable  becomes  truth  through  the  authority  of  Rome,  this 
authority  begins  to  assume  the  aspect  of  positive  law.  Both  the 
criticism  of  accepted  dogmas  and  this  ecclesiastical  positivism 
exercised  a  controlling  influence  upon  the  theology  of  the  future. 

But  Duns  is  not  to  be  counted  among  the  leaders  of  thought 
who  accomplish  only  negative  results.  He  wrought  also  out  of 
the  materials  of  his  age  positive  results  for  its  advancement.  And 
it  was  this  fact  that  lent  such  force  to  his  criticisms.  His  chief 
contribution  of  this  character  was  his  view  of  the  will  as  the  cen¬ 
tral  function  of  the  spirit,  which  dominates  alike  his  anthropology 
and  his  theology.  It  is  not  the  world  in  which  man  lives,  nor 
the  ideas  which  he  derives  from  it,  which  explains  his  conduct 
and  his  aspirations — but  his  will.  The  will  is  the  innermost 
faculty  in  man,  the  absolutely  individual  part  of  his  nature.  He 
no  longer  views  with  merely  theoretic  interest  the  divine  pano¬ 
rama  of  the  world’s  history,  but  he  has  himself  become  a  co¬ 
operating  factor  in  the  shifting  scenes.  In  volition  he  experi¬ 
ences  the  highest  satisfaction.  Man  can  be  understood  only  by 
appreciating  this  will,  free  in  itself  and  determined  by  nothing 
outside  of  itself.  His  worth  depends  upon  it.  ( It  is  the  modern 
man1  whose  features  are  thus  drawn  in  outlines  The  estimate  of 
a  man  according  to  his  own  character  and  aeeds,  personal  re¬ 
sponsibility  and  self-determination, — these  are  ideas  which  are 
involved,  at  least  implicitly,  in  the  psychology  of  Duns,  however 
imperfect  and  incomplete  the  latter  may  be  in  particular  points. 
But  this  theory  became  even  more  significant  when  applied  to 
God.  Since  God  is  conceived  as  the  absolutely  free  Will,  many 
of  the  categories  of  the  traditional  logic  are  dissolved,  and  the 
ground  is  swept  from  beneath  all  the  speculations  as  to  what  God 
must  do,  and  what  must  come  to  pass  (cf.  the  criticism  of 

1  Vid.  also  the  elaboration  of  the  doctrine  of  states  of  the  mind  by  Duns, 
in  Siebeck,  1.  c.,  vol.  95,  p.  251  ff. 


164 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Anselm).  If  the  absolutely  free,  and  even  wanton  Will  is  the 
ground  of  all  things,  then  the  truth  can  be  learned  only  by  the  care¬ 
ful  observation  of  objects  and  events.  This  explains  the  impor¬ 
tance  attached  to  the  concrete  and  the  empirical,  and  the  appeal 
to  experience,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  unrestrained  liberty  of 
thought  as  over  against  traditional  theories,  as  well  as  a  certain 
skepticism,  which  time  and  again  leads  the  thoughtful  student  to 
rest  content  with  a  “  probable  ”  or  “  more  probable.”  This  defi¬ 
nition  of  God  betokens,  however,  a  really  deeper  conception  of 
the  divine  nature.  The  God  of  Duns  is  no  longer  the  ‘  ‘  abso¬ 
lute  Substance,”  but  a  free,  living  Spirit.  He  did  not  venture 
even  here,  it  is  true,  to  cast  aside  the  ancient  formulas,  but  he 
conceived  the  large  thought  of  God  as  the  Loving-Will,  the  sum 
total  of  whose  relations  to  the  world  is  to  be  regarded  from  this 
point  of  view.  Everything  occurring  in  the  world,  as  well  as  all 
divine  activity,  is — in  religious  reflection — to  be  viewed  from 
the  view-point  of  predestination.  At  this  point  Augustinian 
predilections  exert  their  influence  (cf.  also  Thomas,  supra,  p. 
107),  the  Oxford  circle  from  which  Duns  came  being  as  distinctly 
Augustinian  in  temper  as  they  were  inclined  to  empirical  investi¬ 
gation.1  Nevertheless,  Duns  was  no  Augustinian.  It  was  upon 
the  basis  of  the  predestination  pervading  all  things  and  the  divine 
freedom  ordering  all  things  that  the  theory  of  merit  and  good 
Svorks  first  began  to  flourish.  The  ecclesiastical  system  is  not  in 
itself  necessary,  but  it  is — and  this  is  more — positively  deter¬ 
mined  upon  and  ordained  by  God.  Thus  the  apparently  Augus¬ 
tinian  premise  is  transformed  into  the  popular  Catholicism  of  the 
close  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

Finally,  we  can  but  point  to  the  separate  doctrines  in  which  the 
theology  of  Duns  scored  an  advance,  i.  e.,  a  change  as  compared 
with  the  system  of  Thomas.  In  nearly  all  these  instances,  the 
later  theologians  followed  in  the  steps  of  Duns.  We  have  noted 
the  divergencies  in  the  question  of  first  principles  (skepticism 
and  ecclesiastical  positivism);  the  revision  of  the  conception  of 

1  A  history  of  theology  would  find  it  needful  at  this  point  to  discuss  especially 
the  work  of  the  great  bishop  of  Lincoln,  Robert  Grosseteste  (f  A.  D. 
1253),  who  paved  the  way  for  the  ideals  of  the  mendicant  orders  in  England 
and  directed  toward  its  goal  the  awakened  scientific  impulse  (religion  in  the 
sense  of  Augustine,  and  empiricism  in  methods).  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  we 
possess  as  yet  neither  a  comprehensive  biography  of  this  great  man,  nor  even 
an  edition  of  his  more  important  writings.  Some  material  is  furnished  in 
Brown,  Fasciculus,  etc.,  appendix,  London,  1690.  Luard  edited  his  letters 
(London,  1861).  Vid.  his  introduction,  and  Lechler,  Wiclif,  i.  1 7 7  fT. 
Also,  supra,  p.  161  n.,  and  Felton,  Rob.  Grosset.,  1887.  As  to  his  theolog¬ 
ical  position,  see  Seeberg,  Duns  Scot.,  p.  11  ff.  Kropatscheck,  Das 
Schriftprincip  der  luth.  Kirche,  i.  (1904),  359  ff. 


HIERARCHICAL  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHURCH.  1 65 

God  ;  the  emphasis  upon  the  will  in  psychology  ;  the  doctrine  of 
the  original  state  and  the  minimizing,  i.  e. ,  elimination,  of  orig¬ 
inal  sin  ;  the  theory  of  redemption,  with  the  co-ordination  of  the 
subjective  and  objective  aspects  of  the  atonement ;  the  criticism 
of  the  Augustinian  definition  of  grace,  i.  e.,  the  new  definition 
of  the  habitus  ;  the  significance  of  the  meritum  de  congruo  ;  the 
Pelagianism  in  the  order  of  salvation  ;  the  logical  apprehension 
of  the  relation  between  God  and  man  under  the  scheme  of  the 
meritum;  the  symbolical  interpretation  of  the  sacraments,  with 
the  severance  of  sign  and  substance  ;  and  the  criticism  of  tran- 
substantiation. 

Such  is  the  theology  of  Duns  Scotus.  It  proclaims  the  ap¬ 
proaching  downfall  of  the  cosmology  of  the  Middle  Ages. 
Dogma  and  reason,  church  and  world,  threaten  to  part  company. 
And  yet — Thomas  looks  backward,  Duns  faces  the  future. 

§  60.  Criticism  of  Hierarchical  Conception  of  the  Church. 

1 .  We  must  here  assume  the  familiarity  of  the  reader  with  the  out¬ 
ward  history  of  the  papacy  from  the  days  of  Benedict  XI. ,  the  suc¬ 
cessor  of  Boniface  VIII.  The  papacy  at  Avignon  reiterated,  indeed, 
with  lofty  assumption  the  ancient  claims  of  supremacy.  But  its  de¬ 
pendence  upon  the  course  of  French  politics — the  bull  Unam  sanc- 
tam  was  annulled,  so  far  as  France  was  concerned,  and  Boniface 
VIII.  barely  escaped  condemnation  for  infidelity  and  frivolity — 
robbed  its  claims  of  all  force  or  sacredness.  The  great  contest 
against  Louis  of  Bavaria  (A.  D.  1314-47),  despite  many  humilia¬ 
tions  inflicted  upon  the  emperor,  set  loose  a  storm  of  criticism  of 
the  papacy,  its  legality  and  its  claims,  which  penetrated  to  its  very 
foundations.  The  Electoral  Union  at  Rense  declared  (A.  D.  1338) 
that  the  electors  elect  the  emperor,  and  that  this  election  confers 
upon  him  the  right  of  government  in  the  empire  without  any  nomi¬ 
nation,  approbation,  or  confirmation  on  the  part  of  the  Curia.  The 
papacy,  when  again  transferred  to  Rome,  was  rent  by  the  great 
schism  (A.  D.  1378).  The  moral  delinquencies  of  many  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  hierarchy  were  well  known,  but,  above  all,  the  avarice 
of  the  Romish  Curia.  The  trade  in  spiritual  offices,  the  indul¬ 
gences,  the  papal  taxes,  etc. ,  all  served  but  one  end,  to  procure 
money  and  much  of  it.  The  unnatural  character  of  the  papal 
dominion  made  this  a  necessity  ;  it  was  a  civil  government  with¬ 
out  the  regular  sources  of  revenue.  With  murmurings  against 
the  draining  of  national  resources  by  the  papacy  were  com¬ 
bined  bitter  complaints  of  the  immorality  and  dissipation  of  the 
higher  as  well  as  the  lower  clergy.1  The  widespread  discontent 

1  A  striking  portraiture  of  the  times  is  given  in  the  work  of  Nicholas  of 


1 66 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


awakened  by  these  abuses  led  to  a  constantly  growing  demand 
for  a  reformation  of  the  church,  which  led  to  the  so-called  “  Re¬ 
form  Councils  ”  at  Pisa,  A.  D.  1409,  at  Constance,  A.  D.  1414-1 
and  at  Basel,  1431-47.  The  exaltation  of  the  church  universal 
above  the  papacy  was  here  asserted1  and  utterance  given  to  many 
pious  laments  and  hopes  touching  the  “  necessity  of  a  reforma¬ 
tion  of  the  church  in  head  and  in  members.”2  But  there  was 
neither  the  power  nor  the  courage  requisite  for  a  thoroughgoing 
reformation.  And  every  politic  compromise  indicated  a  victory 
for  the  old  order  of  things.  Thus  the  popes  always  grasped 
again  the  sceptre,  and,  despite  all  the  complaints  of  clergy  and 
laity,  the  reformation  still  remained  only  a  pious  wish.  In  the 
bull,  “  Pastor  aeternus,"  Pope  Leo  X.  announced  to  the  world  : 
“  Since  also  that  only  the  Roman  pontiff  (in  office)  for  the  time 
being,  as  having  authority  over  all  councils,  has  the  full  right  and 
power  of  summoning,  transferring,  and  dissolving  councils,  is 
evident  not  only  from  the  testimony  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  the 
sayings  of  the  holy  fathers,  and  of  the  other  Roman  pontiffs,  .  .  . 
and  the  decrees  of  the  holy  canons,  but  even  from  the  very  con¬ 
fession  of  the  councils  themselves”  (Binius,  Concil.  general,  ix. 
15 1).  And  yet  the  great  spiritual  agitation,  which  disturbed 
the  minds  of  multitudes  for  almost  two  hundred  years,  was  not 
in  vain.  The  mistrust  of  Rome  and  the  hierarchy,  the  critical 
attitude  toward  the  church  and  her  laws,  and,  combined  with 
this,  the  conviction  that  there  is  a  church  of  God  which  is  more 
and  better  than  the  hierarchical  system  of  Rome — these  ideas 
were  engraven  more  and  more  deeply  upon  the  general  con¬ 
sciousness.  And,  just  in  proportion  as  the  sense  of  national  in¬ 
dependence  gained  in  strength  and  the  value  of  earthly  posses¬ 
sions  increased,  must  these  critical  ideas  become  more  extended 
in  their  scope  and  the  unreasonableness  of  the  Romish  system 

Clemanges,  De  ruina  ecclesiae  (in  Von  D.  Hardt,  Constant,  concil.  i.  3). 
He  writes,  p.  21  :  Everywhere  they  search  for  money  ( quaeslu??i );  they  are 
greatly  concerned  about  money  ;  they  think  money  is  piety.  They  do  noth¬ 
ing  at  all  unless  they  believe  that,  upon  their  doing  it,  money  may  be  voted  for 
the  increase  of  their  gain.  For  this  they  dispute,  fight,  swear,  go  to  law  ; 
they  would  bear  with  much  greater  equanimity  the  casting  away  of  ten  millions 
of  souls  than  of  ten  or  twelve  solidi.  Vid.  also  the  other  writings  col¬ 
lected  in  this  volume — from  D’Ailli,  Gerson,  etc.;  also  Dietrich  v.  Niem, 
De  scismate,  11.  3  ed.  Erler,  1890. 

1  This  council,  assembled  legitimately  in  the  Holy  Spirit,  representing  the 
Catholic  church,  has  authority  immediately  from  Christ,  to  which  everyone  of 
whatsoever  rank  or  dignity,  even  the  papal,  he  may  be,  is  bound  to  render 
obedience  in  those  things  which  pertain  to  the  faith,  .  .  .  and  to  the  general 
reformation  of  the  said  church  in  head  and  in  members  (Constanz  sess.  5r 
vid.  Mansi,  xxvii.  590  ;  Basel  sess.  2,  vid.  Mansi,  xxix.  21). 

2  Title  of  a  document  in  Hardt,  i.  7,  p.  277. 


HIERARCHICAL  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHURCH.  1 67 

become  more  evident.  Cf.  Hefele,  CG.  vi.  vii.  Schwab, 
Gerson,  1858.  Tschackert,  Peter  v.  Ailli,  1877.  Erler, 
Dietrich  v.  Niem,  1887. 

2.  The  criticism  of  the  hierarchical  system  in  the  new  period 
found  its  fullest  expression  in  the  literature  which  was  produced 
during  the  conflicts  of  Louis  of  Bavaria  with  the  pope. 
Especially  Marsilius  of  Padua  and  William  Occam  developed 
ideas  which  tapped  the  very  roots  of  the  dominant  system  (vid. 
Mars. ,  Defensor  pacis.  Occam,  Octo  quaestiones ;  Compen¬ 
dium  errorum  papae  ;  Dialogus  ;  Opus  XC  dierum, — all  to  be 
found  in  Goldast,  Monarchia  ii.  Frankf.  1614).  The  most 
characteristic  feature  of  these  publications  is  the  distinct  separa¬ 
tion  of  state  and  church,  politics  and  religion.  As  all  laws  are 
to  be  traced  back  to  the  people,  so  the  sovereign  power  lies  also 
with  them.  They  choose  their  princes  and  give  them  their 
authority  ;  they,  therefore,  may  recall  it  again  and  remove  the 
princes  from  office  (Mars.  i.  12,  p.  169  ff. ;  9,  p.  168  ;  18,  p. 
184  f. ).  There  is  no  necessity  for  a  papal  confirmation  of  the 
election,  nor  for  an  investiture  by  the  pope,  any  more  than  the  pope 
has  authority  to  remove  the  emperor.  The  election  gives  the 
emperor  his  power;  he  stands  directly  under  God  (Occ.  8, 
quaest.  2.  7,  8  ;  4.  8,  9).  As  concerns  the  pope,  further,  it  is 
held  that  he  is  subject  to  the  emperor  in  all  secular  affairs, 
as  even  Christ  allowed  himself  to  be  condemned  by  secular 
judges,  and  neither  he  nor  anyone  of  the  apostles  ever  laid  claim 
to  earthly  dominion  or  any  kind  of  cooperative  jurisdiction 
(juris dictio  coactiva )  whatever,  even  though  the  emperor  had 
of  his  own  free-will  granted  the  Donation  of  Constantine  (Mars, 
ii.  4,  p.  195  ff.  Occ.  8,  quaest.  3.  3,  4;  dial.,  p.  750  f.,  785,  959, 
956).  According  to  Jerome,  the  bishops  were  originally  the  same 
as  the  priests,  and  it  was  only  at  a  later  day  that  one  of  the  latter  was 
selected  to  be,  as  it  were,  a  superintendent.  There  can  hence  be 
no  thought  of  any  such  thing  as  a  divine  authority  of  bishops 
or  popes  (Mars.  ii.  15).  The  papacy,  as  such,  can  by  no  means 
be  described  as  an  institution  absolutely  necessary  for  the  church. 
No  more  cogent  arguments  can  be  adduced  for  a  monarchical 
than  for  an  aristocratic  form  of  civil  government.  And  even 
though  the  monarchy  be  preferable  in  civil  life,  it  can  scarcely 
be  so  in  the  world-embracing  government  of  the  church.  Here 
Christ  reigns  as  the  only  supreme  Head  (Occ.  dial.,  p.  818  f. ). 
Thus  the  question  of  the  papal  primacy  is  treated  entirely  from 
the  view-point  of  the  natural  reason  ;  it  has  for  our  author 
no  positively  religious  aspect.  The  discussion  is  regulated  by 
the  transfer  of  the  idea  of  popular  sovereignty  to  the  church. 
The  Scriptures,  Occam  holds,  do  not  teach  us  that  Christ 


i68 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


appointed  Peter  as  the  prince  of  the  apostles.  All  the  apostles 
received  the  Spirit  in  the  same  way.  Paul  does  not  consider 
himself  subordinate  to  Peter,  and  the  latter  does  not  preside  at 
the  first  council.  The  injunction  to  feed  the  lambs  is  given 
to  him  only  as  the  representative  of  the  other  apostles.  Even 
in  Matt.  16,  Peter  is  only  a  in  a  certain  way  ”  designated  as  a 
foundation.  The  real  and  absolutely  necessary  foundation  of 
the  church  is  Christ.  It  is  only  as  an  incidental  historical 
foundation  that  Peter  comes  into  view  (dial.,  p.  846-863.  Mars, 
ii.  22,  p.  264).  According  to  Marsilius,  it  yet  remained  to  be 
proved  from  the  Scriptures  that  Peter  was  ever  at  Rome  ;  and, 
in  any  event,  Paul  was  certainly  there  before  him  (ii.  16). 
Accordingly,  the  papacy  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  institution 
worthy  of  commendation  upon  practical  considerations,  but  by 
no  means  as  one  enjoined  by  religious  precept. 

The  duties  of  the  pope,  as  of  the  clergy  in  general,  are  purely 
spiritual.  Christ  bestowed  upon  Peter,  as  upon  the  other 
apostles,  the  keys  of  the  kingdom  of  heaven  and  the  power  to 
bind  and  loose.  They  were  commissioned  to  spread  the  teach¬ 
ing  and  the  moral  principles  of  Jesus,  and  to  baptize  believers. 
But  the  plenitude  of  power  ( plenitudo  potestatis')  consists  really  in 
the  exercise  of  the  priestly  functions  of  the  sacrament  of  repent¬ 
ance.  But,  inasmuch  as  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  the  imparting 
of  grace  are  matters  for  God  alone,  the  priestly  absolution  has 
merely  a  declarative  signification.  Beyond  this,  the  pope — or 
any  other  priest — may  allow  the  substitution  of  a  temporal  satis¬ 
faction  for  the  pains  of  purgatory.  It  seems  of  doubtful 
propriety,  on  the  other  hand,  to  allow  the  clergy  to  administer 
the  great  excommunication.  An  unjust  excommunication,  it  is 
true,  does  the  victim  no  spiritual  harm  ( ‘  ‘  can  do  no  harm  for 
the  state  of  the  future  world,  because  God  does  not  always  follow 
the  church,  i.  <?.,  the  decision  of  the  priests,  when,  e.  g.,  they 
condemn  anyone  unjustly”);  but  it  is  hurtful  for  the  present 
life  through  the  accompanying  disgrace.  It  seems,  therefore, 
prudent  to  commit  the  duty  of  casting  out  from  the  church  to  the 
church  itself,  or  to  a  council,  as  suggested  in  Matt.  18.  17. 
Finally,  to  the  clergy  belongs  the  power  of  administering  (, con - 
ficiendi )  the  sacrament  of  the  eucharist  (vid.  Mars.  ii.  6,  p. 
205-209).  The  right  of  the  pope  in  spiritual  things  consists, 
therefore,  in  the  authority  to  issue  precepts  and  prohibitions  in 
the  church  as  required  by  the  common  good  {tit i lit  as  communis') . 
In  temporal  affairs,  he  has  only  the  right  to  proper  sustenance  : 

‘  ‘  the  right  of  asking  for  temporal  things  for  his  support  and  for  the 
execution  of  his  office”  (Occ.  dial.,  p.  786).  These  sentiments 
indicate  an  immense  revolution  of  thought.  The  canon  law, 


HIERARCHICAL  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHURCH.  1 69 

the  jurisdiction  of  the  church,  exemption  of  the  church  from 
taxation,  and  the  holdings  of  the  church  in  property,  are  all  here 
surrendered,  and  there  remains  no  intelligible  reason  why  the 
state  should  not  hold  the  prebends  and  the  congregations  them¬ 
selves  elect  and  remove  their  pastors.1  The  pope  ceases  to  be  a 
dogmatic  entity  ;  he  is  an  administrator  of  the  devotional  services 
of  the  church,  and  is  bound  to  the  positive  instructions  of  the 
New  Testament.  He  is  fallible,  as  are  all  other  men.  He  cannot 
therefore  establish  any  new  articles  of  faith.  His  declaration 
does  not  make  any  opinion  heretical,  but  the  crucial  question  in 
regard  to  every  doctrine  is,  whether  it  can  be  deduced  from  the 
Scriptures  (Occ.  dial.,  p.  420).  It  would  be  altogether 
irrational  to  suspend  one’s  recognition  of  the  truth  until  a  papal 
declaration  could  be  secured.  Our  faith  would  thus  be  made 
subject  to  the  opinion  of  a  man,  whereas  Paul  in  the  second 
chapter  of  1st  Corinthians  instructs  us  not  to  let  our  faith  rest 
upon  the  wisdom  of  a  man,  but  upon  the  power  of  God  (com- 
pend.  error.,  p.  976).  Here,  for  the  first  time,  the  infallible 
Scriptures  are  set  over  against  the  fallible  pope  :  “  Holy  Scrip¬ 
ture  cannot  err  ’  ’  {errare  non  potest')  \  but,  “  the  pope  .  .  .  can 
err”  (ib.  p.  843). 2  But  if  a  pope  should  stubbornly  fall  into 
error,  i.  e.,  become  a  heretic,  he  may,  according  to  both  law 
and  reason,  be  deposed  (p.  464  ff.,  568  If.). 

God  has  indeed  promised  to  lead  his  church  into  all  truth ; 
but  this  promise  by  no  means  applies  to  the  pope  (for  popes 
have  become  heretics,  ib.,  p.  464,  468  ff.,  958,  976,  994),  nor 
to  the  college  of  cardinals — not  even  to  the  Romish  church  nor 
a  general  council,  for  in  case  every  member  of  such  a  council 
were  to  fall  into  error  before  his  arrival,  how  should  his  falli¬ 
bility  be  removed  by  his  arrival  at  a  certain  locality  or  place  (p. 
495  f.)  ?  It  is  very  possible  that  God  may  at  certain  times  so 
order  it  that  the  truth  may  be  preserved  among  the  laity  alone  : 

1  Vid.  especially  Mars.  ii.  9,  17,  13. 

2  Let  it  be  observed,  that  it  is  the  same  juristic,  abstract  infallibility  which 
had  been  ascribed  to  the  pope,  which  is  here  transferred  to  the  Scriptures.  It 
is  based  upon  a  strict  theory  of  inspiration,  and  falls  short  of  the  evangelical 
view  of  the  Scriptures.  But  it  is  yet  important  to  observe  that  it  was  practical 
considerations  which  determined  the  attitude  of  Occam.  His  religion  drove 
him  to  the  Scriptures.  But  his  religion  was  epitomized  in  the  doctrine 
of  poverty.  When  popes  and  cardinals  denied  this  doctrine,  which  Occam 
believed  to  be  found  in  the  Scriptures,  it  was  evident  to  him  that  their  teach¬ 
ing  was  erroneous,  and  he  was  compelled  to  assert  the  authority  of  the  Scrip¬ 
tures  against  that  of  the  hierarchy.  The  same  considerations  impelled  him 
to  free  the  civil  government  from  the  dominion  of  the  hierarchical  power. 
Thus  inner  motives  led  him  to  the  Scriptures.  It  would  be  instructive  to 
compare  his  experience  at  this  point  with  that  of  Luther.  Vid.  Seeberg  upon 
Occam  in  PRE.,  ed.  3. 


170 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


“He  is  able  to  give  the  poor,  simple,  illiterate,  and  rustic  for 
the  edification  of  the  orthodox  church  ”  (p.  498).  This  dare  by 
no  means  be  limited  to  the  clergy.  The  clergy  have  indeed,  in 
the  canon  law,  limited  the  term  ecclesia  onesidedly  to  the  clerici , 
but  the  Scriptures  understand  by  it  the  whole  number  ( congre - 
gatio )  of  Christian  believers.  It  may  therefore  be  said  that 
“  laymen  and  women  are  ecclesiastics  ( personae  ecclesiasticae )  as 
truly  as  the  clergy,  because  they  are  as  truly  of  the  church  {de 
ecclesia )  as  are  the  clergy”  (ib.  p.  502).  A  new  conception 
of  the  church  breathes  in  these  words.  The  truth  surrendered 
by  the  hierarchy  may  be  preserved  among  the  women  of  the 
church,  and  if  not  among  them,  among  the  children.  The  laity 
have  the  full  rights  of  membership  in  the  church.  Kings  and 
laymen  should  be  admitted  even  to  the  councils  (p.  603  f.,  605  ; 
cf.  Mars.  ii.  20).  The  papal  tyranny  must  not  control  the 
church,  for  the  gospel  is  a  law  of  liberty  (p.  776  f. ).  Plain 
laymen,  guided  by  the  Scriptures,  may  soar  beyond  the  knowl¬ 
edge  of  the  ecclesiastical  authorities.  “  Let  it  be  granted,  that 
the  simple  are  not  legally  {regular iter')  bound  to  believe  any¬ 
thing  explicitly  except  those  things  which  have  been  by  the 
clergy  declared  necessary  to  be  believed.  Yet  the  simple,  never¬ 
theless,  in  reading  the  divine  Scriptures  with  acuteness  of  reason, 
in  which  even  the  simple  are  not  altogether  lacking,  observe 
that  something  which  the  pope  and  cardinals  have  not  declared 
follows  evidently  from  the  divine  Scriptures — this  they  can  and 
ought  to  in  that  case  believe  explicitly,  and  they  are  not  bound 
to  consult  the  pope  and  cardinals,  because  the  sacred  Scripture 
is  to  be  preferred  to  the  pope  and  cardinals.  ”  Further:  “The 
pope  and  cardinals  are  not  the  rule  of  our  faith  ”  (p.  770). 

The  transformation  in  the  conception  of  the  church  which  is 
foreshadowed  in  this  movement  consists  in  the  following  points  : 
(1)  The  state  is  independent  of  the  church.  (2)  The  sphere  of 
the  spiritual  (clerical)  office  is  not  lordship,  but  doctrine  and 
the  administration  of  the  sacraments.  (3)  The  hierarchical 
organization  of  the  church  has  become  historic,  but  is  not  a 
religious  necessity.  (4)  Not  the  pope,  but  Scripture,  is  the 
infallible  authority  in  the  church.  (5)  Pope  and  clergy  may 
err,  and  are  liable  to  deposition.  (6)  In  secular  affairs,  the 
clergy  are  subject  to  the  secular  jurisdiction.  (7)  The  laity  are 
independent  members,  and  the  compeers  of  the  clergy,  in  the 
church. 

3.  But  these  ideas  and  their  critical  motive  must,  in  order  to 
be  fully  understood,  be  viewed  in  a  wider  connection.  Very 
early  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  Old  Germanic  idea  of  a  purely  legal 
state  was  so  far  modified,  after  the  pattern  of  the  church  and  the 


HIERARCHICAL  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHURCH.  171 

ancient  theory  of  the  state,  that  the  state  was  no  longer  regarded 
as  existing  only  by  virtue  of  the  law  and  for  its  execution,  but  as 
having  in  view  the  further  object  of  promoting  the  common  weal, 
and  as  based  upon  natural  motives.  A  compromise  of  the  con¬ 
tradiction  between  the  Germanic  idea,  that  the  state  exists  for  the 
law,  and  the  ancient  idea  of  the  subordination  of  the  law  to  the 
common  weal — both  of  which  ideas  existed  side  by  side — was 
attempted  by  the  combination  of  the  positive  and  the  natural 
law.  The  statutes  of  the  positive  law,  it  was  maintained, 
whether  expressions  of  the  will  of  the  ruler  or  of  that  of  the 
sovereign  people,  have  their  norm  in  the  law  of  nature.  Noth¬ 
ing  which  contravenes  the  law  of  nature  can  be  regarded  as  au¬ 
thoritative.  This  primacy  of  the  natural  law  was,  indeed,  limited 
by  the  condition,  that  its  execution  must  always  be  guided  by  the 
concrete  circumstances  in  any  case.  As  the  idea  of  popular 
sovereignty  furnished,  on  the  one  hand,  the  controlling  thought- 
in  the  struggles  of  the  councils  against  the  popes,  so,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  criterion  of  the  natural  law  was  relentlessly  ap¬ 
plied  in  criticism  of  the  positive  ordinances  of  the  church.  The 
ancient  juristic  ecclesiastical  conception  of  the  primacy  of 
natural  law,1  which  had  hitherto  been  employed  by  the  church 
in  criticism  of  secular  laws,  was  now  turned  against  the  church 
herself.  But  the  application  of  this  weapon  was  here,  no  less 
than  in  the  secular  use  of  it,  subject  to  serious  limitation  by  the 
positive  forms  of  the  church  life.  Criticism  was  applied  with  a 
keen  relish  and  carried  ruthlessly  to  its  logical  conclusions  ;  but 
no  one  thought  of  abolishing  the  papacy,  the  hierarchy,  the 
canonical  law,  or  the  accepted  dogmas  of  the  church.  Even  the 
boldest  agitators  sought  no  more  than  a  correction  of  the  existing 
system  within  its  own  limits. 

What  is  then  the  content  of  natural  law  ? 2  Natural  law  is  the 
law  of  reason,  and  it  is  the  divine  law  :  “  Employing  the  natural 
dictate  ( dictamen )  of  reason,  this  is  employing  natural  law;” 
or,  “  natural  reason  ( ratio )  is  natural  law”  (Occ.  dial.,  p.  629, 
568).  It  is,  therefore,  man’s  innate  ideas  of  law  and  order  in 
the  world  (p.  93 2). 3  Now,  the  same  God  who  implanted  these 

1  Vid. ,  e.  g. ,  Isidor,  etymol.  v.  4  f.  Gratian,  decret. ,  pars  1,  dist.  5-  Cf.. 
Greg.  VII. 

2  I  do  not  enter  further  upon  the  differentiation  of  the  jus  naturale ,  lex  dei , 
and  commune  jus  gentium.  Vid.  Gierke,  J.  Althusius,  p.  273. 

3  The  latest  offshoot  of  this  theory  of  infallible  moral  ideas  innate  in  man  is 
in  the  modern  definition  of  conscience  as  the  voice  of  God.  Its  origin  is  to  be 
sought  in  the  idea  entertained  by  the  Apologetes — of  the  Logos-sharing  upon 
man’s  part.  According  to  Thomas,  natural  law  is  the  content  of  the  con¬ 
science.  Vid.  supra,  p.  114  m  Also  Seeberg,  Gewissen  u.  Gewissensbildung, 
1896,  pp.  6  ff. ,  69  f. 


172 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


ideas  in  man,  has  imparted  them  likewise  through  inspiration  in 
the  Holy  Scriptures.  The  law  of  God  is,  therefore,  identical 
with  the  law  of  nature  {lex  dei  et  jus  naturae ,  ib.  pp.  772,  778, 
783,  786,  934).  From  this  is  derived  the  idea  of  the  absolute 
authority  of  the  law  of  reason  and  nature — and  of  the  Scriptures  : 
“  Human  laws  founded  in  divine  and  natural  law  ”  (ib.  p.  587). 
“  No  just  positive  law  can  be  contrary  to  natural  law  ”  (p.  629). 
“  There  can  be  no  law  which  is  repugnant  to  the  higher  law  or 
to  plain  reason.,”  Hence,  whatever  civil  law  is  repugnant  to  the 
divine  law,  or  to  plain  reason,  is  no  law.  In  the  same  way,  the 
words  of  the  canonical  or  civil  law,  in  any  case  in  which  they  are 
repugnant  to  the  divine  law,  i.  e. ,  the  Holy  Scripture  or  right 
reason,  are  not  to  be  observed”  (p.  630).  But  all  of  these 
declarations  are  but  repetitions  of  definite  ideas  of  the  canonical 
law  (vid.  Gratian,  decret.,  pars  i.,  dist.  1-9).  This  was,  there¬ 
fore,  the  path  which  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  authority  of  the 
Scriptures.  Scripture  and  reason  are  identical.  The  Scriptures 
present  not  positive  revelation,  but  the  universal  truth  of  reason. 
It  is  quite  evident  that  in  this  way  the  Scriptures  should  come  to 
be  regarded  more  and  more  from  the  view-point  of  the  law.  And 
it  is  further  beyond  question,  that  this  entire  legal  way  of  appre¬ 
hending  the  church  and  religion  could  not  possibly  lead  to  a 
spiritual  conception  of  the  nature  of  the  church.  On  the  con¬ 
trary,  it  was  just  in  this  age  of  reform  councils  and  of  conflicts 
with  the  Curia  that  the  church  came  to  be  almost  universally  re¬ 
garded  as  a  polity,  based  upon  juristic  principles. 

Riezler,  Die  litt.  Widersacher  d.  Papste,  pp.  194  ff. ,  243  ff.  A.  Dorner, 
Staat  u.  K.  nach  Occ.  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1886,  p.  672  ff.’  Friedberg,  Die 
mittelalt.  Lebren  lib.  d.  Verhaltn.  zw.  Staat  u.  K.,  1874.  K.  Muller,  Der 
Kampf  Ludw.  d.  Bay.  mit.  d.  Curie,  1879!.  Gierke,  J.  Althusius  u.  die 
Entwicklg.  der  naturrechtl.  Staatstheorien,  1880,  p.  77  ff. ,  1 23  ff. ,  264  ff.  Von 
Bezold,  Hist.  Ztschr.,  vol.  36,  p.  330  ff.  Kropatscheck,  Occam  und 
Luther  (Beitrage  zur  Forderung  christl.  Theol.  i v. ) ,  1900. 

§61.  Sketch  of  Church  Life  and  Religious  Agitations  at  the  Close 

of  the  Middle  Ages. 

Literature.  Jannsen,  Gesch.  d.  deutsch.  Volkes  seit  Ausg.  d.  MA.  i. 
14  A.,  1887,  and  in  connection,  Kawerau,  Ztschr.  f.  K.  Wiss.,  1882,  p.  142  ff., 
263  ff.,  313  ff.,  362  ff.  Moll,  Die  vorref.  KG.  d.  Niederlande,  deutsch.  Von 
Zuppke,  ii.  (1895),  pp.  396-406,  554-565,  579-768.  Moller,  KG.  ii., 
481  ff,  531  ff.  Lamprecht,  Deutsche  Gesch.,  vol.  v.  1,  1894.  Von  Bezold, 
Gesch.  d.  deutsch.  Ref.  (Oncken  Allg.  Gesch.).  Gothein,  Polit.  u.  rel. 
Volksbewegg.  vor.  d.  Ref.,  1878.  Berger,  Die  Kulturaufgaben  d.  Ref., 
1895.  Geffcken,  Der  Bilderkatechism.  d.  15,  Jarh.,  1855.  Joh.  Nider’s 
Formicarius,  and  in  connection,  Schieler,  Mag.  J.  Nider,  1885,  pp.  195- 
248.  Hasack,  D.  chr.  Gl.  d.  deutsch.  Volkes  b.  Schluss  d.  MA.,  1868. 
Lechler,  J.  v.  Wicl.  u.  d.  Vorgesch.  d.  Ref.,  2  vols.,  1873.  Bratke, 


CHURCH  LIFE  AND  RELIGIOUS  AGITATIONS. 


173 


Luther’s  95  Thesen  u.  ihre  dogmenhist.  Voraussetzungen,  1884.  Vid.  Kro- 
PATSCHECK,  Das  Schriftprincip  der  luth.  Kirche,  vol.  i.  (Mittelalter),  1904. 
Brieger,  Das  Wesen  des  Ablasses  vor  Ausgang  des  MA.  Leipziger  Pro- 
gramm,  1897. 

i .  Every  great  revolution  in  the  history  of  religion  is  preceded 
by  a  crisis  period.  Traditional  forms  and  aspirations  no  longer 
satisfy  the  world.  Some  blame  the  old  order  of  things,  and  long 
for  a  new  order  which  they  know  not  how  to  secure.  Others 
glorify  the  old  order.  The  new  requirements  of  the  age,  which 
even  they  must  recognize,  are  to  be  met  by  the  diligent  and 
thorough  use  of  the  old  means.  Harsh  criticism  of  the  tradi¬ 
tional  positions  and  customs  and  abnormal  devotion  to  them  are 
here  closely  associated.  It  is  still  hoped  that  the  stones  may  be 
made  bread.  The  crisis  through  which  Luther  passed  in  the  cloister 
had  been  hovering  over  the  church  in  the  fifteenth  century.  The 
individuality  of  the  modern  man  and  the  deepening  of  religious 
experience  crave  a  personal  assurance  of  faith  and  inner  cer¬ 
tainty.  The  church  offers  instead  the  rule  of  faith  and  the 
power  of  the  sacraments.  The  heart  seeks  life  through  the  for¬ 
giveness  of  sins  ;  the  church  points  to  confession  and  absolution. 
The  consciousness  of  the  independence  of  the  world  and  its 
interests  is  crushed  beneath  the  ancient  claims  of  the  hierarchy  ; 
the  increasing  prosperity  of  the  world  and  the  new  business  en¬ 
terprises  are  in  conflict  with  the  ideal  of  “  poverty.”  New 
necessities  and  old  methods,  with  the  zealous  attempt  to  draw 
from  old  forms  the  satisfaction  of  new  requirements — this  consti¬ 
tuted  the  crisis.  It  was  naturally  first  felt  among  the  cultured 
classes  ;  but  it  penetrated  also  the  masses.  All  the  phenomena  in 
the  religious  life  of  this  period — the  ecclesiastical  institutions,  the 
brotherhoods,1  the  indulgences,  the  pilgrimages,  the  increasing 
adoration  of  relics,  of  Mary  and  the  saints,  the  spread  and  exagger¬ 
ated  terrors  of  the  faith  in  devils  and  demons,2  the  craze  upon  the 
subject  of  celibacy,3  the  mysticism,  the  revolutionary  Christian- 
social  plans,  the  contempt  for  the  clergy  and  the  monks,  are  all 
closely  connected  with  the  crisis.  So  loud  were  the  complaints 
that  eyes  were  turned  to  the  future  in  expectation  of  a  new  era  of 
“  prophecy”  and  the  “introduction  of  a  new  religion.”4 

We  must  observe  ( a )  the  means  by  which  the  church  at- 

1  Vid.  Lea,  A  hist,  of  conf.  and  indulg.  iii.,  470  ff.  Moll,  KG.  ii.,  646  ff. 

2  Vid.  esp.  the  bull  of  Innocent  VIII.,  Summis  desiderantes  affectibus,  the 
Malleus  maleficarum,  and  Joh.  Nider’s  Formicarius,  lib.  v.  Cf.  Roskoff, 
Gesch.  d.  Teufels,  ii.  (1869),  p.  206  ff.,  226  f. 

3  Vid.  Examples  in  SCHiELER,.Nider,  p.  203  ff. 

4  Vid.  Trithemius  chronolog.  myst.  18  fin.  Cf.  Schneegans,  Trithemius, 
p.  183  f. 


174 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


tempted  the  culture  of  piety,  (A)  the  way  of  salvation  as  con¬ 
ceived  by  the  “  Friends  of  God,”  and  (<r)  the  scope  of  the 
reformatory  ideas  of  the  age. 

2.  The  means  by  which  the  church  sought  to  influence  the 
multitudes  remained  the  same  as  of  old,  except  that  there  was — 
as  required  by  the  demands  of  the  age — an  increased  zeal  in  the 
use  of  them.  The  duty  of  preaching  is  insisted  upon  with 
greater  emphasis.  It  is  required  that  all  members  of  the  church 
be  acquainted  with  the  Creed,  the  Lord’s  Prayer,  the  Ave 
Maria,  and  the  teachings  of  the  church  concerning  mortal 
sins  and  the  sacraments.  Louis  of  Bavaria,  e.  g.,  proved  his 
orthodoxy  by  repeating  the  Lord’s  Prayer,  the  greeting  of  the 
angels,  and  the  Apostles’  Creed  (R.  Muller,  Der  Kampf  Lud¬ 
wigs  mit  der  Curie,  ii.  75).  This  knowledge  is  to  be  tested  at 
the  confessional,  which  thus  becomes  a  religious  examination.1 
The  Ten  Commandments  were  frequently  here  used  as  the 
criterion.2  In  preaching,  the  moral  element  still  predominates ; 
but  with  it  are  combined  quite  rigid  doctrinal  discussions, 
miraculous  narratives,  and  commendations  of  indulgences  and 
the  grace  accompanying  them.  If  it  cannot  be  said  that  the 
church  shirked  the  new  task  assigned  her,  she  certainly  dis¬ 
covered  no  new  means  to  apply  in  the  performance  of  it.  The 
sacraments  bring  grace,  as  the  power  enabling  their  recipients 
to  perform  meritorious  works  (Hasack,  p.  419,  133,  262  f. ). 

But  Repentance  appears  as  really  the  chief  sacrament.3  The 
religious  unrest  of  the  age  and  the  financial  schemes  of  the  Curia 

1  E.  g.,  Hefele,  vi.  608,  696,  706,  721,  944.  Moll,  KG.  ii.  396  ff.,  653  f. 
Geffcken,  Bilderkatech. ,  p.  24  ff.,  and  suppl.,  p.  191  f. ;  Beichtanweisung 
aus  d.  15  larh.,  ed.  Wagner,  Ztschr.  f.  KG.  ix.  445,  462.  The  “Christian 
faith”  consists,  as  before,  of  the  twelve  or  fourteen  articles  of  the  Apostles’ 
Creed  (as  to  the  number,  vid.  Hefele,  vi.  ed.  2,  220  a. ) ;  its  content  is  especi¬ 
ally  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  and  Christology,  e.  g.,  Gabr.  Biel,  De  festi- 
vitat.  serm.  21,  fol.  2i4r,  and  Hasack,  1.  c.,  p.  138  ff.  All  are  required  to 
believe  “what  the  holy  church  commands  to  believe”  (Ztschr.  f.  KG.  ix. 
462).  As  examples  of  open  heresy,  Occam  adduces  the  denial  of  the  unity 
and  trinity  of  God  and  of  the  birth  of  Christ  from  the  Virgin  (dial.,  p.  631). 

2  E.  g.,  Hasack,  1.  c.,  p.  191  ff.,  227  b  Geffcken,  1.  c.,  Ztschr.  f.  KG. 
ix.  445  ff,  462  ff. 

3  The  Augustinian,  John  of  Paltz,  has  in  his  Coelifodina  (Lips.  1510) 
undertaken  to  uncover  the  mine  of  grace — for  the  guidance  of  preachers.  Of 
what  does  he  treat  ?  First,  there  is  a  detailed  exposition  and  application  of  the 
passion  history  ;  then,  sins  in  thought  are  discussed,  and  death  ;  then  the  sac¬ 
raments  are  explained,  with  all  the  emphasis  upon  repentance  and  indulgences. 
In  the  Supplementum  Coelifodinae  (Lips.  1516),  indulgences  are  defended  at 
length  and  the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments  again  presented.  Vid.  also  the  many 
manuals  of  confession  at  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages,  e.  g.,  in  PIasack,  1.  c. 
As  to  the  biography  of  Paltz,  vid.  Kolde,  Die  deutsche  Augustinercongrega- 
tion,  1879,  p.  174  ff 


CHURCH  LIFE  AND  RELIGIOUS  AGITATIONS. 


1 75 


here  joined  hands.  The  whole  religious  life  of  the  times  finds 
its  centre  in  the  ordinance  of  repentance.  Here  faith  is  confessed 
and  sins  are  forgiven  :  here  meritorious  works  are  assigned  and 
men  thus  justified ;x  but  here,  too,  may  release  from  them  be 
purchased.  The  dominant  conception  of  confession  and  abso¬ 
lution  is  in  thorough  conformity  with  the  scholastic  theories 
(supra,  p.  135).  As  the  logic  of  the  theory  led  by  necessity  to 
the  recognition  of  attrition  as  the  starting  point  of  repentance 
(p.  136),  so  in  praxis  the  latter  came  to  be  regarded  as  entirely 
sufficient.  John  of  Paltz  considers  the  advantage  of  the  new 
covenant  over  the  old  to  consist  precisely  in  the  fact,  that  it 
does  not  require  contrition,  as  does  the  old,  but  is  content  with 
attrition,  which  is  then  by  absolution  transformed  into  con¬ 
trition,  this  contrition  being  the  destruction  of  sin.1 2 3  To  do 
this,  however,  is  a  matter  for  the  priest  (Coelifodina,  Cc.  1  v). 
“  Under  the  new  law,  the  mode  of  repenting  and  of  salvation 
is  easier”  (ib.  Q.  5  v).  Paltz  gives  an  excellent  definition  of 
attrition.  “And  such  attrition  cannot  be  better  defined  in 
common  speech  than  as  ‘gallows-penitence’  (Kgalgen?'ew') ,s 
because  the  attrite  mourns  that  he  has  sinned — on  account  of  the 
infernal  gallows  ”  (ib.  Q.  6  v).  It  has  for  its  basis  servile  fear 
and  the  fear  of  death,  whereas  contrition  springs  from  filial  fear 
and  the  love  of  God  (ib.  Q.  6  r).  Very  few  get  beyond  the 
former:  “About  all  of  our  people  who  confess  in  Lent  do 
not  have  true  contrition,  nor  do  they  have  attrition  in  the  first 
grade,  because  they  would  then  do  entirely  what  they  can 
to  attain  true  contrition  ;  but  they  often  have  attrition  in  the 
second  grade,  doing  in  some  measure  what  they  can,  and  such 
are  assisted  by  the  priests  in  the  sacramental  absolution  ”  (ib. 
R.  1  v).  It  is  therefore  sufficient  if  there  be  within  the  heart  a 
certain  discontent  with  self  and  fear  of  hell,  begotten  by  the  con¬ 
templation  of  the  commandments  (supra,  p.  174).  This  will 
be  sufficient  to  secure  the  forgiveness,  i.  e .,  the  destruction, 
of  sin.  There  was  a  recognition  of  the  fact,  that  in  the  days  of 
the  first  love  there  had  been  no  need  of  indulgences  :  ‘  ‘  But  now, 
love  having  grown  cold  in  these  last  times,  neither  are  satisfac- 

1  Vid.,  e.  g.,  in  Hasack,  p.  137  :  “  Grace  justifies  man  :  whatever  infirmity 
(Bresten)  clings  to  man,  it  punishes  this,  and  changes  it,  and  cleanses  it  with 
repentance.’  ’ 

2  Attrition  is  transformed  into  contrition  by  other  means  also,  i.  <?.,  through 
extreme  unction  (coelifod.  T.  2  v),  the  eucharist  (Z  6  v),  the  mass  and 
preaching  (Aa  3  r).  The  last-named  especially  confirms  the  pyschological 
interpretation  of  this  Scotist  formula  (vid.  supra,  p.  138).  Cf.  also  Tetzel’s 
theses,  n.  49:  “attrite  and  through  confession  contrite”  (Luther,  opp.  var. 
arg.  i.  300). 

3  So  also  Luther,  Weim.  ed.  i.  99. 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


I  76 

tions  commensurately  imposed,  nor  when  moderately  imposed 
are  they  performed :  therefore  there  is  a  much  more  necessary 
and  copious  use  of  indulgences,  so  that  what  is  lacking  through 
indolence  ( acedia )  may  be  supplemented  through  the  prayers  of 
others  (Biel,  expos,  can.  miss.  lect.  57,  fol.  154  v).  It  is  doubt¬ 
less  true  that  it  was  always  presupposed,  whether  expressly 
so  stated  or  not,  that,  in  order  to  secure  the  benefit  of  the  indul¬ 
gence,  the  purchaser  must  have  experienced  and  confessed  sorrow 
for  sin  :  “  He  who  remains  in  sin,  and  is  neither  contrite  nor 
attrite  nor  has  confessed,  can  by  no  means  secure  indulgences 
(Paltz,  Aa  3  r).  Just  as  the  sacrament  of  repentance  has  respect 
directly  to  sin  (culpa),  so  the  benefit  of  indulgence  has  respect 
to  penalty,”  and  that  the  temporal  penalty  (ib.  X  1  r).  This 
is  true  even  of  the  so-called  jubilee-indulgence,  whether  so  stated 
in  the  bull  proclaiming  the  latter  or  not  (ib.  Z  6  r).  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  attention  may  be  drawn  to  the  formula  employed 
in  the  proclamation  of  such  indulgences  :  “I  absolve  thee  from 
punishment  and  from  guilt”  (a  poena  et  a  culpa).  Paltz 
replies:  “But  a  jubilee  is  something  more  than  a  bare  indul¬ 
gence,  because  it  includes  the  authority  of  confessing  and  absolv¬ 
ing,  and,  with  this,  the  indulgence  of  remitting  penalty,  and  thus 
it  includes  the  sacrament  of  repentance  and,  with  this,  indulgence 
properly  so  called.  .  .  .  Commonly,  when  the  pope  gives  a 
jubilee,  he  gives  not  a  bare  indulgence,  but  he  gives  also 
authority  of  confessing  and  absolving  from  all  sins,  even  so  far  as 
their  guilt.  And  thus  guilt  is  remitted  by  reason  of  the  sacra¬ 
ment  of  repentance  which  is  there  introduced ;  and  penalty,  by 
reason  of  the  indulgence  which  is  there  employed”  (ib.  X  1  r). 
Paltz,  therefore,  understands  the  remission  of  sin  as  involved  in 
the  authority  granted  by  the  jubilee-indulgence  to  select  for 
one’s  self  a  confessor,  who  shall  be  authorized  to  absolve  in 
all  cases  not  reserved  to  the  pope  himself  (Aa  4  r).  Even  the 
latter  cases  were  often  included  in  the  authority  thus  given.1 
The  jubilee-indulgence  thus  indeed  embraced  in  itself  the  sacra¬ 
ment  of  repentance.  The  sacrament  must  not  of  necessity  be 
administered  by  the  properly  appointed  confessor,  but  sacra¬ 
mental  functions  may  also  be  discharged  by  the  papal  commis¬ 
sary.  Thus  the  papal  power  intruded  upon  the  province  of  the 
pastoral  cure  of  souls,  and  thus,  although  the  forgiveness  of  sins 

1  A.  g.y  Lea,  Hist,  of  conf.  and  indulg.,  iii.  70  n.  Cf.  Hasack,  p.  434  : 
“  Indulgence  from  penalty  and  guilt  .  .  .  is  to  be  thus  understood  :  Indul¬ 
gence  from  penalty  is  a  remitting  of  the  penalty  which  one  ought  to  suffer 
for  his  sin.  Indulgence  from  guilt  is  complete  authority  to  absolve  and 
release  from  all  sins,  even  those  sins  which  are  to  be  reserved  for  the 
holy  Roman  chair.” 


CHURCH  LIFE  AND  RELIGIOUS  AGITATIONS. 


177 


was  not  itself  directly  secured  by  the  payment  of  money,  yet  the 
especial  administration  of  the  sacraments  which  carried  with  it 
the  forgiveness  of  sins  was  thus  purchased.  Under  these  circum¬ 
stances,  the  popular  perversions  upon  the  subject  may  be  easily 
understood.  The  above  formula  was  in  the  highest  degree  open  to 
misunderstanding.1  Popes  expressly  rejected  it,2  and  theologians 
pronounced  against  it.  Nevertheless,  it  was  permitted  still  to  play 
its  part  of  deception  and  confusion  of  thought  in  the  church  (cf. 
Lea,  hist,  of  conf.  and  indulg.  iii.,  p.  57-78.  Moll,  ii. 
7 28). 3  Matters  were  made  worse,  as  the  theory  of  the  validity 
of  indulgences  for  the  souls  in  purgatory  ( supra ,  p.  139)  also 
found  endorsement  in  praxis.4  Cf. ,  e.  g.,  Paltz,  Cc  1  r,  Dd  5  v, 
etc.5  The  idea  that,  “  as  soon  as  the  money  rings  in  the  chest, 
the  soul  leaps  out  of  purgatory,  ’  ’  was  only  a  perfectly  intelligible 
inference.6 

Such  was  the  course  of  penitential  praxis  at  the  close  of  the 
Middle  Ages.  The  frightful  danger  attending  it  can  be  under¬ 
stood  only  when  attrition  and  indulgences  are  viewed  in  their 
combination,  and  when  the  misleading  glorification  of  the  latter  is. 
considered.7  A  little  “  gallows-penitence  ’  ’  and  the  confes¬ 
sional,  and  then  a  little  money,  and  the  sinner  is  freed  from  the 
fear  of  hell  and  purgatory,  and  even  from  the  performance  of 
works  of  penance.  Money  was  immediately  the  means  of  re¬ 
leasing  from  purgatory,  and  mediately  of  securing  the  forgive¬ 
ness  of  sins. 

1  Bratke  prepared  the  way  for  this  understanding  of  the  jubilee-indul¬ 
gences.  Brieger  produced  convincing  evidence  of  it  (Das  Wesen  des 
Ablasses  (Leipzig,  1899). 

2  Boniface  IX.,  vid.  Lea,  1.  c.,  iii.  66  f. ,  the  papal  plan  of  reformation  at 
Constance,  vid.  Hefele,  vii.  341.  Benedict  XIV.,  vid.  Wildt,  Kirchenlex. 
i.  ed.  2,  95. 

3  Cf.  already  the  complaints  of  Berthold  of  Regensburg,  touching  the 
“  penny-preachers.”  When  thou  standest  up  and  forgivest  one  all  the  sin 
which  he  has  ever  done  for  a  single  helbelinc  or  a  few  pennies,  then  he  im¬ 
agines  that  he  has  atoned  and  at  once  refuses  to  atone  any  more.  Thou  mur¬ 
derer  of  God  and  the  world  and  many  Christian  souls,  which  thou  murderest 
with  thy  false  comfort,  so  that  he  can  never  be  saved  (Pred.  i.  1 17).  He 
claims  that  he  has  power  from  the  pope,  to  take  from  thee  all  thy  sin  for  a  few 
helbelincs  or  for  a  heller  (ib.  i.  208).  The  Reformat.  Sigismunds,  p.  163, 
edited  by  Boehm,  also  speaks  of  paying  dearly  for  indulgence  of  sins.  Cf. 
Wessel,  De  poenit.,  opp.,  p.  798  f. 

4  According  to  Lea,  iii.  345  ff. ,  not  before  Sixtus  IV.,  A.  D.  1476.  Vid. 
also  Biel,  expos,  can.  miss.  lect.  57  K. 

5  Indulgences  may  bring  even  to  the  lost  a  mitigation  of  punishment,. 
Paltz,  Ff.  4  v. 

6  Vid.  Rawer AU,  Sobald  das  Geld,  etc.,  1889,  p.  9,  11  f.,  17  ff. 

7  A  contrite  person  may,  even  before  confessing,  receive  an  indulgence 
(Durand,  sent.  iv.  d.  20,  q.  4,  a.  2.  Paltz  holds  otherwise,  Aa  3).  How  easily 
may  he  be  deceived  as  to  his  condition,  or  postpone  the  subsequent  confession  ! 


12 


i7  8 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


But  along  with  this  externalizing  of  religion — which  the  church 
herself  promoted — were  heard  also  some  voices  emphasizing 
the  seriousness  of  repentance  and  its  works.  The  whole  Chris¬ 
tian  life  is  a  “doing  penance:  ”  “That  the  whole  life  of 
a  Christian  man  is  nothing  else  than  a  cross”  (Hasack,  p.  443). 
But  this  thought  is  completed  by  the  additional  idea,  that  we  “  are 
obligated  to  the  imitation  of  the  crucified  life  ”  of  Christ,  “  since 
the  passion  of  Christ  has  not  been  an  entire,  but  a  partial,  cause 
of  our  salvation  ”  (ib.,alsop.  477).  The  “  imitation  of  Christ  ” 
is,  therefore,  a  supplementing  of  the  redeeming  work  of  Christ 
by  effort  upon  our  part ! 

3.  The  so-called  German  Mysticism,  dogmatically  considered, 
furnishes  scarcely  anything  further  than  a  popular  rendering  of 
the  scholastic,  i.  e.,  Thomistic  ideas.  But  these  ideas  are  applied 
to  the  relation  of  the  soul  to  God.  The  practical  aspect  of  the 
way  to  God  is  the  controlling  one  for  these  writers.  The  ideas 
of  the  dogmaticians  become,  under  their  hands,  practical  relig¬ 
ious  truths,  which  were  employed  for  edification  by  the  wide¬ 
spread  circles  of  the  “  Friends  of  God.”  The  use  of  the  mother 
tongue  deepened  the  experience  and  enriched  the  religious  ap¬ 
prehension.  Little  as  it  belongs  to  the  sphere  of  the  History 
of  Doctrines  to  follow  the  speculations  of  the  Mystics,  it  is  im¬ 
portant,  in  tracing  the  transition  from  the  Middle  Ages  to  the 
Reformation  era,  to  understand  the  way  of  salvation  as  pursued 
by  the  pious  at  the  close  of  the  medieval  period.  In  endeavor¬ 
ing  to  trace  this  briefly,  we  follow  chiefly  the  following  : 

Master  Eckhart  (f  1327,  vid.  Pfeiffer,  Deutsche  Mystiker,  ii. ,  1857.  Ex¬ 
cerpts  from  his  Latin  writings  in  Denifle,  Archiv  f.  Litt.  u.  KG.  d.  MA.  ii. 
553  ff. ),  Johann  Tauler  (f  1361.  Sermons,  Basel,  1521),  Heinrich 
Seuse  (Suso,  f  1366,  ed.  Denifle,  Munch.,  1880),  Johann  von  Ruusbroec 
(f  1381.  WW.  6  vols. ,  Gent,  1858  ff.),  the  Theologia  Deutsch  (ed. 
Pfeiffer,  reprint  3,  1875),  the  Buch  von  geistl.  Armut  (ed.  Denifle,  1877), 
Thomas  a  Kempis,  De  imitatione  Christi  (ed.  Hirsche,  1874). 

The  spiritual  life  pursues  the  course  :  Purification,  Illumina¬ 
tion,  Unification  (Theol.  D.,  p.  50). 1  “A  devoted  man  must 
be  unfashioned  from  the  creature,  fashioned  with  Christ  and  re¬ 
fashioned  in  the  divine  nature”  {entbildet,  gebildet,  uberbildet , 
Seuse,  p.  248).  He  is  first  a  servant,  then  a  friend,  and  finally 
a  son  of  God  (Ruusbr.  vi.  208  ff.).  ( a )  The  first  step,  there¬ 
fore,  is  to  turn  away  from  the  creature  and  turn  toward  God. 
The  sacrament  and  the  word  of  God  then  exert  an  influence 
(Tauler,  fol.  65  v);  especially  repentance  and  the  Lord’s  Supper 
are  recommended.  These  are  re-enforced  by  prayer  and  the 


1  Cf.  Dionys.  Areop.,  Hierarch,  eccl.  6.  3.  5. 


CHURCH  LIFE  AND  RELIGIOUS  AGITATIONS. 


x79 


contemplation  of  the  love  of  God  (Eckh.,  p.  557).  Thus 
man  feels  himself  impelled  to  a  pious  and  virtuous  life,  to  con¬ 
tinuous  and  earnest  self-examination,  and  penitence.  “Purifi¬ 
cation  belongs  to  the  beginning  or  repenting  man,  and  takes 
place  in  three  ways,  with  sorrow  and  mourning  on  account  of  sin, 
with  complete  confession,  and  with  perfect  penitence  ’  ’  (Theol. 
D.,  p.  50).  This  is  the  first  stage,  repentance  and  its  exercises  ; 
the  struggle  for  the  overcoming  of  sensuality  ( Sinnlichkeit )  is  its 
essential  characteristic.  (h)  In  the  second  stage,  the  Imitatio 
Christi  holds  the  place  of  prominence.  “Thou  must  break 
through  my  suffering  human  nature,  if  thou  art  really  to  come  to 
my  unveiled  divine  nature”  (Seuse,  p.  52.  Tauler,  f.  nyv, 
i56r.  Theol..  D.,  p.  220). 1  Here  the  principal  thing  is  thorough¬ 
going  meditations  upon  the  passion  of  Christ:  “Not  with  a 
hasty  going  over  it  as  one  has  time  and  place  ;  but  it  must  be 
with  a  fervent  love  and  with  a  mournful  review  ”  (Seuse,  p.  396). 
The  life  of  Seuse  testifies  with  what  dramatic  vividness  and  with 
what  barbarous  ascetic  exercises  these  meditations  were  prac¬ 
ticed.  The  aim  is  sympathy  and  imitation.2  But,  apart  from 
these,  God  himself  sends  sufferings  and  crosses  of  various  kinds 
upon  man,  in  order  to  make  him  a  true  follower  of  Christ.  “  The 
swiftest  beast  that  bears  you  to  perfection  is  suffering”  (Eckh., 
p.  492).  “  No  one  so  cordially  feels  the  passion  of  Christ  as  he 

to  whom  it  happens  to  suffer  similar  things  ’  ’  (Thom,  a  Kemp, 
ii.  1 21).  True,  there  is  in  these  circles  a  deep  conviction  that 
Christ’s  passion  is  our  “  perfect  righteousness”  (Seuse,  p.  393). 
“And  thus  has  he  redeemed  us,  not  with  our  works  but  with  his 
works,  and  with  his  merits  has  he  made  us  free  and  redeemed 
us”  (Ruusbr.  iii.  140).  “All  my  comfort  and  my  confidence 
rests  wholly  upon  thy  passion,  thine  atonement,  and  thy  merits  ’  ’ 
(Seuse,  p.  427b).3  But  Seuse  writes  also:  “And  yet  every 
man  draws  to  himself  only  so  much  of  the  atonement  as  he  with 
sympathy  makes  himself  like  me,”  i.  e.,  Christ  (Seuse,  p.  39s).4 
What  is  this  but  saying,  as  this  school  bluntly  puts  it,  that  Christ 
is  only  the  partial  cause  of  ours  alvation  ?  The  Imitatio  Christi 
(vid.  Thom.  aK.  i.  1.  1  ;  25.  3  ;  ii.  1.  2)  is  the  religion  of  these 
mystics:  “Give  to  me  to  imitate  thee  with  contempt  of  the 
world”  (ib.  iii.  56.  2).  They  plunged  into  asceticism — which 

1  Cf.  Augustine,  serm.  261.  7  :  “Through  the  man  Christ  thou  attainest  to 
the  God  Christ;”  also  the  passages  cited  in  Vol.  I.,  p.  262.  Already  in 
Origen,  c.  Celsus,  vi.  68. 

2  Vid.  Seuse,  p.  52ff.,  321  ff.,  and  Seeberg,  Leben  Seuse,  p.  28  ff. 

3  Particularly  the  dying  are  often  urged  to  pray:  “Upon  thy  mercy  and 
goodness  will  I  die,  and  not  upon  my  good  works  ”  (Hasack,  p.  437). 

4  Cf.  Thom,  in  sentent.  iii.  d.  49,  a.  2,  3).  Thom,  a  Kemp',  i.  24.  I  : 
satisfactional  and  purifying  sorrow  ( dolor  satisfactorius  et  purgativus'). 


i8o 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


they  regarded  as  meritorious  and  entitling  to  reward  (l onbar 
Seuse,  p.  385,  383),  but  they  nevertheless  kept  alive  a  love  for 
Jesus  and  appreciation  of  his  life — as  the  counterpart  to  the  view 
which  regarded  him  as  a  stern  celestial  judge,  before  whom 
Mary  and  the  saints  must  appear  to  intercede  for  us.  “  As  the 
lodestone  draws  to  it  the  iron,  so  does  Jesus  draw  to  himself  all 
hearts  that  are  touched  by  him”  (Tauler,  f.  43  v).  Though  all 
this  remains  perfectly  Catholic,  yet  these  ideas  just  as  truly  be¬ 
token  a  “pre-reformation”  element.1  This  is  the  way.  Man 
must  return  to  nothingness  ( entwerde?i ,  “unbecome”),  for 
only  out  of  a  nothing  ( niht )  does  God  make  an  it  ( iht ),  (Eckh., 
p.  189.  Taul.  f.  146  V). 

(/)  The  goal,  finally,  is  unification  with  God  in  the  depths  of 
the  soul ;  and  this,  too,  with  God  in  the  inner  unity  of  his  nature. 
“  The  essence  of  the  soul  is  united  with  Nothingness,  and  the 
powers  of  the  soul  with  the  works  of  Nothingness.2  In  this  state  of 
absolute  passivity  God  causes  his  Son  to  be  born  in  our  soul  “a 
hundred  thousand  times  more  quickly  than  the  twinkling  of  an 
eye”  (Tauler,  f.  60  r).3  This  state  can  be  experienced  in  two 
psychological  forms  :  either  in  such  a  way  that  man  in  the  intel¬ 
lectual  process  experiences  the  “vision”  ( Schauung )  of  the 
essence  of  God,  or  in  such  a  way  that  “  the  created  will  is  merged 
into  the  eternal  Will  and  therein  dissolved  and  reduced  to  noth¬ 
ingness,  so  that  the  eternal  Will  alone  here  wills,  acts,  and  fails 
to  act  ”  (Theol.  D.,  p.  104).  The  former  harmonizes  with  the 
Thomistic,  the  latter  with  the  Scotist  theology  (Ritchl,  Gesch. 
d.  Pietismus,  i.  470),  although  the  two  forms  were  not  sharply 
discriminated.4  The  moments  of  extreme  ecstatic  exaltation 
were  of  brief  duration.  Lukewarmness  and  lassitude  followed 
(Seuse,  p.  360,  355,  358,  448).  The  words  of  the  Scriptures^ 
— Christ’s  sweet  love-letter,  and  his  presence  in  the  Lord’s 

1  But  it  must  be  ever  borne  in  mind  that  this  conception  of  the  “  Follow¬ 
ing  of  Christ,”  which  maybe  traced  back  to  the  Apostolic  Fathers,  is  but  a 
mutilated  and  dislocated  presentation  of  biblical  ideas.  The  following  of 
Jesus  means,  in  the  Gospels,  that  he  who  attaches  himself  to  Jesus  walks  with 
him  and  finds  in  him  God  and  the  Son  of  the  living  God.  The  result  of  fol¬ 
lowing  him  is  announced  in  Matt.  16.  16  and  Jn.  6.  67  f. 

2  This  is  the  Areopagite  conception  of  the  nature  of  the  Godhead.  Cf. 
my  remarks,  Thomas.  DG.  ii. ,  ed.  2,  p.  305,  A.  2. 

3  Cf.  my  exposition,  Thomas.  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  p.  307  ff. 

4  Cf.  my  remarks,  1.  c.,  p.  310b  Also  Dante,  Parad.  28.  109  ff.:  “Through 
vision,  therefore,  is  blessedness  attained.  Not  through  love,  for  this  follows 
only  when  it  has  sprung  from  vision  as  its  source.”  With  Staupitz  (ed. 
Knaake,  i.  106),  Luther  accepted  the  latter  form,  vid.  Glosses  upon  Tauler, 
Weim.  ed.  ix.  102  :  “The  whole  of  salvation  is  resignation  of  the  will  in  all 
things.”  Also,  Thom,  a  K.,  iii.  15.  2  ;  56.  1.  Goch,  dialog.  9.  IO  (Walch,,. 
Monim.  Med.  aev.  i.  4,  p.  129,  132). 


CHURCH  LIFE  AND  RELIGIOUS  AGITATIONS.  l8l 

'Supper — console  the  pious  (ib.  355,  62 1  f. ,  450  f.  Thom,  a  Kemp, 
iv.  11.  4).  They  should  be  always  ready  to  turn  aside  from  the 
highest  religious  transport  to  prepare  a  plate  of  soup  for  a  pauper 
(Eckh.,  p.  553.  Taul.  f.  128  r,  95  r,  121  r).1  “  He  to  whom 

inwardness  becomes  outwardness,  to  him  the  inwardness  becomes 
more  inward  than  to  him  to  whom  inwardness  becomes  inward¬ 
ness  ”  (Seuse,  p.  246). 

We  cannot  overlook  the  medieval  mould — ascetism  and  ecstacy 
— in  which  the  controlling  ideas  here  are  cast.  But,  inasmuch  as 
the  entire  body  of  the  traditional  teaching  and  culture  of  the 
church  is  concentrated  upon  the  religious  life  of  the  individual 
soul,  which  is  to  grow  by  the  contemplation  of  Jesus  and  by  that 
intercourse  of  the  soul  with  him2  in  which  blessedness  consists,3 
these  men  were,  nevertheless,  “schoolmasters  leading  to  Christ.”4 

Literature.  Greith,  Die  deutsche  Mystik  im  Predigerorden,  1861. 
Bohringer,  Die  deutschen  Mystiker,  1855.  Preger,  Gesch.  d.  deutschen 
Mystik,  3  vols. ,  1874,  1881,  1893  ;  cf.  Denifle,  Hist,  polit.  Blatter,  vol.  75, 
•679  ff.,  77 1  ff,  9°3  ff-,  and  Archiv  f.  Litt.  u.  KG.  d.  MA.  ii.  417  ff.  Denifle, 
Das  geistl.  Leben,  3  A.,  1880. 

Upon  separate  topics  :  Lasson,  M.  Eckh.,  1868.  R.  Seeberg,  Ein  Kampf 
um  jenseitiges  Leben  (Biogr.  Seuses),  Dorpat,  1889.  C.  Schmidt,  J. 
Tauler,  1841,  and  Denifle,  Taul.  Bekehrung,  1879.  Upon  the  Buch  v. 
geistl.  Armut,  Ritschl,  Ztschr.  f.  KG.  iv.  337  ff.  Strauch,  Marg.  Ebner 
u.  Heinr.  v.  Nordb,  1882,  and  “  Offenbarungen  d.  Adelheid  Langmann,” 
1 875.  Upon  the  Brethren  of  the  Common  Life,  Hirsche,  PRE.  ii.  678-760. 
Particularly  SEEBERG  in  Thomas.  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  290-315. 

4.  Not  least  among  the  influences  leading  to  the  crisis  at 
the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  the  change  in  the  conditions 
■of  the  business  world.  (Cf.  Inama-Sternegg,  Deutsche  Wirt- 
schaftsgesch.  iii.  2,  1901.)  The  traffic  in  money  emphasized 
the  contrast  between  the  rich  and  the  poor.  In  the  cities 
there  was  an  accumulation  of  capital  in  the  hands  of  indi¬ 
viduals,  which  proved  in  the  highest  degree  detrimental  to  the 
general  social  advancement,  as  both  the  nobles  and  the  peasants 
realized  in  sad  experience.  The  Romish  canon  law  was  rigidly 
enforced,  and  proved,  as  always,  the  ally  of  the  financially 
stronger  party.  The  heaviest  burden  fell,  in  the  last  instance, 


1  Cf.  Thom.  summ.  ii.  ii.  q.  182,  a.  I,  ad  3. 

2  Thom,  a  Kemp.  ii.  8.  I  :  “  It  is  a  great  art  to  know  how  to  walk  {con¬ 

i' er  sari)  with  Jesus.” 

3  Ib.  iii.  59.  1  :  “Where  thou,  there  heaven,”  ii.  12.  3:  “Thou  hast 
found  paradise  on  earth.” 

4  Note  also  the  value  attached  to  practical  deeds  of  love.  The  monastic 
idea  of  forsaking  the  world  is  often  painfully  prominent  ( e .  g. ,  Thom,  a  K.  i. 
10.  I  ;  20.  1);  but  see  also  the  splendid  sermons  of  Tauler  upon  the  earthly 
calling  (fob  1 1 7  r  f. ,  fol.  94  v  f. ).  Cf.  Uhlhorn,  Die  christl.  Liebestatig- 
keit,  ii.  (1884),  p.  350  ff. 


182 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


upon  the  peasantry.  The  impoverishment  of  the  latter,  the  de¬ 
velopment  of  the  feudal  system,  and  the  pressure  exerted  by  the 
nobles,  gave  birth  to  the  '  ‘  social  question  ”  of  the  fifteenth  cen¬ 
tury.  As  the  only  social  power  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  the 
church,  it  was  inevitable  that  these  social  problems  should  assume 
a  religious  form.  The  ethics  of  the  medieval  church  had  not 
risen  to  the  demands  of  the  new  economic  conditions.  The 
friendly  interest  with  which  the  most  truly  religious  spirits  of  the 
day  regarded  the  suffering  peasants  did  not  alleviate  their  misery. 
The  terrible  strain  of  mind  found  vent  in  forecasts  and  prophe¬ 
cies.  Not  only  the  hierarchy,  which  had  become  utterly  secu¬ 
larized  and  was  ever  thirsting  for  gold,  but  all  the  high  and 
mighty  of  the  world  as  well,  were  to  be  destroyed.  All  secular 
ordinances  and  laws  were  declared  null  and  void,  and  only  the 
divine  law  must  rule.  The  pious  shall  conquer.  Wealth  will 
cease  to  be  ;  evangelical  poverty  will  become  universal,  and 
with  it  communism  will  prevail.  All  are  to  be  equal,  made  free 
by  ‘ ‘  evangelical  liberty.”  God  will  bring  it  to  pass.  The 
time  would  soon  be  ripe,  it  was  thought,  to  lay  hand  to  the  work. 
This  was  the  Christian  Socialism  of  the  day,  which,  in  league 
with  “evangelical  liberty,”  pressed  on  to  revolution.1  Far 
beyond  the  circles  of  those  actually  engaged  in  these  movements 
extended  the  stimulating  and  disturbing  influence  of  these  ideas. 
What  strange  contrasts  are  here  blended — ideas  as  full  of  contra  - 

1  Vid.  especially  “The  Vision  and  Creed  of  Piers  Ploughman”  (ed. 
Wright,  Lond.,  1856).  Die  Reformation  Sigismunds  (ed.  Bohm,  1875). 
Cf.  Gesch.  des  Hans  Boheim  (Barack,  Arch.  d.  hist.  Vereins  f.  Unter- 
franken,  xiv.  3,  pp.  1-8).  The  “  new  ”  or  “  divine”  order  which  the  Refor¬ 
mation  of  Sigismund  had  in  view  (p.  241,  242,  170)  embraces,  in  addition  to 
all  manner  of  ecclesiastical  and  social  improvements,  the  demand  of  “  liberty.” 
The  latter  is  deduced,  however,  from  the  redemption  achieved  by  Christ : 
“  Christ  suffered  for  us”  that  he  might  free  us  and  release  us  from  all  bonds, 
and  herein  no  one  is  exalted  above  the  other,  for  we  are  in  the  same  condition 
in  redemption  and  liberty,  whether  noble  or  peasant,  rich  or  poor,  great  or 
small  (p.  221,  214,  245,  246f.).  In  the  name  of  this  liberty,  feudal  serfdom 
is  to  be  abolished,  and  woods,  pasture,  and  water  (Wald,  Weide,  Wasser)  are 
to  be  free  to  all  (p.  222  f. ).  The  imperial  and  papal  codes  of  law  areslumber- 
ing,  but  the  “Little  Ones”  are  wakeful  (p.  225).  This  liberty  which 
Christ  is  said  to  have  brought,  constitutes  one  root  of  the  conception  of  “  evan¬ 
gelical  liberty.”  The  other  is  found  in  the  (evangelical)  idea  of  natural  law, 
i.  <?.,  that  by  nature  all  are  free,  and  all  things  common  to  all  (vid.  sub).  To 
this  must  be  added  the  great  emphasis  laid  upon  evangelical  liberty  and  the 
evangelical  law  in  pre-reformation  circles  (vid.  especially  Goch,  dialog,  c.  7, 
18,  19).  I  would  thus  answer  the  inquiry  raised  by  Von  Nathusius  (die  christl. 
soz.  Ideen  d.  Ref.-zeit  u.  ihre  Herkunft,  1897,  p.  48  ff. ),  but,  in  my  judg¬ 
ment,  not  satisfactorily  answered  by  him,  as  to  the  medieval  origin  of  the  con¬ 
ception  under  discussion.  As  to  the  eschatological  framing  of  these  ideas, 
vid.  Wadstein,  Die  eschat.  Ideengruppe,  1896,  p.  183  ff.,  1 7 1  ff.  Kropat- 
scheck,  Das  Schriftprincip  der  luth.  Kirche,  i.  247  ff. 


CHURCH  LIFE  AND  RELIGIOUS  AGITATIONS.  1 83 

dictions  as  was  the  closing  period  of  the  Middle  Ages  itself ! 
Hatred  of  the  church  and  love  for  evangelical  law,  longing  for 
more  secure  possession  of  property  and  enthusiasm  for  holy  pov¬ 
erty,  individualistic  and  socialistic  tendencies,  practical  demands 
of  the  present  age  and  lofty  apocalyptic  expectations  (cf.  Joachim 
v.  Floris),  the  gospel  and  natural  law, — here  meet.  The  result 
was  in  keeping  with  it  all — revolution  in  the  name  of  the  gospel. 

But  even  here  it  was  theological  ideas  which  lay  in  the  back¬ 
ground,  i.  e .,  the  evangelical,  or  natural,  law  as  the  criterion  for 
criticism  of  all  existing  institutions,  and  the  perfect  life  to  be 
found  in  the  observance  of  this  law.  But  by  natural  or  divine 
law  was  understood  :  “  all  possession  of  all  things  in  common, 
and  there  is  one  liberty  of  all  ”  (Occam,  dial.,  p.  932.  Cf.  op. 
90,  dier.  p.  1143).1  But  above  all  influential  here  were  the 
ideas  of  the  great  Hussite-Wickliffe  movement,  or  the  views  of 
Wickliffe  (f  1384),  whom  Huss  and  his  adherents  interpreted 
for  their  countrymen.2  Wickliffe’ s  work,  De  civili dominio  (i.,  ed. 
Poole,  1885),  demands  attention.3  All  human  rights,  it  claims, 
must  rest  upon  divine  right.  Accordingly,  the  unpardoned  sin¬ 
ner  holds  unrightfully  what  he  possesses  (i.,  p.  2  f. ,  28,  8).  In 
the  sight  of  God  his  possessions  would  belong  to  the  righteous, 
and  he,  therefore,  steals  them  (p.  34):  “  for  by  the  very  fact 
that  anyone  takes  another’s  goods  unjustly,  their  owner  being  un¬ 
willing  or  ignorant  (of  the  act),  he  commits  theft  or  robbery. 
Since,  therefore,  every  unrighteous  man  unjustly  takes  the  goods 
of  his  body  and  goods  of  fortune,  which  all  belong  to  every 
righteous  person,  ...  he  in  this  way  seizes  or  steals  whatever 
goods  (he  possesses).”  But  the  righteous  are,  in  Wickliffe’ s 
view,  the  predestinated  (vid.  sub).  These,  accordingly,  as  the 
adopted  sons  of  God,  have  rightful  claims  to  dominion  over  the 
whole  world:  “  he  has  a  right  to  the  whole  kingdom,  .  .  . 
therefore  everyone  thus  righteous  rules  the  whole  visible  world  ’  ’ 
(p.  47  f. ).  They  are,  therefore,  kings,  like  Christ;  but  also 
bishops,  since  they  must  proclaim  the  holy  doctrine.4  It  is,  of 

1  Occam  borrows  this  verbally  from  Isidor,  Etymol.  v.  4.  Gratian  also  ac¬ 
cepts  Communism  as  guaranteed  by  natural  law,  with  appeal  to  Acts  iv.  32, 
Plato  and  Augustine  (Deer,  pars  i.,  dist.  8).  Roman  law  allows,  as  included 
in  natural  rights,  only  the  union  of  man  and  wife,  the  education  of  children, 
and  the  liberty  of  all.  Vid.,  e.  g .,  Digest,  i.  I. 

2  As  to  the  relation  of  Huss  to  Wickliffe,  and  the  controlling  influence  of  the 
latter  upon  the  Bohemian  agitation,  vid.  Loserth,  H.  u.  W.,  1884.  The  in¬ 
fluence  of  this  English  theologian  upon  the  continent  may,  perhaps,  be  in  this 
respect  compared  with  that  of  Carlisle  in  the  nineteenth  century. 

3  It  was  widely  read  in  Bohemia  Loserth,  pp.  242,  hi. 

4  How  similar  is  this  to  Luther's  “Liberty  of  a  Christian  Man,”  and  yet 
how  different ! 


184 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


course,  not  meant  by  this  that  the  righteous  are  at  once  to  appro¬ 
priate  to  themselves  the  possessions  which  others  have  wrong¬ 
fully  seized.  On  the  contrary,  the  positive  duties  of  life  are 
contained  in  the  “  evangelical  law,”  which  term  best  expresses 
comprehensively  the  practical  reformatory  demands  of  Wickliffe. 
The  Holy  Scriptures,  or  the  ‘Maw  of  Christ”  (p.  397),  is  in 
and  of  itself  sufficient  for  the  regulation  of  the  entire  life  of  the 
Christian  world  ( Ipsa  pure  per  se  sufficit  regere  totum  populum 
christianum ,  p.  395 ).1  There  is  really  no  need  of  any  law  be¬ 
yond  the  Scriptures  for  the  Christian  world  (opus  evangelic,  i.,  p. 
200,  ed.  Loserth).  Civil  laws  are  righteous  only  in  so  far  as  they 
have  the  Biblical  spirit  (civ.  dom.,  p.  400,  139).  Only  in  so 
far  can  they  claim  acknowledgment  at  the  hand  of  believers  (op. 
ev.  i.  367).  But  the  requirements  of  the  evangelical  law  are 
met  by  humility,  love,  and  poverty  in  the  imitation  of  Jesus  : 
“  But  humility,  love,  and  poverty  are  the  doctrine  of  Christ. 
Therefore,  whoever  shall  not  hate  those  things  by  imitating 
Christ  as  an  eagle,  knows  that  he  is  not  of  his  church  ”  (de  eccl., 
p.  63,  ed.  Loserth).  The  life  of  Christ  is  the  commentary  upon 
his  law  (trialog. ,  p.  300,  ed.  Lechler).  Ascetic  imitation  of 
Christ  is,  therefore,  in  the  true  Franciscan  fashion,  depicted  as  the 
duty  of  the  Christian.  “  It  behooves  everyone  who  is  to  be 
saved  to  follow  him  either  in  suffering  or  in  mode  of  life  ”  ( mori - 
bus')  (sermones  ii.,  p.  15,  ed.  Loserth;  also  iii.  491  f.;  op. 
evang.  i.,  p.  105).  “  We  ought  to  imitate  the  life  of  Christ  and 

his  apostles  as  far  as  we  are  able  ”  (trialog.,  p.  456  ;  op.  ev.  i. 
469  f. ;  ii.  140).  These  are  the  ideas  found  in  Wickliffe.  The 
predestinated  and  the  pious  are  the  lords  of  the  world,  the  prop¬ 
erty  of  the  wicked  being  robbery  and  their  codes  of  justice  injus¬ 
tice.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  they  ought  to  be  imitators  of  Christ, 
poor,  humble  servants  of  the  divine  law.  These  ideas  stand  side  b.y 
side.  Either  of  them  alone,  or  both  combined,  may  be  capable 
of  arousing  a  storm  of  criticism  that  may  shake  the  world. 
Either  the  evangelical  law  or  the  rights  of  nature  may  be  in¬ 
voked  in  deadly  assault  upon  all  property  and  law,  upon  every 
rank  and  every  ordinance  of  society.2  The  pious  may  assert 
their  rights  against  the  ungodly  in  the  name  of  the  gospel.  The 
rights  of  nature  and  the  imitation  of  Christ  are  woven  together, 

1  Evangelical  law  and  natural  law  fall  naturally  into  one,  since  both  are  in¬ 
spired  by  God,  e.  g.,  De  civ.  domin.,  p.  1,  22,37,28;  p.  125:  “Divine 
created  right  is  divinely  inspired  right ;  human  right  is  right  devised  by  occa¬ 
sion  of  the  sin  of  humanity.” 

2  Wickliffe  feels  this  when  he  restricts  the  thought,  that  civil  laws  are  valid 
only  in  so  far  as  they  agree  with  God’s  law,  by  the  caution  :  “  Therefore  the 
things  thus  said  here  are  not  to  be  proclaimed  too  freely  to  the  whole  populace  ” 
(opp.  ev.  i.  367). 


THEOLOGY  IN  FOURTEENTH  AND  FIFTEENTH  CENTURIES.  185 

and  the  resultant  is  the  holy  revolution.  Hussitism  first  put  the 
ideas  into  practical  execution. 

Cf.  Wiegand,  De  eccl.  notione  quid  Wicl.  docuerit,  Lips.,  1891,  p.  58  ff. 
Von  Bezold,  Zur  Gesch.  d.  Husitentums,  1874;  ib.  Die  “  armen  Leute,” 
Hist.  Ztschr.,  1879,  1  ff. 

§  62.  Review  of  History  of  Theology  in  the  Fourteenth  and 
Fifteenth  Centuries.  Nominalism  and  Augustinianism. 

Literature.  Werner,  Die  nachscot.  Scholastik,  1883;  Der  Augustinism. 
ind.  Schol.  d.  spat.  MA.,  1883  ;  Der  Endausgang  der  mittelalt.  Schol.,  1887. 
Ritter,  Gesch.  d.  Philos,  viii.  (1845),  p.  547  ff.  Prantl,  Gesch.  d.  Logik,  iii. 
(1867),  p.  327  ff.  Siebeck,  Occ.  Erk. -lehre,  Archiv  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos., 

1 897,  p.  317  ff.  Ullman,  Reformatoren  vor  der  Ref.,  1841-42.  Ritschl, 
Rechtf.  u.  Vers,  i.,  ed.  2,  129  ff.  Kolde,  Die  deutsche  Augustinercongregat. 
u.  Staupitz,  1879.  Clemen,  Joh.  Pupper  v.  Goch,  1896.  Kropatscheck, 
Der  Schriftprincip  der  luth.  Kirche,  i.,  1904. 

1.  As  at  the  beginning  of  the  twelfth  century  a  keen  critical 
mind  furnished  the  occasion,  both  positively  and  negatively,  for 
the  great  theological  agitation  of  the  twelfth  and  thirteenth  cen¬ 
turies,  so  again,  at  the  beginning  of  the  fourteenth  century,  a 
•critical  thinker  directed  theological  ideas  into  new  paths.  The 
former  movement  conducted  to  the  culminating  point  of  Schol¬ 
asticism  ;  the  latter,  to  its  fall.  Thus  far  we  may  find  a  parallel 
between  Abelard  and  Duns  Scotus.  The  method  of  Duns  con¬ 
trols  his  opponents  as  well  as  his  adherents.  Nothing  is  too  lofty 
nor  too  sacred,  too  firmly  settled  nor  too  well  attested,  to  be 
called  in  question.  This  method,  which  stands  in  intimate  rela¬ 
tion  with  the  conception  of  God  as  the  absolute,  unregulated 
Will,  became  the  lever  for  the  critical  unsettling  of  dogma,  em¬ 
ployed  particularly  and  in  a  far-reaching  way  by  the  so-called 
Nominalists.  The  Lombard  brought  the  materials  together ; 
Thomas  framed  definitions ;  Duns  built  up  and  demolished 
arguments ;  Occam  advocated  the  positively  valid,  though  not 
without  robbing  it  of  the  nimbus  of  rationality. 

(V)  Although  Duns  was  not  yet  a  Nominalist,  the  way  was 
prepared  for  the  transition  to  Nominalism  by  his  emphasizing  of 
the  singular  and  the  individual  (p.  147).  The  work  was  com¬ 
pleted  by  his  greatest  pupil,  William  of  Occam  (f  ca.  1350). 

Vid.  esp.  super  quatuor  libr.  sent,  and  Centilogium  theologic.,  Lyon, 
1495.  Quodlibeta,  Strassburg,  1491.  De  sacr.  altaris,  Strassburg,  1491. 
Summ.  totius  logicae,  Bologna,  1498.  Major  summ.  log.,  Venet.  1508. 
Exposit.  aurea  super  totam  artem  veterem,  Bol.  1496.  The  writings  upon 
church  polity,  vid.  supra,  p.  167.  In  these  and  the  following  citations  of  lit¬ 
erature,  I  have  been  guided  by  no  bibliographical  interest  (for  which  see 
Werner),  but  merely  cite  the  editions  which  I  have  used. 

Following  Abelard,  Thomas  and  Duns,  Occam  is  the  fourth 


1 86 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


typical  figure  among  the  Scholastics.  An  intellectual  acumen 
that  moved  with  ease  amid  the  finest  subtleties  of  thought, 
a  devotion  to  abstraction  and  rational  criticism  of  the  strictest 
type,  are  his  striking  characteristics.  He  is  keenly  interested  in 
politics;  but  in  politics,  as  in  theology,  he  is  a  fanatical  champion 
of  logic.  One  looks  to  him  in  vain  for  warmth  of  feeling  or 
devotional  language.  His  logic  is  keen,  but  its  edge  is  turned 
when  it  meets  the  authority  of  the  Romish  church.  The  reader 
cannot  escape  a  painful  impression,  when  the  talented  author 
apologizes  for  his  bold  conclusions  as  harmless  intellectual  exer¬ 
cises,  or  quotes  a  large  number  of  opinions  without  stating  clearly 
which  of  them  accords  with  his  own  judgment  (octo  quaest.,  p. 
391,  398;  dial.,  p.  504,  546,  771;  de  sacr.  alt.  c.  6,  fin.)! 
His  Nominalistic  theory  of  knowledge  (vid.  sub)  as  well  as 
his  critical  skepticism  (upon  both,  vid.  sub,  2  and  3)  spread 
rapidly  in  all  directions  (esp.  Adam  Goddam,  Robert  Holkot, 
Joh.  Buridan,  Marsilius  of  Inghen,  Peter  D’Ailli.  Quaes- 
tiones  super  libr.  sent.,  Strassburg,  1490).  But  it  is  scarcely 
correct  to  consider  his  theological  standpoint  as  merely  a  conse¬ 
quence  of  his  Nominalism.1  His  critical  radicalism  is  rather  to 
be  explained  as,  on  the  one  hand,  a  direct  application  of  the 
Scotist  method  ;  and  this  method  led  him,  on  the  other  hand,  to 
the  position  of  external  ecclesiastical  positivism.  The  last 
important  representative  of  this  tendency  was  Gabriel  Biel 
(t  1495,  Collectorium  sive  epitoma  in  Sentent.  11.  iv.  Tub., 
1501,  with  the  Expositio  canonis  missae,  Basel,  1510.  Cf.  also 
Sermones  de  tempore  u.  de  festivitatibus,  Hagenau,  1515.  Cf. 
Linsenmann,  Theol.  Quartalschrift,  1865,  195  ff. ,  449  ff. , 
601  ff.  Werner,  Endausgang,  p.  262  ff. ).  At  the  same  time, 
however,  pure  Scotism  still  found  adherents  ( e .  g.,  Vorillon 
and  Franz  Lychetus,  who  wrote  a  commentary  upon  the  Opus 
Oxoniense) . 

(£)  Parallel  with  the  Nominalist  tendency,  was  still  preserved 
a  line  of  Thomist  theologians  (e.  g.t  Hervaeus  Natalis,  f  1323  ; 
cf.  Seeberg,  PRE.  vii.,  ed.  3,  771  ff.  Petrus  de  Palude, 
t  1342);  but  even  such  Dominicans  as  Durandus  de  St. 
Portiano  (f  1334,  vid.  in  iv.  libros  mag.  sentent.,  Paris,  1508 
et  pas. )  departed  from  the  doctrine  of  the  great  teacher  of  their 
order.  The  most  energetic  defender  of  Thomism  against  the 
Scotist  theology  was  the  General  of  the  Thomists,  Joh.  Cap- 
reolus  (f  1444.  Defensionum  theologiae  divi  doctoris  Thomae, 
11.  iv.,  Venet.  1483.  Cf.  Werner,  D.  h.  Thom.  v.  Aq.  iii.  15 1 

1  E.  g.,  Baur,  Dreieinigkeit  ii.  872  f.  Thomas,  ii.,  ed.  2,  92  f.  Wagen- 
Mann,  PRE,  x.,  ed.  2,  691. 


THEOLOGY  IN  FOURTEENTH  AND  FIFTEENTH  CENTURIES.  1 87 

ff. ).  Dionysius  Rickel  (Carthusianus)  (f  1471,  vid.  in  sent. 
Venet.  1584)  deserves  mention  in  this  connection,  as  he  attached 
himself  in  essential  points  to  Thomas,  although  giving,  in  his 
eclectic  fashion,  an  excellent  summary  of  the  theories  of  the 
various  scholastic  teachers  (cf.  Werner,  Endausgang,  p.  134  ff., 
206  ff. ).  The  commentaries  written  by  Thomas  sel  Vio 
(Cajetan)  upon  the  Summa  of  Thomas  and  by  Sylvester  Fer- 
rariensis  upon  the  Summa  contra  gentiles  (cf.  Werner,  1.  c.,  p. 
305  ff. )  extend  into  the  Reformation  period. 

(c)  Side  by  side  with  these  two  tendencies,  we  note  a  third, 
which  sought  to  combine  certain  mystical  notions  with  Averroistic 
ideas. 1  Its  prominent  representatives  are  Petrus  Aureolus  (f  ca. 
1345,  Sentence-comm.  and  Quodlibet,  Rome,  1596),  Joh.  v. 
Baconthorp  (f  1346,  Quaest.  in  iv.  libros  sent,  and  Quodlibet, 
Cremona,  1618),  and  Joh.  de  Janduno  (ca.  1320).  The  last- 
named  especially  maintained  that  the  Averroistic  ideas  of  the 
eternal  world  and  of  the  one  intellect  common  to  all  men  are 
rationally  necessary  truths,  i.  e . ,  he  did  not  adopt  the  Thomistic 
interpretation  of  Aristotle,  but  held  that  of  Averroes  as  the  more 
correct  because  it  made  a  fundamental  distinction  between  theo¬ 
logy  and  secular  philosophy.  But,  since  the  Christian  concep¬ 
tion  of  salvation  can  be  maintained  intact  only  on  the  basis  of 
the  faith  of  the  church,  it  was  necessary  to  cling  to  the  ecclesi¬ 
astical  dogmas  (Werner,  Nachscot.  Theol.,  p.  5  f. ).  This 
tendency,  with  its  extreme  Realism,  was  dominant  in  the  theo¬ 
logical  school  of  Padua  (e.  g.,  Urban  of  Bologna,  f  1403  ;  Paul 
of  Venice,  f  1429;  Augustin  Niphus  of  Suessa,  f  ca.  1550, 
etc.  Vid.  Werner,  Endausgang,  p.  142  ff. ).  This  view,  which 
prevailed  in  northern  Italy,  and  outlasted  Nominalism  by  about 
a  hundred  years,  requires  no  further  notice  in  the  History  of 
Doctrines. 

(d)  Neither  can  the  school  of  Augustinian  Eremites  be 
compared  in  importance  or  completeness  of  thought  with  the 
two  tendencies  first  named.  At  their  head  stood  Aegidius  of 
Colonna  (also  called  Romanus,  f  1316.  The  best  edition  of 
his  Comm,  upon  the  first  three  books  of  the  Sentences,  Cordova, 
1707,  Kirchenlex.  iii.  669).  Among  his  adherents  were 
Jacob  Capocci,  f  1308;  Gerhard  of  Siena,  Prosper  of 
Reggio,  Albert  of  Padua,  Simon  Baringundus,  Thomas  of 
Strassburg  (f  1357,  vid.  11.  iv.  in  mag.  sentent.,  Strassburg, 
1490  and  passim).  But  despite  the  aim  of  this  school  to  main¬ 
tain  Augustinianism,  their  theory  of  sin  and  grace  is  by  no  means 

1  Cf.  Renan,  Averroes  et  1’  Averroisme,  3  A.  1866  ;  and  briefly,  Erdmann, 
Gesch.  d.  Philos,  i.,  ed.  4,  339  ff. 


t88 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


that  of  Augustine  (vid.  Werner,  Der  Augustinismus,  p.  171  ff., 
18 1  if. ).  The  resolution  adopted  A.  D.  1287,  to  make  the  theology 
of  Aegidius  the  doctrine  of  the  order  (vid.  Ossinger,  Bibl. 
Augustiniana,  1786,  p.  237),  had  comparatively  slight  effect. 
Gregory  of  Rimini  (f  1358,  Lectura  in  1.  i.  and  ii.  Sent., 
Paris,  1482)  advocated  variant  views,  accepting  Nominalism, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  then  demanding  strict  adherence  to 
Augustinianism,  which  he  held  is  to  be  freed  from  the  wrappings 
of  Peripateticism.  He  was  therefore  honored  with  the  title, 
Doctor  Authenticus.  He  strongly  insisted  that  man  was  created 
in  a  state  of  grace,  and  that  concupiscence  is  the  material  of 
original  sin.  Sin  is  transmitted  through  the  sensuous  concupis¬ 
cence  of  the  generating  act.1  That  in  other  points  the  popular 
theology  of  the  Augustinians  before  the  Reformation  did  not 
overstep  the  bounds  of  the  common  Catholicism,  may  be  seen, 
e.  g .,  in  the  Coelifodina  of  Johann  of  Paltz  (supra,  p.  175). 

(<?)  The  tendency  which  crops  out  in  men  like  Gregory  had 
from  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century  been  influencing  the 
minds  of  many  theologians,  i.  e .,  the  desire  for  a  return  to  the 
genuine  Augustine,  or  to  the  simple  teaching  of  the  ancient* 
church.  In  A.  D.  1400  Joh.  Gerson  wrote  :  “  A  reformation 
seems  to  be  necessary  in  the  faculty  of  theology.  .  .  .  First, 
that  useless  doctrines  without  fruit  or  solidity  may  not  be  so 
commonly  discussed,  since  through  these  the  doctrines  necessary 
to  salvation  and  useful  are  deserted.  .  .  .  Second,  that  those 
who  are  (not)  scholars  are  misled  through  these  (teachings), 
because  they  think  that  those  persons  are  chiefly  to  be  regarded 
as  scholars  who  give  themselves  to  such  things,  despising  the 
Bible  and  the  doctors.  .  .  .  Through  these  teachings,  theolo¬ 
gians  are  ridiculed  by  the  other  faculties  :  for  they  are,  on  this 
account,  called  Phantastics,  and  are  said  to  know  nothing  con¬ 
cerning  solid  truth  and  morals  and  books.  .  .  .  Through  these 
(teachings)  the  church  and  the  faith  are  edified  neither 
internally  nor  externally.”2  A  remedy  is  to  be  found  by 
lecturing  not  only,  as  was  customary,  upon  the  first  book  of 
the  Sentences,  but  upon  the  last  three,  and  lectures  should  be 
presented  in  a  simple  way,  and  with  practical  reference  to  the 
religious  and  moral  conditions  of  the  age  (Gers.  opp.  ed.  Dupin 

1  Both  Aegidius  and  Gregory  taught  the  maculate  conception  of  Mary. 
Thomas  of  Strassburg  championed  the  immaculate  conception.  Werner, 
p.  176  f. 

2  In  the  later  commentaries  upon  the  Sentences  (already  in  Hervaeus,  and 
especially  since  Occam),  the  metaphysical  questions  of  the  First  Book  really 
claim  the  first  place  in  importance  and  in  the  space  devoted  to  them.  Theology 
is  lost  in  metaphysics  or  canonical  casuistry. 


THEOLOGY  IN  FOURTEENTH  AND  FIFTEENTH  CENTURIES.  189. 

i.  122  ff. ).  The  faults  here  noted  are  manifest  in  the  scholastic 
literature  of  the  age.  When  criticism  found  itself  limited  by  the 
dogmas  of  the  church,  it  became  empty  and  fruitless.  And 
a  theology  which  created  a  thousand  difficulties  and  suggested  a 
thousand  possibilities,  only  to  return  at  last  to  the  formulas  so 
•laboriously  criticized,  became,  together  with  its  advocates, 
ridiculous.  Demand  was  made  for  a  practical  and  churchly 
theology,  and  gradually  the  beginnings  of  such  a  theology  began 
to  appear.  Side  by  side  with  the  commentaries  upon  the  Sen¬ 
tences,  we  find  treatises  and  brochures  upon  popular  theology, 
expositions  of  the  Creed,  directions  for  confessing,  “  patterns  of 
virtue/’  etc.1  A  simple  outline  of  dogmatics  is  presented,  e.  g., 
in  the  Compendium  theologiae  found  among  the  works  of  Gerson.2 
If  works  of  this  character  led  back  to  the  simple  forms  of  the 
earlier  theology,  there  was  at  the  same  time  a  return  to  Augus¬ 
tine.  Many  influences  contributed  to  this  movement.  Against 
the  rising  tide  of  Pelagianism,  Thomas  of  Bradwardina 
(f  1349)  lifted  the  standard  of  Augustinian  doctrine,  not  how¬ 
ever  without  first  refining  it  into  a  system  of  Determinism  (vid. 
De  causa  dei  c.  Pelagium  et  de  virtute  causarum,  London,  1618. 
Cf.  R.  Seeberg,  PRE.  iii.,  ed.  3,  350  ff. ).  In  the  mind  of 
Wickliffe  the  conception  of  the  Supreme  will  of  God  was  asso¬ 
ciated  inseparably  with  that  of  predestination,  and  thus  became 
a  critical  weapon  against  the  church  and  the  clergy.  His  chief 
opponent,  Thomas  Netter  (f  1431.  Doctrinale  antiquitatum 
fid.  cath. ),  endeavored  to  expound  the  Catholic  doctrine  from  the 
Scriptures  as  in  opposition  to  the  views  of  Wickliffe,  and  with  an 
avoidance  of  the  scholastic  forms.  He  thus  helped  to  prepare 
the  way  for  the  final  statement  of  the  church’s  doctrine  in  the 
Confession  of  Trent  (vid.  Seeberg,  PRE.  xiii.,  ed.  3,  749  ff.). 
The  more  profound  piety  of  the  Mystics  produced  a  certain  con¬ 
geniality  in  temper  and  thought  with  Augustine.  And  wherever 
the  deeper  religious  needs  came  into  collision  with  the  external¬ 
ized  church,  they  found  in  him  both  religious  nutriment  and 

1  The  libraries  furnish  a  mass  of  such  material  in  manuscript.  These  docu¬ 
ments  are  partly  in  refutation  of  the  charges  ventilated  at  the  Reform  Councils. 
But  cf.  in  connection  with  them  the  mystical  tractates,  which  also  present  out¬ 
lines  of  popular  theology.  Wickliffe  as  a  theologian  followed  strictly  the 
scholastic  method  ;  but,  as  he  always  contrived  to  give  to  his  monographs  a 
practical  and  reformatory  bearing,  even  he  strengthened  the  union  of  theology 
and  the  church. 

2  This  book  first  expounds  the  Creed  ;  then  the  Decalogue.  It  then  treats 
of  the  seven  sacraments,  of  the  three  theological  and  the  four  cardinal  virtues, 
of  the  seven  gifts  of  the  Spirit,  of  the  eight  Beatitudes,  of  the  various  sins — 
and,  finally,  the  definitions  of  pyschology  are  discussed,  with  constant  refer¬ 
ence  to  sin.  As  to  the  question  of  its  authorship,  see  Schwab,  Gerson, 
p.  780. 


190 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


weapons  for  the  conflict.  This  is  true  of  all  the  men  who  are 
commonly  spoken  of  as-  the  Forerunners  of  the  Reformation, 
such  as  foH.  Pupper  of  Goch  (f  after  1475),  JOH*  Ruchrath 
of  Wesel  (f  1481),  Joh.  Wessel  (f  1489).  But  Augustine 
could  give  to  no  one  more  than  he  possessed  himself  ;  and  hence 
these  men,  in  the  decisive  question  concerning  grace  and  justifi¬ 
cation,  still  held  to  the  Catholic  conception  of  infused  grace 
(vid.  sub).  They  had  no  more  real  grasp  than  the  later 
Scholastics  upon  the  principle  of  the  sole  authority  of  Scripture 
in  matters  of  faith.  It  follows,  that  the  term  “Forerunners  of 
the  Reformation  ”  is  a  misleading  one1  (vid.  Ritschl,  Rechtf.  u. 
Yers.  i.,  ed.  2,  129  ff.). 

This  hasty  review  is  sufficient  to  reveal  the  activity  and 
versatility  of  the  intellectual  life  of  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth 
centuries.2  But  the  progressive  impulse  in  this  play  of  forces 
came  practically  from  the  Nominalistic  and  Augustinian  circles, 
and  to  them  we  must  now  turn  our  attention. 

2.  We  first  view  the  positions  of  Nominalism,  as  presented  in 
Occam  (cf.  Seeberg,  PRE.  xiv.,  ed.  3).  Man’s  knowledge 
has  to  do  with  propositions,  not  with  things.  Nature  produces 
only  the  individual  object  (sent.  i.  d.  2,  q.  4  X).  The  Universal 
does  not  objectively  exist,  but  only  in  the  subjective  understand¬ 
ing  (ib.  q.  8  E).  In  order  that  knowledge  may  come  into 
existence,  there  is  needed  only  the  intellect  ( intellectus )  and  the 
thing  perceived  {res  cognita)  \  the  mediating  intelligible  forms  {spe¬ 
cies  sensibiles  et  intelligibiles)  are  superfluous  (contrary  to  Duns, 
supra,  p.  147),  “because  in  vain  is  that  accomplished  through 
more  stages,  which  can  be  accomplished  through  fewer  ”3  (sent, 
ii.  q.  15  O).  Objects  beget  in  us  a  sensuous  impression.  From 
this,  the  intellect  is  able  to  beget  in  the  mind  a  picture  ( fictum ), 
a  copy  ( simulacra ,  idola ,  phantasmata ,  imagines') ,  of  the  actual 
object  (ib.  q.  17  S,  i.  d.  13,  q.  1  J),  which  is  of  course  only  a 
representatively  ( objectively ),  and  not  a  really  ( subjectively ) 
existent  copy  (ii.  q.  15  SS).  “  The  intellect,  seeing  anything 
outside  of  the  soul,  constructs  a  corresponding  thing  in  the 

1  This  is  notably  true  of  Savonarola  (f  1498),  who  was  in  theology 
a  Thomist,  and  whose  reformatory  labors  pursued  strictly  the  line  of  the 
medieval  conception  of  the  relations  of  church  and  state,  and  the  ascetic  ideal 
of  Christian  life. 

2  Regarded  separately,  with  almost  every  name  mentioned  in  the  above 
review  is  associated  a  wealth  of  historical  questions  of  biographical,  literary, 
dogmatic,  and  philosophic  interest.  Protestant  theology  will  find  it  increas¬ 
ingly  necessary  to  devote  far  more  attention  and  industry  to  this  field  of  investi¬ 
gation  than  has  been  customary. 

3  A  favorite  principle  with  Occam,  as  it  had  been  with  Duns,  derived 
originally  from  Aristotle. 


THEOLOGY  IN  FOURTEENTH  AND  FIFTEENTH  CENTURIES.  191 

mind”  (ib.  i.  q.  8  E).  This  copy  corresponds  exactly  with 
the  object  copied.  Over  against  these  results  of  first  intention 
( termini  primae  intentionis')  originating  directly  from  the  actual 
individual  object,  stand  the  results  of  second  intention  ( termini 
secundaeintentiones') ,  which  are  naturally  (  naturalitur )  constructed 
by  the  thought  from  the  former.1  These  are  the  abstract  con¬ 
ceptions,  which  assert  something  as  common  to  the  separate 
objects,  i.  e .,  the  Universals  (ib.  ii.  q.  25  O).  There  is  no 
objective  existence  corresponding  to  them.  They  are  simply  a 
result  of  the  inability  of  the  human  mind  to  apprehend  a  single 
object  without  at  the  same  time  thinking  of  it  as  having  a  general 
character.  For  example,  when  one  sees  a  white  object,  or 
several  white  objects,  he  is  compelled  to  think  of  the  abstract 
property  of  whiteness — or,  we  cannot  look  upon  a  thing  as  hav¬ 
ing  bulk,  or  as  related  to  other  things,  or  as  continuing  to  exist, 
without  thinking  of  quantity,  or  relation,  or  duration.  It  is  easy 
to  see  from  this  why  knowledge,  or  science,  should  be  concerned 
only  with  conceptions  and  definitions,  not  with  real  objects. 
But  according  to  Occam,  conceptions  of  both  the  classes  named 
are  truly  real  entities  ( vere  entia  realia ),  i.  e.,  as  “  qualities  sub¬ 
jectively  existing  in  the  mind”  (quodlib.  iv.  19  ;  v.  13),  and 
they  correspond  to  existing  reality.  It  is  utterly  unjust  to 
accuse  Occam  of  robbing  concepts  of  their  content  and  see¬ 
ing  in  them  only  figments  of  the  imagination.  He  writes : 
“  The  universal  is  not  such  a  figment,  to  which  nothing  similar 
in  the  subjective2  being  corresponds,  as  if  it  were  only  imagined 
to  be  in  the  objective  being  (sent.  ii.  q.  8  H).  Intoning,  as 
he  does  so  strongly,  the  activity  of  the  soul  in  the  act  of  per¬ 
ception,  and  shattering  so  completely  the  illusive  dreams  of 
Realism,  Occam  is  the  real  originator  of  the  modern  theory  of 
knowledge. 

3.  This  more  precise  theory  as  to  the  nature  of  perceptions 
was  enlisted  in  the  service  of  the  critical  assaults  upon  the  tradi¬ 
tional  dogmatics.  (0)  Dogma,  it  was  held,  cannot  be  scientifi¬ 
cally  proved.  With  equal  right  entirely  other  views  might  then 
be  advocated.  In  his  Centilogium ,  Occam  presents  a  number  of 
examples  :  If  God  assumes  any  other  nature  than  his  own,  the 
propositions  :  “God  is  an  ass,  God  is  a  stone,”  are  also  possi¬ 
ble  (concl.  7).  If  the  Son  became  the  son  of  Mary,  so  might 

1  Here  belong  also  intelligible  processes,  such  as  acts  of  the  thought  or  will, 
desire,  sorrow,  etc.,  which  man  experiences  within  himself  and  which  can 
become  the  direct  objects  of  thought,  i.  «?.,  which  furnish  an  intentio  prima , 
or  a  directly-formed  conception  (sent.  i.  prol.  q.  r  HH). 

2  Subjective — substantively,  or  objectively  :  objective — imaginatively.  The 
meaning  of  the  terms  is  now  just  the  reverse. 


192 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


also  the  Father  (8)  or  the  Holy  Ghost  (9).  From  the  doctrine 
of  the  commufiicatio  idiomatum  might  be  drawn  such  prop¬ 
ositions  as,  “God  is  the  foot  of  Christ,”  or,  “the  foot  is  the 
hand”  (13).  The  Trinity  is  undemonstrable,  and  can  be 
known  only  through  infused  faith  ( fides  infusa )  (55).  Differ¬ 
ences  of  ethical  merit  cannot  lead  to  corresponding  differences 
of  reward,  since  the  latter  is  infinite  (92).  In  a  similar  way, 
transubstantiation  is  criticized  ;  the  proofs  for  the  unity  of  God 
surrendered  (Biel,  sent.  i.  d.  2,  q.  10);  it  is  declared  probable 
that  God  created  the  world  in  eternity  (ib.  ii.  d.  1,  q.  3  A);  or 
taught  that  God  could  have  forgiven  sin  without  the  repentance 
of  the  sinner  (Occ.  sent.  iv.  q.  8  M);  or,  that  God  might  have 
just  as  well  have  commanded  as  prohibited  hatred  against  him¬ 
self,  theft,  murder,  etc.  (sent.  ii.  q.  19).  (<£)  But  it  by  no 

means  follows  that  the  dogmas  of  the  church  are  to  be  surren¬ 
dered,  nor  their  acceptance  made  a  matter  of  indifference.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  declared  :  “This  is  my  faith,  since  it  is  the 
Catholic  faith  ;  for  whatever  the  Roman  church  believes,  this 
alone  and  not  anything  else  do  I  believe,  either  explictly  or  im¬ 
plicitly”  (Occ.  de  sacr.  alt.  1.  16;  quodlib.  iv.  35).  The  author¬ 
ity  of  the  church’s  doctrine  is  supported  by  that  of  the  Scrip¬ 
tures.  But  this  is  done — theoretically  at  least — in  a  different 
way  from  that  adopted  by  Thomas  or  Duns  (supra,  p.  101  f.,  149). 
Only  those  truths  are  Catholic  which  the  Holy  Scriptures  teach  : 
“Therefore  the  Christian  is  not  by  the  necessity  of  salvation 
bound  to  believe  ;  nor  is  he  to  believe  what  is  neither  contained 
in  the  Bible,  nor  can  be  inferred  by  necessary  and  manifest  con¬ 
sequence  alone  from  the  things  contained  in  the  Bible  ”  (Occ. 
dial.,  p.  41 1,  769  f.,  Goldast).  “An  assertion  of  the  canonical 
Scripture  is  of  greater  authority  than  an  assertion  of  the  Christian 
church  ”  (D’Ailli  in  Tschackert,  Petr.  v.  Ailli,  append.,  p.  10). 
But  these  doctrines  are  true  because  inspired  by  God,  whether  as 
natural  and  innate  in  all  men,  or  as  revealed  for  recording  in 
Scripture.  The  pope  or  the  church  can  by  their  declarations 
alter  absolutely  nothing  in  these  truths  (Occ.  ib.,  p.  419). 
“  Human  authority  is  by  no  means  to  be  relied  upon  in  those 
things  which  pertain  to  the  faith,  because  our  faith  is  above  the 
human  intellect  ”  (p.  432).  The  truths  of  the  faith  are  binding 
simply  on  account  of  their  conformity  to  the  Scriptures  (Biel, 
sent.  iii.  d.  25,  q.  un.  dub.  3  ;  d.  24,  q.  un.  dub.  3).  The  cred¬ 
ibility  of  the  Scriptures  is  acknowledged  “  because  there  it  has 
been  written  and  asserted  by  suggestion  ( instinctu )  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  (Occ.,  p.  822,  834).  God  immediately  infused  the  knowl¬ 
edge  here  contained  into  the  minds  of  the  Biblical  writers  as  the 
most  perfect  certainty  or  evidence  (Biel,  iii.  d.  24,  q.  un.  concl. 


THEOLOGY  IN  FOURTEENTH  AND  FIFTEENTH  CENTURIES.  1 93 

7).1  Should  anyone,  therefore,  call  the  Scriptures  in  question, 
he  would  have  to  be  regarded  as  a  heretic  :  “  Whoever  says  that 
any  part  of  the  New  or  of  the  Old  Testament  asserts  anything 
false,  or  is  not  to  be  received  by  Catholics,  is  to  be  regarded  as 
heretical  and  stubborn  ”  (Occ.  ib.,  p.  449).  D’Ailli,  indeed, 
placed  the  authority  of  the  New  Testament  above  that  of  the 
Old,  and  could  even  ascribe  to  some  of  the  writings  of  the  New 
Testament  an  “authority  greater”  than  that  of  others 
(Tschackert,  append.,  p.  9);  but  this  had  no  practical  signifi¬ 
cance.  As,  now,  “all  things  to  be  believed  are  contained  in  the 
canonical  Scriptures,”  there  can  be  no  quantitative  enlargement 
of  the  body  of  truth.  The  three  ancient  symbols  merely  sum¬ 
marize  the  biblical  ideas,  or  explain  them  as  against  the  heresies 
which  have  arisen  (Biel,  iii.  d.  25,  q.  un.,  a.  1  ;  a.  3,  dub.  2. 
Durand,  iii.  d.  26,  q.  2,  a.  2).  “  It  is  evident  that  the  church, 

or  the  pope,  by  ordaining  or  making  a  new  symbol,  .  .  .  does 
not  make  new  Catholic  truths  or  articles,  but  declares  anew  that 
certain  truths  have  been  and  are  Catholic  ”  (Biel,  ib.  a.  3,  dub.  3 
fin.;  cf.  expos,  can.  miss.  lect.  41  L).  But,  plainly  as  the  prin¬ 
ciple  of  the  exclusive  authority  of  the  Scriptures  is  here  theoret¬ 
ically  expressed,  our  authors  did  not  undertake  to  make  practical 
application  of  it.  The  teachings  of  the  Scriptures  and  of  the 
church  are  unconsciously  placed  upon  the  same  level  (<?.  g. , 
Occ.  1.  c.,  p.  434,  459,  475;  sent.  i.  d.  2,  q.  1  F).2  Occam, 
e.  g.,  declares  that  he  will  hold  to  transubstantiation  on  account 
of  the  authority  of  the  Romish  church,  although  he  knows  of 
another  view  which  explains  everything  better  and  is  not  con¬ 
trary  to  the  Bible,  which  does  not  expressly  teach  transubstantia¬ 
tion  (quodlib.  iv.  35  ;  desacr.  alt.  3).  He  would  not  support  the 
usual  theory  of  original  sin,  unless  there  were  “  authorities  of  the 
saints  ”  in  its  favor  (sent.  ii.  d.  26  U).  It  appears  to  be  safer 
to  submit  to  ancient  authority.3  “To  the  apostolic  sanctions 

1  Biel  says  (sermon,  de  temp.  fol.  157  r):  “  But  the  canonical  Scriptures  of 
both  Testaments  are  believed  to  have  been  written,  the  Holy  Spirit  dictating 
and  inspiring.”  Paul  is  the  “celestial  secretary”  (D’  Ailli,  sermones,  Strassb. 
1490,  form  Y  5  v).  Durand,  sent.  prol.  q.  1  L  :  “We  assent  to  them  (the 
articles  of  faith)  alone  or  chiefly  upon  the  authority  of  the  Scriptures,  which 
we  believe  to  be  inspired  by  God.”  D’ Ailli :  “  All  the  canonical  Scriptures 
have  been  revealed  by  the  same  infallible  author,”  i.  e.,  God  (Tschackert, 
Petr.  v.  Ailli,  append.,  p.  9).  Vid.  also  Duns,  sent.  iv.  d.  14,  q.  3.  5. 
Wickliffe,  de  civil,  dom.  i.  p.  418,  439:  “Scripture  divinely  inspired.” 
Other  citations  may  be  found  in  Holzhey,  Die  Inspirat.  d.  h.  Schr. ,  1895,  PP* 
94-1 19. 

2  Occam  (de  sacr.  alt.  3)  even  says  :  “  This  (transubstantiation)  is  believed 
to  have  been  divinely  revealed  to  the  holy  fathers.” 

3  Ritschl’s  comments  upon  Occam  (Fides  implicita,  1890,  p.  28  ff. )  are  un¬ 
reliable,  as  he  was  unacquainted  with  the  thorough  discussion  of  the  questions 

*3 


i94 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


and  decrees  which  are  not  certainly  contrary  to  the  divine  and 
natural  law  of  Holy  Scripture,  although  there  should  be  some  doubt 
of  this,  assent  and  obedience  are  to  be  rendered”  (Biel,  serm. 
de  temp,  fob  157  r).1  It  is  remarkable  that  the  same  men  who 
apply  reason  so  sharply  in  criticism  of  the  dogmas  of  the  church 
and  subordinate  them  to  the  sole  authority  of  the  Scriptures,  are 
yet  always  ready  in  any  given  instance  to  submit  to  the  ‘ ‘  Romish  ’  ’ 
doctrine.  But  we  should  not  on  this  account  wonder  at  their 
studied  irony,  nor  doubt  either  their  honesty  or  their  courage. 
If  I  understand  the  matter  rightly,  this  wavering  stands  in  inti¬ 
mate  connection  with  the  juristic  conception  of  the  church. 
Just  as  in  civil  life  the  law  of  nature  holds  primacy  and  yet  finds 
application  only  in  a  form  adapted  to  the  precepts  of  positive 
law  (supra,  p.  171  f. ),  so  it  is  also  in  the  church.  Here,  the  ac¬ 
cepted  dogma,  or  the  Roman  doctrine,  is  the  positive  law ;  the 
Scriptures  (and  reason)  correspond  to  the  law  of  nature  (supra, 
p.  1 71  f.  ).2  The  application  of  the  latter  criterion  produces  a  rad¬ 
ical  criticism  of  dogma  and  church  ;  but  this  criticism  is  shat¬ 
tered — very  much  as  in  the  political  world — upon  actual  concrete 
conditions — upon  the  positive  legal  status  of  the  Romish  church. 
Neither  in  church  nor  in  state  has  the  criticism  based  on  the  law 
of  nature  abolished  the  existing  positive  law,  although  logical 
consistency  might  require  that  it  should  do  so.  But,  since  all  at¬ 
tempt  to  prove  the  teachings  of  the  church  to  be  conformed  to 
reason  has  been  abandoned  upon  principle,  ecclesiastical  positiv¬ 
ism  asserts  itself  in  the  naked  form  :  I  believe  what  the  Romish 
church  believes  !  This  position  could,  of  course,  not  be  perma¬ 
nently  maintained.  The  longer  criticism  pursued  its  way,  the 
more  intolerable  became  the  positivism  of  the  church,  and  the 
longer  the  latter  held  sway  in  the  church,  the  more  improper 
must  the  bold  criticisms  appear.3 


at  issue  in  Occam’s  writings  upon  church  polity.  On  p.  30,  the  Dialog,  is  re¬ 
ferred  to  as  “  not  printed,”  but  see  G.  Hoffmann,  Die  Lehre  der  fides  impli- 
cita,  1903,  p.  153  ff. 

1  Such  a  man  as  D’Ailli  could,  upon  occasion,  write  of  the  books  of  the 
Bible  :  “  We  thus  receive  the  canonical  or  divine  Scriptures  on  account  of  the 
authority  of  the  Catholic  church,  which  so  receives  and  approves  them” 
(Tschackert,  append.,  p.  11). 

2  It  is,  of  course,  not  implied  that  the  entire  contents  of  the  Scriptures  fall 
under  the  heading  of  the  law  of  nature  ;  but,  regarded  as  a  whole,  they  claim 
the  same  primacy  over  the  positive  ecclesiastical  principles  devised  by  man,  as 
the  law  of  nature  given  to  man  by  God  holds  over  positive  human  laws. 

3  These  theologians,  on  the  one  hand,  identified  the  law  of  reason  with  the 
teachings  of  the  Scriptures,  and,  on  the  other,  regarded  the  latter  as  in  con¬ 
formity  with  the  teachings  of  the  church.  Both  ideas  are  equally  perverted, 
and  both  errors  combined  in  preventing  them  from  seriously  applying  their  view 
of  the  authority  of  the  Bible.  Hence,  they  never  established  the  authority  of 


THEOLOGY  IN  FOURTEENTH  AND  FIFTEENTH  CENTURIES.  1 95 


4.  The  truths  of  Scripture  are  apprehended  in  Faith,  (a) 
<l  Faith  is  a  certain  adherent  ( adhaesiva )  and  firm  knowledge 
(, notitia )  of  truth  pertaining  to  religion,  received  through  reve¬ 
lation”  (Biel,  iii.  d.  23,  q.  2,  a.  1  D).  In  its  essential 
nature,  faith  is  intellectual  assent  {ass emus')'.  11  To  believe  is  an 
act  of  the  intellect  assenting  to  the  truth,  proceeding  from  a 
command  of  the  will  ”  (ib.  C).  But  revelation  embraces  only  to 
a  small  extent  truths  which  are  necessary,  or  evident  to  reason ; 
the  majority  of  its  teachings  are  contingent  truths,  for  which  it 
would  be  impossible  to  present  a  scientific  demonstration  (Occ., 
sent.  prol.  q.  1  N;  q.  7  ;  quodlib.  ii.  3.  Biel,  iii.  d.  25,  q.  un., 
a.  1,  n.  3),  or  which  may  even  directly  contradict  reason. 

‘ ‘Whoever  is  a  Catholic  and  believing  Christian  can  easily 
believe  anything  to  which  he  could  by  no  means  by  his  natural 
powers  assent.”  Here  God  comes  to  his  aid:  “God,  out  of 
his  grace,  infuses  into  him  a  habitus ,  through  the  medium  of 
which  ( quo  mediante)  he  is  able  to  assent  to  any  article  of  faith 
whatsoever”  (Occ.,  centilog.  60).  This  is  the  fides  infusa , 
without  which  no  act  of  faith  would  be  possible.1  It  is  a 
“  quality  ( qualitas )  produced  by  God  in  the  soul,”  which  in¬ 
clines  the  understanding  to  the  act  of  faith.”  This  habitus  is 
infused  in  baptism  (Biel,  iii.  d.  23,  q.  2,  a.  1  G.  Occ., 
quodlib.  iii.  7).  But,  in  order  that  acts  of  faith  may  be  actually 
performed,  there  is  always  further  needed  an  acquired  faith  ( fides 
acquisita).  No  child  can  come  to  faith,  despite  the  faith  infused 
into  it,  unless  it  secure  also,  through  instruction  or  the  reading 
of  the  Bible,  the  concrete  faith  directed  upon  particular,  separate 
truths  (Occ.,  sent.  iii.  q.  8  LM).  ( b )  However  untenable  the 
conception  of  the  ‘  ‘  infused  faith  ’  ’  may  be,  yet  our  Dogmati- 
cians,  in  employing  it,  are  guided  by  a  certain  presentiment  of  a 
real  truth.  It  was  their  great  aim  to  gain  a  special  sphere  for  the 
religious  life.  The  pious  reader  of  the  Bible,  Biel  explains,  en¬ 
larges  not  so  much  his  knowledge  as  his  faith,  since  he  is  through 
the  infused  faith  inwardly  bound  to  the  authority  of  Scripture 
(iii.  d.  24,  q.  un.,  a.  2,  concl.  5).  But  again,  in  so  far  as  the 
material  furnished  by  revelation  for  faith  is  not  accessible  to 
reason  as  such,  theology  is  not  in  the  usual  sense  of  the  term  a 
science  (Occ.,  sent.  prol.  q.  1.  Biel,  sent.  prol.  q.  7).  {c) 

Occam  thus  defines  the  fides  implicita  :  “  To  believe  implicitly 

the  Scriptures  upon  any  secure  basis.  It  was  not  establishing  it  to  take  from 
the  pope  his  infallible  authority  and  transfer  it  to  the  Bible  !  But  this  is  the 
basis  of  Occam’ s  regard  for  the  Bible.  Vid.  supra,  p.  169,  n.  2. 

1  But  Occam  in  Quodlib.,  iii.  7,  has  introduced  this  conception  as  required 
neither  by  reason  nor  by  experience  .  .  .  nor  by  inference  but  solely  by 
authority.  Cf.  Duns,  supra,  p.  150. 


196 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


is  to  firmly  assent  to  some  Universal  from  which  many  things 
follow,  and  not  to  pertinaciously  cling  to  anything  contrary  to 
it”  (dial.,  p.  434).  Faith  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Scriptures  is 
thus  also  included  in  the  category  of  implicit  faith.  It  is  the 
idea,  already  familiar  to  us  (supra,  p.  103),  that  we  accept 
everything  taught  by  the  Scriptures,  i.  e .,  by  the  church,  as 
taught  by  these  authorities:  “  Everything  contained  in  the 
canonical  Scriptures  is  true”  (Biel,  iii.  d.  25,  q.  1,  a.  1,  n.  2  ; 
expos,  can.  miss.  lect.  12  B:  ‘‘I  believe  as  the  church  be¬ 
lieves  ” ) .  The  technical  formulas  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity  and  of  Christology  fall,  for  the  laity,  under  the  “implicit 
faith”1  (ib.  a.  2,  concl.  5),  as  well  as  the  facts  of  biblical 
history,  which  cannot  be  experienced  (ib.  a.  1,  n.  2).  Even  if 
a  layman,  in  thus  obeying  his  prelate,  should  believe  what  is 
false,  “  such  a  one  would  not  only  not  sin,  but  he  would  even,  by 
thus  believing  what  is  false,  merit”  (words  of  Innocent  III.  in 
Biel,  1.  c.,  a.  1,  n.  2).  But  every  believer  must  unconditionally 
possess  explicit  faith  in  Christ  as  the  Redeemer  (ib.  a.  2,  concl. 
3  ;  further,  concl.  5).  It  is  therefore  the  specific  Catholic  con¬ 
ception  of  faith  which  here  again  meets  us.  Faith  is  knowledge, 
( notitia )  and  assent  ( assensus )  in  regard  to  the  biblical  revela¬ 
tion.  Faith  is  the  same  in  all  persons ;  but  some  believe  ex¬ 
plicitly,  others  implicitly  (ib.  concl.  4). 

5.  Such  are  the  principles  of  Nominalistic  Scholasticism. 
Within  the  old  forms  a  new  ferment  is  stirring ;  but  the  new 
wine  has  not  yet  burst  the  old  bottles.  The  Scriptures  are  the 
sole  authority  in  the  church.  It  is  felt  that  they  constitute 
a  canon  of  criticism ;  but  yet  no  dogma  is  overthrown,  nor  is 
any  right  of  the  hierarchy  molested.  Reason  calls  in  question 
the  bold  systems  of  the  past.  Theologians  surrender  the  sys¬ 
tems,  but  allow  the  definitions  to  stand.  Or,  they  doubt  the 
separate  doctrines,  but  believe  the  whole.  Skepticism  forms  a 
league  with  the  positivism  of  the  church — doubt  with  implicit 
faith — and  they  counterbalance  each  other.  There  is  an  unde¬ 
fined  sense  of  a  really  positive  theology  within  reach  ;  but  what 
is  actually  cultivated  is  a  fruitless  criticism,  a  “  negative  theo¬ 
logy.  ’  ’  But,  amidst  all  the  murkiness  of  thought,  two  ideas  are 
never  lost  sight  of,  i.  e. ,  the  authority  of  the  Scriptures  as  over 
against  the  church  and  her  dogmas,  and  the  feeling  that  the 
Christian  religion  is  no  ordinary  human  system  of  religious 
philosophy,  but  a  special,  positive,  and  clearly  marked  whole — 
the  historical  revelation  given  by  God,  which  only  faith  can 

2  But  Occam  claimed  also  for  himself  the  right  of  cherishing  implicit  faith 
in  the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation  (!)  (De  sacr.  alt.  I,  supra,  p.  192). 
Cf.  also  account  in  Moll,  KG.  d.  Niederl.  ii.  562. 


SEPARATE  DOCTRINES  IN  LATER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


I97 


apprehend.  The  league  between  the  gospel  and  speculative 
thought,  which  held  sway  in  the  church  from  the  days  of  Origen, 
was  glorified  by  the  Scholastics  also  ;  but  it  was  finally  shattered, 
too,  at  their  hands.  Duns  and  the  Nominalists  proved  it  unten¬ 
able.  It  is  this  service  chiefly  which  establishes  their  position 
among  the  forces  preparing  the  way  for  the  coming  Reformation. 
It  would  be  a  serious  error  to  criticize  their  separate  teachings 
and  ignore  the  chief  service  rendered  by  them. 

The  separate  doctrines  are  here  of  interest  to  us  only  because 
of  their  significance  in  the  historical  development.  In  the 
closing  period  of  Scholasticism,  as  we  have  already  treated  of  the 
sacraments  in  §  58,  and  of  repentance  in  particular  in  §  61,  2, 
we  shall  need  to  examine  only  the  views  held  upon  sin,  redemp¬ 
tion,  grace,  and  the  appropriation  of  salvation,  together 
with  the  modifications  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper. 
We  have,  likewise,  no  occasion  to  attempt  a  presentation  of  the 
Augustinian  tendency  in  all  its  details  ;l  and  shall  therefore  con¬ 
fine  ourselves  to  a  few  remarks  touching  the  doctrine  of  grace 
and  to  criticism  of  the  conception  of  the  church  and  of  the 
theory  of  indulgences. 


§  63.  Labors  of  the  Later  Middle  Ages  Upon  Separate 

Dogmas  and  Doctrines. 

1.  As  the  conception  of  God  held  by  Duns  regulated  the 
theistic  speculations  of  the  Nominalists,  so  in  nearly  all  doctrines 
they  attached  themselves  more  or  less  closely  to  the  Doctor 
Subtilis.  This  is  evident  in  their  views  of  Sin  and  Liberty. 
The  rebellion  of  the  sensuous  nature  against  the  spirit  is  natural. 
The  donum  superadditum  removed  it,  and  in  consequence  merits 
became  possible  (Biel,  ii.  d.  30,  q.  1,  a.  1-3).  Original  sin 
“  consists  in  a  privation  of  the  original  righteousness  owed” 
(Biel,  ib.  q.  2,  a.  2,  concl.  3.  Occ.,  sent.  ii.  q.  26  U ;  cf. 
Durand,  ii.  d.  30,  q.  3).  Yet  an  infection  of  children  through 
the  generating  act  is  also  maintained  (Biel,  ib.  q.  2,  a.  1,  concl. 
1.  Duns  differs,  supra ,  p.  153).  But,  despite  sin,  the  natural 
freedom  of  the  will  remains  perfectly  intact.  “The  integrity 
of  his  natural  will,  i.  e.,  its  freedom,  is  not  corrupted  by  sin; 
for  that  is  really  the  will  itself,  and  not  separable  from  it”  (Biel, 
ii.  d.  30,  q.  1,  a.  3,  dub.  4).  “Through  mortal  sin  nothing 
is  corrupted  nor  destroyed  in  the  soul  ”  (Occ.,  sent.  iv.  q.  8  and 
9  D).  That  these  assertions  are  irreconcilable  with  the  Augus- 

1  Of  how  little  interest  for  the  History  of  Doctrines  such  a  discussion  would 
be  may  be  seen  in  Clemen’s  work  upon  Goch. 


198 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


tinian  doctrine  of  original  sin  is  very  evident.1  Vid.  also  Biel, 
De  festivit.  serm.  33. 

2.  The  doctrine  of  the  Atonement  and  Redemption  is  treated 
entirely  in  the  spirit  of  Thomas  and  Duns.  The  subjective  as¬ 
pect  is  the  more  prominent,  but  the  objective  is  not  wanting. 
The  relation  of  the  two  to  one  another  remains,  as  heretofore, 
without  clear  definition. 

(#)  Aureolus,  Baconthorp,  Durandus,  and  Capreolus  fol¬ 
low  in  the  tracks  of  Thomas.  The  merit  of  Christ  is  of  infinite 
value,  and  is  capable  of  affecting  atonement  for  all  (Aur.  iii.  d. 
20,  q.  1,  a.  1.  Bac.  iii.  d.  32,  a.  1.  Capr.  iii.  d.  18,  a.  3. 
Dur.  iii.  d.  19,  q.  1,  a.  2 :  “  The  passion  of  Christ  was  a  sufficient 
and  superabundant  satisfaction  for  the  sin  of  the  whole  human 
race.  .  .  .  Christ,  by  suffering  out  of  love  and  obedience, 
offered  to  God  something  more  acceptable  than  the  recompens¬ 
ing  of  the  sin  of  the  whole  human  race  required  ’  ’ ).  Anselm’s  ^ 
idea  of  the  necessity  of  satisfaction  is  rejected  (Aur.  1.  c.,  q.  2. 
Dur.  d.  20,  q.  1).  But  redemption  through  the  passion  of 
Christ  is,  nevertheless,  the  most  suitable  way,  since  man  is  in  this 
way  assured  of  the  magnitude  of  the  divine  love  and  incited  to 
a  responsive  affection,  and  receives  also  the  example  of  Christ  to 
stimulate  him  to  the  practice  of  every  virtue  (Dur.  ib.).  The 
redemption  wrought  by  Christ  is  realized  only  in  the  case  of 
those  “  who  are  joined  to  him  as  members  to  the  Head,”  or 
“  through  real  imitation,  i.  e.,  when  we  suffer  after  the  similitude 
of  Christ”  (Dur.  d.  19,  q.  1,  a.  2). 2 

(£)  Gabriel  Biel,  on  the  other  hand,  follows  Duns  more  closely. 
Christ,  from  the  time  of  his  conception  onward,  by  his  obedience 
merited  for  us  grace  and  glory  :  “  for  he  was  in  the  very  moment 
of  his  conception  a  man  perfect  in  every  grace  and  virtue  and 
meritorious  work  ”  (iii.  d.  18,  a.  2,  concl.  2).  This  merit  be¬ 
comes  efficacious  through  the  acceptio  divina  (d.  19,  a.  2,  concl. 
1),  but  only  for  the  predestinated  :  “  Only  for  the  predestinated 
did  he  merit  final  grace  and  glory,”  for  “  no  one  finally  obtains 
salvation  unless  he  was  predestinated  from  eternity.  ’  ’  Here  also 
Biel  follows  Duns  (supra,  p.  152). 3  Salvation  rests  upon  the  divine 

1  As  to  the  views  of  this  period  upon  the  immaculate  conception  of  Mary, 
see  Esp.  Occam,  quodlib.  iii.  9.  10,  and  cf.  Werner,  Nachscot.  Scholast., 
P-  347- 

2  Wicliffe  argues  the  necessity  of  a  satisfaction  upon  the  ground  that  man 
must  perform  an  act  of  humility,  which,  in  contrast  with  Adam’s  presumption, 
shall  lower  him  beneath  himself  (trialog.,  p.  215  f.,  ed.  Lechler). 

3  The  idea  of  predestination  occurs  very  frequently  in  his  writings.  The 
eucharistic  sacrifice  brings  “remission  of  sin  ;  not,  indeed,  to  all,  but  to  the 
predestinated”  (Biel,  sermon,  defestiv.  fol.  279  r).  The  church  is  the  “  mul- 
titudeof  the  predestinated  ”  (expos,  can.  miss.  lect.  22  E. ;  vid.  also  sent.  d.. 


SEPARATE  DOCTRINES  IN  LATER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


1 99 


predestination,  and  the  passion  of  Christ  is  only  a  means  for  its 
realization  :  “  If  Christ  had  not  suffered,  the  elect  would  never¬ 
theless  have  been  saved,  because  before  the  passion  of  Christ  God 
foresaw  that  the  elect  would  be  saved  ”  (ib.  concl.  4).  By  the 
side  of  this  conclusion  stands  the  other,  that,  although  the  pas¬ 
sion  of  Christ  primarily  (_ principaliter )  secures  salvation  for  us, 
yet  our  own  working  ( operatio )  cooperates.  For,  when  anyone 
becomes  a  recipient  of  grace,  he  needs,  upon  his  part,  a  certain 
disposition  of  the  will,  such  as  attritio  ;  and  this  implies  a  merit 
of  fitness  (de  congruo').  In  the  case  of  the  baptized  child,  a  sub¬ 
stitute  for  this  is  found  in  the  merit  of  the  sponsors.  The  per¬ 
son  thus  equipped  with  grace  performs  works  having  merit  of 
worthiness  (de condigno'),  and  these  become  a  ground  for  the  in¬ 
crease  of  grace.  It  is  concluded  therefore:  “That,  granting 
that  the  passion  of  Christ  is  the  principal  merit  on  account  of 
which  are  conferred  grace,  the  opening  of  the  kingdom  and  glory,, 
yet  it  is  never  the  sole  and  entire  meritorious  cause.  This  is 
evident,  because  with  the  merit  of  Christ  always  concurs  some 
work,  such  as  the  merit  of  fitness  or  of  worthiness  of  the  one  re¬ 
ceiving  the  grace  or  glory  ”  (concl.  5).  Thus  the  merit  of  Christ 
finds  its  necessary  complement  in  our  merit.  This  final  conclu¬ 
sion  is  here — not  illogically — derived  from  the  idea  of  merit ; 
but  it  is  essentially  an  outgrowth  of  the  Thomistic  idea,  that  we 
became  partakers  of  the  results  of  the  work  of  Christ  only  in  so 
far  as  we  are  in  life  conformed  to  his  image  (supra,  p.  178  f. , 
179b,  n.  4).1  This  merit  of  the  obedience  of  Christ,  as  thus 
more  sharply  defined,  God  accepts  as  a  satisfaction  for  the  sins 
of  all  who  believe  on  Christ  (d.  20,  a.  3,  dub.  1).  This  course 
of  divine  dealing  cannot,  of  course,  be  described  as  necessary 
(ib.  a.  2,  concl.  1);  and  Anselm  is  thus  refuted  with  the 
weapons  of  Duns  (ib.  a.  i).2  On  the  other  hand,  the  plan  of 
salvation  may  be  shown  to  be  most  admirably  adapted  to  the  end 
in  view,  since  it  binds  us  to  God  and  stimulates  us  to  love  him 

27,  a.  3,  dub.  4).  Werner  (Endausgang,  p.  285)  interprets  the  above-cited 
passage  from  the  Sentences  as  teaching  “the  universal  efficacy  of  Christ's 
redemptive  act  for  all  the  descendants  of  Adam.” 

1  This  relationship  between  Biel  and  Thomas  is,  with  justice,  maintained 
by  an  ascetic  document  dating  from  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
which  reproduces  the  thoughts  of  Biel  (in  Hasack,  p.  477),  where  we  find 
also  the  declaration  (p.  443):  “  Since  the  passion  of  Christ  was  not  an  entire, 
but  a  partial,  cause  of  our  salvation.”  In  general,  this  formula  represents  ad¬ 
mirably  the  religious  conception  of  the  day.  But  we  find,  on  the  contrary,  in 
Duns,  iii.  d.  19,  \  8  :  “Christ,  as  the  entire  cause  ( totalis  causa),  merited  for 
us  the  opening  of  the  gates  of  paradise.” 

2  Yet  Biel,  like  Duns  (supra,  p.  157),  is  not  indisposed  to  accept  the  argu¬ 
ments  as  valid,  “  divine  ordination  being  presupposed  ”  (q.  20,  a.  1,  n.  1  B). 


200 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


in  return  (ib.  a.  3,  dub.  2),  and  also  because  God  chose  this  plan 
and  no  other  (ib.  a.  2,  concl.  2). 

(c)  It  is  not  correct  to  say  that  “  the  fundamental  ideas  of 
Anselm’s  theory  were  nevertheless  generally  accepted”  (Thoma- 
sius,  Christi  Person  u.  Werk,  ii.,  ed.  3,  165).  Anselm’s  theory 
is  accepted  by  no  one.  On  the  contrary,  we  constantly  meet  the 
fundamental  ideas  of  Abelard,  almost  always  indeed  combined 
with  the  older  thought  of  the  merit  of  Christ  which  avails  before 
God  as  the  ground  of  divine  grace.  This  combination  appears 
also  in  the  popular  treatises  of  the  day,  particularly  in  the  mys¬ 
tical  literature.1  The  passion  of  Christ  is  here  treated  in  the  spirit, 
and  often  in  the  very  language,  of  Bernard.  Its  purpose  is  to  re¬ 
veal  to  us  God’s  love  and  incite  us  to  responsive  love  and  imitation.2 
On  the  other  hand,  salvation  and  eternal  blessedness  are  with  the 
greatest  earnestness  made  dependent  upon  the  objective  merit 
of  Christ  and  the  satisfaction  rendered  by  him,  the  contempla¬ 
tion  of  which  is  especially  commended  to  the  dying.3  It  is  a, 
favorite  thought  (Anselm,  supra,  p.  70)  that  in  the  redemptive 
work  of  God  justice  and  mercy  concur  ( e .  g.,  Biel,  sermon,  de 
festiv.  fol.  225  v).  Exceedingly  instructive  is  a  sermon  by  Biel 
(De  circumcis.  domini).  Here  Anselm’s  doctrine  is  first  pre¬ 
sented  in  bold  outlines,  and  from  it  deduced  the  concurrence  of 
the  justice  and  mercy  of  God  (1.  c.,  fol.  197  v).  But  this  work 
of  Christ  has  for  its  purpose  the  efficacy  of  the  sacraments : 

‘  ‘  The  sacraments  ...  by  which  man  is  directly  disposed  to  the 
reception  of  grace,  which  is  the  health  and  life  of  the  soul ;  for 
these  he  merited  efficacy  by  the  shedding  of  his- blood  ”  (fol. 
198  r).  “Christ,  as  true  God  and  man,  instituted  the  sacra¬ 
ments,  primarily  ( principaliter )  according  to  his  divine  nature, 
meritoriously  according  to  his  human  nature”  (ib.).  This 
medicine  gives  grace,  “  by  which  they  are  able  to  merit  eternal 
blessedness”  (199  v).  But  even  this  institution  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  is  a  work  of  the  grace  which  grants  the  means  of  salvation 

1  The  numerous  sermons  and  meditations  upon  the  Passion  in  the  Incuna- 
bula-literature  of  before  and  after  A.  D.  1500  are  especially  instructive. 
Space  forbids  the  citation  of  these  separately.  See  both  views  also  in  Wessel, 
De  causis  incarnat.  6  (opp.  p.  424  b ),  and  Goch,  vid.  Clemen,  Goch,  p. 
131  ff. ). 

2  E.  g.,  Wessel,  De  caus.  incarn.  1,  p.  414  :  “  Nothing  is  so  effectual  for 
turning  the  minds  of  men  to  good  as  pious  exercise  in  the  life  and  passion  of 
the  Lord.”  G.  Biel,  passionis  dominie,  serm.  (Hagenau,  1515),  form  A  3; 
expos,  can.  miss.  lect.  85  XY. 

3  Cf.  supra,  p.  179,  n.  3.  Upon  Christ  as  atoning  sacrifice,  e.  g. ,  in 
Wessel,  De  caus.  incarn.  19,  p.  455  ;  de  magnitud.  passion.  39,  p.  539  ;  40, 
p.  541  ;  44,  p.  549.  Cf.  in  Hasack,  p.  155  f.,  143  :  “Thou  wilt  to-day 
interpose  between  thy  wrath  and  my  transgression  the  most  dear  and  accept¬ 
able  sacrifice,  Christ.”  Yid.  also  Moll,  KG.  d.  Niederl.  ii.  657  f. 


SEPARATE  DOCTRINES  IN  LATER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


201 


to  its  enemy,  as  well  as  of  the  justice  which  rewards  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  work  of  Christ,  i.  e. ,  through  the  institution  of 
the  sacraments  (sent.  iv.  d.  2,  q.  1,  a.  3,  dub.  1  ;  cf.  Duns,  iv. 
d.  2,  q.  2.  8).  The  so-called  objective  aspect  of  salvation  may, 
accordingly)  be  reduced  to  the  proposition,  that  Christ  has 
secured  for  us  the  medicine  of  the  sacraments  (cf.  Duns  Scotus). 

3.  It  has  already  been  remarked  (p.  174),  that  the  religious 
life  is  moulded  under  the  influence  of  the  sacrament  of  repent¬ 
ance.  It  is  accordingly  under  this  heading  that  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  personal  piety  is  treated.1  The  problem  is  the  con¬ 
version  of  the  sinner.  (<2)  It  is  for  the  sinner — as  is  repeated 
until  it  becomes  wearisome — to  do  what  in  him  lies  ( quod  in  se 
est),  and  God  will  then  not  suffer  grace  to  be  lacking  (<?.  g. , 
Biel,  sent.  ii.  d.  27,  q.  un.).  The  sinner  acts  from  himself  up 
to  the  point  of  attrition.  But,  according  to  Paltz,  even  this  is 
to  be  traced  back  to  the  influence  of  a  grace  gratuitously  given 
(suppl.  R  2  r;  4  r).  “  Nevertheless,  if  we  do  what  is  in  us, 

so  that  we  have  attrition,  he  changes  for  us  that  attrition  into 
contrition — sometimes  of  his  own  motion  ( per  se)  before  the 
reception  of  the  sacraments,  sometimes  in  the  reception  of  the 
sacraments,  which  is  more  certain”  (ib.).  The  sacraments, 
and  even  divine  worship  before  their  reception,  effect  this 
transformation  (see  citation,  p.  175),  in  connection  with  which 
man  receives  simultaneously  the  peculiar  grace  ( gratia  gratum 
facie?is)  infused  by  the  sacraments.  By  contrition  mortal  sin 
in  him  is  destroyed,  and  by  the  sacrament  the  power  of  doing 
good  is  infused,  (b)  This  is  the  Justification  of  the  sinner.  The 
ultimate  disposition  being  fixed  by  an  act  of  the  free  will,  grace, 
which  is  the  form  of  justification,  is  immediately  infused  by  God 
(Durand,  iv.  d.  17,  q.  1,  a.  3).  There  is  need  of  faith  in  con¬ 
nection  with  this  process  only  in  so  far  as  the  disposition  to 
accept  the  grace  which  is  the  prerequisite  of  the  process,  i.  e. , 
faith,  is  necessary.  “  Therefore  for  the  reception  of  justification 
in  the  adult  there  is  required  a  motion  of  the  free  will,  accord¬ 
ing  to  which  it  consents  to  grace.  And,  because  the  first  motion 
through  which  he  consents  to  grace  is  a  motion  of  faith,  there¬ 
fore  that  motion  itself  is  a  motion  of  faith.  Thus  Romans, 
chapter  5,  justifies  through  faith”  (Paltz,  R  2  r).  Justification 
may,  like  generation,  be  understood  in  two  senses :  as  the 
gradual  movement  toward  righteousness,  or  as  a  change  without 
movement  (mutatio  sine  motu).  In  the  former  sense,  it  occurs 
gradually  ( successive );  in  the  other,  “  justification  is  effected  in 

1  Cf.,  in  addition  to  Biel’s  Book  of  Sentences,  also  Joh.  of  Paltz,  who,  in 
the  supplement  of  his  Coelifodinn ,  treats  of  conversion  and  justification  in  con¬ 
nection  with  a  discussion  of  the  sacrament  of  repentance. 


202 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


an  instant  ”  (ib.  R  5  r).  When  the  sinner  thus  becomes  right¬ 
eous  through  the  infusion  of  grace,  he  receives  at  the  same  time 
the  forgiveness  of  sins.1  (V)  But  the  infusion  of  grace  is  also  the 
basis  of  meritorious  works,2  which  are  accordingly  imposed  in  the 
confessional.  By  this  means  the  entire  process  is  brought  under 
the  view-point  of  merit  (supra,  p.  122).  The  dominant  termin¬ 
ology  is  derived  from  Duns  (p.  160).  The  general  definition 
is  :  “A  meritorious  act  is  an  act  called  forth  ( 'elicitus )  by  free 
will,  accepted  for  the  repaying  of  some  recompense  ( ad  retri - 
buendum  aliquod praemium ),  (Biel,  ii.  d.  27,  a.  1,  n.  2  ;  cf.  iii. 
d.  18,  q.  un.).  The  initiatory  steps,  which  man  is  able  to  take 
in  his  own  strength,  e.  g.,  the  attrition  produce  the  merit  of 
fitness  ( de  congruo').  “  The  soul  is  able,  by  the  removal  of  an 
obstacle  and  by  a  good  movement  toward  God  elicited  by  free 
will,  to  merit  the  first  grace  by  fitness,”  since  it  is  just  for  God  to 
reward  this  merit  by  imparting  grace  (ib.  concl.  4  ;  cf.  iv.  d. 
14,  q.  1,  a.  2,  concl.  5  :  meritum  de  congruo  ad  justificationem  ; 
d.  16,  q.  2,  a.  3,  prop.  4 ;  Durand,  i.  d.  17,  q.  2,  a.  2).  But 
through  the  infusion  of  grace  the  works  become  merits  of 
worthiness.  “  A  merit  of  worthiness  ( condigni  or  de  condigno ) 
is  an  act  elicited  by  free  will  for  a  recompense  (praemium)  of 
someone  according  to  a  debt  to  be  repaid  to  justice.”  An 
‘  ‘  equality  ’  ’  and  ‘  ‘  proportion  of  merit  to  reward  ’  ’  is  here  required 
(ib.  ii.  d.  27,  a.  1,  n.  3). 3  By  means  of  these  merits,  man 
secures  for  himself  both  an  increase  of  grace  and  eternal  glory 
(vid.  also  Paltz,  coelifod.  Bb  3  r  and  suppl.  R  4  r).4  (<f)  The 

possibility  of  being  sure  of  the  possession  of  grace  was  denied  by 
Biel,  though  asserted  by  Duns  (ii.  d.  27,  a.  3,  dub.  5).  The 
unworldly  ideal  of  life,  and  the  dualism  between  the  religious  and 
the  secular  life,  were  perpetuated  (cf.  the  Mystic  literature). 
But  here  also,  the  views  of  the  church  were  in  conflict  with 
modern  advancement  and  its  ideals.5 

1  Some  follow  Thomas  (p.  120),  and  conceive  of  it  as  the  logical  consequent 
of  the  infusion  of  grace,  e.  g.,  Paltz,  R  5  r  :  “  Grace  is  infused  before  guilt  is 
remitted,  because  through  grace  the  guilt  isremitted;  ”  Biel,  iv.  d.  14,  q.  1,  a. 
2,  concl.  5.  Others,  with  Duns,  reverse  the  process  (p.  161),  e.g.,  Occ., 
iv.  q.  8  and  9  L:  “Yet  in  fact  and  as  a  rule,  the  expulsion  of  guilt  is 
previous  to  the  infusion  of  grace.”  Vid.  also  supra,  p.  161,  n. 

2  Cf.  Hasack,  p.  133  :  “It  (grace)  moves  the  free  will  to  do  well  and  to 
think  well,  to  live  well  and  to  work  well,  and  it  gives  power  for  all  praise¬ 
worthy  undertakings.  .  .  .  Grace  makes  all  work  meritorious.  .  .  .  But 
grace  is  given,  that  man  may  with  (the  assistance  of)  grace  perform  all  things 
appointed.” 

3  Yet  Durand  asserts,  that,  in  the  strictest  sense,  man  can  secure  this  merit 
with  men  only,  and  not  with  God  (i.  d.  17,  q.  2,  a.  2). 

4  Cf.  Hasack,  p.  262  f. 

5  Yet  such  a  man  as  Biel  had  a  certain  comprehension  of  the  economic  con* 


SEPARATE  DOCTRINES  IN  LATER  MIDDLE  AGES.  203 

Our  review  makes  it  very  evident  that  in  the  theology  of  the 
Schoolmen  only  the  sacramental  and  Pelagian  tendencies  made 
progress.  The  free  will  and  the  sacraments  are  the  two  forces 
which  mould  the  Christian  life. 

4.  In  regard  to  the  Lord’s  Supper,  mention  must  be  made  of 
a  theory  which  found  many  adherents.1  (#)  It  is  the  view 
mentioned  already,  and  not  without  sympathy,  by  Duns,  i.  e .,  that, 
even  after  the  creation  of  the  body  of  Christ,  the  substance  of 
the  bread  is  retained,  and  not  merely  the  accidents  (supra, 
p.  13 1  n.).  Occam  calls  attention  to  the  fact,  that  the  Scriptures 
do  not  contain  the  theory  of  transubstantiation  (de  sacr.  alt.  3), 
and  he  plainly  intimates  that  the  view,  that  the  substance  of  the 
bread  and  wine  remain,  is  “  very  reasonable  “  Neither  is  the 
contrary  to  this  contained  in  the  canonical  Bible,  nor  does 
it  any  more  include  any  contradiction,  that  the  body  of  Christ 
coexists  with  the  substance  of  the  bread,  than  (that  it  coexists 
with)  its  accidents,  nor  is  it  repugnant  to  reason”  (quodl.  iv. 
35  ;  cf.  centilog.  39  C).  Nevertheless,  out  of  regard  for  the 
Roman  church,  he  will  continue  to  hold  transubstantiation  (sacr. 
alt.  1,  5).  But  the  entire  tenor  of  his  discussion  (vid.  sub) 
testifies  that  he  is  not  serious  in  his  submission.2  Durand  also 
acknowledges  the  possibility  of  the  retention  of  the  earthly  sub- 

ditions  of  the  age,  and  when  treating  of  repentance  made  excellent  comments 
upon  it,  e.  g .,  against  the  communism  based  on  the  law  of  nature  (iv.  d.  15,  q. 
2,  a.  I,  n.  I ) ,  upon  war  (ib.  q.  4),  upon  the  method  of  taxation  (ib.  q.  5,  a.  2, 
concl.  3),  upon  the  wild-game  abuses  (ib.  concl.  5),  upon  trading  and  prices 
(ib.  q.  10,  a.  I,  n.  2),  upon  the  question  of  coinage  and  interest  (ib.  q.  9,  11), 
etc.  Cf.  also  Roscher,  Gesch.  der  Nationaloekonomik,  p.  22  ff. 

1  The  high  regard  for  the  mass  continues  (vid.  supra,  p.  134).  Cf. 
Luther,  Weim.,  ed.  vi.  375  :  “That  they  made  of  it  a  sort  of  magic  !  Some 
have  masses  held,  that  they  may  become  rich  and  that  it  may  go  well  with  them 
in  their  business  ;  some,  because  they  think  that  if  they  hear  mass  in  the  morn¬ 
ing,  they  are  safe  for  the  day  from  all  distress  and  danger  ;  some  for  their 
sickness;  some  for  things  even  more  foolish  and  even  sinful, — and  yet  find 
priests  so  stupid  as  to  take  money  and  do  their  will.  And,  further,  they  have 
now  made  one  mass  better  than  the  others,  and  esteem  one  as  useful  for  this 
purpose,  another  for  that.  .  .  .  Here  everyone  keeps  silent  and  (they)  let 
the  people  go  on  for  the  sake  of  the  accursed,  shameful  penny.”  In  con¬ 
nection  with  the  idea  that  the  Lord’s  Supper  blots  out  venial  sins,  stands  the 
view  that,  as  Christ  atoned  for  original  sin,  so  the  eucharistic  sacrifice  atones 
for  daily  sins,  e.  g .,  Pseudo-Thomas,  Opusc.  58,  c.  I  (opp,  ii.  42).  Cf. 
Confes.  Augsb.  24. 

2  A  contemporary  of  Duns,  the  Dominican  John  of  Paris  (ca.  1300),. 
declared  in  favor  of  the  retention  of  the  substance  of  the  bread,  which  how¬ 
ever  combines  with  the  body  of  Christ  to  form  one  “subsistence,”  so  that 
there  are  indeed  two  corporeities  (  Corporeitaten') ,  but  only  one  body.  Vid.  his 
work:  Determinatio  de  modo  existendi  Corpus  Christi  in  sacr.  alt.  alio  quam 
sit  ille  quern  tenet  eccl.,  ed.  Alix,  London,  1686.  Cf.  Kirchenlex.  vi.,  ed.  2, 
621  f.  Argentre,  Collectio  indiciorum,  i.  264  ff. 


204 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


stances  (iv.  d.  n,  q.  i,  a.  3)  ;  likewise  Biel  (expos,  can.  miss, 
lect.,  41  J);  Thomas  of  Strassb.  (iv.  d.  1 1,  p.  1,  a.  2  ;  cf. 
also  Dionys.  Carthus.  iv.  d.  11,  q.  1),  and  Joh.  v.  Wesel 
(vid.  Ullmann,  Reform,  vor  d.  Ref.  i.  330,  390).  D’Ailli 
zealously  supports  this  view,  “because  it  is  altogether  possible 
that  the  substance  of  the  bread  coexists  with  the  substance 
of  the  body.  This  mode  is  possible  ;  it  is  repugnant  to  neither 
reason  nor  the  authority  of  the  Bible  ;  it  is  far  easier  to 
be  understood  and  more  reasonable”  (in  sent.  iv.  q.  6  E).1 
Wessel  also  holds  to  both  the  presence  of  the  body  of  Christ 
(de  eucharist.  c.  8,  16  ;  opp.  1614,  p.  673,  688  f. ),  and  the  con¬ 
tinued  existence  of  the  bread,  “  which  truly  vivifies  and  refines 
alone  by  signifying  (Ksignificatio?ie')  and  by  pious  commemo¬ 
ration  ”  (c.  13,  p.  683).  The  chief  thing  is  that  Christ  “  desired 
to  be  corporally  near  ( cominus )  to  those  longing  for  him  ”  (c.  23, 
p.  695  ;  24,  p.  697),  and  that  spirit  and  life  are  thereby  brought 
to  us  (c.  8,  9,  10).  ( b )  For  the  completion  of  this  theory,  we 
must  bear  in  mind  the  conception  then  held  of  the  presence  of 
Christ’s  body  in  the  Supper  (cf.  supra,  p.  116).  We  follow  here 
chiefly  Occam.  According  to  the  Nominalistic  view,  quantity  has  no 
independent  existence,  but  it  is  the  “  how  much  ”  of  a  thing  ;  it 
is  not  separate  from  the  substance  or  the  qualities  of  an  object 
(sacr.  alt.,  form  B  2  r  and  c.  17).  The  quantity  of  a  thing 
may  be  increased  or  diminished,  as  by  compression  or  by  exten¬ 
sion,  without  the  thing  becoming  thereby  a  different  thing.  Ac¬ 
cordingly,  a  thing  may  become,  like  a  mathematical  point,  with¬ 
out  quantity,  without  thereby  changing  its  substance  (ib.  c.  37  ; 
sent.  iv.  q.  4  H  ;  cf.  Biel,  Sent.  iv.  d.  10,  a.  1,  n.  2).  In  this 
way  the  body  of  Christ  exists  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  :  The  body 
of  Christ  is  not  quantitatively  ( quantum )  in  the  sacrament  of  the 
altar  (sacr.  alt.,  form  B  6  rand  c.  31,  41).  The  bodily  pres¬ 
ence  of  a  thing  may  be  of  two  kinds  :  “  To  be  circumscriptively 
in  a  place  is  for  anything  to  be  in  a  place,  a  part  of  which 
is  in  a  part  of  the  place  and  the  whole  of  it  in  the  whole  place  ; 
but  to  be  definitively  in  a  place  is  when  a  whole  thing  is  in 
a  whole  place  and  not  beyond  it,  and  the  whole  of  it  is  in  every 
part  of  that  place  ”  (quodl.  i.  4). 2  Examples  of  the  latter  are 
seen  in  the  angels  and  in  the  human  soul,  which  are  present 
entire  in  every  part  of  the  space  which  they  occupy  as  well  as  in 
the  entire  space.  Thus  also  the  whole  Christ  is  present  in  the 
hostia ,  just  as  he  is  equally  in  all  its  parts  (sacr.  alt.  c.  6).  If 
now  the  body  of  Christ  exists  at  the  same  time  with  the  bread  in 


1  To  this  Luther  appealed  in  his  De  captiv.  Babyl.,  Weim.  ed.  vi.,  508. 

2  Biel  added  the  further  category,  repletive  (sent.  i.  d.  37,  q.  un.  a.  i). 


SEPARATE  DOCTRINES  IN  LATER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


205 


the  hostia ,  two  questions  arise  :  ( 1 )  How  the  same  body  can  be 
present  at  the  same  time  in  different  places,  and  (2)  How  its 
parts  can  coexist  in  one  place.  The  former  is  answered  by 
a  reference  to  the  simultaneous  presence  of  the  soul  in  all  parts 
of  the  body.  In  reply  to  the  second  question,  it  is  to  be  said, 
that  the  body  of  Christ  is  not  in  the  Supper  quantitatively,  and 
therefore  we  are  not  to  think  of  a  correspondence  between 
separate  parts  of  the  space  with  parts  of  the  body.  There  is 
hence  no  necessity  to  inquire  whether  the  body  present  is  the 
glorified  or  the  natural  body  (sent.  iv.  q.  4  J  K  O).  While  the 
body  of  Christ  is  at  one  place  in  heaven  in  extended  form  and 
quantitatively,  it  is  also  present  everywhere  as  a  whole  in  the 
host  (cf.  Biel,  iv.  d.  10,  a.  2,  concl.  2,  and  expos,  can.  miss, 
lect.  43 ).1  But  this  presence  is  not  confined  to  the  host: 
“  The  body  of  Christ  is  present  to  everyone,  is  present  to  him¬ 
self  immediately,  and  consequently  that  form  of  bread,  i.  e. ,  the 
host,  has  nothing  to  do  with  ( nihil  facit')  the  presence  of  the 
body  ”  (Occ.,  ib.  N).  Thus  regarded,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
body  of  Christ  can  be  everywhere  ( ubique )  just  as  God  is  every¬ 
where  (centiloq.  25,  2 8). 2  This  way  of  apprehending  the 
matter,  which  had  an  influence  on  Luther,  suggests  the  following 
comments  :  ( 1 )  The  abstract  logical  method  of  considering  the 
subject,  and  the  references  to  the  institution  of  the  Supper,  and  even 
to  the  act  of  worship  involved,  are  not  clear.  (2)  The  eucharistic 
body  of  Christ  stands  in  boldest  contrast  with  his  actual  body — 
it  is  a  certain  omnipresent  Something.  (3)  As  Occam  weaves 
in  the  problem,  How  two  bodies  can  be  at  one  place,  he 
betrays  the  fact  that  transubstantiation  is  not  in  his  mind.  (4) 
Transubstantiation  maintained  its  place  in  the  canons  of  the 
church,  but  the  theology  of  the  closing  era  of  the  Middle  Ages 
took  no  delight  in  it.3  Cf.  Rettberg,  Occ.  und  Luther,  Stud.  u. 
Krit.  1839,  69  ff. 

1  Vid.  also  Durand,  iv.  d.  II,  q.  I,  a.  I,  2. 

2  Cf.  also  (concl.  23),  the  view  that  a  stone  fallen  from  heaven  might 
cleave  through  the  body  of  Christ  without  dividing  it  or  meeting  with  any 
opposition  in  its  course. 

3  We  must  not  overlook  at  this  point  the  teaching  of  Faber  Stapulensis, 
f  1536  (cf.  Graf,  Ztschr.  f.  hist.  Theol.  1852,  3  ff.,  165  ff. ),  since  the 
attempt  has  been  made  to  trace  to  him  Luther’s  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper 
(Hospinian,  Calixtus).  At  the  first  Supper  Christ  was  present  both  sensibly 
and  also  concealed,  sacramentally  and  impassibly,  beneath  the  outward  signs. 
The  result  was  a  union  ( unitio )  between  him  and  the  participants,  which 
brought  to  the  latter  immortality  (Comm,  upon  the  Fourth  Gospel,  Basel, 
1523,  fol.  1 15).  Thus  he  is  again  present  at  every  subsequent  celebration  of 
the  Supper.  “For,  always  remaining  in  heaven,  he,  existing  everywhere, 
descends  immobilely  into  every  believer,  whom  he  vivifies  and  nourishes.”  He 
gives  immortality  and  life  (ib.  fol.  318  f. ).  But  in  this  his  presence  is  a 


2o6 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


(c)  In  this  connection  we  must  recall  the  very  bold  and  cut¬ 
ting  criticism  which  was  during  the  Middle  Ages  directed  against 
the  doctrine  of  transubstantiation.  It  originated  with  Wickliffe 
(vid.  his  work  of  A.  D.  1382-83,  De  eucharistia,  ed.  Loserth, 
1892  ;  cf.  Fasciculus  zizaniorum,  Mag.  Joh.  Wiclif,  ed.  Shirley, 
1858,  p.  1 15  f. )  and  was  spread  by  Huss  (vid.  De  corpore 
Christi)  and  the  Hussites  (cf.  Loserth,  in  the  introduction  to 
De  euchar.,  p.  xlivff. ).  Transubstantiation  is  to  Wickliffe’s 
mind  worse  than  heathenism:  “They  believe  worse  than  the 
pagans,  that  that  consecrated  host  is  their  God  ”  (p.  13b).  It 
is  a  new  doctrine,  against  which  the  Scriptures  and  reason  pro¬ 
test  (p.  71).  It  has  against  it  the  testimony  of  the  eyes  (p.  57), 
and  involves  in  all  manner  of  contradictions.  Will  God  then  destroy 
a  portion  of  the  entire  substance  of  the  body  (p.  129),  or  will  he 
cause  the  body  to  grow  at  every  celebration  of  the  ordinance? 
(p.  193).  According  to  Wickliffe’s  own  view,  we  must  dis¬ 
criminate  sharply  between  the  sign ,  or  sacrament ,  and  the  body 
(p.  18,  38,  112;  trial.,  p.  248).  The  words  of  institution  are 
to  be  understood  tropice ,  or  figurative.  Their  effect  is  that  they 
to  the  bare  natural  existence  {nudum  esse  naturale )  of  the  bread 
add  a  superadded  sacramental  character  ( superadditum  esse 
sacramentale )  (p.  153,  35,  83,  291).  The  bread  signifies  the 
body  of  Christ,  upon  which  we  should  spiritually  direct  our 
attention  and  remembrance.  “That  change  does  not  destroy 
the  nature  of  the  bread,  nor  alter  the  nature  of  the  body  .  .  .  but 
it  effects  the  presence  of  the  body  of  Christ  and  destroys  the  pre¬ 
eminence  of  the  bread,  so  that  the  whole  attention  of  the  worshiper 
is  concentrated  upon  the  body  of  Christ”  (p.  100).  “Not 
that  the  bread  is  destroyed,  but  that  it  signifies  the  body  of  the 
Lord  there  present  in  the  sacrament  ”  (p.  101,  121).  But  this 
presence  of  Christ  is  a  spiritual  one,  mediated  through  the 
symbol  :  “That  the  body  of  Christ  is  there  virtually  and  in  the 
sign — not  the  body  of  Christ  as  it  is  in  heaven,  but  the  vicarious 
sign  of  it”  (p.  303,  271,  83  f. ).  Then,  as  to  the  eating: 
“We  do  not  tear  the  body  of  Christ  with  the  teeth,  but 


bodily  one  :  “  Who  is  divinely  everywhere,  and  also  corporeally  wherever  he 
will ”  (ib.  fol.  402  v).  But  only  the  believing  recipient  obtains  this  blessed 
presence  (fol.  318  r).  Faber  here  lays  special  emphasis  upon  the  personal 
presence  of  Christ  {praesenlia  salvatoris).  The  punishments  inflicted  upon 
unworthy  participants  are  educational  (according  to  I  Cor.  ii.  29,  ff. ). 
Vid.  Epp.  div.  Pauli,  Paris,  15 12,  fol.  97  v.  This  important  composition  is 
distinguished  by  its  independence  of  tradition.  Faber  pays  no  attention  to  the 
Scholastic  problems.  He  sought  to  draw  directly  from  the  sources,  and  insists 
upon  the  personal  and  bodily  presence  of  Christ,  without  concerning  himself 
about  the  how.  This  does  indeed  remind  us  of  Luther’s  original  position,  but 
without  any  evidence  of  historical  connection  between  the  two. 


SEPARATE  DOCTRINES  IN  LATER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


207 


we  receive  it  spiritually  ”  (p.  13).  It  is  eaten,  not  corporeally, 
but  spiritually,  by  the  believer,  since  his  mind  is  fed  from  the 
memory  of  the  body  of  Christ  (p.  308,  17).  This  is  the 
doctrine  of  the  Scriptures,  which  the  teachers  of  the  first  thousand 
years — when  Satan  was  bound  (Rev.  20.  2) — also  advocated 
(p.  286).  It  commends  itself  particularly  by  its  simplicity,  as 
the  yoke  of  the  New  Testament  law  is  always  light  (p.  119). 
This  is  essentially  a  reproduction  of  Augustine,  with  his  view 
polemically  developed  and  directed  against  the  Catholic  doc¬ 
trine. 

5.  We  are  thus  already  brought  into  contact  with  the  labors  of 
the  Augustinian  school  upon  the  doctrines  of  the  church.  First 
of  all,  we  note  the  resuscitation  of  the  Augustinian  doctrine  of 
grace.  The  latter  embraces  predestination,  which  now  becomes 
its  leading  thought.  If  predestination  was  with  Augustine  an 
auxiliary  line  of  thought,  it  now  becomes  the  first  principle. 
With  him  it  was  anthropologically  developed ;  here,  in  a 
strictly  theological  way.  The  conception  is  further  unde- 
signedly  combined  with  the  Scotist  conception  of  God :  the 
absolute  Lord  of  the  world  rules  absolutely  as  he  will,  and  hence 
the  inexplicable  predestination. 

( a )  Bradwardina  was  especially  severe  in  his  arraignment  of 
the  age  upon  the  charge  of  Pelagianism.  Free  will,  man’s  own 
strength,  merit — is  everything,  and  thus  predestination  is  earned 
(vid.  de  causa  dei,1  i.  31,  p.  602,  ed.  Savil.).  Thus,  he 
maintains,  do  his  contemporaries  teach.  On  the  contrary,  he 
has  learned  by  experience  that  not  merit,  but  grace  alone,  saves 
us  (i.  35).  Everything  which  exists  and  happens  is  made  and 
brought  to  pass  by  God  (i.  3,  32;  ii.  29  b).  Divine  foresight 
( provide ntia)  is  in  reality  fore-determination  of  the  divine  wull 
i^praevolentia  voluntatis )  (i.  27,  p.  261).  All  that  happens 
rests  upon  the  immutable  “antecedent  necessity”  of  the  divine 
determination  (i.  25).  No  one  can  pray  better  than  by  saying  : 
Thy  will  be  done.  This  being  the  case,  all  merits  fall  to  the 
ground  (i.  39).  Here  predestination  finds  its  place.  It  is  “a 
pre-ordination  of  the  divine  will  concerning  a  rational  creature 
and  there  is  a  two-fold  (, gemina )  predestination  (i.  45).  All  the 
giftsof  grace  are  grounded  upon  it  :  “  The  effects  of  predestina¬ 
tion  are  the  conferring  of  grace  in  the  present,  justification  from 
sin,  good  merits,  final  perseverance  ”  (ib.,  p.  422).  Grace  is  a 
“habitus  of  the  soul  gratuitously  infused  by  God”  (i.  23). 
The  determinism  into  wrhich  this  theory  leads  (^.  g .,  iii.  27, 


1  The  very  numerous  manuscripts  in  which  this  work  has  been  preserved, 
even  upon  the  continent,  attest  its  wide  distribution. 


20  8 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


p.  704)1  Bradwardina  rejects,  maintaining  free-will  (ii.  1,2; 
iii.  1).  Cf.  Seeberg,  PRE.  iii.,  ed.  3,  350  If. 

(£)  Wickliffe  also  exalts  predestination  to  the  central  place 
in  his  theology.  God  alone  is  the  cause  that  some  are  pre¬ 
destinated  and  others  only  foreknown  ( praesciti ).  “God 
necessitates  individual  active  creatures  to  whatever  action  he 
desires  {ad  quemlibet  actum  suuni),  and  thus  some  are  predesti¬ 
nated,  i.  e.,  ordained  to  glory  after  labor,  and  some  are  fore¬ 
known,  i.  e.9  ordained  to  everlasting  punishment  after  a  miser¬ 
able  life  ”  (trialog.,  p.  122).  But  human  freedom  is  not  thereby 
excluded:  “But  God  cannot  determine  that  I  shall  merit 
or  demerit,  unless  I  also  determine”  (de  dom.  div.,  p.  149). 
The  predestinating  grace  is  the  deepest  ground  for  the  bestowal 
of  grace  upon  the  sinner.  Grace  is  both,  as  gratia  increata ,  the 
“divine  volition,  by  which  God  determines  to  do  good  to  a 
creature,”  and,  as  gratia  creata ,  the  infused  “  good  quality,  by 
which  the  creature  is  formally  acceptable  to  God”  (ib.,  p. 
236  f. ).  But  this  quality  is  the  condition  of  the  “  acceptation  by 
which  God  accepts  a  man”  (trial.,  p.  152  f. ;  de  dom.  div., 
p.  238).  Since  this  divine  acceptance  is  taken  into  the  account, 
the  personal  nature  of  grace  comes  to  some  extent  into  view. 
But  it  is  the  imparting  of  grace  which  first  capacitates  man  for 
meritorious  conduct  (dom.  div.,  p.  241).  Since  God  “  pre- 
veniently  ( praeveniendo )  incites  and  necessitates  to  meriting 
.  .  .  the  freedom  of  the  will  being  preserved,”  it  follows,  that 
every  creature  merit  is,  as  such,  only  a  merit  of  fitness  (ib., 
p.  226  f. ,  242,  249).  It  is  evident  that  the  Catholic  concep¬ 
tion  of  grace  underlies  also  the  theory  of  Wickliffe,  but  the 
gratia  increata ,  or  the  free  loving  will  of  God,  receives  at 
his  hands  through  predestination  and  acceptance  an  actual 
importance  which  does  not  attach  to  it  in  the  popular  teaching. 
It  is  the  old  conception,  but  there  is  yet  in  it  an  element  which 
points  the  way  to  a  new  apprehension  of  the  subject.  The 
divine  loving  will  is  the  chief  thing,  and  the  infused  quality  is 
only  a  means  for  its  realization.  Should  it  be  inconceivable  that 
other  means  might  also  be  found  for  the  accomplishment  of  the 
divine  purpose? 

(e)  The  Catholic  doctrine  of  grace  was  not  repudiated  even 
by  the  more  popularistic  theologians  of  this  school,  suchasGocH. 
He  combats  the  Pelagianism  of  his  day,  and  maintains  the  neces¬ 
sity  of  grace  for  salvation,  since  faith  and  love  are  supernatural 
acts,  which  man  cannot  render  without  the  aid  ( auxilium )  of 
grace  (dialog,  c.  5,  Walch,  monimenta  med.  aev.  i.  4,  p.  91, 


1  Cf.  Wickliffe’s  critique,  De  dorainio  div.  i.  136  f.,  148  if. 


SEPARATE  DOCTRINES  IN  LATER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


209 


94-97).  The  infusio  gratiae  consists  in  this:  that  God  begets 
in  us  “  a  supernatural  faculty  ( facultas )  for  doing  supernatural 
acts”  (c.  14,  p.  162).  The  acts  thus  performed  are  meritorious 
(c.  19,  p.  192  f. ).  The  fides  formata  makes  the  soul  acceptable 
to  God  (c.  4,  p.  86).  According  to  Wesel,  the  forgiveness  of 
sins  is  the  infusion  of  th e gratia  gratum  faciens  (adv.  indulg.  18, 
in  Walch,  monim.  med.  aev.  ii.  1,  p.  126).  Likewise  Wessel  : 
“  Concerning  justification  it  is  evident  enough,  because  that  sins' 
be  taken  away  is  nothing  else  than  to  have  justifying  love,  which 
he  who  does  not  have  remains  in  sin.  In  order,  therefore,  that 
he  may  take  away  sin,  it  is  necessary  to  infuse  righteousness  ’ r 
(de  magnitud.  passionis,  c.  7,  opp.  Groning,  1614,  p.  466). 
God  accepts  the  sinner  on  account  of  faith,  faith  being  regarded 
as  including  love  :  “  And  since  faith  is  the  source  of  love,  there¬ 
fore  it  is  also  accepted  on  account  of  its  offspring”  (c.  45,  p. 

550) .  That  is,  God  will  bestow  upon  the  believer  the  righteous¬ 
ness  secured  through  the  satisfaction  rendered  by  Christ  (ib.  p. 

551) .  “  Therefore  neither  our  faith  .  .  .  nor  the  sacrifice  of 
Christ,  but  the  determination  of  God  accepting  the  sacrifice  of 
Christ,  and  through  Christ  accepting  the  sacrifices  of  Christians, 
is  our  righteousness  ”  (c.  44,  p.  549).  These  are  all  medieval 
ideas.  As  long  as  they  are  not  abandoned,  all  the  admirable  at¬ 
tempts  to  overthrow  the  monastic  ideal  which  are  found,  e.  g.T 
in  Goch,  and  the  idea  of  evangelical  liberty  (which  grace  does- 
not  destroy,  but  completes)  which  is  not  to  be  resigned  in  favor 
of  any  vow,  as  though  without  the  latter  there  can  benou  perfec¬ 
tion  of  Christian  life”  (dial.  c.  7,  p.  109  ff.;  11,  p.  144;  12, 
p.  155  ;  9,  p.  125  ff. ) — are  but  a  beating  of  the  air.  The  same 
must  be  said  of  the  emphasis  laid  upon  the  rights  of  property  : 
“  The  proprietorship  of  law  may  consist  with  the  highest  evan¬ 
gelical  perfection ;  the  proprietorship  of  love  is  simply  inad¬ 
missible  and  forbidden  to  all  Christians  through  the  precept  of 
love  (c.  22,  p.  234).  But  in  these  thoughts  there  breathes  the 
atmosphere  of  a  new  era.  The  Holy  Scriptures,  which  in  these 
circles,  as  in  the  church  in  general,  are  recognized  as  the  highest 
authority  (vid.  esp.  Goch,  Epistola  apologetica,  in  Walch, 
monim.  med.  aev.  ii.  1,  p.  4  ff.,  10,  11)  begin  to  be  employed 
as  a  critical  standard,  by  which  not  only  the  laws  of  the  state 
(p.  183  f. ),  but  the  ordinances  and  ideals  of  the  church  as  well,, 
are  measured. 

6.  This  leads  us  a  step  further,  to  the  criticism  of  the  Sacra¬ 
ment  of  Repentance  and  Indulgences.  “  There  are  two  prin¬ 
cipal  sacraments,  in  which  the  church  is  being  ruined,  viz.,  the 
sacrament  of  the  eucharist  and  the  sacrament  of  repentance” 
(Wickliffe,  De  euch.  et  poenit.,  in  Loserth’s  edition  of  De 

14 


2  10 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


eccl.,  p.  329).  Wickliffe  denies  the  necessity  of  the  sacramental 
confession,  which  does  not  harmonize  with  the  ‘  ‘  liberty  of  the  law 
of  the  Lord”  (ib.,p.  331  ff. ,  341).  He  combats  indulgences  most 
vigorously  as  a  scandalous  traffic  and  blasphemous  presumption 
of  the  pope  (ib.,  p.  340;  trialog.  iv.  32,  p.  357  ff.  Cf.  Huss, 
Quaestio  disputata  .  .  .  de  indulgentiis,  opp.  Norimb.  1558,1. 
174  ff. ).  Wesel  teaches  that  God  alone  forgives  the  eternal 
penalties  of  sin,  which  he  does  by  the  infusion  of  grace.  To  the 
priest  belongs  only  a  sacramental  ministration  (ministeriuiri) . 
There  exists  a  “  covenant  established  with  priests  ’  ’  (adv.  indulg. 
23,  26,  27,  28  ;  in  Walch,  monim.  med.  aev.  ii.  1).  Since 
now  God  himself  imposes  temporal  penalties  for  sin  in  this 
life,  it  is  clear  that  indulgences  have  no  ground  to  rest  upon. 
They  would  do  away  with  purgatory  altogether  (ib.  47). 
The  pope  can  remit  only  the  penalties  which  men  have  imposed 
(34).  The  doctrine  of  indulgences  has  the  Scriptures  arrayed 
against  it ;  they  are  only  “  pious  frauds  upon  believers  ”  (50). 
Wessel  is  still  more  severe.  Under  his  hand,  the  whole  sacra¬ 
ment  of  repentance  falls  to  pieces.  The  pope  can  only  out¬ 
wardly  separate  any  person  from  the  church  ;  and  when  he  does 
so,  his  action  has  no  direct  significance  for  the  inner  life  (de 
sacr.  poenit.,  opp.  p.  772  f.,  776,  781).  This  sacrament  has 
really  nothing  to  do  with  the  matter.  God  grants  the  spirit  of 
love,  and  with  it  contrition.  This  is  already  a  work  of  infused 
grace:  “The  contrite  (is)  righteous  before  the  sacrament” 
(p.  790). 1  “Repentance,  if  it  be  a  sacrament,  does  not  need 
contrition  ”  (ib.).  Similarly,  it  is  God  alone  who  forgives  sin  ; 
the  priest  has  no  judicial  power  in  administering  absolution 
(p.  794  f. ).  Should  God,  who  remits  the  eternal  penalties, 
not  forgive  also  the  temporal  (p.  798)?  And  if  he  does  not  do 
so,  he  is  but  exercising  the  educational  discipline  of  a  father 
(ib.).  Thus  the  satisfaction  to  be  rendered  by  good  works  also 
falls  to  the  ground.  Grace  gives  peace.  What  is  the  benefit  of 
the  dismissal  “in  peace  ”  and  the  assurance  of  the  forgiveness 
of  sins,  if  the  sinner  still  remains  subject  to  the  severest  penal¬ 
ties  (p.  800)?  It  is  not  a  question  of  a  contrite  body,  but  of  a 
contrite  heart  (p.  801).  Satisfaction,  strictly  interpreted,  ends 
in  a  blasphemy  ;•  for  Christ  did  his  work  completely.  We 
receive  forgiveness  from  grace  alone,  and  do  not  have  to  con¬ 
tribute  anything  by  works  of  satisfaction  (p.  80 2). 2  Indulgences 
can  accordingly  be  understood  only  as  remitting  ecclesiastical 


1  Cf.  my  remarks,  supra,  p.  135  f. 

2  Vid.,  on  the  other  hand,  the  view  discussed,  supra,  p.  199. 


SEPARATE  DOCTRINES  IN  LATER  MIDDLE  AGES. 


2  I  I  * 


penalties  (p.  781  ).1  The  whole  theory  is  overthrown  ;  but  the 
infused  grace  still  remains. 

7.  Finally,  we  must  notice  the  conception  of  the  Church, 
especially  in  Wickliffe  (De  eccl.,  ed.  Loserth)  and  Huss  (De 
eccl.,  opp.  i.  Norimb.  1558).  (<2)  In  harmony  with  the  idea 

of  predestination,  the  church  is  here  defined  as  the  congregatio 
■omnium  predestinatorum ,  whether  the  latter  belong  to  the  past, 
the  present,  or  the  future — whether  they  be  men  or  angels, 
or  even  Jews  and  heathen  (Wickliffe,  p.  2  f.,  5,  70,  409.  Huss, 
fob  196  v,  201  r).  The  foreknown  ( praesciti )  do  not  belong 
to  the  church  as  thus  conceived.  They  are  not  of  the  church, 
although  they  are  empirically  in  the  church  :  they  no  more 
belong  to  the  church  than  filth  and  foul  humors  belong  to  the 
body  (Huss,  fob  199  v).  Whether  anyone  really  belongs  to  the 
church,  i.  e.,  is  predestinated,  can  only  be  judged  with  prob¬ 
ability  from  his  life  (Wickliffe,  trial.,  p.  325.  Huss,  fob 
198  v).  In  the  sense  of  the  assembly  of  the  predestinated,  the 
church  is  an  object  of  faith,  since  it  may  be  thus  brought  under 
the  category  of  Heb.  11.  1  (Wickliffe,  eccl.,  p.  409.  Huss, 
fob  204  V,  206  v).  In  proportion  as  Wickliffe’s  opposition  to 
the  accepted  doctrines  spread,  this  conception  of  the  church, 
combined  with  the  emphasizing  of  the  exclusive  authority  of  the 
<flaw  of  Christ,”  became  the  critical  canon.  The  pope  errs, 
when  he  has  the  Scriptures  against  him  (eccl.,  p.  563  f. ).  So 
far  from  being  the  head  of  the  church,  it  is  even  open  to 
question  whether  he  is  a  member  of  the  church  (p.  464.) 
Therefore,  no  man’s  salvation  can  depend  upon  him  (p.  33); 
and  his  excommunication  can  exclude  no  one  from  the  true 
church  (p.  72).  (£)  Wesel  and  Wessel  base  their  criticism 

upon  other  grounds.  Wesel  declares  that  the  hierarchical  order 
of  the  church  is  “derived  from  paganism  and  forbidden  by  the 
word  of  Christ”  (adv.  indulg.  42).  In  the  church  universal 
the  church  of  Christ  exists  as  a  part ;  and  only  the  latter  is  holy 
and  spotless  (ib.  52  f. ).  According  to  Wessel,  the  spiritual 
authority  rests  upon  a  compact  (de  potest,  ecclesiastica,  opp., 
p.  752).  But  Christians,  as  rational  beings,  must  criticize  their 
leaders,  and  not  blindly  follow  them  (p.  753).  The  latter  are 
4  ‘  not  therefore  to  be  heard  simply  on  account  of  their  pastoral 
authority”  (p.  755).  “  A  currupt  prelate  desires  the  obedience 

of  his  subjects,  in  order  that  he  may  rule  them  at  will  ’  ’ 
(p.  757).  False  teachers  are  not  to  be  followed  (p.  762  f. ). 
If  the  prelates  violate  the  compact,  not  observing  the  law 

1  Vid.  also  the  discussion  of  the  sacrament  of  repentance  in  Marsilius, 
Defensor  pacis,  ii.  6,  p.  205  f.  Goldast. 


2  12 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


as  it  applies  to  them,  then  is  the  other  party,  i.  e.,  the  sub¬ 
jects,  free  from  every  obligation.  Such  prelates  must  be  de¬ 
posed.  If  they  are  still  tolerated,  it  is  only  as  abandoned 
women  are  tolerated  in  the  cities  for  fear  of  other  evils  (p.  7  6  5  f. ) . 
It  is  not  the  clerical  office  which  establishes  the  unity  of 
the  church,  but  its  one  Head,  the  one  divine  truth,1  and  the  faith 
and  love  of  its  members  (767,  de  poenit.,  p.  778-781).  In. 
this  communion  the  spirit  of  love  is  infused  (cf.  supra,  p.  209). 
This  is  the  “  communio  sanctorum  :  “  All  saints  have  fellowship 
{communicant)  in  true,  essential  unity:  as  many  as  cling  to 
Christ  with  one  faith,  one  love ;  under  whatsoever  prelates  they 
live  ;  however  the  latter  may  ambitiously  contend  or  dissent  or 
err,  even  though,  they  be  heretics  ;  in  whatever  localities  in 
space  ;  separated  by  whatever  intervals  of  years  ;  and  this  is 
that  communio ,  of  which  we  speak  in  the  Creed :  I  believe  in  the 
communion  of  saints”  (de  comm,  sanct.,  p.  809).  From  this 
spiritual  communion  no  declaration  of  the  church  can  sever  (de 
poenit.,  p.  782).  The  criticism  of  these  men  does  not  extend 
any  further  than  that  of  Marsilius  and  Occam  (p.  167);  but  it 
attests  the  wide  distribution  of  the  critical  temper.  It  was  aided 
by  the  fact  that  the  church  was  coming  to  be  regarded  ever  more 
clearly  and  positively  as  a  spiritual  body.  The  communio  sanc¬ 
torum ,  the  congregatio  predestinatorum , — such  is  its  essential 
character.  The  place  for  its  discussion  is  under  the  Creed,  not 
under  canon  law.  The  forms  of  the  latter  are  either  to  be 
repudiated,  or  are  of  temporary  value,  in  the  course  of  historical 
development.  Cf.  Seeberg,  Begr.  d.  Kirche,  i.  65-77.  Gott- 
schick,  Ztschr.  f.  KG.  viii.  357  ff.  Buddensieg,  Joh.  Wiclif, 
1885,  p.  157  ff.  Wiegand,  Quid  de  eccl.  notione  Wicl. 
docuerit  ?  1891,  p.  11  ff. ,  92  ff. 


§  64.  The  Renaissance  and  Humanism  in  Their  Significance  for 

the  History  of  Doctrines. 

Literature.  J.  Burckhardt,  Die  Kultur  der  Renaiss.  in  Ital.  4.  A., 
1885.  Geiger,  Renaiss.  u.  Humanism.,  1882.  Voigt,  Die  Wiederbele- 
bung  des  klass.  Altertums,  2  vols.,  2  A,  1880  f.  Vahlen,  Lorenzo  Valla, 
1870.  Geiger,  Reuchlin,  1871.  Von  Bezold,  K.  Celtis  in  Hist.  Ztschr., 
1883,  I  ff.,  193  ff.  Drews,  Pirkheimer’s  Stellungz.  Ref.,  1887.  Stichart, 
Erasmus,  seine  Stellung  z.  Kirche,  etc.,  1870.  Seebohm,  The  Oxford  Re¬ 
formers,  ed.  2,  1869.  Lezius,  Zur  Char.  d.  rel.  Standpunktes  d.  Erasm. , 
1895.  Kampschulte,  DieUniv.  Erfurt  in  ihrem  Verh.  z.  Humanism,  u.  z. 
Ref.,  2  vols.,  1858.  Maurenbrecher,  Gesch.  d.  Kath.  Ref.  i.  1 1 9 ff. ,  349 ff. 

1  “  For  we  believe  in  God — not  in  the  Catholic  church,  not  in  a  Latin  council, 
not  in  the  pope,”  p.  779.  “Since  therefore  it  is  not  obligatory  to  believe 
man,  neither  will  it  be  obligatory  to  believe  the  pope,”  p.  780. 


RENAISSANCE  AND  HUMANISM. 


213 


Dilthey,  Archiv.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos.,  1891,  6c>4ff.;  1892,  337  ff.  K. 
Muller,  KG.  ii.  167  ff.  p.  228  A.  Z.  1  v. 

1.  The  spiritual  unrest  of  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  cen¬ 
turies  constituted  the  starting-point  for  a  revolution  in  the  whole 
•conception  of  the  universe  and  in  the  civilization  of  the  world. 
The  latter  was  accomplished  beneath  the  banner  of  Individual¬ 
ism.  The  circle  of  interest  extended  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
church  and  her  dogmas.  The  individual  emerges.  A  man  is 
^something  more  than  a  member  of  the  ecclesiastical  or  civil  cor¬ 
poration,  for  he  is  himself  a  separate  something.  The  world  is 
looked  upon  with  other  eyes — it  is  not  lying  in  wickedness. 
Nature  and  history,  man  in  himself  and  in  his  association  with 
his  fellows,  the  state  and  society  at  large — are  seen  in  a  new 
light.  New  criteria  are  applied :  the  independence  of  the 
spiritual  and  political  spheres,  individual  character,  personal  re¬ 
sponsibility  and  honor.  In  proportion  as  this  spirit  was  propa¬ 
gated  must  ensue  alienation  from  the  existing  order  and  criti¬ 
cism  of  it ;  or,  at  least,  the  best  men  had  neither  time  nor  incli¬ 
nation  to  pursue  that  which  was  officially  regarded  as  the  best. 
The  reformation  of  St.  Francis,  the  spread  of  the  Mystic  type 
of  piety,  the  criticism  indulged  in  by  Duns  and  the  Nominalists, 
the  revived  interest  in  literature  and  art  (Dante,  Petrarch,  Boc¬ 
caccio),  and  the  political  and  social  conditions,  combined  to 
create  a  new  spiritual  atmosphere.  But  the  most  powerful  factor 
in  this  combination  was  antiquity.  The  treasures  of  the  ancient 
world  were  brought  to  light  and  comprehended.  In  cultivated 
•circles,  especially  in  Italy,  antiquity  assumed  the  leadership  and, 
for  not  a  few,  took  the  place  of  the  church.  Its  treasures  were 
studied  with  an  indescribable  enthusiasm.1  The  ancient  world 

1  d  i-.  <t  .  i  ■■  .  r, 

appeared  to  furnish  the  ideal  of  life  and  culture. 

2.  Such  a  profound  movement  could  not  but  prove  highly  sig¬ 
nificant  for  the  History  of  Doctrines.  This  is  true  in  a  general 
way,  inconsequence  of  the  enlargingof the  intellectual  horizon, 
the  increased  study  of  languages,  the  introduction  of  the  historic 
method,  and  of  historico-philological  criticism — the  evidence 
adduced  by  Lorenzo  Valla  of  the  spurious  character  of  the 
Areopagite,  the  non-apostolic2  composition  of  the  Creed,  and  the 
forging  of  the  Donatio  Constantmi ,  suggesting  what  might  be 
expected  from  the  last-named  source.  To  these  influences  must 
be  added  especially  the  new  method  of  discussion  modeled  after 
the  ancient  patterns.  The  method  of  questions,  with  the  pro 

1  Cf.  the  account  of  the  body  of  a  young  girl  of  ancient  Rome  found  in 
1485  :  “  She  was  beautiful  beyond  all  that  can  be  said  or  written.” 

2  Cf.  Thieme,  Aus  d.  Gesch.  d.  apostolicums,,  1893,  p.  4  ff. 


( 


214  HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 

♦ 

and  contra ,  followed  by  the  “  resolutions,”  yields  to  the  simple 
presentation  required  by  “  reason  and  sound  sense.”  The  tech¬ 
nical  Latin  of  the  Middle  Ages  makes  way  for  the  toilfully-won 
language  of  the  classic  authors,  i.  e .,  the  Latin  is  becoming  a 
dead  language.  The  Italians,  for  the  most  part,  avoided  the¬ 
ology  ;  but  Humanistic  circles  in  England  (Colet,  f  1519,  and 
Thomas  More,  f  1 5 3 5 )  and  Germany  (especially  Reuchlin,  -j- 
1522,  and  Erasmus,  f  1536)  showed  a  different  disposition. 
The  traditional  theology  of  the  Scholastics  at  least  was  rejected, 
although  some  thoughtful  minds  still  recognized  its  value : 
“  Scotus  and  his  like  are  useful  for  study  ( adreruni  cognitionem) , 
but  useless  for  speech  ’  ’  ( dicendum )  (Erasm.,  ratio  concionandi. 
ii.  opp.  Ludg.  Bat.  1704,  v.  857).  The  scholastica  dog??iata  are 
not  articles  of  faith  (Erasm.,  ratio  verae  theol.,  opp.  v.  90). 
The  Scriptures  and  the  Church  Fathers  are  the  true  authorities. 
“  We  may  therefore  philosophize  upon  the  sacred  writings  in  so 
far  as  our  industry  leads  us  to  the  conclusions  which  Paul  has  re¬ 
corded.  But  those  who  have  not  fixed  for  themselves  this  limit, 
but  choose  this  profession  in  order  that  they  may  bring  forth  any 
kind  of  paradoxes  or  novelties  by  which  they  may  win  the  admira¬ 
tion  of  the  populace,  who  are  always  ready  to  admire  insipid  things, 
are  vanity-mongers  (mataeologi') ,  not  theologians.  .  .  .  Now  into 
the  sacred  assemblies  themselves  this  ostentation  has  penetrated. 
...  I  see  the  simple  multitude  panting  and  hanging  eagerly 
upon  the  lips  of  the  orator,  expecting  food  for  their  souls,  desir¬ 
ing  to  learn  how  they  may  return  better  to  their  homes,  and 
there  some  theologaster  .  .  .  ventilates  some  frigid  and  perplex¬ 
ing  question  from  Scotus  or  Occam”  (ib.  v.  135  f.).  “I  had 
rather  be  a  pious  theologian  with  Chrysostom  than  an  invincible 
one  with  Scotus  ”  (ib.  137).  “  Scotus  seems  to  have  given  these 
men  such  great  confidence  that,  without  having  even  read  the 
sacred  writings,  they  yet  think  themselves  unlimited  theologians” 
(enchiridion,  2,  opp.  v.  8).  Erasmus,  therefore,  published  not 
only  the  New  Testament  in  Greek  (A.  D.  1516),  but  also  the 
works  of  Jerome,  Cyprian,1  Hilary,  Irenaeus,  Ambrose,  Augus¬ 
tine,  Chrysostom,  and  Origen.  It  was  the  aim  to  liberate  the¬ 
ology  from  dogmatics,  and  introduce  a  practical,  ethical — undog- 
matic — Christianity.  We  cannot  fail  to  note  here  a  certain 
flavor  of  Augustinian  piety,  however  unwilling  the  leaders  of  the 
movement  were  to  reproduce  the  entire  Augustine.  At  this 
point  the  efforts  of  the  theologians  of  a  practical  turn,  whether 
Augustinians  or  Mystics,  and  those  of  the  pious  Humanists 

1  Cf.  Lezius,  Der  Verf.  d.  pseudocypr.  Traktates  de  duplici  martyrio,  Neue 
Jarbb.  f.  deutsche  Theol.,  1894. 


RENAISSANCE  AND  HUMANISM. 


2I5 


coalesced.  In  this  sense,  Humanism  possesses  a  “pre-reforma¬ 
tory  ’  ’  character.  But,  earnestly  as  the  Humanists  desired  to 
reform  the  church,  they  yet  shrunk  with  terror  from  the  Refor¬ 
mation  and  the  “tumult”  it  occasioned.  Erasmus  frequently 
thus  expressed  himself  as  the  movement  assumed  a  serious 
form.  The  tragedy  of  his  life  is  thus  explained.  He  was 
prevented  by  internal  and  external  motives  from  pressing  for¬ 
ward  as  the  new  and  great  agitation  surged  about  him,  and  he 
could  not  retreat.1  It  was  his  fate,  like  Moses,  to  die  in  the  land 
of  Moab.2 

3.  Consequently,  no  positively  influential  ideas  emanated  from 
Humanistic  circles.  Despite  all  their  criticism  of  the  church  and 
its  doctrines,  despite  their  exaltation  of  worldly  delights — 
which  too  often,  especially  in  Italy,  led  to  brutal  egotism  and 
sordid  self-indulgence — the  old  religious  ideas  maintained  their 
sway,  and  in  times  of  distress,  in  life  or  in  death,  the  heart  turned 
to  them  for  comfort.  This  was  seen  in  the  case  of  the  leaders 
of  the  movement  themselves.  ‘  ‘  Lived  like  heathens  and  died 
like  Christians — was  applicable  to  very  many  of  the  representa¬ 
tives  of  the  new  classical  culture”  (Bezold,  1.  c.,  p.  212).  We 
may  study  the  same  phenomenon  in  Erasmus.  There  was  very 
much  of  the  “modern  man”  about  him,  but  yet  he  remained, 
in  his  unmarried  and  unsettled  life,  a  monk  of  the  higher  order. 
And  even  his  religious  ideas,  particularly  in  the  pre-reformation 
period,  do  not  rise  beyond  the  religious  conceptions  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  It  is,  to  state  it  briefly,  the  piety  of  the  Imitatio  Christi 
which  he  commends.  i  1  Let  this  be  thy  .  .  .  rule  :  set  Christ 
before  thee  as  the  sole  centre  ( scopus )  of  thy  whole  life,  to  whom 
alone  thou  mayest  bring  all  thy  studies,  all  thine  efforts,  all  thy 
leisure  and  thy  business.  But  I  think  Christ  to  be  not  an  empty 
word,  but  nothing  else  than  love,  simplicity,  patience,  purity,  in 
short,  everything  which  he  taught.  ...  To  Christ  tends  every¬ 
one  who  is  lifted  to  virtue  alone  ”  (enchir.  4,  p.  25).  But  the 
History  of  Doctrines  has  no  occasion  to  attempt  a  portrayal  of 
the  theology  of  Erasmus,3 * * * * * * *  nor  that  of  his  friend,  Colet,  who  so 

1  Cf.  esp.  the  attractive  sketch  of  Lezius,  Zur  Char.  .  .  .  d.  Erasm. ,  p.  46  ff. 

2  Vid.  Luther’s  opinion  of  him  in  Kostlin,  Luther,  i.,  ed.  4,  688  f. 

3  Upon  particular  points  Erasmus  furnishes  much  that  is  of  importance*,  e.  g.y 

his  remark  as  to  the  gradations  of  authority  in  the  books  of  the  New  Testa¬ 

ment  (opp.  v.  92,  1049);  the  Bible  written  under  dictation  of  the  Holy  Spirit 

(v.  274);  his  criticism  of  the  homousios  (v.  1090)  and  of  the  sacrament  of 

repentance  (ib.  167,  944,  1046);  his  legal  conception  of  Sabbath  observance 

(v.  1190  f.);  his  symbolic  view  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  (iii.  521  f.,  892  ff.,  1028, 

1891  ;  v.  1019);  his  definition  of  faith  as  fiduciam ,  collocare  in  deo  (v.  105, 

777,  798,  1079,  II47*  1 166  et  passim).  We  do  not  yet  possess  a  detailed 

presentation  of  his  views.  Vid.  Stichart,  and  esp.  Lezius. 


2l6 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


earnestly  sought  to  understand  the  writings  of  St.  Paul.1  The 
fundamental  ideas  are  always  the  same.  Christ  came  down  from 
heaven  in  order  to  teach  us  to  despise  the  world  and  its  posses¬ 
sions,  and  practice  peace,  love,  and  harmony,  and  to  confirm 
this  teaching  by  his  example.  “  For  his  life  is  a  doctrine  excel¬ 
ling  all  human  (doctrine)”  ( Beatus  Rhenanus  upon  Zwingli, 
opp.  vii.  58).  But  to  this  is  to  be  added  faith  in  the  evangelical 
doctrine ,  which  is  laid  down  in  the  Scriptures,  the  Apostles’ 
Creed,  and  the  Fathers  (Erasm.  v.  8,  1162,  162  ;  i.  653). 

Such  is  the  dogmatic  history  of  the  Middle  Ages.  At  the 
first  glance  it  may  be  thought  that  doctrinal  development  was 
carried  backward  by  more  than  a  thousand  years.  The  declara¬ 
tions  of  Scripture,  the  Apostles’  Creed,  the  Fathers,  and  the 
dogmas  of  the  ancient  church,  appear  to  be  all  that  remain  in  the 
shiftings  of  history.  There  were  extended  circles  in  which  this 
was  felt  to  be  the  case.  But  history  never  simply  turns  back¬ 
ward.  Other  forces  were  in  the  field,  and  they,  too,  were  alive, 
and  have  perpetuated  their  vitality  to  the  present  day.  There 
was  a  complicated  play  of  forces  ;  even  the  ancient  and  despised 
was  still  a  force  to  be  reckoned  with.  We  must  differentiate 
three  groups  in  the  closing  period  of  the  Middle  Ages,  which 
were  capable  of  various  combinations.  (1)  The  Popular  Ca¬ 
tholicism,  the  official  ecclesiasticism.  It  does  not  scorn  the 
help  of  the  “  Moderns”  (/.  e .,  Nominalists),  but  it  begins  to 
rely  upon  the  “old  theology  ”  of  the  thirteenth  century.  (2) 
The  “negative,”  critical  theology  of  the  Nominalists.  They 
preserved  their  claim  to  recognition  by  their  theory  of  the  fides 
implicita.  (3)  The  Mystic,  Augustinian,  and  Humanistic  ten¬ 
dencies.  To  them  the  future  seemed  assured,  for  they  sought 

to  serve  the  cause  of  reform  and  progress.  Which  of  these  ten- 
% 

1  His  Opuscula  theologica,  ed.  Lupton,  London,  1876,  lies  before  me. 
Particularly  in  his  commentary  upon  Romans,  his  effort  to  be  Pauline  is  notice¬ 
able.  He  strongly  emphasizes  the  justitia  fidei  sola  (  p.  209).  “By  this 
sole  faith  of  Christ  one  enters  the  kingdom  of  heaven  ;  believers  are  righteous  ; 
the  faith  of  Christ  is  righteousness”  (p.230),  and  this  gratuitously: 
“  through  grace  men  believe,  and  through  grace  believers  are  justified  ”  (p. 
251).  The  divine  will  alone  is  the  ground  of  justification  (p.  254).  But 
faith  is  to  be  more  precisely  defined  as:  “The  faith  of  Christ  with  imitation 
and  representation  of  him  ”  (p.  241,  272),  or  “  Justifying  faith  imports  in  its 
signification  imitation  of  Christ  and  co-operation  with  him  ”  (p.  248).  In  har¬ 
mony  with  this  must  be  understood  the  declaration  :  “By  this  (2.  e.,  faith)  be¬ 
lievers  are  justified,  so  that  they  may  do  well  in  love.  .  .  .  Believers,  if  they 
imitate  Christ  Jesus,  God  will  crown  this  righteousness”  (p.  261  f. ;  cf.  p.  186: 
“  made  righteous  ( factijusti )  by  God,  that  we  may  live  righteously  ”  ).  Colet 
thus  taught  essentially  as  did  Thomas  (supra,  p.  120).  God  infuses  grace 
into  the  sinner,  which  produces:  first,  faith,  and  then  love  and  good  works. 
Further  than  this,  he,  like  Erasmus,  did  not  attach  himself  to  any  particular 
scholastic  theory. 


RENAISSANCE  AND  HUMANISM. 


217 


dencies — and  with  what  combinations  and  concessions — would 
have  gained  the  victory,  if  no  new  element  had  been  introduced  ? 
It  will  not  be  without  profit  to  reflect  upon  the  problem. 
The  future  did  actually  produce  the  humanistic  Nominalism  of 
the  Socinians,  the  Augustinianism  of  the  Jansenists,  the  Thom- 
ism  of  the  Modems.  But  a  fourth  spiritual  power  appeared 
amid  the  play  of  forces — the  Gospel,  or  the  Reformation.  This 
introduced  a  new  element.  Old  problems  were  pushed  aside, 
and  the  questions  pressing  for  solution  assumed  a  different  form. 


BOOK  III. 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENT  OF  DOCTRINE  THROUGH 
THE  REFORMATION  AND  FIXATION  OF  THE 
DOCTRINES  OF  CATHOLICISM. 


PART  I. 

GENESIS  OF  PROTESTANT  DOCTRINE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  VIEWS  OF  LUTHER. 

§65.  Luther''  s  Place  in  the  History  of  Doctrines. 

Literature.  The  works  of  Luther  are  cited  in  the  following  pages  from 
the  Weimar  edition  (—  W)  and  from  the  first  issue  of  the  Erlangen  edition 
(German  Works  =E);  de  W.  =  De  Wette,  Luther’s  Briefe,  6  vols.,  1825  ff. ; 
opp.  ex.  =  Opera  Exegetica  and  var.  arg.  =  Varii  Argumenti — both  of  the 
Erlangen  edition  ;  Gal.  =  the  large  Commentary  upon  Galatians  in  the  same 
edition.  Cf.  Kostlin,  M.  Luther,  2  vols.,  5th  edition  by  Kawerau,  1903. 
Kolde,  M.  L.,  2  vols.,  1883  ff.  Kostlin,  Luther’s  Theologie,  2  vols.,  1863, 
2ded.,  1901.  Th.  Harnack,  Luther’s  Theologie,  1862-86,  2d  issue,  1901. 
Lommatsch,  Luther’s  Lehre  v.  eth.  rel.  Standp.  aus,  1879.  Luthardt,  Die 
Ethik  Luther’s,  2d  edition,  1875.  Plitt,  Einleitungin  d.  Augustana,  i.,  1868. 
Moller-Kawerau,  KG.  iii.,  1894.  Ritschl,  Rechtf.  u.  Vers.  i.  141  ff. 
Thomasius,  DG.  ii. ,  ed.  2,  330  ff.  Loofs,  DG.,  ed.  3,  345  ff.  Harnack, 
DG.  iii.,  ed.  3,  726  ff. ;  cf.  Kubel,  Neue  kirchl.  Ztschr. ,  1891,  13  ff.  Hering, 
Die  Mystik  Luther’s  im  Zusammenhang  s.  Theol.,  1879.  Lipsius,  Luther’s 
Lehre  v.  d.  Busse,  1892.  Thieme,  Die  sittl.  Triebkraft  des  Glaubens,  1895. 
Schafer,  L.  als  Kirchenhistoriker,  1897. 

i.  In  the  crisis  periods  of  history  there  is  commonly  no  lack 
of  vigorous  thought  and  great  possibilities.  There  were  now 
many  possibilities  in  view.  But  which  of  these,  if  achieved, 
could  have  solved  the  problems  of  the  great  crisis  now  threaten¬ 
ing  the  doctrinal  structure  of  the  church,  as  well  as  the  moral  and 
social  life  of  the  world?  Altogether,  they  did  not  extend  in 
scope  beyond  the  horizon  of  medieval  piety.  But  in  the  midst 
of  the  sultry  calm  and  dark  forebodings  of  those  days  appeared 
a  man  who  had  something  practical  to  propose  in  the  face  of  all 
the  vague  possibilities.  He  trod  like  a  giant  through  his  age, 
tramping  to  earth  what  a  thousand  years  had  held  in  veneration; 
but  everywhere  new  life  blossomed  in  his  footsteps.  It  was  the 
wonder-worker  of  modern  times,  Martin  Luther  (b.  A.  D. 
1483).  He  was  a  genius  without  parallel,  and  yet  his  was 
a  “ 1  simple  soul.”  He  possessed  the  wonderful  faculty  of  real¬ 
izing  in  the  clear  depths  of  his  own  experience  all  the  emotions 
and  needs  of  his  age.  “Yet  he  possessed”  also,  “in  his. 

(221) 


222 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


religious  genius,  a  unique  and  peculiar  energy  which  carried  his 
contemporaries  along,  at  least  for  some  distance,  in  his  path  as 
by  a  power  beyond  and  higher  than  their  own.  He  was  born  to 
deal  with  men  and  govern  them  ”  (Dilthey,  Archiv  f.  Gesch. 
d.  Philos,  v.  356  f. ).  His  power  lay  in  his  faith,  which  he  dis¬ 
covered  amid  the  stress  of  dark  and  terrifying  spiritual  struggles. 
The  firm  assurance  of  evangelical  faith  which  he  had  himself 
won,  he  proclaimed  to  his  age  with  the  amazing  vividness  which 
only  personal  experience  can  give,  with  the  force  and  versatility 
of  a  true  religious  genius,  and  with  the  holy  passion  of  a  prophet. 
Looking  back  upon  his  life,  he  himself  declares  :  “  God  led  me 
on  like  a  horse  whose  eyes  have  been  blind-folded  that  he  may 
not  see  those  who  are  rushing  toward  him,”  and  “  that  a  good 
work  should  seldom  be  undertaken  or  accomplished  through 
wisdom  or  foresight — everything  must  be  accomplished  in  the 
midst  of  error  or  ignorance”  (E.  57,  31  f.).  Men  listened  to 
him.  He  led  them  back  from  scholastic  speculations  to  the  firm 
ground  of  historical  revelation,  from  dogma  to  faith.  The 
Reformation,  so  longed  talked  of,  here  became  a  reality,  and  in 
a  way  which  no  one  had  anticipated.  And  only  gradually  has  the 
Christian  world  learned  to  understand  clearly  its  controlling 
principles,  to  draw  the  inevitable  conclusions  and  estimate  it 
correctly  from  a  critical  point  of  view,  casting  aside  the  peculiar 
and  sometimes  incongruous  wrappings  that  have  partly  concealed 
its  true  character.  It  would  be  idle  to  wish  that  the  great 
age  of  the  Reformers  might  itself  have  wrought  out  to  a  logical 
conclusion  all  that  was  involved  in  the  new  principles. 

2.  It  is  very  significant,  that  the  peculiar  religious  experiences 
of  Luther  in  the  cloister  fall  within  the  sphere  of  the  sacrament 
of  repentance  and  the  overvaluation  of  the  monastic  life.  The 
controlling  element  in  the  penitential  praxis  was  not  for  him 
attrition,  but  contrition.1  Luther  sought  to  force  himself  to  con¬ 
trition  by  meditating  upon  his  sins.  He  was  thus  led  to  “  bung¬ 
ling  work  and  doll-sins  ’  ’  indeed  ;  but  he  also  discovered,  as  the 
chief  source  of  trouble,  sin  in  the  sense  of  sinfulness.  As  his 
own  contrition  never  reached  the  required  depth,  so,  on  the 
other  hand,  absolution — the  formula  for  which  makes  forgive¬ 
ness  dependent  upon  the  “contrition  of  the  heart,  the  good 
works  which  thou  hast  done  from  love  of  Christ  ”  (Kostlin,  M. 
Luth.  i.  5,  64) — brought  him  no  certainty  of  the  forgiveness  of 
his  sins.  The — genuinely  Catholic — suggestion,  that  it  was  his 

1  In  theory,  contrition  alone  was  generally  spoken  of,  but  in  practice  attri¬ 
tion  alone  was  usually  thought  of,  as  the  “  beginning  of  penitence  ” 
(E.  25,  130).  But  this  lightening  of  the  burden  permitted  by  the  dogmatics 
•of  the  age,  Luther  would  not  allow  to  himself. 


luther’s  place  in  the  history  of  doctrines.  223 

duty  to  believe  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  pointed  him  in  a  new 
direction.  He  learned  that  not  separate  acts,  but  love  to 
righteousness  and  to  God,  constitute  the  criterion  of  true 
repentance  (Staupitz).  From  this  time  onward,  Luther  fell 
more  and  more  under  the  influence  of  Augustine  and  Mysticism. 
It  is  perhaps  the  greatest  work  of  Augustine,  that  he  prepared 
the  way  in  following  which  this,  his  greatest  son,  found  Paul. 
Gradually  Luther  is  led  in  his  inmost  experience  into  the  very 
heart  of  scriptural  ideas,  and  such  terms  as  grace  and  righteous¬ 
ness  receive  a  new  meaning. 

3.  There  meets  us,  hence,  in  the  very  first  connected  utterances 
of  Luther  (§  66),  an  entirely  new  apprehension  of  religious  truth. 
The  differences  between  the  “  first  form  ”  and  the  later  forms 
of  Luther’s  theology  are  commonly  very  much  exaggerated.  If 
we  consider  the  technical  terminology,  there  is  indeed  a  mani¬ 
fest  difference ;  but  if  we  have  in  view  the  actual  content  and 
logical  results  of  his  ideas,  we  can  scarcely  reach  any  other  con¬ 
clusion  than  that  Luther  had  before  A.  D.  1517  already  grasped 
the  conceptions  and  attained  the  points  of  view  which  gave 
character  to  his  life-work.  This  can  be  traced,  as  will  be  done 
in  the  following  pages,  in  the  peculiar  construction  of  nearly  all 
the  theological  definitions  of  the  later  Luther.  But  it  is  most 
important  of  all  to  observe  that  he,  at  the  very  beginning  of  his 
career,  makes  practical  application  of  his  new  idea  of  faith  ;  for 
the  leverage  of  Luther’s  reformatory  principle  lies,  not  in  justifi¬ 
cation,  nor  in  a  new  theory  of  grace,  but  in  the  conviction  that 
faith  is  the  form  of  true  religion.  “  He  who  believes,  has” 
(e.  g. ,  E.  27,  180).  But  this  central  conviction  dominates  his 
very  first  writings,  and  it  is  instructive  to  observe  what  a  trans¬ 
forming  influence  it  exerted  upon  the  theological  views  there 
presented  (vid.  sub).  It  will  be  advisable,  nevertheless,  to 
present  separately  the  first  utterances  of  his  new  thoughts,  as 
their  historical  relations  can  thus  be  more  clearly  seen. 

4.  Luther,  it  is  well  known,  had  pursued  a  thorough  course  of 
Scholastic  study,  making  himself  familiar  particularly  with  the 
Lombard,  Occam,  D’Ailli,  and  Biel.  This  schooling  is  often 
apparent  in  the  earlier  period  (e.  g.,  W.  1  *  3 6 7  fT. ) .  But  the  influ¬ 
ence  of  these  studies  was  a  permanent  one.  He  had  imbibed  the 
outline  and  organization  of  the  theological  ideas  of  Scholasticism, 
and  they  remained  as  the  points  of  connection  in  his  theological 
thinking.  In  the  most  of  his  definitions,  the  form  of  construc¬ 
tion  can  be  understood  only  if  we  bear  this  fact  in  mind.1  Yet 

1  Luther  was  accurately  acquainted  with  the  separate  Scholastic  writers,  as 
maybe  seen  from  his  writings  during  the  indulgence  controversy — e.  g.,  his 
opinion  of  Duns,  W.  2.  403,  and  of  Occam,  6.  183.  E.  24.  347  :  “Occam, 


224 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Luther  was  confessedly  a  passionate  opponent  of  Scholasticism,, 
as  well  as  of  Aristotle.  “  Thomas  wrote  many  heretical  things, 
and  is  the  cause  of  the  dominance  of  Aristotle,  the  devastator  of 
pious  doctrine  ’ ’  (W.  8.  127).  But  the  motive  which  impelled 
him  in  this  opposition  was  different  from  that  which  inspired  the 
hounding  of  the  Scholastics  by  the  Humanists.  His  criticism 
was  not  directed  primarily  against  the  formal  defects  of  the 
system.  He  regards  the  teachings  of  Biel  as  good,  except  upon 
the  topics  of  grace,  love,  hope,  faith,  and  virtue  (De  W.  1.  34); 
at  a  later  date,  he  speaks  approvingly  of  the  Lombard,  with 
the  exception  that  what  he  has  said  of  faith  and  justification  is 
“too  thin  and  weak”  (E.  25.  258). 1  This  is  the  ground  of 
Luther’s  opposition  :  “  That  carnalizer  of  consciences,  theolo- 
gistria ,”  with  its  doctrines  of  free-will,  merit,  righteousness, 
and  works,  directs  to  a  false  way  of  salvation,  which  leads 
only  to  doubt  and  despair :  “I  lost  Christ  there ;  now  I  have 
found  him  in  Paul  ”  (W.  2.  401,  414,  503,  447).  It  destroys 
the  gospel  (W.  2.  416,  465)  and  opposes  “sacred  theology” 
(ib.  416).  It  mixes  Scripture  and  philosophy  (E.  63.  162). 2 
“Scholastic  theology  is  nothing  else  than  ignorance  of  the  truth 
and  scandal  placed  side  by  side  with  Scripture”  (W.  8.  127). 3 
Many  have  assailed  the  formalism  of  Scholasticism ;  Luther 
attacked  its  substance,  and  he  overthrew  it. 

5.  Luther’s  decisive  religious  experiences  were  gained  in  con¬ 
nection  with  the  sacrament  of  repentance,  under  the  stress  of  a 
false  conception  of  repentance  for  which  he  struggled  to  find  a 
substitute.  This  was  the  starting-point  from  which  his  funda¬ 
mental  religious  ideas  were  developed.  The  latter  may,  there¬ 
fore,  be  comprehended  under  the  conception  of  Evangelical  Re¬ 
pentance  ,  constituting  a  Substitute  for  the  observance  of  the  Sacra¬ 
ment  of  Repentance.  This  is  the  point  of  view  from  which  the 
work  of  Luther  must  be  considered  in  the  History  of  Doctrines. 

my  dear  Master;”  Scotus  and  Occam  are  “the  best  two.”  He  himself 
counts  himself  among  the  Moderni,  or  Nominalists,  W.  9.  9  ;  cf.  I.  226  and 
op.  var.  arg.  5.  137  :  sum  Occanicae  factionis.  As  to  his  studies,  see  Glosses 
upon  the  Lombard,  W.  9.  28  ff. ;  and  in  the  Mystics,  upon  Tauler,  ib.  9 7  ff. 

1  W.  1.  391  :  “  Not  that  I  entirely  condemn  them  (the  Scholastics),  for  they 
have  done  their  part.”  Cf.  especially  the  remarkable  contrasting  of  the  prob¬ 
lems  of  the  Scholastic  and  the  Evangelical  theology,  E.  24.  372  ff. 

2  “  .  .  .  Origen,  who  soured  and  spoiled  the  Scriptures  by  philosophy 
and  reason,  as  with  us  the  universities  have  hitherto  done.” 

3  With  this  agrees  Luther’s  opinion  of  Aristotle  :  “  the  constructor  of 
words,  the  deluder  of  minds”  (W.  i.  612).  In  addition  to  his  Moralism,  he 
charges  upon  him,  that  his  God  does  not  act  mightily  in  the  government  of  the 
world,  but  “governs  the  world  blinkingly,  as  a  woman  rocks  her  child  in  the 
dark”  (E.  10.  321  ;  7.  239  ;  W.  6.  457  f. ).  Vid.  Nitzsch,  Luth.  and  Arist., 
Kiel,  1893. 


225 


luther’s  place  in  the  history  of  doctrines. 

All  his  ideas  in  regard  to  penitence  and  faith,  faith  and  works, 
sin  and  grace,  law  and  gospel,  together  with  his  new  ideal  of  life, 
constitute  a  complex  of  religious  conceptions  which  were  devel¬ 
oped  under  the  pressure  of  and  in  opposition  to  the  sacrament 
of  repentance.1  This  brings  his  work,  however,  into  the  very 
centre  of  the  current  of  religious  development  in  the  West.  The 
controlling  thought  in  the  latter  is  always  the  salvation  of  souls 
( salus  animarum )  (Vol.  I.,  p.  192  f.,  199).  Repentance,  for¬ 
giveness,  new  life  were,  hence,  the  inspiration  of  all  conflicts 
and  schisms  from  the  days  of  Calixtus  to  the  Fanatics  of  the 
Reformation  era.  One  ideal  runs  through  all  these  movements  : 
the  congregation  of  saints.  The  great  church  thought  of  the 
holiness  of  her  ordinances,  the  opus  operatum.  To  this  her 
critics  had  nothing  to  oppose,  in  the  last  analysis,  but  human 
works,  the  opera  operands — not  holiness  and  righteousness.  In'7 
the  conception  of  the  righteousness  of  faith,  Luther  found  the 
solution  of  the  problem.  Everything  comes  to  the  sinner  from 
God ;  but  it  becomes  his  only  when  it  begets  in  him  a  powerful, 
glowing,  vital  experience.  Yet  the  heart  does  not  place  its  con¬ 
fidence  in  this  experience  in  so  far  as  it  is  its  own  ;  but  only  in  so 
far  as  it  comes  from  God.  This  is  now  both  entirely  objective 
and  entirely  subjective.  It  is  broad  enough  to  embrace  all  that 
was  right  in  the  position  of  the  church  as  against  the  schismatics, 
and  all  that  was  right  in  the  contentions  of  the  latter  against  the 
church.2 

6.  We  cannot  here  attempt  a  review  of  the  reformatory  work 
of  Luther.  A  few  observations  must  suffice.  The  question  of 
the  authority  of  the  church  forced  itself  upon  his  attention 
already  in  the  indulgence  controversy.3  The  Leipzig  Disputation 
(A.  D.  1519)  brings  Luther  to  the  conviction  that  the  pope  and 

1  Melanchthon  recognizes  this  in  Corp.  Ref.,  xi.  728  :  Luther  makes  evident 
the  true  and  necessary  doctrine  ;  for  that  there  was  densest  darkness  upon  the 
doctrine  of  repentance  is  manifest.  Discussing  these  things,  he  shows  what  is 
true  repentance.  Cf.  v.  568  ;  vi.  gof.;  i.  3 5 o ff . ;  viii.  311. 

2  Regarded  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  medieval  church,  the  Reformation 
may  be  considered  as  the  last  of  the  schisms  in  the  Western  church.  But  it 
must,  in  that  case,  be  freely  acknowledged  that  it  is  profoundly  and  entirely 
different  from  all  schismatic  movements. 

3  Vid.,  besides,  the  95  Theses:  Disputat.  pro  declarat.  virtutis  indulgent.; 
Ein  sermon  v.  ablass  u.  gnade,  1517;  Asterisci ;  Sermo  de  poenit.  Eine  frei- 
heit  des  sermons  papstl.  ablass  u.  gnaden  belangend  ;  Resolutiones  disputa- 
tionum  de  indulg.  virtu te  ;  sermo  de  virtute  excommunicat.  (these  in  W.  1). 
Eine  kurze  unterweisung,  wie  man  beichten  soil,  1518.  Unterricht  auf.  etl. 
artikel;  sermo  de  duplici  justitia ;  Ein  sermon  vom  sakr.  d.  busse,  1519 
(W.  2).  Confitendi  ratio,  1520  (W.  3).  Cf.  esp.  for  this  period  the  Dispu¬ 
tat.  c.  scholast.  theol.,  1517.  The  Heidelberg  Theses,  1517  (W.  1),  the  small 
commentary  upon  Galatians,  15 19  (W.  2).  Responsio  ad  libr.  Ambros. 
Catharini,  15 19  (opp.  v.  a.  5). 

15 


226 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


councils  may  err,  and  that  the  Scriptures  are  the  only  authorized 
authority  in  the  church.1  The  outward  barriers  which  had  hitherto 
restrained  Luther’s  spirit  are  thereby  broken  down.  The  eyes 
of  men  of  culture  and  of  all  friends  of  reform  are  now  turned 
upon  him.  He  is  recognized  as  a  prophet.  His  cause  is  no 
longer  a  theological  tournament  ;  it  is  the  cause  of  the  people. 
Thus,  stimulated  and  sustained  by  the  longings  and  hopes  of  his 
people,  he  enters  the  greatest  year  of  his  life,  1520.  With  wonder¬ 
ful  energy  he  wields  the  sword  and  plies  the  trowel.  The  old  theory 
of  the  sacraments  is  demolished  ;  there  is  a  new  conception  of  the 
church ;  the  new  ideal  of  Christian  life  appears ;  good  works  are 
understood  in  the  evangelical  sense  ;  and  the  program  of  practical 
reformation  is  clearly  indicated.2  Then  follows  the  fiery  trial  at 
Worms,  the  test  of  sincerity  at  the  Wartburg  and  in  face  of  the 
fanaticism3  at  Wittenberg.  Political  circumstances  then  open 
the  way  for  the  development  of  evangelical  church  life4  and  the 
spread  of  the  gospel.  But  to  this  period  of  development  belong 
also  separations  (1524-25).  The  powerful  movement  for  re¬ 
form  had  quickened  into  new  life  the  other  reformatory  ten¬ 
dencies  of  the  age,  and  it  seemed  as  though  they  might  be  com¬ 
bined  in  one  current  with  it.  Humanists,  Mystics,  and  social 
reformers  stretch  out  their  hands  to  Luther.  And  he  recognizes 
the  “  other  spirit  ”  in  them  and  repels  them.5  It  is  among  the 
greatest  acts  of  his  life.  He  thereby  lost  his  unparalleled  popu¬ 
larity.  He,  whom  nothing  had  hitherto  been  able  to  withstand, 
was  now  compelled  to  realize  the  inexorable  limitations  which 
beset  all  human  efforts.  To  this  was  added  the  alarming  revela- 

1  Ad  dialog.  Silv.  Prierat.  de  potest,  papae,  1518  (W.  1).  Acta  Augus- 
tana,  1518.  Disputat.  et  excusat.  adv.  criminationes  Ioh.  Eck.  Resolut. 
Lutheriana  super  proposit.  sua  XIII.;  the  proceedings  of  the  Disputation  at 
Leipzig  (W.  2). 

2  Von  den  guten  Werken  ;  vom  Papstt.  z.  Rom  wider  den  hochberiimten 
Romanisten  z.  Lpz. ;  Ein  sermon  v.  N.  T.  d.  i.  von  der  h.  Messe ;  an  den 
christl.  Adel  deutscher  Nation  von  des  christl.  Standes  Besserung;  De  capti- 
vit.  babyl.;  Wider  die  Bulle  des  Endchristes  (W.  6).  Also  Von  der  Frei- 
heit  eines  Christenmenschen  (E.  27  and  op.  v.  a.),  all  in  1520.  In  1519  : 
Ein  sermon  v.  d.  hochw.  Sakr.  der  Taufe  ;  Ein  sermon  v.  d.  hochw.  Sakr. 
des  h.  hochw.  Leichnams  Christi  (W.  2).  Vid.  also Themata  de  votis  ;  Vom 
Misbrauch  der  Messe  ;  De  votis  monasticis,  152 1  (W.  8);  An  die  Herren 
deutschen  Ordens,  1523  E.  29). 

s  Vid.  the  Eight  Sermons,  1523  (E.  28). 

4  E.  g.,  Ordnung  eines  gemeinen  Kastens  ;  Von  d.  Ordnung  des  Gottes- 
dienstes,  Taufbiichlein,  1523.  Deutsche  Messe,  1526  (E.  22).  Traubuch- 
lein  (E.  23);  the  two  catechisms,  1529,  etc. 

5  De  servo  arbitrio,  1525  (op.  v.  a.  7);  Wider  d.  himml.  Propheten, 
1524-25  (E.  29).  Ermanung  zum  Frieden  ;  Wider  d.  mSrderischen  u.  rau- 
berischen  Rotten  der  Bauern  ;  Ein  Sendbrief  v.  dem  harten  Biichlein  wider 
die  Bauern,  1525  (E.  24). 


EARLY  VIEWS  OF  LUTHER. 


227 


tions  of  the  church  visitations.  From  this  time  forward  a  certain 
austerity  of  temper  is  noticeable  in  the  Reformer.  Severe  utter¬ 
ances  touching  the  “  coarse,  common  man  ’  ’  and  “  the  full  and 
foolish  Germans  ’  ’  now  belong  to  his  constant  repertoire.1  There 
is  a  lowering  also  of  his  ecclesiastical  ideals.2  But  he  remains  true 
to  himself  and  the  gospel,  even  against  Zwingli.3  The  evangel¬ 
ical  views  are  now  summarized  in  the  Augsburg  Confession. 

The  most  wonderful  thing  in  Luther  was  that  his  opponents  could 
never  confuse  him  nor  force  any  concessions  from  him.  On  the 
contrary,  every  obstacle  which  he  met  but  served  to  open  up  new 
treasures  from  the  deep  mine  of  his  fundamental  religious  idea ; 
as,  in  opposition  to  the  Fanatics,  he  defined  more  accurately  the 
significance  of  the  means  of  grace,  and  against  Erasmus  main¬ 
tained  salvation  by  grace  alone. 

We  have  thus  indicated  the  points  of  view  from  which  the  re¬ 
formatory  ideas  of  Luther  will  be  presented  in  the  following 
pages.  One  of  the  most  important  tasks  of  the  History  of  Doc¬ 
trines  is  thus  set  before  us.  For  whether  we  regard  Luther  as 
the  destroyer  of  the  foundations  of  the  old  dogma,  or  as  the 
originator  of  new  dogmas,  it  is  evident  that  either  opinion  can 
be  sustained  only  by  a  thoroughgoing  study  of  his  teachings. 
Above  all  is  it  the  duty  of  those  who  extend  the  scope  of  the 
History  of  Doctrines  into  the  age  of  Protestantism  to  furnish  a 
■complete  portraiture  of  Luther.  It  is  astonishing  to  find  in  some 
Protestant  works  upon  the  subject  lengthy  discussions  of  Augus¬ 
tine,  Thomas,  etc.,  but  only  a  short  sketch  of  Luther.4  This  is 
out  of  all  due  proportion,  whether  we  regard  the  matter  from 
the  standpoint  of  medieval  doctrinal  development  or  in  the  light 
of  the  Protestant  Confessions. 


§66.  Doctrinal  Views  of  Luther  Before  the  Period  of  His 

Reformatory  Activity. 

Literature.  Expositions  of  the  Psalms,  with  work  upon  the  Penitential 
Psalms,  lectures  upon  Judges,  sermons  and  tracts  to  A.  D.  1517  in  Weimar 
edition,  vols.  i.,  iii. ,  iv.  Cf.  Dieckhoff,  L.  Lehre  in  ihrer  ersten  Gestalt, 
i887. 

1  Cf.,  e.  g.,  E.  24.  305,  309;  22.  255,  181,  194  ;  4.  405  ;  also  the  com¬ 
plaints  of  the  great  change  of  sentiment,  14.  225  f.,  233  ;  47.  14  f. ,  210  ft'.; 
48.  375- 

2  Cf.  Kolde,  Ztschr.  f.  Kirchengesch.  xiii.  552  ff. 

3  Wider  die  himml.  Propheten  u.  Bildern  u.  Sakr.  1524-25  (E.  29);  letter 
to  the  Strassburgers,  1524  (De  W.  2.  574 ff. );  Vorwort  z.  Syngramma  suevi- 
■cum,  1526  (E.  65.  180  ff. );  sermon  v.  Sakr.,  1526  (E.  29);  Das  diese  Worte, 
Das  ist  mein  Leib  ;  noch  feste  stehen,  1527  ;  Bekenntnis  v.  Abendmal  Christi, 
1528  (E.  30);  Kurzes  Bekenntnis  v.  h.  Sakr.  1545  (E.  32). 

4  A  praiseworthy  exception  is  found  in  the  Leitfaden  of  Loofs. 


228 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


i.  The  high  regard  for  the  Scriptures,  which  is  already  so 
evident  in  Luther,  is  scarcely  more  pronounced  than  was  usual  in 
the  writers  of  the  later  Middle  Ages  ( e .  g. ,  W.  3.  517  ;  4.  531  ; 
1 .  52).  But  a  new  path  was  opened  by  his  conception  of  Christ  as 
the  real  content  of  the  Scriptures  (1.  219).  Highly  significant, 
too,  was  his  view  of  the  difference  between  the  Law  and  the  Gos¬ 
pel.  The  external  word  of  the  preacher  reaches  only  the  ear  of 
the  hearer;  “but  God  speaks  ( sonat )  and  teaches  inwardly  to 
the  heart”  (3.  124,514).  Human  speech  effects  nothing  “  with¬ 
out  the  co-operation  and  inward  infusion  (Ps.  38.  2)  of  God.” 
There  is  an  “inward  whispering  :  Thy  sins  are  forgiven  thee  ” 
(1.  175,  190,  201). 1  This  is  the  Augustinian  view.  (Vol  I., 
p.  321).  The  word  falls  into  the  two  categories  of  law  and 
gospel.  These  terms  are  often  synonymous  with  the  Old  and 
the  New  Testament,  e.  g. :  “The  law  teaches  the  knowledge  of 
self ;  but  the  gospel,  or  the  New  Testament,  teaches  the  knowl- 
of  God  ”(4.  565,  567).  In  this  sense,  the  law  is  the  rude  vesti¬ 
bule  to  the  gospel  (3.  249).  It  conceals  the  New  Testament 
ideas  (4.  251,  305),  such  as  evangelical  grace  and  the  righteous¬ 
ness  of  faith  (3.  560).  It  is  unable  to  give  to  anyone  a  good 
will,  or  love  (4.  250).  But,  since  it  can  call  forth  only  outward 
works,  it  makes  men  in  the  end  hypocrites  (4.  566).  It 
makes  men  sinners,  but  the  gospel  comforts  and  saves  them 
(4.  566).  But  Luther  finds  law  also  in  the  New  Testament, 
since  the  latter  teaches  the  spiritual  understanding  ( intelligentia ) 
of  the  law  :  ‘  ‘  But  this  understanding  of  the  law  spiritually 
much  rather  slays,  because  it  makes  the  law  impossible  to  fulfill, 
and  thereby  makes  man  despairing  of  his  own  strength  and 
humiliated”  (1.  105).  This  is,  however,  a  foreign,  and  not 
the  peculiar,  office  of  the  gospel  (1.  113;  4.  87.)  Its  own 
mission  is  to  comfort  and  lift  up  all  who  have  been  smitten  and 
humbled  by  the  law.  “Therefore,  as  much  as  the  gospel  has 
caused  grief  by  interpreting  the  law,  so  much  and  more  does  it 
cause  rejoicing  by  proclaiming  grace  ”  (1.  105,  106,  108,  113). 
The  gospel  humiliates,  not  only  by  its  interpretation  of  the  law, 
but  also  by  manifesting  the  works  and  the  glory  of  God  and 
thereby  revealing  the  sin  and  shame  of  man  (1.  111  f. ). 
Finally,  the  gospel  imposes  a  cross  and  chastisement  upon  man, 
since  it  subjugates  the  old  man  (4.  253  ;  3.  462).  The  gospel 
may  therefore  be  called  a  compound  ( mixtum):  “because  the 
gospel  imposes  cross  and  life,  peace  and  war,  good  and  evil, 
poverty  and  riches.  And  this  is  most  truly  a  salutary  mixture  so 

1  It  is  the  word  of  the  gospel,  vocal  or  written,  i.  e.y  the  Holy  Scriptures 
(3-404). 


EARLY  VIEWS  OF  LUTHER. 


229 


long  as  this  life  lasts  ’  ’  (3.  516).  If  it  is  therefore  the  chief  office 
of  the  gospel  to  proclaim  grace  and  consolation,  it  yet  deepens 
also  the  understanding  of  the  law  and  humiliates  and  chastens 
the  sinner.1  We  shall  treat  the  doctrinal  points  resulting  from 
this  general  view  in  the  order  :  sin,  freedom  of  the  will,  Christ, 
grace,  faith,  righteousness. 

2.  Luther  did  not  suffer  while  in  the  cloister  from  outbreaks 
of  any  particular  sin.  He  was  oppressed  by  the  sense  of  sinful¬ 
ness,  or  Original  Sin.  He  recalls  attention  to  it :  “No  one  is 
longer  solicitous  for  the  mortification  of  the  tinder  ( fames )  and 
the  root-sin,  but  they  are  concerned  only  for  the  cutting  off 
( amputandis )  of  actual  sins  by  contrition,  confession,  and  satis¬ 
faction  ”  (1.  67).  But  original  sin  (peccatum  originate, 2  Erb- 
sundf  1.  197)  is  the  concupiscence  filling  the  whole  man  (1. 
126,  225),  which  is  the  root  of  all  peccata  actualia .  “It  is  an 
abiding  sin  in  this  present  time”  (1.  168,  86),  “a  very  cor¬ 
ruption  (corruptio )  of  nature  ”  (1.  121),  since  the  memory,  the 
understanding,  and  the  will  are  weakened  by  it  (3.  453).  This 
is  the  old  man,  “which  absolutely  does  not  love  God,  nor 
fervently  hunger  and  thirst  (for  him),  but  thinks  to  find  full 
satisfaction  for  mind  and  spirit  in  created  things  ”  (1.  146).  It 
has  a  horror,  not  a  fear,  of  God;  “  but  horror  is  the  seed-bed 
of  hate”  (1.  3 9). 3  The  “nature  and  essence”  of  man  is, 
from  his  birth,  an  evil  tree  and  a  child  of  wrath  (1.  188). 4  Just 
as  little,  therefore,  as  the  will  is  free  to  do  good  (1.  148,  224), 
is  man  able  to  prepare  himself  in  worthiness  ( de  condigno') 
or  in  fitness  (de  congruo )  for  the  reception  of  grace  (1.  147, 
148,  70). 

3.  In  Christology,  certain  definite  fundamental  conceptions  of 
Luther  are  already  quite  prominent.  The  doctrine  of  the  two 
natures  of  Christ  (3.  467)  is,  for  example,  presented  in  its 
practical  religious  aspect.  We  recognize  the  divinity  of  Christ, 

1  Cf.  the  frequently  recurring  declarations,  that  man  must  become  nothing, 
must  be  judged  and  crucified,  before  God  can  work  in  him,  e.  g.:  1.  183  f.,  1 12, 
113,  1 19,  227,  186,  189,  201  f.,  214  ;  3.  513,  288  f.,  291,  466  ;  4.  376  f.,  412. 
Vid.  also  the  view  of  the  Mystics,  supra,  p.  180. 

2  Definition,  4.  690 ;  cf.  9.  73,  75. 

3  Luther  retains  the  Scholastic  idea  of  the  Synteresis  (supra,  p.  1 1 4  f . )  : 
•“  Therefore,  just  as  the  synteresis  of  the  understanding  ( rationis )  is  also  con¬ 
formed  to  the  wisdom  of  God,  although  the  entire  understanding  may  be 
totally  non-conformed  to  it,  so  the  synteresis  of  the  will  is  conformed  to  the 
will  of  God  ”( 1.  36,  558;  3.  238). 

4  The  wrath  of  God  is  attributed  to  the  creature,  without  having  a  real  exist¬ 
ence  in  God:  “God  does  not,  properly  speaking,  afflict  by  approaching,  but 
by  departing  and  leaving  in  the  hand  of  creatures.”  This  is  the  biblical 
idea,  that  God  is  angry  when  he  forsakes.  Luther’s  conceptions  at  this  time 
.harmonize  with  Creationism  (4.  342). 


230 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


since  we  attribute  all  our  blessings  to  him  and  expect  salvation 
wholly  from  him,  as  well  as  render  him  obedience  :  “  To  con¬ 
fess  that  Christ  is  God  is  to  restore  and  refer  to  him  all  good 
things  received  from  him,  ...  to  hope  for  all  good  things  from 
him,  and  to  put  our  trust  in  no  creature”  (i.  123,  140).  His 
divinity  is  “a  gracious  will  to  pity  and  help  ”  (1.  203).  4 ‘That 
he  pities,  proves  him  to  be  God  and  distinguishes  him  from 
others,  who  cannot  pity  ( tnisereri )  since  they  are  themselves, 
objects  of  pity  ( miseri ).  Therefore  he  who  pities  and  is  good, 
is  God”  (4.  248.)  But  Christ  concealed  his  divinity  in  his- 
humanity,  so  that  it  remained  in  the  Father  ( divinitatein  suam 
abscondi  ab  eis  in  palre ,  3.  502  f.,  124).  He  put  away  from 
him  his  power:  “He  banished  ( subtraxit )  all  his  power 
by  which  he  would  have  been  able  to  resist  them  (his 
enemies)  and  in  every  way  subjected  himself  to  infirmity” 
(3.  1 21).  Thus,  even  his  divine  works  were  concealed  in  the 
humiliation  of  his  passion  (3.  547 ).1  Thus  God  came  to  us. 
“  Since  God  pitied  us,  he  also  adapted  himself  to  our  infirmity, 
so  that  he  came  to  us  as  a  man,  concealing  his  divinity  and 
thereby  removing  all  terror”  (4.  647;  1.  201).  There  is, 
therefore,  no  knowledge  of  God,  save  only  in  the  humanity  of 
Jesus.  “  All  ascent  to  the  knowledge  of  God  is  perilous  except 
that  which  is  made  through  the  humility  of  Christ,  because  this 
is  Jacob’s  ladder.  .  .  .  Wherefore  he  who,  of  himself,  makes 
haste  to  know  God,  is  hastening  to  the  abyss  of  despair.  .  .  . 
In  other  works  God  is  recognized  according  to  the  greatness  of 
his  power,  wisdom,  and  justice,  and  there  his  works  appear  to  be 
exceedingly  terrible ;  but  here  is  seen  his  most  gentle  pity 
and  love,  so  that  thus  his  works  of  power  and  wisdom  may  be 
contemplated  with  confidence  ”  (4.  647,  648).  God  has  come 
to  us  in  Jesus,  as  the  Temple  of  God  (1.  203),  through  the  in¬ 
carnation.  In  him  alone  is  God  to  be  known  (202). 

This  is  the  great  revelation  of  God  to  us  :  his  love  and  right¬ 
eousness  are  revealed  in  Christ  (1.  140).  This,  to  speak  pre¬ 
cisely,  embraces  two  ideas:  Christ  dwells  in  us  (4.  328,  3,  8), 
as  a  “counsel  of  example,”  and,  through  his  sacraments,  an 
“  aid  of  grace  ”(1.77).  In  the  former  aspect,  his  zeal  for  our 
salvation  inspires  our  zeal  for  the  same.2  He  still  lives  in 
his  followers,  and  incites  them  to  all  good.  The  kingdom 
in  which  Christ  reigns  is  the  church  (4.  85).  “And  thus- 


1  It  harmonizes  with  the  emphasis  thus  laid  upon  the  humanity  of  Jesus 
that  Luther  even  held  it  permissible  to  speak  of  him  as  exercising  faith. 
(4.  267). 

2  This  idea  appears  to  be  related  to  that  of  Biel,  that  Christ  is  only 
the  partial  cause  of  our  salvation  (4.  596,  645). 


EARLY  VIEWS  OF  LUTHER. 


2  31 


it  truly  comes  to  pass,  that  the  life  of  Christ  does  not  lie  quiet 
in  his  believing  follower,  because  it  has  never  lain  quiet,  but 
always  lives  and  acts.  ...  We  do  not  live,  speak  and  act,  but 
Christ  lives,  acts  and  speaks  in  us ;  because  what  we  do  and  say 
is  accomplished  by  his  acting  within  us  and  impelling  us  ’  ’ 
(4.  646).  No  law  is  able  to  transform  the  will  and  make  it 
good ;  but  the  life  of  Christ  effects  this,  moving  our  will  to 
imitation  (4.  646  ;  1.  121).  The  Christ  in  us  is  not  idle,  but 
most  active  (1.  140).  But  it  is  only  one  aspect  of  the  work  of 
Christ  that  is  thus  described.  The  same  Christ  has  also  fulfilled 
the  law  for  us,  endured  for  us  the  wrath  of  God  and  death,  and 
overcome  the  devil  (1.  35,  59  ;  4.  609).  He  is  our  righteous¬ 
ness  (1.  171,  140;  3.  174),  and  his  merits  are  imputed  to  us 
by  God  (1.  140).  “Thou,  Lord  Jesus,  art  my  righteousness, 
but  I  am  thy  sin  ;  thou  hast  assumed  mine  and  given  thine  to 
me ;  thou  hast  assumed  what  thou  wast  not.  .  .  .  Therefore 
not  except  in  him,  by  sincere  despair  of  thyself  and  thy  works, 
canst  thou  find  peace  ”  (De  W.,  1.  17).  Christ’s  blood  cleanses 
us  (1.  189,  12 1).  He  is  the  hen,  under  whose  wings  we  find 
rest  and  peace  (1.  31,  35,  117).  “  Now  henceforth  our  God 

is  no  more  the  exactor  of  righteousness  and  the  judge,  but  he  is 
through  his  pity  a  saving  (power)  within  us”  (4.  609).  He 
does  not  simply  causally  work  our  righteousness,  te  for  that  is 
dead,  yea  it  is  never  given,  unless  Christ  himself  is  also  present  ’  ’ 
(1. 219). 

These  are  the  permanent,  fundamental  features  of  Luther’s 
Christology  and  Soteriology.  The  historical  Jesus  is  the  revela- 
tion  of  God.  In  the  love  of  Christ  his  divinity  is  revealed  ;  but 
the  power  of  the  latter  he  conceals.  The  Christian  experiences 
Christ  as  a  present  and  active  reality  in  his  life.  Christ  hereby 
becomes  an  active  force  within  him,  both  as  the  law  and  pattern 
of  goodness  setting  him  free  to  do  good  and  making  him  capable 
of  doing  it,  and  as  the  righteousness  transferred  from  him  to  us. 
Christ’s  fellowship  with  us  brings  us  both  a  new  life  and  the  for¬ 
giveness  of  sins ;  it  makes  us  good  both  in  the  real  and  in  the 
ideal  sense  of  the  word.  This  leads  us  to  consider  the  con¬ 
ception  of  grace  and  the  subjective  forms  of  the  blessings  it 
confers. 

4.  According  to  the  traditional  dogmatics,  the  activity  of 
grace  is  two- fold,  embracing  the  infusion  of  new  powers  and  the 
forgiveness  of  sins.  This  must  be  borne  in  mind  if  we  would 
understand  Luther  correctly.  When  guilt  has  been  removed, 
sickness  must  be  replaced  by  health  (3.  453  ;  i.  65,  68,  43,  84  : 
justificante  et  imputante') .  The  infusion  of  grace  is  not  a  mo¬ 
mentary  act,  so  that  at  once  all  grace  is  given  and  all  sin  blotted 


232 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


out.  That  idea  leads  to  despair,  as  Luther  had  learned  in  his 
own  experience  (i.  43).  “The  infusio  is  an  interior  illumi- 
nation  of  the  mind  and  inflammation  of  the  will  .  .  .  this  is  neces¬ 
sary  for  the  extirpation  of  concupiscence,  until  it  shall  be  perfectly 
extirpated  ”  (1.  66).  It  brings  the  “  good-will  directed  straight 
toward  God,  seeking  God  alone  ”  (1.  19 1),  and  it  infuses  love 
(1.115;  4.250).  As  Christ  was  conceived  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  so 
every  Christian  is  through  love  born  anew  andjustified  by  the  Holy 
Ghost  (3.  468).  It  purifies  us  :  “  But  that  purification  {purgatio) 
is  a  work  of  God  and  an  infusion  of  grace,  a  justification  with¬ 
out  us  ’  ’  ( sine  nobis ,  1.  118).  It  washes  and  purifies  us  continu¬ 
ally  (1.  186,  189).  The  essential  factor  in  the  righteousness 
infused  by  grace  is  faith.  “Faith  is  righteousness”  (1.  118, 
84).  It  is  frojn  God,  who  gives  the  true,  fundamentally  good 
righteousness,  which  is  the  faith  of  Christ  (1.  213).  To  pray 
for  faith  is  the  same  as  to  pray  for  life  or  righteousness  (4.  325). 
When  God,  therefore,  graciously  “begets  and  creates”  the 
new  man,  i.  e.,  works  righteousness  in  him  (1.  215  ;  3.  154) 
through  the  Holy  Spirit  (1.  218),  this  righteousness  consists  not 
so  much  in  works,  as  in  hope,  love,  and  especially  faith  (1.84).  So 
little  does  this  appear  to  depend  upon  the  inward  state,  that  Luther 
traces  it  to  a  divine  covenant :  “  Faith  and  grace,  by  which  we 
are  to-day  justified,  would  not  of  themselves  justify  us  unless  a 
covenant  of  God  caused  them  to  do  so  ”  (3.  289),1  i.  e.,  that 
he  who  believes  and  is  baptized  shall  be  saved  (Mk.  16.  16). 

This  presentation  of  the  subject  runs  entirely  within  the  lines 
of  medieval  theology.  But  Luther’s  new  definition  of  faith 
leads  us  further.  What  is  faith,  and  how  does  it  originate?  We 
recall  the  fact  that  the  accepted  dogmatic  scheme  found  place  for 
an  acquired  faith  in  addition  to  the  infused  faith ,  and  that  the 
later  Scholasticism  laid  special  stress  upon  the  former  (supra,  p. 
150,  195). 2  “When  thou  hearest  that  he  suffered  for  thee, 
and  believest,  there  springs  up  already  confidence  toward  him  and 
tender  love,  and  thus  perishes  all  love  of  (other)  things  as  use¬ 
less,  and  there  arises  a  passionate  regard  for  Christ  alone  as  the 

1  This  is  a  Scotist  idea.  Thus  Luther  occasionally  declares  of  every  human 
preparation  for  receiving  grace,  that  the  latter  is  given,  not  through  such  pre¬ 
paration,  but  by  virtue  of  a  divine  covenant  (4.  329). 

2  The  Scotist  criticism  prepared  the  way  for  this  (p.  150,  159  f. ).  We  can 
understand  the  advance  of  Luther  from  the  position  held  by  Duns,  although 
Luther  rejected  the  self-acquired  faith  as  a  work  of  man  himself  in  favor  of  the 
infused  faith  (vid.  $  67,  5)!  And,  similarly,  the  new  conception  of  grace  may 
be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  gratia  creata  first  recedes  behind  the  gratia 
increata  (p.  1 18  f. ),  and  then  makes  way  for  the  latter.  It  follows  that  the 
imputed  grace  crowds  the  infused  from  the  field.  Here,  too,  Duns  performed 
some  preparatory  work  (p.  160). 


EARLY  VIEWS  OF  LUTHER. 


233 


One  Thing  necessary,  and  there  remains  to  thee  nothing  save 
Jesus  only,  he  alone  enough  and  sufficient  for  thee,  so  that  de¬ 
spairing  of  all  things  thou  hast  this  Only  One,  in  whom  thou 
hopest  for  all  things,  and,  therefore,  lovest  him  above  all 
things.  But  Jesus  is  the  one  true  and  only  God  whom  when 
thou  hast,  thou  hast  no  strange  God”  (i.  399  f. ).  This  is  a 
faith  wrought  by  God,  but  yet  inwardly  acquired  and  experienced 
— a  faith  alive  and  practical,  the  experience  ( experimentum )  of 
despairing  of  self  in  order  to  allow  one’s  self  to  be  led  by  God 
alone  (1.  88). 1  This  faith,  as  it  springs  from  the  contemplation 
and  experiencing  of  Christ,  “  consists  more  in  taking  from  God 
than  in  giving,  more  in  longing  than  in  having,  more  in  becom¬ 
ing  than  in  being  pious  ”  ( 1 .  212).  But  since  the  Christian  recog¬ 
nizes  that  all  his  blessings  come  from  God,  he  gains  confidence 
in  him  (1.  74  ff. ).  “  His  whole  life  is  a  trusting,  depending, 

waiting,  hoping,  in  God”  (1.  210).  “And  hence  faith  takes 
away  from  us  ourselves  and  the  things  that  are  ours,  referring  all 
things  to  God  with  praise  and  gratitude  ”  (1.  123).  Faith  is  a 
‘  ‘  possession  of  things  hoped  for  ”  (4.  271).  This  faith  is,  there¬ 
fore,  upon  the  one  hand,  the  entreating,  struggling  faith  of  Au¬ 
gustine  (Vol.  I.,  p.  347);  but  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  some¬ 
thing  more,  i.  e. ,  the  apprehending  of  God  in  Christ  and  trust  in 
God.  Its  essential  content  is  Christ  (1.  219);  what  is  his,  be¬ 
comes  ours  ;  there  fs  between  us  and  him  a  perfection  matrimo- 
nium  (1.  104).  This  leads  to  the  new  conception  of  grace.  The 
actions  resulting  from  the  infused  love  find  a  filling  out  of  their 
imperfection  in  the  fullness  of  Christ,  “  because  the  fullness  of 
Christ  is  accepted  instead  of  it,  until  it  is  also  made  perfect  ’  ’ 
(1.  1 15):  not  only  thus,  however,  but  in  the  comprehensive 
sense,  that  without  any  regard  to  any  beginnings  of  subjective 
righteousness,  the  righteousness  of  Christ  alone  is  our  righteous¬ 
ness  :  “  That  the  Father  in  his  mercy  imputes  to  us  the  right¬ 
eousness  of  his  Son  ”  (1.  140).  Thus  sin  is  no  more  imputed 
to  us,  but  forgiven  (1.  86).  Lust  remains  in  us.  “It  is  here, 
but  God  in  grace  does  not  impute  it  to  us  ”( 1.  168).  “  For  to 

such  an  one  he  does  not  impute  sin,  because  he  imputes  right¬ 
eousness  to  him”  (3.  175).  But  this  righteousness  is  mine 
only  in  so  far  as  I  accept  it.  “For  his  mercy  is  my  righteous¬ 
ness.  .  .  .  For  what  is  mercy,  if  I  do  not  accept  it  ?  .  .  .  But 
my  righteousness  signifies  that  I  am  accepted  by  the  One  showing 
mercy  ”  (3.  43).  But  this  comes  to  pass  through  faith. 

This  is  Luther’s  Soteriology  in  its  first  form.  Two  lines  of 


1  This  does  not  conflict  with  the  fact  that  outward  perception  and  recogni¬ 
tion  of  this  faith  are  still  excluded  (he  does  not  see  nor  experience  it,  1.  102). 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


2  34 

thought  pervade  it.  God  infuses  grace,  i.  e .,  faith  and  love; 
he  makes  us  righteous.  But  since  faith  is  regarded  as  a  confi¬ 
dence  in  the  revelation  of  God  inwardly  acquired,  it  may  also  be 
said,  that  faith  lays  hold  on  Christ  and  thereby  also  upon  the 
righteousness,  or  forgiveness  of  sins,  which  exists  in  him  and  is 
imputed  to  us.  The  gratia  infusa  is  here  supplanted  by  the 
Christ  living  and  acting  within  us.  It  is  no  longer  the  sacra¬ 
ments — Luther  very  seldom  mentions  them  in  this  connection — 
but  the  word  concerning  Christ  which  produces  the  result.  But 
this  Christ  is  “  most  active  ”  within  us  (1.  140)  ;  and,  although 
the  righteousness  of  faith  is  not  given  to  us  on  account  of  our 
works,  yet  it  is  given  to  enable  us  to  perform  works  ( ad  opera , 
1.  1 19).  It  may  be  said:  “  For  righteousness  is  from  God, 
since,  when  we  are  righteous,  it  is  because  God  justifies  and  im¬ 
putes  ”  (1.  84). 

5.  The  religious  processes  above  traced  are  actualized  in  expe¬ 
rience  in  connection  with  the  observance  of  the  Sacrament  of  Re¬ 
pentance.  Let  us  glance  at  Luther’s  view  of  that  sacrament. 
Contrition  springs  from  meditation  upon  the  blessings  conferred 
by  God  and  upon  our  ingratitude  as  revealed  by  our  sins  :  “  All 
these  things  reflected  upon  and  compared  with  our  own  sins  won¬ 
derfully  stir  up  hatred  and  detestation  of  ourselves,  but  love  and 
praise  of  God.”  But  this  penitence  arises  from  love  to  God  and 
to  righteousness  (1.  99;  cf.  supra,  136  n.  3,  175).  “This  con¬ 
trition  must  be  so  brought  about  {paranda )  that  it  may  proceed, 
not  so  much  from  hatred  as  from  love  ”  (1.  446).  But  neither 
the  completeness  of  this  contrition  nor  confession  following  it 
imparts  the  certainty  of  forgiveness,  which  comes  to  us  only 
through  faith  :  “  Simply  believe  the  word  which  the  priest  utters 
in  absolution,  that  the  absolution  may  be  based  upon  neither  his 
merit  nor  thine  own  ”  ( 1 .  1 3 1 ) .  The  true  satisfaction  is  that 
required  in  Lk.  3.  8:  it  is  a  “service  of  the  whole  Christian 
life.”  Where  private  confession  and  satisfaction  are  taught  in 
the  Bible,  Luther  does  not  know  (1.  98).  Through  them  we 
cannot  secure  any  righteousness,  but  only  through  faith  (1.  102). 
He  regards  indulgences  with  suspicion.  If  no  one  can  be  sure 
of  the  contrition  of  another  person,  it  is  mere  trifling  to  main¬ 
tain  that  a  soul  escapes  from  purgatory  through  indulgences  ;  for 
if  the  individual  concerned  had  not  true  contrition,  the  indul¬ 
gence  would  not  secure  his  pardon  (1.  66).  Moreover,  the 
grace  imparted  impels  us  to  perseverance  in  the  self-mortifica¬ 
tions  of  repentance,  so  that  the  true  Christian  does  not  desire 
any  indulgence  (1.  68). 

6.  It  is  to  be  observed,  finally,  that  upon  other  points 
Luther  is  during  this  period  very  conservative.  The  worship 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  235 

of  Mary  and  the  saints,1  the  seven  sacraments,  transub- 
stantiation,  the  mass,  and  the  infallibility  of  the  church  are 
still  maintained.  He  has  no  idea  of  assailing  them  (vid.  Kost- 
lin,  L.  Theol.  i.  221  ff. ,  Engl,  transl.  i.  200  f. ) ;  but  it  may 
be  observed  that  the  elements  of  his  later  conception  of  the 
church  may  be  found  already  in  his  writings.  The  church  is  the 
City  of  God.  4  ‘  It  is  built,  not  by  human  teachings  or  works, 
but  by  the  word  and  grace  of  God  alone’’  (1.  202  ;  4.  400). 
It  is  the  summary  of  the  works  of  God,  or  the  new  creation 
(3.  1 54). 2 *  But  since  the  church  is  thus  the  work  of  God,  or  of 
his  word,  its  essence  is  invisible  and  perceptible  only  by  faith  : 
“Because  the  church  is  a  labor  and  construction  ( opera  et 
factura')  of  Christ,  it  does  not  outwardly  appear  to  be  anything, 
but  its  whole  structure  is  internal,  invisible  before  God ;  and 
thus  they  are  known,  not  to  the  carnal  eyes,  but  to  the  spiritual 
in  the  mind  and  in  faith  ’ ’  (4.  81  ;  3.  154,  367). 

7.  Everywhere,  beneath  the  old  forms  the  new  life  was  swell¬ 
ing.  Let  us  once  more  recall  the  leading  features  of  the  latter  : 
The  recognition  of  man’s  moral  bondage;  the  new  apprehension 
of  the  humanity  of  Jesus  as  the  absolute  revelation  of  God  ;  the 
conception  of  faith  as  a  laying  hold  upon  Christ,  together  with 
trust  in  God ;  the  thought  of  Christ  working  in  us ;  the  idea  of  the 
righteousness  of  Christ  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins  graciously 
attributed  to  us.  It  is  a  new  understanding  of  religion  which 
finds  expression  in  these  views,  however  all  the  elements  of  the 
past — the  ancient  dogmas,  the  Augustinian  apprehension  of  sin 
and  grace,  the  criticism  of  the  scholastic  and  pre-reformation 
eras,  the  mystic  attempts  to  mount  from  the  man  Jesus  to  God, 
with  their  doctrine  of  the  indwelling  of  Christ — may  have  pre¬ 
pared  the  way  before  it. 

§67-  Criticism  of  the  Sacrament  of  Repentance  and  Exposition 
of  Evangelical  Repentance.  Faith,  Sin ,  Grace ,  Justifica- 
tion ,  Atonement. 

1.  “The  right  way  and  the  proper  manner,  than  which  no 
other  is  to  be  found,  is  the  most  worthy,  gracious,  holy  sacrament 
of  repentance”  (W.  2.  715).  “  But  I,  a  poor  brother,  have 

kindled  a  new  fire,  and  have  bitten  a  great  hole  in  the  pope’s 
pocket,  by  attacking  confession”  (W.  8.  340).  The  central 
point  in  Luther’s  work  lay  in  the  abolition  of  the  sacrament  of  re- 

1  E.  g. ,  4.  694  :  “  And  thus  the  divine  Virgin  holds  the  medium  between 
Christ  and  other  men,”  with  reference  to  her  conception. 

2  The  communio  sanctorum  et  bonorum  (4.  401)  is  to  be  interpreted  in 

the  neuter  gender. 


236 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


pentance  and  the  substitution  for  it  of  the  new  conception  of  faith 
and  justification.  This  must  also  be  our  starting-point.  In  the  95 
Theses  (A.D.  1517)  we  find  the  traditional  view  of  the  sacrament 
of  repentance,  as  well  as  some  echo  of  the  criticism  of  the  preced¬ 
ing  period  and  of  Luther’s  own  evangelical  views.  ( a )  Luther 
does  not  here  assail  indulgences  as  such.  They  are  to  be  highly 
esteemed  (Th.  69,  38,  7,  71),  and  he  proposes  to  combat  only 
the  abuses  connected  with  them  (72).  The  pardoning  power  of 
the  pope  can  extend  only  to  the  canonical  penalties  imposed  by 
himself,  and  not  to  every  penalty  (5,  20,  21,  34).  As  regards 
the  dead,  they  are  valid  only  in  the  way  of  supplication  (26). 
The  forgiveness  of  sins  has  in  his  view  only  a  declarative  force 
(38,  76,  6).  The  thesaurus  of  the  church  is  not  to  be  found  in 
the  merits  of  Christ  and  of  the  saints,  as  these  are  effectual  with¬ 
out  the  pope  (58);  but  “  the  keys  of  the  church  bestowed  through 
the  merit  of  Christ”  constitute  it.  (h)  But  this  is  not  in 
the  present  day  the  character  of  indulgences.  The  indulgence- 
preachers  are  in  many  ways  responsible  for  the  abuses,  as  if  souls 
were  freed  from  purgatory  as  soon  as  the  money  rattles  in 
the  chest  (27,  28,  86),  and  as  though  the  certainty  of  salvation 
may  be  purchased  (52,  30-32).  Good  works  appear  to  be  no 
longer  necessary.  It  might  be  asked  why  the  pope  does  not 
employ  his  power  to  empty  purgatory  (82,  84),  and  why 
he  does  not  spend  his  own  money  to  build  St.  Peter’s  (86). 
The  church  is  being  exposed  to  ridicule  (90).  (<r)  Our  Lord 

and  Master  Jesus  Christ,  by  saying  :  Repent,  intended  that  the 
whole  life  of  believers  should  be  repentance  ( 1 ) .  This  is  not 
said,  of  course,  with  reference  to  the  sacramental  acts,  but  to  the 
mortifications  of  the  flesh  and  the  hatred  of  self  (2-4).  In  this 
sense,  the  penalty  ( poena')  of  sin  remains  as  long  as  we  live  on 
earth  (4).  But  if  this  self-mortification  is  a  duty,  then  the  true 
penitent  will  prefer  the  penalties,  i.  e.,  the  works  of  love, 
to  indulgences  (40,  41,  43,  44).  But  he  cannot  by  these  means 
gain  a  consciousness  of  forgiveness.  “  Every  truly  contrite 
Christian  has  plenary  remission  of  penalty  and  guilt  due  him, 
even  without  letters  of  pardon  (36);  and  he  has  this  through  his 
participation  in  Christ  and  the  treasurers  of  the  church  (37). 
The  hierarchy  cannot  pardon  the  least  sin  as  to  its  guilt  (7 6); 
there  belongs  to  it  only  the  declaration  of  that  which  God  does 
(38).  Therefore,  God  alone  forgives  the  guilt  of  sin  ;  but  the 
penitent  exercises  himself  in  good  works.  Indulgences  are  not 
necessary.  They  are  indeed  dangerous,  in  so  far  as  they  may  by 
outward  means  make  the  sinner  feel  secure,  and  in  so  far  as  they 
give  to  him  something  which  is  altogether  uncertain.  If  scarcely 
anyone  is  certain  of  his  contritio ,  how  much  less  of  the  attain- 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  237 

ment  of  plenaria  reniissio?  (30-32).  He  who  has  not  money  in 
superabundance  need  pay  out  nothing  for  indulgences  (46). 

Such  are  the  Theses.  They  are  less  energetic  than  many  criti¬ 
cisms  of  earlier  date  (supra,  p.  210).  But  yet — carried  to  their 
logical  conclusions — they  leave  very  little  remaining  of  the  sac¬ 
rament  of  repentance.  The  contrite  sinner  secures  forgiveness 
— it  is  taught  with  Augustine — to  what  end  does  he  then  need 
confession  and  absolution  ?  Works  are  moral  exercises  :  then 
indulgences,  and  works  of  satisfaction  as  well,  have  no  ground 
to  stand  upon.  As  indicated  in  the  first  Thesis,  the  repentance 
which  fills  the  whole  life  occupies  for  Luther  the  central  place, 
and  no  longer  the  sacrament  of  repentance.1  Cf.  Dieckhoff, 
Der  Ablass-streit,  1886.  Bratke,  L.’s  95  Thesen,  1884.  Brie- 
ger,  Das  Wesen  d.  Ablasses  .  .  .  mit  Riicksicht  auf  L.  ’s  Thesen 
(Lpz.  Progr.  1897). 

2.  Luther’s  utterances  in  the  following  years  develop  these 
ideas  in  both  their  positive  and  their  negative  aspects.  The 
essence  of  repentance  consists  in  Contritio.  (<z)  But  true  con¬ 
trition  is  secured  by  the  contemplation  of  righteousness,  which 
begets  in  us  love  for  the  good,  and,  through  this,  sorrow  for  our 
sins  (W.  1.  319).  “  But  this  contrition  is  to  be  produced  in  such 

a  way  that  it  may  proceed,  not  so  much  from  hatred  as  from  love. 
But  it  proceeds  from  love,  ...  if  a  man  reflects  with  himself 
upon  the  benefits  of  God  conferred  upon  him  throughout  his 
whole  life.  .  .  .  All  these  things,  reflected  upon  and  compared 
with  our  own  sins,  wonderfully  stir  up  hatred  and  detestation  of 
ourselves,  but  love  and  praise  of  God  ”  (W.  1.  466).  The  op¬ 
posite  course  is  most  vigorously  rejected.  He  who  determines  to 
attain  sorrow  for  sin  simply  by  the  contemplation  of  it,  becomes 
a  hypocrite,  and  is  sorry  only  from  fear  of  punishment.  He 
really  gets  no  further  than  attrition  (ib.  319,  also  W.  2.  160  fi, 
421,  363,  368;  6.  160,  610.  Cf.  E.  31.  182,  183;  18.  6). 2 
An  actual  penitent  frame  of  mind  can  thus,  according  to  Luther, 
be  induced  only  upon  the  basis  of  positive  love  for  the  good, 

1  In  this  consists  the  historical  significance  of  the  first  Thesis  :  all  depends, 
not  upon  the  sacramental  acts,  but  upon  the  penitent  disposition  of  the  heart. 
This  introduction  follows  the  example  of  the  medieval  discussions  of  the  sub¬ 
ject,  which  open  with  a  presentation  of  the  virtue  of  repentance.  Particularly 
in  Duns,  the  sacramental  acts  are  really  only  means  for  promoting  repentance  as 
a  self-mortification  dominating  the  whole  Christian  life.  Vid.  my  discussion 
of  Duns’  doctrine  of  repentance  in  Abhandl.  f.  Alex.  v.  Oettingen,  p.  172  ff. 

2  The  last  two  passages  prove  that  Luther  in  writings  of  the  years  1530  and 
1 5 37  could  advocate  exactly  the  same  views  as  in  his  tract,  De poenitentia ,  of 
the  year  1518.  But  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance,  that  he  here  denies 
entirely  the  possibility  of  begetting  contrition  before  the  reception  of  grace. 
His  own  conflicts  in  the  cloister  therefore  fall  under  the  head  of  attrition. 


238 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


which  measures  its  own  conduct  by  the  good,  and  not  by  the  pre¬ 
sentation  of  duties  and  penalties.  But  it  is  important  to  scruti¬ 
nize  the  theological  connection  of  this  thought.  It  was  clearly 
expressed  by  Luther  at  the  Leipzig  disputation  (1519):  All  the 
Scholastics,  he  maintains,  agree  with  him,  “since  they  all  agree 
that  contrition  ought  to  be  produced  {fieri)  in  love,  .  .  .  that 
contrition  is  produced,  love  impelling  and  enjoining”  (W.  2. 
263,  364,  371,  422). 1  This  is,  in  fact,  correct,  for  contrition  is 
an  act  “  formed  by  love  (p.  135 ).2  But  it  must  be  said  at  the 
same  time  :  ( 1 )  That  this  love  presupposes  faith —  for  such  is  the 
traditional  relation — and  (2)  That  Luther  is  not  here  thinking 
primarily  of  the  empirical  beginning  of  conversion.  It  is  not  to  be 
denied,  however,  that  Luther,  during  the  years  of  the  indulgence 
controversy,  not  infrequently  made  even  the  initial  penitence  of 
the  Christian  life  dependent  upon  faith  and  love  :  ‘  ‘  The  great 
thing  is  a  heart  contrite  from  nothing  else  than  faith  ardently  re¬ 
garding  the  divine  promise  and  threatening,  which,  beholding 
the  immutable  truth  of  God,  alarms,  terrifies,  and  thus  makes 
contrite  the  conscience — again  exalts  and  consoles  and  keeps  it 
contrite,  so  that  the  truth  of  the  threatening  is  the  cause  of  the 
contrition,  and  the  truth  of  the  promise  the  cause  of  the  conso¬ 
lation  if  it  is  believed,  and  by  this  faith  man  merits  the  forgive¬ 
ness  of  sins”  (W.  6.  545;  1.  542,364).  Thus  faith  produces 
contrition  and  maintains  it.  Not  fear,  but  the  gentle  goodness 
of  God  allures  the  sinner  to  repentance  (W.  2.  362,  363,  370). 
In  the  moment  when  we  hear  that  Christ  suffered  for  us,  faith 
and  love  arise  (W.  1.  399).  Contemplation  of  the  sufferings  of 
Christ  transforms  man,  and  in  them  we  recognize  the  magnitude 
of  our  sin  (W.  1.  137):  “This  contemplating  essentially  trans¬ 
forms  man  and,  very  nearly  like  baptism,  regenerates  him  ”  (ib. 
139).  “  This  faith  justifies  thee,  will  make  Christ  to  dwell,  live, 

and  reign  in  thee”  (ib.  458).  Thus  as  we  contemplate  the 
goodness  of  God  in  Christ,  true  contrition  appears,  while  at  the 
same  time  man  is  preserved  from  despair.”  “When  true  con¬ 
trition  is  about  to  arise  from  the  goodness  and  benefits  of  God, 
especially  from  the  wounds  of  Christ,  so  that  man  first  comes  to 
(a  sense  of)  his  ingratitude  from  the  contemplation  of  the  divine 
goodness,  and  from  that  to  hatred  of  himself  and  love  of  the 

1  Eck  acknowledged  that  this  is  the  higher  position,  hut  that  it  is  one 
which,  on  account  of  frailty,  cannot  be  attained  (W.  2.  361).  Luther  was 
brought  to  his  view  through  Staupitz,  De  W.  1.  116. 

2  If,  then,  grace  produces  this  condition,  Luther  has  a  right  to  say  :  “  It  is, 
therefore,  expressly  Pelagian  heresy  to  say  that  repentance  begins  before  love 
of  righteousness  ;  but  love  of  righteousness  is  from  God,  and  not  from  nature  ” 
(W.  2.  421,  362). 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT. 


239 


goodness  of  God,  then  tears  flow,  and  he  will  heartily  hate  him¬ 
self,  but  without  despair,  since  he  will  hate  his  sin,  not  on  ac¬ 
count  of  its  penalty,  but  on  account  of  his  view  of  the  goodness 
of  God  which,  being  beheld,  preserves  him  that  he  may  not  de¬ 
spair,  and  may  hate  himself  ardently,  even  with  delight  ”  ( i . 
5 7 6) . 1  Thus  God  crushes  the  sinner’s  heart  by  showing  him 
favor.2  But  in  that  perturbation  ( conturbatione )  begins  salva¬ 
tion  (540).  But  “the  grace  of  contrition  is  given  to  no  one, 
but  at  the  same  time  the  merits  of  Christ  are  given  to  him  ’  ’ 
(612).  This  great  unrest  is  the  beginning  of  grace  (595). 
Contrition  lasts — as  habitualis  poenitentia — through  the  whole 
life  (322,  652),  being  experienced  daily  (W.  2.  160,  408,  409  b 
E.  29.  357).  Repentance  in  this  sense  can  certainly  not  be 
identified  with  the  temporal  acts  of  the  sacrament  of  repentance 
(W.  1.  531  ;  8.  109).  “Because  this  is  at  length  to  exercise 
living  and  true  repentance,  to  separate  the  heart  from  vices  for 
God’s  sake,  and  to  keep  it  separated  and  to  separate  it  the  more. 
But  thou  who  dost  practice  only  that  sacramental  repentance  and 
initial  repentance  before  the  eyes  of  men,  whose  fervor  and  tumult 
cannot  last  without  a  miracle,  thou  hast  devised  an  impossibility  ’  ’ 
(1.  649  f. ).  The  meaning  is  here,  that  love  of  the  good  springs 
up  simultaneously  with  faith  in  the  heart.  The  divine  benefits, 
together  with  the  good  now  ardently  desired,  beget  in  us  shame 
and  grief  on  account  of  the  sins  yet  clinging  to  us.  To  this  is 
now  added  the  law,  which,  as  the  standard  of  the  good,  “  co¬ 
operates  in  giving  a  knowledge  of  sin,  but  in  no  way  effects  pen¬ 
itence.  ”  “I  concede  that  the  law,  the  recounting  of  sins,  the 
contemplation  of  penalties,  can  terrify  the  sinner ;  but  they  never 
make  him  penitent  ”  (W.  2.  362).  The  Commentary  on  Gala¬ 
tians  already  lays  very  great  stress  upon  this  influence  of  the  law. 
It  is  said  to  teach  man  to  know  his  weakness  and  his  wrong,  to 
show  us  the  good.  It  can,  indeed,  never  awaken  in  us  a  desire 
for  the  good,  but  only  increase  the  desire  for  evil  (2.  526  f. ); 
but  it  even  in  this  way  drives  us  to  Christ  (528).3  This  is  the 

1  The  endurance  of  the  pains  of  hell  ( W.  1.  557.  Cf.  E.  12.  387  ;  De  W.  2. 
125)  is  thus  excluded  as  an  abnormal  experience;  cf.  Gottschick,  Ztschr.  f. 
Theol.  u.  K.,  1891,  255  ff. 

2  lb.  “But  then  (at  the  infusion  of  grace)  the  man  is  so  ignorant  of  his 
justification  that  he  thinks  himself  to  be  very  near  to  damnation,  and  does  not 
think  this  to  be  an  infusion  of  grace,  but  an  infusion  of  wrath.” 

3  Hence  the  law  makes  no  one  pious,  but  teaches  only  the  outward  piety  of 
hypocrisy, W.  6.  353  f.  W.  2.  720  suggests  a  further  use  of  the  law  :  “  But  the 
hard-hearted,  who  do  not  yet  desire  comfort  of  the  conscience,  and  who  have 
not  experienced  the  same  torture,  to  them  the  sacrament  (of  repentance)  is  of 
no  benefit.  They  must  first  be  made  tender  and  timid,  that  they  may  also  long 
for  and  seek  this  comfort  of  the  sacrament.”  The  method  of  threatening  must 
thus,  after  all,  be  employed  in  dealing  with  such  as  are  still  impenitent. 


240 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


true  childlike  fear  of  God,  even  though  something  of  servile 
fear  (timor  servilis')  may  yet  ever  cleave  to  it  throughout  life  on 
earth  (  VV .  i .  3  2 1  f. ) .  “  Love  being  possessed,  man  is  at  the  same 
time  moved  to  the  fear  of  God,  and  thus  repentance  begins  from 
fear  in  love”  (W.  2.  364,  369,  396).  There  thus  arises  an  ex¬ 
ultant  hatred  of  sin  (1.  543),  faith  meanwhile  restraining  from 
despair  (632).  Thus  repentance,  both  as  a  state  of  life  and  as 
the  beginning  of  life,  is  a  fruit  of  faith  and  love,  however  much 
the  law  may  contribute  to  its  production. 

This  repentance  now  begets  in  the  heart  a  positive  desire  to 
perform  good  works.  The  man  is  willing  to  bear  the  penalties 
(W.  1.  597);  impelled  by  the  Spirit  and  the  Christ  dwelling 
within,  he  brings  forth  fruits  of  repentance  (1.  532,  649,  364 ; 
2.  424). 1  ( b )  Luther  at  an  early  period  recognized  the  im¬ 

possibility  of  confessing  all  mortal  sins  (W.  1.  322;  2.  60;  6. 
162,  545).  The  thought  then  soon  occurred  to  him,  that  we 
are  really  under  obligation  to  confess  our  sins  only  to  God  (W. 
6.  158  f. ),  and  that  the  confession  required  by  the  church  is  only 
a  human  ordinance  (8.  152  f. ).  Hence  we  can  confess  to  whom¬ 
soever  we  will ;  we  are  even  free  to  omit  confession  to  man  al¬ 
together,  if  we  but  confess  to  God  (8.  161,  182,  175,  181.  E. 
28.  248,  308;  29.  353;  10.401;  23.  86  f. ).  From  this  posi¬ 
tion  Luther  never  wavered,  although  he  always  warmly  com¬ 
mended  voluntary  private  confession  (8.  168,  173,  176,  178; 
6.  546.  E.  23.  26  f.;  28.  249,  250,  308). 2  Absolution  is 
to  be  received  in  faith.  In  so  far  as  we,  in  receiving  it,  believe 
the  divine  promise,  it  is  effectual  (W.  1.  595).  “  Thy  sins  are 

forgiven,  if  thou  believest  them  forgiven  ”  (ib.  631,  542).  It 
is  faith  in  the  institution  of  absolution  by  Christ  which  is  here 
meant  (W.  2.  14,  59).  Everything  depends  upon  this  faith  : 
“  It  depends  not  upon  the  priest,  not  on  thy  doing,  but  entirely 
upon  thy  faith  ;  as  much  as  thou  believest,  so  much  thou  hast  *  ’ 
(2.  719,  715).  Luther  still,  indeed,  at  first  understands  thisfin 
the  Catholic  way:  Grace  and  faith  are  infused  (1.  364),  and 
forgiveness  results  from  the  infusion :  4  ‘  Remission  of  guilt 

occurs  through  the  infusion  of  grace  before  the  remission  of  the 
priest”  (1.  541). 3  But  the  essential  thing  is,  after  all,  only  that 


L 


1  In  view  of  this  connection,  Luther  laments  that  works  no  longer,  as  of  old, 
precede  absolution,  since  the  sincerity  of  the  contrition  would  thus  be  tested, 
W.  1.  551,  661. 

2  In  A.  D.  1519  he  demands  that,  together  with  the  “testing”  of  the 
penitence,  faith  be  also  tested  ( W.  2.  720  ;  cf.  the  severe  arraignment  of  the 
confessional  manuals,  6.  163,  and  E.  15.  469  f. ;  22.  3),  and  similarly  in  1526 
(E.  29.  358  ;  cf.  11.  185.  Conf.  Aug.  24.  6  :  “But  none  are  admitted  unless 
they  have  previously  been  examined  ” ). 

3  Cf.  W.  1.  542  :  Remission  effects  ( operatur )  the  grace  of  God  ;  543  : 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT. 


241 


the  word  be  believed ;  and  to  this  end  there  is  no  need  of  the 
ecclesiastical  machinery. 

(V)  Satisfaction  cannot  be  shown  to  be  commanded  by  God 
(W.  1.  324,  383;  6.  610).  The  same  is  to  be  said  of  Indul¬ 
gences  (1.  384  ff.).1  The  thesaurus  indulgentiarum  is  rejected 
(2.  161).  Luther  for  a  time  adheres  to  the  idea  of  Purgatory, 
despite  some  suspicions  (1.  555,  563  ;  2.  161,  423,  323  f.,  332, 
324  {.;  2.  70  ;  6.  17,  370),  but  at  a  later  period  recognizes  it 
as  an  invention  (<?.  g. ,  11.  362).  Of  the  penalties  of  “  satis¬ 
faction  ’  ’  there  yet  remain  only  moral  works  and  readiness  to 
bear  the  cross.  “  God  changes  eternal  into  temporal  penalty, 
viz.,  that  of  cross-bearing  ”  (W.  2.  161). 

Luther  appears  to  have  preserved  almost  the  entire  structure 
of  the  sacrament  of  repentance.  But  this  is  only  in  appearance. 
Every  separate  part  of  it  is  recast  and  the  structure  as  a  whole 
demolished.  Into  the  place  of  attrition,  or  contrition,  has  come 
that  repentance  which  has  not  to  do  “piece-meal”  with  some 
particular  works,  but  extends  “  over  the  whole  person  with  all 
its  life  and  conduct”  (E.  11.  282),  and  which  springs,  not 
from  slavish  fear,  but  from  love.  Instead  of  the  sacramental  con¬ 
fession,  it  is  required  :  “  This  confession  is  now  so  highly  neces¬ 
sary,  that  it  should  not  be  omitted  for  a  moment,  but  should  be 
precisely  the  whole  life  of  a  Christian  ”  (E.  11.  154).  Accord¬ 
ingly,  every  sermon  becomes  an  absolution  (11.  267).  But  by 
the  side  of  repentance  stands  Faith .  This  element  is  now 
woven  into  the  penitential  process  by  Luther.2  Satisfaction  was 
replaced  by  the  good  works  which  spring  from  faith.  The 
sacrament  of  repentance  as  a  whole  is  therefore  disintegrated.  It 
is  only  “invented  folly  ”  (E.  9.  299  ;  279  f.;  smalc.  aft.  iii., 
3.  313  ff. ).  Into  its  place  comes  the  moral  and  religious  state 
of  evangelical  repentance,  consisting  of  penitence,  faith,  and 
good  works  (E.  10.  401), 3  and  embracing  justification  and  the 
forgiveness  of  sins.  Luther  began  with  criticism  of  the  sacra - 

“  Remission  of  sin  and  donation  of  grace,  to  justify  and  to  heal;”  428: 
“God  showing  mercy  and  infusing.” 

1  Luther  often  ( W.  1 . 587  f. )  declared,  according  to  the  popular  understanding 
of  the  matter,  “  that  they  sold  indulgences  for  the  divine  grace  which  forgives 
sin”  (E.  24.  337  ;  26.  18).  Theologically,  he  thus  expresses  himself :  “In 
all  indulgence  bulls  he  (the  pope)  promises  forgiveness  of  the  sins  of  all  who 
have  mourned  ( bereuet )  and  confessed  {gebeichtet )”  (E.  28.  175;  31. 
141),  who  have  “mourned  and  confessed  and  give  money”  (25.  132).  Eck 
well  expresses  the  doctrine  as  understood  by  the  masses  (W.  2.  352  f.,  359). 

2  A  partial  anticipation  of  this  is  seen  in  the  testing  of  faith  at  the  confes¬ 
sional  toward  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Supra,  p.  174. 

3  Only  penitence  and  faith  are  commonly  spoken  of  as  elements  of  repent; 
ance  (<?.  ^.,E.6.  340;  3.  7 6f.;  11.293,296;  17.  125  ;  19.64;  23.  39),  but  it 
is  clear  that  works  fall  under  the  same  heading. 

16 


242 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


ment  of  repentance,  and  he  substituted  for  it  evangelical  repent¬ 
ance.  Of  a  change  in  his  views  concerning  the  initial  penitence, 
we  shall  speak  in  another  connection. 

We  have  thus  outlined  the  views  of  Luther  at  this  period  upon 
the  topics  of  repentance,  faith,  works,  and  the  pardon  of  sin. 
We  have  yet  to  trace  his  teachings  concerning  sin,  the  relation 
of  law  and  gospel,  and  the  work  of  Christ. 

3.  In  regard  to  Sin  and  the  moral  Bondage  of  the  Will,  he  main¬ 
tained  the  same  positions  which  he  had  taken  in  the  earliest  period 
(supra,  p.  229).  (a)  Before  the  fall,  Adam  was  inclined  only 

to  good  (E.  15.  46).  Since  the  fall,  he  and  all  his  descendants 
are  subject  to  sin.  The  human  race  is  a  massa  perditioms  (W. 
1.  427;  2.  526.  E.  28.  206).  Every  individual  of  the  race  is 
full  of  sins  (W.  1.  427),  his  nature  full  of  lust  (W.  2.  412  f.). 
Human  works  may  appear  outwardly  beautiful,  and  yet  be  mortal 
sins  (W.  1.  353).  Every  sin  is  a  mortal  sin  (W.  2.  416,  419). 
“And  there  is  therefore  included  briefly  and  barely  in  this 
word,  Sin,  what  one  lives  and  does  without  and  outside  of  faith 
in  Christ”  (E.  12.  in).  Sin  constitutes  a  kingdom  of  the 
devil  (W.  2.  96).  Especial  emphasis  is  laid  by  Luther  upon 
original  sin.1  He  proposes  to  defend  Augustine’s  conception  of 
it  against  the  Pelagianism  of  Rome  (W.  1.  272,  649.  E.  11. 
281).  The  Scholastics  of  all  schools,  with  the  single  exception 
of  Gregory  of  Rimini  (supra,  p.  188),  were  Pelagians  (W.  2. 
295  f.,  303,  394  f.,  308). 2  The  danger  of  that  tendency  lies 
in  the  fact  that  it  leads  to  work  righteousness  (E.  14.  245  ;  30. 
365).  This  opposition  forms  the  central  nerve  in  Luther’s 
presentation  of  the  subject.  Through  the  act  of  generation, 
which  is  performed  in  evil  lust,  sin  passes  from  parents  to  their 
children.  It  is  inherited  sin,  or  nature-sin  (E.  19.  15),  as  being 
the  real  chief  sin  (10.  305  ;  15.  49).  As  the  formative 

material  in  father  and  mother  is  corrupt,  it  remains  so  in  the 
children  (E.  11.  246;  19.  15.  W.  2.  167).  From  Adam 
down,  the  nature  and  essence  of  man  is  corrupt  (E.  10.  304; 
46.  67).  Human  nature  is  “an  evilly  disposed  nature”  (E.  7. 
289),  a  “  corrupted  nature  ”  (E.  9.  234;  15.  187;  20.  155), 
a  flesh  poisoned  by  sin  (15.  47  ;  20.  157,  297),  in  which  evil 
lust  reigns  (15.  48;  18.  73).  In  his  doctrine  of  the  “old 
man,”  Luther  however  strongly  emphasizes  the  spiritual,  moral 

1  The  Scotist  definition  :  Want  of  original  righteousness  (E.  15.  46)  does 
not  influence  his  conception.  The  contrast  to  original  sin  is  the  wirkliche 
Sunde  (E.  10.  306),  which  is  simply  a  translation  of peccatu?n  actuale.  Vid. 
also  W.  9.  73,  74  f.,  78. 

2  But  Pelagianism  is  the  ‘  ‘  chief  heresy,”  E.  19,  184.  Upon  Gregory,  see 
Stange,  Neue  kirchliche  Ztschr.,  1900,  574  ff. ;  1902,  721  ff. 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  STN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT. 


243 


side  of  sin.  Its  essence  consists  in  “  blindness  and  wickedness  ’  ’ 
(9.  288),  “  the  despising  of  God,  inborn  inward  impurity  of 
heart,  the  disobeying  of  God’s  will  ”  (12.  m),  “  unbelief,  the 
despising  of  God,  disobedience’’  (9.  15),  but,  above  all,  in 
unbelief,  as  the  “real  chief  sin  ”  (12.  no;  50.  57;  63.  16) 
and  “cause  of  all  sin  and  crime  ”  (13.  158;  47.  54).  “The 
chief  righteousness  is  faith ;  again,  the  chief  wickedness  is 
unbelief”  (12.  178). 1  It  is  just  the  distinguishing  feature  of 
the  “natural  man,”  that  he  has  not  the  Spirit.  Strongly 
as  Luther  emphasizes  the  natural  depravity  of  man,  he  just  as 
positively  recognizes  also  the  ability  of  the  natural  man.  “  The 
natural  light  ’  ’  sustains  the  striving  after  good,  without  indeed 
knowing  the  good  ( 10.  182;  35.  68).  It  may  protect  against 
the  lusts,  but  not  against  lust  (14.  151).  In  secular  affairs,  in 
law  and  order,  reason  judges  very  correctly  (12.  90  f. ,  109), 2 
although  in  spiritual  matters  it  appears  as  the  “  devil’s  strumpet  ” 
(29.  241). 

(<£)  The  consequence  of  natural  depravity  is  the  Bondage  of  the 
Will.  Free-will  is  for  the  non-Christian  only  a  word  (W.  1.  354. 
E.  29.  353). 3  His  will  is  free  only  to  do  evil,  but  not  to  repent 
(W.  1.  359  ;  2.  362,  702.  E.  7.  239,  302).  But  it  is  main¬ 
tained,  on  the  other  hand,  that  no  compulsion  to  either  good  or 
evil  is  exerted  upon  the  will  (W.  1.  365  ;  2.  370).  The  sig¬ 
nificance  which  the  absolute  bondage  of  the  sinner  holds  in 
Luther’s  circle  of  thought  from  the  beginning  explains  his  bitter 
assault  upon  the  De  libero  arbitrio  of  Erasmus.  Luther’s  work, 
De  servo  arbitrio  (1525,  opp.  var.  arg.  7),  reveals  a  fundamen¬ 
tal  difference  from  the  Semipelagianism  of  the  cultured  circles  of 
his  day.4  This  is  not  saying,  however,  that  his  theoretical  sys¬ 
tem  was  an  expression  of  his  fundamental  religious  position.  To 

1  E.  9.  313  gives  a  classification  of  sins  :  If  we  gather  all  sins  upon 
one  heap,  they  fall  into  two  classes,  which  are  the  devil’s  own  work,  namely, 
lies  and  murder. 

2  The  term  Conscience  ( Gewissen )  is  very  often  used  by  Luther  in  the 
general  sense  of  the  moral  consciousness.  As  to  its  nature,  see  W.  8.  606  : 
“  For  conscience  is  not  a  power  ( virtus )  of  working,  but  a  power  of  judging, 
which  judges  concerning  works.  Its  proper  work  is  to  accuse  or  excuse,  to 
make  either  guilty  or  acquitted,  fearful  or  secure.  Wherefore  its  office  is  not 
to  do,  but  to  dictate  concerning  things  done  and  to  be  done ,  which  make  either 
guilty  or  saved,  in  the  sight  of  God.”  Similarly  in  E.  47.  23,  59  ;  18.  58,  22  : 
“If  we  sin  greatly,  our  conscience  gnaws  us,  leaves  us  no  rest;  my  heart 
passes  the  judgment :  I  shall  be  punished  for  this.”  The  medieval  conception 
is  reproduced  in  E.  29.  156:  “The  natural  law,  written  upon  every  man’s 
heart.”  Cf.  supra,  p.  171. 

3  But  see  W.  6.  27  :  “wounded  in  (his)  free  will.” 

4  But  Erasmus’  statement  of  the  question  :  “  Either  free  will  or  physical 
unfreedom  ”  had  an  undue  influence  upon  Luther. 


244 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


the  theory  of  man  as  free  and  determining  his  own  destiny  he- 
opposes  the  almighty,  all-working  will  of  God.  He,  not  man 
himself,  effects  salvation.  But  this  thought  is  enlarged  to  a  met¬ 
aphysical  determinism:  “That  God  works  all  things  in  all 
things.”1  Hence  everything  that  happens,  happens  by  absolute- 
necessity.  This  thought  is,  however,  combined  with  the  Scotist. 
idea  of  the  absolute  independence  of  God’s  will  and  appoint¬ 
ments :  “Because  he  wills,  therefore  what  happens  must  be- 
right  ”  (p.  260).  God  is  also  working  in  the  wicked,  but  it  is 
tjjeir  fault  that  they  do  evil.  It  is  as  when  a  carpenter  cuts  badly 
with  a  sharp  hatchet  (p.  255!.).  Everything  is  the  work  of  God, 
even  the  fall  of  Cain,  although  Luther  does  not  enter  upon  the 
question  of  the  genesis  of  evil  in  the  world.  From  this  follows, 
as  a  logical  consequence,  the  absolute  double  predestination  and 
the  subjugation  of  the  free  will  :  “  With  this  thunderbolt  he 
Hurls  down  and  crushes  the  free  will  to  its  foundations  ’  ’  ( penitus , 
p.  132).  What  we  so  name  is  in  reality  only  the  particular 
form  of  man’s  activity,  which  requires  a  peculiar  divine  energy 
operating  upon  him.  The  will  is  not  coerced,  but  acts  accord¬ 
ing  to  its  own  inclination  and  desire  ;  but  it  attains  to  the  doing 
of  good  only  through  the  divine  action  upon  it.  Man  is  passive 
in  his  relation  to  God;  God  alone  has  a  free  will  (p.  158). 
Man  is,  as  Luther,  adopting  an  old  metaphor,  says,  like  a  steed. 
He  wills  what  God  or  the  devil  wills,  just  in  so  far  as  he  is 
guided  by  God  or  the  devil  (157).  But  why  God  converts  some 
and  leaves  others  to  destruction  we  do  not  know.  That  is  a 
matter  of  his  secret  will,  in  regard  to  which  we  dare  ask  no 
questions.  It  is  for  us  to  be  guided  by  his  revealed  will.  In 
this  way  Luther  attained  the  end  which  he  had  in  view,  i.  e. ,  he 
proved  that  free  will  was  inconceivable,  and  that  grace  was  the 
sole  agency  in  conversion.  This  was  the  essential  thing  for 
Luther.  The  Scotist  and  Deterministic2  ideas  were  only  means 
for  reaching  this  end.  We  can  understand,  therefore,  why  he 
did  not  employ  them  more  frequently,  but,  on  the  contrary,  with 
all  his  emphasizing  of  the  moral  bondage  of  the  natural  man, 
appealed  constantly  to  God’s  earnest  will,  revealed  in  the  word, 
to  save  all  men  (E.  54.  22  ;  55.  162  ;  opp.  lat.  2.  170).  Christ 

1  Cf. ,  e.  g. ,  E.  11.  no:  “  All  created  things  are  masks  and  disguises  of  God, 
which  he  chooses  to  permit  to  work  with  him  and  help  him  do  all  manner  of 
things;”  or  35.  252,  according  to  which  praying  and  working  “are  merely  a  pure 
sham-battle.”  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  find  the  queries:  “Who  can 
coerce  the  will  of  a  man?”  (E.  24.  310).  “Who  can  control  his  heart?” 
(ib.  311). 

2  This  is  the  conception  of  predestination  found  in  Bradwardina  and  Wick- 
liffe.  Luther  appears  to  derive  it  directly  from  Augustine.  See  also  Loofs, 
DG.  376  n. 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  245 

bore  the  sins  of  all  men  ;  if  all  believed,  all — and  not  alone  the 
predestinated — would  be  saved  (46.  107  f. ).  The  method  of  the 
De  servo  arbitrio  presents  therefore  nothing  more  than  theoreti¬ 
cal  lines  of  thought  employed  as  auxiliary  to  the  main  purpose. 
But,  as  is  well  known,  Luther  always  maintained  the  correctness 
of  the  conclusions  here  drawn ;  vid.  Comm,  in  Gen.  Cf. 
Luthardt,  Lehrev.  freien  Widen,  p.  91  ff.  Lutkens,  L.  Prae- 
dest.-lehre,  Dorpat,  1858.  Kattenbusch,  L.’s  Lehre  v.  unfr. 
Widen,  Gott.,  1875. 

(V)  Luther’s  views  concerning  the  Wrath  of  God  must  be  con¬ 
sidered  in  this  connection.  Upon  the  sinner  is  visited  the  wrath 
of  God,  which  “  condemns  (him)  in  advance  to  death,  that  we 
must  be  eternally  separated  from  God  ”  (14.  117).  “  God  can¬ 
not  deny  his  nature,  i.  e.,  he  is  not  able  not  to  hate  sin  and  sin¬ 
ners,  .  .  .  otherwise  he  would  be  unjust  and  would  love  sin  ” 
(Gal.  1.  338).  This  relationship  to  God  we  have  inherited  from 
Adam  (46.  67).  But,  since  God  punishes  sin,  it  is  clear  that  sin 
is  our  fault  :  “  For  since  there  is  wrath  here,  there  must  also  be 
guilt,  which  merits  such  wrath  ”  (E.  14.  117;  19.  213;  8.  177). 
“  The  word  sin  embraces  the  eternal  wrath  of  God  and  the  whole 
kingdom  of  Satan  ”  (Gal.  1.  54).  “  Death  is  the  eternal  pen¬ 

alty  of  God’s  wrath  ’  ’  (E.  20.  161).  To  feel  one’s  self  forsaken 
of  God  is  to  experience  the  wrath  of  God  (39.  44,  46).  Even 
children  dying  unbaptized  are  lost  (W.  6.  26).  The  sinner, 
when  he  is  ‘  ‘  separated  ”  from  God  regards  “him  alone  as  a 
stern  judge  ”  (17.  37).  The  unbeliever  remains  under  wrath 
(46.  29;  47.  25,  31).  The  Christian,  on  the  other  hand, 
recognizes  God  as  nothing  but  love.  He  is  no  longer  to  think  of 
him  as  a  wrathful  judge  (47.  21  f. ,  342).  “For  God  alone  is  the 
Man  who  ceases  not  to  do  only  good  to  the  world  ”  (E.  19.  364  b, 
37  7>  3^6).  If  the  Christian  has  now  learned  to  know  that  his 
natitre  is  nothing  but  love ,  he  knows  then  ‘  ‘  that,  so  far  as  we  are 
concerned,  even  his  works  of  wrath  must  be  nothing  but  love,” 
since  they  serve  for  the  subjugation  of  our  foes  and  to  our  “  test¬ 
ing  ”  (47.  21).  “There  is,  therefore,  with  God  no  wrath  nor 
disfavor,  and  his  heart  and  thoughts  are  nothing  but  pure  love,  as 
may  be  seen  in  all  his  works  before  our  very  eyes  ”  (E.  19.  369, 
370).  Thus,  whoever  is  “  separated  ”  from  God  experiences 
his  wrath;  the  Christian  knows  him  as  “  nothing  but  love.”1 

1  The  believing  Christian  cannot  and  dare  not  by  any  means  represent  God 
to  himself  as  angered  and  placated  ( iratum  et  placatwn) ,  as  the  sacrifice  of 
the  mass  requires  ( W.  8.  441 ).  Cf.  47.342:  “  For  he  who  thinks  of  God  and 
believes  that  he  is  a  wrathful  God,  will  also  find  him  such  ;  for  as  one  holds, 
believes,  and  imagines  concerning  God,  so  is  he  also,  and  one  finds  him  also 
yso,  namely,  a  wrathful  God.” 


246 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


He  who  considers  the  death  of  Christ  recognizes  44  how  im¬ 
measurably  great  and  terrible  is  the  wrath  of  God  against  sin, 
and  again  how  unutterable,  yea,  how  unsearchable,  is  the  mercy 
and  grace  of  God  toward  us  condemned  men”  (E.  3.  100). 1 

4.  In  his  understanding  of  the  relation  between  the  Law  and 
the  Gospel,  Luther  also  continued  within  the  lines  originally 
drawn  by  him  (supra,  p.  22 8).  No  one  attains  salvation, 
except  as  the  law  performs  its  work  upon  him  before  the  gospel. 
Law  and  gospel  are  the  word  of  God,  but  each  in  a  peculiar 
sense  (E.  19.  235).  Not  to  have  recognized  this  difference,  is 
the  greatest  fault  of  the  Romish  theology.  Luther  never  wearied 
of  urging  this  distinction  in  ever-new  applications.  “This 
difference  between  the  law  and  the  gospel  is  the  highest  art  in 
Christianity,  which  each  and  everyone  who  boasts  or  accepts  the 
name  of  Christian  should  know  and  understand  ”  (E.  19.  235). 

(#)  The  Law  is  a  divine  requirement,  rule,  and  mirror.  It 
tells  what  man  ought  to  do  and  has  not  done.  4 4  It  reveals  what 
man  is,  what  he  has  been,  and  what  he  shall  again  become  ’ ’ 
(E.  14.  151).  What  it  says  to  the  heart  is  confirmed  by 
the  conscience  (14.  153).  But  what  is  here  to  be  understood 
by  the  44  Law?”  The  Mosaic  law,  in  so  far  as  it  44  made 
particular  laws  and  ordinances, ?  ’  i.  e. ,  was  a  positive  system  of 
laws,  is  only  a  44  Jewish-Saxony  code.”  But  in  so  far  as  it 
coincides  with  inborn  natural  right ,  it  is  a  permanent  requirement 
valid  for  all  times,  which  has  received  a  peculiarly  excellent  ex¬ 
pression  in  the  Mosaic  law.  44  Where  now  the  law  of  Moses  and 
the  law  of  nature  are  one  thing,  there  the  law  remains  and  is  not 
outwardly  abolished,  only  spiritually  through  faith.  .  .  .  There¬ 
fore  image-making  and  Sabbath  and  everything  which  Moses 

1  Luther  shared  the  vivid  faith  in  devils  and  demons  which  characterized 
the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages.  But  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  he  repre¬ 
sented  the  central  processes  of  the  religious  life  without  making  any  essential 
use  of  these  views.  Large  sections  of  his  sermons  may  be  searched  in  vain 
for  any  reference  to  the  devil.  His  conceptions  here  also  were  more  spiritual 
than  those  of  the  Middle  Ages.  He  added,  so  to  speak,  a  hellish  majesty 
to  the  devil,  and  the  comic  aspects  of  the  popular  belief  disappear  entirely. 
Touching  the  work  of  the  devil,  he  says:  “When  impurity  abounds,  the 
devil  fills  the  arteries  and  bones  as  full  of  such  evil  lust  as  man  permits” 
(E.  17.  3).  “A  Christian  must  know  this,  that  he  is  sitting  in  the  midst  of 
devils,  and  that  the  devil  is  nearer  to  him  than  his  coat  or  shirt,  yea,  nearer 
than  his  own  skin,  that  he  is  round  about  us,  and  that  we  are  always  at  dag¬ 
ger’s  points  with  him”  (17.  178,  180  ff.  See  also  11.  269  ff. ).  The  devils 
are  very  shrewd  (17.  182,  195).  They  exist  in  great  numbers  (17.  1 9 1 ) : 
“  How  many  devils  do  you  suppose  were  there  ...  at  the  Diet  of  Augsburg  ? 
Every  bishop  had  brought  with  him  so  many  devils — as  many  as  a  dog  has 
fleas  on  it  about  St.  John’s  Day”  (ib.  210).  Upon  the  fall  of  the  devil,  see 
46.  3  f. ;  upon  angels  and  the  protection  rendered  by  them,  17.  177  ff.,  182  f.> 
189,202,  216,  219;  10.  1 5 1 . 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  247 

appointed  more  than  and  beyond  the  natural  law,  since  it  has  no 
natural  law,  is  free,  void,  and  done  away  with  ”  (E.  29.  156  f. ; 
46.  84,  87  ;  47.  25).  God’s  law,  or  love,  is  natural  law  (E. 
20.  125  ;  22.  104,  202).  These  written  laws  are  to  be  included 
under  the  category  of  the  reason,  since  they  have  flowed  from  it 
as  from  a  fountain  of  law  (E.  20.  106).1  As  Luther  shared 
the  medieval  conception  of  an  inherited  natural  law  (supra, 
p.  171b),  he  therefore  recognized  the  “  Law  ”  only  in  so  far  as 
it  agreed  with  the  latter.  In  connection  with  it,  he  thought  of 
other  means  of  convincing  us  of  our  sins.  From  this  point  of 
view,  the  sufferings  of  Christ  became  also  a  preaching  of  the 
law  (E.  13.  116  f.  ;  11.  147).  The  entire  law,  however,  in¬ 
cluding  the  decalogue,  together  with  the  laws  of  the  church  (Gal. 
1.  18 1.  W.  2.  527),  does  not  give  life,  but  slays  (W.  2.  468; 
6-353).  It  has  not  the  power  to  move  or  renew  man  inwardly, 
but  remains  an  inflexible,  tormenting  requirement  (46.  75). 
Thus  it  calls  forth  the  hatred  of  the  sinner  against  itself  (W.  2. 
498,  532).  The  works  which  he  performs  without  being 
inwardly  conquered  by  the  good,  merely  upon  the  requirement 
of  the  law,  are  done  from  fear  of  punishment  (W.  2.  532),  and 
are  in  the  last  analysis  therefore  hypocritical  (2.  513;  6.  354). 
A  “  servile  spirit”  arises  in  man’s  heart  (E.  7.  247).  The 
law  makes  him  really  worse  (W.  2.  525,  527),  however  far  out¬ 
ward  integrity  may  be  secured  by  it  (E.  7.  283,  284).  The 
righteousness  of  works  which  it  produces  is  no  righteousness 
at  all  :  “  That  righteousness  of  works  is  most  truly  nothing  else 
than  to  love  sin,  to  hate  righteousness,  to  detest  God  with  his 
law,  and  to  adore  the  greatest  wickedness”  (Gal.  2.  103). 
Since  the  law  thus  presses  upon  man  and  he  cannot  inwardly  and 
actually  meet  its  demands,  there  seizes  him,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
terror  at  the  thought  of  God  and  desire  to  escape  from  him 
(E.  9.  179);  he  becomes  an  enemy  of  God,  without  being  able 
to  escape  from  him  (E.  18.  73).  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  great  longing  fills  his  heart  to  be  free  from  this  pressure.  This 
impels  him  toward  Christ  and  the  gospel  (W.  2.  528,  532.  E. 

1  This  passage  is  very  instructive  in  showing  Luther’s  conception  of  the  Old 
Testament  law.  It  is  indeed  a  divine  revelation  ;  but  it  is  universally  valid 
only  in  so  far  as  in  harmony  with  the  moral  ideas  inborn  in  man.  We  may 
here  detect  a  remnant  of  the  natural  theology  of  the  Middle  Ages.  The  con¬ 
clusions  which  might  be  drawn  from  this  position — denial  of  the  total  depravity 
of  the  natural  man,  the  superfluity  of  the  preaching  of  the  law — Luther  did  not 
realize.  From  this  point  of  view  we  may  understand  also  his  interpretation  of 
the  Third  Commandment  and  his  naturalistic  and  rationalizing  way  of  regard¬ 
ing  the  observance  of  Sunday.  See  esp.  the  Larger  Catechism,  Symbol.  Bucher 
(Muller),  p.  401  f.  In  his  works  as  early  as  1518  :  W.  1.  436  f.  Cf.  G. 
Hillner,  L.  Stellung  in  d.  Sonntagsfrage  in  Mitteil,  u.  Nachr.  f.  die  ev.  K. 

in  Russl.,  1888,  Sept. -Oct. 

* 


2  48 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


c 

7.  289).  It  awakens  displeasure  with  himself,  the  resolution  to 
amend  the  life  (6.  390,  339),  and  a  thirst  for  the  grace  of  God 
(E.  7.  251). 

(^)  Preachers  should  begin  with  this  preaching  of  the  law,  and 
never  cease  (E.  10.  123  f. );  for  the  world  surely  needs  it  (10. 
283  ;  48.  210).  The  knowledge  of  sin  must  first  be  preached; 
the  consciences  of  men  must  be  terrified  by  the  divine  wrath ; 
the  sinner  must  feel  that  he,  with  his  sinful  lust,  belongs  to 
the  devil  and  is  lost  (E.  14.  15).  Only  then,  after  he  recog¬ 
nizes  his  sin,  can  Christ  and  grace  begin  their  work  (E.  11.  328  ; 
13.  295;  51.  270).  Only  after  the  preaching  of  the  law  has 
had  its  effect,  follows  the  consolation  of  the  gospel,  according 
to  Lk.  24.  47  (E.  29.  139  f.;  11.  327  f.;  27.  124.  Gal.  t. 
186  f. ;  2.  1 1 5).  Then  should  be  preached,  along  with  repent¬ 
ance,  the  forgiveness  of  sins  (3.  354).  “  That  is  all  a  preach¬ 

ing  of  the  law,  however  or  whenever  it  is  done,  which  preaches 
of  our  sins  and  God’s  wrath.  Again,  the  gospel  is  such  a  preach¬ 
ing,  which  shows  and  gives  nothing  else  than  grace  and  forgive¬ 
ness  in  Christ.  ...  Yea,  where  is  there  a  more  earnest  and 
terrible  announcement  and  preaching  of  God’s  wrath  against  sin 
than  the  sufferings  and  death  of  Christ  ?  .  .  .  But  so  long  as  all 
this  preaches  God’s  wrath  and  terrifies  man,  it  is  not  yet  the  real 
preaching  of  the  gospel  nor  of  Christ,  but  a  preaching  of  Moses  and 
the  law  against  the  impenitent  ”  (E.  13.  116).  4 ‘The  law  is  that 

which  displays  what  we  must  do ;  the  gospel,  where  we  are  to 
get  the  power  to  do  it.  .  .  .  The  law  reveals  the  sickness  ; 
the  gospel  gives  the  medicine”  (14.  14;  cf.  19.  239  fi;  48. 
200).  “  The  law  has  its  goal,  i.  e.,  how  far  it  is  to  go  and  what 
it  is  to  accomplish,  namely,  to  terrify  the  impenitent  with  God’s 
disfavor  and  wrath  and  (to  lead  up)  to  Christ  ”  (19.  236).  He 
who  rests  under  the  law,  is  without  grace  and  without  the  Holy 
Spirit  (12.  1 1 2).  If  he  is  not  to  fall  into  despair,  the  gospel 
must  soon  come  to  his  aid  (E.  12.  372).  With  the  gospel 
comes  the  Spirit ;  Moses  must  now  withdraw,  and  the  law 
is  robbed  of  its  power  (12.  251;  9.  251;  19.  246).  The 
gospel  proclaims  the  goodness  of  God  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
(7.  I5^,  327  ;  10.  89).  With  it,  the  Spirit  enters  and  quickens 
the  man  inwardly,  bringing  with  him  Christ,  who  reigns  in  us. 
By  this  means  faith,  desire  and  love  for  the  good,  and  a  new 
pious  life  are  produced  in  man  (9.  240,  278;  13.  234,  265  ; 
51.  302).  The  gospel  effects  the  new  birth  (12.  323)7  The 
law  inwardly  transforms  no  one  ;  it  is  only  the  Holy  Ghost  who 
does  this  (52.  296). 1  But  the  new  man  needs  no  law.  “Just  as 

1  The  Holy  Spirit  does  not  therefore  come  through  the  preaching  of  the  law, 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  249 

three  and  seven — not  ought  to  be,  but  are  ten,  nor  is  any  law  or 
rule  to  be  sought  for  making  them  ten  ...  so  a  righteous 
man — not  ought  to,  but  does  live  well,  nor  does  he  need  a  law 
which  may  teach  him  to  live  well  ”  (W.  2.  596.  E.  22.  66  f. ). 
The  Christian  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  law  (E.  13.  35,  37, 
39).  “  It  is  therefore  the  highest  art  and  wisdom  of  Christians 

not  to  know  the  law”  (Gal.  1.  16).  Christ  has  abolished  it 
(W.  6.  354).  Neither  the  Mosaic  law  nor  the  law  of  nature  can 
longer  require  anything,  since  there  is  no  longer  need  of  any 
requirement. 

(<r)  The  law  is  designed,  therefore,  to  awaken  the  repentance 
which  is  involved  in  conversion.  To  this  end  it  is  to  be 
preached.  But  it  is  to  be  preached  also  for  the  maintenance  of 
order  among  the  rude  and  coarse  populace,  and  to  be  taught  to 
children  (E.  13.  51  ;  19.  246).  The  influence  of  the  civil  law 
lies  in  the  same  direction.  The  same  fundamental  principle 
finds  expression  in  all  codes  of  laws.  Finally,  even  converted 
Christians,  being  yet  flesh,  have  need  of  admonition  and  the 
presentation  to  them  of  the  divine  will  (13.  118).  “  Thus  must 

Moses  without  Christ  do  his  work,  that  it  may  drive  those  who 
are  not  Christians,  or,  in  other  words,  the  old  man.  For  he  does 
not  thereby  make  Christians  pious ;  but  this  indeed  he  does,  he 
shows  them  what  their  calling  is,  which  they  according  to  the 
Spirit  willingly  observe — not  that  the  flesh  either  will  or  can  so 
readily  follow  that  they  do  not  on  its  account  still  need  to  be  put 
on  their  guard  and  admonished  ”  (13.  41). 

(</)  We  cannot  fail  to  observe  the  difference  between  this 
view  of  the  subject  and  that  presented  above  (under  2  a).  In 
the  large  Commentary  upon  Galatians  (A.  D.  1535),  Luther 
writes:  “But  man,  being  humiliated  through  the  law  and 
brought  to  the  knowledge  of  himself,  then  he  is  made  truly  peni¬ 
tent ,  for  true  penitence  begins  from  fear  and  the  judgment  of 
God”  (Gal.  1.  193).  But  in  his  publication,  Von  den 
Sehlusseln  (A.  D.  1530),  we  meet  again  the  other  position: 

but  comes  afterward,  since  it  is  only  through  the  gospel  that  he  acts  :  “  Now 
the  Holy  Ghost  is  not  the  law,  nor  the  reverse.  Where  the  law  is,  there  the 
Holy  Ghost  is  not.  .  .  .  The  law  is  not  intended  to  and  cannot  make  pious, 
but  the  Holy  Ghost  makes  pious  before  God”  (E.  52.  297  ;  47.  359).  Parallel 
with  this  way  of  apprehending  the  process,  we  find  another,  which  traces 
penitence  directly  to  the  preaching  of  Christ ,  which  awakens  terror  before  the 
wrath  of  God  and  the  purpose  of  amendment.  “But  such  penitence  man 
•cannot  himself  awaken  ;  it  is  the  work  of  the  Holy  Ghost  which  he  begins  in 
us  through  the  word  of  God,  which  first  reveals  sin  and  at  the  same  time  an¬ 
nounces  the  penalty  of  sins,  eternal  death.”  Here  penitence  is  represented  as 
awakened  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  whereas  faith  does  not  appear  to  come  until 
afterward  (E.  6.  339  f.,  389  f.,  356).  See  also  63.  127  :  “  The  wrath  of  God 
is  revealed  through  the  gospel  ”  (A.  D.  1522). 


250 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


“  In  order  that  repentance  also  may  be  begun  from  desire  and 
love  ”  (E.  31.  183).  And  in  a  sermon  of  A.  D.  1537,  he  de¬ 
clares  :  “  Hypocrisy  indeed  comes  from  the  law,  but  true 
repentance  follows  only  from  the  name  of  Jesus  Christ  ”  (18.  6). 
One  thing  is  here  clear.  In  the  first  passage,  “repentance” 
designates  the  transitory  penitence  of  the  yet  unconverted, 
wrought  by  the  law.1  In  the  other  two  passages,  it  is  the  evan¬ 
gelical  repentance,  springing  from  faith  and  love,  and  filling  the 
whole  life.  Apart,  however,  from  this  difference  in  the  use  of 
the  term,  two  things  are  historically  certain.  (1)  Luther,  from 
the  beginning  to  the  end  of  his  activity,  urged  the  preaching  of 
the  law,  since  it  is  its  office  to  humiliate,  awaken  an  initial  peni¬ 
tence,  and  point  to  Christ.  (2)  He  also,  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end  of  his  activity  as  a  reformer,  urged  a  repentance  which, 
springing  from  faith  and  love  through  the  agency  of  the  gospel 
and  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  indicates  a  conflict  with  evil  filling  the 
whole  Christian  life.2  And  we  note  also  (3)  as  an  episode  in  the 
controversy  concerning  confession,  the  view  that  the  religious 
process  in  the  Christian’s  heart  begins  with  faith  and  love,  arid 
that  only  as  a  result  of  these  does  repentance  ensue.  If  I  am 
correct,  the  last-named  view  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  effort  to 
retain  in  the  life  of  the  believer  only  a  complete  penitence  and 
to  avoid  everything  analogous  to  the  traditional  attrition  (supra, 
p.  237).  But  as  early  as  A.  D.  1524,  upon  the  occasion  of 
a  controversy  upon  the  question,  whether  the  law  must  of  neces¬ 
sity  precede  the  gospel,  he  maintained,  with  appeal  to  Lk.  24.  47, 
that  law  and  gospel  are  to  be  preached,  since  the  latter  comforts 
only  those  who  have  through  the  former  learned  to  know  their 
sin.  The  law  is  also  to  be  used  for  the  outward  disciplining  of 
the  rude  and  ungodly  (E.  53.  250). 3  Cf.  Kawerau  in  Beitr. 
z.  Ref.  -gesch.,  dedicated  to  Kostlin,  p.  61  ff.  Melanchthon’s  ut¬ 
terances  in  the  “  Unterricht  an  d.  Visitatoren,”  1528,  follow  the 
same  line.  Through  the  preaching  of  the  law,  the  people  are  to  be 
stirred  up  to  penitence  and  fear.  “  For  along  with  this  it  is 

1  This  is  still  the  dominant  use  of  the  term  in  the  praxis  of  the  church.  Using 
it  in  this  sense,  how  could  we  understand  Luther’s  first  Thesis?  Cf.  E.  6. 
15 1  :  “Ceasing  from  evil,  regret,  and  sorrow  for  it — he  calls  repenting 
(Busse  thun);  believing  on  Christ  he  calls  being  converted  to  God  (zu  Gott 
sich  bekehren),”  and  27.  194:  “Penitence  (die  Reu)  flows  from  the  com¬ 
mandments,  faith  through  the  promise  of  God.” 

2  The  law  here  comes  under  consideration  only  as  a  directive  and  confirm¬ 
ing  agency. 

3  Under  these  circumstances  Luther  could  write  :  “And,  in  fine,  it  is  more 
necessary  to  preach  and  urge  the  law  of  God  than  the  gospel,  because  there 
are  many  wicked  who  must  be  restrained  through  the  compulsion  of  the 
law,  but  the  pious  who  understand  the  gospel  are  few  and  known  to  God” 
(53-  249)- 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT. 


251 


useful  to  preach  of  faith.  ’  ’  The  law  is  to  be  proclaimed  also  in 
order  to  incite  the  justified  to  good  works  (C.  R.  xxvi.  51  ff. ). 
It  cannot  be  said  that  this  is  a  change  from  Luther’s  position. 
Yet  so  early  as  A.  D.  1527  Melanchthon  was  violently  assailed 
for  holding  this  opinion  by  Joh.  Agricola,  who  deduced  peni¬ 
tence  from  love  of  righteousness.  Luther  succeeded  in  allaying 
this  conflict  (cf.  Kawerau  in  Stud,  u  Krit.,  1880,  p.  24  ff. ), 
but  ten  years  later  Agricola  renewed  his  assault,  maintaining 
that  repentance  should  be  taught  as  produced,  not  by  the  law,  but 
by  the  gospel.  There  is  no  need  whatever,  he  held,  for  the 
preaching  of  the  law.  “The  decalogue  belongs  to  the  hall  of 
justice,  not  the  pulpit.”  Man  is  overpowered  by  the  kindness 
of  God,  and  thereupon  renounces  his  former  life  and  shrinks 
from  incurring  the  displeasure  of  his  heavenly  Father  (Luth. 
opp.  var.  arg.  iv.  420  ff.  Forstemann,  Neues  Urkunden- 
buch,  i.  304.  Kawerau  in  Beitr.  z.  Ref.-Gesch.,  etc.,  p. 
65  ff. ).  Luther  opposes  him  in  the  six  disputations  against  the 
Antinomians,  arguing  anew  in  defense  of  the  position  which  he 
later,  as  is  well  known,  maintained.  The  right  to  appeal  to  the 
earlier  Luther  can  be  only  to  a  limited  extent  granted  to  Agricola, 
for  Luther  had  always  attributed  an  influence  of  some  kind  to  the 
law,  and,  in  view  of  the  practical  demands  of  the  years  1527-28, 
it  was  an  extreme  of  folly  to  speak  as  did  Agricola. 

(Y)  Law  and  gospel  represent  for  Luther  two  opposing  con¬ 
ceptions  of  the  universe.  The  natural  man’s  view  of  God  and 
the  world  is  always  legalistic  (Y.  g .,  46.  87  ;  48.  148).  The 
gospel  opposes  this ;  the  mercy  of  Christ  lays  hold  upon  man’s 
heart  and  transforms  him.  He  allows  Christ  to  lay  hold  of  him, 
and  he  lays  hold  of  Christ.  This  is  the  source  of  all  good  in 
him.  But  only  he  will  allow  himself  to  be  transformed  by 
Christ  who  has — according  to  the  appointment  of  God  and 
under  his  guidance  (the  law) — seriously  struggled  with  the 
legalistic  view  of  the  world  and  has,  in  his  own  sin,  experienced 
its  insufficiency.1 

1  But  the  problem  is  not  thus  solved.  It  is  not  evident  how  the  law  (which 
is  from  God,  but  does  not  exert  the  specific  divine  energy  of  the  Holy  Ghost, 
p.  248  n. )  produces  contrition.  How  can  the  good  control  us,  before  we 
have  been  inwardly  laid  hold  of  by  it  and  have  recognized  it  as  good  ?  Luther 
silently  assumes  such  a  recognition,  presupposes  it  upon  the  basis  of  the  “law 
of  nature,”  or  even  of  a  certain  general  faith  in  Christianity,  but  yet  discrim¬ 
inates  between  the  application  of  the  law  to  the  justificandi  and  to  the 
“  wild  ”  and  “rude.”  But  is  there  not  thus  presupposed  a  certain  initial 
faith  before  the  working  of  the  law  ?  However  distinctly  this  may  differ  from 
the  specific  saving  faith — Agricola  in  his  first  controversy  spoke  of  a  faith  in 
the  threatenings  of  the  law  (/ ides  minarum'),  see  Kawerau,  Stud,  u  Krit., 
1880,  43 — which,  as  Luther  shows,  cannot  arise  before  there  is  a  full  con¬ 
sciousness  of  guilt,  yet  it  just  as  distinctly  differs  from  it  as  being  its  beginnings 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


252 

“  How  is  it  possible  to  preach  about  the  forgiveness  of  sins, 
where  sin  is  not  first  present?”  (32.  73,  70).  In  history,  the 
revelation  of  law  preceded  the  revelation  of  grace  :  “  This  occurs 
to-day  individually  and  spiritually  in  every  Christian  in  whom  is 
found  a  season  of  law  and  a  season  of  grace  following  in  turn  ’  ’ 
(Gal.  2.  109). 

Cf.  Th.  Harnack,  L.  Theol.  i.  479  ff.  Herrmann,  Die  Busse  des  ev. 
Christen,  Ztschr.  f.  Theol.  u.  K.,  1891,  p.  28  ff.  Lipsius,  L.  Lehre  v.  d. 
Busse,  1892.  Galley,  Die  Busslehre  Luther’s  (Beitrage  zur  Forderung 
christl.  Theol.  iv.  2,  1900). 

5.  The  definition  of  the  gospel  leads  us  to  consider  Luther’s 
conception  of  faith,  (a)  Christian  faith  has,  in  his  view,  for 
its  object  simply  the  peculiar,  positive  revelations  of  God  in  the 
words  and  works  of  Christ.  Christ  says  :  “  Come  to  me,  I  will 
refresh  ( tranken )  you,  i.  e.,  in  me  and  through  me  you  shall  find 
the  word  and  doctrine,  which  will  comfort  and  strengthen  your 
heart”  (E.  48.  199  ;  13.  55,  172;  14.  1).  Only  in  the  man 
Jesus  is  God  actually  to  be  found  ;  here  he  wishes  therefore  to  be 
nought,  found,  and  called  upon  (E.  10.  181  ;  7.  68  ;  41.  385  ; 
47.  179,  296,  344,  348  ff. ;  48.  334;  49.  92,  183  f.j  49.  83  f.; 
50.  197).  Christ  is  the  “  true  epistle,  ”  4 ‘  the  golden  book  ”  in 
which  the  gracious  will  of  God  is  revealed  (W.  8.  274  f.,  276. 
E.  10.  187;  12.  381).  God  is  “  hidden  in  the  despised  man, 
Christ”  (W.  8.  381).  Just  in  the  Crucified  do  we  discover  the 


Such  a  “  part  of  faith”  ( Stuck  des  Glaubens )  Luther  himself  recognizes  in  the 
disciples  before  the  resurrection  (12.  171).  But  in  positing  this  legal  peni¬ 
tence  before  true  repentance,  Luther  really  establishes  a  pendant  to  attrition. 
It  was  the  same  considerations  which  led  him  to  the  acknowledgment  of  such  a 
legal  penitence,  and  the  Scholastics  to  their  theory  of  attrition  (p.  135  f. ).  It 
is  also  with  him,  in  the  last  analysis,  a  doing  by  man  of  “  what  is  in  him  ” 
(W.  4.  261),  although  there  remains  the  immense  difference,  that  he  did  not 
allow  to  this  initial  penitence  in  any  sense  a  meritorious  character  !  It  may, 
perhaps,  be  said,  that  Luther,  both  in  his  pre -reformatory  period  and  again  in 
his  later  years,  regarded  his  experiences  beneath  the  pressure  of  “the  law” 
in  the  cloister  as  normal,  and  only  during  that  episode  felt  them  to  be  simply 
the  result  of  erroneous  views.  But  even  thus,  there  still  remains  the  vast 
difference  between  his  position  and  that  of  his  opponents,  that  the  law  and  the 
actual  gospel  are  to  be  proclaimed  together  ;  and  also  his  contention,  that 
“repentance”  is  not  a  sacramental  act,  but  the  very  substance  of  the  moral 
development  of  the  Christian.  I  remark,  finally,  that  both  the  lines  of  thought 
thus  traceable  in  Luther  are  borrowed  from  the  representations  of  the  law  in 
the  New  Testament.  It  is  abolished  and  powerless,  as  the  rule  of  conduct 
which  is  to  make  righteous  (Paul  :  Rom.  6.  14  ;  10.  4);  and  it  remains,  as  the 
expression  of  the  divine  will  (Jesus:  Matt.  5.  17).  But  with  the  latter 
thought  as  a  point  of  departure,  and  in  view  of  the  positive  confirmation  of  the 
law  in  the  discourses  of  Jesus,  might  not  Luther  have  secured  some  more  im¬ 
portant  place  in  his  theory  for  the  authority  of  the  Old  Testament  law  ? 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT. 


253 


loving-will  of  God.  From  the  kind  heart  of  Jesus1  we  mount 
up  to  the  heart  of  God  (W.  2.  140  f.,  84;  1.  362,  614.  E.  9. 
17  f.,  247  ;  12.  297,  381).  Christ  should,  therefore,  not  be 
preached  as  “a  history  and  narrative  from  chronicles,”  but  in 
such  a  way  as  to  tell  us  “why  Christ  came,  how  we  are  to  use 
and  enjoy  him,  what  he  has  brought  and  given  to  me  ”  (27. 

187) .  This  is  the  right  way  to  find  God,  and  not  the  opposite 
course  of  beginning  to  speculate  from  the  basis  of  the  divine 
majesty  and  government  of  the  world  (E.  19.  50  f. ;  20.  132, 
138).  In  Christ  we  may  gain  a  conception  of  God  as  he  is,  so 
“  that  we  do  not  place  instead  of  him  in  our  hearts  a  horrible 
bugaboo  or  scarecrow,  but  long  for  him  rightly,  as  he  wishes  to 
be  and  has  represented  himself  ”  (  E.  1 6. 206  ) .  If  we  do  not  hold 
to  the  revelation  given  us,  we  will  picture  him  to  ourselves  “  as 
the  painters  paint  the  devil,  with  long  horns  and  horrible  fiery 
eyes”  (ib.  203.  208).  In  Christ  we  have  the  good  gathered 
up  as  into  one  word  (W.  1.  341),  and  in  him  we  have  the  very 
nature  of  God.  That  nature  is  “merciful  will,  kind  will  ”  (E.  7. 
68,  72,  74,  76;  12.  230,  246,  260,  311,  325,  373;  11.  96; 
14.  193);  “nothing  but  love”  (14.  49)  ;  “divine  nature  is 
nothing  else  than  pure  benevolence”  (eitel  Wohlthlitigkeit ,  7. 
159);2  “an  eternal  power  and  divine  energy”  (3.  302;  10. 

188) .  Christ  is  free,  since  he  is  the  deliverer  (21.  99). 

In  these  ideas  are  manifest  two  steps  in  advance,  i.  e.,  the 
Christian  religion,  and  hence  also  theology,  is  understood  as  a 
positive  entity  (in  contrast  with  all  innate  religion  of  reason  or 
nature);  and  the  nature  of  God,  which  is  to  be  apprehended  by 
faith,  is  defined  as  an  eternal  and  almighty  loving-will.  By  either 
of  these  conceptions  the  religious  character  of  Christianity  is 
assured.3 

1  Cf.  his  combating  of  the  popular  belief,  which  looked  upon  Christ  as  a 
“  tyrant  ”  and  “  judge  ”  (y.  g-,  E.  13.  49  ;  15.485;  16.144;  19.  222  ;  20. 

15 1 ;  47*  23. ) 

2  In  all  these  explanations,  the  divinity  of  Christ  is  assumed  by  Luther  as  a 
fixed  premise  (vid.  sub),  but  his  ideas  carry  him  also  beyond  the  ancient 
Greek  doctrines  of  the  Logos.  In  opposition  to  the  view  that  the  “  Word  of 
God  ...  is  a  light  which  shines  naturally  and  has  always  shone  in  the  reason 
of  men,  even  of  the  heathen,”  he  says  :  “These  are  all  still  human,  Platonic, 
and  philosophical  ideas,  which  lead  us  out  of  Christ  into  ourselves.  The 
Evangelist,  on  the  other  hand,  desires  to  lead  us  out  of  ourselves  into  Christ ; 
for  he  does  not  desire  to  deal  with  nor  speak  of  the  divine,  almighty,  eternal 
Word  of  God  except  as  in  the  flesh  and  blood  which  walked  upon  the  earth. 
He  does  not  wish  to  scatter  us  out  among  the  creatures  which  were  created  by 
him,  that  we  may  there  run  after  him,  seek  him,  and  speculate  about  him  as 
do  the  Platonists  ;  but  he  wishes  to  recall  us  from  those  high-flying  and  widely- 
wandering  thoughts  of  Christ  ”  (E.  10.  1 8 1 ) . 

3  In  both,  however,  Luther  follows  impulses  which  passed  from  Duns  into 
the  life  of  the  later  Middle  Ages  (cf.  supra,  p.  164,  150  n. ). 


2  54 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


(^)  When  God  thus  through  the  gospel,  which  is  always  ac¬ 
companied  by  an  influence  of  the  Spirit,  reveals  to  men  his  love  in 
Christ,  faith  arises  (W.  2.  140.  E.  7.  164,  76,  109;  28.  417). 
The  love  of  God  overpowers  our  hearts.  “  Thus  God  has  noth¬ 
ing  but  the  best,  and  this  he  shares  with  us,  nourishes  us,  sup¬ 
ports  us,  waits  upon  us  through  his  Son.  Thus  our  heart  is  con¬ 
verted  to  follow  Christ”  (W.  1.  275).  “But  when  thou 
hearest  that  he  suffered  for  thee,  and  believest,  there  arises 
already  confidence  toward  him  and  tender  love  ”  (ib.  399  ;  6. 
216.  E.  47.  341,  346).  The  first  thing  that  is  to  be  said  of  this 
faith  is  therefore,  that  is  a  taking  and  a  receiving.  “  But  that  such 
bestowed  righteousness  should  be  in  us  .  .  .  this  comes  to  pass 
alone  through  faith,  for  it  must  always  be  received  and  accepted 
by  us.  Now  it  cannot  be  grasped  by  us  otherwise  than  with  the 
heart”  (E.  12.  118).  Faith  lays  hold  upon  the  benefits  of 
God  (W.  8.  35  ;  E.  12.  118),  the  works  of  Christ  (E.  14.  286  ; 
10.  10 1  :  “  Therefore,  in  order  that  thy  faith  may  remain  pure, 
do  nothing  but  hold  still ;  let  it  receive  good,  accept  the  work 
of  Christ,  and  let  Christ  exert  his  love  upon  it  ”),  atonement  and 
salvation,  with  all  gifts  from  above  (7.  178,  227,  272,  304).  It 
is  God,  therefore,  who  begets  faith  in  man  when  the  latter  ac¬ 
cepts  the  divine  revelation.  With  this,  as  Luther  said  at  an 
earlier  period,  God  infuses  faith  into  men.  But  this  does  not 
mean  that  a  quality  is  thereby  imparted  to  them,  as  the  Scholas¬ 
tics  taught,  but  that  the  heart  is  penetrated  by  the  word  of  God, 
and  the  dominion  of  Christ  is  inwardly  experienced:  “The 
heart  is  imbued  with  the  same  truth  of  the  word  and  through  the 
word  is  convinced  of  the  truth  ”  (W.  6.  94). 1  Christ  is  in  the 
soul  by  faith  as  king  ;  the  will  as  servant  (W.  1.  283).  Faith  is 
therefore  a  having  (W.  1.  595.  E.  12.  169;  27.  180).  God, 
accordingly,  through  the  revelation  in  Christ,  leads  us  to  accept 
that  revelation.  If  now  the  content  of  the  revelation  be  the  un¬ 
changing  purpose  of  God  to  save  us,  the  acceptance  of  it  must 
take  the  psychological  forms  of  obedience,  confidence,  or  trust.2 


1  Luther  most  vigorously  rejects  the  fides  acquisita  of  the  Scholastics  (supra, 
p.  150,  195  f. ),  for  this  is  supposed  to  be  secured  by  man’s  own  efforts, 
whereas  it  is  in  fact  only  through  a  divine  influence  that  we  can  attain  faith.  He 
therefore  advocates  the  fides  infusa — this  it  is  which  justifies  ( W.  2.  566,  146  ; 
6.  85,  89,  95  ;  8.  323).  No  one  can  apprehend  an  article  of  faith  “  without 
grace  and  the  giving  of  God  ”  (E.  18.  ill).  This  leads  us  back  to  Occam 
(supra,  p.  150)-  If  the  medieval  conception  of  grace  be  abandoned,  no  import¬ 
ance  then  attaches  to  the  figure  of  an  “infusing.”  Despite  of  it,  in  fact,  it 
may  be  said  that  it  is  the  fides  acquisita,  which  constitutes  a  prelude  to  Luther’s 
psychological  conception  of  faith,  rather  than  the  idea  of  an  “  infused  faith.” 

2  This  remark  finds  confirmation  in  the  fact  that  Luther  at  an  earlier  period 
discriminated  between  fides  and  fiducia ,  by  the  former  designating  the  accept- 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT. 


255 


“  If  faith  be  genuine,  it  is  a  certain  sure  confidence  of  the  heart 
and  firm  assent,  by  which  Christ  is  apprehended  ’  ’  (Gal.  i.  191). 
Faith  is  “  confidence  in  God’s  mercy  ”  (W.  6.  209.  E.  7.  66  ; 
11.  50,  1 16  ;  14.  41  ;  18.  46),  the  assurance  that  God,  and  he 
alone,  will  make  it  well  with  us  (E.  22.  15,  16,  135).  Faith  is 
therefore  not  a  theoretical  belief  of  certain  things  (E.  7.  242), 1 
but  it  is  the  practical  confidence,  that  we  are  ourselves  through 
the  work  of  Christ  in  favor  with  God  (12.  97,  149,  164,  174, 
333  ;  13.  203;  27.  187),  and  that  we  and  our  works  will  be 
pleasing  in  his  sight  (W.  6.  206,  209).  In  the  light  of  this,  we 
can  understand  the  declaration  :  “  Faith  is  never  concerned  with 
things  past,  but  always  with  future  things  ’ ’  (W.  8.  323). 

But  this  confidence  in  the  grace  of  God  is  based  upon  the  con¬ 
templation  of  a  historical  revelation  :  and  it  is  in  particular  histori¬ 
cal  facts  that  the  latter  has  been  given.  Hence,  this  confidence 
with  regard  to  the  future  embraces  also  the  conviction  of  the  real¬ 
ity  and  potency  of  definite  facts  of  the  past.  “  It  is  not  enough 
to  believe  that  Christ  has  come,  but  also  that  he  has  come  as  St.  Paul 
here  relates,  namely,  that  he  was  sent  from  God  and  is  God’s 
Son  ;  likewise,  that  he  is  true  man  ;  likewise,  that  his  mother  is 
a  virgin  ;  likewise,  that  he  alone  fulfilled  the  law ;  likewise,  that 
he  did  this  not  for  himself,  but  for  our  good  and  grace  ’  ’  (E.  7. 
261;  23.  18). 2  Rome,  on  the  contrary,  knows  only  the  outward 
fides  historical  (47.  12  ff .  )  “  To  believe  the  resurrection  of  Christ 
is  nothing  else  than  to  believe  that  we  have  a  reconciler  before 
God”  (12.  171;  20.  141).  The  same  inner  relationship  of  ideas 
prevails  also  in  the  exposition  of  the  Apostles’  Creed  in  the  cate¬ 
chism.  The  connection  of  thought  is  therefore  as  follows  :  The 
revelation  of  God  in  Christ  influences  us  to  its  own  acceptance, 
which  occurs  when  we  place  our  trust  in  the  love  of  God  as  rec¬ 
ognized  by  us  and  are  convinced  of  the  reality  of  the  historical 
events  in  which  God  was  revealed  to  us.4 

ance  as  true,  and  by  the  latter  the  personal  application  to  one’s  self  (W.  I. 
593  ;  2.  458). 

1  It  is  no  contradiction  of  this  statement,  that  Luther  upon  occasion  says  : 
“  Faith  means  properly  the  holding  to  be  true  .  .  .  what  the  gospel  says 
-about  Christ  and  all  the  articles  of  faith”  (E.  12.  204  f.)  ;  for  the  context 
shows  that  even  here  we  are  to  think  of  a  practical  religious  insight. 

2  To  make  a  universal  application  of  this  idea  lay  far  from  the  thought  of 
Luther  and  from  the  needs  of  the  age.  The  birth  of  Christ  from  a  virgin  he 
supported  from  the  necessity  that  the  Saviour  should  be  sinless,  which  would 
not  be  tenable  if  he  had  been  sexually  generated  (<?.  g.,  E.  7.  263  ;  10.  131,  306; 
II.  246;  14.  161  ;  15.  52  ;  20.  155  ;  29.  49,  52).  Even  though  this  argu¬ 
ment  be  not  convincing,  it  is  instructive  to  observe  the  attempt  of  Luther  to 
find  a  religious  basis  for  the  doctrine. 

3  Cf.  his  strictures  upon  “milk-faith”  (E.  46.  219). 

4  Faith  originates  in  the  reason,  but  extends  also  to  the  will  : 


“For  wher- 


256 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


(7)  This  saving  faith,  or  the  trust  awakened  in  us  through  the 
revelation  of  Christ,  is,  further,  the  beginning  of  an  absolutely 
new  state  of  life.  Faith  is  no  natural  human  work,  but  some¬ 
thing  new  which  God  effects  in  man,  the  directing  of  the 
life  toward  God.  With  faith  comes  the  new  birth  of  the  man. 
“  Now  the  divine  birth  is  nothing  else  than  faith  ”  (E.  10.  206  ; 
11.  311).  Faith  *  ‘  renews  man  ’  ’  (13.  236).  It  is  “  a  living, 
real  thing,  makes  man  entirely  new,  transforms  his  disposition, 
and  converts  him  wholly.  It  goes  down  to  the  foundations  and 
there  occurs  a  renewing  of  the  whole  man  ”  (ib.  267).  It  is  in 
harmony  with  this,  that  the  principle  of  the  new  birth,  or  the 
Holy  Ghost,  becomes  with  faith,  according  to  Luther,  effectual 
in  man  to  his  regeneration  and  renewal  (8.  223,  308,  307; 
7.  240;  12.  1 12;  11.  314;  14.  149).  The  usual  representa¬ 
tion  is  that  the  Holy  Ghost  through  the  gospel  effects  regener¬ 
ation  and  renewal,  whose  first  and  essential  element  is  faith  (W. 
1.  632.  E.  4.  184;  8.  223;  7.  1 7 1  j  10.  206;  12.324,  404 ; 
24.  325  ;  46.  269  f.,  275  ;  61.  125  ;  63.  124).  But,  inasmuch 
as  the  renewal  effected  by  the  Spirit  does  not  develop  into 
activity  until  after  the  entrance  of  faith,  it  may  also  be  said  that 
the  effectual  workings  of  the  Spirit  follow  faith  (W.  6.  206,  356). 
At  all  events,  the  first  activity  which  the  gospel  begets  in  man  is 
faith.  And  he  who  believes  has  begun  an  entirely  new  life. 
“  Your  faith  is  not  a  dream  and  fancy,  but  it  is  life  and  deed  ” 
(W.  8.  385.  E.  24.  325).  It  is  a  life  with  Christ  and  from 
Christ,  for  he  lives  and  reigns  in  us  (W.  1.  455,  458  ;  8.  608). 

‘  ‘  Out  of  a  dry  block  ’  ’  God  makes  ‘  ‘  a  new  flourishing  tree  ’  ’ 
(E.  7.  170).  Thus  the  believer,  since  his  life  takes  the  new 
direction  toward  God,  is  a  new  man,  who  now  endeavors  to  love 
God  and  be  obedient  to  him  (W.  8.  357,  363.  E.  12.  90;  10. 
289  f.,  184  ;  12.  324). 

(7)  Having  seen  that  faith  is  a  work  of  God,  and  that  its 
essential  nature  is  trust,  as  the  beginning  of  a  new  state  of  life, 
there  yet  remain  to  be  noted,  according  to  Luther,  some  accom¬ 
panying  phenomena.  First  of  all,  we  may  observe  that  faith  is 
intimately  associated  with  a  Feeling  and  Experience  of  divine 
grace.  Luther  says  indeed:  “  Feeling  is  against  faith,  faith 
against  feeling ;  ’  *  but  his  meaning  here  is  only  that  faith 

ever  reason  goes,  there  the  will  follows  after  ;  wherever  the  will  goes,  there 
follow  love  and  desire”  (E.  10.  207  ;  II.  200;  22.  135;  cf.  W.  1.  66; 
vid.  the  polemics  against  Eck’s  assertion  :  “  The  will  is  in  the  soul  as  a  king  in 
his  kingdom”)  (W.  I.  283).  According  to  this,  Luther  does  not  accept  the 
Scotist  idea  of  the  primacy  of  the  will.  With  regard  to  the  relationship  of  the 
reason  and  the  will  in  faith  he  thus  agrees  to  a  certain  extent  with  Thomas 
(supra,  p.  103),  Duns  (p.  150),  Biel  (p.  195);  but  he  places  a  higher  esti¬ 
mate  upon  the  share  of  the  will  in  faith  than  any  of  the  medieval  theologians. 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  257 

reaches  out  beyond  “  what  we  can  apprehend  by  reason  and  the 
senses.’’  It  has,  according  to  Heb.  n.  i,  nothing  whatever  to 
do  with  “  the  things  which  are  seen”  (E.  n.  198;  12.  165, 
%  34i;  14-  55>  62>  231;  46.  276.  W.  1.  541).  “But 
when  feeling  and  thinking  fail,  then  comes  another  light,  another 
feeling”  (E.  11.  200).  The  believer  feels  directly  that  he  has 
a  gracious  God  (W.  8.  106).  He  has  and  feels  Christ  and  the 
workings  of  grace  in  his  heart  (E.  9.  27 8  f.;  7.  170;  48.  333). 
He  feels  that  Christ  has  power,  and  ‘  ‘  is  man  enough  for  the 
devil  ”  (E.  20.  148).  He  feels  the  Holy  Ghost,  as  well  as  sin, 
within  him  (8.  31 1  ;  49.  179).  The  immediate  inner  observa¬ 
tion  of  these  things  effects  an  experience,  not  uncertain  opinions 
( persuasioncs ,  50.  28  f. ).  “For  a  Christian  life  consists 
entirely  in  the  exercise  and  experience  of  those  things  which  we 
daily  hear  and  read  from  the  word  of  God”  (9.  95).  The 
Christian  experiences  the  care  of  God  (W.  6.  125).  The 
“  experience  of  faith  ”  “feels”  the  presence  of  Christ  (E.  29. 
334  f. ).  In  order  that  the  faith  that  is  in  us  may  be  steadfast, 
experience  must  enter.  “  Although  I  should  preach  of  God  for 
a  hundred  years,  that  he  is  so  kind,  sweet,  and  merciful,  and 
helps  men — and  have  yet  not  tasted  this  by  experience,  it  yet  all 
amounts  to  nothing,  and  no  one  thereby  learns  to  trust  God 
aright”  (E.  13.  155).  Creation  and  redemption  are  not  realities 
for  us,  “  if  we  do  not  also  experience  and  feel  them  to  be  so  ” 
(E.  23.  249)..  Without  such  personal  experience,  Christ  is  not 
our  Saviour  (E.  18.  7  f.,  45  f. ,  47).  Only  where  this  feeling 
and  this  experience  are  present,  do  we  become  “sure  of  (our) 
faith”  (E.  14.  220.  W.  2.  458),  “sure  of  salvation”1  (E. 
7.  275),  and  only  there  is  the  truth  of  the  gospel  and  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  confirmed  (E.  12.  362,  386;  13.  118;  23.  250,  267). 
The  immediate  (direct)  feeling  and  the  abiding  experience  of  the 
living  object  of  faith  are  therefore  the  final  evidence  of  its  reality 
(E.  13.  183  ff. ).  Only  thus  is  an  inner  certainty  possible, 
according  to  Luther;  not  through  trust  in  one’s  own  works, 
which  are  always  uncertain  (E.  58.  375  f. ).  This  experience  is 
not  of  itself  identical  with  the  act  of  faith.  The  feeling  may  at 
times  be  wanting,  so  that  faith  must  depend  solely  upon  the 
word  (E.  12.  309;  18.  47  ;  14.  45  :  “before  we  experience  or 
feel  it.”  W.  2.  1 1 7);  but,  as  a  rule,  it  accompanies  every  act  of 
faith,  as  indeed  the  entire  Christian  life.  “  And  there  comes  to 
him  unsought  and  undesired  the  feeling  and  experience,  precisely 
in  and  through  such  thinking  ( vormutlien )  or  believing  (W.  8. 

1  Luther,  on  the  other  hand,  most  vigorously  denounced  the  false  ‘  ‘  secur¬ 
ity  ”  of  the  impenitent,  e.  g.,  W.  2.  7 37.  E.  18.  8  ;  9.  185,  187. 

17 


258 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


357>  379) -1  And  if  thou  dost  not  experience  it,  then  hast  thou 
not  faith,  but  the  word  hangs  upon  thine  ears  and  floats  upon 
thy  tongue  like  foam  upon  the  water  ”  (E.  13.  184;  28.  298). 

The  believer  experiences  a  light  and  joyful  heart  (W.  2.  714). 
With  faith  is  intimately  associated  the  feeling  of  present  . blessed¬ 
ness.  “Thou  must  have  heaven  and  be  already  saved  before 
thou  doest  good  works.  ’  ’  The  Christian  life  is  a  waiting  for  the 
blessedness  which  we  already  have  (E.  7.  165  ff.;  n.  3,  196  ; 
12.  329,  331;  14.  120;  16.  116,  138;  47.  367;  48.  24  fi; 
46.  26).  The  Christian  therefore  leads  a  life  of  peace,  joy,  and 
liberty  (E.  n.  321;  7.  272).  He  has  a  “courageous,  bold, 
and  unterrified  heart  ”  (W.  6.  275;  1.  273.  E.  63.  125).  In 
all  affairs  of  his  outward  life  also  he  consoles  himself  with  the 
thought  of  the  providence  of  God  (W.  8.  215  f.  E.  9.  138  ; 
10.  241,  244;  12.  332  ;  13.  175,  252;  47.  183). 2  Faith  im¬ 
pels  to  prayer ;  yea,  it  is  itself  prayer  (14.  47).  It  makes  us 
thankful  (9.  49)  and  capable  of  decision  in  spiritual  things  (12. 
90),  etc. 

6.  But  the  most  important  phenomena  resulting  from  faith  are 
Good  Works.  Christ  dwells  in  the  believer  and  moves  him 
to  imitate  the  works  which  he  himself  has  done  (W.  1.  364, 
649).  “But  he  lives  in  us,  not  speculatively,  but  really,  most 
intimately,  and  efficaciously  (Gal.  2.  134).  Further,  if  faith  is 
the  new  attitude  of  man  toward  God,  it  in  consequence  works 
in  him  as  a  “  leaven  ”  (W.  8.  106);  it  is  the  beginning  of  the 
pious  life  from  which  proceed  all  good  works.  The  works  which 
the  believer  performs  are  hence,  in  so  far  as  they  proceed 
directly  from  faith,  sinless  and  good3  (E.  12.  160;  7.  229; 
10.  4).  Faith  (the  Spirit)  gives  power  to  fulfill  the  law 
(12.  113;  9.  259),  and  that  willingly  and  with  delight  (7. 
290,  296;  10.  88).  The  good  is  written  upon  the  heart  as  a 
law  of  the  Spirit,  as  a  “  living  will  and  an  experimental  life” 
(W.  2.  499).  The  energy  of  faith  finds  expression  in  good 
works.4  “For,  as  faith  brings  to  thee  blessedness  and  eternal 

1  There  are  elements  here — and  they  are  intimately  connected  with  Luther’s 
conception  of  faith — which  present  him  in  the  light  of  a  pioneer  of  the  views 
which  have  been  prevalent  among  us  since  the  days  of  Schleiermacher.  The 
method  of  detecting  the  agent  in  the  effect  is  very  common  in  Luther,  e.  g. : 
Where  faith  is,  there  also  grace  and  the  Holy  Ghost  (E.  7.  164;  12.  99, 
267  f. );  where  works,  there  faith  (13.  228). 

2  Luther  can  even  say,  that  faith  makes  man  a  god,  since  all  things  are 
now  possible  to  him  (E.  10.  31.1  ;  11.  52). 

3  With  this,  indeed,  we  meet  concurrently  the  thought,  that  imputed  right¬ 
eousness  also  makes  the  works  good. 

4  So  far  as  faith  is  exercised  by  ourselves,  it  may  also  be  considered  as 
a  “work  ” — yea,  it  is  the  “  chief  work  ”  (W.  6.  204,  206,  210). 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  259 

life,  so  does  it  also  bring  with  it  good  works  and  is  unrestrained. 
For  just  as  a  living  man  cannot  refrain,  but  must  exert  himself, 
eat  and  drink  and  find  something  to  do,  and  as  it  is  not  possible 
that  such  wrorks  should  fail  to  appear  as  long  as  he  lives,  and  as 
he  does  not  need  to  be  commended  and  driven  to  do  such  works, 
but,  if  he  is  only  alive,  does  them — so  nothing  more  is  needed 
in  order  that  we  may  do  good  works  than  that  it  be  said  :  ‘  Only 
believe,’  and  thou  wilt  do  everything  of  thyself”  (E.  12.  16  f., 
399;  47.  20).  The  Holy  Spirit  brings  it  to  pass  “  that  the 
commandment  of  God  now  begins  also  to  live  in  the  heart 
of  man,  for  he  now  comes  to  have  desire  and  love  for  it,  and 
begins  to  fulfill  it,  and  thus  eternal  life  begins  on  earth”  (9. 
248).  It  is  a  pleasure  for  the  believer  to  serve  God  ;  for  this 
reason  he  does  good,  not  for  the  sake  of  laying  up  “  merits  ”  for 
himself  (W.  6.  207).  The  heaven  within  us,  which  faith  has 
brought  us,  does  these  works  “  without  any  seeking  after  merit  ” 
(E.  7.  165).  Gratitude  prompts  us  to  fulfill  the  will  of  God 
and  to  practice  upon  our  brethren  in  turn  the  love  which  we  ex¬ 
perience  (E.  27.  189  ff.).  In  such  connections,  Luther  not 
infrequently  maintains  that  works  attest  the  presence  of  faith  (E. 
13.  66,  228,  237  b,  266.  Gal.  2.  165).  This  does  not,  of  course, 
mean  that  the  works  make  the  man  pious.  The  contrary  is 
true — the  man  must  first  be  good,  then  will  good  works  follow, 
as  only  the  good  tree  is  able  to  bring  good  fruits  (W.  2.  71, 
492.  E.  7.  249;  27.  191  ff. ).  The  doctrine  of  Christ  is  not 
* ‘ about  doing  and  not  doing,  but  about  becoming;  so  that  it 
may  be  said  :  not  new  work  done,  but  first  become  new ;  not 
lived  otherwise,  but  born  otherwise”  (E.  12.  399).  Only 
those  works  therefore  are  good  which  are  done  by  him  who  has 
through  faith  become  a  good  man.  But  whether  these  works 
come  from  faith  or  from  the  Holy  Spirit,  it  is  clear  that 
they  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  law.  They  are  done  in  the 
“liberty  of  faith”  (e.  g.,  W.  2.  425,  479,  485,  560,  497  ;  8. 
372,  594  b  E.  7.  268,  270;  29.  140  b).  But  since  these 
works  are  effected  in  the  heart  of  man  by  the  Spirit,  they 
naturally  are  in  harmony  with  the  works  of  actual  morality  as 
enjoined  by  the  law  (W.  6.  204,  225). 1  Thus  the  Christian 
performs,  indeed,  the  works  of  the  law,  but  with  free  delight  in 
them,  and  not  because  they  have  been  commanded.  To  sum¬ 
marize  :  The  Holy  Spirit  works  faith  as  the  beginning  of  regen¬ 
eration.  By  this  means  man  becomes  actually  good.  Faith 


1  Cf.  Miiller,  Symbol.  Books,  444  :  That  outside  of  the  Ten  Commandments 
no  work  nor  thing  can  be  good  and  pleasing  to  God,  let  it  be  as  great  and 
precious  as  it  may  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. 


26o 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


becomes  the  beginning  of  a  new  and  pious  life.  Cf.  Thieme,, 
Die  sittl.  Triebkraft  des  Glaubens,  1895.1 

7 .  Only  now  are  we  in  position  to  examine  Luther’ s  doctrine  of 
Justification.  Here,  too,  the  ground  originally  taken  by  him  was 
maintained  (p.  231  f. ) .  But  we  must  bear  constantly  in  mind  that 
the  theological  tradition  of  the  age  discriminated  in  the  process  of 
justification  between  the  infusion  of  grace  and  the  forgiveness  of 
sins,  the  former  being  a  real  and  the  latter  an  ideal  change  in  the: 
sinner  (p.  120  f.,  160  f.,  201  f. ).  Luther,  in  harmony  with, 
this  conception,  regards  the  matter — viewed  in  the  first  aspect — 
as  follows:  The  faith  which  God  awakens  in  man  effects  a  reaf 
inward  righteousness  (  justitia  interior ,  intus  justificatur  peccator. 
W.  1.  1 18,  632  ;  6.  98).  Faith  is  the  inward  righteousness- 
which  heals  the  malady  of  the  soul  of  man  and  makes  him  right¬ 
eous  ( rechtfertig )  (W.  8.  106,  in;  2.  13,  14,  424.  E.  22.  138, 
248  ;  12.  89  ;  13.  238),  for  Christ  and  the  Holy  Spirit  dwell  in 
their  power  in  the  heart  of  the  believer  (W.  2.  458,  490,  749. 
Gal.  1.  245).  Thereby  man  is  made  really  righteous  (E.  12.. 
89.  W.  8.  605).  This  righteousness  is,  however,  by  its  very 
nature  subject  to  a  process  of  development,  which  is  never  com¬ 
pleted  in  this  life.  “  Everyone  who  believes  in  Christ  is  right¬ 
eous,  not  yet  fully  in  reality,  but  in  hope.  For  he  has  begun  to- 
be  justified  and  healed.  .  .  .  But  meanwhile,  while  he  is  being; 
justified  and  healed,  what  remains  of  sin  in  the  flesh  is  not  im¬ 
puted  to  him  for  the  sake  of  Christ,  who,  although  he  is  without 
any  sin,  has  now  become  one  with  his  follower  and  intercedes  for 
him  with  the  Father  (W.  2.  495). 

Here  appears,  it  will  be  observed,  a  new  line  of  thought. 
While  the  process  of  making  righteousness  is  being  carried  for¬ 
ward,  the  sins  yet  cleaving  to  him  who  believes  on  Christ  are  not 
imputed  to  him.  The  sins  of  him  who  is  undergoing  the  process 
of  justification  are  forgiven,  on  the  one  hand,  because  he  is  be¬ 
ginning  to  be  righteous — which  is  God’s  doing — and,  on  the  other 
hand,  because  he  is  living  in  fellowship  with  Christ.  “  Thus, 
because  through  faith  righteousness  and  the  fulfilling  of  the  law 
have  been  begun,  therefore  for  the  sake  of  Christ  in  whom  they 
believe,  what  remains  of  sin  and  of  the  law  yet  unfulfilled  is  not 
imputed.  For  faith  itself,  where  it  has  been  born,  has  this  as 
its  office,  to  purge  the  remains  of  sin  from  the  flesh  ”  (ib.  497). 

1  The  superficial  charge  brought  against  Lutheranism  by  its  opponents  of  all 
ages  and  all  parties,  that  in  Luther’s  circuit  of  thought  good  works  and 
morality  are  not  sufficiently  provided  for,  is  utterly  refuted  in  Thieme’s  work. 
It  may  be  said,  on  the  contrary,  that  in  no  other  of  the  Reformers  does  the 
moral  principle  penetrate  so  deeply  and  directly  to  the  very  centre  of  the  relig¬ 
ious  life. 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT. 


26l 


■“  Sin  remains  there,  but,  because  it  has  begun  to  be  driven  out 
{expurgari') ,  it  is  not  imputed  to  him  who  is  driving  it  out  ” 
(ib.  414).  In  precise  harmony  with  these  utterances  of  A.  D. 
1519,  it  is  said  in  1522,  that,  although  there  are  still  many  sins 
in  us,  4  ‘  Yet  grace  does  so  much,  that  we  are  accounted  altogether 
and  fully  righteous  before  God  .  .  .  takes  us  completely  under 
its  protection  for  the  sake  of  Christ,  our  advocate  and  mediator, 
and  on  account  of  the  fact  that  (its)  gifts  have  been  begun  in  us  1 1 
(E.  63.  1 24). 1  The  idea  is  :  Inasmuch  as  sin  has  been  in  prin¬ 
ciple  shattered  in  the  believer,  and  God  looks  upon  him  in  Christ, 
sin  is  forgiven  and  not  imputed.  The  Smalcald  Articles  (A.  D. 
1 5 3  7  )  follow  the  same  line  of  thought :  “  That  we,  through  faith, 
secure  another  and  new  heart,  and  God,  for  Christ,  our  mediator’s 
;sake,  will  and  does  consider  us  as  entirely  righteous  and  holy. 
Although  sin  in  the  flesh  is  not  yet  entirely  banished  nor  dead, 
yet  he  will  not  impute  nor  recognize  it.  And  upon  such  faith, 
renewal,  and  forgiveness  of  sin  then  follow  good  works.  And 
what  in  these  is  yet  sinful  or  defective,  just  for  Christ’s  sake 
shall  not  be  reckoned  as  sin  or  defect,  but  the  man  shall  both  in 
person  and  in  his  works  be  called  and  be  entirely  righteous  and 
holy,  out  of  pure  grace  and  mercy  shed  abroad  and  poured  out 
upon  us  in  Christ”  (E.  25.  142.  Cf.  11.  171  ;  46.  260). 
The  only  difference  observable  in  this  exposition  is  that  the  dec¬ 
laration  of  man’s  righteousness  by  God  is  no  longer  based  ex¬ 
pressly  upon  the  beginning  of  righteousness  within  man  and  the 
work  of  Christ,  but  only  upon  the  latter.  But  the  difference  is 
only  apparent,  and  Luther  is  right  when  he  claims  to  have  thus 
taught  “  hitherto  and  always  ’  ’  (ib. ) ;  for  in  the  very  first  years  of 
his  reformatory  activity  he  finds  the  ground  of  our  comfort  and 
confidence  only  in  the  mercy  of  God  (A.  D.  1519,  W.  2.  100). 2 
Christ  is  our  righteousness,  since  he,  as  the  bridegroom  to  the 
bride,  gives  what  he  has  to  us  and  bears  our  sin  (W.  2.  146. 
De  W.  1. 17.  E.  27.  182  fi).  Thus  he  teaches  also  at  later 
periods.  In  so  far  as  we  hide  ourselves  in  Christ,  who  has  made 
full  atonement  for  our  sin,  and  like  chickens  seek  protection  under 
the  wings  of  this  hen,  we  are  righteous  before  God.  “For  our 

1  Cf.  W.  8.  92  (A.  D.  1521)  :  Because  they  believe,  and  are  living  undei 
the  kingdom  of  mercy,  and  sin  in  them  is  condemned  and  assiduously  morti¬ 
fied,  therefore  it  is  not  imputed  to  them.  Also  ib.  109,  ill.  E.  8.  255  ; 
9.  310;  7.  226;  12.  97,  100,  103;  13.  239,  267;  14.  17. 

2  Cf.  W.  6.  133  (A.  D.  1520)  :  “We  rest,  I  say,  in  the  righteousness  of 
Christ,  by  which  he  is  righteous,  because  we  cling  to  this,  through  which  he  is 
acceptable  to  God  and  intercedes  as  our  advocate  for  us  and  makes  himself 
entirely  ours  ...  as  impossible  as  it  is  therefore  that  Christ  in  his  righteous¬ 
ness  should  not  be  acceptable,  so  impossible  is  it  that  we  by  our  faith,  by 
which  we  cling  to  his  righteousness,  should  not  be  acceptable.” 


262 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


faith  and  all  that  we  may  have  from  God  is  not  sufficient,  yea  it 
is  not  genuine,  unless  it  seeks  refuge  under  the  wings  of  this  hen 
and  believes  firmly  that  not  we  but  Christ  can  render  and  has 
rendered  satisfaction  for  us  to  the  righteousness  of  God,  and  that 
grace  and  salvation  are  granted  to  us,  not  for  the  sake  of  our 
faith,  but  for  Christ’s  sake  ”  (E.  7.  178;  3.424;  10.226;  15. 
381,  486;  28.417;  46.71.  W.  8.  hi  f. ).  If  we  look  upon 
the  faith  which  we  have,  it  is  only  a  beginning  of  righteousness 
(Gal.  2.  312  ;  cf.  E.  16.  256)  ;  but  if  we  look  upon  Christ,  who- 
is  embraced  by  this  faith  as  a  precious  stone  in  a  ring,  it  may  be 
said:  ‘  ‘  God  regards  him  as  righteous  ’  ’  (Gal.  1.  195,  322,339). 
The  true,  abiding  righteousness  is  wrought  in  us  by  the  gracious 
forgiveness  of  sins  guaranteed  us  through  the  work  of  Christ  and 
through  his  “return  to  the  Father”  (E.  25.  76;  50.  60  f.;  7. 
299.  Opp.  ex.  19.  43.  Opp.  var.  arg.  5.  438).  “Sin  is  indeed 
still  present,  but  it  is  forgiven  ”  (E.  5.  251).  It  is  another’s  {eine 
fremde )  righteousness  which  is  transferred  to  us  (E.  14.  12. 
Opp.  ex.  5.  269)  :  “  That  we  may  become  righteous  and  deliv¬ 
ered  from  sin  through  forgiveness  of  sins”  (E.  5.  247).  And  yet 
it  remains  true,  in  Luther’s  mind,  that  abiding  righteousness  be¬ 
fore  God  belongs  to  him  alone  in  whom  actual  righteousness  has: 
through  faith  begun  to  exist,1  not  indeed  because  this  faith  as  a 
human  activity  constitutes  the  subjective  beginning  of  actual 
righteousness,  and  thus  embraces  in  itself  also  love- (per  contra, 
Gal.  1.  137),  but  because  it,  as  a  work  of  the  Christ  most  actively 
working  in  us ,  and  by  virtue  of  the  power  of  Christ,  furnishes 
the  guarantee  for  the  continuance  of  the  process  of  advancing 
actual  righteousness.  Not  for  the  sake  of  man’s  faith,  but  be¬ 
cause  Christ,  the  Redeemer,  constitutes  the  substance  and  power 
of  this  faith,  does  God,  through  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  pro¬ 
nounce  the  believer  righteous.  “  Therefore  it  is  not  our  right¬ 
eousness,  but  Christ’s  righteousness — yea,  this  righteousness  is 
Christ  himself,  and  yet  becomes  my  righteousness  if  I  believe” 
(E.  3.  435  ;  50.  61.  Opp.  ex.  18.  189  f.). 

1  Very  instructive  is  his  development  of  the  parallel  between  the  influences 
flowing  from  Adam  and  from  Christ  (E.  13.  120)  :  “  As  sin  has  been  inherited 
by  us  from  Adam,  and  has  now  become  our  own,  so  must  also  Christ’s  right¬ 
eousness  and  life  become  our  own,  in  such  a  way  that  the  same  power  of  right¬ 
eousness  and  life  may  work  in  us,  just  as  though  they  had  also  been  inherited 
by  us  from  him.  For  there  is  in  him  not  a  merely  personal,  but  an  actual  and 
powerful  righteousness  and  life — yea,  a  fountain  which  gushes  and  flows  forth 
into  all  who  become  partakers  of  himself,  just  as  from  Adam  sin  and  death  have 
flowed  into  man’s  whole  nature.  And  it  is  therefore  now  declared  that  men 
become  righteous  and  alive  from  sin  and  death,  not  from  themselves  or  through 
themselves,  but  through  the  alien  righteousness  and  life  of  this  Lord  Christ, 
namely,  when  he  touches  them  with  his  hand  and  imparts  to  them  through  the 
word  his  work  and  power  to  blot  out  sin  and  death,  and  they  believe  the  same.  ’  ’ 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  263 

Whoever  will  be  at  pains  to  compare  with  this  the  utterances 
of  Luther  at  the  beginning  of  his  career  must  confess  that  he  has 
steadfastly  kept  within  the  lines  which  he  then  marked  out  : 
(1)  Christ,  or  the  Holy  Spirit,  works  faith.  In  the  believer 
(the  regenerated)  Christ  is  efficaciously  present,  together  with  the 
Holy  Spirit,  through  and  in  his  faith.  Man  is  thereby  renewed 
( verneuert ),  made  4  4  actually  ”  righteous.  44  Justification  is,  in 
fact,  a  certain  regeneration  into  newness  (of  life)  ”  (Jen.  i, 
540  v) .  (  2  )  But  this  fermentative  energy  of  faith  is  a  progressive 

and  not  seldom  interrupted  process.  The  sinner  can  hence  find  se¬ 
cure  comfort  only  through  the  fact  that  God,  by  virtue  of  the  union 
between  Christ  and  the  believer  effected  and  made  effectual  in 
faith,  imputes  to  him  the  righteousness  which  Christ  has  secured 
for  him,  i.  e. ,  forgives  him  his  sins.  This  is  the  4  4  personal  ’  ’ 
righteousness  which  avails  for  the  whole  man  and  makes  him, 
despite  his  sins,  acceptable  to  God.  In  this  are  firmly  rooted 
the  consolation  of  the  believing  conscience  and  the  assurance  of 
salvation.1 

If  we  now  review  these  delineations  of  the  process  involved  in 
the  justification  of  the  sinner,  it  must,  it  appears  to  me,  be  evi¬ 
dent  to  all  that  the  deepest  motives  of  the  Pauline  and  Johan- 
nine  cycles  of  thought  find  expression  in  them ;  but,  none  the 
less,  that  they  are  moulded  formally  upon  the  pattern  of  the 
medieval  idea  of  justification.  But,  in  place  of  the  infused 
grace  of  the  earlier  theology,  is  now  the  Christ  working  effect¬ 
ually  in  us.  And  the  powerless  forgiveness  of  sins,  which  was  in 
one  way  or  another  merely  a  pendant  to  the  gratia  infusa ,  is  re¬ 
placed  by  the  energizing  consciousness,  inseparably  connected 
with  the  contemplation  of  the  life  and  work  of  Jesus,2  that  his 
redemptive  work  means  for  us  the  forgiveness  of  our  sins.3 

8.  This  leads  us  to  Luther’s  conception  of  Grace.  It  must  be 

1  Cf.  Opp.  ex.  19.  48  (A.  D.  1532)  :  44  These  \.he  two  parts  of  justifi¬ 
cation.  The  former  is  the  grace  revealed  through  Christ,  that  through  Christ 
we  have  a  God  appeased,  so  that  sin  is  no  longer  able  to  accuse  us,  but  the  confi¬ 
dence  of  conscience  in  the  mercy  of  God  is  reduced  to  certainty.  The  latter 
is  the  bestowal  of  the  Spirit  with  his  gifts,  who  illuminates  against  the  pollu¬ 
tions  of  the  spirit  and  the  flesh.”  So  also,  E.  12.  285.  It  is  no  more  than  a 

„  dividing  of  this  second  element  of  righteousness,  when  Luther  in  other  con¬ 
nections  discriminates  between  an  “inward”  and  an  “outward”  righteous¬ 
ness,  describing  the  former  as  “  righteousness  in  the  heart”  and  the  latter  as  the- 
“  fruit,  result,  and  proof”  of  the  former.  E.  g .,  E.  13.  238,  269.  W.  2.  146, 

2  Here,  as  in  connection  with  the  above  remarks  upon  the  “  workings”  cf 
Christ,  must  be  borne  in  mind,  what  Luther  has  said  (see  supra,  pp. 
230  f.,  252  f . )  touching  the  contemplation  of  Christ  and  the  continued  activity 
of  the  exalted  Saviour. 

3  If  this  doctrine  of  justification  shall  appear  “  unlutheran  ”  to  any,  they 
must  explain  to  their  own  satisfaction  the  fact  that  it  comes  from  Luther  ! 


264 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


said  here,  first  of  all,  that  Luther  never  wearied  of  assailing 
every  form  of  work-righteousness  and  all  claims  to  human  merit. 
This  is  a  leading  point  in  his  reformatory  ideas.  As  he  who  now 
performs  good  works  does  not  aim  thereby  to  gain  merits,  since 
God  is,  in  the  last  instance,  the  original  source  of  the  works 
(E.  7.  165.  Cf.  above  under  6),1  so  also  by  the  conception 
of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  all  meriting  or  atoning  is  excluded 
(E.  15.  385;  9.  257  f.;  24.  98;  46.  106).  By  his  own  merit 
can  no  one  become  righteous  or  be  saved  (46.  69;  43.  362); 
nor  can  anyone  even  act  meritoriously  before  the  recep¬ 
tion  of  grace  (43.  360).  “  When  we  are  speaking  of  that 

which  concerns  the  Christian  life  .  .  .  how  we  may  become 
pious  before  God  and  secure  forgiveness  of  sin  and  eternal  life, 
then  all  our  merit  is  absolutely  excluded  ( rein  abgeschnitten ) 
and  we  should  not  hear  nor  know  anything  of  it  ”  (E.  43.  359. 
Gal.  1.  185  f.,  193  f. ).  Thus  is  this  idea,  which  had  since  the 
days  of  Tertullian  exerted  its  fateful  influence  in  the  Western 
church,  finally  ejected  from  the  Christian  conception  of  religion.2 
But  this  was  made  possible  by  the  new  understanding  of  grace ; 
for  so  long  as  the  conception  of  the  latter  as  a  substantial  endow¬ 
ment  prevailed,  the  legalistic  view  of  the  relation  between  God 
and  man,  together  with  the  associated  notions  of  merit,  consti¬ 
tuted  a  counter-weight  to  it,  preserving  the  personal  element  in 
the  relation  of  man  to  God. 

The  dominant  idea  in  the  medieval  doctrine  of  grace  is  the 
gratia  creata ,  as  a  quality  created  in  man  (<?.  g.,  Biel,  p.  195). 
Against  this  idea  Luther’s  criticism  is  directed.  “I  accept 
grace  here  properly  as  meaning  the  favor  of  God ,  not  a  quality 
of  the  soul  as  our  more  recent  writers  have  taught  ”  (W.  8.  106, 
92  f.  E.  7.  170).  God’s  favor,  his  merciful  will,  as  it  is  re¬ 
vealed  and  proclaimed  by  Christ,  is  grace  (W.  6.  209.  E.  7. 
128  f . ;  10.  90,  cf.  50.  61  ;  46.  69).  Hence  it  follows  that 
God — just  because  he  is  love — forgives  sin.  The  effect  of  this 
grace  is  not  a  quality  “attached  ”  to  the  soul,  but  forgiveness 
and  salvation  (E.  5.  246  f. ).  From  the  grace  of  God  thus  un¬ 
derstood  must  be  discriminated  the  gift  bestowed  upon  its 
recipient.  “Grace  and  gift  differ  in  this,  that  grace  properly 
means  the  favor,  or  regard,  which  he  in  himself  cherishes  toward 
us,  by  which  he  is  disposed  to  pour  upon  us  Christ  and  the  Spirit 
with  his  gifts”  (E.  63.  123  ;  12.  285).  This  is  by  no  means  to 
be  understood  as  equivalent  to  the  gifts  of  the  gratia  creata  ;  for 

1  We  may  therefore  understand  also  the  declaration,  that  works  are  unsuited, 
yea,  even  offensive,  and  a  hindrance  to  justification.  (E.  10.  161.) 

2  Upon  the  popular  use  of  the  idea — drawn  from  the  Scriptures — see  E.  43. 
364  ff. 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT. 


265 


grace  in  the  sense  of  gift  is  most  clearly  discriminated  from  the 
“quality”  of  the  old  theory.  “It  is  a  very  great,  strong, 
powerful,  and  active  thing — this  grace  of  God.  It  does  not  lie, 
as  the  dream-preachers  falsely  teach,  in  the  souls  of  men  and 
sleep  and  allow  itself  to  be  carried  by  them  as  a  painted  board 
carries  its  color.  Nay,  not  so  !  It  carries,  it  leads,  it  drives, 
it  begets,  it  transforms,  it  works  all  things  in  man,  and  makes 
itself  felt  and  experienced.”  This  is  the  grace  which  “trans¬ 
forms  and  renews”  man  (E.  7.  170  f. ,  30.  368). 1  It  is  the 
same  thing  to  which  Luther  applies  the  term,  Gift.  The  two 
elements  in  the  definition  are  therefore  related  as  follows  :  ( 1 ) 
Grace  expresses  the  favor,  or  the  loving-will,  of  God,  as  revealed 
in  his  not  imputing  sin.  (2)  The  word  “grace,”  or  “gift,” 
designates  the  peculiar  workings  of  this  loving-will  within  the 
heart  of  man.  With  these  two  aspects  of  grace  naturally  corre¬ 
spond  the  two  meanings  of  the  term,  Justification  (p.  263).  The 
old  conception  of  grace,  as  wrought  out  by  Augustine  (Vol.  I., 
p.  350  f. )  is  here  overthrown.  From  the  time  of  Duns,  the  irre¬ 
sistibly-working  natural  power  of  grace  had  been  but  a  respect¬ 
able  phrase  (see  note,  i.  e.,  on  this  page).  The  Augustinianism 
of  the  closing  Middle  Ages  (supra,  p.  207)  then  sought  to  repris- 
tinate  Augustine’s  doctrine  of  grace.  Luther  replaced  and  sur¬ 
passed  it  with  the  idea  of  the  personal  loving-will  of  God,  which 
is  omnipresently  and  omnipotently  accomplishing  its  work  in  the 
hearts  of  men.  It  is  in  this  only  that  we  discover  the  deepest  re¬ 
ligious  motives  underlying  Luther’s  De  serzw  arbitrio  (p.  244  f. ). 
Luther’s  God  is  the  Almighty  Loving-Will — almighty  power, 
present  in  all  that  exists  and  shall  exist  (30.  58),  almighty 
energy  also  in  the  outworking  of  love.2  The  grace  of  this  God 
is  a  working  force,  not  a  quiescent  quality  in  the  soul. 

9.  Faith  in  the  grace  of  God  embraces  the  conviction  that  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  is  ‘granted  “not  for  nothing,  nor  without 
satisfaction  of  his  righteousness  (justice).  For  there  can  be  no 
room  for  mercy  and  grace  to  work  upon  us  and  in  us  .  .  .  satis¬ 
faction  must  first  be  rendered  most  completely  to  righteousness, 

1  The  “  Sophists,”  Thomas  and  Scotus,  say  of  it,  “  that  it  adorns  and  helps 
to  produce  the  works”  (ib.);  cf.  supra,  p.  158,  119.  Luther  rejected  the 
gratia  infusa,  as  an  empty  notion.  At  this  point  the  criticisms  of  Duns  pre¬ 
pared  the  way,  as  the  gratia  infusa  was  for  him  little  more  than  a  phrase 
(p.  1 59  f. ).  Luther  rejected  the  “  infused  grace  ”  not  because  it  attributed 
too  much  to  God,  but  because  it  attributed  too  little  to  him. 

2  But  Luther  never,  when  unfolding  his  religious  ideas,  especially  in  his 
sermons,  permitted  these  principles  to  lead  him  to  determinism  or  predesti¬ 
nation.  For  him  there  exists  between  God  and  man  a  personal  and  ethical 
relation.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  that  the  power  of  love  of  which  he  thinks 
is,  in  the  last  analysis,  the  spiritual  power  of  the  person  of  Christ. 


266 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Matt.  5.  1 8.”  (E.  7.  175).  This  compels  us  here  to  consider 
the  “  Work  of  Christ.”1  (0)  It  is  Luther’s  firm  conviction  that 
justification  does  not  rest  upon  an  arbitrary  imputation  by  God, 
as  the  passion  of  Christ  would  otherwise  have  been  unnecessary 
(E.  7.  298).  In  this,  he  takes  up  arms  against  the  Scotist 
theory  of  an  arbitrary  divine  will.2  “  But  if  the  wrath  of  God 
is  to  be  taken  from  me  and  I  am  to  obtain  grace  and  forgiveness, 
then  must  it  be  merited  ( abverdienet )  from  him  by  someone ; 
for  God  cannot  be  favorable  nor  gracious  toward  sins,  nor  remove 
penalty  and  wrath,  unless  payment  be  made  and  satisfaction  ren¬ 
dered  for  them”  (11.  290;  9.  381  f.  W.  2.  137).  But 
Christ,  in  obedience  to  the  Father,  serving  our  race  in  love,  has 
offered  this  satisfaction  or  payment  to  God  through  his  life  and 
death  (E.  8.  177;  15.  57b  W.  1.  270  ;  2.  146).  The  pur¬ 
pose  which  inspired  him  in  so  doing  was  to  obtain  for  himself 
the  human  race  as  a  kingdom  and  to  become  their  Lord  (W.  2. 
97.  E.  22.  66).  All  his  acts  and  his  endurance  were  subor¬ 
dinated  to  this  purpose,  to  become  the  Lord,  that  is,  “a  help¬ 
ful  power  to  his  subjects.”  His  government  is  forgiveness  of 
sins,  peace  and  righteousness  (E.  20.  146  f. ;  48.  265  f. ; 

50.  61).  He  rules  through  the  gospel  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
(E.  14.  251  ;  7.  55;  8.  229;  40.  88).  “For  we  should 
regard  Christ’s  kingdom  as  a  great  and  beautiful  dome  or  roof, 
everywhere  stretched  out  above  us,  which  covers  us  and  protects 
us  from  the  wrath  of  God ;  yea,  as  a  great  wide  heaven  where 
nothing  but  grace  and  forgiveness  shine  and  fill  the  world  and 
all  things,  so  that  ail  sins  are  in  comparison  scarcely  as  a  spark 
to  the  great  wide  ocean”  (14.  18 1  f. ).  But,  as  his  reign 
brings  to  men  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  so  does  it  bring  also  the 
fullness  of  all  virtue,  faith,  love,  purity,  happiness,  and  obedient 
service.  “  This  flows  over  upon  the  Christian  world  from  its 
Lord,  who  is  a  head  and  beginning  of  all  grace  and  virtue  ’  ’  (W. 
6.  13b).  The  purpose  of  the  work  of  Christ  is  therefore  the 
establishment  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  i.  e.,  he  becomes  Lord, 
in  that  he  forgives  sins  and  inspires  to  a  new  life. 

(A)  The  Acts  and  Sufferings  of  Christ  are  subordinate  to 
this  purpose.3  Luther  presented  the  so-called  objective  aspect 

1  Luther  uses  this  term,  E.  7.  109;  14.  1 15.  Upon  the  atonement  as 
a  reconciliation  of  love  and  righteousness,  cf.  supra,  p.  67,  1 1 2,  156  f. ,  200. 
Vol.  I.,  p.  295,  361. 

2  But  he  does  not,  like  Anselm,  postulate  the  necessity  of  the  atonement 
upon  general  grounds,  but  deduces  it  as  an  inference  from  the  actual  fact  of 
the  passion  of  Christ.  On  the  contrary,  see  the  Scotist  ideas,  supra,  p.  15 1  : 
“God  is  not  pious  because  he  does  this  work,  but  the  work  is  right,  good, 
holy,  and  well  done,  because  he  himself  does  it  ”  (E.  35.  168). 

3  Let  it  be  observed,  further,  that  Christ  here  appears  everywhere  as  the 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  267 

of  the  atonement  with  energy  and  with  variety  of  form.  The 
sinful  race  was  under  the  wrath  of  God,  under  debt  to  him, 
fallen  under  the  power  of  the  devil,  under  obligation  to  the  law, 
subject  to  penalties  for  the  transgression  of  the  law,  or  to  eternal 
death  (E.  15.  57).  But  Christ  has  entered  the  race,  and  in 
such  a  way  that  he  bore  for  us  the  lot  which  had  become  ours 
through  sin  :  “  But  now  has  he  stepped  into  our  place  and  for 
our  sakes  suffered  law,  sin,  and  death  to  fall  upon  him”  (51. 
272).  He  pays  and  makes  good  for  our  debt,  so  that  we  are 
released  from  it  (6.  371  f. ).  He  is  sacrifice  and  payment  for 
the  sin  of  the  world  (12.  246,  118  ;  18.  49  ;  2.  249  ;  3.  100  ; 
47.  46  ;  48.  97;  50.  246).  Christ  “as  himself  guilty”  has 
“  stepped  into  the  place  of  our  sinful  nature,  heaped  upon  him¬ 
self  and  vanquished  all  the  wrath  of  God  which  we  had  merited  ’  ’ 
(7.  302  ;  11.  290).  He  was  compelled  “to  feel  in  his  tender, 
innocent  heart  the  wrath  and  judgment  of  God  against  sin, 
to  taste  for  us  eternal  death  and  perdition,  and,  in  short,  to  suffer 
everything  which  a  condemned  sinner  has  deserved  and  must 
eternally  suffer”  (39.  48). 1  But  all  this  he  endured,  “  that  the 
wrath  of  God  might  be  placated,  in  order  that  we  might  stand  in 
grace  and  have  forgiveness”  (W.  8.  442.  E.  10.  418;  11. 
290;  12.  283;  311;  14.  119;  20.161).  He  likewise  fulfilled 
in  our  stead  and  for  our  benefit  the  law,  which  affected  only  sin¬ 
ners,  and  endured  the  penalties  prescribed  for  its  violation  (E.  15. 
260  f. ;  1.310#.;  14.  154b;  161).  He  thereby  “rendered  satisfac¬ 
tion  to  the  law”  (15.  17 ;  11.  314 ),/.<?.,  the  law  has,  since  he 
has  satisfied  its  demands,  no  right  and  no  further  claim  to  men 
(15.57  b,  262). 2  He  also  robs  the  devil  of  his  “right  and 

God-man.  His  divinity  is  recognized  in  his  works,  e.  g.,  from  his  mediatorial 
activity  (E.  18.  225  ;  16.  211);  or  from  the  infinite  nature  of  the  atonement 
and  his  appeasing  of  the  wrath  of  God  (11.  290 ;  49.  1 39  ;  46.  366;  45. 
315  f . ;  46.  46);  or  from  his  exercising  of  the  sovereignty  of  God  in  the  world 
(10.  345  ;  40.  50.  Opp.  ex.  23.  308;  18.  85);  or  from  his  power  to  save 
(47.  6,  198);  or  from  the  fact  that  we  can  believe  only  on  God  (47.  44). 

1  Luther  can,  of  course,  not  mean  to  say  that  Christ  was  eternally  dead  and 
accursed,  for  the  latter  could  not  be  the  case,  if  for  no  other  reason,  because 
the  former  was  not  true.  He  means  that  Christ  endured,  as  all  other  conse¬ 
quences  of  sin,  also  an  abandonment  by  God  which  corresponded  with  that 
awaiting  the  lost.  See  W.  2.  260  :  “  was  forsaken  by  God,  as  one  who  is 
eternally  accursed.’ ’  Cf.  20.  1 6 1  ;  46.  191. 

2  That  is,  since  the  law  laid  hold  upon  Christ,  the  sinless  One,  Christ 
robbed  it  of  its  power  over  the  race.  It  is  made  powerless.  This  is  explained 
in  a  thoroughly  mythological  way  (cf.  the  outwitting  of  death  and  the  devil, 
45.  318;  46.  370)  ;  e.  g.,  E.  15.  261  ;  18.  176  f.  But  in  the  last  citation 
above  appears  the  expression,  “to  satisfy  the  law.”  In  order  to  understand 
this,  we  must  clearly  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  relation  established  by  the 
law  between  man  and  God  is  to  be  regarded  as  one,  not  of  private,  but 
of  public  obligation.  This  is  of  the  very  highest  importance,  for  it  reveals  the 


268 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


power  ”  over  men,  because  he  “slew  Christ  without  any  guilt  ” 
(49-  25°  1  33-  io7)* 

Christ  therefore  became  a  sacrifice  for  our  debt ;  he  endured 
the  wrath  of  God,  took  upon  himself  the  works  and  penalties  of 
the  law,  suffered  the  assaults  of  the  devil  and  of  death.  All  this 
carries  us  back  to  the  will  of  God,  who  would  not  forgive  before 
satisfaction  had  been  rendered  to  his  justice.  “  God,  neverthe¬ 
less  (/.  e.,  despite  his  mercy)  required  that  satisfaction  be  made 
for  sin,  and  that  his  honor  and  law  be>  recompensed.  ’  ’  His 
mercy  sent  forth  Christ,  “who  merited  it  for  us  and  in  our 
stead”  (15.  385.  Cf.  12.  266).  The  death  of  Christ  was  the 
payment,  or  satisfaction,  for  our  sins  (19.  74,  21 1  f. ;  11.  290  ; 
28.  240).  Thus  God  requires  also  that  positive  satisfaction  be 
rendered  to  his  law,  which  is  accomplished  by  Christ’s  perfect 
meeting  of  its  demands.  What  he  did  in  this  respect  is  as 
though  we  had  ourselves  done  it  (7.  177  f. ;  11.  314;  1.  312). 
Luther’s  idea  is  thus:  The  ordinance  of  the  law,  established  by 
God  for  the  sinful  race  of  men,  has  been  with  its  penalties  abol¬ 
ished  by  Christ,  in  that  he  fulfilled  the  law  and  endured  its 
penalties — and  that  in  such  a  way  that  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
prevent  the  execution  of  the  penalties  of  the  law,  while  his  active 
fulfillment  of  the  law’s  requirements  deprives  the  whole  ordinance 
of  the  law  of  its  force.  Thus  Christ  passed  through  the  whole 
course  of  human  existence  from  conception  to  the  state  of  the 
dead,  and  thereby  “consecrated  and  hallowed  it  ”  (20.  156  ff. , 
150).  “  In  him  and  through  him  ”  we  become  free  from  death 

and  all  misfortune  (ib.  172).  He  who  holds  to  him  in  faith  is 
for  his  sake  free  as  well  from  the  works  as  from  the  penalties  of 
the  law.  Christ  bestows  upon  us  his  piety  and  his  sufferings 
(12.  230).1  His  obedience,  innocence,  and  holiness  are  our  con¬ 
solation  (1.  311;  7.  178.  W.  1.  593). 

entirely  different  meanings  attached  by  Luther  and  Anselm  to  the  ‘  ‘  satisfac¬ 
tion  ”  rendered  by  Christ.  In  Anselm,  the  satisfaction  is  brought  to  God  per¬ 
sonally,  as  to  an  offended  private  man  ;  according  to  Luther,  it  consists  in  the 
fulfilling  of  the  divinely  given  system  of  laws  by  our  representative,  Christ. 
Since  satisfaction  is  rendered  to  this  moral  order  of  the  world  and  it  is  thus 
recognized  and  actually  honored,  the  wrath  of  God  is  appeased,  and  the  law 
made  powerless.  There  is  thus  presented  a  really  ethical  view,  capable  of  the 
most  profound  interpretation,  in  contrast  with  the  objectionable  anthropo¬ 
morphism  of  Anselm.  Here  again  Duns  prepared  the  way  for  Luther.  Sent, 
iv.  d.  14,  q.  I,  7. 

1  For  ethical  purposes,  Luther  stripped  the  conception  of  “  Satisfaction  ”  of 
its  validity,  as  he  had  already  (supra,  p.  264)  done  with  that  of  merit  ( 1 1.  296, 
280  :  “  Therefore  let  this  word,  Satisfaction,  henceforth  be  nothing  and  dead  in 
our  churches  and  our  theology,  be  committed  to  the  judges  and  to  the  schools 
of  the  jurists,  where  it  belongs  and  whence  the  papists  derived  it ;  ”  vid.  Tertul., 
Vol.  I.,  p.  133).  Yet  in  the  doctrine  of  Redemption  both  conceptions  play 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  269 

(V)  Christ  has,  according  to  the  will  of  the  Father,  appeased 
wrath,  satisfied  the  law,  and  effected  the  forgiveness  of  sins. 
Grace  is  now  maintained  through  his  continuous  intercession  in 
heaven.  We  need  no  sacrifice,  since  his  blood  atones  eternally 
(E.  8.  154;  9.  236;  28.  240)  and  he  “  without  ceasing  offers 
before  God”  (W.  6.  369;  cf.  1.  703.  E.  7.  109;  12.  118; 
47-  23). 

These  thoughts  are  for  Luther  of  great  practical  importance. 
Since  sin  at  all  times  yet  clings  to  the  believer,  he  experiences 
also  the  divine  wrath  directed  against  him.  To  counteract  this, 
he  lays  hold  of  the  thought  that  Christ  intercedes  for  him  before 
the  Father.  He  who  now  by  faith  is  united  to  Christ  becomes 
certain  that,  for  the  sake  of  Christ’s  intercession,  God  forgives 
him  his  sin  (Gal.  1.  338  f. ),  for  that  intercession  silences  the 
demands  of  the  law  upon  us,  since  he  has  fulfilled  it ;  and 
he  frees  us  from  sin,  death,  and  the  devil,  since  he  has  vanquished 
them.  But  this  avails  for  us  only  in  so  far  as  we  ‘ 4  creep  beneath 
his  mantle  and  wings,”  i.  e.,  believe  (E.  14.  154  ff . ,  159,  156; 
48.  275).  Since  Christ  intercedes  for  us,  and  his  work  is  well 
pleasing  to  the  Father,  we  are  sure  of  being  in  favor  with  God 
(E.  15.  237  ff. ).  “  But  we  are  very  certain  that  Christ  is 

pleasing  to  God.  ...  In  so  far,  therefore,  as  Christ  is  pleas¬ 
ing  and  we  cling  to  him,  in  so  far  we  also  are  pleasing  to  God 
.  .  .  and  although  sin  clings  in  the  flesh  .  .  .  nevertheless 
grace  is  more  abundant  and  more  powerful  than  sin.  .  .  . 
Wherefore  sin  is  not  able  to  terrify  us  nor  make  us  doubtful  con¬ 
cerning  the  grace  of  God  in  us.  For  Christ,  the  most  mighty 
giant,  has  borne  the  law,  condemned  sin,  abolished  death  and 
all  evils.  So  long  as  he  is  at  the  right  hand  of  God  interceding 
for  us,  we  cannot  on  account  of  ourselves  doubt  concerning  the 
grace  of  God  ”  (Gal.  2.  164!.). 

(</)  But  Christ  is  not  only  our  representative  before  God  ;  he 
also  represents  God  among  us.  This  comes  to  pass  in  that  he  re¬ 
veals  to  us  the  love  of  God  and  thereby  awakens  in  us  faith  and 
love.  According  to  this,  a  further  element  must  be  included  in 
the  Work  of  Christ.  Christ  not  only  secures  the  revelation  of  the 
grace  of  God,  but  he  also  imparts  it  to  us.  “  It  was  necessary 
for  him  to  appear  before  God  for  us  and  be  our  veil,  shield,  and 
hen,  beneath  whom  we  have  forgiveness  of  sin  and  salvation 
from  the  wrath  of  God  and  from  hell.  And  not  only  this ,  but  he 
in  addition  gives  the  Holy  Spirit,  that  we  may  also  follow  him 

a  leading  role  in  Luther — and  until  the  present  day  !  (Upon  the  term  merit, 
see  also  E.  7.  179,  194,  195  ;  15.  385;  28.  417.  W.  1.  309,  428,  etc. ) 
But  this  is  with  Luther  no  inconsistency,  for  both  conceptions  fall  within  the 
lines  of  the  relation  between  man  and  God  as  fixed  by  the  law. 


270 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


and  here  begin  to  quench  and  crucify  sin  ”  (E.  14.  161  f. ).  As 
the  intercession  of  Christ  applies  both  to  his  earthly  life  and  to 
his  present  existence,  so  also  does  his  revealing  agency.  Christ 
once  on  earth  revealed  God,  and  he  now  does  so  again,  in  that  his 
word  is  preached,  the  Spirit  sent  by  him,  and  thereby  a  new  life 
begotten  within  us  (e.  g.,  14.  x  5 5  ) . 1  He  is  the  ground  of  the 
forgiveness  of  sins,  and  is  at  the  same  time  the  source  of  faith  and 
of  personal  righteousness  (Opp.  ex.  18.  189.  E.  14.  119b,  supra, 
p.  260  ff.).  “Therefore  has  God  given  us,  in  the  first  place,  a 
man  who  should  make  complete  satisfaction  for  us  to  the  divine  jus¬ 
tice.  In  the  second  place,  he  through  the  same  Man  pours  out 
grace  and  rich  blessing.”  This  occurs  through  regeneration  (7. 
177).  “  This  is  grace  upon  grace,  that  we  are  pleasing  also  to  the 
Father  for  the  sake  of  the  Lord  Christ,  and  that  we  also  through 
Christ  receive  the  Holy  Ghost  and  become  righteous  ”  (46.68). 
From  Christ,  as  the  Second  Adam  and  head  of  the  new  race, 
streams  into  us  new  life  and  righteousness,  for  he  dwells  and 
reigns  in  us  (E.  13.  225  f.  W.  2.  531,  502,  529).  It  is  only 
a  varied  application  of  this  thought,  when  it  is  said  that  the  love 
of  Christ  begets  a  responsive  love  in  our  hearts  (W.  2.  523  ;  6. 
117.  E.  12.  258  f.,  312),  or  when  he  is  represented  as  our 
pattern,  or,  in  the  earlier  writings,  as  a  “divine  legislator” 
(W.  1.  533). 2  But  in  the  discussions  of  Christ  as  our  pattern, 
we  observe  a  connection  between  this  subjective  aspect  of  re¬ 
demption  and  its  objective  side.  To  regard  Christ  merely  as  an 
example  is  papistic  and  fanatical  error  (E.  8.  235  f.,  248;  9. 
244  b;  15.  388;  29.  27 8). 3  “Imitation  does  not  make  sons, 
but  sonship  makes  imitators  ”  (W.  2.  518.  E.  29.  211).  We 
must  first  accept  Christ  in  faith  “as  a  sacrifice  and  portion  ”  and 
thereby  become  blessed  and  righteous,  and  only  then  follows 
“the  example  and  imitation”  (E.  7.  303  f.;  8.  3). 4 

1  Luther  thus  ascribes  to  Christ  a  representative  agency  toward  men  similar 
to  that  which  he  exercises  in  behalf  of  men  before  God.  But  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  revelation  of  Christ  through  the  Holy  Spirit,  being  lim¬ 
ited  to  the  Word,  cannot  go  essentially  beyond  the  historical  revelation  made 
during  his  earthly  life.  E.  12.  300,  and  cf.  $  69,  2. 

2  Luther  afterward  expressly  rejects  this  term,  e.  g.,  E.  7.  298;  47.  302. 

3  How  striking  is  this  remark  in  view  of  the  history  of  the  Imitatio  Christi , 
e.  g.y  supra,  p.  178,  179. 

4  Luther  often  speaks  of  the  Follozving  of  Christ  in  the  sense  of  the  imita¬ 
tion  of  him  as  our  pattern,  e.g..  W.  1.  328,  264.,  320,  612,  697  ;  2.  13S,  141, 
147  b>  15 L  5oi,  747  ;  6.  275  ;  8.  367,  420.  E.  29.  11  ;  8.  157,  234,  247, 
251  ;  9.  51  ;  11.  52,  171  ;  14.  46  ;  15.  175,  425,  462  ;  17.  41.  Only  sel¬ 
dom,  so  far  as  I  can  recall,  did  he  designate  the  “  Following  ”  in  the  original 
sense  (supra,  p.  180,  n.  I,  cf.  E.  48.  276)  expressly  as  faith  (W.  1.  275);  but 
this  idea  lies  at  the  foundation  of  his  entire  conception  of  the  faith  obtained  in 
the  contemplation  of  the  historical  Christ. 


REPENTANCE,  FAITH,  SIN,  GRACE,  ATONEMENT.  27  I 

(<?)  Reviewing  now  the  work  of  Christ  as  thus  portrayed,  it  is 
evident  that,  as  in  the  medieval  presentations  of  the  subject,  the 
features  of  that  work  having  relation  to  man  are  to  be  discrim¬ 
inated  from  those  relating  to  God.  Christ  reconciled  the 
Father,  and  he  revealed  God  to  us.  In  the  first  aspect  of  his 
work,  all  .the  conceptions  of  the  traditional  teaching  are  pre¬ 
served,  i.  e.y  satisfaction,  merit,  sacrifice,  deliverance  from  sin, 
death,  hell,  devil,  etc.1  Yet  it  is  important  to  observe  that  there 
is  here,  after  all,  a  certain  modification  of  the  thought.  'Luther’s 
fundamental  idea  of  the  subject  is  as  follows :  On  account  of  sin, 
God  has  placed  the  race  under  the  law,  with  its  demands  and 
penalties.  The  relation  of  man  to  God  is  accordingly  not  to  be 
apprehended  in  the  light  of  private  obligation  (law),  but  in  that 
of  public  law  (supra,  p.  267,  n.  2).  The  legal  ordinances  thus 
expressing  the  will  of  God  have  not  been  observed,  but  their  pen¬ 
alties  could  be  borne  only  by  those  who  were  guilty  of  their  vio¬ 
lation.  To  this  divine  ordinance  Christ  rendered  satisfaction  in 
our  stead  through  his  fulfillment  of  the  law  and  through  the  en¬ 
durance  of  its  penalties.  Thereby  it  became  possible  for  God  to 
.abrogate  the  legal  ordinance,  since  his  love  has  now  been  revealed 
to  men  in  Christ,  renewing  them  and  filling  them  with  the  con¬ 
sciousness  that  they  now  enjoy  his  favor  (grace). 

It  is  very  clear  from  this  that,  in  Luther’s  conception,  the  rec¬ 
onciliation  of  the  Father  by  Christ  precedes  the  bestowal  of 
grace  as  its  basis.  But  it  is  equally  true,  that  there  is  lacking 
here,  as  distinctly  as  in  Thomas  or  Duns  (p.  114  n.  1,  141 
n.),  any  clear  explanation  of  the  inner  relationship  of  the  two 
ideas.  This  could  be  secured  only  by  showing  the  reconciliation 
of  the  Father  to  be  a  necessary  means  for  securing  the  end  in 
view,  i.  e. ,  the  bestowal  of  grace.  But  this  Luther  never  attempts 
to  do.  Since  the  nature  of  God  is  love,  the  revelation  of  his 
righteousness  (justice)  does  not  abrogate  his  mercy.  The  mis¬ 
sion  of  Christ  is  to  be  traced  back  to  the  divine  compassion.  But 
in  what  connection  does  the  selection  of  the  particular  form  of 
Christ’s  work  stand  with  the  end  in  view?  Why  does  not  love 
directly  abolish  theancient  ordinance?  To  this  Luther  responds: 
Because  God  willed  that  satisfaction  must  first  be  rendered  to  the 
latter.  The  mercy  of  God  sends  Christ  to  bring  to  us  the  for¬ 
giveness  of  sins,  but  God  wills  that  it  shall  first  be  earned,  or  mer¬ 
ited  (abverdienf) ,  from  him  through  the  satisfaction  to  be  ren¬ 
dered  by  Christ  (15.  385  ;  12.  2 66;  7.  299  f. ).2  It  is  therefore 

1  The  “  Sermon  von  der  Betrachtung  des  heil.  Leidens  Christi,”  A.  D. 
1519,  W.  2.  136  ff.,  is  peculiarly  instructive  as  displaying  the  variety  of  aspects 
under  which  Luther  could  present  the  sufferings  of  Christ. 

2  The  last  of  these  citations  summarizes  Luther’s  view  in  a  classical  form: 


272 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


the  will  of  God — and  nothing  more  can  be  said — that  the  be¬ 
stowal  of  grace,  or  the  introduction  of  a  new  ordinance,  shall 
follow  only  upon  the  ground  of  the  allaying  of  his  wrath  through 
the  satisfaction  of  the  old  ordinance.1  The  connection  existing 
between  this  two-fold  character  of  the  work  of  Christ  and  the 
duplex  nature  which  we  have  traced  in  grace,  justification,  faith 
and  sin,  is  self-evident. 

Cf.  Held,  De  opere  Jesu  Chr.  salutari  (Gott.,  i860).  Von  Hoffman, 
Schutzschriften,  ii.  23  ff.  Th.  Harnack,  L.  Theol.  288  ff.  Gottschick, 
Propter  Christum,  Ztschr.  f.  Theol.  u.  K.,  1897,  p.  352  ff. ;  1898,  406  ff. 

10.  The  entire  Christian  life  is  a  repentance.  But  contrition 
is  no  longer  a  fruitless  self-torture,  for  it  stands  in  league  with 
faith.  And  works  are  no  more  attempts  to  render  satisfaction, 
for  God  performs  them  through  faith.  This  repentance  is  to  fill 
the  entire  life.  It  takes  the  place  of  the  discipline  once  exacted 
through  the  sacrament  of  repentance.  Luther’s  central  ideas 
can  be  understood,  as  we  have  shown,  only  when  regarded  from 
this  point  of  view. 

Our  study  of  the  new  conception  of  moral  works  leads  us,  fur¬ 
ther,  to  consider  Luther’s  ideal  of  life;  and  the  examination  of 
his  conception  of  the  work  of  Christ  leads  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
Word  and  Sacraments,  and  also  to  that  of  the  Church. 

“  Although  now  purely  out  of  grace  our  sin  is  non -imputed  to  us  by  God,  yet 
he  would  nevertheless  not  do  this,  unless  satisfaction  should  first  be  fully  and 
superfluously  rendered  to  his  law  and  his  justice.  It  was  required  that  such 
gracious  imputation  should  first  be  purchased  and  secured  for  us  from  his  jus¬ 
tice.  Therefore,  since  this  was  impossible  for  us,  he  appointed  One  for  us  in 
our  stead,  who  should  take  upon  himself  all  the  punishment  which  we  had 
merited,  and  fulfill  for  us  the  law,  and  thus  avert  from  us  God’s  judgment  and 
reconcile  his  wrath.”  It  will  be  observed  how  strictly  the  discussion  is  here 
held  to  the  ideas  of  law,  with  its  fulfillment  and  penalties.  The  firm  rela¬ 
tionship  here  established  marks  a  step  in  advance  which  is  intimately  connected- 
with  Luther’s  general  doctrinal  position.  The  idea  of  “superfluous”  satis¬ 
faction  is  derived  from  the  Thomistic  theology  (p.  112,  198). 

1  The  influence  of  Scotist  ideas  is  here  unmistakable.  That  Christ  recon¬ 
ciled  the  Father  was  simply  because  God  willed  that  he  should  do  so.  Only 
in  this  sense  could  Luther  speak  of  a  necessity,  and  a  “  must”  in  connection 
with  the  atonement  (see  previous  note),  just  as  in  Duns  and  Biel.  But  in 
other  aspects  also,  if  I  am  correct,  Luther’s  way  of  regarding  the  matter  is  for¬ 
mally  parallel  with  the  conceptions  of  Duns  and  Biel  (vid.  supra,  p.  157, 
200),  since  in  them  also  the  purpose  to  effectually  bestow  grace  upon  men 
(through  the  institution  and  agency  of  the  sacraments)  was  associated  with  the 
arbitrarily  ordained  condition  of  a  previous  reconciliation  of  God  through  the 
merit  of  Christ.  This  historical  parallel  will  explain  the  peculiar  lack  of  con¬ 
nection  between  the  two  aspects  of  the  work  of  Christ.  To  speak  of  an  “  abso¬ 
lute  necessity  ”  of  the  atonement  as  maintained  by  Luther  (Th.  Harnack,  L.’s 
Theol.  ii.  304  ff. )  is  therefore  in  my  opinion  misleading.  A  solution  of  the 
problem  thus  stated  it  is  the  province  of  Dogmatics  to  seek  with  the  most  care¬ 
ful  study  of  the  Scriptural  ideas  involved.  The  History  of  Doctrines  can  only 
state  the  fact,  that  it  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Luther. 


EVANGELICAL  IDEAL  OF  LIFE. 


273 


§  68.  The  Evangelical  Ideal  of  Life. 

Literature.  Cf.  Ritschl,  Gesch.  d.  Pietismus,  i.  (A.  D.  1880),  36  ff. 
Luthardt,  Gesch.  d.  chr.  Ethik,  ii.  (1893),  25  ff.  Uhlhorn,  Die  chr. 
Liebestatigkeit,  iii.  (1890),  3  ff.  Eger,  Die  Anschauungen  Luther’s  von 
Beruf. ,  Giessen,  1900.  Seeberg,  Luther’s  Stellung  zu  den  sittlichen  und 
sozialen  Noten  seiner  Zeit.,  Leipzig,  1902. 

1.  The  crisis  at  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  occasioned, 
not  only  by  the  dissolution  and  practical  insufficiency  of  the 
“dogma :  ’  of  the  church,  but  by  the  conflict  between  practical  life 
and  the  church’s  ideal  of  what  life  should  be  (cf.  supra,  p.  173, 
1 8 1  f. ) .  The  Reformation  achieved  by  Luther  was,  accordingly, 
not  a  reconstruction  of  doctrine,  but  the  vigorous  enforcement  of 
a  new  ideal  of  life.  Ritschl  has  rendered  good  service  in  empha¬ 
sizing  this.  For  the  medieval  Christian,  faith  was  subjection  to  the 
canon  law  of  the  church.  Sin  was  located  chiefly  in  the  sensual 
impulses  of  nature.  The  natural  was  essentially  evil.  Hence, 
the  natural  order  of  human  life  in  the  state  was  the  direct  con¬ 
trast  to  the  kingdom  of  God,  or  the  church.  At  this  point  the 
ideas  of  Luther  entered  a  mighty  protest.  He  drew  the  con¬ 
clusion  from  the  entire  previous  course  of  development ;  or, 
more  properly  speaking,  he  substituted  vigorous  Christian  ideas 
for  the  negations  and  skepticism,  the  longings  and  anticipations 
of  the  past.  The  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries  had,  it  is 
true,  prepared  the  way  for  him.  But  in  his  spirit  criticism 
became  assertion,  the  unchurchly  and  secular  became  churchly 
and  biblical.  His  criticism  did  not  end  in  the  helpless  pusil¬ 
lanimity  of  Occam,  nor  in  the  worldly  frivolity  or  secret  qualms 
of  conscience  which  marked  so  many  of  the  Humanists.  He 
recognized  the  right  of  every  man  to  gain  for  himself  religious 
conviction,  without  constraint,  and  pointed  to  Christ  as  the  way 
to  its  attainment.  He  taught  that,  since  God  created  man,  his 
natural  impulses  and  ordinances  are  in  accordance  with  the  will 
of  God.  No  one  need  be  ashamed  of  them.1  He  recognized 
the  lawfulness  of  the  natural  life  and  of  the  civil  organism, 
beholding  in  them  ordinances  of  God  which  are  not  sinful. 
The  natural  forms  of  existing  things  are  not  essentially  evil,  but 
according  to  God’s  will,  however  men,  as  Luther  never  forgets, 
may  continually  pollute  them. 

2.  From  this  point  of  view  we  may  understand  his  demolition 
of  the  medieval  ideals  both  in  the  sphere  of  individual  life  and 

1  E.  g.,  E.  10.  440:  Dear  lad,  be  not  ashamed  that  you  long  for  a  maid, 
and  the  maid  longs  for  a  lad.  Only  let  it  lead  to  marriage  and  not  to  wanton¬ 
ness,  and  it  is  then  no  disgrace  to  you,  just  as  little  as  eating  and  drinking  are 
a  disgrace.  Cf.  29.  39  ;  28.  199,  but  also  E.  22.  205. 

18 


274 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


in  that  of  the  state.  The  ethics  of  the  desensualizing  theory 
beheld  the  “  state  of  perfection  ”  in  the  life  of  the  religiosi ,  i.  e . , 
the  monks  (p.  124).  Luther  saw  therein  only  a  self-chosen  and, 
in  the  deepest  sense,  ungodly  sanctity  (E.  28.  231).  This  is  not 
Christian  perfection  (W.  8.  328.  E.  9.  287  ;  7.  321  ;  8.  13  ; 

12.  227).  Good  works,  as  they  are  performed  either  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  so-called  “  evangelical  counsels  ”  ( consilia  ev an¬ 
gelica),  which  come  from  the  devil  (W.  8.  585.  E.  22.  65), 
or  in  pursuance  of  the  sacrament  of  repentance  (W.  6.  207, 
208,  209,  210  f.,  212  ;  8.  366,  378.  E.  7.  245  ;  10.  234,  273  ; 

13.  208,  217  f. ),  are  not  good  works  pleasing  to  God;  for  they 
neither  result  from  the  free  inner  impulse  of  the  heart,  nor 
do  they  benefit  anyone.  “  It  is  most  shamefully  repugnant  and 
contrary,  not  only  to  the  word  of  God,  faith,  Christian  liberty, 
and  the  precepts  of  God,  but  to  thee  thyself”  (W.  8.  639,  605, 
616.  E.  10.  425;  29.  39).  The  marks  of  really  good  works 
(p.  259)  are  wanting  in  these,  i.  e.,  the  impulse  from  within, 
or  freedom ;  the  divine  commandment ;  and  usefulness.  It  is 
better  to  rear  one’s  children  well  than  to  make  pilgrimages  or 
build  churches  (W.  2.  169  f. ).  And  since  these  works  are  un¬ 
natural,  the  pursuit  of  them  bears  bitter  fruit,  as  may  be  seen  in 
all  those  who  have  taken  the  (monastic)  vows ;  for  example,  in 
the  “unchaste  chastity”  of  the  monks  (E.  29.  17,  327;  10. 
426).  This  is  one  objection  which  Luther  constantly  presents 
against  the  Romish  ideal  of  life  :  its  works  are  unnatural  and 
purely  legalistic.  And  just  because  they  are  so,  they  are  regarded 
as  “meritorious,”  which  forms  his  second  ground  of  objection 
to  them.  But,  as  these  works  are  rejected,  there  remains  no 
place  for  the  “saints.”  Whatever  in  them  was  good,  was 
wrought  by  God  (W.  1.  420).  They  have  had  no  power  to 
render  satisfaction  even  for  themselves  (ib.  606).  There  are 
no  superfluous  ( uberlangliche )  works  ( opera  supererogatio nis ,  E. 
14-  35)- 

3.  In  the  sphere  of  civil  life,  also,  the  rightfulness  of  the  natural 
order  is  to  be  recognized  as  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  God. 
“The  secular  law  and  sword”  exist  in  accordance  with  the 
divine  ordinance  (E.  22.  63,  76),  for  they  are  necessary  for  the 
world  (73).  Hence  the  Christian  may  with  a  good  conscience 
hold  a  civil  office  (73,  80),  provided  he  can  thus  benefit  his 
neighbor  (78). 1  This  is  especially  true  of  the  “Christian 
prince.”  “Service  ”  is  his  calling  (94  ff. ).  But,  essentially, 

1  This  is  true  even  of  war  :  “  What  else  is  war  than  a  punishing  of  wrong 
and  evil  ?  Why  does  anyone  go  to  war,  except  because  he  desires  to  have 
peace  anjl  obedience  ?  ”  (23.  249.  Cf.  16.  195).  From  this  we  may  under¬ 
stand  Luther’s  attitude  toward  the  “  thieving  and  murderous  peasants.” 


EVANGELICAL  IDEAL  OF  LIFE. 


275 


the  civil  government  has  to  do  only  with  the  outward  conduct  of 
men  (87),  whereas  Christ  reigns  only  in  the  hearts  of  men  by  his 
Spirit  (E,  22.  70).  In  the  duty  resting  upon  the  government 
is  included  a  solicitude  for  culture  and  education  (schools),  as 
well  as  for  social  conditions.  But  “  the  secular  government  has 
laws  which  do  not  extend  further  than  over  body  and  property 
and  what  is  outward  in  the  world.  For  over  the  souls  of  men 
God  cannot  and  will  not  allow  anyone  but  himself  alone  to  rule. 
Therefore  in  matters  which  have  to  do  with  the  salvation  of 
souls,  nothing  but  God’s  word  must  be  taught  or  accepted  (22. 
82,  83,  86;  45.  115).  Thus  the  boundary  line  of  the  civil 
authority  and  the  rights  of  liberty  of  conscience  are  preserved.1 
(Cf.  Lezius,  Gleichheit  u.  Ungleichheit,  in  Greifswalder  Studien, 
1895,  p.  287  ff.  Ward,  Darstellung  .  .  .  der  Ansichten 
Luther’s  vom  Staat  u.  seinen  wirtschaftlichen  Aufgaben,  1898.) 

4.  The  State  of  Perfection  ( status  perfectionis')  is  to  be  (pos¬ 
sessed)  of  a  living  faith,  a  despiser  of  death,  of  life,  of  glory, 
and  of  the  whole  world,  a  servant  of  all  in  fervent  love  (W.  8. 
584).  Faith  and  love  (or  works)  are  the  content  of  the 
Christian  life.  “Now  faith  and  love  are  the  whole  life  of  a 
Christian  man.  .  .  .  Faith  receives ,  love  gives  ”  (W.  8.  355, 
362,  366,  385  f.  E.  7.  159,  161  ;  8.  40,  71,  75  ;  9.  280  f., 
137;  10.  20;  46.  254).  “  Thus  faith  remains  the  doer  and 

love  remains  the  deed”  (E.  8.  63).  “Faith  brings  man  to 
God  ;  love  brings  God  to  men.  Through  faith  man  allows  God  to 
do  him  good  ;  through  love  God  does  good  to  men  (E.  14.  40). 
But  all  this  is  not  to  be  required  by  compulsion  or  law.  The 
Christian  life  is  a  life  of  freedom,  since  the  good  is  wrought  in 
the  heart  by  God  and  is  done  with  delight.  Hence  no  com¬ 
mandments  have  validity  here.  This  is  “evangelical,”  or 
“Christian  liberty,”  or  “the  liberty  of  faith.”2  The  law  is 
valid  only  for  the  outward  man  (vid.  supra,  3),  where  it  is  neces¬ 
sary,  particularly  for  the  rude  “Lord  Omnes  ”  (E.  24.  140  f. ). 
These  ideas  are  grandly  developed  in  the  tract,  Von  der  Freiheit 
eines  Christenmenschen.  Through  faith  the  Christian  becomes  a 
free  lord  of  all  things.  In  faith  he  lays  hold  upon  the  man 

1  But  Luther  places  the  law  of  nature  (cf.,  p.  17 1)  above  the  “written  law 

or  the  counsels  of  the  jurists  :  ”  “  The  highest  law  and  master  of  all  laws 
remains  the  reason  ”  (E.  22.  95,  257).  “  Such  free  judgment  does  love  pro¬ 

nounce,  and  natural  law,  of  which  all  reason  is  full  ”  (ib.  104). 

2  A.  g.,  W.  I.  530,  647,  675  ;  2.  486  ;  8.  327,  330,  334.  E.  10.  425  ; 
12.  363  f. ;  29.  188  f. ,  etc.  The  pope  and  the  fanatics,  according  to  Luther, 
destroy  this  liberty  ;  the  former  by  commandments,  the  latter  by  prohibitions 
(29.  189).  Against  Carlstadt  he  formulated  the  practical  canon,  “that 
everything  should  be  free  which  God  does  not  in  clear  language  forbid  in  the 
New  Testament  ”  (29.  188). 


276 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Christ,  and  the  righteousness  of  the  bridegroom  becomes  a  prop¬ 
erty  also  of  the  bride,  the  soul  (E.  27.  183).  Again,  the  soul 
through  faith  is  filled  with  all  goodness  (181),  so  that  it  needs 
no  law  nor  commandment.  Hereby  the  Christian  is  made  free. 
Since  he  does  good  with  inward  heartfelt  delight,  because  the 
word  of  Christ  dwells  in  his  soul,  he  does  not  require  the 
demands  of  the  law.  Is  God  now  his  in  faith,  there  is  thereby 
given  to  him  the  certainty  that  all  things  must  work  together  for 
his  good  (185),  as  he  has  now,  on  the  other  hand,  to  appear 
before  God  in  intercession  for  others.  Thus  the  Christian  is  a 
king  and  a  priest.  4  4  Through  his  kingship,  he  has  power  over 
all  things ;  through  his  priesthood,  he  has  power  over  God  ’  ’ 
(1 86).  But  the  Christian  must  also  44  govern  his  own  body  and 
associate  with  his  fellow-men.  ’  ’  This  requires  a  disciplining  and 
exercising  of  the  body,  that  it  may  become  obedient  and  con¬ 
formable  to  the  inner  man.1 2  But  faith  is  an  inward  appreciation 
of  the  benefits  of  God,  and  hence  begets  the  inner  impulse  to  do 
what  will  please  God,  i.  e.,  to  serve  one’s  neighbor.  4 4  There 
thus  flow  from  faith,  love  and  desire  toward  God ;  and  from 
love,  a  free,  willing,  joyous  life  of  service  of  one’s  neighbor” 
(196).  These  are  the  true  good  works,  as  they  flow  forth 
freely  from  the  heart  and  bring  good  to  others.  44  For  whatever 
work  is  not  designed  to  serve  another  ...  is  not  a  good 
Christian  work”  (198).  Thus  the  Christian  is  through  faith  a 
free  lord,  and  through  love  a  ministering  servant. 

These  remained  controlling  principles  with  Luther.  Faith  is 
the  acceptance  ( Hinnahme )  of  God  and  his  benefits.  These  so 
overpower  our  hearts  that — and  also  through  the  Holy  Spirit 
(E.  19.  376) — there  follows  a  self-surrender  ( Hingabe )  to  God, 
as  a  44  great  fervent  love”  to  him  (E.  14.  4).  But  this  love 
leads  us  with  inward  desire  to  subject  ourselves  to  the  will  of 
God  (E.  7.  161).  And  thus  out  of  love  to  God  arises  love  to 
our  neighbor  (W.  8.  386.  E.  14.  34,  46;  28.  207;  9.  284). 
Love  is  accordingly  defined  as  the  will  to  do  good  :  44  Love  is 
nothing  but  simply  to  do  good  and  to  be  useful  to  all  men,  friends 
and  foes  ”  (W.  8.  362).  44  But  to  love  is  from  the  heart  to  wish 

good  to  another  ”  (W.  2.  604). 2  Thus  all  love  is  service ,  and 
the  Christian’s  whole  life  is  a  service  for  God  and  his  brethren 
(W.  2.  148  ;  8.  360  f. ,  367).  We  know  that  we  were  created 

1  These  ideas  produce  a  complete  transformation  as  to  the  province  of  ascetic 
exercises.  These  are  not  a  self-mortification  nor  a  meritorious  work,  but  the 
disciplining  and  exercise  of  the  natural  powers,  which  they  thus  make 
fit  agencies  for  the  accomplishment  of  good  in  the  Christian  sense.  See 
R.  Seeberg,  Askese,  PRE.  ii.,  ed.  3,  138  f. 

2  With  this  definition  compare  p.  107. 


EVANGELICAL  IDEAL  OF  LIFE. 


277 


for  the  sake  of  others  (E.  8.  263),  and  that  we  are  instruments 
in  the  hand  of  Christ  (12.  365).  But  such  service  can  be  ren¬ 
dered  only  by  really  good  works,  such  as  we  may  learn  from  the 
Ten  Commandments,  and  not  by  the  self-chosen  Romish  works 
(E.  9.  287;  10.  411  f . ;  11.  318;  13.  159).  These  are  the 
works  which  belong  to  the  natural  course  of  life,  in  which  we 
^should  manifest  toward  our  fellow-men  “love,  humility,  patience, 
gentleness’7  (E.  9.  287,  289  f.).  This  we  should  do,  further¬ 
more,  each  in  his  own  particular  calling:  “serve  God  in  his 
calling  and  thank  him  that  he  uses  him  also  in  his  position  in  life 
as  an  instrument  ”  (9.290).  The  moral  equality  of  all  callings, 
•even  the  lowest,  is  continually  assumed  (<?.  g.,  E.  7.  228;  10. 

233  fif.;  8.  259  f.;  16.137;  17.258  ;  18.85;  19-  337.  352  G 
30.  367  ;  48.  273).  To  serve  God  in  the  forms  of  the  natural 
life  and  calling  by  the  humble  service  of  love  toward  the  brethren 
— such  is  the  appointed  task  of  the  Christian’s  life.  But  the 
power  for  such  service  springs  from  faith,  or  from  God. 

But  this  is  also  the  path  to  a  realization  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God.  This  term  has  in  Luther  a  two-fold  significance.  On  the 
one  hand,  it  indicates  the  dominion  which  Christ  exercises  in 
begetting  faith  and  life  through  the  word  and  granting  the  for¬ 
giveness  of  sins  (E.  14.  181  fi,  cf.  supra,  p.  266;  21.  115  ;  14. 
238  f.,  240,  251  ;  18.  234  ;  39.  34  fi;  15.  21  fi;  12.  2  fi;  51. 
18 1  ;  34.  26  :  “Christ’s  kingdom  must  on  earth  rule  in  our 
hearts”).  On  the  other  hand,  it  signifies  the  sphere  in  which 
this  dominion  is  exercised,  or  mankind,  in  so  far  as  they  place  all 
that  they  do  or  can  do  at  the  service  of  God  (W.  2.97;  22. 
166).  Hence,  all  virtues  in  their  fullness  are  combined  in  this 
kingdom:  “  The  kingdom  of  God  is  nothing  else  than  to  be 
pious,  orderly,  pure,  kind,  gentle,  benevolent  and  full  of  all 
virtue  and  graces ;  also,  that  God  have  his  being  within  us  and 
that  he  alone  be,  live,  and  reign  in  us.  This  we  should  first  of 
all  and  most  earnestly  desire  ”  (W.  2.  98).  Since  Christ  exer¬ 
cises  his  dominion  upon  us,  we  become  and  grow  to  be  members 
of  his  kingdom.1 

This  is  what  is  meant  by  true  evangelical  perfection  in  the 
sense  of  Luther.  But  it  is  not  to  be  thought  of  as  a  completed 
attainment,  but  as  a  continual  striving.  This  is  true  of  faith, 
which  maintains  itself  amid  all  manner  of  assaults,  so  that  it  be- 

1  The  term  “  kingdom  ”  in  Luther,  as  in  the  New  Testament,  very  often 
<(<?.  £\,  E.  4.  356  ;  23.311;  18.233;  I5- 21  >  29.  295)  signifies  “  dominion.” 
He  always,  as  do  the  Scriptures,  thinks  of  it  as  in  close  association  with  its 
Ruler  (e.  g.,  2.  95).  It  is  the  result  of  the  work  of  Christ  in  the  world.  In 
this  sense,  it  is  a  purely  religious  conception  ;  but,  since  men  strive  with  all  their 
power  for  its  realization,  it  is  also  the  supreme  ethical  ideal. 


278 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


comes  “  tried  and  experienced  faith  ’ ’  (W.  8.  378.  E.  14.  52). 
The  same  is  to  be  said  also  of  the  entire  scope  of  the  inner  life  : 
“  It  is  and  remains  upon  earth  only  a  beginning  and  increasing, 
which  will  be  completed  in  yonder  world  ”  (E.  27.  188).  This 
ideal  of  life  eradicates  the  ancient  disposition,  imbibed  from 
Hellenism,  to  flee  from  the  world.  It  makes  possible  a  life  of 
active  interest  in  the  duties  of  the  natural  life  and  secular  voca¬ 
tion,  yet  in  perfect  consistency  with  the  most  profound  religious 
experience. 

5.  The  recognition  of  the  validity  and  independence  of  the 
natural  life  awakened  in  Luther  the  desire  to  see  civil  and  social 
affairs  regulated  by  the  principles  properly  underlying  them. 
The  dispute  between  the  peasants  and  the  nobility  had  to  do,  it 
appeared  to  him,  with  purely  secular  affairs  (E.  24.  283,  277  f.). 
The  gospel  neither  advocates  communism  (ib.  291),  nor  does  it 
abolish  feudal  service  (281).  The  peasants  may  be  never  so 
clearly  in  the  right,  yet  let  them  not  press  their  legal  claims  in 
the  Christian  name  (273).  “In  the  name  of  the  gospel  M  they 
act  against  the  gospel  (275).  The  social  question  of  the  age 
was  accordingly  in  his  view  not  an  ecclesiastical,  but  a  natural 
and  civil  one.1  But  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  church  has 
nothing  to  do  with  this  question  and  its  solution.  How  little 
such  an  idea  would  harmonize  with  Luther’s  meaning2  is  evident 
from  his  broad  program  of  reform,  as  seen  in  his  Address  to  the 
Nobility,  and  in  his  energetic  discussion  of  social  problems, 
as  in  his  “ Zinskauf"  and  “ Kaufhandlung  und  WucherV  But 
as  the  Address  is  dedicated,  not  to  the  church,  but  to  the  nobility, 
so  for  himself  Luther  declined  to  assume  responsibility  for  the 
solution  of  the  technical  questions  involved.3  The  church  calls 
attention  to  the  abuses,  demands  that  they  be  corrected,  and 
gives  her  counsel  and  encouragement  to  that  end  ;4  but  to  the 
state,  i.  e. ,  to  the  social  organization,  belongs  the  execution  of 
the  task.  This  is,  briefly  stated,  Luther’s  attitude  upon  such 
questions. 

1  The  peasants  claimed  to  be  “a  Christian  mob  or  union,”  “Christian 
brothers”  (24.  265,  290),  and  on  that  ground  claim  for  themselves  “divine 
right”  (265 )  and  “  evangelical  liberty  ”  (270).  These  terms  had  for  them  the 
genuine  medieval  significance,  supra,  p.  171,  182. 

2  We  must  here  let  the  “  whole  Luther”  be  heard,  which  will  at  least  not 
be  “  unlutheran.” 

3  E.  g.y  W.  6.  6  :  “  But  it  is  no  part  of  my  work  to  announce  whether  five, 
four,  or  six  per  cent,  is  to  be  paid.  I  leave  it  to  the  decision  of  the  laws,  so 
that  where  the  ground  is  so  good  and  rich,  six  per  cent,  may  be  taken.” 

4  Dilthey,  Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos,  v.  366,  rightly  says  :  In  the  name 
of  the  new  Christian  spirit,  Luther  demands  a  reorganization  of  German  society 
in  its  secular  and  ecclesiastical  ordinances. 


WORD  AND  SACRAMENT. 


279 


Cf.  Schmoller,  Zur.  Gesch.  d.  nat. -ok.  Ansichten  in  d.  Ref.-zeit,  in 
Ztschr.  f.  d.  ges.  Staatswiss,  i860,  461  ff.  Erhardt,  Die  nat. -ok.  Ansichten 
d.  Ref.,  in  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1880,  672  ff.  Also,  Braasch,  L.  Stellung  z. 
Sozialism.,  1897.  W.  Kohler,  Die  Quellen  z.  L.  Scnrift  an  den  Adel., 
1895.  Seeberg,  Luther’s  Stellung  z.  u.  den  sittlichen  u.  sozialen  Noten  s. 
Zeit.,  1902. 


§  69.  Word  and  Sacrament. 

1.  In  the  religious  processes  depicted  in  §67,  a  personal  influence 
is  exerted  by  God  upon  the  human  heart.  It  is  in  keeping  with 
a  true  conception  of  the  nature  of  man  in  its  sensuous  and  social 
features,  that  Luther  does  not  conceive  of  such  influence  as  mys¬ 
tical  and  direct.1  In  order  to  win  the  hearts  of  men,  God  makes 
use  of  elements  of  this  world  and  its  history ;  of  Christ  and  the 
word  which  testifies  of  him  ;  as  also  of  the  sacraments  instituted 
by  him.  Only  through  Word  and  Sacrament2  does  the  Spirit, 
operating  upon  the  heart  ( intus  opera?!^ ,  come  to  us  (W.  1. 
632;  2.  112.  E.  29.  208;  9.  210;  11.  223). 3  Through 
these  are  mediated  the  great  chief  miracles,  which  Christ  performs 
upon  the  soul,  and  which  are  far  greater  than  the  bodily  miracles 
which  he  wrought  (E.  16.  190  ;  cf.  58.  95  ;  59.  3).  This  view 
was  confirmed  and  deepened,  particularly  in  the  conflict  with  the 
‘  ‘  fanatics.  ’  * 

2.  But  before  the  outbreak  of  the  fanatical  movement,  Luther’s 
doctrine  was  firmly  established  in  its  essential  features.  In  the 
word  alone  does  God  work  in  the  hearts  of  men  :  “  The  word 
alone  is  the  vehicle  of  grace.”  Therefore  man  should  hear  the 
word  and  meditate  upon  what  he  has  heard  (W.  2.  509,  95, 
112,  453;  1.  698).  Only  in  this  form  can  we  apprehend 
Christ :  “  He  is  of  no  benefit  to  thee  and  thou  canst  not  know 
anything  about  him,  unless  God  put  him  into  words ,  that  thou 
mayst  hear  and  thus  learn  to  know  him  ”  (W.  2.  213).  Luther 
discriminates  here,  however,  between  the  “inward”  and  the 
“outward”  word.  Yet  the  two  are  closely  associated: 
“  But  when  the  outward  goes  rightly,  the  inward  does  not  fail 
to  appear ;  for  God  never  suffers  his  word  to  go  forth  without 
(bringing)  fruit.  He  is  with  it,  and  himself  teaches  inwardly 

1  The  mystical  way  in  which  Augustine  rings  the  changes  upon  the  theme  : 
“  God  and  the  soul,”  is  not  characteristic  of  Luther.  His  praise  is  given  to 
faith  :  “  For  the  two  belong  together,  faith  and  God”  (Muller,  Symb.  Book, 
386,  388.  E.  49.  20).  But  this  faith  is  wrought  by  the  Word,  and  its  content 
is  the  God  revealed  in  Christ. 

2  See  the  association  of  the  two  in  Augustine,  Vol.  I.,  p.  320  f. 

3  Word  and  sacrament,  according  to  Luther,  differ  in  the  fact,  that  the 
former  is  addressed  to  the  church  at  large,  the  latter  specifically  to  the  indi¬ 
vidual  (E.  29.  345  ;  II.  157  f.). 


280 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


what  he  gives  outwardly  through  the  priest  ”  (ib.  112).  The 
words  of  the  priest  are,  accordingly,  accompanied  with  an  inner 
working  of  God  upon  the  heart. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  third  decade  of  the  sixteenth 
century,  there  was  an  energetic  effort  in  both  Germany  and 
Switzerland  to  carry  forward  and  complete  the  evangelical 
reformation  by  exalting  mystic  and  ascetic  ideals.  The  pro¬ 
moters  of  the  movement  were  representatives  of  the  mystical 
piety  of  the  closing  Middle  Ages,  with  which  they  not  infre¬ 
quently  combined  apocalyptic  visions  or  socialistic  principles. 
The  “  Imitation  of  Christ  ”  with  a  “  sensible  tasting  of  his  suf¬ 
ferings,’’  the  “divesting  self  of  material  things,”  the  “  becom¬ 
ing  naked  and  barren  of  all  created  things,  ’  ’  the  ‘  ‘  righteousness 
of  dying  to  the  world,”  “the  righteousness  of  the  Spirit,” 
the  ‘ ‘  inward  call,  ’  ’  the  4  ‘  heavenly  voice,  ’  ’  the  ‘  ‘  inner  word,  ’  ’  the 
“tedium,”  and  the  “reformation  ”  of  the  Christian  world  into 
a  “  congregation  of  saints,” — such  are  the  watchwords  of  this 
party.  But,  above  all,  they  held  that  no  importance  attached 
to  an  external  ecclesiasticism,  or  to  the  outward  word  and  sacra¬ 
ments.  The  “Spirit”  does  everything,  and  has  no  need  of 
infant  baptism  or  the  “  bodily  ”  word.1  This  agitation  has  im¬ 
portance  for  the  History  of  Doctrines,  because  it  gave  occasion 
(Zwickau  prophets,  Carlstadt,  Miinzer)  to  Luther  to  verify  and 
deepen  his  doctrine  touching  the  word. 

In  opposition  to  the  idea  of  a  direct  operation  of  the  Spirit, 
Luther  maintains:  “Since  now  God  has  sent  forth  his  holy 
gospel,  he  deals  with  us  in  two  ways  :  first,  outwardly,  and 
secondly,  inwardly.  He  deals  with  us  outwardly  through  the 
spoken  word  of  the  gospel  and  through  bodily  signs,  s‘uch  as 
baptism  and  sacrament.  Inwardly,  he  deals  with  us  through  the 
Holy  Spirit  and  faith,  together  with  other  gifts ;  but  all  this  in 

1  Luther  describes  these  religious  theories  very  thoroughly  in  his  publica¬ 
tion,  Wider  die  himmlischen  Propheten ,  e.  g. ,  29.  138,  146,  152,  173,  177, 
180,  168,  160,  278,  285,  295,  177,  209  f.  Cf.  H.  Ludemann,  Reformation 
and  Taiifertum,  Bern,  1896.  .  .  .  The  “  inner  word  ”  may  be  thought  of  as 
accompanying  the  outer  word  (thus  Augustine,  and  at  first  Luther).  It  may 
also  be  conceived  as  a  direct  speaking  of  God  to  the  soul,  which  was  the  idea 
of  the  Fanatics  (e.  g.,  Denk,  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1851,  177,  184,  cf.  131.  Seb. 
Franck,  in  Hegler,  Geist  u.  Schrift ;  in  S.  F.,  1892,  p.  83  ff.).  It  may  be 
understood  therefore  as  the  innate  intuition  of  reason,  or  as  the  Conscience  : 
“The  conscience,  which  is  the  Godhead  and  Christ  himself,  who  now  dwells 
in  our  hearts,  understands  and  decides  what  is  evil  and  what  is  good  ”  (Th. 
ThamER,  vid.  Neander,  Thamer,  1842,  p.  27,  24  f. ,  26  f. ,  28,  29,  38  f. , 
cf.  47).  It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  Seb.  Franck  regards  the  idea  of  com¬ 
munism  as  a  part  of  man’s  inherited  moral  endowment  (  Hegler,  p.  92).  Cf. 
supra,  p.  183.  Upon  the  entire  question,  vid.  R.  Grutzmacher,  Wort  und 
Geist,  1902. 


WORD  AND  SACRAMENT. 


281 


the  manner  and  order,  that  the  outward  part  shall  and  must  pre¬ 
cede,  and  the  inward  come  afterward  and  through  the  outward,  so 
that  he  has  deter??iined  to  give  the  inward  part  to  no  man  except 
through  the  outward  part”  (E.  29.  208;  47.  391;  49.  86). 
44  In  the  same  word  comes  the  Spirit  and  gives  faith  where  and 
to  whom  he  will”  (29.  212).  From  this  time,  Luther  never 
ceased  to  lay  emphasis  upon  this  point.  Where  the  word  is, 
there  are  Christ  and  the  Spirit  (9.  275,  229,  236;  n.  35; 
14.  326;  47.  57,  198,  221  f. ).  The  Spirit  himself  4 *  speaks  to 
the  heart  ’  ’  and  4  4  impresses  ’  ’  the  word  upon  the  heart  of  the 
hearers.  He  44  touches  and  moves  the  heart”  (9.  232,  274; 
13.  184,  286  ;  8.  308  ;  11.  206  ;  28.  298  :  47.  353  f.). 

The  relation  of  the  outward  word  to  the  divine  operation 
accompanying  it  is  explained  by  Luther  in  various  ways.  The 
Spirit  enlightens  44  with  and  through  the  word”  (14.  188). 
The  power  of  God  is  44  with  it  and  under  it  ”  (11.  13 1).  Of 
the  Spirit  it  is  to  be  said,  that  he  is  given  44  through  the  word  and 
with  the  word  external  and  preceding”  (Smalc.  Art.,  Muller, 
321),  and  that  he  44  comes  with  and  through  the  word,  and  goes 
no  further  than  so  far  as  the  word  goes  ”  (12.  300).  The  Holy 
Spirit  therefore  teaches  nothing  else  and  nothing  more  than 
what  the  words  44  which  pass  out  of  the  mouth  of  Christ  from  one 
mouth  to  another”  contain  (ib.).  He  does  not  enlarge  the 
sphere  of  revelation,  but  he  with  divine  power  adapts  the  revel¬ 
ation  made  to  the  individual  and  his  needs.  Luther  discrimi¬ 
nates  therefore  the  purely  human  operation  of  the  word  from  the 
resultant  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit 4  4  in,  ”  44  with  and  through,  ’  ’ 
44  with  and  under  ”  the  word,1  but  in  such  a  way  that  the  latter 
occurs  absolutely  only  through  the  former.2 

1  E.  18.  38  :  “  Along  with  this  preaching  office,  God  is  present,  and  through 
the  spoken  word  touches  to-day  this  heart,  to-morrow  that  heart.  All  preachers 
are  nothing  more  than  the  hand  which  points  out  the  way,  which  does  no  more 
than  stand  still  and  allow  (us)  to  follow  or  not  to  follow  the  right  path.  .  .  . 
They  are  not  the  persons  whose  duty  it  is  to  make  anyone  pious.  God  alone 
does  that.” 

2  These  formulas  display  an  interesting  parallel  to  those  upon  the  Lord’s 
Supper.  Viewed  in  detail,  the  matter  is  not  perfectly  clear.  Luther  began 
with  Augustinian  differentiation  of  the  outward  and  the  inward  word,  but  he 
modified  it  by  positing  a  fixed  connection  between  the  two.  For  this  the  Scot- 
ist  theory  of  the  sacraments  appears  to  have  originally  furnished  the  suggestion. 
God  has  “determined”  (29.  208)  that  wherever  the  word  goes,  a  divine  in¬ 
fluence  shall  accompany  it.  Vid.  also  45.  215  f . :  “No  one  can  rightly 
understand  God  according  to  the  Word  of  God  unless  he  receives  it  [z.  e. , 
this  ability]  immediately  from  the  Holy  Spirit.  But  no  one  can  have  it  from 
the- Holy  Spirit,  unless  he  experiences  it,  tries  it,  and  feels  it  frerfahres, 
vorsuchs  und  empfinds  denn);  and  in  this  experience  the  Holy  Spirit  teaches 
as  in  his  own  school,  outside  of  which  nothing  is  taught  but  appearances, 
words,  and  idle  prattle.” 


282 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Medieval  theology  constructed  the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments. 
Luther  was  the  first  to  frame  a  doctrine  of  the  Word  of  God.1 
Of  the  Bible,  we  shall  speak  in  another  connection.  Cf.  R.2 
Grutzmacher,  Wort  und  Geist,  1902,  9.  8  ff. 

3.  As  to  the  general  conception  of  the  nature  of  the  sacraments, 
it  is  to  be  observed,  that  Luther  started  with  the  Scotist  idea, 
that  the  sacraments  are  efficacious  signs  ( efficacia  signa)  of  grace 
(W.  1.  595).  But  this  is  modified  by  placing  them  in  the  most 
intimate  association  with  faith.  Their  effectual  operation  de¬ 
pends  upon  faith  (ib.).  They  are  “  signs  which  help  and  incite 
to  faith  .  .  .  without  which  faith,  they  are  of  no  benefit”  (W. 
2.  686,  693).  “  And  it  depends  altogether  upon  faith,  which 

alone  brings  it  to  pass  that  the  sacraments  effect  what  they  signify’  ’ 
(2.  715;  6.  24).  The  sacraments  are  symbols  which  awaken 
faith,  and  thus  promise  grace  to  all,  but  confer  it  only  upon  be¬ 
lievers  (6.  86).  The  sacrament  is  a  sign  :  “That  is,  it  is  ex¬ 
ternal,  and  yet  has  and  signifies  something  spiritual,  in  order  that 
we  may  through  the  external  be  drawn  to  the  spiritual  ” 
(6.  359).  In  this,  Luther  has  fallen  back  upon  the  Augustiniaa 
conception.  The  sacrament  is  a  symbolic  transaction,  which 
brings  to  the  believer  that  which  it  outwardly  signifies.  This, 
idea  meets  us  also  later,  but  with  the  modifications,  that  the 
sacrament  gives  something  also  to  the  unbeliever,  and  that  great 
stress  is  laid  upon  the  fact  that  there  is  a  real  influence  exerted. 
But,  in  and  of  itself,  it  is,  even  at  later  periods,  spoken  of 
as  an  “outward  sign,”  as  a  “seal  or  signet  ring”  (E.  12. 
178  f. ;  16.  48,  50,  52).  In  the  tract,  De  captivitate  Baby  Ionic  a 
(A.  D.  1520),  Luther  sharply  criticises  the  Romish  doctrine  of 
the  sacraments.  Of  four  of  the  seven  sacraments,  he  asserts 
that  the  Scriptures  know  nothing  at  all.  There  remain  only 
three  (baptism,  the  Lord’s  Supper,  and  repentance),  although, 
strictly  speaking,  even  repentance  dare  not  be  described  as  a 
sacrament  (W.  6.  549,  572). 3  It  therefore  gradually  became 
customary — repentance  having  now  entirely  lost  its  sacramental 

1  The  “  Word  of  God  ”  is  for  Luther  primarily  the  oral  proclamation,  since 
through  this  God  operates  upon  the  heart.  But  this  operation  occurs  only 
when  such  proclamation  is  in  content  a  presentation  of  the  biblical  revelation  ; 
E.g.,  W.  1.  391.  E.  9.  230;  36.  197  ;  46.  240;  65.  170;  3.  347. 

2  Due  attention  should  be  given  at  this  point  to  the  ideas  formulated 
at  about  this  time  ;  that  the  reformation  is  to  be  effected  not  by  violent  means, 
but  through  the  proclamation  of  the  word  (E.  28.  217  f. ,  219,  221,  227  f., 
308,  310);  that  outward  customs  may  be  retained  (28.  237);  and  that  in  such- 
matters  the  rabble  (Pofel)  is  not  to  have  the  deciding  voice  (29.  160,  162  f.r 
166  f.,  206,  226). 

3  In  A.  D.  1519,  he  already  calls  them  the  two  chief  ( furne?nliche)  sacra¬ 
ments,  W.  2.  754. 


WORD  AND  SACRAMENT.  283 

character — to  count  only  two  sacraments  (E.  28.  418;  29.  208; 
12.  179). 

But  the  general  definition  is  here  of  little  importance.  As, 
from  the  time  of  Duns,  the  theory  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  did  not 
fit  into  the  general  definition  of  a  sacrament,  but  was  carried 
along  independently  (supra,  p.  131  n.),  so  was  it  likewise  with 
Luther,  particularly  in  the  case  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  but  also 
noticeably  in  the  case  of  baptism.  We  must  therefore  treat 
directly  of  the  two  sacraments  in  turn. 

4.  Luther  presents  a  connected  view  of  his  theory  of  baptism  in 
the  Sermon  von  dem  heiligen ,  hochwur digen  Sakr ament  der  Taufe 
(A.  D.  1519).  The  sign  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  signifi¬ 
cation  ( Bedeutung )  of  baptism.  The  latter  consists  in  (1)  The 
duty  of  dying  to  sin  ;  for  by  baptism  a  sentence  of  death  is  pro¬ 
nounced  upon  the  natural  man  :  “  Therefore  drown  thyself  in 
the  name  of  God.  ’  ’  Thus  a  blessed  dying  begins  with  baptism 
(W.  2.  728).  (2)  The  “spiritual  birth.”  This,  like  the 

“  increase  of  grace  and  righteousness,”  “begins  in  baptism,  but 
continues  also  until  death  ”  (ib. ) — on  the  ground  that  God  through 
baptism  contracts  a  covenant  with  man,  from  which  result  both 
regeneration  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  so  that  both  are  contin¬ 
uous  :  ‘  ‘  and  begins  from  that  hour  to  renew  thee,  pours  into  thee 
his  grace  and  Holy  Spirit,  who  begins  to  crucify  the  nature  and 
sin”  (730).  Sin  yet  remains  in  man  (72 8)  ;  but,  since  God 
considers  it  as  in  principle  shattered,  he  does  not  thereafter  im¬ 
pute  it  to  the  sinner  :  “  will  not  look  upon  it  nor  condemn  thee 
for  it,  is  satisfied  in  regard  to  it,  and  is  pleased  that  thou  art  thy¬ 
self  continually  desiring  and  attempting  to  slay  it  ”  (731).  In 
this  fact,  that  God  has  “bound”  himself  no  longer  to  impute 
sin  to  the  baptized,  lies  the  peculiar  consolation  of  baptism  (732, 
733).  It  is  here  evident  that  the  theory  of  baptism  harmon¬ 
izes  precisely  with  the  original  view  of  justification  through  the 
word  :  regeneration  and,  in  connection  with  it,  the  forgiveness 
of  sins  (cf.  p.  260  f.  ). 

This  remained  essentially  the  view  of  Luther,  except  that,  at  a 
later  period,  just  as  in  the  case  of  justification,  forgiveness  is  no 
longer  so  closely  associated  with  the — divinely  wrought — re¬ 
newal.  In  baptism,  the  triune  God  is  present ;  the  Holy  Spirit 
being  particularly  operative  (E.  19.  76).  The  word  and  will  of 
God  make  it  what  it  is,  so  that  it  is  not  merely  a  “sign” 
(Large  Catechism,  Muller,  Symb.  Bb.  495,  487  f. ,  489.  “  Bap¬ 

tism  is  united  with  and  confirmed  by  the  divine  word  and  ap¬ 
pointment).  ”  1  It  thus  secures  an  “admission  to  all  divine 
blessings”  (E.  22.  165.  W.  2.  746). 

1  But,  on  the  other  hand,  baptism  is  still  “  nothing  more  than  an  outward 


284 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


I 


This  involves  two  things,  (a)  The  Holy  Spirit  through  baptism 
effects  regeneration.  It  is  “ a  spiritually-rich  water,  in  which  the 
Holy  Spirit  is,  and  in  which  he  works;  yea,  the  entire  holy  Trinity 
is  present,  and  the  man  who  is  baptized  is  then  called  regenerated  ’  ’ 
(E.  46.  266  ;  16.  69,  74  ;  29.  341). 1  Thus  the  heart  is  washed 
clean  (8.  226),  the  whole  nature  transformed  (7.  169),  the 
Spirit  granted  (Cat.  493),  grace  “infused”  (12.  387.  W. 
2.  168).  But  since  baptism  is  an  act  but  once  performed, 
it  assures  of  the  continuous  readiness  of  God  to  renew  the  sin¬ 
ner  :  “  Therefore  baptism  also  remains  always,  and  thou  canst 
not  be  so  far  nor  so  deeply  fallen  from  it  but  that  thou  couldst 
and  shouldst  again  hold  fast  to  it  ”  (E.  16.  99).  With  this 
continual  renewal,  proceeding  from  God,  are  given  also  the  im¬ 
pulse  and  the  obligation  to  constantly  renew  ourselves.  The 
slaying  of  the  old  Adam  and  the  arising  of  the  new  man  is  the 
duty  of  the  baptized,  “  so  that  Christian  life  is  nothing  else  than 
a  kind  of  daily  baptism  ”  (Cat.  495,  496,  498.  E.  16.  103). 
In  baptism  is  involved  the  duty  of  making  the  whole  Christian 
life  a  repentance  (Cat.  496  f. ).2 

This  is  one  aspect  of  baptism.  But,  despite  the  renewal  thus 
effected,  our  life  remains  sinful,  and  original  sin  is  still  operative. 

(£)  The  second  blessing  which  the  baptismal  covenant  car¬ 
ries  with  it  is  the  certainty  that  God  is  ever  ready  to  forgive  us 
our  sins.  “  They  are  all  forgiven  through  grace,  but  not  yet  all 
healed  through  the  gift  ”  (W.  8.  107,  57,  88,  93  ;  2.  160,  415. 
E.  15.  50;  16.  141).  God  has  in  baptism  embraced  us  and  laid 
us  upon  his  bosom  (E.  13.  38)  ;  all  sins  are  now  and  shall  be 
forgiven  us.  Hence,  the  sinner  should  ever  anew  “  creep  to 
(hisj  baptism”  (E.  16.  119.  Cat.  492).  This  sign  has  been 
given  us  by  God,  to  assure  us  that  he  will  through  Christ  be  gra¬ 
cious  to  us  (E.  12.  163,  205),  and  that  we  are  really  admitted  to 
a  place  beneath  his  sway  and  “  incorporated  ”  into  his  kingdom 
(12.  212).  This  means,  in  the  sense  of  Luther,  nothing  else 
than  that  we,  by  virtue  of  our  fellowship  with  Christ,  al- 

sign,  that  is  to  admonish  us  of  the  divine  promise.  If  we  can  have  it,  it  is 
well.  .  .  .  But  if  anyone  could  not  have  it,  or  if  it  were  denied  to  him,  he 
is  nevertheless  not  lost,  if  he  only  believes  the  gospel.  .  .  .  Therefore  he 
who  has  the  sign,  which  we  call  sacrament,  and  not  faith,  has  a  bare  seal 
attached  to  a  letter  without  any  writing  in  it  ”  (E.  12.  179). 

1  “At  an  earlier  period  the  Scotist  foundation  underlying  the  conception  of 
the  sacrament  was  more  evident :  That  the  priest  pours  upon  the  child,  sig¬ 
nifies  the  holy,  divine,  and  eternal  grace  which  is  together  with  this  (do  neben ) 
poured  into  the  soul”  (W.  2.  168). 

2  “  Thus  resipiscentia ,  or  repentance,  is  nothing  else  than  a  sort  of  retracing 
of  the  steps  and  return  to  baptism,  so  that  that  is  again  sought  and  practiced 
which  was  indeed  before  begun  and  yet  through  negligence  intermitted” 
(Cat.  497). 


WORD  AND  SACRAMENT.  285 

ways  experience  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  renewal  to  a  better 
life. 

In  Luther’s  view,  baptism  has  thus  a  double  blessing,  or  effect. 
God  enters  into  a  covenant  relationship  with  the  baptized, 
which  signifies  :  ( i )  That  the  Holy  Spirit  is  always  present  and 
operative  for  his  renewal.1  (2)  That  he  always  finds  God  ready 
to  forgive  him  his  sins  for  Christ’s  sake.  Baptism  therefore 
brings  :  “  namely,  victory  over  death  and  the  devil,  remission  of 
sins,  the  grace  of  God,  Christ  with  his  works,  and  the  Holy 
Spirit  with  all  his  gifts”  (Cat.  491).  But,  since  only  the  be¬ 
liever  is  capable  of  enjoying  such  experiences,  it  is  to  be  believed 
that  God  in  some  way  endows  infants  brought  for  baptism  with 
faith,  on  account  of  the  believing  presentation  of  them  and  the 
prayer  offered  in  their  behalf  by  their  sponsors  (<?.  g.,  De  W.  2. 
126,  202.  W.  6.  538.  E.  28.  416;  11.  62  ff. ;  26.  255  ff. 
Cat.  494). 2 

These  are  the  leading  principles  of  Luther’s  doctrine  of  bap¬ 
tism.  We  meet  in  them  precisely  the  same  ideas  already  found 
in  the  discussions  of  grace  and  justification.  In  a  certain  sense, 
his  doctrine  of  baptism  is  therefore  a  complement  to  his  doctrine 
of  the  grace  operative  in  the  word.  Baptism  both  begets  a  dis¬ 
position  to  yield  to  the  influences  exerted  by  the  word,  and  it 
accompanies  and  individualizes  those  influences. 

5.  Luther’s  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  in  the  form  which 
it  assumed  through  the  conflict  with  Zwingli,  will  require  atten¬ 
tion  hereafter.  We  have  now  to  do  with  his  view  of  the  sacra¬ 
ment  before  the  outbreak  of  the  controversy.  We  take  as  a 
starting-point  the  tract :  Ein  Sermo?i  von  der  hochw.  Sacrament 
des  Leichna?ns  Christi  u.  von  den  Bruderschaften  (A.  D.  1519). 
The  ‘  ‘  meaning  or  work  ’  ’  of  the  sacrament  is  here  said  to  be  ‘  ‘  com - 

1  Of  the  highest  importance  upon  this  point  is  the  remark,  E.  12.  215  f. : 
“  Where  the  word  goes  and  is  heard  and  baptism  is  desired,  there  it  is  com¬ 
manded  to  administer  baptism  to  both  old  and  young.  For  where  the  word 
as  the  chief  part  goes  right,  there  everything  else  goes  right  also  ;  where  the 
word  or  teaching  is  not  right,  there  is  the  other  also  in  vain,  for  neither  faith 
nor  Christ  is  there.” 

2  Luther  accordingly  does  not  think  here  of  a  “vicarious  faith”  of  the 
sponsors.  “  The  faith  of  the  sponsors  and  the  church  implores  and  obtains  for 
them  personal  faith,  in  which  they  are  baptized  and  believe  for  themselves” 
(n.  63).  The  lack  of  reason  in  the  child  does  not,  to  Luther’s  mind,  make 
against  the  possibility,  that  they  may  have  faith,  as  it  is  just  reason  “which 
chiefly  resists  faith  and  the  word  of  God”  (11.  65  f. ).  But  is  such  faith  in 
any  way  psychologically  conceivable?  See  Kostlin,  L.  Theol.  ii. ,  ed.  2,  237 
ff. ,  where  my  view  is  inaccurately  stated.  With  respect  to  infants  dying  unbap¬ 
tized,  Luther  afterward  said  that  they  are  “  without  doubt  admitted  to  grace  by 
him”  (God)  on  account  of  the  intercession  of  parents  and  sponsors  (E.  3. 
166  ;  23.  340). 


286 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


munio .  ”  It  establishes  a  fellowship  with  Christ  and  all  saints  in 
heaven  and  on  earth,  so  that  all  blessings,  sufferings,  and  sins 
become  common  to  all.  Accordingly,  the  communicant  may 
console  himself  with  the  merit  of  Christ,  and  his  representation 
of  and  intercession  for  the  saints  above  and  the  church  on  earth 
(W.  2.  743,  744):  “  That  we  here  lay  aside  from  us  all  misery 
and  distress  upon  the  church  (gemeyri),  and  particularly  upon 
Christ”  (745).  But  we  are  ourselves  also  obligated  by  this 
communio  to  render  to  others  the  service  which  we  here  enjoy : 
“Thou  must  .  .  .  learn,  as  this  sacrament  is  a  sacrament  of 
love,  and  as  love  and  help  have  come  to  thee,  to  show  love  and 
help  in  return  to  Christ  in  his  needy  followers.  For  here  must 
thou  grieve  for  all  the  dishonor  of  Christ  in  his  holy  word,  all 
the  misery  of  the  church,  all  unjust  sufferings  of  the  innocent 
.  .  .  here  must  thou  protect,  act,  and  pray,  and  if  thou  canst  do 
no  more,  have  pity.  .  .  .  Behold,  thus  thou  bearest  them 
all,  and  thus  do  they  all  bear  thee  again,  and  all  things  are  com¬ 
mon — good  and  evil  ”  (745,  747).  The  fellowship  thus  effected 
by  the  Lord’s  Supper  is  symbolized  in  the  bread  and  wine,  com¬ 
posed  of  many  grains  and  separate  grapes,  and  in  the  fact  that 
we  eat  and  drink  the  bread  and  wine  and  thus  transform  them 
within  our  bodies  that  they  become  one  thing  with  us.  It 
is  taught,  further,  that  this  sign  is  a  “perfect  ”  one,  viz.:  “  his 
true  natural  flesh  in  the  bread ,  ”  since  “  the  bread  is  changed 
( verwandelt )  into  his  true  natural  body,  and  the  wine  into  his 
natural  true  blood  ”  (749).  In  reply  to  the  question,  “where 
the  bread  remains,  when  it  is  changed  into  the  body  of  Christ,  ’  ’ 
Luther  warns  against  “subtlety.”  “It  is  enough  that  thou 
knowest  that  it  is  a  divine  sign,  in  which  Christ’s  flesh  and  blood 
are  truly  present — how  and  where,  commit  to  him  ”  (750).1 

But  Luther’s  interest  centres  in  this  bodily  presence  of  Christ 
only  in  view  of  the  conviction  that  “  Christ  has  given  his  body,  in 
order  that  the  meaning  of  the  sacrament,  i.  e.,  fellowship  and  the 
interchange  of  love,  might  be  practiced,  and  he  esteems  less  highly 
his  own  natural  body  than  his  spiritual  body,”  i.  e.,  the  fellow¬ 
ship  of  his  saints.  Hence  the  communicant  should  fix  his  mind 
more  upon  the  spiritual  body  of  Christ  than  upon  the  natural 
body,  for  the  latter  without  the  former  would  be  of  no  benefit 
(751).  The  presence  of  the  body  of  Christ  in  the  Lord’s 
Supper  is  therefore  designed  to  remind  us  that  he  surrendered 
this  body  in  order  that  a  fellowship  of  love  might  be  established. 
We  shall  meet  this  idea  again. 

1  Literally,  transubstantiation  is  here  retained  (cf.  W.  8.  435),  but  really 
Luther  is  only  concerned  to  hold  fast  the  idea  that  the  body  is  “in”  the 
bread. 


WORD  AND  SACRAMENT. 


287 


The  presence  of  the  body  of  Christ  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  was 
thus  the  fixed  belief  of  Luther  from  the  first.  Its  denial  he 
regarded  as  a  Hussite  heresy  (W.  6.  80).  But  from  A.  D. 
1520,  he  expressly  rejected  transubstantiation.  It  is  a  Thomistic 
fiction,  that  only  the  accidents  of  the  bread  and  wine  are  pre¬ 
served,  but  not  the  substance.  It  is  refuted  by  eyesight. 
Luther  now,  appealing  to  D’ Ailli  (supra,  p.  204),  adopts  the  view 
prevalent  in  theology  since  Duns  and  Occam  (p.  131  n.,  203), 
that  the  substance  of  the  bread  remains,  and  with  it  the  body  of 
Christ  is  at  the  same  time  given  (W.  6.  508.  E.  28.  366  ff. ).x 
Bread  and  wine  are  signs,  “  under  which  is  truly  Christ’s  flesh 
and  blood”  (W.  6.  365,  cf.  sub  pane  et  vino ,  W.  8.  440  ;  im 
Brot ,  E.  29.  336).  The  significance  of  this  presence  of  the 
body  of  Christ  consists  in  the  fact,  that  it  is  “a  powerful 
and  most  noble  seal  and  sign  ”  (W.  6.  359.  E.  28.  412;  29. 
350;  22.  40):  That  is,  the  presence  of  the  body  of  Christ 
attests  and  confirms  the  grace  of  God,  for  it  was  this  body  which 
was  offered  up  to  obtain  grace  for  us.  ‘‘In  order  that  this 
divine  promise  might  be  for  us  the  most  certain  of  all  and  might 
render  our  faith  most  secure,  he  appended  the  most  faithful  and 
most  precious  pledge  and  seal  of  all,  viz.,  the  very  price  of  the 
promise  itself,  his  own  body  and  blood  with  the  bread  and  wine, 
by  which  he  has  merited  that  the  blessings  of  the  promise  be 
given  to  us,  which  he  paid  also  in  order  that  we  might  receive 
the  promise  ”  (W.  8.  440 ;  6.230,358.  E.  22.  40  ;  29.350). 
Luther’s  meaning  is  :  The  body  of  Christ,  as  it  is  symbolized  by 
the  bread  and  really  present  in  it,  is  by  its  presence  the  clearest 
evidence  of  the  grace  of  God  toward  us.  It  does  not  occur  to 
him  to  doubt  the  bodily  presence,1 2  but  its  significance  consists 
alone  in  deepening  the  impression  of  the  word.  This  is  the  im¬ 
portant  thing,  and  the  believer  may  even  do  without  the  sacra¬ 
ment  (W.  6.  355  f. ,  362,  363.  E.  22.  39  f. ).  As  the  sacra¬ 
ment  can  be  received  with  benefit  only  by  him  who  believes  in 
the  atonement  and  intercession  of  Christ  (E.  28.  240),  its  bless¬ 
ing  consists  in  the  fact,  that  we  therein  “  remember  ”  Christ  and 
are  thereby  ‘  ‘  strengthened  in  faith  ’  ’  and  ‘  ‘  made  ardent  in  love  ’  ’ 
(W.  6.  358;  8.  437.  E.  22.  40;  28.  240).  This  strength¬ 
ening  of  faith,  together  with  the  gift  of  the  body  of  Christ  will- 

1  His  condemnation  of  transubstantiation  is  here  a  mild  one,  provided  that 

doctrine  be  not  made  an  article  of  faith  ( W.  6.  508).  “  No  great  importance 

attaches  to  this  error,  if  only  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  are  left,  together 
with  the  word.”  (A.  D.  1523.  E.  28.  402.) 

2  The  idea  of  a  purely  symbolical  interpretation  occurred  to  him  indeed  : 
“because  I  saw  well  that  I  could  thereby  have  given  the  pope  the  greatest 
thump.”  De  W.  2.  577. 


238 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


ingly  given  to  death  for  our  sins,  assures  us  of  the  forgiveness  of 
sins  (E.  29.  347  f. ).  Nothing  is  here  made  to  depend  upon  the 
eating  of  the  body.  The  consciousness  of  the  bodily  presence1 
of  the  Lord  increases  within  us  faith  in  (the  offered)  grace,  and 
thus  produces  the  assurance  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  fellowship  into  which  he  here  enters  with  us  is 
for  us  the  most  powerful  incentive  to  serve  him  and  our  brethren 
in  love  (E.  29.  351).  “  You  have  two  fruits  of  the  holy  sacra¬ 

ment  :  one  is,  that  it  makes  us  brethren  and  fellow-heirs  of  the 
Lord  Christ,  so  that  from  him  and  us  one  loaf  results ;  the  other, 
that  we  also  become  common  and  one  with  all  other  believers  .  .  . 
and  are  also  one  loaf  ’ ’  (E.  11.  186.  Vid.  alsoW.  19.  96,  99). 

This  is  Luther’s  original  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper.2  The 
most  profound  impulses  of  his  religious  consciousness  contributed 
to  its  formulation,  i.  e.,  the  Christ  in  us,  who  becomes  ours  only 
by  virtue  of  the  apprehension  of  his  historical  character,  and  the 
summing  up  of  all  the  results  of  his  activity  in  the  forgiveness  of 
sins,  faith,  and  love. 

It  was  not  until  A.  D.  1522  that  Luther  was  confronted  with  a 
new  problem.  He  learned  from  certain  Bohemian  Brethren,  that 
they  regarded  the  bread  and  wine  as  bare  symbols  (cf.  Wickliffe, 
supra,  p.  206).  At  the  same  time,  Honius  of  Holland  laid 
before  him  by  letter  the  interpretation  of  the  Est  in  the  words 
of  institution,  as  equivalent  to  significat.  Then  appeared  Carl- 
stadt  with  his  strange  idea,  that  the  “  This  ”  of  the  words  of 
institution  relates  to  the  body  of  Christ,  while  the  “  Take  ”  and 
the  “  Eat  in  remembrance  of  me  ”  refer  to  the  bread.  These 
suggestions  opened  up  new  questions  for  Luther.  The  relation 
of  the  body  to  the  elements,  and  the  exegesis  of  the  words  of  in¬ 
stitution,  claim  the  chief  attention.  From  this  time  forward,  he 
calls  for  a  simple  adherence  to  the  words  of  Scripture  (E.  28. 
412  f.;  29.  329,  321,  216,  331);  when  the  Bible  says  “  is,”  we 
dare  not  interpret  it  as  meaning  “  signifies”  (28.  393,  396, 
398).  But  the  bodily  omnipresence  of  the  Lord  is  not  to  be  dis¬ 
puted,  as  he  does  not  travel  up  and  down  between  heaven  and 
earth  (29.  289,  293  f. ). 

Luther,  as  we  have  seen,  never  denied  the  real  presence  of  the 
body  of  Christ  in  the  Lord’s  Supper.  But  as  the  question  of  the 

1  E.  11.  187  :  “  If  I  believe  that  his  body  and  blood  are  mine,  then  I  have 
the  Lord  Christ  entire,  and  everything  that  he  is  able  to  accomplish.”  Accord¬ 
ing  to  this  and  the  above,  a  personal  presence  and  fellowship  of  Christ  is  also 
to  be  maintained.  On  the  other  hand,  Luther  rejected  (28.  412)  speculation 
upon  the  concomitance  of  the  divine  nature  (supra,  p.  132),  and  discriminated 
between  the  presence  of  the  body  and  that  “  of  the  entire  Christ,  i.  e.,  of  his 
kingdom  (lordship)”  (29.  295). 

2  What  practical  applications  may  be  made  of  these  ideas  ! 


REFORMATORY  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHURCH.  289 

“  How  ”  of  that  presence  now  comes  to  the  front,  he  is  led  to 
ascribe  to  it  a  greater  and  independent  significance.  Whereas 
the  body  was  originally  only  a  means  of  realizing  the  sacramental 
gift,  it  afterward  comes  to  be  regarded  as  being  the  gift  itself, 
as  we  shall  have  further  occasion  to  observe. 

6.  We  note,  finally,  that,  from  A.  D.  1520,  Luther  expressed 
himself  clearly  and  positively  in  favor  of  the  reception  of  the 
Lord’s  Supper  in  both  elements  (W.  6.  502  ff.,  78  f.  E.  28. 
296;  11.  161)  and  against  the  sacrifice  of  the  mass.  The 
Scriptures  do  not  teach  the  latter  (W.  8.  42 1).1  Neither  would 
it  be  possible  for  us  to  bring  a  sacrifice  (W.  6.  367),  nor  is  it 
necessary  for  us  to  appease  God  (W.  8.  441  f. ).  He  denounced 
the  abuses  which  have  made  of  the  mass  simply  a  magical 
jugglery  (W.  6.  375,  supra,  p.  203,  n.  1).  We  should  offer  to  God 
nothing  but  prayer,  thanksgiving,  and  praise  (6.  368),  together 
with  the  faith  “  that  Christ  in  heaven  is  our  priest,  offers  himself 
for  us  without  ceasing,  presents  and  makes  acceptable  us,  our 
prayers  and  our  praises  ’  ’  (6.  369  f.). 

§  70.  The  Reformatory  Conception  of  the  Church. 

Literature.  Kostlin,  L.’s  Lehre  v.  d.  Kirche,  1853,  and  L.’s  Theol., 
i.  248  ff.,  Engl.  Tr.  i.  289 ff.  Kolde,  L.’s  Stellungz.  Concil.  u.  Kirche,  1876. 
Seeberg,  Begriff  d.  Kirche,  i.  85  ff.  Gottschick,  Ztschr.  f.  KG.  viii.  543  ff. 
Sohm,  Kirchenrecht,  i.  460  ff. 

1.  The  chief  elements  of  Luther’s  conception  of  the  Church 
may  also  be  traced  in  his  writings  of  the  pre-reformation  period 
(p.  235  f. )  ;2  but  they  were  made  powerless  by  his  bondage  to  the 
canonical  ideas  upon  the  subject.  The  pope,  as  such,  is  still  re¬ 
garded  as  an  authority  (W.  1.  582,  670,  683  ;  2.  30),  and  he  yet 
looks  to  councils  for  new  articles  of  faith  (W.  1.  582  ff.,  681  ;  2 
36  f. ).  This  wavering  and  confusing  attitude  terminated  with 
the  controversy  with  Eck  and*  the  Leipzig  Disputation  (A.  D. 
1519).  Luther  had  asserted  that  the  primacy  of  the  Romish 
church  over  all  others  had  not  been  exercised  in  the  days  of 
Gregory  I.,  at  least  not  over  the  Greek  church  (W.  2.  16 1),  and 
that,  according  to  the  Fathers,  the  pope  was  only  a  co-episcopus 

1  See  the  interesting  discussion  of  the  origin  of  the  mass,  W.  6.  365  f. 

2  Gottschick  has  rightly,  in  opposition  to  Ritschl,  myself,  and  others, 
proved  Luther’s  independence  of  Huss.  At  the  time  of  the  Leipzig  Disputa¬ 
tion,  Luther  was  not  acquainted  with  Huss’s  book  upon  the  Church  (E.  24. 
22,  cf.  Enders,  L.’s  Briefe,  ii.  196)  and  he  had  only  a  slight  knowledge  of 
his  sermons,  gained  while  at  Erfurt  (E.  65.  81).  Since  the  formula,  congre- 
gatio praedestinatorum,  does  not  affect  Luther’s  conception  of  the  church,  we 
cannot  think  of  the  acts  of  the  Council  of  Constance  as  the  source  of  his  views 
upon  that  topic.  His  conception  of  the  church  is  based  upon  Augustine  and 
the  current  medieval  definition,  communio fidelium  (supra,  p.  144,  n.  2). 

*9 


290 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


with  the  other  bishops  (2.  20,  229).  At  this  point  the  contro¬ 
versy  began.  Luther  maintained  his  position  (2.  185).  Peter 
does  not,  according  to  the  Scriptures,  stand  above  the  other 
apostles  (ib.  235  f. ).  The  Council  of  Nice  did  not  attribute 
primacy  to  the  Roman  bishop  (238,  265,  397,  672).  The  duty 
of  obedience  to  the  pope  is  not  called  in  question,  but  it  is 
like  that  which  is  due  to  any  government,  even  that  of  the  Turk 
(186).  The  papacy  is  based,  not  upon  divine,  but  only 
upon  human  right ;  for  such  passages  as  Matt.  16.  18  f.  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  pope  (187,  189  ff.,  194).  The  papal 
decretals,  upon  which  the  claims  of  the  papacy  are  based,  are 
mere  human  laws  (201).  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  divine 
law,  according  to  2  Pet.  2.  13,  that  the  pope,  together  with  all 
his  subordinates,  should  be  subject  to  the  emperor  (220  f. ).  As 
Peter  exercised  no  secular  authority,  the  ecclesiastical  jurisdiction 
is  not  of  divine  right  (223).  And  Luther  finally  comes  to 
doubt  whether,  after  all,  “any  other  head  of  the  whole  church 
has  been  appointed  upon  earth  except  Christ  ”  (239).  Luther  now, 
at  Leipzig  and  elsewhere,  defends  the  proposition,  that  Huss  was 
right  in  calling  the  church  the  general  assembly  of  the  predes¬ 
tinated  ( predestinatorum  universitas').  But  as  this  definition  was 
condemned  at  Constance,  Luther  found  himself  driven  to  the  fur¬ 
ther  assertion  :  “ Nor  can  a  Christian  believer  be  forced  beyond 
the  sacred  Scriptures ,  which  are  properly  the  divine  law ,  unless 
some  new  and  proved  revelation  should  be  added  ;  for  we  are  for¬ 
bidden  by  divine  law  to  believe  except  what  is  proved  either  through 
the  divine  Scriptures  or  through  manifest  revelation  ”  (W.  2.  279). 
A  principle  of  immense  scope  is  thus  established,  that  in  all  ques¬ 
tions  affecting  doctrine  the  Scriptures  are,  as  the  divine  law,  the 
only  decisive  authority.  This  idea  is  not  new.  It  lay  at  the  basis 
of  the  medieval  criticisms  of  the  papacy  (supra,  p.  169,  172),  and 
Luther  himself  had  made  use  of  it  at  an  early  period.1  But  the 
establishing  of  it  as  a  fundamental  principle  and  the  energetic 
concrete  application  of  it  were  new.  The  new  canon  is  directed 
against  the  councils  in  general,  especially  the  venerated  Council 
of  Constance,  and  against  the  pope  as  well  (W.  2.  283  ff. ,  313, 
404,  314,  397).  “A  council  cannot  make  divine  right  out  of 
that  which  is  not  by  nature  divine  right  ”  (308).  To  establish 
the  Romish  papacy  by  divine  right  is  a  “  new  dogma,”  which  is 
not  binding.  The  church  needs  no  head  (313  f. ).  The 
hierarchical  system  is  not  biblical,  nor  of  divine  right  (379, 
433  f. ).  The  canon  law  begins  to  totter  (423). 

1  Cf.  Undritz,  Neue  kirchl.  Ztschr. ,  1897,  579  ff.  As  the  idea  was 
widely  current  in  the  later  Middle  Ages,  no  importance  attaches  to  its  use  by 
Carlstadt,  A.  D.  1518  (Kolde,  L.’s  Stellung  z.  Concil.,  p.  34). 


REFORMATORY  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


29I 


The  great  significance  of  the  Leipzig  Disputation  and  the  con¬ 
flicts  which  preceded  and  followed  it  lies  in  the  fact,  that  Luther 
was  thus  led  to  break  fundamentally  and  permanently  with  the 
Romish  conception  of  the  church  and  the  authorities  upon  which 
it  depended  (canons,  pope,  councils,  ecclesiastical  authority) — In 
place  of  the  latter,  was  now  acknowledged  the  sole  authority  of  the 
Holy  Scriptures.  The  way  was  thus  open  to  carry  out  and 
apply  the  ideas  of  reform,  the  old  barriers  being  broken  down. 
Criticism  presses  forward  with  rapid  pace  against  Rome  (<?.  g., 
W.  6.  287  ff.,  290  ff.  E.  31.  257,  310),  the  pope  as  anti¬ 
christ  (De  W.  1.  239.  W.  6.  289,  331,  598,  603;  8. 
470,  183;  9.  701  ff.  E.  28.  224;  17.  25,  etc.),  the  coun¬ 
cils  (W.  6.  79,  138,  258;  8.  150.  E.  22.  143  f.),  and 

the  tradition  of  the  Fathers  (E.  31.  205  ;  11.  10  ff.;  12.  138; 

J4*  33°)- 

2.  But  we  turn  to  view  the  new  conception  of  the  Church, 
as  Luther  first  develops  it  in  detail  in  the  tract,  Von  dem 
Papsttum  zu  Rom  (A.  D.  1520).  The  church  is  “an  as¬ 
semblage  (i)orsa??ilunge )  of  all  Christian  believers  on  earth” 
(W.  6.  292),  and,  furthermore,  “  an  assemblage  of  hearts  in  one 
faith,”  or  “a  community  (( gemein )  of  saints”  (293).  Since 
this  assemblage  is  represented  as  a  spiritual  fellowship,  the 
principle  of  its  unity  is  not  to  be  seen  in  an  accidental  his¬ 
torical  body,  such  as  Rome  or  the  papacy,  but  in  Christ 
(294  f.),  for  it  is  he  who  so  operates  upon  the  members  of  the 
community  (  Gemeinde')  that  they  are  thereby  united  into  one  com¬ 
munity.  As  the  Head,  he  infuses  his  ‘  ‘  disposition,  temper, 
and  will”  into  the  community  (298).  The  church  is  there¬ 
fore  the  spiritual  association  of  those  who  believe  on  Christ, 
established  and  sustained  by  him.  But  by  the  word  “  church  ” 
is  also  understood  the  organized  association  of  those  who  be¬ 
lieve  on  Christ,  “an  outward  thing  with  outward  actions,” 
and  the  order  of  the  clergy  (296).  This  “outward  bodily 
church”  ( Christenheit )  and  the  “inner  spiritual  church” 
(Christenheit)  are  to  be  carefully  discriminated,  but  not  sep¬ 
arated.  They  are  related  to  one  another  as  body  and  soul  in 
man  (297).  It  is,  of  course,  of  chief  importance  that  we  be¬ 
long  to  the  spiritual  church,  but  this  membership  stands  in 
close  connection  with  membership  in  the  external  church.  At 
this  point  appears  thejnew  element  in  Luther’s  theory.  By 
the  introduction  of  the  word  and  sacraments,  he  prevented  the 
dissolution  of  the  conception  of  the  church  as  held  by  Aug¬ 
ustine  and  the  reformers  of  pre-reformation  days.  The  word 
and  sacraments,  as  externally  and  sensibly  set  forth,  call 
into  existence  the  inner  spiritual  church.  “  For  where  baptism 


292 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


and  the  gospel  are,  there  let  no  one  doubt  that  there  are 
also  saints,  even  though  it  should  be  only  children  in  their 
cradles”  (301).  The  church  is  therefore,  in  one  aspect,  an 
external,  visible  association.  But  this  is  not  “  the  true  ( rechte ) 
church  which  is  believed.”  Since,  however,  the  word  and 
sacraments  are  here  operative,  faith  concludes  that  here  in  the 
external  association  may  be  found  a  community  of  saints. 
Thus  the  church  is  an  object  of  faith,  and  not  visible,  “  for 
what  is  believed  is  not  bodily  nor  visible  ”  (300,  301). 

3.  In  this  simple  combination,  the  way  is  pointed  out  for  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  the  church.  Luther 
held  without  wavering  to  these  principles,  not  indeed  without 
adapting  them  to  the  practical  needs  of  his  time.  Two  things 
here  demanded  his  attention,  i.  e.,  the  establishment  of  an  evan¬ 
gelical  church  order,  and  defense  against  the  theories  of  the 
Anabaptists.  If  the  former  task  compelled  him  to  a  funda¬ 
mental  discussion  of  the  form  to  be  assumed  by  the  external 
'  church,  in  order  that  it  may  be  an  appropriate  agency  for  the: 

|  production  of  the  communio  sanctorum ,  the  conflict  with  Ana- 
1  baptism  emphasized  the  necessity  of  such  an  ecclesiastical  system 
(supra,  p.  280  f. ).  In  opposition  to  Rome,  he  asserted  :  Only 
the  word  and  the  sacraments  are  necessary  to  the  existence  of 
the  church  ;  and  against  the  Anabaptists  :  Without  the  word  and 
t  sacraments  no  church  !  We  must  note  a  few  features  brought 
into  prominence  in  the  further  development  of  the  doctrine  con¬ 
cerning  the  church. 

(a)  The  spiritual  nature  of  the  church  is  maintained  without 
abridgment  of  any  kind.  The  church  is  the  communio  sanc¬ 
torum  (W.  6.  606,  131.  Op.  ex.  15.  357),  for  these  words  are 
“  nothing  else  than  a  gloss,  or  interpretation,  by  which  someone 
wished  to  indicate  what  the  Christian  church  is  ”  (Large  Cat.  457). 
It  is  the  “assembly  ( Versammlung )  of  all  believers”  (W.  8. 
163),  the  “  holy  Christian  nation  ”  (E.  25.  355),  the  regenerated 
(46.  258).  It  is  holy,  because  the  Holy  Spirit  reigns  in  it  (W. 
8.  163).  Those  who  belong  to  it  are  all  priests  in  the  spiritual 
sense  (ib.  247  f.,  251  f.,  254,  382/415,  417,  470).  Thus  con¬ 
sidered,  the  church  is  the  “  new  creation  of  God  ”  (W.  6.  130), 
the  product  and  sphere  of  the  redemptive  work  of  Christ  (E. 
46.  154);  or  it  is  the  “kingdom  of  God,”  in  which  Christ 
reigns  through  the  Spirit  and  faith  (E.  29.  3;1  cf.  p.  277). 

1  Upon  the  relationship  of  the  kingdom  and  the  church,  see  E.  5.  231  : 

‘  ‘  Such  kingdom  of  heaven  begins  on  earth  below  and  is  called  by  another  name, 
the  Christian  church,  here  on  earth,  within  which  God  reigns  through  his  word 
and  his  Spirit.”  The  church  is  therefore  the  kingdom  of  God  in  its  temporal, 
historical  course  of  development. 


REFORMATORY  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


29  3 


The  church  in  this  sense  is  an  object  of  faith,  and  may  therefore, 
upon  the  basis  of  the  definition,  Heb.  n.  i,  be  described  as 
spiritual  and  invisible  (see  citations,  supra,  p.  235,  and  also  Op. 
var.  arg.  5.  295.  W.  6.  300;  8.  419,  cf.  the  exposition  of  the 
kingdom  of  Christas  ‘  ‘  invisible.  ”  E.  12.  96,  127;  17.  236, 
•cf.  63.  168;  19.  26). 1  (b)  The  agency  of  Christ  which  incor¬ 

porates  individuals  into  the  church  is,  however,  bound  to  the 
chosen  means,  the  word  and  sacraments  ;  for  through  them  God 
gathers  the  community,  and  they  bring  the  Spirit  (E.  9.  124; 
12.  406;  22.  142;  49.  220;  50.  75  ff.,  48.  68,346).  Hence 
the  peculiar  character  of  the  act  of  faith  by  which  the  existence 
of  the  church  is  recognized.  Wherever  the  means  of  grace  are, 
there  faith  assumes  the  presence  of  a — perhaps  very  small — com¬ 
munity  of  saints  (25.  358,  360;  22.  142).  (c)  By  this  course 

of  reasoning  the  necessity  for  an  outward  ecclesiastical  associa¬ 
tion  is  maintained.  The  church  must,  further,  always  exist  as 
an  empirical  historical  entity.  Thus  considered,  it  is  “  the 
number  or  multitude  of  the  baptized  and  believing  who  belong 
to  a  priest  or  bishop,  whether  in  a  city,  or  in  a  whole  land,  or  in 
the  whole  world  ”  (E.  31.  123).  It  is  evident,  also,  that  mem¬ 
bership  in  the  church  is  necessary  to  salvation,  “  for  outside  of  the 
-Christian  church  is  no  truth,  no  Christ,  no  salvation  ”  (E.  10.  162, 
444;  12.  414;  22.  20;  9.  292;  48.  218  f. ).  (dT)  All  this 
may  be  said  of  the  church,  because  the  word  and  sacraments  are 
absolutely  essential  to  its  existence.  It  follows,  also,  that  all 
the  members  of  the  church  are  called  to  bear  a  part  in  the 
proclamation  of  the  word,  and  that  the  congregation  should  do 
all  in  its  power  for  its  own  edification  (e.  g.,  E.  12.  222,  278). 
But  since  the  congregation  can  no  longer  expect  charismatically- 
endowed  preachers,  and  since  the  preaching  of  the  word  dare 
not  be  discontinued,  provision  must  be  made  for  an  office  to  ad¬ 
minister  the  word  and  sacraments,  without  allowing  this  office  to 
interfere  with  the  duty  of  every  individual  to  bear  testimony  to 
the  truth  (E.  17.  250^;  22.  146  ff.).  The  “keys,”  i.  e., 
teaching  and  preaching  (15.  395),  belong  really  to  all  Christians 
(W.  8.  173),  but  the  public  official  exercise  of  this  duty,  as  is 

1  Already  in  the  middle  of  the  third  decade  of  the  century,  the  Evangelical 
party  in  Franconia  assert  against  the  Romanists  :  ‘  ‘  This  church  is  spiritual  and 
invisible ,  not  that  we  do  not  see  the  persons,  but  that  no  one  knows  which 
really  belong  to  the  Christian  church”  (in  Engelhardt,  Ehrengedachtnis 
der  Ref.  in  Frank en,  p.  97,  123).  This  is  no  longer  the  original  method  of 
establishing  the  point.  Luther  meant  to  indicate  by  the  term,  invisible ,  only 
that  the  nature  of  the  church  is  spiritual,  and  hence  invisible  and  an  object  of 
faith  ;  and  did  not  apply  it  as  discriminating  among  the  members  of  the  visible 
church.  Cf.  Wickliffe  and  Huss,  supra,  p.  21 1).  The  term  was,  as  appears 
from  the  above,  first  used  by  Luther,  and  afterward  by  Zwingli. 


294 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


strongly  emphasized  in  opposition  to  the  Anabaptist  propaganda,, 
should  be  restricted  to  officials  regularly  called  (E.  31.  218, 
214  ff.;  48.  298  f. ).  The  object  of  every  divine  service  is  the 
preaching  of  the  word  (22.  153,  155,  235).  Whatever  is 
essentially  an  affair  of  the  congregation  is  to  be  actually  admin¬ 
istered  by  an  office,  viz. ,  the  preaching  of  the  word,  with  the 
administration  of  the  sacraments  and  the  care  of  souls  (E.  22. 
1 1 3  •  31.  315).  “  Therefore  upon  whomsoever  the  office  of 

preaching  is  laid,  upon  him  is  laid  the  highest  office  in  the 
church”  (E.  22.  151  ;  9.  220;  19.  205).  The  office  of  the 
pastor  can  therefore  not  be  outranked  by  a  higher  ecclesiastical 
office,  as  that  of  a  bishop  (28.  181  ;  47.  16)  and  the  hierarchy ; 
for,  according  to  the  analogy  of  Christ’s  rulership,  no  outward 
government  dare  be  exercised  in  the  church,  such  as  that  of  the 
pope,  but  only  “to  rule  souls  through  the  word  of  God.” 
There  is  no  ecclesiastical  government  which  has  authority  to  im¬ 
pose  laws  without  the  permission  and  will  of  the  congregation, 
“  but  their  reigning  is  nothing  else  than  to  use  the  word  of  God, 
and  thereby  guide  Christians  and  vanquish  heresy  ”  (E.  22.  6, 
93  f. ;  46.  183  ff.  Thus  the  relationship  of  the  word  and  the 
Spirit  requires  an  ecclesiastical  office.1 

(<?)  But  since  the  church  must,  according  to  this  definition, 
always  be  an  external  association,  it  is  evident  that  there  must 
belong  to  it  empirically  a  great  number  of  inchoate,  imperfect, 
and  even  hypocritical  members,  who  can  have  no  share  in  its 
spiritual  exercises  (E.  9.  303;  14.  211  ;  16.  247;  2.  53,  61  f.; 
25.  363  >  65*  66.  Gal.  3.  151  f.).  Regarded  empirically, 
therefore,  the  church  is  like  a  field  in  which  tares  are  growing 
among  the  wheat.2  (/)  This  must  be  borne  in  mind  when 
speaking  of  the  evangelical  church  of  the  New  Testament.  If 
the  question  be  raised,  which  of  the  two  churches,  the  Romish 
and  the  Evangelical,  is  the  “true”  ( rechte )  one,  the  answer 
cannot  be  given  on  the  basis  of  their  comparative  morality.  But, 
since  the  object  of  the  outward  organization  of  the  church  is  to 
bring  Christ  to  men  through  the  word,  therefore  it  can  lay  claim 
to  the  title,  “  true  church,”  just  in  proportion  as  its  preaching 
of  the  word  is  in  harmony  with  this  purpose,  i.  e.,  is  truly  evan¬ 
gelical.3  The  mark  of  the  true  church  is,  accordingly,  that  in 

1  The  purely  secular  character  which  every  form  of  church  government  has 
and  must  have,  in  Luther’s  view,  is  evident  from  the  above,  cf.  Sohm,  517  ff. 

2  This  affects  the  conception  of  the  character  of  public  worship,  and 
explains  Luther’s  reference  to  sinful  assemblies  of  more  mature  Christians  in 
his  Deutsche  Messe ,  W.  19,  73,  75,  112. 

3  Cf.  E.  26.  42  ;  31.  389  :  I  have,  thank  God,  reformed  more  with  my 
gospel  than  they  could  perhaps  have  done  with  five  councils. 


REFORMATORY  CONCEPTION  OF  THE  CHURCH.  295 

it  the  gospel  is  purely  preached  (E.  31.  366),  that  it  has  the 
“  teaching,  faith,  and  confession  of  Christ”  (12.  245,  249; 
48.  224  ff. ;  49.  230  ;  50.  ioff. ).  This  can  be  known  from  the 
agreement  of  its  doctrine  with  the  “word  of  Christ”  (12. 
289):  “  That  the  true  church  holds  with  me  to  God’s  word” 
(28.  279  ;  9.  230).  Our  doctrine  is  “  the  Scriptures  and  the 
clear  word  of  God”  (13.  219,  223).  The  “  pure  doctrine  ” 
is  therefore  of  the  highest  importance,  since  every  corruption  of 
it  must  immediately  influence  the  life  (15.  358;  16.  101  ;  26.. 
35  f. ).  Hence,  the  church  dare  not  tolerate  false  teachers  (E.. 
26.  37  f. ).  As,  therefore,  the  inner  unity  of  the  church  is 
established  through  Christ  as  its  head,  so  its  external  unity  is 
secured  through  the  pure  doctrine  of  the  gospel.1  “  Therefore 
this  unity  of  the  church  is  not  said  to  be,  and  is  not,  the  having  and 
holding  of  any  one  form  of  outward  government,  law,  or  ordi¬ 
nance,  and  church  customs,  as  the  pope  and  his  crowd  profess 
and  wish  to  have  all  excluded  from  the  church  who  will  not  in 
this  be  obedient  to  him.  .  .  .  It  is  called  one  holy  catholic  or 
Christian  church,  because  there  is  here  one  pure  and  uncorrupted 

doctrine  of  the  gospel  and  outward  confession  of  the  same  ”  (9. 

2 93).  Where  this  old,  true  doctrine2  has  free  course,  i.  e.r 
where  the  Apostles’  Creed  is  confessed,  there  the  conditions  are 
present  for  the  existence  of  the  communio  sanctorum ,  and  hence 
there  is  the  true  church.3  There  has  been  a  change  in  the 

1  We  dare  not  here,  if  we  would  not  lose  the  spirit  of  Luther,  overlook  the 
practical  aim  of  the  “doctrine.”  Even  the  theoretical  construction  of  the 
doctrinal  system  is,  to  his  mind,  subordinate  to  the  great  aim  of  interpreting 
and  appropriating  the  gospel.  (A.  g. ,  W.  2.  469.)  This  is  attested  by  his 
according  to  all  Christians  the  right  to  pass  judgment  upon  the  doctrine  and 
preaching  of  the  church  (22.  145  ;  12.  367  ;  13.  182  ff. ;  46.  232  f. ;  47. 
354).  But  this  assumes  an  inner  experience  secured  through  the  hearing  of 
the  gospel,  which  may  be  used  as  a  criterion.  “If  thou  knowest  God,  then 
hast  thou  already  the  level,  measure,  and  yard-stick,  by  which  thoucanst  judge 
all  the  doctrine  of  the  Fathers.  .  .  .  Who  teaches  you  this  ?  Thy  faith  in 
thy  heart,  which  believes  only  this  (13.  185).  Thou  must  thyself  decide.  It 
means  for  thee  thy  neck — it  means  thy  life.  Therefore  God  must  say  to  thee 
in  thy  heart,  ‘This  is  God’s  word;’  otherwise  it  is  undecided  ”  (ib.  183). 
There  was,  accordingly,  in  Luther’s  mind  no  thought  of  a  doctrinal  hierarchy. 

2  The  papal  teachings  are  a  “new”  doctrine  (<?.  g.,  E.  17.  142,  cf.  51. 
103,  where  “  Scripture  and  experience  ”  are  represented  as  “  two  touch-stones 
of  the  true  doctrine”).  The  Evangelical  party  have  the  “  old  doctrine”  and 
are  therefore  “  the  old,  true  church.”  “  For  whoever  thinks  alike  and  holds 
alike  with  the  old  church,  he  belongs  to  the  old  church  ”  (E.  26.  14). 

3  Although  Luther  declares  the  Romish  church  to  be  a  “devil’s  church,” 
because  it  confesses  “untrue  articles,”  he  yet  holds  that  in  it  the  Lord 
through  baptism  and  the  word  “nevertheless  retains  the  young  children  .  .  . 
and  some  adults,  but  very  few,  who  have  turned  to  Christ  again  at  their 
death  ”  (E.  26.  28,  281  ;  4.  59  ff. ).  Strictly  speaking,  the  false  church  has. 
no  right  to  the  property  of  the  church  (26.  39,  59). 


296 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


meaning  of  this  term.  Once  it  signified  the  “  true  church,  Much 
is  believed”  (W.  6.  301);  it  is  now  the  church  of  pure  doctrine 
(E.  12.  245,  249;  26.  43;  28.  379;  48.  359  f.).  Once  it 
was  a  purely  religious,  now  it  is  an  empirical  conception.1  The 
doctrinaire  tendency  which  may  attach  itself  to  the  watchword, 
‘‘pure  doctrine”  ( reine  Lehre ),  is  entirely  foreign  to  Luther. 
The  doctrine  of  the  church  embraces  the  gospel,  and  the  latter  is 
a  power  which  lays  hold  upon  the  entire  life,  begetting  faith, 
love,  and  works,  and  binding  Christians  together  in  inward  and 
outward  fellowship.2 


§  71.  Luther's  Attitude  Toward  the  Traditional  Standards  of 

Doctrine ,  viz . ,  the  Scriptures  and  the  Dogmas  of  the  Church . 

Literature.  Romberg,  L.’s  Lehre  v.  d.  heil.  Schrift,  Wittenberg,  1868. 
Thimme,  L.’s  Stellung  z.  heil.  Schrift,  Neue  kirchl.  Ztschr.,  1896,  644  ff. 
Kattenbusch,  L.’s  Stellung  zu  den  okumen.  Symbolen,  Giessen,  1883.  H. 
Preuss,  Die  Entwicklung  des  Schriftprincips  bei  L.  bis  zur  leipziger  Disput., 
1901.  Scheel,  Luther’s  Stellung  zur  heil.  Schrift,  1902.  W.  Walther,  Das 
Erbe  der  Reform,  i.,  1903.  Thieme,  Luther’s  Testament  wider  Rom,  1900. 

i.  In  the  preceding  paragraphs  we  have  traced  the  leading 
features  of  Luther’s  teaching  in  so  far  as  it  has  affected  the  His¬ 
tory  of  Doctrines.  It  maybe  said  that  here  all  is  new.  Luther 
knew  how  to  present  the  Gospel  in  all  its  heights  and  depths  as 
no  man  had  done  since  the  days  of  Paul  and  John.  We  may 
best  understand  how  he  was  led  to  this  profound  knowledge  of 
the  truth  by  noting,  first  of  all,  his  new  conception  of  Faith — 
not  the  intellectual  acceptance  of  a  dogma,  nor  the  theoretical 
conviction  of  the  correctness  of  a  formula,  but  the  heartfelt  ex¬ 
perience  of  the  omnipotence  of  love  revealed  to  us  in  Christ. 
This  experience  makes  of  me  a  new  man,  and  inspires  me  with 
the  powers  and  impulses  of  another  world.  But  this  experience 
involves  also  the  assurance  that  I  enjoy  the  favor  of  God,  al¬ 
though  sinful  impulses  are  yet  felt  within.  There  now  springs  up  a 
new  life,  which  is  full  of  true  evangelical  repentance.  The  do¬ 
minion  of  the  sacrament  of  repentance  is  abolished  by  true  repent¬ 
ance  ;  the  works  once  demanded  by  the  former  being  replaced 
by  the  works  of  my  earthly  calling  and  the  introduction  of  a  new 
ideal  of  the  Christian  life.  But  even  more  than  this  may  be  truly 

1  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  guard  here  against  the  misunderstanding  of  this 
change  as  involving  a  limitation  of  the  religious  character  of  the  church.  The 
church  of  the  pure  doctrine  has  value  or  significance  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  a 
means  for  the  establishment  of  the  communio  sanctorum. 

2  I  still  maintain  the  positions  taken  in  my  Kirchenbegriff,  /.  88,  as  to  the 
social-ethical  tendency  of  Luther’s  conception  of  the  church,  despite  the  criti¬ 
cisms  of  K.  Muller  (Symbolik,  p.  326  f. ). 


LUTHER  AND  TRADITIONAL  DOCTRINE.  297 

said.  As  Luther  interprets  Christianity,  with  all  its  facts  and 
doctrines,  from  the  view-point  of  faith,  all  his  utterances  have 
the  direct  impress  of  religious  experience.1  What  he  sought  to 
tell  of  all  things  was,  what  influence  they  might  have  upon  the 
believing  heart  and  how  the  latter  might  secure  such  influence. 
In  this  way  he  fell  upon  simpler,  yet  at  the  same  time  more  pro¬ 
found,  formulas  than  many  of  those  which  tradition  had  handed 
down.  He  held  to  Augustine’s  doctrine  of  original  sin,  or,  to 
speak  more  accurately,  restored  it ;  but  for  him  the  essence  of 
sin  lay  no  longer  in  sensuous  desire,  but  in  unbelief.  He  often 
reproduced  the  theological  and  Christological  formulas  of  the 
ancient  church ;  but  the  God  of  his  experience  was  not  the  infinite 
“Subsistence  ”  (Vol.  I.,  p.  340  n.),  but  the  omnipotent  Loving- 
will.  He  spoke  of  grace  and  its  gift  to  us,  even  of  “infused 
grace  ;  ’’  but  he  meant  by  it  not  a  “  quality  glued  in,”  but  the 
efficient  power  of  love  which  transforms  our  hearts. 

The  re-discovered  gospel  bore  within  itself  the  hidden  impulse 
for  the  construction  of  new  theological  formulas,  and  with  lavish 
hand,  and  almost  recklessly,  Luther  dashed  them  from  his  pen. 
But  the  reformation  of  the  theology  which  he  effected  was  not 
directed  by  any  thought  of  a  complete  revision  of  the  traditional 
dogmatic  system.  It  was  Luther’s  aim  to  obtain  a  secure  and 
permanent  place  for  the  newly-won  conceptions  touching  the  re¬ 
ligious  life  (faith,  justification,  grace,  works,  the  enslaved  will,  the 
gospel,  the  law).2  He  never  wearies  of  seeking  to  impress  them 
upon  his  hearers  and  readers.3  Under  the  guidance  of  this  cen- 

1  Cf.  58.  398  f. :  “  There  is  only  one  article  and  rule  in  theology  ;  he  who 
does  not  know  and  have  this  is  no  theologian,  viz.,  true  faith,  or  trust  in  Christ. 
All  the  other  articles  continually  flow  into  this  one  and  out  again,  and  the 
others  are  nothing  without  this.”  Similarly  in  Gal.  i.  3. 

2  From  this  fact,  as  exemplified  particularly  in  Luther’s  writings  and  the 
Epistle  to  the  Romans,  it  may  be  understood  that  Melanchthon  should  have 
failed  to  treat  of  the  Trinity  and  Christology  in  his  first  edition  of  the  Loci. 

3  There  may  be  found  in  Luther  a  very  great  variety  of  propositions,  each 

of  which  is  declared  to  be  the  “  chief  article,”  or  “  the  sum  of  the  gospel.” 
In  reality,  they  all  amount  in  the  end  to  the  same  thing.  I  cite  a  few  groups  : 
Justification  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins ,  e.  g.,'  E.  31.  250  :  “  The  word  of 

grace  and  forgiveness  of  sins,  and  that  we  become  righteous  and  are  saved 
alone  through  Christ  without  merit :  for  this  is  the  chief  article,  out  of  which 
all  our  doctrine  has  flowed,  which  was  held  and  confessed  at  Augsburg  before 
the  emperor,  as  it  is  based  upon  the  Scriptures.”  Cf.  Muller,  Symb.  Bb.,  300. 
De  W.  4.  1 5 1 .  E.  8.  184,  236;  11.  157;  14.  188.  Repentance  and  for¬ 
giveness,  II.  279.  Grace,  forgiveness,  liberty,  13.  30;  40.  324.  Christ, 
the  God-?nan,  who  delivers  us,  13.  49,  56,  204  ;  15.  155  >  *6.  254  >  9-  2I3  > 
IO.  346  ;  12.  246  f. ;  18.  24  ;  19.  390  ;  47.  45,  58  ;  48.  98.  But  not  our  free 
will,  IO.  218  ;  14.  33.  Grace  and  love ,  14.  73  ;  22.  233  ;  25.  76.  Gal.  I. 
322.  Faith  and  baptism,  12.  204.  Faith  and  works,  16.  140.  The  Trinity, 
9.  I,  especially  the  contents  of  the  Creed,  28.  413  f.,  346  f. ;  13.  221  f. ;  49.  5, 
and  the  symbolical  writings. 


298 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


tral  idea,  he  moulded  anew  all  doctrines  that  came  within  his 
range.  Whatever  stood  in  its  way,  he  rejected,  as,  e.  g.,  the 
medieval  Semi-pelagianism  and  doctrine  of  grace,  the  whole 
theory  of  the  sacraments,  the  hierarchical  system,  work-right¬ 
eousness,  and  the  doctrine  of  merits.  And  just  as  readily  did  the 
fanatical  notions  of  an  immediate  operation  of  the  Spirit  fall  be¬ 
neath  the  weight  of  the  reformatory  principle.  Other  doctrines, 
on  the  contrary,  which  did  not  collide  with  his  religious  princi¬ 
ple,  he  conserved.  If  he  had  been  entrusted  with  the  construc¬ 
tion  of  the  doctrines  of  the  Trinity  or  of  Christology,  he  would 
certainly  have  framed  formulas  different  from  those  of  Nice  or 
Chalcedon.  This  does  not  imply  connivance,  nor  calculation 
of  consequences1  —  not  even  a  lack  of  logical  consistency. 
With  a  genuine  historic  sense,  he  allowed  the  formulas  in  ques¬ 
tion  to  stand,  for  the  sake  of  the  important  truths  imbedded  in 
them.  Here  arises  for  us  a  new  question  :  What  was  Luther’s 
attitude  toward  dogma  ? 

2.  Before  attempting  an  answer  to  this  query,  we  must  have 
a  clear  understanding  upon  another  point.  We  have  seen  that 
Luther,  impelled  by  his  central  reformatory  principle,  was  led 
by  an  inner  necessity  to  abandon  the  theories  of  the  medieval 
church  and  replace  them  with  new  doctrinal  statements.  Faith, 
with  its  independent  assurance,  its  “  feeling  ”  and  “  experience  ” 
(p.  257.  E.  13.  185,  183,  supra,  p.  295,  n.  1,  2.),  here  became 
at  once  the  critical  and  the  constructive  norm.  ( a )  But,  in  the 
decisive  hour  at  Worms,  Luther  appealed  not  only  to  his  religious 
experience,  but  also  to  the  authority  of  the  Holy  Scriptui'es .  In 
this  he  established  a  further  canon  for  the  reformation  of  doc¬ 
trine.  He  habitually  appealed  to  it — very  naturally — in  contro¬ 
versy  with  his  opponents,  and  was  controlled  by  it  in  his  own 
religious  life.2  Its  importance  became  clear  to  him  at  the  Leip¬ 
zig  Disputation  (p.  289  f.).  Only  the  “divine  law”  ( das 
gottliche  Recht ),  or  the  Scriptures,  dare  rule  in  the  church  : 
“What  is  asserted  without  the  Scriptures  or  proved  revelation 
may  be  held  as  an  opinion,  but  is  not  necessary  to  be  believed  ” 
(W.  6.  508;  2.  297,  279,  309,  315).  No  water  dare  be  min¬ 
gled  with  this  wine  (W.  8.  141  f. ;  143  f. )  ;  no  lantern  held  up 
against  this  sunlight  (ib.  235).  The  word  of  God,  not  the 

1  For  the  legal  status  of  the  Reformation,  the  retention  of  the  Trinitarian 
and  Christological  formulas  was  of  the  highest  importance. 

2  E.  28.  350  :  “  Now  I  handled  the  abomination  (indulgences)  at  first 
almost  tenderly  and  gently  and  handsomely,  and  would  very  gladly  have 
allowed  the  papacy  to  stand  and  have  helped  it  be  something  ;  but  the  Scriptures 
I  was  determined  to  have  uncorrupted,  pure  and  certain  :  I  did  not  yet  know 
that  it  (the  papacy)  was  contrary  to  the  Scriptures,  but  only  considered  it  to 
be  without  Scripture ,  as  other  worldly  government  set  up  by  men.” 


LUTHER  AND  TRADITIONAL  DOCTRINE.  299 

teachings  of  men — Christ,  not  philosphy,  must  rule  the  people  of 
God  (ib.  144,  146,  149,  345.  E.  9.  232  ;  n.  7  ;  28.  298). 
The  servants  of  Christ  must  teach  only  his  word  (E.  7.  82).  The 
word  itself  is  to  be  taught ;  it  is  not  to  be  bound  by  the  inter¬ 
pretation  of  it,  as  does  Rome  (W.  2.  339.  E.  11.  31),  nor  be 
robbed  of  its  meaning  by  neglect  of  the  context  (W.  2.  361, 
425  ;  8.  348).  This  principle  became  the  more  firmly  estab¬ 
lished  for  Luther  in  proportion  as  the  necessity  of  an  authori¬ 
tative  norm  became  apparent  among  his  own  following.  He 
thus  withstood  Iconoclasts  and  Fanatics,  and  upon  this  basis 
constructed  the  new  evangelical  organization  of  the  church.  It 
was  henceforth  a  maxim:  “Thou  must  plant  thyself  upon  a 
clear,  transparent,  strong  statement  of  the  Scriptures,  whereby 
thou  canst  then  hold  thy  ground  ”  (E.  28.  223).  From  this 
may  be  understood  his  insistence  upon  the  est  in  the  formula  of 
the  Lord’s  Supper.  But  there  is  nothing  essentially  evangelical 
as  yet  in  all  this  reverence  for  the  Scriptures,  for  it  had  been 
quite  common  in  the  Middle  Ages  (supra,  p.  101,  149,  192  ff. ). 
The  strict  view  of  inspiration  which  Luther  sometimes  expresses 
(“  the  writing  of  the  Holy  Spirit,”  “  the  Spirit’s  own  writing.” 
Op.  ex.  7.  313;  1.  4.  E.  27.  244;  11.  248;  45.  301  ;  52. 
321,  333)1  was  also  current  in  the  later  Middle  Ages  (p.  193  n. ). 
But  for  Luther  the  Scriptures  were  something  more  than  the 
“divine  right,”  or  law  inspired  by  God,  as  Occam  and  Biel 
regarded  them. 

(^)  This  is  proved  by  a  number  of  considerations  which  point 
to  another  conception  of  the  Scriptures.  ( 1 )  At  the  close  of 
the  Middle  Ages  the  natural  law  ( naturrecht )  innate  in  the 
reason  was  represented  as  equivalent  to  the  divine  law  ( gottliches 
Recht )  of  the  Scriptures  (supra,  p.  17 1  f. ,  192  f. ,  184  n.).  Since 
Luther  denies  this  (E.  11.  30  ;  19.  26b),2  revelation  is  not  for 
him  equivalent  to  the  general  dictates  of  reason,  but  has  positive 
and  peculiar  content.  (2)  This  content  is  Christ  and  the  rev¬ 
elation  given  through  him.  “  If  I  know  what  I  believe,  then  I 
know  what  stands  in  the  Scriptures,  because  the  Scriptures  con¬ 
tain  nothing  more  than  Christ  and  Christian  faith”  (W.  8. 
236).  The  Holy  Spirit,  operative  in  the  New  Testament  authors, 
merely  carried  out  what  Christ  said  :  “As  the  evangelist  John 

1  See  many  more  instances  in  Rohnert,  Die  Inspirat.  d.  h.  Schr.,  1889, 
p.  144  ff. 

2  This  is  not  contradicted  by  the  fact  that  Luther  would  at  first  accept  only 
“  what  the  holy  father  proves  with  Scripture  or  with  reason  ”  (E.  27.  21), 
nor  his  readiness  at  Worms  to  be  convinced  “by  proofs  of  Scripture  or  by 
clear  reasons ”  (Kostlin,  L.’s  Leben,  i.  452).  Luther  here  means  citations 
from  Scriptures  or  evident  inferences  from  such  citations.  Cf.  Occam,  supra, 
p.  192. 


3°° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


wrote  many  more  things  than  Christ  said  just  at  this  time,  but  yet 
always  keeps  to  this  one  purpose,  to  most  thoroughly  present  the 
article  concerning  the  person,  office,  and  kingdom  of  Christ,  of 
which  Christ  also  himself  speaks”  (E.  12.  135  f.,  138,  141). 
Thus  is  for  Luther  the  specific  content  of  all  Holy  Scriptures  de¬ 
fined.  That  which  is  valuable  in  them,  and  which  determines 
their  character,  is  their  relation  to  Christ.  1  ‘  This  is  also  the 
proper  touch-stone  for  the  criticism  of  all  books,  if  we  observe 
whether  they  treat  of  Christ  or  not,  since  all  Scripture  testifies 
of  Christ  (Rom.  3.  21),  and  St.  Paul  will  know  nothing  but 
Christ  (1  Cor.  2.  2).  That  which  does  not  teach  Christ  is  not 
apostolic,  even  though  St.  Peter  or  St.  Paul  should  teach  it.  On 
the  other  hand,  whatever  preaches  Christ  would  be  apostolic, 
even  if  Judas,  Hannas,  Pilate,  and  Herod  should  do  it  ”  (E.  63. 
157).  (3)  In  this  connection,  Luther’s  critical  opinions  con¬ 

cerning  the  Scriptures  are  very  significant.  Thus,  he  asserts 
that  the  text  of  the  prophecies  has  often  fallen  into  confusion  ; 
the  discourses  were  presumably  not  committed  to  writing  until 
afterward,  and  then  by  redactors  (63.  57,  74;  62.  123).  The 
prophets  were  often  in  error  ( fehlten ),  when  they  prophesied  of 
worldly  events  ( von  weltlichen  Laufteii)  (E.  8.  23).  The  books 
of  the  Kings  are  more  trustworthy  than  the  Chronicles  (62.  132). 
By  whom  Genesis  was  composed,  is  a  matter  of  indifference  (57. 
35).  It  would  be  better  if  the  book  of  Esther  were  not  in  the 
canon  (op.  ex.  7.  195.  E.  62.  131).  The  composition  of  Eccle¬ 
siastes  by  Solomon  is  doubted  (E.  62.  128).  The  reports  of  the 
synoptic  gospels  are  not  of  uniform  value  (30.  314,  331  ;  14. 
319).  The  Epistle  of  Jude  is  derived  from  the  Second  Epistle 
of  Peter  (63.  158).  The  Epistle  of  Hebrews  errs,  in  denying 
a  second  repentance  (ib.  155),  “  and  is  apparently  composed  of 
many  parts.”  James  wrote  “  a  right  strawy  epistle  .  .  .  for  it 
has  certainly  no  evangelical  character  about  it  ”  (ib.  1 15),  i.  e ., 
“he  teaches  nothing  ”  about  Christ,  and  connects  righteousness  • 
with  works  (156  f. ).  He  even  says  :  “James  talks  wildly” 

(, delirat )  (op.  ex.  4.  328.  W.  2.  425).  Luther  did  not  orig¬ 
inally  regard  the  Apocalypse  as  a  prophetic  or  apostolic  book, 
“because  Christ  is  neither  taught  nor  known  in  it  ”  (63.  1 69  f. ). 
He  remained  in  doubt  as  to  its  authorship  (159).1  Great  em¬ 
phasis  was  laid  by  him  upon  the  testimony  borne  to  the  various 
books  by  the  ancient  church.2  On  this  ground,  Hebrews,  James, 

1  Luther  attaches  very  little  value  to  prophecies  touching  outward  events, 
but  places  the  Apocalypse  in  this  respect  upon  a  level  with  Joachim  of  Floris> 
and  the  Lichtenberg  prophet !  (E.  8.  22). 

2  Already,  A.  D.  1519,  at  Leipzig,  he  rejected  Macc.  II.  as  not  canonical 
(W.  2.  325,  329,  339).  As  to  the  Apocrypha  in  general,  see  63.  91  ff. 


LUTHER  AND  TRADITIONAL  DOCTRINE. 


301 


Jude,  and  the  Apocalypse  are  distinguished  in  the  Prefaces  of 
A.  D.  1522  from  the  “  real  certain  chief  books  ’ ’  (63.  154). 
But  the  inner  canon  is  for  him  yet  more  important.  The  Gospel 
of  John  and  Paul’s  epistles,  especially  Romans  and  First  Peter, 
are  ‘  ‘  the  real  kernel  and  marrow  among  all  the  books.  .  .  . 
For  in  these  thou  findest  not  much  description  of  the  work  and 
miracles  of  Christ ;  but  thou  findest  here  portrayed  in  the  most 
masterly  way  how  faith  in  Christ  overcomes  sin,  death,  and  hell 
and  gives  life,  righteousness,  and  salvation — which  is  the  real 
character  of  the  gospel  ’  ’  (63.  144  b ;  51.327).  Inconsistency 
with  this  view  of  the  Scriptures,  historical  oversights  and  errors 
in  the  sacred  writings  disturbed  Luther  but  little  ( e .  g.,  E.  14. 
319;  46.  174;  50.  308  f.;  62.  132.  Walch,  Luth.  WW.  xiv., 
1208,  1293  f.).1  They  did  not  affect  the  real  grounds  of  his 
confidence.2  (4)  It  is  again  in  perfect  consistency  with  the 
above,  that  Luther’s  acknowledgment  of  the  authority  of  the 
Scriptures  is  not  based  upon  their  official  recognition  by  the 
church,3  but  upon  the  experience  of  their  truth  :  “  Everyone 
must  believe  only  because  it  is  God’s  Word  and  because  he  is 
satisfied  in  his  heart  {inwendig  befinde')  that  it  is  truth  (E.  28. 
340;  47.  356),  i.  e.,  a  reality  and  not  a  mere  ‘  idea  ’  ” 
(48.  29). 

( c )  The  principles  thus  avowed  indicate  a  conception  of  the 
character  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  entirely  different  from  that  un¬ 
derlying  the  medieval  formulas  employed  by  Luther  as  cited  in 
paragraph  (#)  above.  We  must  not  be  too  ready  therefore  to 
regard  such  declarations  as  the  hasty  utterances  of  superabundant 
enthusiasm,  and  magnanimously  absolve  the  Reformer  from  re¬ 
sponsibility  for  them.  This  is  forbidden,  not  only  by  the  fact 
that  they  occur  for  the  most  part  in  carefully  composed  passages, 
such  as  the  prefaces  to  his  publications,  but  especially  by  the  im¬ 
portant  consideration  that  they  stand  in  very  intimate  connection 
with  his  reformatory  conception  of  faith.  There  thus  results  an 
entirely  new  conception  of  the  authority  and  inspiration  of  the 
Scriptures.  Their  specific  content,  in  both  the  Old  and  the  New 

1  It  is  thus  seen  that  Luther  employed  “criticism  ”  in  the  widest  variety  of 
forms.  Almost  all  the  criteria  employed  at  the  present  day  were  applied  by 
him  in  his  own  way. 

2  In  the  sense  of  Occam  or  Biel,  Luther’s  position  is  simply  heretical ,  since 
the  Christian  is  under  obligation  to  accept  all  the  books  of  the  Bible  and  believe 
everything  found  in  them  (supra,  p.  192).  It  is  very  remarkable  that  the  op¬ 
ponents  of  Luther  did  not  make  more  capital  out  of  his  bold  utterances  in  this 
direction.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  similar  views  were  held  by  such  men  as 
Erasmus  and  Cajetan  (cf.  Kunze,  Glaubensregel,  heil.  Schrift  u.  Taufbe- 
kenntniss,  1899,  p.  516  ff. ). 

3  D’Ailli  still  taught  differently,  supra,  p.  191,  n.  1. 


3°2 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Testaments,  is  Christ,  with  his  office  and  kingdom.  It  is  this  con¬ 
tent  in  which  faith  is  interested,  and  which  faith  verifies  by  inner 
experience.  This  is  therefore  the  important  thing  in  the  Scrip¬ 
tures.  It  must  accordingly  be  the  impelling  motive  in  the  special 
divine  agency  which  gave  the  Scriptures  their  peculiar  character. 
In  other  words,  the  testimony  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  Scriptures 
is  the  testimony  to  the  great  facts  of  salvation  andredemption.  This 
is  the  purpose  of  their  inspiration,  and  in  proportion  as  they  ful¬ 
fill  it  do  they  substantiate  their  claim  to  be  regarded  as  an  au¬ 
thority  in  matters  of  religion.1  This  makes  them  the  criterion 
and  touch-stone,  by  which  all  the  teaching  of  the  church  must 
be  attested  as  evangelical  truth  (e.  gmf  E.  9.  207,  372  ;  12.  289  ; 
13.  208;  15.  144;  18.  22  ;  48.  69,  92  ;  46.  231,  240).  This 
places  the  above-cited  passages  touching  the  authority  of  the 
Scriptures  in  a  new  light.  The  Scriptures  were  for  Luther  an 
absolute  authority.  But  although  he  could  in  controversy  em¬ 
ploy  them  as  “divine  law”  in  contrast  with  “ecclesiastical 
law,”  yet  they  were  an  actual  authority  for  him  only  as  the 
primitive  and  original  testimony  to  Christ  and  his  salvation. 
This  determines  their  nature  and  their  form.2 

But,  when  thus  regarded,  the  Scriptures  dare  not  be  co-ordi¬ 
nated  with  justifying  faith  as  the  second  principle  of  Protestant¬ 
ism.  The  controlling  principle  is  faith  ;  and,  since  only  the  be¬ 
liever  can  understand  the  Scriptures,  and  they  exist  only  to  min¬ 
ister  to  faith,  they  are  subordinate  to  it.  This  view  produced  a 
new  and  profounder  conception  of  the  authority  of  the  Scriptures. 
The  ancient  problems :  wherein  the  authority  of  the  Scrip¬ 
tures  really  consists,  how  is  it  to  be  proved,  and  what  its  relation 
to  that  of  other  writings — were  fundamentally  solved  by  Luther, 
since  he  recognized  this  authority  as  based  upon  religious  grounds 
— a  statement  which  is  not  invalidated  by  the  fact  that  Luther 
did  not  always  in  praxis  adhere  strictly  to  his  own  principle. 

3.  We  are  now  in  position  to  understand  Luther’s  attitude 
toward  the  Dogmas  of  the  Ancient  Church.  We  have  seen  that 


1  Cf.  the  remarkably  characteristic  declaration,  E.  11.  248:  “Thus  I 
would  take  Moses,  the  Psalter,  Isaiah,  and  also  the  same  Spirit,  and  make 
just  as  good  a  New  Testament  as  the  apostles  wrote  ;  but  since  we  do  not 
have  the  Spirit  so  fully  and  powerfully,  we  must  learn  from  them  and  drink 
out  of  their  well.” 

2  The  doctrine  of  the  Scriptures  in  the  dogmatic  system  of  the  present  day 
must  be  framed  with  due  regard  to  the  principles  of  Luther  as  above  deduced, 
although  the  latter  were  not  reduced  by  the  Reformer  himself  to  a  complete 
doctrinal  form.  How,  for  instance,  could  a  verbal  inspiration  be  sustained 
in  view  of  Luther’s  derogatory  remarks  upon  particular  passages  in  the  canon¬ 
ical  books,  his  recognition  of  redactors,  who  have  collected  the  materials  of 
many  of  the  books,  and  his  acknowledgment  of  errors? 

A. 


LUTHER  AND  TRADITIONAL  DOCTRINE.  303 

he  rejected  as  unbiblical  the  medieval  doctrine  of  the  sacraments, 
and  denied  the  infallibility  of  the  pope  and  the  councils.  But 
what  was  his  attitude  toward  the  ancient  dogmas  ?  (cf.  esp.  his 
tract,  Von  den  Conciliis  und  Kirchen ,  1539,  the  three  Symbols  of 
1538,  and  the  other  symbolical  writings) .  It  is  very  clear,  in  the 
first  place,  that  Luther  acknowledged  and  frequently  reproduced 
the  Nicene  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  and  the  Chalcedonian  Christol- 
ogy.  Also,  that  he  treated  the  symbols  of  the  ancient  church  with 
great  respect,  especially  the  Apostles’  Creed,  which,  he  declared, 
contains  all  the  principal  articles  of  faith  (28.  413  f. ,  346  f. ;  9. 
29  ffi;  13.  221  f.;  20.  297  f.).1  But  this  is  not  to  be  under¬ 
stood  as  implying  that  he  believes  these  symbols  or  councils  as 
such,  and  thus  subjects  himself  to  an  earthly  authority.  His 
liberty  in  this  respect  is  manifest  from  his  criticism  of  the  ancient 
terminology.  ‘  ‘  That  if  my  soul  loathes  the  word,  homousion ,  and 
I  am  unwilling  to  use  it,  I  am  not  a  heretic  ;  for  who  will  com¬ 
pel  me  to  use  it,  provided  I  hold  the  thing  which  is  defined  from 
the  Scriptures  by  the  council  ”  (W.  8.  117  f.  ).2  He  objected  to 
the  word  “ Trinity  ”  (E.  6.  230),  declaring  that  it  “  sounds 
cold,”  and  was  4 *  discovered  and  invented  ”  by  men  (E.  12. 
378);  although  ne  afterward  admitted  that  the  form  of  expression 
is  not  important,  as  “  original  sin,”  for  example,  is  not  found  in 
the  Scriptures  (E.  25.  291  f. ;  28.382;  29.  183  f.).  And  in  his 
tract,  Von  den  Conciliis ,  etc.,  he  ‘ 4  with  masterly  historical  crit- 
cism  ’  ’ 3  denies  all  binding  authority  to  the  ancient  councils. 
The  highest  council  was  that  of  the  apostles,  and  it  enjoined  re¬ 
fraining  from  blood,  an  injunction  which  no  one  now  observes. 
“  If  we  want  to  be  guided  by  councils,  we  must  recognize  this  one 
above  all  others ;  if  we  do  not,  then  we  need  not  recognize  any 
of  the  other  councils,  and  are  therefore  free  from  all  councils  ’  ’ 
(25.  240).  Just  as  little  are  all  the  decrees  of  Nice  observed 
(244,  251  f. ).  And  no  council  has  set  forth  “  the  whole  Chris¬ 
tian  doctrine  ”  (261).  The  decrees  of  councils  are  not  on  their 
own  account  true,  but  because  they  repeat  the  old  truth,  as  given 
to  the  apostles  by  the  Holy  Spirit  (266  f. ,  295,  328,  331). 
Councils  likewise  have  “  no  power  to  form  new  articles  of  faith, 
but  should  indeed  smother  and  condemn  new  articles,  in  accord- 

1  E.  20.  155:  “  I  have  a  little  book  which  is  called  the  Credo.  .  .  .  This 
is  my  Bible,  which  has  stood  so  long  and  still  stands  unshaken,  to  this  I  hold 
fast,  to  this  I  was  baptized,  upon  this  I  live  and  die.”  E.  9.  29:  “Thus 
this  Symbol  has  been  excellently  and  briefly  composed  out  of  the  books  of  the 
holy  prophets  and  apostles  for  children  and  plain  Christians,  so  that  it  is  fitly 
called  the  Apostles’  creed,  or  faith.” 

2  Eck,  on  the  other  hand,  at  Leipzig  highly  lauded  the  ecclesiastical  defini¬ 
tion  of  the  homousia.  W.  2.  335.  Erasmus  already  criticises  it.  Opp.  v.  1090. 

3  E.  g.y  his  investigations  concerning  Nestorius,  25.  304  ff. 


3°4 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


ance  with  the  Holy  Scripture  and  the  ancient  faith.”  Thus,  at 
Nice,  Constantinople,  Ephesus,  and  Chalcedon,  the  4 ‘new  arti¬ 
cles”  of  Arius,  Macedonius,  Nestorius,  and  Eutyches  were  re¬ 
jected  (333,345)-  Luther’s  idea  is,  that  the  dogmas  are  true  only 
in  so  far  as  they  agree  with  the  Scriptures  ;  they  have  no  au¬ 
thority  in  themselves.  But  the  truth  of  the  Scriptures  is  inwardly 
attested.  Hence  it  may  be  said,  in  harmony  with  Luther’s  idea, 
that  the  Holy  Spirit  begets  in  us  an  experience  of  the  truth  of 
the  doctrine  (of  the  Creed)  (E.  23,  249,  267  ;  20.  148);  for  in 
no  other  way  can  we  be  led  to  faith  than  by  being  practically 
and  inwardly  convinced  of  that  which  has  been  taught  (20. 

1 41,  136,  144  f. ;  22.  15  f.).1  The  doctrine  of  the  two  natures 
in  Christ  is  in  itself  of  no  interest  to  the  Christian ;  it  is  only 
from  the  work  of  Christ  that  he  learns  to  understand  it  (35.  208). 

We  have  thus  before  us  the  criteria  and  rules  which  Luther 
applied  in  the  criticism  of  religious  utterances  of  all  kinds.  A 
thing  is  true,  if  it  is  attested  by  faith,  by  his  own  experience, 
and  by  the  Scriptures.  The  outward  and  legalistic  testing  of 
religious  views  by  the  standard  of  the  ancient  dogmas  has  been 
abolished ;  the  ancient  canon  of  Vincent  of  Lerius  shattered. 
But,  beyond  this,  the  legalistic  use  of  the  Scriptures  is  itself  upon 
principle  abandoned.  Luther’s  attitude  toward  the  Bible  was 
thus  very  different  from  that  of  Occam.  The  problems  which 
in  every  age  arise  in  this  field  of  study,  in  consequence  of  advanc¬ 
ing  historical  knowledge,  may  all  be  adjusted  to  the  principles  of 
Luther  and  thus  find  their  solution.  That  his  praxis  was  not 
always  consistent  or  worthy  of  imitation  can  be  here  merely 
suggested. 

4.  In  conclusion,  we  may  at  least  touch  upon  a  further  ques¬ 
tion  :  Was  not  Luther’s  peculiar  apprehension  of  religious  truth 
limited  or  restrained  by  the  recognition  and  acceptance  of  the 
Trinitarian  and  Christological  dogmas  ?  The  reader  of  his  dis¬ 
cussions  of  the  knowledge  of  God  in  Christ  (supra,  p.  252  f.)  re¬ 
ceives  at  first  the  impression  that  the  Father  was  revealed  in  the 
words  and  works  of  Jesus,  and  that  a  separate  divinity  of  the  Son 
is  therefore  not  in  the  author’s  mind.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
Luther  emphasizes  most  vigorously  the  idea  that  the  divinity  of 
the  Son  is  revealed  in  his  own  life.  He  is  true  God  and  true 


1  Hence  the  papists  have,  in  Luther’s  opinion,  the  whole  second  article  of 
the  Creed  only  “with  the  mouth” — “in  the  heart  they  deny  it,”  since  they 
hold  that  “  man  is  not  so  utterly  lost,”  and  credit  him  with  “  free  will  ”  (E. 
20.  142  ;  46.  87  ;  63.  154).  It  is  evident  that  everything  is  made  to  depend, 
not  upon  the  acceptance  of  the  traditional  formula,  but  upon  a  practical  ex¬ 
perience,  upon  the  basis  of  which  alone  can  the  formula  be  really  comprehended. 
Critical  objections  to  any  one  of  the  facts  asserted  in  the  Creed  had  never 
fallen  under  Luther’s  observation. 


LUTHER  AND  TRADITIONAL  DOCTRINE. 


3°5 

man,  two  natures  and  one  person  (E.  7.  185  f. ,  196).  His 
human  life,  with  its  deprivations,  sufferings,  and  temptations,  is 
depicted  in  the  most  animated  and  vivid  way  (E.  13.  307  ;  10. 
131  f.,  299  ff. )  This  man  was  entirely  under  the  guidance  of 
the  divine  nature.  It  was  “  personally  present”  in  him  (7. 
185).  His  human  nature  does  not  see  and  feel  everything,  but 
what  the  divine  nature  permits  it  to  feel  and  know — hence  Jesus 
does  not  know  when  the  day  of  judgment  shall  be  (ib. ).  Thus 
it  becomes,  since  the  Spirit  more  and  more  profoundly  and  con¬ 
stantly  controls  it,  the  u  instrument  and  dwelling  place  of  the 
divine  nature  ”  (10.  300).  Yet,  in  his  passion  and  death,  the 
divine  nature  “  lay  entirely  hidden  and  quiet  within  him,  and 
did  not  assert  itself  nor  shine  forth”  (3.  302;  39.  47  f., 
supra,  §  66,  3),  as,  upon  the  other  hand,  Jesus  restrained  his 
omnipotence  and,  as  it  were,  concealed  it  (37.  33;  39.  55; 
40.  49).  The  intimate  conjoining  of  the  divine  and  human 
natures,  as  the  emphasis  laid  upon  the  reality  and  genuineness  of 
the  human  life  of  Jesus,  is  by  no  means  a  product  of  the  sacra¬ 
mental  controversy,  but  is  closely  connected  with  the  most  pro¬ 
found  tendencies  of  Luther’s  thought  :  in  the  words  and  works 
of  Jesus,  God  is  revealed.  But,  in  the  first  line  of  thought,  it 
seemed  necessary  to  think  of  the  Father ;  in  the  latter,  only 
directly  of  the  Son  (cf.  8.  156  ff. ;  40.  109). 1  The  difficulty 
cannot  be  overcome  by  assuming  a  Modalistic  conception  of  the 
Trinity,2  for  Luther  reproduces  the  orthodox  doctrine  in  its 
regular  form  (<?.  g. ,  Smalc.  Art.,  Muller,  299  ;  9.  2  ff.  22, 
32,  116,  231  ;  10.  166,  171  f.;  12.  378  ff.;  16.  79,  108  f.; 
18.  23;  30.  363  f. ;  45.  294  f. ;  308  f.  ).3  It  is  true,  that  even  in 
so  doing  he  manifested  a  Western  feeling.  The  term  ‘  ‘  Trinity  ’  ’ 
(. Dreifaltigkeit ,  three-foldness)  does  not  please  him,  because 

1  Upon  the  Christology  of  Luther,  cf.  Th.  Harnack,  L.’s  Theol.  ii. 
126  ff.  Thomasius,  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  573  ff.  H.  Schultz,  Gotth.  Christi, 
182  ff.  Lezius,  Die  Anbetung  Jesu  neben  d.  Vater,  Dorpat,  1892. 

2  Cf.  Loofs,  DG.  358.  A.  Harnack,  DG.  iii.,  ed.  3,  752  f.  This  position 
is  not  justified,  but  it  is  true  that  Luther  had  a  strong  consciousness  of  the  one- 
personal  God. 

3  Cf.  28.  136  :  God  is  “  not  only  one  person  ;  ”  but,  on  the  other  hand,  see 
30.  227,  217.  Christ  is  “one  undivided  person  with  God  ;  ”  cf.  also  the  re¬ 
mark,  7.  189  :  “  The  Holy  Spirit  is  easily  believed,’ ’  “  if  a  man  is  brought 
so  far  as  to  regard  two  persons  as  One  God.”  The  Holy  Spirit  is  a  separate 
person  (49.  149);  his  divine  nature  is  recognized  in  his  working  (49.  391); 
in  word  and  sacrament  he  works  (49.  220  ;  50.  75,  etc.)  faith  and  everything 
good  in  man.  He  is  a  comfort  against  the  Evil  Spirit  in  the  world  (49.  382). 
The  place  in  which  he  is  revealed  is  the  church  :  “Learn  .  .  .  how  and  where 
thou  shouldst  seek  the  Spirit :  not  up  above  the  clouds  .  .  .  but  here  on 
earth  below  is  he,  just  as  the  church  is  on  earth  ...  so  that  we  may  draw 
him  into  the  office  and  government  of  the  church,  the  word  and  sacrament”’ 
(49.  223  f.). 


20 


3°6 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


God  is  “  the  supreme  Unity.”  Simply  Dreiheit  (threeness) 
“  sounds  entirely  too  ironical.”  The  comparison  with  three 
angels  or  men  will  not  do,  for  there  are  not  “three  Gods.” 
“  There  is  indeed  in  the  Godhead  ein  Gedrittes  (a  tripartate 
reality)  but  this  same  Gedrittes  consists  of  persons  of  the  One 
only  Godhead  (6.  230). 1  Luther  was  therefore  not  a  Monarch- 
ian.  But  he  had  a  vigorous  consciousness  of  the  absolute  unity 
of  God,  and  this  enabled  him  to  see  in  each  trinitarian  person 
the  entire  Godhead.  God  is  therefore  fully  revealed  through 
Christ  (30.  62  ;  45.  295 ;  47.  180  ;  49.  93),  just  as  through  the 
Holy  Spirit,  with  his  sway  in  the  hearts  of  men  (16.  214). 
Father  and  Son  are  “one  nature,  one  will,”  “one  heart  and 
will”  (47.  305  f.;  49.  144).  Where  one  part  is,  “there  is 
certainly  the  entire  Godhead  ”  (50.  94).  There  is  therefore  no 
contradiction  between  the  expressions  referred  to  and  Luther’s 
consciousness  of  the  Trinity — all  the  less  since  Luther  did  not  con¬ 
ceive  the  nature  of  the  Godhead  as  “  Subsistence,”  but  as  om¬ 
nipotent  Loving-will.  He  was  able  to  combine  this  idea  in  his 
own  mind  with  the  traditional  content  of  the  doctrine  concern¬ 
ing  God.  The  theoretical  problems  which  arise  in  this  connec¬ 
tion  never  presented  themselves  to  his  mind.2 


CHAPTER  II. 

DOCTRINE  OF  ZWINGLI.  OPPOSITION  OF  LUTHER  AND  ZWINGLI 
UPON  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  LORD’S  SUPPER. 

§72.  The  Reformatory  Principles  of  Zwingli. 

Sources.  Zwingli’ s  Works,  edited  by  Schuler  and  Schulthess,  8  vols., 
1828  ff.  Among  the  writings  of  Z.,  the  following  are  the  most  important  for 
our  purpose  :  Von  klarheit  und  gewiisse  des  worts  gottes,  1522  ;  Uslegen  und 

1  Cf.  Augustine:  cluster,  not  dii  tres.  Vol.  I.,  p.  240. 

2  If  the  divine  nature  is  to  be  conceived  as  Loving-will,  how  must  we  then 

represent  to  our  thought  the  trinitarian  life  of  the  Godhead,  particularly  the 
divinity  of  Christ?  The  divinity  of  Christ  consists  chiefly  in  this,  “  that  the 
Father  has  just  the  will  which  I  have  ”  (47.  306,  308,315).  “  This  will  of 

the  Father  thou  canst  not  miss,  if  thou  keepest  thyself  to  the  man  Christ,  but 
meetest  him  in  this  man  ”  (ib.  318;  48.  142).  Luther  represents  to  himself 
the  trinitarian  life  as  a  conversation  in  God  (45.  300  ff . ;  50.  82).  These  are 
problems  which  Luther  has  left  to  Protestant  dogmatic  theology.  Dilthey 
also  recognizes  that  Luther’s  faith  does  not  touch  “  the  material  of  the;ancient 
Christian  dogma” — Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos,  v.  358  ff. 


REFORMATORY  PRINCIPLES  OF  ZWINGLI. 


3°7 


grund  der  schlussreden,  1523;  Ynleitung,  1525  ;  Von  gottl.  und  menschl. 
gerechtigkeit,  1523  (vol.  i.).  Archeteles,  1522;  De  vera  et  falsa  relig., 
1525  (vol.  iii.).  De  provident.,  1530;  fidei  ratio,  1530;  fid.  exposit.,  1531 
(vol.  iv. ).  Cf.  Morikofer,  Huldr.  Zw.,  2  vols.,  1867-9.  R.  Stahelin, 
Huldr.  Zw.,  2  vols.,  1895-7,  cf.  PRE.  xvii.  584  ff.  Hundeshagen,  Beitrage 
zur  Kirchenverfassungsgesch.,  etc.,  i.  1864,  136  ff.  Moller-Kawerau, 
KG.  iii.  44  ff.4ZELLER,  Dastheol.  Syst.  Zw.,  1853.  Sigwart,  U.  Zw.,  1855. 
Sporri,  Zwinglistudien,  1866.  A.  Baur,  Zw.  Theol.,  2  vols.,  1885-9. 
Usteri,  Initia  Zwinglii,  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1885,  607  ff.,  1886,  95  ff.  Ritschl, 
Rechtf.  u.  Vers.  i.  165  ff.  Seeberg,  Zur  Charakteristik  der  ref.  Grundge- 
danken  Zw.  in  Mitteilgn.  u.  Nachr.,  etc.,  1889,  1  ff.,  and  Thomasius,  DG.  ii. , 
ed.  2,  395  ff.  Loofs,  DG. ,  ed.  3,  381  ff.  Nagel,  Zw.  Stellungz.  Schrift,  1896. 

i.  At  the  close  of  A.  D.  1506,  while  Luther  was  seeking  “a. 
gracious  God”  in  the  cloister,  Ulrich  Zwingli  (b.  A.  D. 
1484),  became  pastor  at  Glarus.  His  pastorate  was  a  stormy 
and  eventful  one.  When  Luther  in  1517  began  the  great  con¬ 
flict,  Zwingli  was  at  “  Einsiedeln  in  the  Dark  Forest,”  searching 
in  the  Scriptures  for  the  true  “philosophy  of  Christ.”  The 
former  stepped  forth  from  the  loneliness  of  inner  struggles  into 
the  great  conflict  of  the  church ;  the  latter  had  learned  to  know 
men  and  human  life  before  devoting  himself  in  solitude  to  his 
studies.  Luther  was  impelled  by  the  religious  needs  of  his  own 
heart,  the  personal  experience  of  faith  making  him  a  reformer. 
Zwingli  followed  the  counsel  of  Erasmus  and  the  humanistic  ten¬ 
dency  of  the  age,  in  turning  to  the  “  very  purest  sources.”  His 
point  of  departure  was  different  from  that  of  Luther,  i.  e ., 
the  humanistic,  critical  temper  of  the  age,  as  differentiated  from 
the  church  and  its  teachings — a  return  to  the  sources,  or  the  con¬ 
viction  that  only  the  doctrine  of  the  Bible  is  the  truth.  These 
were  ideas  which  Erasmus  advocated,  and  which  the  majority  of 
the  cultured  classes  applauded.  It  was  under  these  circumstances 
that  Zwingli  began  his  study  of  the  Scriptures.  The  scope  of  his 
reformatory  activity  was  in  consequence,  from  the  first,  wider 
than  that  of  Luther,  and  he  was  more  conscious  of  a  definite  pur¬ 
pose.  The  idea  of  a  reformation,  which  only  gradually  dawned 
upon  Luther,  was  the  controlling  motive  with  Zwingli  from  the 
beginning.  From  A.  D.  1519  he  labored  in  Zurich,  preaching 
the  Scriptures,  taking  up  one  book  after  another.  Reformatory 
ideas,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  were  at  first  foreign  to 
him  (Usteri,  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1886,  122  if.).  As  the  religious 
lever  of  his  work  as  a  reformer  was  undoubtedly  found  in 
the  idea  of  justification  through  Christ  and  by  faith,  it  is  natural 
to  inquire  from  what  source  he  derived  this  idea ;  and  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  he  derived  it,  as  well  as  his  fundamental 
reformatory  views,  from  Luther.  This  is  manifest,  not  only 
in  view  of  his  known  acquaintance  with  the  writings  of  Luther 
(Usteri,  1.  c.,  141  ff. ),  but  as  well  from  the  form  of  his  doctrinal 


3°8 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


writings,  as  they  are  found  in  his  “  Schlussreden  ”  and  “  Usle- 
gung.  ’  ’ 1  Zwingli  started  with  the  Erasmian  ideas  of  a  reforma¬ 
tion.  This  led  him  to  the  Scriptures ;  but  it  was  Luther’s  range 
of  ideas  that  continually  guided  him  in  their  interpretation.  At 
the  central  point  of  his  apprehension  of  religious  truth,  Zwingli 
is  dependent  upon  Luther.  But,  as  the  more  comprehensive  aims 
of  the  school  from  which  he  sprung  fitted  him,  on  the  one  hand, 
for  more  varied  application  and  a  more  speedy  realization  of  the 
reformatory  ideas ;  so,  on  the  other  hand,  he  retained  some  ele¬ 
ments  which  were  not  up  to  the  evangelical  standard,  and  which 
betray  their  origin  from  the  medieval  conceptions  of  the 
humanistic  party.2  This  explains  his  agreement  with  Luther  in 
the  central  doctrines,  as  well  as  the  divergence  of  their  theological 
and  ecclesiastical  views. 

2.  In  endeavoring  to  depict  the  reformatory  ideas  of  Zwingli, 
we  must  begin  with  the  emphasis  laid  by  him  upon  the  Authority 
of  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Here  the  will  of  God  is  revealed  to  us 
(i.  54.  207),  and  here  the  Holy  Spirit  teaches  us  “all  that  we 
should  know  of  God  ”  (176).  All  doctrine  is  to  be  based  upon 
the  inspired  word  (i.  81.  177;  iii.  51.  359).  The  proclama¬ 
tion  of  the  latter  and  obedience  to  it  are  the  essential  tasks  of 
the  Reformation  (i.  36.  38;  iii.  70).  This  was  the  point  of 
departure  which  regulated  all  his  thinking :  “  Is  it  proper  to 
conform  to  ( obtemperare )  divine  things  or  human?”  (iii.  67). 
This  went,  indeed,  beyond  the  attitude  of  the  medieval  reformers 
toward  the  Scriptures  ;  for  with  Zwingli  they  were  more  than  a 
book  of  external  laws.  His  obedience  to  them  was  a  result  of 
inner  religious  experience  (1.  79).  But  he  never  attained  in 

1  Zwingli’ s  dependence  upon  Luther  may  without  hesitation  be  asserted  as 
a  settled  historical  fact.  Usteri,  1.  c.,  and  Stahelin,  Zw.  i.  164  ff.,  175  f., 
furnish  the  material  to  substantiate  this,  although  their  own  judgment  upon  it 
is  limited  to  a  “  perhaps.”  We  can  understand  their  hesitancy  from  the  fact 
that  Zwingli  himself  denies  all  such  dependence  (i.  253  ff. ;  iii.  489,  543  ;  vii. 
144;  ii.  2.  20  ff. ) .  But  we  can  understand  also  the  Sad  self-deception  to 
which  he  has  here  fallen  a  victim.  The  study  of  the  Scriptures  was  and 
remained  for  him  the  source  of  his  doctrinal  views;  and  he  found  Luther’s 
ideas  in  the  Scriptures — after  he  had  learned  them  from  Luther.  It  is  some¬ 
what  similar  to  this,  when  he  disputes  Lather’s  claim  to  having  brought  forth 
the  Scriptures  from  their  obscurity  by  pointing  to  Erasmus  and  Reuchlin 
(ii.  2.  21).  Cf.  also  Kawerau  (Mdller,  KG.  iii.  46). 

2  In  Luther,  the  general  demands  for  reformation,  in  so  far  as  he  joined  in 
them,  were  thoroughly  subordinated  to  the  religious  principle  ;  for  it  was  not 
those  demands  which  had  awakened  his  energy  and  directed  his  course.  With 
Zwingli,  they  occupied  an  independent  position  side  by  side  with  the  religious 
principle  ;  or,  rather,  the  latter  stood  related  to  them  as  means  to  an  end. 
Those  who  embraced  the  Erasmian  conception  of  reform,  unless  they  gained 
also  the  religious  experience  of  Luther,  found  what  they  sought  in  Zwingli 
rather  than  in  Luther.  Of  this,  history  furnishes  many  illustrations. 


REFORMATORY  PRINCIPLES  OF  ZWINGLI.  309 

his  relation  to  them  the  lofty  religious  freedom  of  Luther?^ 
Zwingli  holds  the  humanistic  view,  that  the  Scriptures  are  the 
original  source  of  primitive  Christianity  ;  yet  he  also  applies  the 
medieval,  juristic  conception,  that  they  constitute  the  divine  law 
which  is  to  regulate  public  life. 

3 .  In  order  to  understand  Zwingli’ s  conception  of  Justification, 

we  must  familiarize  ourselves  with  his  doctrine  of  Sin.  Adam 
was  created  free,  but  died  through  his  sin,  and  with  him  the 
whole  human  race.  “  There  he  and  all  his  race  in  him  died  as 
dead  as  stone  ”  (i.  183,  196).  Sin,  as  original  sin,  is  “  the  in¬ 
firmity  and  defect  ( Bresten  und  Mangel')  of  shattered  nature.” 
In  this  invalided  nature,  the  flesh  is  more  powerful  than  the 
spirit.  From  this  disease  of  original  sin  grow  individual  sins 
like  branches  from  a  tree  (i.  190,  264,  60;  iii.  203).  “  Sin, 

then,  is  when,  the  law  of  the  Creator  being  neglected,  man  prefers 
to  follow  himself  rather  than  the  banners  of  his  leader  and  Lord  ’  ’ 
(iii.  169).  Sin  is  disobedience  toward  God.  The  sinner 
cannot  obey  the  law  of  God  (1.  184  f.),  because  his  nature  has 
been  “shattered”  ( zerbrochen ).  But  original  sin  in  itself  is 
only  ‘  ‘  a  defect  which  one  derives  from  birth  without  his  own 
fault”  (ii.  1.  287;  i.  309;  iii.  203  f.).  The  longing  for  eternal 
life  is  likewise  innate  (1.  59,  58),  since  the  “natural  law,”  or 
an  internal  illuminating  and  drawing  agency  of  the  Spirit  of 
God,  still  remains  to  all  men,  even  the  heathen  :  “although  I 
think  that  few  of  them  have  understood  it  ”  (i.  326,  360  f. ). 
Accordingly,  all  truth  in  the  natural  man  is  inspired  by  God  (iv. 
36,  93,  95  ;  iii.  156).  But,  however  this  may  be,  for  practical 
purposes  we  must  regard  sin  as  a  shattering  force  which  excludes 
all  possibility  of  self-deliverance. 

4.  Christ  is  the  Deliverer.  In  the  work  of  deliverance  (sal¬ 

vation),  the  divine  Mercy  finds  exercise,  and  at  the  same  time 
satisfaction  is  rendered  to  the  divine  Justice  (i.  186  ;  iii.  180  ; 
iv.  475).  ( a )  Christ  has  by  his  innocent  sufferings  made  pay¬ 

ment  to  the  divine  justice  (1.  186,  387  •  ii.  2.  7  ;  iii.  194,  187, 
198,  498).  He  suffered  for  us,  bought  us,  reconciled  us  with 
God  ( ut  iratus  placetur,  iii.  181),  became  a  sacrifice  for  us,  and 
delivered  us  (1.  76,  179,  233  b,  236;  iii.  189,  197,  209,  194). 
There  is  therefore  no  need  of  the  sacrifice  of  the  mass  (i.  237), 
nor  of  other  mediators,  such  as  the  saints  (i.  268  ff. ).  His 
payment  of  the  debt  covers  not  only  original  sin,  but  all  sins 
(i.  264;  ii.  198;  supra,  p.  203,  n.  1).  He,  the  Innocent  and 
Just,  fulfilled  the  law  for  us  (i.  213,  263,  309).  The  latter  he 

1  Zwingli  holds  the  Humanistic  view,  that  the  Scriptures  are  the  original 
source  of  primitive  Christianity  ;  yet  he  also  applies  the  medieval,  juristic  con¬ 
ception,  that  they  constitute  the  divine  law  which  is  to  regulate  public  life. 


3IQ 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


did  as  God,  since  his  will  was  the  divine  will  ;  the  former,  as  a 
pure  man,  who  could  render  a  spotless  sacrifice  (i.  264).  By 
thus  effecting  our  deliverance,  God  “  by  this  example  of  justice 
removed  from  us  our  languor  and  torpor  and  displayed  himself 
to  us  as  he  was — just,  good,  and  merciful  ’ ’  (iii.  180).1  (£)  This 
last  idea  leads  further.  Christ  is  also  by  his  works  the 
Revealer  of  God.  He  has  made  known  to  us  the  will 
of  God  (i.  179).  This,  strictly  speaking,  carries  beyond 
the  mere  fact  of  deliverance:  ‘‘is  come  not  alone  to  deliver 
us,  but  also  to  teach  true  love  of  God  and  works  which  God 
requires  of  us  ”  (180).  He  thus  becomes  our  leader  (195)  and 
pattern  (313),  whom  we  should  follow  (iii.  194,  21 1).  Thus 
the  agency  of  Christ  is  two-fold:  “  For  Christ  everywhere  in¬ 
culcates  these  two  things,  viz. :  redemption  through  him,  and 
that  those  who  have  been  redeemed  by  him  ought  now  to  live 
according  to  his  example”  (iii.  324).  (r)  Christ’s  redemptive 

act  now  becomes  ours  through  his  relation  to  us  as  our  Head, 
and  in  the  way  appointed,  i.  e.,  through  our  believing  in  him. 
“But  Christ  is  righteous  and  our  Head,  and  we  are  his  mem¬ 
bers  ;  therefore  we  the  members  come  to  God  through  the 
righteousness  of  the  Head  ”  (i.  310),  and  :  “  If  we  believe  upon 
the  Lord  Christ  Jesus,  that  he  is  our  propitiation,  etc.,  then  is 
he  our  entire  perfection  before  God,  our  salvation,  our  payment 
and  atonement  ”  (i.  186).  He  who  believes  on  Christ  is  counted 
by  God  as  righteous  (iii.  164)  and  has  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
(i.  296,  393  ;  iii.  230);  so  far,  that  is,  as  he  follows  Christ. 
“  Whence  also  his  righteousness  is  our  righteousness,  if  only  we 
walk,  not  according  to  the  flesh,  but  according  to  the  Spirit” 
(iii.  209  f. ).  These  are  clear  and  thoroughly  evangelical  ideas. 
Christ  has  endured  for  us  the  penalty  of  unrighteousness  and  per¬ 
formed  the  works  of  righteousness.  Because  we  believe  on  him 
and  hold  to  him,  God  for  his  sake  regards  us  as  righteous. 

5.  Here  arises  the  further  question  :  How  about  Faith  and  its 
origin  ?  The  revelation  of  the  love  of  God  in  Christ  overcomes 
us:  “So  that  ...  at  length  the  great  humility  of  his  mind 
and  his  deeds  of  mercy  .  .  .  compel  us  to  hold  him  in  love  and 
to  anticipate  all  good  things  from  him  ’ ’  (i.  186,  31 1  ;  iii.  205). 
Faith  is  thus  confidence  in  the  grace  of  God.  “  For  faith  is 
that  by  which  we  rest  immovably,  firmly,  and  undistractedly 
upon  the  mercy  of  God  ”  (iii.  231).  But  it  is  not  to  be  under¬ 
stood  in  the  sense  of  the  Jides  acquisita  (iii.  174.  Cf.  Luther,  supra, 
p.  254,  n.  1),  but  it  is  wrought  by  the  Spirit  of  God  (iii.  223). 

1  But  Zwingli  adds:  “  or,  that  we  may  not  presume  to  say  too  little  about 
his  counsels,  because  it  thus  pleased  him.”  Cf.  Luther,  supra,  p.  271. 


REFORMATORY  PRINCIPLES  OF  ZWINGLI.  3II 

The  Spirit  makes  man’s  spirit  ( Gemuth )  “to  understand  his 
word”  (i.  389)  and  gives  man’s  spirit  to  understand  that  the 
word  “comes  from  God”  (i.  81).  As  one  reads  the  Scrip¬ 
tures,  comes  the  consciousness:  “I  have  experienced  that” 
(79).  Hence,  because  the  Spirit  of  God  incites,  we  under¬ 
stand  and  comprehend  the  teachings  of  the  Scriptures  as  the 
word  of  God.  Thereby  we  are  overpowered  with  a  sense  of 
satisfaction  and  inward  health:  “For  Christian  faith  is  some¬ 
thing  which  is  felt  in  the  soul  of  believers,  as  health  in  the  body  ’  ’ 
(iii.  198).  To  state  the  matter  briefly  in  the  sense  of  Zwingli, 
we  may  say  :  The  Holy  Spirit  so  moves  man,  that  he  feels  the 
Scriptures  to  be  the  truth,  and  thereby  attains  confidence  in  the 
grace  of  God.  This  is  faith.  The  Scriptures,  as  doctrine,  have 
thus  for  him  a  significance  different  from  that  which  they  have 
for  Luther,  whose  faith  arose  directly  from  the  experience  of  the 
efficacious  working  of  Christ  (supra,  p.  252  f. ). 

6.  The  movement  begun  in  us  by  the  Holy  Spirit  continues 
in  such  a  way  that  good  works  follow  faith  (i.  278,  31 1).  Since 
God  thus  works  in  us,  we  are  his  “  fellow- workmen,”  i.  e.y 
“tools  in  his  hand”  (406).  Although  the  “infirmity” 
( Bresten )  still  clings  to  us  and  we  sin  in  many  ways,  yet  God 
continually  “  moves  ”  us  again,  so  that  we  return  to  him.  And 
thus  our  very  sin  compels  us  to  take  refuge  anew  in  God  (i.  T91  f. ). 
Since  now  the  Spirit  of  God  works  in  believers  that  which 
is  good,  they  no  longer  really  need  the  law,  “  for  the  Spirit  is 
above  the  law  ;  and  where  it  is,  there  one  no  longer  needs  the 
law”  (1.  212,  214). 1  The  example  of  Christ  takes  the  place 
of  the  law.  “Therefore  there  is  need  of  no  law,  for  Christ  is 
his  law  ;  upon  him  alone  he  looks,  yea,  Christ  guides  and  leads 
him  alone,  so  that  he  needs  no  other  leader,  for  Christ  is  the  end 
of  the  law  ”  (1.  213).  As  the  example  of  Christ  here  replaces 
the  old  law  as  an  outward  rule  of  conduct,  it  may  also  be  said 
that  all  who  are  born  of  God  obey  his  word  (in.  178).  In 
this  sense,  the  law  remains,  and  is  even  a  part  of  the  gospel. 
“The  gospel  thus  understood,  namely  as  the  will  of  God 
revealed  to  men  and  required  of  them,  contains  in  itself  .  .  . 
commandment,  prohibition,  precept,  and  obedience ;  so  that  all 
commandment  and  prohibition  of  God  must  remain  in  force 
forever”  (i.  209  ff.,  308). 2  The  believer  is  to  fulfill  his  com¬ 
mandments,  except  the  tinsel-work  of  the  ceremonial  law  (i. 

1  Cf.  also  the  freedom  from  the  law  of  Sabbath-observance,  which  recalls 
Luther’s  position,  i.  317. 

2  Cf.  also  in  i.  308,  554,  the  complaint  concerning  those  who  speak 
insolently  ( unbescheidenlich )  of  the  law,  representing  that  it  makes  us  despair 
and  hate  God  (referring  to  Luther). 


312 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


31 1,  586),  i.  e.,  the  commandments,  in  so  far  as  they  coincide 
with  the  “  law  of  nature”  (i.  359,  361).  The  law  is  therefore 
the  permanent  moral  rule  of  conduct  (i.  359,  325  ;  iv.  102).  But 
it  can  be  fulfilled  only  as  God  works  in  us  the  necessary  power. 
“  The  believer  does  it  not  of  his  own  power,  but  God  works  in 
him  the  love,  the  counsel,  and  the  work,  as  much  as  he  does” 
(i.  311).  But  when  we,  warmed  by  the  fire  of  love  within  us, 
fulfill  the  law,  we  do  it  freely,  not  under  compulsion  (in.  205). 
Herein  is  a  further  modification  as  compared  with  Luther — 
Zwingli  does  not  realize  that  “  the  law”  is  the  expression 
of  an  entirely  different  conception  of  life,  and  he  uncon¬ 
sciously  makes  the  gospel  a  “  new  law”  (1.  31 1).  God 

impels  us,  but  he  impels  us  to  the  fulfilling  of  his  command¬ 
ments.  Luther  laid  more  stress  upon  the  negative  than  upon 
the  positive  character  of  the  law  ;  Zwingli,  on  the  contrary,  put 
the  chief  emphasis  upon  the  latter. 

7.  In  seeking  to  discover  Zwingli’ s  Ideal  of  the,  Christian 
Life,  we  shall  find  especially  instructive  his  tract  entitled  :  Quo 
pacto  ingenui  adolescentes  formandi  sint  (iv.  149  ff.  ) .  Faith  here 
stands  first.  Christ  is  our  attorney,  surety,  and  advocate  ;  he  has 
opened  for  us  the  way  to  the  Father.  He  who  believes  on  him, 
to  him  are  his  sins  forgiven.  But  faith  is  also  the  principle  of  a 
life  of  ceaseless  striving  after  the  good:  “  Only  believers 
experience  how  Christ  gives  them  no  ease  and  how  cheerfully 
and  joyfully  they  address  themselves  to  his  business”  (p.  152). 
Among  the  means  of  preserving  the  spirit  in  this  exalted  state, 
the  study  of  the  word  stands  first,  but  the  example  of  Christ  is 
also  particularly  mentioned.  As  Christ  gave  himself  for  us,  so 
should  we  also  not  live  unto  ourselves,  but  seek  to  become  all 
things  to  all  (155  f.).  At  the  same  time,  we  should  be  always 
humble  as  was  Christ.  “  He  will  therefore  be  perfect  ( absolutus ) 
who  resolves  to  emulate  Christ  alone”  (157)-  A  life  in  the 
assurance  of  faith  and  in  the  steadfastness  of  love  in  the  imitation 
of  Christ — this  is  the  ideal.  The  Christianity  of  Zwingli  is 
thoroughly  practical.  “  It  is  the  duty  of  a  Christian  man,  not 
to  talk  magnificently  about  doctrines,  but  to  be  always  doing 
great  and  difficult  things  with  God  ”  (158).  Only  when  life  is 
conducted  in  obedience  to  God  and  his  word,  in  true  doctrine 
and  right  living,  is  justice  done  to  the  glory  of  God  (0.  g.,  i. 

237,  322>  392>  398-  Cf.  iii.  165,  132,  48  f.).1 

8.  These  are  the  fundamental  reformatory  principles  of  Zwingli. 
Their  essential  agreement  with  Luther’s  ideas  must  be  evident  to 
all.  With  these  fundamental  ideas  were,  however,  combined  a 


1  Cf.  also  the  discourse  of  Schmidt  of  Kiissnacht,  i.  536  f. 


REFORMATORY  PRINCIPLES  OF  ZWINGLI. 


3J3 


number  of  subordinate  convictions  which  help  to  explain  the 
new  form  assumed  by  his  teaching  in  opposition  to  the  medieval 
views.  In  opposition  to  the  Romish  doctrine  of  merit  and  works, 
he  developed  his  theory  of  predestination.  God  is  “  an  eternally 
existent  Working  and  Knowing”  (i.  276);  “  the  eternal 

Power  of  all  good,  and  an  unchangeable  Working”  (277)  ;  and 
4 ‘the  first  moving  Cause  M  (278).  Yea,  he  is,  properly  speak¬ 
ing,  Causality  itself,  since  all  second  causes  are  only  figuratively 
speaking  causes  (iv.  96).  God  rules  in  the  world,  as  the  soul 
in  the  body.  Nothing  can  transpire  which  is  contrary  to  his 
will  (iii.  283).  Everything  which  occurs  may  be  traced  back 
to  his  power.  The  believer  recognizes  that  his  works  are  really 
works  of  God,  and  that  he  “is  only  an  instrument  and  tool  by 
which  God  works”  (1.  276).  This  is  divine  providence. 
“  Providence  is  the  perpetual  and  immutable  government  and 
administration  of  the  affairs  of  the  universe”  (iv.  84).  This 
leads  to  the  denial  of  all  accidental  occurrences  as  well  as  of  all 
free  actions  (iv.  93).  Everything,  even  evil,  is  based  upon  the 
will  of  God  (iv.  1 12  ff. ).  This  determinism  involves  the  doc- 
.  trine  of  Predestination  (iii.  283)  :  “  He  elects  one,  to  be  fitted 
for  his  work  and  use  ;  another,  he  doesnot  desire”  (i.  276).  “So 
that  thus  election  is  attributed  only  to  those  who  are  to  be  saved  ; 
but  those  who  are  to  be  lost  are  not  said  to  be  elected,  although 
the  divine  will  has  determined  also  concerning  them,  but  for  the 
repelling,  rejecting,  and  repudiating  of  them,  by  which  they 
/may  become  examples  of  justice  ”  (iv.  115).  It  is  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  the  sole  agency  of  God,  that  when  some  are  saved  and 
others  lost,  the  fate  of  both  is  ascribed  to  the  divine  will.  Every¬ 
thing  depends  upon  the  eternal  election  of  God.  Only  in  the 
elect  is  faith  wrought ;  it  follows  election,  and  is  a  sign  of  its 
presence  (iv.  121  ;  vi.  1.  215,  340  ;  vi.  2.  106,  105,  155).  He 
who  believes  is  elect.  But  even  the  elect  who  die  before  attain¬ 
ing  faith  will  be  saved.  “  For  it  is  election  which  saves  ( beatos 
facity  ’  (iv.  122,  123).  Only  in  a  figurative  sense  can  faith  be 
traced  to  the  preaching  of  the  word.  God  uses  the  latter  only 
as  an  instrument :  “  He  implants  faith,  as  with  an  instrument, 

but  his  own  hand  being  also  very  near.  This  inward  drawing 
is  (the  work)  of  the  Spirit  directly  operating”  (iv.  125). 
Election  alone  saves ;  it  works  everything  good  in  man. 
Only  upon  the  ground  of  fixed  election  can  man  be  sure 
of  salvation  (iv.  140).  One  thing  is  clear — and  this  was  what 
concerned  Zwingli — that  this  doctrine  excludes  all  insistence 
upoirwofFTand  merits.  “  By  the  providence  of  God  therefore 
are  abolished  at  once  both  free  will  and  merit,  for  since  it  deter¬ 
mines  all  these  things,  what  are  our  parts,  that  we  should  be  able 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


31 4 

to  think  anything  done  by  ourselves  ?  But  since  all  works  are 
from  him,  how  shall  we  merit  anything?  ”  (iii.  283  ;  iv.  116; 
i.  275  k,  278).  The  Synergism  of  the  Middle  Ages  is  thus  shat¬ 
tered  by  the  doctrine  of  the  sole  agency  of  grace.  Zwingli  in 
this  entered  upon  the  path  pursued  by  Luther  in  his  De  servo 
arbitrio.  But  there  is  still  an  essential  difference  between  the 
two.  While  Luther  never  allowed  his  speculative  determinism 
to  effect  his  Soteriology,  it  assumed  great  importance  in  Zwingli’ s 
religious  thought.  He  constantly  recurs  to  it.  While  Luther 
once  broaches  the  idea,  Zwingli  lays  a  constantly-increasing  stress 
upon  it,  particularly  in  the  controversy  with  Anabaptism.  His 
ideas  were  doubtless  moulded  by  Thomas  of  Aquino  and  the 
Stoic  conception  of  God.1  In  fact,  the  parallel  to  Thomas’  doc¬ 
trine  of  grace  is  very  striking.  As  the  latter,  for  example,  re¬ 
duces  grace  finally  to  the  idea  of  the  Prime  Mover  (p.  118),  so 
also  does  Zwingli  (vid.  supra).  Whereas  Luther  conceived  of  God 
as  Almighty  Love  revealed  in  Christ,  Zwingli  did  not  make  this 
positive  limitation  of  the  earlier  conception.  God  is  to  be 
known  before  Christ  :  1  ‘  The  knowledge  of  God  by  its  very  nature 
precedes  the  knowledge  of  Christ”  (iii.  180). 2  It  is  certainly  a 
perversion  to  describe  the  determinism  of  Zwingli  as  the  “  funda¬ 
mental  principle  ’  ’  of  his  theology,  since  his  doctrine  of  justifica¬ 
tion  had  other  sources  and  motives.  But  neither  is  it  correct  to 
regard  it  as  a  passing  episode.  It  is  a  foreign,  but  permanent, 
intrusion — otherwise  than  in  the  case  of  Luther — into  the  warp 
and  woof  of  his  religious  thought.3  This  foreign  element  robs 


1  IV.  139  :  “  To  be  of  the  universe  is  therefore  to  be  of  God  ;  ”  cf.  90 : 
“What  he  (Pliny)  calls  nature,  we  call  God.”  Seneca,  p.  95,  93,  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  ideas  :  “  These  patterns  of  all  things  God  has  within  himself.”  He 
studied  Thomas,  iv.  113.  And  shall  we  see  no  connection  between  the  divis¬ 
ion  of  his  material  in  the  Comm,  de  ver.  et  fals.  religione  (God,  to  whom  re¬ 
ligion  tends,  and  man,  who  by  religion  tends  to  God)  and  the  arrangement  in 
the  Summa  of  Thomas?  (cf.  supra,  p.  98). 

2  The  whole  passage — which  combats  a  fundamental  thought  of  Luther’s — 
reads:  “  That  therefore  our  rivals  shall  here  say,  that  we  have  hitherto  dis¬ 
coursed  of  piety  in  such  a  way  as  to  have  made  no  mention  of  salvation  through 
Christ  and  of  grace,  they  caw  in  vain  :  first,  because  whatever  we  have  said 
concerning  the  fellowship  of  the  soul  and  God  has  been  thus  said  also  of 
Christ  just  as  of  God  (for  Christ  is  God  and  man)  ;  second,  because  the  knowl¬ 
edge  of  God  by  its  very  nature  precedes  the  knowledge  of  Christ.” 

3  I  cannot  therefore  agree  with  K.  Muller  (Symbolik,  450),  when  he  pro¬ 
nounces  it  just  as  improper  to  bring  the  charge  of  a  metaphysical  determinism 
against  Zwingli  as  against  Luther.  He  has  failed  to  take  account  of  the  increas¬ 
ing  significance  of  the  theory  for  Zwingli.  Cf.  also  Dilthey’s  opinion  as  to  the 
“pantheism”  of  Zwingli  (Archiv.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos,  v.  370).  The  close- 
drawn  lines  of  the  whole  document,  De  providentia  dei ,  attest  both  the  human¬ 
istic  and  philosophical  trend  of  Zwingli  and  the  lingering  influence  of 
Thomistic  metaphysics  upon  him. 


REFORMATORY  PRINCIPLES  OF  ZWINGLI.  315 

man  indeed  of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  but  it  also  inspires  his 
will — as  an  instrument  of  the  almighty  divine  agency — to  the 
most  strenuous  activity.  “A  long  list  of  stern,  heroic  spirits 
down  to  Cromwell  stands  beneath  the  influence  of  this  attitude 
of  will  (Dilthey,  Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos,  v.  369). 

9.  Another  consequent  of  Zwingli’s  reformatory  views  is  seen 
in  his  conception  of  the  Church.  The  hierarchical  view  disap¬ 
pears  entirely.  Christ  alone  is  the  foundation  of  the  church. 
All  disciples,  “  all  believers  and  teachers,”  receive  the  keys,  i. 
e.,  the  authority  to  preach  the  gospel  (i.  386,  387  f.,  iii.  215, 
221).  The  prelates  are  not  the  church,  but  it  is  (i  the  entire 
congregation  of  all  those  who  are  founded  and  built  up  in  one 
faith  upon  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ.”  With  this  congregation  at 
large  is  contrasted  the  individual  congregation,  or  kilchhore  (i. 
197  ff. ,  656  j  iii.  1 25  ff. ).  The  church,  as  the  communion  of 
saints,  that  is,  of  all  believers  (iii.  131),  is  not  visible,  since  its 
members  are  scattered  throughout  the  whole  world  (i.  201 ) .  It  is 
composed  of  believers,  who  place  their  confidence  in  Christ  alone, 
and  obey,  not  human  ordinances,  but  the  authority  of  the  divine 
word  (l_2oi  f. ).  That  is  the  true  church,  which  never  errs, 
which  clings  to  the  word  of  God,  and  follows  only  the  shepherds 
who  bring  that  word  (iii.  129).  These  simple  conceptions  were 
afterward  modified  by  the  introduction  of  the  idea  of  predestina¬ 
tion.  The  invisible  church  now  becomes  the  totality  of  the  elect 
and  believing  of  all  ages  (vi.  1.  337,  447).  Whereas,  in  the 
earlier  writings  of  Zwingli,  the  conceptions  of  the  true  church 
universal  and  the  communio  sanctorum  are  not  kept  distinctly  sep¬ 
arate,  this  is  now  done.  The  separate  congregations,  or  Kilch- 
horen ,  form  in  combination  the  universal  ecclesia  sensibilis ,  or 
v isibilis  (iii.  574,  576  ff.,  580,  586;  vi.  432;  viii.  380),  in 
which  the  ecclesia  spiritualis  invisi bills,  or  electa  is  contained  (iv. 
8  f.,  58).  The  source  of  the  latter’s  existence  is  to  be  found 
solely  in  predestination.  Therefore  may  children,  even  though 
baptism  effects  no  real  change  in  them,  be  fully  qualified  mem¬ 
bers  of  the  church.  It  was,  in  part,  the  effort  to  maintain  his 
theory  of  baptism  against  the  Anabaptists  and  yet  preserve  the 
membership  of  children  in  the  church,  which  led  to  this  applica¬ 
tion  of  predestination  to  the  conception  of  the  church  (cf.  Gott- 
schick,  Ztschr.  f.  KG.  viii.  604  ff.).  But  the  church  thus  falls 
asunder  into  two  unconnected  parts  :  the  elect  of  all  ages  and 
places,  including  noble  heathen  whom  we  shall  meet  in  heaven — 1 
in  short,  all  whom  the  Spirit  shall  have  transformed  by  the  exer- 

1  E.  g. ,  Hercules,  Theseus,  Socrates,  Aristides,  Antigonus,  Numa,  Camil- 
lus,  the  Catos  and  Scipios,  iv.  65  ;  vi.  1.  242  ;  2.  69  ;  viii.  179  ;  vii.  550. 


3l6 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


tion  of  his  omnipotence — and  the  historical  fellowship  of  believers 
in  Christ.  There  exists  no  necessary  connection  between  the 
two,  for  “a  conductor  ( dux )  or  vehicle  of  the  Spirit  is  not 
necessary”  (iv.  io).  See  Seeberg,  Begr.  d.  Kirche,  i.  78  ff. 

10.  This  brings  us  to  the  conception  of  the  Sacraments. 
Zwingli  here  adopts  the  Augustinian,  purely  symbolical  view, 
which  was  also  advocated  by  Erasmus.  The  sacraments  are 
nothing  more  than  “  a  sure  sign,  or  seal  ’  ’  (1.  239).  They,  on 
the  one  hand,  remind  the  believer  in  a  symbolic  form  of  salva¬ 
tion  and  its  blessings,  and  are,  on  the  other  hand,  a  means  by 
which  he  testifies  his  membership  in  the  church  of  Christ.  There 
resides  in  them  no  kind  of  purifying  or  sanctifying  power  ;  they 
are  simply  signs  in  the  sense  indicated  (iii.  229,  231  ;  iv.  117). 
We  dare  not  attribute  to  the  symbols  the  “  things  which  belong 
to  the  divine  power  alone  ”  (iv.  119).  Only  two  signs  of  this 
kind  were  instituted  by  Christ ;  the  other  five  sacraments  are  to 
be  abolished  as  not  being  commanded  by  him.1  Baptism  also 
falls  under  this  symbolical  point  of  view.  Through  it  we  engage 
ourselves  to  Christ  (is  “either  a  candidate  or  a  soldier  of 
Christ  *  ’),  and  we  receive  a  symbol,  “  that  we  are  to  conform  our 
life  to  the  rule  of  Christ  ”  (iii.  231,  643).  It  is  an  “  initiative 
sign,”  an  engagement,  as  when  a  member  of  a  confederacy  wears 
a  white  cross  as  a  badge  of  his  membership  (ii.  1.  242,  249). 
If  Zwingli  himself  at  first  entertained  doubts  as  to  the  propriety 
of  infant  baptism  (ii.  1.  245  ;  vii.  365),  he  distinctly  advocated 
it  after  the  Anabaptists  began  to  make  it  a  prominent  object  of 
their  assaults  (A.  D.  1525.  See  esp.  Yon  Tauf,  Von  Wieder- 
tauf,  and  Von  Kindertauf).  But  while  Luther  in  these  conflicts 
was  led  to  value  more  highly  the  historical  and  positive  ordinances, 
Zwingli  thought  that  he  could  best  sweep  away  the  foundations 
of  the  Anabaptist  party  by  making  baptism  a  bare  symbol,  and, 
particularly,  by  insisting  upon  it  as  an  obligatory  symbol.  By 
the  greater  stress  laid  upon  predestination  and  the  purely  ex¬ 
ternal  character  of  baptism,  it  appeared  that  the  great  importance 
attached  to  baptism  by  the  opposing  party  might  be  best  shown 
to  be  unjustifiable ;  while  by  insisting  upon  the  obligatory  char¬ 
acter  of  the  ordinance  its  administration  to  children  was  made  to 
appear  necessary.  It  was  in  combating  the  Anabaptists  that 
the  speculative  and  philosophical  element  became  more  promb 

1  See  criticisms  in  the  “ Uslegen”  etc.:  confirmation,  I.  240  f . ;  unction, 
241  ;  against  confession  to  men  (lyselbichl') ,  with  slight  criticisms  of  Luther, 
393  f.,  400,  cf.  iii.  543,  562  ;  ii.  2.  22  ;  confession  to  be  made  only  to  Christ, 
396  f. ;  the  priest  is  only  to  be  asked  for  advice,  394  ;  works  of  penance,  397  ; 
indulgences,  398  ff. ;  purgatory,  402  ff.  Against  the  priestly  character  of  the 
clergy — the  priesthood  an  “  office,”  not  a  rank,  414  f. 


REFORMATORY  PRINCIPLES  OF  ZWINGLI.  317 

nent  in  Zwingli’s  teaching.  His  determinism,  having  served 
him  as  a  weapon  against  the  Romish  work-righteousness,  was 
turned  also  against  the  mystical  dreams  of  a  visible  congregation 
of  saints.  Upon  Zwingli’s  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  see 
§73.  Cf.  Stahelin,  i.  484  ff.  Usteri,  Darstellung  d.  Tauf- 
lehre  Zw.,  in  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1882,  205  ff. 

1 1 .  Zwingli  proclaimed  the  truth  of  the  gospel,  and  drew  the 
doctrinal  inferences  which  seemed  involved  in  it.  The  source 
upon  which  he  depended  was  primarily  the  Holy  Scriptures. 
But  he  felt  himself  also  in  full  accord  with  the  doctrine  of  God 
and  the  Christology  found  in  the  ancient  symbols  (i.  57  ; 
iv.  3  ff. ).  He  presented  no  original  ideas  in  these  connections. 
He  conceived  of  God  as  the  all-working  Power,  and  at  the  same 
time  accepted  the  orthodox  formulas,  without  attempting  to  har¬ 
monize  the  two  conceptions.  His  Christology  has  the  Nestorian 
tendency  of  the  Scholastics  (see  below).  His  interpretation  of 
original  sin  harmonizes  with  that  of  the  later  Middle  Ages.  His 
theory  of  the  sacraments  follows  the  symbolic  view  not  infre¬ 
quently  held  in  the  Middle  Ages.  He  mingles  philosophical 
theories  with  his  presentations  of  the  gospel,  lacking  Luther’s 
sense  of  the  positive  character  of  revelation — Duns  and  the  Nomi¬ 
nalists  having  here  prepared  the  way.  Thus  Christianity  became 
a  kind  of  philosophy  deduced  from  the  Bible.  In  view  of  these 
characteristics  of  his  teaching,  it  may  be  said  that  the  undeniable 
difference  between  Zwingli  and  Luther — despite  their  common 
understanding  of  the  gospel — is  to  be  explained  by  the  fact,  that 
Zwingli  received  his  impulse  originally  from  the  Erasmian  illu- 
ministic  tendency,  and  that,  in  consequence,  the  medieval  ideas 
continued  to  exert  a  greater  influence  upon  him  than  upon  Luther. 

As  in  the  particulars  already  noted,  so  also  in  his  practical 
operations  in  the  church,  Zwingli  betrays  his  dependence  upon 
the  medieval  ideals.  But  the  theocratic  ideal  which  he  pursued 
allows  to  neither  church  nor  state  its  proper  position.  On  the 
one  hand,  the  secular  government  conducts  the  discipline  of  the 
church  in  such  a  way  that  the  doctrine  of  the  latter  becomes  di¬ 
rectly  the  law  of  the  state  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  secular 
government  is  absolutely  subject  to  the  authority  of  the  Scriptures, 
its  laws  and  ordinances  being  valid  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  scrip¬ 
tural.  If  the  government  acts  in  a  way  contrary  to  the  Scriptures, 
it  is  to  be  abrogated.  The  subjection  of  the  church  to  the  state  is 
only  apparent,  for  the  laws  of  the  state  are,  after  all,  valid  only 
in  so  far  as  they  conform  to  the  law  of  the  church,  or  the  Bible. 
This  is  a  genuinely  medieval  idea.1  The  carrying  out  of  his  re- 

1  Supra  (p.  172,  183  f. ).  Cf.  Zw.  i.  524  :  “  My  lords  should  also  prescribe 
no  law  otherwise  than  out  of  the  holy  undeceptive  Scripture  of  God.  If  they 


HISTORV  OF  DOCTRINES. 


318 

formatory  work  embraced  both  a  new  system  of  doctrine  and  a  new 
order  of  social  and  practical  life,  which  must  be  enforced 
by  the  agency  of  the  state.  Christianity  is  an  affair  of  the 
state,  but  the  state  is  the  organ  of  the  church.  Like  Savona¬ 
rola,  Zwingli  sought  to  reform  his  city  according  to  the  divine 
law  of  the  Bible,  with  the  help  of  the  secular  power.  It  was 
also  in  accord  with  the  example  of  Savonarola,  that  Zwingli ’s 
political  ambition  was  not  satisfied  with  the  direction  of  his 
native  city,  but  associated  his  direct  reformatory  labors  with 
political  combinations  of  the  widest  and  most  daring  character 
(cf.  Lenz,  Zw.  u.  Landgraf  Philipp,  in  Ztschr.  f.  KG.  iii. 
28  ff.,  220  ff.,  429  ff. ).  Thus,  in  every  sphere  of  his  doctrinal 
and  practical  activity,  we  are  impressed  with  the  medieval  and 
humanistic  limitations  of  Zwingli,  and  that,  too,  in  such  forms  as 
to  emphasize  the  contrast  between  his  ideas  and  those  of  Luther.1 


§  73.  The  Controversy  Upon  the  Lord's  Supper . 

Literature.  Dieckhoff,  Die  ev.  Abendmalsl.  im  Ref.-ztalter,  i.  1854. 
Thomasius-Seeberg,  DG.,  ii.  522  ff.,  571  ff.  Baur,  Zw’sTheol.  ii.  292  ff. 
Stahelin,  Zwingli,  ii.  213  ff.  Kostlin,  Luther,  ii.,  ed.  4,  66  ff.  W. 
Walther,  Reformirte  Taktik  im  Sakr.-streit  der  Ref.,  in  Neue  kirchl. 
Ztschr.,  1896,794  ff,  917  ff.  Kawerau  (Moller,  KG.  iii.),  74  ff.  Kubel, 
PRE.  xvi.,  ed.  2,  121  ff.  Jager,  Luthers  relig.  Interesse  an  der  Lehre  von 
der  Realprasenz,  1900. 

1.  The  difference  in  the  views  of  Zwingli  and  Luther  found 
expression  in  the  controversy  upon  the  Lord’s  Supper.  But 
Zwingli  had  already,  before  the  outbreak  of  the  controversy, 
developed  his  view  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  to  a  certain  degree  of 
maturity.  The  theory  of  transubstantiation  he  had  from  the 
beginning  regarded  with  suspicion  (  WW.  vii.  391).  Lie  received 
the  impulse  to  the  construction  of  a  positive  theory,  as  he 
reported  to  Melanchthon,  from  Erasmus  (C.  R.  iv.  970).  The 
purely  symbolical  view  was  in  harmony,  as  well  with  the  critical 
humanistic  school  of  thought,  to  which  he  originally  belonged, 
as  with  his  general  conception  of  the  sacraments  and  the  sepa¬ 
ration  of  the  immediate  divine  operations  from  all  earthly  media, 

should  become  negligent  at  this  point  and  recognize  anything  else,  as  I  hope 
(they  may)  not,  I  would  none  the  less  stiffly  preach  against  them  with  the 
word  of  God.”  See  also  “  Schlussreden,”  42  :  “  But  should  they  (the  gov¬ 
ernment)  become  untrustworthy  and  act  beyond  the  rule  of  Christ,  may  they 
be  deposed  by  God.”  Zwingli  here  has  in  mind  by  no  means  simply  the  form 
of  the  republican  constitution.  On  the  basis  of  his  conception  of  popular  sov¬ 
ereignty,  it  is  his  view  that  “  the  mass  of  the  people,”  or  the  “  greater  part,” 
are  authorized  to  “  cast  out”  ungodly  kings  (see  Vol.  I.,  p.  318). 

1  I  do  not,  of  course,  forget  that  Luther  also  had  medieval  limitations. 


CONTROVERSY  UPON  THE  LORD’S  SUPPER.  319 

to  which  he  advanced.  It  therefore  fits  logically  into  the  frame¬ 
work  of  his  theological  ideas,  although  it  cannot  be  regarded  as 
a  criterion  of  his  fundamental  reformatory  principles.  For  as, 
one  the  one  hand,  he  derived  his  ideas  upon  the  subject  from  a 
foreign  source,  so  also  in  the  illuminated  circles  of  the  day  the 
symbolical  theory  was  in  the  very  air.  His  ideas  were  brought 
to  a  definite  conclusion  only  in  consequence  of  the  correspondence 
of  Honius  with  Luther  (p.  288),  in  which  the  former  interpreted 
the  e st  as  equivalent  to  significat }  The  publication  of  Zwingli 
upon  the  subject  seems  not  to  have  become  known  until  the 
latter  part  of  A.  D.  1523  (Loofs,  DG.  387  n.).  Thenceforth 
he  is  clear  in  his  mind.  Basing  his  argument  upon  Jn.  6  (“  the 
flesh  profiteth  nothing”),  he,  in  harmony  with  Augustine  and 
the  older  Scholastics  (Vol.  I.,  p.  323  ;  supra,  p.  133  f. ),  con-  ' 
ceives  of  the  existence  of  the  body  of  Christ  in  heaven  as  local, 
and  accordingly  rejects  the  presence  of  the  body  in  the  Lord’s 
Supper,  being  thus,  of  course,  compelled  to  interpret  the  words 
of  institution  in  a  purely  symbolical  way.  He  was  from  the  first 
conscious  of  the  deviation  of  his  ideas  from  those  of  Luther, 
which  explains  in  part  the  zealous  assertions  of  his  (supposed) 
independence  of  the  Saxon  reformer  (supra,  p.  308).  If  he  at 
first,  indeed,  represented  this  difference  as  a  merely  formal  one, 
though  emphasizing  the  idea  of  a  repeated  memorial  (Wieder- 
gedachtniss,  i.  257),  yet  he  very  soon  resolved  to  assail  the 
theory  of  Luther,  and  from  the  year  1525  built  up  a  carefully 
planned  and  vigorous  propaganda  for  the  purpose  of  winning  the 
Southern  Germans  to  his  view,  at  first  through  the  fictitious  letter 
to  Alberus  (iii.  591  ff. ).1 2  Like-minded  friends  rallied  around 
him  with  advice  and  aid  (Oecolampadius,3  Bucer,  Capito), 
and  means  of  doubtful  character  were  employed  (the  corruptions 
in  Bugenhagen’s  commentary  upon  the  Psalms,  and  the  notes  in 
the  translation  of  Luther’s  Church  Postils).  There  was  a  feel¬ 
ing  of  strong  confidence  that  Luther’s  view  could  be  explained 

1  The  formula,  significat ,  has  a  point  of  attachment  in  the  general  sacra¬ 
mental  theory  of  the  later  Middle  Ages  (supra,  p.  127).  What  was  relatively 
new  was  really  only  the  application  of  the  formula  to  the  Lord’s  Supper, 
which  held  an  exceptional  position  in  relation  to  the  medieval  sacramental 
theory.  But  see  already  Wickliffe,  supra,  p.  206. 

2  The  following  among  Zwingli’ s  writings  have  a  bearing  at  this  point  :  the 
Comm,  de  ver  et  fals.  relig.,  1525  (iii.  239  fif.);  Subsidium  sive  coronis  de 
eucharist,  1525  (iii.  326  ff.);  Ad  Io.  Bugenhagen,  1525  (iii.  604  ff.);  Un- 
derrichtung  vom  Nachtmal,  1526  (ii.  I.  426  ff.);  Arnica  exegesis,  1527  (hi* 
459  ff-);  friindlich  verglimpfung,  1527  (ii.  2.  iff.);  Dass  dise  worte  Christi 
.  .  .  ewiglich  den  alten  einigen  sinn  haben  werdend,  1527  (ii*  2.  16  ff.); 
Uiber  Luther’s  buch  bekenntniss  genannt,  1527  (ii.  2.  94  ff. ). 

3  Oecolampadius  entered  the  controversy  with  his  tract,  De  genuina  ver- 
borum  Christi  .  .  .  expositione  liber,  1525. 


32° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


away  as  simply  the  product  of  hypocrisy  and  timidity  0-  g->  vii. 
390  f. ).  Zwingli  and  his  friends  were  impatient  in  their  desire 
to  measure  swords  with  Luther  and  undermine  his  authority, 
and  counseled  against  the  use  of  prudent  or  pious  tactics  in  deal¬ 
ing  with  him.  (See  proofs  adduced  in  Walther,  1.  c. ,  p. 
815  ff. ,  916  IT.)1  And  they  actually  succeeded  in  stirring  up  a 
serious  agitation  against  Luther’s  doctrine  in  Southern  Germany, 
although  their  efforts  met  with  some  determined  opposition  upon 
that  territory  (Osiander,  Brenz,  the  Syngramma,  Pirckheimer).2 
These  facts  must  be  kept  in  view  if  we  would  understand  the 
severity  of  Luther  when  he  finally  broke  his  silence  and  entered 
the  fray.3 

2.  Zwingli’ s  theory  is  a  simple  one.  Bread  and  wine  are 
signs  of  the  body  and  blood  offered  up  in  sacrifice  for  us.  These 
signs  signify  the  body  and  blood  thus  offered,  and  thus  remind 
us  of  the  redemptive  act  (<?.  g.,  iii.  599).  The  est  of  the  words  of 
institution  is  therefore  equivalent  to  significat  (ii.  2.  41  ff. ,  61  ; 
iii.  257,  336,  553,  606).  Only  faith  can  apprehend  and  appro¬ 
priate  salvation  ;  but  faith  has  to  do  only  with  spiritual  entities. 
Hence  the  eating  of  the  body  of  Christ  can  signify  only  the  be¬ 
lieving  appropriation  of  the  salvation  secured  for  us  by  the 
sacrifice  of  that  body.  Christ  is  present  in  the  Supper  only  “  by 
the  contemplation  of  faith  ’  ’  ( contemplatione  fidei ) ,  but  not  ‘  ‘  in 
essence  and  really  ”  ( per  essentiam  et  realiter ).  Faith  in  Christ 

1  Bucer  writes  very  characteristically  to  Zwingli  :  “  O  Flesh  !  O  Satan  ! 
what  work  hast  thou  made  for  us  !  It  shall  be  destroyed  by  us  for  the  pro¬ 
motion  of  the  glory  of  God,  and  we  shall  see  this  arrogance  vanish  ”  (Zw.  opp. 
vii.  521 ).  Luther  expresses  his  opinion  of  the  conflict  from  the  moral  point  of 
view  with  unsurpassable  clearness  (E.  30.  266):  “My  free,  open,  simple 
snapping  at  the  devil  is  to  my  notion  much  better  than  their  poisonous,  plot¬ 
ting  assassination,  which  they  practice  against  the  upright  under  the  pretense 
of  peace  and  love.”  As  to  the  method  of  his  opponents,  see  also  30,  24,  38, 
61,  98,  139,  148  ff.,  160,  205.  It  is  more  important  to  set  forth  clearly  the 
spirit  of  these  opponents  and  the  historic  basis  of  it,  than  to  shudder  at  the 
thought  of  Luther’s  coarseness  in  dealing  with  them. 

2  See  Bilibaldi  Pirckheimeri  de  vera  Christi  carne  et  vero  ejus  sanguine  ad 
Io.  Oecolamp.  respons.  Norimb.  1526,  and  B.  Pirckh.  de  vera  Chr. ,  etc., 
respons.  secunda,  Norimb.  1527.  The  argumentation  of  these  documents 
touches  the  positions  of  Luther  at  many  points  {e.g.,  the  clearness  of  the 
words  of  institution — see  the  first  response,  form  B,  7  r,  E  4,  and  in  the  con¬ 
clusion,  upon  the  definition  of  a  iropus ,  E  5  v  ;  against  the  significat ,  F.  2  r  and 
the  two  resp.  F.  8  r);  even  in  the  conception  of  the  ubiquity  :  “And  it 
would  not  indeed  be  impossible  with  God  .  .  .  that  one  body,  most  highly 
clarified,  should  be  in  many  places  ”  ( 1st  resp.  F.  5  v).  But  Stahelin  (Zw.  ii. 
269  f. )  is  in  error  when  he  represents  Pirckheimer  as  having  “first”  intro¬ 
duced  the  idea  of  the  ubiquity  into  the  controversy,  as  Luther  had  already  done 
so  in  1525  (E.  29.  288  f. ,  294).  Pirckheimer  had  read  Luther  ( e .  g. ,  resp.  I 
F.  3  v,  6  v  ;  H.  I  r,  2). 

3  See  Luther’s  writings  during  the  controversy.  Cf.  supra,  p.  227,  n.  3. 


CONTROVERSY  UPON  THE  LORD’S  SUPPER.  32 1 

is  really  the  eating  of  his  body.  “  The  body  of  Christ  is  then 
eaten,  when  his  death  ( caesum )  for  us  is  believed  ”  (iii.  243  f. , 
595,  331;  iv.  53,  1 18).  If  we  would  take  the  eating  of  the  body 
of  Christ  seriously,  we  would  come  into  conflict,  on  the  one 
hand,  with  the  maxim,  that  the  flesh  profiteth  nothing  (Jn.  6. 
63  f. ;  ii.  2.  85  ff.,  184  ff. );  and,  on  the  other  hand,  collide 
with  the  limitation  of  Christ’s  body  to  locality  (ii.  2.  81  ;  iii. 
33  2,  338,  512).  Moreover,  at  the  time  of  the  institution  of  the 
Lord’s  Supper,  the  blood  of  Christ  had  not  yet  been  shed  (iii. 

333  f-)- 

The  Christology  of  Zwingli  is  at  this  point  called  into  service. 
While  Luther  interprets  the  traditional  dogma  from  the  view¬ 
point  of  personal  unity,  Zwingli  always  premises  the  abstract 
difference  of  the  two  natures.  God  ‘  ‘  assumed  human  nature  ’  * 
— the  incarnation  signifies  nothing  more  than  this  (ii.  2.  69  f. ). 
As  in  the  history  of  Christ’s  earthly  life  his  two  natures  are  to  be 
carefully  discriminated  (so  that,  for  example,  he  according  to  his 
human  nature  does  not  know  the  day  of  his  second  coming,  yet 
according  to  his  divine  nature  knows  all  things,  iii.  537  f.;  ii. 
2.  67),  so  also  his  divine  nature  fills  heaven  and  earth,  while  at 
the  same  time  his  human  nature  is  limited  to  a  particular  place 
in  heaven  (for,  as  created,  it  is  “  not  infinite  ”)  and  is  a  type  of 
our  resurrection  (ii.  2.  71,  72,  81:  “  willst  also  never  be  able  to 
maintain  that  the  human  nature  of  Jesus  Christ  is  in  more 
than  one  place  ”).  If  now  in  the  Scriptures  that  is  ascribed  to 
the  one  nature  which  belongs  to  the  other,  or  attributes  of  the 
one  nature  are  attributed  to  the  entire  person,  this  is  to  be  ex¬ 
plained  through  the  figure  of  speech  known  as  Alloeosis ,  or 
1 1  interchange,  ’  ’  i.  e. ,  it  is  a  rhetorical  “  exchange  by  which,  when 
speaking  of  the  one  nature  of  Christ,  we  use  the  terms  belonging 
to  the  other”  (iii.  525;  ii.  2.  68  f.).  Thus,  if  it  is  said  of 
Christ  that  he  is  at  the  right  hand  of  God,  this,  strictly  inter¬ 
preted,  applies  only  to  his  divine  nature  (ii.  2.  71).  Zwingli’s 
ideas  as  to  the  divine  and  human  natures  of  Christ  and  his  per¬ 
sonal  unity  are  here  orthodox  (<?.  g. ,  ii.  2.  66  ff.,  82  ;  ii.  1. 
449)..  But  for  the  great  thought  in  Luther’s  theology — that 
even  the  human  words  and  works  of  Christ  are  a  revelation  of 
God — he  has  no  comprehension.1  His  Christology  remains 
absolutely  upon  the  plane  of  the  medieval  conception.  The 
divine  and  human  natures  are  assigned  to  the  opposite  cate¬ 
gories  of  finite  and  infinite  nature.  The  consequences  of  this 

1  Stahelin  is  not  entirely  correct,  when  he  (Zw.  ii.  175)  describes,  as  the 
reformatory  factor,  in  Zwingli  as  in  Luther,  “  the  overwhelming  impression  of 
the  vision  of  Christ  upon  the  sensibilities  of  the  soul  burdened  by  sin.”  Cf. 
supra,  p.  314,  but  also  p.  310. 


21 


322 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


position  came  to  light  in  the  controversy  upon  the  Lord’s 
Supper. 

The  Lord’s  Supper  is  thus,  according  to  Zwingli,  on  the  one 
hand,  a  memorial  celebration  designed  to  remind  us  of  the  re¬ 
demption  wrought  by  the  death  of  Christ ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  profession  of  adherence  to  Christ  in  the  presence  of  the 
congregation,  and  thus  the  assuming  of  an  obligation  to  lead  a 
Christian  life  (iii.  601).1 

3.  We  found,  as  the  result  of  our  study  of  Luther’s  doctrine  of 
the  Lord’s  Supper  (supra,  p.  288),  that  he  from  the  beginning 
taught  the  presence  of  the  body  of  Christ  in  the  Supper,  and  in 
such  a  way  that  the  body,  as  a  seal  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
wrought  by  it  and  by  the  word  appropriated  by  faith,  strengthens 
and  confirms  the  communicant  in  his  faith.  The  theories  of 
Carlstadt,  who  misinterpreted  the  rovro  ;  of  Zwingli,  who  inter¬ 
preted  the  est  as  meaning  significat ;  of  Oecolampadius,  who  ex¬ 
plained  the  <ru)[ia  as  a  sign  of  the  body, — all  fell  beyond  the  lines 
of  his  thought.  It  was  just  at  this  time,  moreover,  that  Luther 
became  thoroughly  convinced  of  the  indissoluble  connection  be¬ 
tween  the  empirical  word  and  the  exertion  of  the  Spirit’s 
agency.  Here  appeared  to  be  another  attempt,  similar  to  that 
of  the  Anabaptists,  to  tear  the  two  asunder  (E.  30.  136,  353). 
Finally,  he  felt  the  new  theory  to  be  unspiritual  and  unchurchly, 
and  he  was  convinced  that  it  was  unscriptural  as  well.  The 
words  of  the  institution  appeared  to  him  simple  and  plain.  What 
need  for  interpretations  of  such  plain  terms  as  bread,  wine,  body, 
blood,  eat,  drink,  is  (29.  329,  331  ;  30.  33  ff.,  154,  293,  355)? 
And  as  the  words  point  to  reality,  this  is  confirmed  by  the  cir¬ 
cumstance  that  the  traditional  preservation  of  them  is  in  all  the 
sources  in  the  same  simple  form  (30.  31 1),  and  by  the  consider¬ 
ation  that  symbols  are  characteristic  of  the  Old  Testament,  not 
of  the  New  (ib.  338).  Accordingly,  he  inferred  that  we  truly 
eat  the  body  of  Christ  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  (29.  338;  30.  30, 
103).  “  But  how  this  occurs,  or  how  he  is  in  the  bread,  we  do 

not  know,  and  are  not  to  know.  We  should  believe  the  word  of 
God,  and  not  dictate  ways  and  means  to  him  ”  (30.  30).  The 

1  Zwingli  thus  summarizes  the  errors  of  Luther:  (1)  That  the  body  of 
Christ,  naturally  eaten  in  this  sacrament,  confirms  faith.  (2)  That  the  body 
of  Christ,  naturally  eaten,  forgives  sins.  (3)  That  the  body  of  Christ  is  nat¬ 
urally  brought  in  the  vehicle  of  the  words  spoken.  (4)  “That  when  I  offer 
the  body  of  Christ  to  be  naturally  eaten,  I  bring  the  gospel  very  near  to  him 
to  whom  I  offer  this,  and  to  whom  I  give  the  body  and  blood”  (iii.  561). 
Also,  ii.  2.  93  :  “  That  the  flesh  of  Christ  is  an  entirely  spiritual  flesh  ;  that 
the  body  of  Christ  is,  like  the  divine  nature,  omnipresent,  .  .  .  that  the  body 
of  Christ,  bodily  eaten,  preserves  our  body  for  the  resurrection,  .  .  .  gives 
and  increases  faith.” 


CONTROVERSY  UPON  THE  LORD’S  SUPPER.  323 

exegetical  difficulties  of  the  words  of  institution  never  troubled 
Luther,  and  he  denied  the  application  of  Jn.  6  to  the  Lord’s 
Supper  (30.  79  ff. ).  Nor  did  the  manner  of  the  union  of  the 
body  and  bread  disturb  him.  There  was  another  problem, 
however,  which  awakened  his  most  profound  concern.  His  op¬ 
ponents  asserted  the  impossibility  of  the  bodily  presence  at  many 
places.  If  Luther  meant  to  maintain  his  position,  it  was,  there¬ 
fore,  incumbent  upon  him  to  prove  that  the  ubiquity  of  the  body 
of  Christ  was  conceivable  (30.  49,  56,  58,  70,  201,  206,  282). 

4.  In  order  to  follow  the  arguments  employed  by  Luther  in 
support  of  this  position,  we  must  bear  two  things  constantly  in 
mind.  In  the  first  place,  for  Luther,  as  a  scholastically  trained 
theologian,  the  problem  was  not  an  uncongenial  one  ;l  and,  in 
the  second  place,  his  Christology  furnished  the  materials  to  be 
used  in  its  solution.  He  had  from  the  beginning  thought  of  the 
two  natures  of  Christ  as  so  united  that  the  man  Jesus  was,  in  all 
his  words  and  works,  the  expression  and  organ  of  his  divine  na¬ 
ture.  He  knew  no  God  except  the  One  revealed  in  the  man 
Jesus.  God  “  is  present  and  substantial  ”  (gegenwartig  und  wes- 
enlicli)  in  all  created  things,  but  he  “  dwells”  in  Christ  bodily, 
so  that  one  person  is  man  and  God  (30.  63).  When  these  ideas 
are  considered  in  the  light  of  the  formula  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  two  natures,  the  inference  is,  that  the  two  natures  are 
“one  single  person”  (30.  63,  206  f.,  211,  222),  in  abso¬ 
lutely  inseparable  union,  so  that  where  the  one  is  the  other 
must  also  be  (21  if. ).  There  subsists  between  the  two  a  re¬ 
lation  like  that  between  body  and  soul  (204);  and  the  flesh  of 
Christ  is,  therefore,  being  permeated  by  God,  “nothing  but 
spirit,  nothing  but  holiness,  nothing  but  purity  ”  (231).  It  is 
“  a  divine  flesh,  a  spirit-flesh.”  “It  is  in  God  and  God  in  it  ” 
{30.  125  ;  48.  26,  58).  God  has  become  completely  man,  so 
that  all  human  attributes,  such  as  suffering  and  dying,  have  also 
become  his  (25.  310,  312,  314).  “  Out  of  the  infinite  God  has 

been  made  a  finite  and  definable  man  ”  (47.  182).  The  commu- 
nicatio  idiomatum  is  thus  taken  in  its  full  meaning  (25.  309) .  All 
the  activity  and  suffering  of  the  man  is  also  the  activity  and  suf¬ 
fering  of  God  (30.  62,  67;  46.  332  f).  “Whatsoever  I  be¬ 
hold  in  Christ  is  at  the  same  time  both  human  and  divine”  (47. 
361  f. ).  “  Wherever  thou  canst  say,  Here  is  God,  there  must 

thou  also  say,  Therefore  Christ  the  man  is  also  here.  And  if 
thou  shouldst  point  out  a  place  where  God  was  and  not  the  man, 

1  Supra,  p.  133,  204.  Luther  had  the  feeling  of  superiority  of  a  dogmati¬ 
cally  (scholastically)  trained  theologian  as  compared  with  Zwingli.  The 
latter  was  for  him  “a  self-grown  doctor;  they  generally  turn  out  so  ”  (30. 
267). 


32  4 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


V 

't* 


then  would  the  person  be  already  divided,  since  I  might  then  say 
with  truth,  Here  is  God,  who  is  not  man,  and  never  yet  became 
man.  But  nothing  of  that  God  for  me  !  .  .  .  Nay,  friend, 
wherever  thou  placest  God  for  me,  there  must  thou  also  place 
for  me  the  human  nature.  They  cannot  be  separated  and  divided 
from  each  other.  There  has  come  to  be  One  person”  (30. 
21 1).1  The  divine  nature  gives  its  peculiarity  (attributes)  to 
the  human  nature,  and  the  human  nature  also  in  return  its  pecu¬ 
liarity  to  the  divine  nature  (30.  204  ;  47.  177).  It  is  no  more 
wonderful  that  God  dies,  than  that  he  became  man  (25.  312). 
Hence  Luther  could  see  in  the  Alloeosis  only  “  the  devil’s  mask  ” 
(30.  203,  205,  225),  for  this  separation  of  the  works  of  the  two 
^  natures  no  longer  permits  us  to  see  in  the  human  nature  the  full 
revelation  of  God.  It  misleads  us,  after  the  fashion  of  the 
Scholastics,  to  take  refuge  in  the  divine  nature  and  cling  to  this, 
looking  away  from  the  man  Jesus  (47.  361  f. ).  It  robs  the 
atoning  work  of  Christ  of  its  specific  divine  value  (25.  312b; 
30.  203;  18.  225).  It  is,  therefore,  by  no  means  a  product 
of  polemical  necessity  which  we  behold  in  Luther’s  Christology,, 
as  developed  in  the  controversy  with  Zwingli.  It  is  the  same 
Christology  which  he  had  advocated  from  the  beginning.  And  this 
doctrine  marks  an  advance  in  the  development  of  the  traditional 
,  Christology — effected  by  evolution  from  within.  The  divine  nature 
y  no  longer  swallows  up  the  human  nature,  but  the  latter  is  the  organ 
and  bearer  of  the  former.  It  is  precisely  the  unqualified  preser¬ 
vation  of  the  human  nature  which  makes  Jesus  capable  of  really 
becoming  the  God  revealed  among  us.  Luther’s  most  profound 
ideas  concerning  the  knowledge  of  God  and  faith  may  be  under¬ 
stood  in  the  light  of  these  principles  (supra,  p.  252  b).  But  his¬ 
torical  fidelity  requires  the  recognition  of  the  fact,  that  Luther  in 
the  controversy  upon  the  Lord’s  Supper  extended  his  Christology 
by  including  an  inference  not  previously  drawn.  The  practical 
identity  of  the  divine  and  human  natures  in  the  earthly  life  of 
Jesus  is  deliberately  transferred  to  the  state  of  exaltation.  If  the 
words  and  deeds  of  Jesus  on  earth  were  the  words  and  deeds  of 
God,  then  are  the  works  of  the  Lord  in  heaven  also  the  works 
of  the  man  Jesus.  And  this  means  that  the  man  Jesus  is  at  the 
same  time  the  omnipotent  and  omnipresent  Lord  of  the  world. 
If  he  is  present  in  the  Lord’s  Supper,  he  is  there  also  the  man 
Jesus ;  and  since  he  arose  from  the  dead  bodily,  his  body  is  also 
present  in  the  sacrament.  Thus  the  theory  of  the  Ubiquity  is, 

1  Luther  does  not  yet  employ  the  term,  Person,  in  the  modern  sense.  It 
corresponds  precisely  with  the  ancient  “Hypostasis,”  e.  g.y  30.  204:  “  Be¬ 
cause  body  and  soul  is  one  person.”  Luther  elsewhere  speaks  of  Christ  as 
“one  person”  with  God  (30.  216,  227). 


CONTROVERSY  UPON  THE  LORD’S  SUPPER.  325 

in  Luther’s  understanding  of  it,  only  a  logical  inference  from 
his  Christology.1 

5.  Luther  opens  the  discussion  with  a  definition  of  the  term  : 
the  Right  Hand  of  God.  This  cannot  be  conceived  of  as  a 
“  golden  chair”  beside  the  Father  (30.  56  f. ).  We  must  here 
recall  Luther’s  conception  of  God  as  the  “  omnipotent  Power.” 
If  now  God  is  the  all -permeating  and  all-moving  Will,  then  his 
Right  Hand  is  simply  everywhere.  If  God  is  “substantial  and 
present  at  all  places,”  in  “  the  smallest  leaf  upon  the  trees,”  in 
‘  ‘  the  most  inward  ’  ’  and  ‘  ‘  most  outward  ’  ’  things  (  5  8 ) , 2  then  his 
Right  Hand  is  also  “  everywhere  in  all  things  ”  (64).  Accord¬ 
ingly,  Christ  is  also  omnipresent,  and  that,  too,  in  his  body, /.  <?.  / 
he  reigns  and  has  power  over  all  things.  “If  he  is  to  have 
power  and  reign,  he  must  certainly  also  be  there  present  and 
substantial”  (65).  This  must,  of  course,  be  applicable  in  a 
general  sense,  even  apart  from  all  thought  of  the  Lord’s  Supper.3 
The  body  of  Christ  is  in  every  stone,  in  fire  and  water.  But  we 
can  really  find  and  apprehend  him  only  where  he  has  in  his  word 
directed  us  to  seek  him  (29.  338).  “  But  he  is  then  present  for 

thee  when  he  adds  his  word,  and  thereby  binds  himself,  and 
says  :  Here  shalt  thou  find  me.”  He  is  omnipresent,  but  in  his 
divine  mode  of  presence  incomprehensible  :  “  He  has  now  also 
become  incomprehensible,  and  thou  wilt  not  seize  upon  him, 
although  he  is  in  thy  bread,  unless  it  be  that  he  may  bind  him¬ 
self  to  thee  and  assign  thee  to  a  particular  table  by  a  word,  and 
point  out  to  thee  the  very  bread  by  his  word  ”  (30.  69  f. ).  As 
the  divine  nature,  so  also  is  Christ  in  his  body  near  to  all,  “  and 
it  is  only  a  question  of  his  revealing  himself”  (30.  67);  but  this 
takes  place  in  the  words  of  institution,  which  instruct  us  to  seek 
and  find  in  a  particular  loaf  him  who  is  essentially  present  in 

1  A  peculiarity  of  Luther’s  Christology  is  the  lack  of  a  sharp  discrimination 
between  the  states  of  humiliation  and  exaltation.  This  may  be  understood, 
when  we  remember  that  his  practical  religious  mode  of  apprehension  saw  in 
the  man  Jesus  the  full  and  real  revelation  of  God.  If  we  recall  his  definition 
of  the  divinity  of  Christas  the  omnipotent  Loving-will  (p.  253),  the  question 
arises  :  How,  in  the  light  of  this,  shall  the  Ubiquity  be  conceived  in  harmony 
w'ith  Luther?  We  might,  perhaps,  reply:  The  omnipotent  Redeeming-will, 
which  became  one  with  the  man  Jesus,  is  present  with  the  man  Jesus  in  the 
Lord’s  Supper,  in  order  by  this  presence  to  assure  us  of  the  reality  of  redemp¬ 
tion.  But  Luther  did  not  draw  these  inferences. 

2  “  Therefore  must  he  be  himself  present  in  every  creature  in  its  most  inward 
and  most  outward  (parts),  around  and  about,  through  and  through,  beneath 
and  above,  before  and  behind,  so  that  nothing  can  be  more  truly  nor  pro¬ 
foundly  present  in  all  creatures  than  God  himself  with  his  power.” 

3  Even  the  earthly  body  of  Christ  was  “present  everywhere,”  30.  67  ; 
upon  the  glorification  of  his  body  Luther  lays  but  little  stress,  30.  98  ff. ;  cf. 
Occam,  supra,  p.  205. 


326 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


every  loaf.  The  presence  of  the  glorified  body  is  to  be  con¬ 
ceived  of  in  the  same  manner  as  the  divine  presence  in  the  world 
in  general.  God  is  not  “  such  an  outspread,  long,  broad,  thick, 
high,  deep  Being,”  filling  the  world  as  straw  fills  a  sack  (ib. 
221 );  as  though  God  were  such  a  great  outspread  Object,  reach¬ 
ing  through  and  out  beyond  every  created  thing  ”  (213,  216). 
We  are  not,  therefore,  to  think  of  any  local,  sensible  presence. 
There  are,  says  Luther,  ‘ 4  three  ways  of  being  in  a  place  :  locally 
or  cir cions criptively ,  definitively ,  and  repletively  (207).  The  first 
indicates  a  purely  spacial  relation,  as  of  wine  in  a  cask.  Anything 
is  definitively ,  or  “  incomprehensibly,”  at  a  place  when  it  does 
not  correspond  with  the  portions  of  space  in  the  latter ;  as  an 
angel  may  be  in  a  whole  house,  in  one  room,  or  even  in  a  nut¬ 
shell  (208).  The  mode  of  presence  is  repletive ,  or  supernatural, 
“  when  anything  is  at  the  same  time  in  its  entirety  at  all  places  and 
fills  all  places,  and  is  yet  measured  and  contained  by  no  place  ’  * 
(  209 ) . 1  This  repletive  existence  is  now  attributed  also  to  the  body 
of  Christ  (211).  All  things  are  “as  related  to  the  body  of 
Christ,  present  and  penetrable”  (210,  216).  His  body  was 
present  circumscriptively  during  his  earthly  life,  “  since  it  took 
and  gave  space  according  to  its  size  ”  (216).  The  definitive  form 
of  presence  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  body  which  passed  out  of 
the  closed  grave  and  through  the  locked  doors,  and  to  the  body 
present  in  the  bread  (216).  As  the  soul  is  present  at  the  same 
time  in  the  whole  body  just  as  in  every  separate  part ;  as  vision 
or  sound  reaches  over  great  distances  ;  as  sound  passes  through 
air,  water,  boards,  and  walls,  and  enters  many  ears  at  once,  in 
such  a  way  are  we  to  conceive  also  of  Christ’s  presence  in  the 
Lord’s  Supper  (29.  333  fi;  30.  216,  218  f.).  We  are,  hence, 
to  represent  to  ourselves  the  presence  of  Christ  in  the  sense  in 
which  God  as  the  Omnipotent  Will  dwells  in  all  things,  or  in 
which  the  soul  permeates  the  body,  and  not  in  the  “  crude,  fat, 
and  thick  ideas  ’  ’  of  the  circumscriptive  mode  of  existence  (215). 
The  word  “  in  ”  is  not  to  be  understood  in  the  sense  in  which 
“  straw  is  in  a  sack  and  bread  in  a  basket  ”  (223).  Not  in  this, 
external,  local  way  is  Christ’s  body  in  the  Lord’s  Supper,  but  in 
some  such  way  as  color  and  light  are  in  the  eye  (66.  189  f. ). 
A  “sacramental  unity”  ( Einigkeit )  exists  between  the  body 
and  the  bread  (297,  300).  But  the  body,  which  is  here  spoken 
of,  is  the  veritable  body  of  Christ  which  was  born  of  the  Virgin 
(89). 

If  we  compare  with  this  Occam’s  doctrine  of  Ubiquity,  p. 

1  This  classification  is  of  scholastic  origin.  The  first  two  modes  are  de¬ 
rived  from  Occam  (supra,  p.  204).  The  three-fold  classification  (adding  the 
repletive  mode)  was  taken  from  Biel  (Sent.  i.  d.  37  qu. ). 


CONTROVERSY  UPON  THE  LORD'S  SUPPER.  327 

204  f.  ),*  it  is  clear  that  Luther  was  influenced  by  Occam.  Both 
the  classification  of  the  modes  of  spacial  existence,  and  the  super- 
spacial  existence  of  the  body  of  Christ  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  and 
in  all  existing  things,  point  unmistakably  to  that  source.  But 
a  profound  difference  is  here  traceable.  While  Occam,  in  addi¬ 
tion  to  this  bodily  presence  everywhere,  thinks  of  the  real  body 
of  Christ  as  in  one  place  in  heaven ;  for  Luther  the  body  of 
Christ  is,  by  virtue  of  the  communicatio  idiomatum ,  absolutely 
omnipresent.  Occam  appends  to  the  current  medieval  doctrine 
a  speculative  inference,  postulating  a  certain  Something  which 
may  figure  as  the  body  of  Christ  in  the  Lord’s  Supper.  Luther 
defends  the  religious  idea,  that,  just  as  we  apprehend  Christ  only 
in  the  positive  forms  of  his  human  life,  so  he  is  present  in  the 
Holy  Supper  also  as  the  man  Jesus  with  the  human  nature  (in¬ 
cluding  his  body)  by  which  he  effects  our  salvation.  What  he  is 
most  earnestly  striving  for  will  be  evident  if  we  compare  his  orig¬ 
inal  conception  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  :  “  The  same  Christ  who* 
has  secured  for  us  grace  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  present  in 
the  Lord’s  Supper  in  order  to  assure  us  of  his  redeeming  act.”2: 
Here  lies  the  nerve  of  his  opposition  to  Zwingli  and  Oecolampa- 
dius.  The  sacrament  is  not  ‘  ‘  a  sign  of  a  future  or  absent  thing  ;  ’  ’ 
but  a  “  form  of  the  thing  present  and  yet  invisible.  ”  Under 
the  visible  form  of  bread  and  wine  are  “  his  invisible  body  and 
blood  present”  (105).  The  important  thing,  for  which  he  con¬ 
tends,  is  that  Christ,  and  Christ  the  historical  Redeemer,  is  him¬ 
self  present,  and  that  we  are  not  merely  to  think  of  him  as 
present  by  an  effort  of  our  imagination.  The  scholastic  mate¬ 
rial  by  which  he  seeks  to  establish  this  position  is  regarded  as 
means  to  the  end  in  view.3 

6.  With  this  view  harmonize  also  the  utterances  of  Luther 
concerning  the  Reception  and  Fruits  of  the  Sacrament.  We  do 
really  eat  and  chew  the  body  of  Christ,  and  the  pope  was  there¬ 
fore  justified  in  requiring  this  confession  from  Berenger  (supra,  p. 
76).  But  the  bread  is  the  body,  as  the  dove  is  the  Holy  Spirit  f 
for  ‘ ‘  no  one  sees,  grasps,  eats,  or  chews  the  body  of  Christ,  as 
we  visibly  see  and  chew  other  flesh.  For  whatever  we  do  to 
the  bread  is  well  and  properly  applied  to  the  body  of  Christ,  on 
account  of  the  sacramental  unity  ”  (297,  cf.  57.  75  f. ).  The 
bread  is  therefore  really  eaten,  but  with  it  at  the  same  time  the 

1  See  already  Alger,  supra,  p.  77>  an(l  Gerhoh,  p.  66. 

2  Cf.  29.  348;  48.  23;  30.  85,  134,  137:  “What  is  the  difference  now?1 2 
Yea,  how  is  it  any  better  for  them  to  eat  flesh  and  bone  with  the  soul,  than, 
that  we  should  eat  it  with  the  mouth  ?  ” 

3  Luther  himself  wished  these  explanations  to  be  regarded  only  as  possibil¬ 
ities,  which  do  not  exclude  other  explanations,  30.  200,  202,  210,  217. 


328 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


spiritual  body  of  Christ ;  bread  and  body  are  at  the  same  time 
and  together  present  (300).  There  results  “a  substantial 
X  { naturlich )  unification  of  the  body  of  Christ  with  us,  and  not 
alone  a  spiritual,  subsisting  in  the  mind  and  will  ”  (202).  But 
despite  this  manducatio  oralis ,  our  reception  of  this  gift  must  be 
spiritual,  i.  e. ,  the  heart  must  believe  the  presence  of  Christ  in 
the  bread,  which  the  word  proclaims  (90  f.,  93,  185). 1  Only 
faith  apprehends  life  and  salvation  in  the  present  body  of  the 
Lord  (130).  This  is  the  spiritual  eating,  which  must  accompany 
the  bodily  eating  (86,  185).  The  body  of  Christ  is  therefore 
present  in  the  Lord’s  Supper,  but  only  the  believer  understands 
and  grasps  this  and  has  in  consequence  the  blessing  which  the 
body  brings  :  “  That  which  is  given  therein  and  therewith,  the 
body  cannot  grasp  nor  take  to  itself ;  but  this  is  done  by  the 
faith  of  the  heart  which  discerns  this  treasure  and  desires  it  ” 
(Large  Cat.,  Muller,  p.  504). 2 

From  this  we  may  understand  Luther’s  view  of  the  Benefit  of 
the  Sacrament.  The  body  of  Jesus,  whose  presence  in  the  bread 
faith  apprehends,  strengthens  faith  (135)  and  gives  to  it  the  as¬ 
surance  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  (136).  The  presence  of  the 
body  and  blood  of  Christ  brings  us  the  salvation  which  he  has 
secured  by  means  of  this  body  and  blood.  The  new  testament 
is  here  and  brings  us  4  4  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  the  Spirit,  grace, 
life,  and  all  blessedness”  (338).  Thus  the  word,  combined 
with  the  Redeemer  offered  by  it  and  bodily  present  in  the  sacra¬ 
ment,  effects  a  strengthening  of  faith,  the  sense  of  forgiveness, 
life,  and  salvation.3  To  this  spiritual  effect  produced  by  the 

1  But  unbelievers  also  receive  the  body  ( manducatio  infidelium) ,  although  to 
their  own  hurt,  29.  346  ;  30.  369,  86,  343).  Cat.  509.  But  those  who  do 
not  at  all  believe  the  words  of  institution,  such  as  the  Fanatics,  receive  nothing 
But  bread  and  wine  (30.  132.  Cat.  504). 

2  The  presence  of  the  body  and  blood,  as  Luther  always  maintained,  in¬ 
volves  the  personal  presence  of  Christ,  by  virtue  of  the  personal  unity  (29. 
295  ;  30.  130  ff. ).  On  the  other  hand,  the  idea  that  the  older  German 
linguistic  usage,  in  which  Leib  (body)  is  equivalent  to  “person”  (e.  g.,  in 
Luther,  45.  13  f. :  “In  the  German  language  we  do  not  call  a  dead  man  a 
‘  body,’  but  a  living  man  who  has  body  and  soul  ”  ),  influenced  Luther’s  con¬ 
ception  of  the  “  body  ”  of  Christ,  is,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  without  any  foundation. 

3  3°*  338  f-5  “The  words  are  the  first  thing,  for  without  the  words  the  cup 
and  bread  would  be  nothing.  Further,  without  the  bread  and  cup,  there  would 
be  no  body  and  blood  of  Christ.  Without  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ, 
there  would  be  no  new  testament.  Without  the  new  testament,  there  would 
be  no  forgiveness  of  sins.  Without  forgiveness  of  sins,  there  would  be  no  life 
and  salvation.  Thus  the  words,  in  the  first  place,  embrace  the  bread  and  the  cup 
(to  constitute)  the  sacrament.  The  bread  and  cup  embrace  the  body  and 
blood  of  Christ.  The  body  and  blood  of  Christ  embrace  the  new  testament. 
The  new  testament  embraces  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  The  forgiveness  of  sins 
embraces  eternal  life  and  salvation.  Behold,  all  this  do  the  words  of  the  Lord’s 
Supper  offer  and  give  to  us,  and  we  grasp  it  by  faith.’  ’ 


CONTROVERSY  UPON  THE  LORD’S  SUPPER.  329 

Lord’s  Supper  is  added  further,  in  harmony  with  the  representa¬ 
tions  of  the  ancient  church  (Irenaeus,  ib.  116  ff. ),  an  effect  upon 
the  body  of  the  recipient.  The  body  of  Christ  is  a  pledge  which 
gives  to  our  body  the  assurance  that  it  shall,  by  virtue  of  the 
“eternal  food”  thus  received  by  us,  also  live  forever  (72). 
This  “spiritual  food”  transforms  the  poor  “moth-sack,”  so 
“that  it  also  becomes  spiritual,  that  is,  eternally  alive  and 
blessed”  (101  f.  132,  135).  But  this  second  train  of  thought, 
which  was  of  course  particularly  adapted  for  use  against  Zwingli, 
had  but  a  secondary  importance  for  Luther.  He  could  omit  it 
altogether  in  his  exposition  of  the  subject  on  the  Large  Cate¬ 
chism,1  where  the  whole  benefit  of  the  sacrament  is  made  to  con¬ 
sist  in  the  strengthening  of  faith,  or  in  the  consciousness  of  the 
forgiveness  of  sins,  and  that,  too,  in  a  way  thoroughly  in  keeping 
with  Luther’s  original  conceptions,  viz.:  The  word  proclaims 
forgiveness ;  the  Christ  present  confirms  and  seals  it,  as  it  is  he 
himself  who  secured  it  for  us.  “  Therefore  we  come  to  the  sac¬ 
rament  in  order  that  we  mav  there  receive  such  a  treasure, 
through  which  and  in  which  we  obtain  remission  of  sins. 
Wherefore  this  ?  Because  the  words  are  here  and  give  these 
things  to  us.  If  therefore  I  am  commanded  by  Christ  to  eat  and 
drink,  in  order  that  he  may  be  mine  and  may  confer  a  benefit 
upon  me,  it  is,  as  it  were,  a  certain  pledge  and  surety,  or  rather 
the  very  thing  itself  which  he  has  presented  and  pledged  for  my 
sins,  death,  and  all  evils”  (Muller,  502). 2  In  view  of  this  re¬ 
sultant,  the  divergence  of  Luther’s  later  from  his  earlier  view  of 
the  Lord’s  Supper  must  not  be  overestimated.  The  bodily 
presence  of  the  Saviour  in  the  bread  and  wine  for  the  sealing  of 
the  words  of  institution,  for  the  strengthening  of  faith,  and  for  X 
giving  assurance  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  was  beyond  question 
his  leading  thought.  The  only  addition  made  to  this  was  the 
adoption  of  certain  definite  ideas  as  to  the  mode  of  presence  of 
the  heavenly  body,  to  which  he  was  led  by  the  course  of  contro¬ 
versy  upon  the  subject.  These  were,  in  the  first  instance,  only 
auxiliary  ideas,  but  they  gradually  assumed  the  character  of  per¬ 
manent  elements  in  the  dogma  of  the  Lord’s  Supper.3 

1  Or  at  least  set  it  in  new  relations,  p.  509  :  The  sacrament  is  “  nothing 
but  a  wholesome  and  comforting  medicine,  which  may  help  thee  and  give  thee 
life  in  both  body  and  soul.  For  where  the  soul  is  restored,  there  help  is  given 
also  to  the  body.” 

2  Cf.  the  discussions  as  to  “worthy”  and  “  unworthy  ”  communicants  (504 
ff. ).  Faith,  together  with  the  sense  of  unworthiness,  makes  worthy  (504, 

509  f.).  “Therefore  we  call  those  alone  unworthy  who  do  not  feel  their 
faults  nor  are  willing  to  be  (regarded  as)  sinners”  (510),  i.  e. ,  “who  are 
insolent  and  wild,”  508  Under  no  conditions  dare  we  think  of  the  sacrament 
as  “  though  it  were  a  poison,  in  which  we  should  eat  death  ”  (509). 

3  Luther  from  this  time  most  vigorously  rejected  the  position  of  those  who 


330 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


7.  The  Colloquy  at  Marburg  could  not,  under  the  circum¬ 
stances,  lead  to  harmony,  although  Zwingli,  impelled  by  political 
considerations  (  “  Burgrecht  ’  ’  )*  made  as  large  concessions  as  pos¬ 
sible  to  the  Lutherans.  Agreement  was  indeed  reached  upon 
fourteen  articles  of  faith,  modeled  upon  formulas  drawn  by 
Luther  (Trinity,  Christ,  original  sin,  faith,  justification,  word, 
baptism,  works,  civil  government).  In  regard  to  the  Lord’s 
Supper,  there  was  agreement  in  the  demand  for  “  both  forms  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  institution  of  Christ,”  in  the  condemnation  of  the 
mass,  and  in  the  assertion  that  “  the  spiritual  partaking  of  this 
body  and  blood  ”  is  “  especially  necessary  for  every  Christian.” 
But  there  remained  the  difference  that  they  “have  at  this  time 
not  agreed  whether  the  true  body  and  blood  of  Christ  are  bodily 
in  the  bread  and  wine  ”  (art.  15).  Luther,  although  he  had  not 
hesitated  to  express  to  the  Strassburgers  his  conviction  that  they 
had  “  another  spirit, ”  yet  hoped  for  a  “good-natured  friendly 
harmony,  that  they  may  in  a  friendly  spirit  seek  among  us  for 
that  which  they  lack  ”  (E.  36.  322).  Zwingli  wrote  :  “Luther, 
impudent  and  contumacious,  was  vanquished  .  .  .  although  he 
meanwhile  declared  that  he  was  unconquered  ”  (opp.  viii.  370). 
Upon  the  return  journey  to  Wittenberg,  the  Saxon  theologians 
drew  up  the  Schwabach  Articles,  which  assert  of  the  Lord’s  Sup¬ 
per  :  “  That  in  the  bread  and  wine  the  true  body  and  blood  of 
Christ  are  truly  present,  according  to  the  word  of  Christ  ’  ’  (art. 
10).  This  doctrine  belongs  with  others  to  the  faith  of  the  true 
church  :  “  Such  church  is  nothing  else  than  believers  in  Christ, 
who  believe  and  teach  the  above-named  articles  and  parts”  (art. 
12).  And  they  really  reproduced  the  doctrine  of  the  Luth¬ 
erans.  The  fault  lay,  not  in  this  exaltation  to  the  position  of  a 
“  dogma,”  but  in  the  fact  that  a  peculiar  theological  method  of 
establishing  the  doctrine  very  soon  began  to  be  included  in  the 
“  pure  doctrine  ”  itself. 

Cf.  Kolde,  Luther,  ii.  308  ff.,  and  DerTag  v.  Schleiz,  in  Abh.  f.  Kostl., 
1896,  p.  94  ff.  Stahelin,  Zwingli,  ii.  395  ff.  The  text  of  the  Marburg  and 
Schwabach  Articles  in  Kolde,  Die  Augsb.  Conf.,  1896,  p.  119  ff.,  123  ff. 

held  that  there  is  here  no  article  of  faith,  and  we  should  therefore  not  quarrel 
about  it,  but  each  one  should  be  allowed  here  to  believe  as  he  wishes  (32. 
406  ;  30.  43).  This  is  the  opinion  of  some  laymen,  such  as  Henry  of  Kron- 
berg :  “My  understanding  is  not  competent  to  reach  an  opinion”  (see 
Bogler,  H.  v.  Kr. ,  Schriften  des  Vereins  f.  Ref. -gesch.,  57,  p.  14).  See 
also  Luther’s  opinion  upon  Schwenkfeld’s  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  30. 
285  ff.,  305,  354  ;  32.  397,  404  ff.  Also  Kadelbach,  Ausfurl.  Gesch.  K.  v. 
Sch.,  i860,  p.  104  ff. 

1  Considerations  of  the  same  character — the  possibility  of  reconciling  the 
Emperor — influenced  the  opposition  of  Melanchthon,  whom  the  Strassburgers 
regarded  as  their  real  and  most  dangerous  opponent. 


CONTROVERSY  UPON  THE  LORD'S  SUPPER.  331 

8.  Nor  did  the  Witte?iberg  Concord  (A.  D.  1536)  produce  an 
actual  and  permanent  agreement.  From  the  time  of  the  Diet  Jv 
of  Augsburg,  Bucer  labored  unweariedly  to  bring  about  an  agree¬ 
ment  between  the  Saxons  and  the  theologians  of  Southern 
Germany.  His  formula  was:  “  That  the  true  body  and  the 
true  blood  of  Jesus  Christ  are  truly  present  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  A 
and  are  offered  with  the  words  of  the  Lord  and  the  sacrament.  ’  ’  1 
Both  Luther  and  Melanchthon  hoped  that  an  understanding 
might  be  reached  upon  this  basis.2  But  Luther  did  not  change 
his  own  opinion.  Although  he  was  willing  to  refrain  from  lay¬ 
ing  special  stress  upon  the  assertion,  that  the  body  of  Christ  is 
present  also  for  the  unbelieving,  yet  the  formula  finally  adopted 
expresses  his  view  :  “that  with  the  bread  and  wine  are  truly  A 
and  substantially  present,  offered,  and  received  (vere  et  substan- 
tialiter  adesse ,  exhiberi  et  sumi )  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ.  ’  ’ 

Just  on  this  account  the  Wittenberg  Concord  failed  to  attain  the 
desired  result.  Cf.  Kolde,  PRE.  xvii.,  ed.  2,  222  ff.  Baum, 
Capito  u.  Butzer,  i860,  p.  498  ff. 

1  As  in  general,  so  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  Bucer  found  his 
point  of  departure  in  Luther  (see  the  summary  of  his  preaching,  Strassburg, 
1523),  form  g  3  v.  During  the  sacramental  controversy,  he  was  on  Zwingli’s 
side.  His  view  at  this  time  is  given  in  Ennarrationum  in  evang.  Matthaei,  1. 
ii.  ( Argentorati,  1527),  p.  329  ff. :  As  food  strengthens  the  body,  so  the 
recollection  of  the  deliverance  and  forgiveness  of  sins  wrought  by  Christ 
strengthens  faith.  Thus  the  body  is  truly  eaten,  p.  329  r.  To  this  end  Christ 
instituted  the  Supper,  p.  330  r.  The  transition  to  his  later  position  was  made 
possible  by  the  strongly  emphasized  assertion,  that  we  at  least  with  our  spirit 
eat  the  body  of  Christ  (p.  330  v,  336  v,  333  v),  and  through  the  misinterpre¬ 
tation  of  Luther’s  doctrine  :  “They  contend  that  the  body  of  Christ  is  really 
.  .  .  transported  into  the  bread  by  the  word,  i.  e. ,  that  the  body  of  Christ  is 
really  present  in  the  bread  ”  (p.  331  r,  338  r).  But  influential,  above  all,  were 
political  considerations  and  the  feeling  that  “  what  ought  to  be  for  us  the  symbol 
of  the  warmest  love,  some  evilly  disposed  men  have  made  the  occasion  of  the 
most  violent  hatred  and  of  the  separation  of  brethren  and  of  the  rending  of 
churches”  (1.  c.,  p.  329  v). 

2  Cf.  the  formula  of  compromise  agreed  upon  at  about  this  time  between 
Blaurer  and  Schnepf  for  Wittenberg  :  “  That  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  are 
truly,  i.  e.,  substantially  and  essentially  ( substanzlich  unci  we  sent lie fi) ,  but  not 
quantitatively,  nor  qualitatively,  nor  locally,  present  and  offered,” 


332 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  NEW  DOGMA. 

§  74.  The  Augsburg  Confession. 

Literature.  Plitt,  Einleitung  in  d.  Augustana,  vol.  ii.,  1868.  Plitt, 
Die  Apol.  d.  August.,  1873.  Zockler,  Die  Augsb.  Conf.,  1870.  Kolde, 
Die  Augsb.  Conf.,  1896  (together  with  the  Marburg,  Schwabach,  and 
Torgau  Articles,  the  Confutation,  and  the  Augustana  variata).  Tschackert, 
Die  unanderte  Augsb.  Konf.  nach  den  besten  Handschriften,  1901.  Ficker, 
Die  Confut.  d.  Augsb.  Bek.  in  ihrer  ersten  Gestalt,  1891.  Knaake, 
Luther’s  Anteil  an  der  Augsb.  Conf.,  1863.  Virck,  Melanchthons  polit. 
Stellung  auf  d.  Reichstag  zu  Augsb.  1530,  Ztschr.  f.  KG.  ix.  67  ff. ,  293  ff. 
Thomasius-Seeberg,  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  364  ff.  Loofs,  DG.  397  ff.  Moller- 
Kawerau,  KG.  iii.  94  ff.  J.  W.  Richard,  Luther  and  the  Augsburg  Confes¬ 
sion,  in  the  Lutheran  Quarterly,  1899  and  1900. 

8^“  In  the  references  in  this  section,  a.  indicates  an  article  in  the  Augsburg 
Confession  ;  p.  refers  to  a  page  in  Muller’s  Symbolische  Bucher  ;  the  second 
figure  following,  to  a  paragraph  upon  the  same  page.  The  excellent  English 
translation  in  Jacobs,  Book  of  Concord,  may  be  used,  as  Muller’s  paging  is 
there  carried  in  the  margin. 

i.  The  adherents  of  the  Lutheran  doctrine  gave  confessional 
expression  to  their  religious  convictions  at  Augsburg  in  1530. 
It  was  not  their  aim  to  establish  a  “  new  dogma,”  but  they  on 
the  contrary  desired  only,  as  they  professed  adherence  to  the 
ecumenical  symbols,  to  furnish  the  proof  that  they  really  held 
the  genuine  old  Catholic  faith.  But  the  doctrine  which  they 
presented  in  the  Confession  became  nevertheless  the  fixed  dogma 
of  the  new  church.  It  formed  originally  the  charter  of  the  Smalcald 
League,  and  gradually  became  the  recognized  standard  of  pure 
doctrine  for  the  universities  as  well  as  for  the  congregations  (as 
proved  in  Moller-Kawerau,  iii.  98  f. ).  The  same  may  be  said 
of  the  Apology.  But  it  was  the  Religious  Peace  of  Augsburg, 
A.  D.  1555,  which  first  officially  and  plainly  designated  the 
Augsburg  Confession  as  the  standard,  by  which  new  associations 
in  the  church  were  to  be  tested  in  order  to  secure  recognition 
from  the  empire.  While  we  must  leave  to  Symbolics  the  more 
precise  treatment  of  this  subject,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  con¬ 
sider  the  question,  in  what  forms  the  new  doctrine  attained 
recognition  as  the  official  teaching  of  the  church.  The  dogmas 
of  the  ancient  church  received  a  canonical  character  from  the 
fact  that  they  were  the  decrees  of  general  councils  which  were 
“  accepted  ’  ’  by  the  church  at  large.  These  decrees  were  recog¬ 
nized  and  given  legal  force  by  the  state,  or  by  an  ecclesiastical 
authority — the  Roman  bishop — recognized  by  the  state.  The 
former  was  the  case  with  the  dogmas  of  the  Greek  church  ;  the 


THE  AUGSBURG  CONFESSION. 


333 


latter,  with  the  decrees  promulgated  during  the  Pelagian  and 
Semipelagian  controversies.  The  council  did  not  itself  possess 
binding  authority  ;  for  when  the  acceptance,  i.  e. ,  the  civil  recog¬ 
nition,  was  withdrawn  because  another  council  had  adopted  new 
and  contrary  decrees,  the  decrees  of  the  former  were  annulled. 
This  is  plainly  illustrated  in  the  conflicts  within  the  Greek 
church.  The  medieval  conception  of  the  church  changed  the 
formal  basis  of  accepted  dogma  and  led  to  the  establishment  of 
the  rule,  that  the  decrees  of  ecumenical  councils,  or  the  doctrine 
of  the  Romish  church,  or  the  formal  proclamation  of  a  pope, 
received  eo  ipso  dogmatic  authority  in  the  church.  Dogma 
became  simply  the  formal  statement  made  by  official  teachers  of 
the  church.  But  the  authority  which  these  were  supposed  to 
possess  was  shattered  in  its  very  foundations  by  the  Reformation. 
The  congregations  were  looked  to  for  the  reformation  of  doctrine 
and  life,  as  to  them  belonged  the  right  of  passing  judgment  upon 
doctrine  (supra,  p.  295  n.).  Practically,  however,  the  princes 
were  regarded  as  the  agency  possessing  the  necessary  power  for 
the  carrying  out  of  reform.  Luther  had  voiced  this  sentiment 
in  his  ‘ 4  Address  to  the  Nobility,”  and  this  led  to  the  unique 
fiction  of  “  emergency  bishops”  ( Notbischofe ).  The  princes 
were  utilized  for  these  ecclesiastical  purposes,  not  as  being  the 
bearers  of  the  specific  civil  authority,  but  as  representatives  of 
“  Christianity,”  i.  e .,  of  the  congregation  at  large,  and  particu¬ 
larly  as  “prominent”  ( praecipua )  members  of  it  (thus  ex¬ 
pressed  first  by  Melanchthon,  Schmalk.  Art.,  Muller,  p.  339, 
54.  C.  R.  iii.  244).  When  the  new  church  fellowship  had 
taken  tangible  shape  through  the  carrying  out  of  the  ideas  of  the 
Reformation  by  the  secular  authorities,  the  princes  and  magis¬ 
trates  were  at  once  recognized  as  its  official  representatives. 
Negotiations  were  entered  into  with  them,  and  they  became  the 
public  defenders  of  the  new  doctrine.  The  theologians  formu¬ 
lated  the  latter,  but  they  attained  a  legal  character  only  when 
adopted  by  the  secular  government ;  and  this  applies  to  their 
inner  contents  as  well  as  to  the  outward  form.  This  principle 
was  first  openly  recognized  in  the  decree  of  the  Diet  of  Spires  in 
1526,  although  indeed  the  real  force  of  the  latter  was  only  the 
postponement  of  an  imperial  decision.  It  then  became  the 
guiding  principle  for  the  organization  of  the  new  church,  and 
received  the  legal  sanction  of  the  empire  through  the  Religious 
Peace  of  Augsburg.  The  teachings  of  the  Evangelical  church — 
in  Reformed  as  well  as  in  Lutheran  districts — thus  became  the 
fixed  doctrine  of  the  church,  or  dogma,  when  the  doctrinal 
statements  formulated  by  the  theologians  were  “accepted”  by 
the  secular  government  in  the  name  of  the  church.  There  was. 


334 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


in  this  a  certain  analogy  with  the  genesis  of  the  dogmas  of  the 
ancient  church.  As  a  result,  the  dogmas  of  the  church  were  no 
longer,  as  in  the  Middle  Ages,  the  creation  of  merely  ecclesias¬ 
tical,  i.  e. ,  hierarchical  procedure.  Nor  does  there  lie  behind  them 
the  mystical  authority  of  general  councils.  They  are  proposi¬ 
tions  which  the  theologians  hold  to  be  biblical,  and  to  which  the 
church  at  large,  i.  e. ,  the  state,  gives  assent.  But  it  is  not,  as  in 
Greek  Christianity,  the  civil  authority  as  such  which  expresses 
this  assent,  but  the  state  as  the  representative  of  the  church  at 
large.  The  latter  idea  is  a  genuinely  medieval  one.  The  state 
is  not  yet  recognized  as  the  organism  of  secular  jurisprudence 
nor  sharply  discriminated  from  the  church.  From  this  com¬ 
bination  resulted  all  the  weaknesses  of  territorialism.  But  the 
latter  were  associated  with  the  concrete  application  of  the  theory, 
and  not  with  the  principle  itself.  The  principle  is  expressed  in 
the  simple  axiom  :  The  doctrine  of  the  church,  or  dogma,  is  bib¬ 
lical  truth,  discovered  by  theologians,  but  recognized  and  accepted 
by  the  Christian  congregation  as  such.  This  was  Luther’s  mean¬ 
ing  when  he  clearly  and  distinctly  granted  to  the  congregation  the 
right  to  pass  judgment  upon  doctrine.1  Cf.  as  to  the  bearings 
upon  ecclesiastical  iurisprudence,  Sohm,  Kirchenrecht,  i.  222  ff. , 
33°  56°  658  f. 

2.  The  Augsburg  Confession  was  composed  by  Melanchthon, 
but  it  reproduces,  though  as  a  “  gentle-stepper  ”  ( Leiseire - 
terin ),  the  thought  of  Luther.2  The  “  timidity”  and  “philos¬ 
ophy  ’  ’  of  Melanchthon,  and  his  attempts  to  moderate  and  com¬ 
promise,  do  not  belong  to  the  History  of  Doctrines.  But  it  is 
important  to  bear  in  mind  the  circumstances  under  which  the 
Augsburg  Confession  was  prepared.  It  was  the  Emperor’s  chief 
desire  to  discover  whether  the  Protestant  doctrine  was  in  har¬ 
mony  with  the  twelve  articles  of  the  Christian  faith  (Kawerau, 
Agricola,  p.  100.  C.  R.  ii.  179).  Eck  had  in  404  theses  charged 
almost  all  heresies  upon  the  Protestants.  These  considerations 
required  of  the  Reformers  a  distinct  emphasizing  of  their  agreement 
with  the  doctrine  of  the  ancient  church  and  a  clear  rejection  of  all 
heresies.  It  appeared  to  be  important,  likewise,  to  avoid  all  fel¬ 
lowship  with  Zwingli,  whose  political  aims  made  him  an  object  of 
suspicion  (C.  R.  ii.  25  ;  i.  1099,  1106).  In  all  these  particu¬ 
lars  Melanchthon ’s  personal  inclinations  were  in  accord  with  the 

1  This  does  not  exclude  a  recognition  of  the  fact,  that  Luther  always  main¬ 
tained  his  demand  for  the  general  recognition  of  a  harmonious  pure  doctrine, 
e'g>,32-  406. 

2  Melanchthon  had  before  him,  when  composing  the  Augsburg  Confession, 
on  the  dogmatic  side  the  Schwabach  Articles,  and  on  the  practical  reformatory 
side  the  so-called  Torgau  Articles.  Upon  the  latter,  see  Brieger  in  the 
Kirchen-geschichtl.  Studien  f.  Reuter,  1888. 


THE  AUGSBURG  CONFESSION. 


335 


demands  of  ecclesiastical  policy.  But  all  this  was  only  the  out¬ 
ward  framework  for  the  real  task,  i.  e.,  to  present  the  fundamen¬ 
tal  ideas  of  the  evangelical  party,  and  to  show  clearly  that  they 
demolish  the  monastic  ideal  of  life  and  the  external  legality  of 
the  Romish  church,  but  that  they  have  no  connection  with  the 
revolutionary  tendencies  of  the  Anabaptists.  The  Confession, 
therefore,  undertakes  to  present  the  evangelical  doctrine  as  the 
genuine  ancient  doctrine,  which  is  supported  by  the  Scriptures  as 
well  as  by  the  better  Fathers,  e.  g.  (p.  91  f. ,  29).  “  Only  those 

things  are  recited,”  it  is  said  in  the  Epilogue,  “  which  seemed 
to  be  necessary  to  be  said,  in  order  that  it  might  be  known  that 
nothing  is  received  among  us  in  doctrine  and  ceremonies  con¬ 
trary  to  the  Scriptures  or  to  the  Catholic  church  ;  because  it  is 
manifest  that  we  have  been  most  diligently  on  our  guard  lest  any 
new  and  impious  doctrines  should  creep  into  our  churches.” 
Not  all  evangelical  convictions  found  expression  under  such  a 
rule  (e.  g. ,  C.  R.  ii.  184,  182  f.  Luther,  Briefe,  De  W.  iv.  no, 
52);  but,  on  the  other  hand,  nothing  was  asserted  which  had  not 
been  included  in  the  faith  of  the  evangelical  party. 

3.  Articles  I.  -III.  reproduce  the  results  of  the  dogmatic  labors 
of  the  ancient  church:  “One  divine  essence  .  .  .  three  per¬ 
sons  of  the  same  essence  and  power”  (a.  1).  Original  sin 
consists  in  the  inheritance  of  sin  :  “  Without  the  fear  of  God, 
without  trust  in  him,  and  with  concupiscence.”  This  marks  the 
connection  of  Luther’s  thought  with  that  of  Augustine  (cf.  Apol., 
p.  79.  7  ff. ;  81.  23).  The  main  practical  point  of  the  doctrine 
is  seen  in  the  condemnation  of  the  idea,  that  a  “  man  may  by  the 
powers  of  his  own  reason  be  justified  before  God  ”  (a.  2  ;  cf.  a. 
20.  9,  10  ;  p.  88.  9  f. ).  In  respect  to  the  power  of  “  working 
(< efficienda )  the  righteousness  of  God,”  man,  without  the  influ¬ 
ence  of  the  word  or  of  the  Spirit,  is  not  free,  although  he  has 
“some  power  to  work  a  civil  righteousness  and  to  choose  the 
things  subject  to  reason  ”  (a.  18  and  p.  219.  73).  Sin  is  con¬ 
centrated  in  a  historical  kingdom  of  the  Evil  One.  “  The  his¬ 
tory  of  the  world  shows  how  great  is  the  power  of  the  devil.” 
Hence,  “  it  will  not  be  possible  to  recognize  the  benefits  of 
Christ  unless  we  understand  our  evils”  (p.  86.  50).  This  is  the 
religious  point  of  view  from  which  sin  is  regarded.  Of  Christ  it 
is  said:  “two  natures,  .  .  .  inseparably  joined  together  in 
unity  of  person.”  The  object  of  his  work  was,  “  that  he  might 
reconcile  the  Father  tous  and  might  be  a  sacrifice,  not  only  for 
original  guilt,  but  also  for  all  actual  sins  of  men.”1  The  result 

1  Also,  a.  24.  21,  where  the  blotting  out  of  daily  sins  is  represented  as 
wrought  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  mass.  Cf.  Zockler  upon  this  passage,  and 
supra,  p.  203,  n.  1;  also  Zwingli,  opp.  iii.  198. 


336 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


of  his  resurrection  and  ascension  is  his  dominion  over  his  follow¬ 
ers  and  their  sanctification  through  the  Holy  Spirit  (a.  3  ;  cf.  p. 
94.  40).  Further,  “  Christ  does  not  cease  to  be  Mediator,  after 
we  have  been  renewed.”  He  remains  such,  “in  order  that  for 
his  sake  we  may  have  a  reconciled  God,  even  though  we  are  un¬ 
worthy.  ”  For  his  sake,  who  is  always  interceding  for  us  before 
the  Father,  we  have  the  forgiveness  of  sins  (p.  116  f. ,  42,  44). 

These  are  the  initial  principles,  which  the  new  church  held  in 
common  with  the  old.  Yet  they  are.  not  absolutely  identical. 
The  Confutators  were,  from  their  point  of  view,  right  in  object¬ 
ing  to  the  “  born  without  the  fear  of  God,  without  trust  in  him,” 
as  a  definition  of  original  sin  (Ficker,  p.  8).  They  quote 
Luther’s  remark  in  regard  to  the  > homousios,  and  call  attention  to 
the  fact,  that  the  trinitarian  formulas  as  such  are  not  found  in  the 
Scriptures  (ib.  p.  4  f. ).  The  deliberate  hostility  of  the  critics 
should  not  blind  us  to  the  fact,  that  a  difference  in  point  of  view 
is  here  revealed. 

4.  Article  V.  marks  the  transition  to  the  evangelical  principle  : 
“Through  the  word  and  sacraments,  as  through  instruments,  is 
given  the  Holy  Spirit,  who  worketh  faith  where  and  when  it 
pleaseth  God  in  those  who  hear  the  gospel,  namely,  that  God, 
not  for  our  merits’  sake  but  for  Christ’s  sake,  justifieth1  those  who 
believe  that  they  are  for  Christ’s  sake  received  into  favor.”  The 
word  and  the  sacraments  are  the  means  through  which  the  Spirit 
begets  faith.  But  faith  “  doth  not  only  signify  a  knowledge 
of  the  history,”  .  .  .  “which  believeth  not  only  the  history, 
but  also  the  effect  of  the  history,  namely,  this  article,  the  remis¬ 
sion  of  sins”  (a.  20.  23  ;  p.  96.  51).  “  But  this  is  to  believe, 

to  trust  in  the  merits  of  Christ,  that  for  his  sake  God  wisheth  to 
be  reconciled  to  us”  (p.  99.  69);  “to  desire  and  accept  the 
offered  promise  of  remission  of  sins  and  justification”  (p.  95. 
48;  p.  94F,  44  ff.;  139.  183).  This  is  evangelical  saving  faith, 
as  the  trusting  acceptance  of  the  grace  of  forgiveness  which  has 
been  revealed  through  the  work  of  Christ.  In  this  light  may  be 
understood  the  central  thought  of  Justification:  “That  men 
cannot  be  justified  before  God  by  their  own  powers,  merits,  or 
works  ;  but  they  are  justified  freely  ( gratis )  for  Christ’s  sake 
through  faith,  when  they  believe  that  they  are  received  into  favor, 
and  that  their  sins  are  forgiven  for  the  sake  of  Christ,  who  hath  by 
his  death  made  satisfaction  for  our  sins.  This  faith  doth  God  im¬ 
pute  for  righteousness  before  him”  (a.  4;  cf.  24.  28;  p.  123. 
93;  105.  97).  Here  the  whole  Romish  system  is  excluded  : 

1  The  German  translation  of  the  Editio princeps  is  important:  “Are  ac¬ 
counted  righteous  before  God  for  Christ’s  sake.”  Cf.  Kolde.  Augsb.  Conf., 
p.  28. 


THE  AUGSBURG  CONFESSION. 


337 


“  they  teach  only  that  men  treat  with  God  through  works  and 
merits  ”  (p.  97.  60).  The  relationship  between  God  and  man 
is  not  to  be  thought  of  in  accordance  with  the  scheme  of  merits  : 
“  as  though  Christ  had  come  for  the  purpose  of  delivering  cer¬ 
tain  laws,  through  which  we  might  merit  the  remission  of  sins  ” 
(p.  89.  15).  But  neither  is  it  as  though  the  ‘ ‘  knowledge  of 
the  history  concerning  Christ,”  together  with  the  infusion  of  a 
‘‘habitus  inclining  us  the  more  readily  to  love  God,”  would 
suffice  (p.  89.  15,  17).  In  all  of  this  human  merit  still  remains. 
Nor  does  the  distinction  drawn  between  the  merits  of  fitness 
( 'congrui )  and  of  worthiness  fondigni )  help  matters  ;  for  if  God 
must  of  necessity  reward  the  meritum  congrui  by  the  bestowal  of 
grace,  it  is  in  reality  a  meritum  condigni  (p.  90.  19). 1  Only 
faith  justifies.  It  does  this,  however,  not  as  being  in  itself  a 
worthy  work,  nor  as  being  the  beginning  and  source  of  good 
works,  but  solely  because  it  apprehends  the  grace  revealed  and 
promised  in  Christ,  and  applies  and  appropriates  this  to  itself 
(p.  96.  56;  102.  84,  86;  100.  77;  113.  27;  115.  40;  99. 
71).  Man  therefore  becomes  righteous  through  an  “  imputation 
of  another's  righteousness . ”  This  is  Christ’s  righteousness.2 
But  since  faith  is  the  only  appropriate  organ  for  the  apprehension 
of  this  righteousness,  it  is  our  righteousness.  “  Faith  is  right¬ 
eousness  in  us  imputatively,  i.  e. ,  it  is  that  by  which  we  are 
made  accepted  before  God  on  account  of  the  imputation  and  or¬ 
dination  of  God  ”  (p.  139.  1 86). 3  The  leading  elements  in  the 
conception  of  justification  are  here  brought  into  conjunction. 
The  law  terrifies  the  heart  with  the  wrath  of  God  ;4  the  gospel 
awakens  in  it  trust  in  Christ,  or  the  assurance  that  God  for 
Christ’s  sake  forgives  us  our  sins  and  regards  us  as  righteous  (p. 
101.  79  ff. ). 

Faith  is  thus  represented  as  the  reception  of  the  grace  revealed 
in  Christ,  and  justification  as  the  forensic  declaration  that  the 
person  involved  is  righteous.  But  faith’  is  also  at  the  same  time 
the  beginning  of  a  new  life.  “  This  faith,  encouraging  and 
consoling  in  these  fears,  receives  the  remission  of  sins,  justifies 
and  quickens;  for  this  consolation  is  a  new  and  spiritual  life.” 
The  Holy  Spirit,  who  works  faith  through  the  word,  works  in 
and  with  faith  a  new  life  (p.  98,  63  ff.,  p.  177,  60).  Only  it 

1  These  terms  are  here  used  in  the  sense  attached  to  them  from  the  time  of 
Duns  Scotus.  Cf.  supra,  p.  1 61,  202. 

2  And  Christ  alone,  not  “  partly  our  works,”  p.  130.  Cf.  Biel,  supra, 
P-I99)- 

3  Cf.  p.  99.  69  :  “  For  how  will  Christ  be  Mediator  if  we  do  not  believe 
( sentimus )  that  for  his  sake  we  are  accounted  righteous  ?  ”  p.  99.  62  :  “  this- 
forgiveness,  reconciliation,  and  righteousness  are  received  through  faith.” 

4  The  same  influence  is  also  ascribed  to  the  gospel,  p.  98.  62. 


22 


338 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


must  be  borne  in  mind  that  justification  in  the  above  sense  does 
not  depend  upon  faith  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  considered  as  the 
beginning  of  a  new  life.  But  faith  is  also  the  beginning  of  the 
regeneration  of  man,  or  of  the  process  of  making  him  actually 
righteous.  Inasmuch  as  faith  sets  free  from  the  sense  of  guilt, 
the  heart  becomes  animated,  peace  and  joy  enter,  and  also 
eternal  life  “which  begins  here  in  this  life”  (p.  105.  100). 1 
The  Holy  Spirit  has  begotten  faith,  and  faith  brings  with  it  the 
Spirit,  thereby  renewing  the  man  (p.  108.  115).  Hence  we 
might  more  appropriately  designate  faith  than  love  as  the  grace 
making  acceptable  ( gratia  gratum  faciens,  p.  108.  116).  But, 
as  faith  is  a  new  life,  it  also  produces  “new  movements  and 
works  in  man  ”  (p.  130.  129).  The  Apology  itself  summarizes 
its  view  of  justification  as  follows  :  “  Thus  far  we  have  shown  with 
sufficient  fullness  and  from  testimonies  of  Scripture,  that  by  faith 
alone  we  obtain  the  remission  of  sins  for  Christ’s  sake,  and  that  by 
faith  alone  we  are  justified,  i.  e .,  from  unrighteous  men  are  made 
rightous,  or  regenerated  ”  (p.  108.  117).  Therefore,  faith,  which 
is  begotten  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  is  (1)  the  organ  for  the  appre¬ 
hension  of  grace,  and  (2)  the  beginning  of  a  new  life.  In  the 
former  sense,  it  receives  the  imputed  righteousness  of  Christ ;  in 
the  latter,  it  is  the  beginning  of  ethical  rightness  in  character  and 
conduct.  But  the  former  is  the  fundamental  element  (p.  100.  75). 
From  it,  i.  e. ,  from  the  sense  of  the  forgiveness  of  sin,  the  Apology 
psychologically  deduces  the  inward  renewal ;  for  he  who  has  be¬ 
come  sure  of  the  forgiveness  of  his  sins,  becomes  at  heart  free  and 
joyful  (supra).2  This  portraiture  of  justification  and  sanctifica¬ 
tion  in  the  Apology  corresponds  exactly  with  the  conceptions  of 
Luther,  except  that  he  laid  still  more  stress  upon  the  actual 
righteousness  wrought  by  faith  (supra,  p.  260  ff.). 3  Upon  the 
doctrine  of  justification  in  the  Apology,  compare  the  treatment 

1  Upon  the  idea  of  eternal  life  as  begun  by  faith  on  earth,  see  also  p.  215. 
54  ;  287.  10  ;  no.  ill  :  216.  58  ;  146.  231. 

2  Melanchthon,  p.  101.  79,  assails  the  Scotist  separation  of  forgiveness  and 
infusion  (Duns,  iv.  d.  16,  q.  2.  6,  cf.  supra,  p.  160). 

3  The  terminology  of  p.  100.  72  ff.  presents  difficulties  :  “And  because  to 

be  justified  means  from  unrighteous  men  to  be  made  righteous,  or  to  be  regen¬ 
erated,  it  signifies  also  to  be  pronounced  or  accounted  righteous,  for  the  Scrip¬ 
tures  speak  in  both  ways.”  That  is,  the  general  sense  of  justificari  includes 
“also”  the  particular  form  of  justification  indicated  by  the  term  justum 
pronuntiari.  Upon  the  basis  of  this  is  constructed  the  following  syllogism  : 
I .  Since  the  chief  thing  in  justification  is  forgiveness,  we  may  say  :  ‘  ‘  To  obtain 
remission  of  sins  is  to  be  justified,  Ps.  32.  1.  2.  By  faith  alone,  and  not  on 

account  of  love  or  works,  we  obtain  remission  of  sins,  although  love  follows 
faith.  3.  Therefore,  by  faith  alone  we  are  justified,’  ’  and  that  in  the  sense  that 
“from  unrighteous  men  we  are  made  righteous,  or  regenerated”  (p.  IOO. 
75-78).  The  conclusiveness  of  this  deduction  may  be  doubted. 


THE  AUGSBURG  CONFESSION. 


339 


of  the  subject  by  Loofs,  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1884,  613  ff.  Eich- 
horn,  ib.  1887,  415  ff.  Frank,  Neue  kirchl.  Ztschr.,  1892, 
846  ff.  Stange,  ib.,  1899,  169  ff. 

5.  Faith  is  followed  by  Good  Works  as  its  fruits.  “  For 
good  works  are  to  be  done  on  account  of  God’s  command  ;  like¬ 
wise,  for  the  exercise  of  faith  ;  likewise,  on  account  of  confession 
and  giving  of  thanks  ”  (p.  120.  68,  a.  6.  1  f. ).  They  spring  from 
the  Holy  Ghost,  or  from  regeneration  and  justification  (a.  20. 
29,  p.  109.  4)  1 — both  the  “spiritual  movements”  and  the 
“external  good  works”  (p.  no.  15).  But  works  are  in  no 
way  the  ground  of  justification  (a.  20.  9,  27).  Good  works  are 
accordingly  such  as  spring  from  the  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
and  the  impulse  of  faith,  and  as  are  performed  according  to  the 
will  of  God  (a.  20.  27);  and  hence,  such  as  are  in  accord  with 
the  commandments  of  God,  and  not  with  the  self-made  ideals  of 
the  Catholic  church  (a.  27.  57).  By  virtue  of  their  origin  in 
the  inward  man,  these  works  are  performed  in  Christian  liberty 
(a.  28.  51).  These  four  criteria  determine  the  character  of 
good  works  in  the  evangelical  sense.  Accordingly,  all  civil  and 
secular  occupations  are,  contrary  to  the  view  of  the  Anabaptists, 
good  works  (a.  16;  a.  26.  10).  Marriage  likewise  assumes  a 
new  dignity  (a.  23).  On  the  other  hand,  the  works  of  monastic 
observances  and  of  an  external  ecclesiasticism  are  not  good 
works  (a.  26.  8  ff. ).  It  follows,  further,  that  ascetic  exercises 
are  not  in  themselves  good  works,  but  are  undertaken  for  the 
purpose  of  preparing  ourselves  to  do  good  works:  “Not  in 
order  that  through  this  discipline  he  might  merit  remission  of 
sins,  but  in  order  that  he  might  have  a  body  apt  and  fit 
for  spiritual  things  and  for  doing  his  duty  according  to  his 
calling”  (a.  26.  38).  Finally,  this  conception  of  good  works 
gives  birth  to  a  new  Ideal  of  Life.  In  contrast  with  the  per¬ 
fection  of  the  monastic  vows,  evangelical  perfection  embraces 
the  Christian  life  in  its  religious  central  impulse,  and,  as  well,  in 
its  discharge  of  the  duties  connected  with  the  secular  calling. 
“  Christian  perfection  is  to  reverently  fear  God,  and  again  to  con¬ 
ceive  great  faith  and  confidence  that  we  have  a  reconciled  God; 
to  ask  and  certainly  look  for  aid  from  God  in  doing  all  things  in 
connection  with  our  calling;  and  meanwhile  outwardly  to  dili¬ 
gently  perform  good  works  and  attend  to  our  vocation  ”  (a.  27. 
49,  cf.  p.  216.  61  f. ;  281.  48  ff.).  But  this  perfection  exists 
only  in  the  form  of  earnest  effort:  “For  they  ought  to  strive 
after  perfection  as  long  as  this  life  endures,  and  always  grow  in 

1  It  is  only  upon  the  ground  of  the  personal  experience  of  the  divine  mercy 
that  God  becomes  for  us  an  object  of  affection  ( objectum  amabile'),  p.  no.  8. 


340 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


the  fear  of  God,  in  faith,  in  love  toward  their  neighbor  and  the 
like  spiritual  gifts  ”  (p.  279.  37). 

6.  Articles  VII.  and  VIII.  present  the  evangelical  conception 
of  the  church.  There  will  always  be  a  holy  church.  “  But  the 
church  is  the  congregation  of  the  saints,  in  which  the  gospel  is 
rightly  taught  and  the  sacraments  rightly  administered  ”  (a.  7). 
Since  the  word  and  the  sacraments  constitute  the  church,  it  may 
be  said  :  “  And  unto  the  true  unity  of  the  church  it  is  sufficient 
to  agree  concerning  the  doctrine  of  the  gospel  and  the  adminis¬ 
tration  of  the  sacraments,”  but  it  is  not  necessary  that  cere¬ 
monies  and  traditions  be  everywhere  the  same  ( ib. ,  cf.  Torgau 
Art.,  i. ).  This  church,  which  holds  the  pure  doctrine  and  in 
which  the  preaching  is  in  harmony  with  this  doctrine,  cannot 
possibly,  as  is  the  common  belief,  be  the  church  as  an  object  of 
faith,  or  as  the  so-called  “  invisible  church.”  Melanchthon,  on 
the  contrary,  in  the  note  to  Article  XII.  of  the  Schwabach 
Articles  (supra,  p.  294b;  cf.  Luther’s  conception  of  the  “true, 
rechten ,  church,”  supra,  p.  294),  expresses  the  opinion,  that  there 
has  always  been  and  always  will  be  a  true  church,  i.  e. ,  men  who 
hold  essentially  the  pure  evangelical  doctrine  (cf.  C.  R.  xii. 
481  f. ,  483,  433),  and  that  this  church  requires  for  its  continued 
existence  only  the  word  and  the  sacraments.  Since  in  this  con¬ 
gregation  assembled  around  the  word  there  will  always  be  a 
“  fellowship  of  faith  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  hearts  ”  of 
men  (p.  152  f. ,  5,  8),  it  is  called  congregatio  sanctorum  ;x  but 
since  it  exists  in  an  empirical  earthly  form,  there  are  always 
“many  hypocrites  and  wicked  men  mingled  in  it”  (a.  8, 
p.  157.  28).  These  ideas  are  in  the  end  practically  the  same 
as  Luther  had  expressed.  But  the  definition  of  the  church  is 
constructed  by  Melanchthon  from  a  somewhat  different  point  of 
departure  from  that  of  Luther.  Luther  started  with  the  idea, 
that  the  presence  of  the  word  guarantees  to  faith  the  existence 
of  believing  Christians,  or  the  (invisible)  church.  The  differ¬ 
ences  in  the  proclamation  of  the  word  led  him  afterward  to  dis¬ 
criminate  between  the  true  and  the  false  (visible)  church. 
Melanchthon  begins  with  the  idea,  that  there  has  always  been, 
and  always  will  be  a  true  (visible)  church,  but  shows,  further, 
that  it  can  never  exist  without  a  commixture  of  wicked  men  and 
hypocrites.  In  the  church,  which  is  in  its  essential  nature  the 
congregatio  sanctorum ,  there  are  found  a  kingdom  of  Christ  and 
a  kingdom  of  the  devil ;  but  only  members  of  the  former  are 
really  members  of  the  church  (p.  154  f. ,  16  ff. ).2  There  has 

1  For  the  “  saints,”  and  they  only,  are  properly  the  church. 

2  This  different  point  of  departure  explains  also  the  later  construction  of 
Melanchthon’ s  definition  of  the  church  (vid.  sub).  He  always  starts 


THE  AUGSBURG  CONFESSION. 


341 


always  been,  Melanchthon  means  to  say,  a  congregation  (of 
professing  Christians),  which  possessed  the  gospel,  as  did  the 
association  of  evangelical  believers  existing  at  that  time.  In 
this  congregation — not  outwardly  corresponding  with  it  in 
dimensions — is  the  kingdom  of  Christ,  i.  e.,  the  church  as  an 
article  of  faith.  The  marks  which  prove  the  existence  of  the 
former,  and  therefore  enable  us  to  infer  the  existence  of  the  latter, 
are  the  “  pure  doctrine  of  the  gospel1  and  an  administration  of 
the  sacraments  in  harmony  with  the  gospel  of  Christ  ’  ’  (p. 
i52-  5)- 

From  this  definition  of  the  church  were  drawn  a  number 
of  inferences.  (1)  That  the  bishops  do  not  have  the  right 
“to  ordain  anything  contrary  to  the  gospel”  (a.  28.  34). 
(2)  That  the  peculiar  power  and  authority  of  the  church  is  the 
preaching  of  the  gospel,  and  therefore :  ‘  ‘  The  preaching  office 
is  the  highest  office  in  the  church”  (p.  213;  p.  215.  54; 
a.  28.  5,  8,  10).  (3)  That  all  other  ordinances  in  the  church 

are  of  purely  human  origin  and  must  prove  their  legitimacy  by 
the  gospel  (a.  26.  28).  (4)  That  the  church  has  no  right  to 

claim  or  exercise  any  kind  of  secular  authority  (a.  28.  2  ff. ). 
The  “power  of  the  sword”  ( potestas  gladii  )  must  not  be 
confused  with  the  ecclesiastical  power  ( potestas  ecclesiastica ), 
which  includes  only  the  “power  of  the  keys,”  or  the  “com¬ 
mandment  of  God  to  preach  the  gospel,  remit  and  retain  sins, 
and  administer  the  sacraments”  (a.  28.  2-5,  10  f. ).  Hence 
the  gospel  cannot  come  in  conflict  with  civil  and  social  ordi¬ 
nances,  but,  on  the  contrary,  confirms  them  (p.  215.  56  f. ). 

7.  This  brings  us  to  the  evangelical  doctrine  of  the  Sacra¬ 
ments,  which  is  treated  in  Articles  IX. -XIII.  Of  Baptism  it  is 
taught,  that  it  is  necessary  to  salvation,  and  that  through  it  “  the 
grace  of  God  is  offered  ; 5  ’  that  children  also,  who  are  to  be  bap¬ 
tized,  are  received  into  the  favor  of  God  ”  (a.  9).  Sin  is  for¬ 
given,  not  annihilated  (p.  83.  36).  Of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  it  is 
said  :  “That  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  are  truly  present 

with  the  visible  church.  The  (later)  heading  of  Art.  vii. ,  De  Ecclesia , 
should  rather  have  been  De  perpetuitate  ecclesiae.  Cf.  Apol.,  p.  153-  7>  9* 
C.  R.  xii.  524,  432,  482  ;  xxv.  688,  and  my  comments  in  Neue  kirch.  Ztschr., 
1897,  143  k,  n. 

1  This  expression  points  beyond  question  (cf.  a.  28.  70  and  doctrina  fidei , 
p.  101.  81)  to  the  specific  evangelical  conception  of  salvation  and  grace  ;  for 
this  was,  in  Melanchthon’ s  view,  all  that  was  lacking  in  wide  circles  of  the 
ancient  church  ;  but  it  does  not  exclude — on  the  contrary  includes — the 
acceptance  of  the  ancient  dogmas  (cf.  C.  R.  xxiii.  600).  To  the  marks  of  the 
true  church  belongs  also  beyond  question,  according  to  Melanchthon,  as  the  fol¬ 
lowing  words  attest,  the  Lutheran  conception  of  the  sacraments.  It  was 
Luther’s  main  argument  in  support  of  his  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  that 
it  was  ‘  ‘  in  harmony  with  the  gospel  of  Christ.  ’  * 


342 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


and  distributed  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  (a.  io);  that  they  are 
“  truly  and  substantially”  present,  and  “  we  speak  of  the  pres¬ 
ence  of  the  living  Christ  ”  (p.  164.  57). 1  Melanchthon  intended 
to  reproduce  in  the  language  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  the 
doctrine  of  Luther  (C.  R.  ii.  142).  The  Confutators  interpreted 
Article  X.  inthesenseof  transubstantiation  (Ficker,  p.  40), 2  and 
Melanchthon,  so  far  from  contradicting  them,  even  introduced 
into  the  Apology  a  citation  containing  the  expression  “  changed 
( mutari )  into  flesh”  (p.  164.  5 5). 3  Private  absolution  is 

recognized,  but  not  in  the  sense  that  the  preceding  confession  is 
an  “enumeration  of  all  faults”  (a.  11  ;  also  a.  25).  Repent¬ 
ance  is  open  to  everyone  who  turns  from  his  sins,  and  the  church 
must  grant  him  absolution.  Repentance  consists  of  two  parts. 
One  is  contrition ,  or  terrors  stricken  into  the  conscience  through 
the  knowledge  of  sin  ;  the  other  is  faith ,  which  is  conceived  by 
the  gospel,  or  absolution.  .  .  .  Then  ought  to  follow  good 
works,  which  are  fruits  of  repentance  (a.  12).  These  two,  or 
three  (p.  17 1.  28  ;  cf.  supra,  p.  241,  n.  3),  parts  therefore  con¬ 
stitute  evangelical  repentance.  Here  again  it  is  very  evident 
that  the  general  evangelical  conception  of  salvation  furnishes  the 
direct  contrast  to  the  theory  of  the  sacrament  of  repentance,  and 
presents  a  substitute  for  it ;  for  the  ideas  we  have  just  cited  sim¬ 
ply  summarize  what  has  been  already  presented  in  the  discussion 
of  faith,  justification,  and  works.  This  is  still  more  distinctly 
brought  to  light  in  the  extended  discussions  of  the  Apology. 
The  law  and  the  gospel  are  the  substance  of  the  Scriptures  (p. 
175.  53)-  The  law,  as  also  the  gospel  (according  to  Lk.  24. 
47),  first  exercises  its  office  of  rebuke  upon  man  and  begets  con¬ 
trition.  “We  say  that  contrition  is  the  true  terrors  of  con¬ 
science,  which  feels  that  God  is  angry  with  sin,  and  grieves  that 
it  has  sinned.  And  this  contrition  thus  occurs  when  sins  are 
censured  from  the  word  of  God,  because  this  is  the  sum  of  the 

1  This  language  is  chosen  in  view  of  the  charge  of  the  Confutators,  that  by 
Luther’s  view  there  is  present  in  the  bread  “  a  body  alone,  without  the  accom¬ 
paniment  of  soul  and  blood,”  and  that  thus  he  “  offers  a  dead  body  of  Christ,” 
Ficker,  p.  41. 

2  As  did  also  later  Catholic  writers  (e.  g.,  Heppe,  Gesch.  d.  Prot.  iv.  371  f. 
This  interpretation  of  the  German  text :  “  That  .  .  .  body  and  blood  .  .  . 
are  present  under  the  form  (  Gestalt )  of  the  bread  and  wine,”  is  not  an  impossi¬ 
ble  one,  since  the  form  (species)  of  the  bread,  according  to  the  Catholic 
theory,  remains  despite  the  transubstantiation. 

3  Strictly  speaking,  Melanchthon  cites  Vulgarius  (Theophylact)  only  to 
prove  that  the  Greeks  also  teach  the  presence  of  the  body  of  Christ.  He  by 
no  means  thereby  commits  himself  to  their  mutari ,  and  did  not,  therefore, 
“  drag  in  ”  this  term  (as  Loofs  asserts,  DG.  399).  But  we  dare  not  deny  a 
fatal  diplomacy  in  the  choice  of  the  citation.  Upon  the  entire  question,  see 
Calinich,  Ztschr.  f.  wiss.  Theoh,  1873,  54 1  ff* 


THE  AUGSBURG  CONFESSION. 


343 


preaching  of  the  gospel,  viz.,  to  convict  of  sin  and  to  offer  re¬ 
mission  of  sins  and  righteousness  for  Christ’s  sake,  .  .  .  and 
that,  as  regenerate  men,  we  should  do  good  works”  (p.  171. 
29). 1  But,  since  the  preaching  of  the  gospel  accompanies  that  of 
the  law,  contrition  is  followed  by  “  special  faith  :  this  faith  fol¬ 
lows  terrors  in  such  a  way  as  to  overcome  them  and  render  the 
conscience  pacified.  To  this  faith  we  ascribe  that  it  justifies 
and  regenerates,  since  it  frees  from  terrors  and  brings  forth  in 
the  heart  peace,  joy,  and  a  new  life”  (p.  177.  60).  Hence 
the  gospel,  or  absolution,  as  the  better  Scholastics  also  recog¬ 
nized  (supra,  p.  137),  constitutes  the  real  substance  of  the  sac¬ 
rament  of  repentance  (p.  173.  41).  The  proclamation  of  the 
gospel  is,  therefore,  the  real  power  of  the  keys  (a.  25.  3  f. ). 

As  the  Confession  places  Article  XIII.,  on  the  use  of  the  Sac¬ 
raments,  after  the  discussion  of  baptism,  the  Lord’s  Supper  and 
repentance,  it  is  evident  that  it  recognizes  three  sacraments 
(cf.  Apol.,  p.  202.  4). 2  The  general  conception  of  the  sacra¬ 
ments  is  not  merely  that  they  are  marks  of  profession  (as  in 
Zwingli),  “  but  rather  that  they  are  signs  and  testimonies  of  the 
will  of  God  toward  us,  for  the  purpose  of  awakening  and  con¬ 
firming  faith  in  those  who  use  them”  (a.  13.  1).  They  are 
“rites”  ( Riten )  instituted  by  God,  which,  in  connection  with 
.  the  word  (of  institution),  move  the  heart,  since  they  reach  us 
through  the  eye  as  does  the  word  through  the  ear.  “  Wherefore 
the  effect  of  both  is  the  same  ”  (p.  202.  5).  Now,  as  God  has 
affixed  definite  promises  to  these  rites,  faith  is  necessary  as  the 
prerequisite  for  their  proper  reception  (a.  13.  2  ;  p.  204,  19  ft.). 
The  sacraments  are,  therefore,  to  be  evangelically  defined  as 
signs,  through  the  observance  of  which  God  gives  that  which  the 
words  employed  in  their  institution  promise.  As  their  substan¬ 
tial  result  is  the  strengthening  of  faith,  so  faith  is  also  the  pre¬ 
requisite  for  their  profitable  reception.  The  Apology  rejects  the 
Scholastic  doctrine,  that  they  bestow  grace  by  virtue  of  the  mere 
administration  of  them  (, ex  opere  operato ,  p.  204.  18). 3  The 
religious  character  of  the  sacramental  acts  is  here  in  an  admirable 
way  preserved. 

8.  The  remaining  articles  of  the  Confession,  especially  those 
directed  against  the  prevailing  abuses,  have  already  been  referred 
to  as  far  as  they  have  important  bearing  upon  the  History  of 


1  The  question,  when  contrition  springs  from  love  and  when  from  fear,  is 
waived  aside-as  profitless  scholastic  disputation,  p.  17 1.  29. 

2  But  the  Smalcald  Articles  enumerate  two  sacraments,  p.  485.  I. 

3  The  corresponding  words  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  (a.  13.  3)  were  not 
in  the  original  document,  as  the  Confutators  (Ficker,  p.  48)  do  not  mention 
them. 


344 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Doctrines.  We  mention  here  only  the  articles  upon  the  saints, 
who  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  mediators  in  addition  to  Christ, 
nor  to  be  worshiped  (a.  21.  Upon  Mary,  see  p.  227);  upon 
the  marriage  of  priests  (a.  23),  the  prohibition  of  which  is  con¬ 
trary  to  the  law  of  nature  (p.  236  f. );  upon  the  mass  (a.  24); 
upon  confession  (a.  25);  upon  discrimination  of  meats  fa.  26); 
upon  monastic  vows  (a.  27);  upon  episcopal  authority  (a.  26); 
and  of  Christ’s  return  to  judgment  (a.  17). 

Reviewing  the  entire  document,  it  may  be  said  that  the  Augs¬ 
burg  Confession  affords  a  clear,  compact,  and  thorough  presen¬ 
tation  of  the  views  of  Luther  in  their  fundamental  features. 


§  75.  The  Earlier  Reformed  Confessions. 

Literature.  Niemeyer,  Collectio  confessionum  in  ecclesiis  reformatis 
publicatarum,  1840.  K.  Muller,  Die  Bekenntnisschriften  der  reformirten 
Kirche,  1903.  Thomasius-Seeberg,  ii.,  ed.  2,  417  ff.  K.  Muller,  Sym¬ 
bol  ik,  398  ff. 

1.  The  original  documents  which  here  demand  our  attention 
(Tetrapolitana,  1530.  Basileensis  prior,  1534.  Helvetica 
prior,  1536)  are  only  in  a  general  way  in  accord  with  the  views 
of  Zwingli.  The  influence  of  Bucer’s  irenic  efforts  is  already 
traceable  in  them  (vid.  sub). 

2.  It  must  be  distinctly  noted,  first  of  all,  that  these  confes¬ 
sions  also  give  clear  expression  to  the  doctrine  of  justification  by 
faith  alone.  This  is  “  the  highest  and  most  prominent  chief 
article  .  .  .  that  we  are  preserved  and  saved  alone  through  the 
simple  mercy  of  God  and  through  the  merit  of  Christ.  .  .  . 
Such  high  and  great  benefits  of  divine  grace  and  the  true  sancti¬ 
fying  of  the  Spirit  of  God  we  receive  not  from  our  merits  and 
powers,  but  through  faith,  which  is  a  pure  gift  and  bestowal  of 
God”  (Helv.  12.  Tetr.  3.  Bas.  83). 1  The  sole  authority  of 
the  Scriptures  is  also  maintained.  Only  that  is  to  be  preached 
which  is  found  in  them,  or  deduced  from  them  (Tetr.  1. 
Helv.  1). 

The  fundamental  reformatory  principle  excludes  the  meritor¬ 
ious  character  of  works  and  justification  by  means  of  them 
(Bas.  83).  But  as  faith  is,  in  one  aspect,  the  receptive  organ 
by  which  all  the  gracious  gifts  of  God  are  appropriated,  it  is  also, 
in  another  aspect,  the  fundamental  principle  of  a  new  moral  life. 
“This  faith  is  a  sure,  firm,  yea,  an  undoubted  foundation  and 
apprehension  of  all  things  which  we  hope  for  from  God,  who 

1  These  figures  indicate  articles  of  the  confessions,  except  in  the  case  of  the 
Basileensis,  where  they  refer  to  the  marginal  numbers  in  Niemeyer. 


THE  EARLIER  REFORMED  CONFESSIONS. 


345 


causes  love,  and  hence  all  virtues,  to  grow  from  it*  .  .  This 
faith,  which  does  not  rely  upon  its  own  work,  although  it  per¬ 
forms  innumerable  good  works,  but  upon  the  mercy  of  God,  is 
the  real  true  service,  by  means  of  which  we  please  God  ’  ’ 
(Helv.  13). 

The  spiritual  nature  of  the  Church  is  here  also  plainly  asserted 
(Helv.  14.  Bas.  81.  Tetr.  15).  In  the  doctrine  of  the  sac¬ 
raments,  there  is  a  general  agreement  with  Zwingli.  The  sacra¬ 
ments  serve  “  for  the  begetting  of  faith  and  brotherly  love  ’  ’ 
(Bas.  81)  ;  but  yet  they  are — according  to  the  Helvetica — not 
only  symbols  (symbo/a),  but  they  “  consist  of  signs  and  at  the 
same  time  realities  ”  {signis  simul  et  rebus').  Thus  in  baptism, 
water  is  the  sign,  and  regeneration  and  adoption  the  reality  ;  in 
the  Lord’s  Supper,  bread  and  wine  constitute  the  sign,  while  the 
reality  is  “  the  imparting  ( communicatio )  of  the  body  of  the  Lord, 
the  procuring  of  salvation,  and  the  remission  of  sins.  ’  ’  This  is 
however  upon  the  condition,  that  an  inner  reception  by  the  heart 
accompanies  that  of  the  outward  symbols  (21.  16).  The  chief 
attention  is  naturally  given  to  the  Lord’s  Supper.  Christ  is  the 
food  of  believing  souls.  Our  souls  are  through  faith  refreshed  by 
his  flesh  and  blood  (Bas.  81  f. ).  Christ  left  his  body  to  his 
disciples  as  food  for  the  soul  (Tetr.  18).  The  difference  from 
Luther’s  view  here  remains  evident,  however  carefully  it  is  kept 
in  the  background.  A  carnal  presence  ( carnalis  praesentia )  is 
•expressly  denied.  The  Supper  brings  a  commemoration  of  the 
Crucified  One,  and  thus  refreshes  our  hearts  (Helv.  23).  Zwingli 
could  certainly  have  subscribed  these  statements  in  detail ;  but 
we  can  nevertheless  discern  here,  as  elsewhere  in  the  Confessions, 
a  certain  modification  of  his  ideas.  There  is  here  an  effort  to 
associate  the  spiritual  influence  as  closely  as  possible  with  the 
bodily  reception  of  the  sacraments.1 

1  This  softening  down  of  Zwingli’ s  ideas  is  manifest  also  in  the  theory  of 
•original  sin  (Bas.  80.  Helv.  8).  Predestination  is  not  discussed,  but  the 
characteristic  separation  of  the  divine  influence  from  the  earthly  means  remains 
as  the  fixed  premise  to  the  doctrine  of  the  means  of  grace. 


that  Christ  may  dwell  in  your  hearts  through  faith  *  to  the  end  that 
ye,  being  rooted  and  grounded  in  love,  may  be  strong  to  apprehend  with 
all  the  saints  what  is  the  breadth  and  length  and  height  and  depth,  and 
to  know  the  love  of  Christ  which  passeth  knowledge,  that  ye  may  be 
filled  unto  all  the  fullness  of  Cod,— Eph.  m.  17=19. 


PART  II. 


THE  FURTHER  DEVELOPMENT  AND  (PROVISIONAL)  COM¬ 
PLETION  OF  PROTESTANT  DOCTRINE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

LUTHERAN  DOCTRINE  TO  THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  FORMULA  OF 

CONCORD. 

§  7  6.  Theology  of  Melanchthon  and  its  Significance  for  the 

History  of  Doctrine. 

Literature.  Schmidt,  Ph.  Mel.,  i860.  Hartfelder,  Mel.  als 
Praceptor  Germ.  (=Mon.  paed.  vii. ),  1889.  Herrlinger,  DieTheol.  Mel., 
1870.  Troltsch,  Vernunft  u.  Offenb.  bei  J.  Gerh.  u.  Mel.,  1890.  Ritschl, 
Die  Entstehung  d.  luth.  Kirche,  Ztschr.  f.  KG.  i.  5 1  ff. ;  ii.  366  ff.  Loofs, 
DG.,  ed.  3,  408  ff.  Seeberg,  Mel.  Stellung  in  d.  Gesch.  d.  Dogmas,  Neue 
kirchl.  Ztschr.,  1897,  126  ff.1  Haussleiter,  Aus  d.  Schule  Mel.  (Greifs- 
walder  Festschr. ),  1897.  Sell,  Mel.  u.  die  deutsche  Ref.  bis  1531 
(Schriften  des  Vereins  fur  Ref.-Gesch.,  56),  etc.  Dilthey,  in  Archiv.  f. 
Gesch.  d.  Philos,  vi.  226  ff.,  347  ff. 

1.  In  the  first  period  of  Protestant  doctrinal  history,  we  have 
familiarized  ourselves  with  the  genesis  of  the  Lutheran  and  Re¬ 
formed  Doctrines.  We  studied  first  of  all  the  religious  ideas  of 
Luther  in  their  peculiar  character  and  force,  and  sought  to 
understand  them  in  the  light  of  the  circumstances  attending  their 
development.  We  then  followed  the  course  of  Zwingli,  and  the 
influence  of  his  teachings. 

The  second  period  is  marked  by  the  development  and  pro¬ 
visional2  completion  of  doctrinal  construction  in  the  Protestant 
church.  If  in  the  first  period  ideas  were  produced  and  new 
ideals  created,  the  second  period  addressed  itself  to  the  task  of 
constructing  forms  and  formulas  for  their  permanent  embodi¬ 
ment.  The  former  was  an  essentially  religious,  this  an  essentially 

1  A  part  of  this  article  is  reproduced  in  the  present  section. 

2  The  completion  of  dogmatic  statement  thus  attained  is  described  as  merely 
“provisional,”  partly  upon  general  historical  principles,  for  we  can  of  course 
not  tell  in  advance  to  what  modifications,  additions,  and  omissions  the  Prot¬ 
estant  doctrines  may  yet  be  subjected  in  the  church.  But  the  word  has  also  a 
special  significance,  as  guarding  against  the  error  of  regarding  the  present  forms 
of  statement  as  final,  which  would  be  an  unauthorized  dogmatic  opinion. 

(347) 


348 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


theological  era.  Melanchthon  and  Calvin  are  the  leaders  in  the 
toil  of  the  second  period.  The  historical  transition  from  the  first 
to  the  second  stage  of  development  may  be  easily  understood. 
Luther  had  restored  the  gospel  to  the  church  ;  but  his  religious 
instinct  preserved  him  from  the  attempt  to  simply  reproduce  the 
thought  of  the  apostolic  age,  ignoring  the  entire  historical  devel¬ 
opment  which  intervened.  Upon  the  contrary,  many  ideas  and 
elements  derived  from  the  past  became  coefficients  in  the  shaping 
of  his  religious  views.1  This  was  at  first  quite  unavoidable  in  the 
sphere  of  external  historical  forms.  Continuity  of  life  demands 
points  of  attachment  to  the  forms  of  the  past.  But  as,  in  this 
case,  a  great  literary  and  scientific  revolution  preceded  the  re¬ 
ligious  movement,  the  direct  dependence  of  Protestant  theology 
upon  the  scholastic  materials  of  the  preceding  epoch  was  less 
marked  than  might  otherwise  have  been  expected. 

2.  It  was  Melanchthon  who,  on  Lutheran  territory,  rendered 
the  important  service  of  providing  a  system  of  doctrine  for  the 
youthful  Protestant  church.  His  universal  culture,  which  fitted 
him,  by  the  publication  of  many  text-books,  to  become  the  in¬ 
structor  of  his  age  in  the  spheres  of  general  philosophy  and  phil¬ 
ology,  his  delicate  sense,  so  averse  to  all  extremes  and  disturb¬ 
ances,  and  his  wonderful  talent  for  formulating,  fitted  him  to  be¬ 
come  the  Praeceptor  Germaniae  also  in  the  sphere  of  theology. 
As  early  as  A.  D.  1521  appeared  the  first  draft  of  his  Loci  (ed. 
Plitt-Kolde,  1890).  There  is  here  presented  in  brief  and  com¬ 
pact  form  an  excellent  epitome  of  Luther’s  views  touching  the 
plan  of  salvation.  The  Scriptures  alone,  it  is  held,  furnish  the 
“form  of  Christianity”  forma  christianismi  )  ;  they  alone  es¬ 
tablish  articles  of  faith  (p.  59,  139).  The  doctrines  immediately 
connected  with  Soteriology  are  presented,  but  no  attention  is 
devoted  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  or  to  Christology.2  Sharp 
protest  is  entered  against  the  injection  of  philosophical  specula¬ 
tions  into  religion.3  A  fuller  description  of  the  work  would  be 
apart  from  our  present  purpose  (see  my  review  in  Neue  kirchl. 

1  In  this  sense  the  entire  period  from  the  time  of  Augustine  may  be  described 
as  pre-reformatory.  We  can  in  the  light  of  this  understand  also  the  simple 
retention  of  the  dogmas  of  the  ancient  church. 

2  Melanchthon  accepts  the  Nicene  doctrine  (p.  139  f. ),  but  he  thought  that 
a  “ compendium  of  Christian  doctrine”  might  be  given  —  following  the  ex¬ 
ample  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans — without  detailed  theories  in  regard  to 
God  and  Christ  (p.  64,  61 )  ;  cf.  C.  R.  1.  305  :  “fori  condemn  metaphysical 
theories,  because  I  think  it  a  great  peril  to  subject  celestial  mysteries  to  the 
methods  of  our  reason.” 

3  See  his  fine  remark,  p.  37  :  “  For  just  as  m  these  modern  times  of  the 
church  we  have  embraced  Aristotle  instead  of  Christ,  so,  immediately  after  the 
beginning  of  the  church,  Christian  doctrine  was  weakened  through  Platonic 
philosophy.” 


THEOLOGY  OF  MELANCHTHON. 


349 


Ztschr. ,  1897,  129  ff.),  although  we  shall  have  occasion  to  ex¬ 
amine  the  later  theological  views  of  Melanchthon.  His  aim  is 
here  very  distinctly  to  present  the  teachings  of  Luther.  But  we 
notice  a  characteristic  materializing  and  leveling  down  of  the 
ideas  of  Luther,  while  upon  certain  points  the  author  knowingly 
advocates  positions  differing  from  his.  Both  these  tendencies 
became  most  highly  significant  in  their  influence  upon  thedevel- 
ment  of  doctrine,  although  the  former  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
more  important  in  its  results.  We  begin  with  the  deliberate  doc¬ 
trinal  divergences. 

3.  There  were  two  doctrines  upon  which  Melanchthon  con¬ 
sciously  differed  from  Luther,  viz.,  free  will  and  the  Lord’s 
Supper.  That  he  wavered  from  his  original  deterministic  posi¬ 
tion  is  perhaps  to  be  attributed  to  the  influence  of  the  polemical 
writings  of  Erasmus  against  Luther  (cf.,  e.  g.,  C.  R.  i.  688). 
As  early  as  1527,  in  his  exposition  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Colos- 
sians,  he  recognizes  human  freedom  in  the  sphere  of  the  outward 
life,  although  no  one  can  fear  and  love  God  except  he  be  im¬ 
pelled  by  the  Holy  Spirit  (cf.  Luthardt,  Die  Lehre  vom  fr. 
Willen,  p.  162  ff. ).  Similarly,  in  the  Unterricht  der  Visita - 
toren ,  xxvi.  78.  In  the  Augsburg  Confession,  he  purposely 
avoids  questions  concerning  predestination  (ii.  547).  And  upon 
the  occasion  of  a  disputation  at  Wittenberg  in  1534,  he  pointed 
out  that  neither  religion  nor  morality  could  be  harmonized  with 
the  Stoic  doctrine  of  the  necessity  of  all  events  (x.  70  f.,  785  ff.). 
Already  in  the  Loci  of  1535,  Melanchthon  attributed  to  the 
human  will  an  active,  although  small,  part  in  producing  conver¬ 
sion.  He  there  recognizes  three  causes  of  conversion  :  the  word, 
the  Holy  Spirit,  and  the  human  will.  He  explains,  further,  that 
the  will  either  determines  to  accept  or  determines  not  to  accept 
the  grace  of  God  (xxi.  376  f.,  332).  He  expresses  himself  most 
plainly  upon  this  point  in  the  third  revision  of  the  Loci  (A.  D. 
1 543) .  His  inner  motive  is  opposition  to  the  Stoic  dvdypi.  Man 
yet  retains  freedom  as  a  power  of  applying  himself  to  grace  (fac- 
ultas  applicandi se  ad gratiam )  (xxi.  652,  6591.).  Accordingly, 
in  conversion  God  stirs  the  heart  through  the  word  read  or  heard, 
and  the  heart  then,  by  virtue  of  a  certain  freedom  yet  left  to  it, 
decides  for  or  against  God.  “  God  anticipates  ( antevertif)  us, 
calls,  moves,  aids  ;  but  we  must  see  to  it  that  we  do  not  resist  ” 

(658).1 

1  In  order  to  rightly  judge  this  view  of  Melanchthon’ s,  we  must  bear  in 
mind  ( 1 )  That  he  holds  strictly  to  the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  and  therefore 
excludes  every  form  of  salvation  by  man’s  own  efforts  (xx.  1.  669),  and  (2) 
That  he  sought,  in  opposition  to  the  doctrine  of  predestination,  which  he  under¬ 
stood  as  magical,  morally  untenable,  and  deterministic,  to  retain  the  personal 


35° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


4.  In  a  similar  way,  Melanchthon  gradually  lost  confidence  in 
Luther’s  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper.  He  at  first  shared  the 
symbolic  conception  of  Augustine,  as  advocated  by  Erasmus.  He 
then  fully  adopted  the  view  of  Luther  (<?.  g.,  C.  R.  i.  760,  823, 
830,  1109!'.).  Zwingli’s  theory  appeared  to  him  at  this  time 
and  afterward  as  profane  (ib.  i.  1067,  1077).  In  Marburg,  he 
assisted  Luther  in  making  a  collection  of  citations  from  the 
Fathers  in  confirmation  of  the  latter’s  position.  With  his  grow¬ 
ing  respect  for  the  consensus  of  the  ancient  church,  he  was  very 
profoundly  impressed  by  the  dialogue  of  Oecolampadius,  which 
produced  evidence  that,  in  a  closer  study  of  the  Church  Fathers, 
the  symbolical  view  might  also  be  found  in  their  writings.  He  con¬ 
fessed  this  to  Luther  (ii.  217);  yet  he  still  clung  to  the  Lutheran 
conception  (ii.  212,  222  f.,  226  ;  i.  nopf.).  This  is  also  the  posi¬ 
tion  taken  in  the  tenth  article  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  (ii. 
142).  The  formula  of  Bucer  (supra,  p.  331),  appeared  to  him 
to  prepare  the  way  for  a  union  of  the  divergent  parties  (ii.  498  f. ). 
But  he  still  distinctly  maintains  the  bodily  presence  of  Christ 
(ii.  311,  315,  787,  801).  He  was  able,  indeed,  to  accept  the 
formula  which  Luther  now  framed,  i.  e.,  that  the  body  of  Christ 
is  ‘  ‘  crushed  with  the  teeth  ”  ( E.  55.  7  5  f. ) ,  only  as  ‘  ‘  the  spokes¬ 
man  of  another’s  opinion  ”  ( nuntius  alienae  sententiae ,  ii.  822). 
But,  in  view  of  the  testimonies  of  the  ancient  church,  he  could 
find  no  rest.  “I  affirm  the  true  presence  of  Christ  in  the  Sup¬ 
per.  I  am  not  willing  to  be  the  author  nor  defender  of  a  new 
doctrine  in  the  church  ”  (ii.  824;  cf.  xxi.  479  ;  ix.  785).  At 
heart,  he  inclined  more  and  more  to  the  view  of  the  theologians 
of  Southern  Germany  (ii.  824,  837,  841  f.;  iii.  292).  Melanch¬ 
thon  always  held  to  the  presence  of  the  Lord  in  the  Supper,  but 
he  became  less  and  less  satisfied  with  Luther’s  conception  of  that 
presence.  At  a  later  period,  he  never  wearied — at  least  in  his 
private  correspondence — of  inveighing  against  bread-worship 
(^aproXarpeta),  as  against  the  “  Stoic  necessity  ”  (e.g.,  viii.  362, 
791,  660).  He  fell  back  whenever  possible  upon  the  thought,  that 
there  is  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  a  ‘  1  communion  of  the  body  and 
blood  of  Christ.”  He  denied  the  bodily  ubiquity  of  Christ 
(vii.  780,  884;  viii.  385;  ix.  387,  962,  963),  and  emphasized 
in  contrast  the  spiritual  presence  of  Christ  :  “The  Son  of  God 
lives  and  reigns,  and  wishes  to  be  present  in  the  sacrament  in¬ 
stituted  for  this  purpose,  and  joins  us  as  members  to  himself” 
(xv.  m2).1  In  this  sense  is  the  tenth  article  of  the  Augustana 

and  moral  element  in  conversion.  But  he  did  not  succeed  in  the  solution  of 
the  problem. 

1  Cf.  iii.  514  (A.  D.  1538):  “  Not  to  depart  very  far  from  the  ancients,  I 

have  affirmed  a  sacramental  presence  in  the  celebration  [in  usu )  and  have  said 


THEOLOGY  OF  MELANCHTHON. 


351 


Variata  (A.  D.  1540)  also  to  be  understood  :  “  Concerning  the 
Lord’s  Supper  they  teach,  that  with  the  bread  and  wine  the  body 
and  blood  of  Christ  are  truly  offered  to  those  eating  in  the  Lord’s 
Supper.1  The  “  damnant  ”  is  here  also  wanting.  Cf.  Herr- 
linger,  Theol.  Mel.,  p.  124  ff. 

5.  The  Loci  of  Melanchthon,  after  the  second  revision,  fell 
more  and  more  into  the  track  of  the  traditional  doctrinal 
statements.  Refraining  from  the  attempt  to  trace  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  his  theological  views,  we  present  a  general  summary  of 
them  based  upon  the  third  redaction  of  the  Loci.  The  pedagog¬ 
ical  character  of  the  work  has  become  increasingly  prominent  as 
it  has  been  popularized  in  the  manner  so  characteristic  of  the 
author.2  The  simplicity  of  form  and  the  desire  to  secure  prac¬ 
tical  usefulness  exclude  the  discussion  of  the  more  profound  prob¬ 
lems  and  extended  logical  proof  of  the  positions  taken.3  Although, 
even  in  the  last  revision  of  the  Loci ,  Melanchthon  followed  no  me¬ 
thodical  plan  beyond  the  enumeration  of  the  separate  doctrines,  yet 
the  study  of  his  later  writings  makes  it  manifest  that  the  Reformer 
had  at  least  grouped  his  theological  ideas  around  certain  definite 
fundamental  principles.  These  were  ( 1 )  the  combination  of  ideas 
involved  in  justification  and  the  new  conception  of  repentance, 
and  (2)  the  conception  of  the  church  (cf.  xxviii.  371  f. ).  These 
ideas  constantly  recur.  They  lay  nearer  to  his  heart  than  all 
else.  To  make  them  plain  to  all,  and  to  impress  them  upon  all 
hearts,  appeared  to  him  his  chief  duty.  They  may  be  designated 
as  the  two  focal  points  in  the  theology  of  Melanchthon. 

We  take  as  our  starting-point  the  question  as  to  the  Sources 
and  Standards  of  Christian  truth,  which  Melanchthon  of  course 
answers  by  pointing  to  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Therefore  let  us 
regard  it  as  a  great  blessing  of  God,  that  he  has  given  and  pre- 

that  with  these  elements  Christ  is  truly  present  and  efficacious.  This  surely  is 
enough.  Nor  have  I  added  such  an  inclusion  or  conjunction  by  which  the 
body  would  be  joined  to  the  bread.  .  .  .  Sacraments  are  pledges  that  some¬ 
thing  else  is  present  with  the  things  received.” 

1  The  formula  of  Bucer  and  the  Wittenberg  Concord  (supra,  p.  331)  here 
exerted  a  controlling  influence,  but  the  possibility  of  an  interpretation  favoring 
transubstantiation  is  excluded.  But  it  is  significant  that  the  vere  et  substantialiter 
adesse  of  the  Wittenberg  formula  is  omitted.  Luther  himself  originally  in¬ 
tended  to  express  himself  in  a  way  similar  to  this  in  the  Smalcald  Articles  : 
“  That  under  bread  and  wine  the  true  body  and  blood  are  present,”  etc.,  but 
wrote  instead  :  “  The  bread  and  wine  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  are  the  true  body 
and  blood  of  Christ.”  (SeeKoLDE,  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1893,  p.  159. )  However 
true  it  may  be  that  the  formula  of  the  Augustana  Variata  may  be  interpreted 
in  a  Lutheran  sense,  it  is  equally  true  that  it  was  in  reality  designed  to  favor  the 
divergent  conception  of  Melanchthon. 

2  “  With  every  new  issue,  paper  and  tradition  exerted  greater  influence” 
(Dilthey,  1.  c.,  vi.  230). 

3  Cf.  the  remark  of  Erasmus,  C.  R.  iii.  87. 


352 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


served  to  the  church  a  certain  book,  and  binds  the  church  to  it. 
That  company  of  people  alone  is  the  church,  which  embraces  this 
book,  hears  it,  teaches  it,  and  retains  its  true  sense  in  the  wor¬ 
ship  of  God  and  in  the  regulating  of  conduct  (xxi.  801).1  As  no 
parallels  can  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Melanchthon  to  the  free 
utterances  often  made  by  Luther  in  regard  to  the  letter  of  the 
Scriptures  (supra,  p.  300  f. ),  so  also  his  conception  of  the  author¬ 
ity  of  the  Scriptures  receives  a  different  coloring  from  his  en¬ 
dorsement  of  their  teachings  as  being  the  same  as  embraced  the 
three  ancient  symbols  of  the  church  (xii.  399,  568,  608  ;  v. 
582). 2  Their  doctrine  he  approves  as  being  genuinely  Catholic. 
“This  is  a  Catholic  association  foetus') ,  which  embraces  the 
common  consensus  of  prophetic  and  apostolic  doctrine,  together 
with  the  belief  (sententia) ,  of  the  true  church.  Thus  in  our  Con¬ 
fession  we  profess  to  embrace  the  whole  doctrine  of  the  word  of 
God,  to  which  the  church  bears  testimony,  and  that  in  the  sense 
which  the  symbols  show”  (xxiv.  398;  xxi.  349). 3  He  con¬ 
demns  whatever  varies  from  the  symbola  accepta  (iii.  826,  985  ; 
ix.  366).  He  will  not  extend  his  hand  to  any  “  new  dogma  ” 
(i.  823,  901,  1048),  nor  alter  anything  in  the  ecclesiastical 
formulas,  for  “  often  a  change  of  words  begets  also  new  beliefs” 
(xxiv.  427).  This  high  valuation  of  the  ancient  symbols  is  very 
different  indeed  from  the  attitude  of  Luther  toward  them.  Whilst 
Luther  most  clearly  declares  that  they  have  value  for  him  only  be¬ 
cause,  and  in  so  far  as,  they  agree  with  the  Scriptures  (supra,  p. 
304),  Melanchthon  makes  no  express  limitation  of  this  kind  in 
his  endorsement  of  them.  Thus  again,  the  ideas  of  Luther 
are  contracted  and  materialized.  To  the  symbols  of  the  ancient 
church  was  added,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Augustana.  But  this  is 
not  sufficiently  explicit.4  The  genuine,  true  doctrine  is  that  of 
Luther.  Melanchthon  was  the  first  to  understand  the  relation  of 
Luther  to  the  historical  development  of  the  world,  and  he  ex- 

1  Cf.,  e.  g .,  xxiv.  718  ;  xii.  479,  646  f. ,  649,  698  ;  xxiii.  603  ;  xi.  42  ;  v. 
580  :  “  has  revealed  in  certain  testimonies,  and  given  a  particular  doctrine  and 
word.”  Here  are  the  germs  of  the  later  theory  of  inspiration. 

2  Osiander  assailed  the  subscription  of  the  three  ancient  symbols  and  the 
Augsburg  Confession  under  oath,  which  was  customary  at  Wittenberg  (xii. 
6,  7).  Upon  the  daily  devotional  use  of  the  Apostles’  Creed,  see  xxv.  449  ; 
xxiv.  394,  581. 

3  Cf. :  “  With  true  faith  I  embrace  the  whole  doctrine  handed  down  in  the 
books  of  the  prophets  and  apostles,  and  comprehended  in  the  Apostolic,  Ni- 
cene,  and  Athanasian  symbols”  (Thesis of  A.  D.  1551,  in  Haussleiter,  1.  c., 
P-  95)- 

4  III.  286,  298,  1000,  827,  929:  “  Confessio  u.  Apologia,”  v.  581  ;  ix. 
386  ;  viii.  284  ;  xxxiii.  p.  xxxviii.  names,  besides  the  three  ancient  symbols, 
“  Catechismus  u.  Bekenntnis  Lutheri  u.  Confessio,”  ix.  319,  366,  618, 
213  f.  Also  Smalcald  Articles. 


THEOLOGY  OF  MELANCHTHON. 


353 


pressed  it  with  classical  lucidity.  He  counts  him  among  the 
mighty  heroes  of  the  churchand  her  faith :  Isaiah,  John  the  Baptist, 
Paul,  Augustine,  and  Luther.  “  Luther  brought  to  light  the  true 
and  necessary  doctrine”  (xi.  728  ;  cf.  vi.  57,  72,  73,  92  ;  vii. 
398;  xi.  272).  We  must  hold  fast  to  the  pure  doctrine,  namely, 
the  confessio  Lutheri  (xi.  272  f. ;  viii.  49 )d  It  is  the  doctrine  of 
the  Church  and  of  the  University  of  Wittenberg  (xi.  327,  600  ; 
xxi.  602  ;  iii.  1106).  But  the  truth  of  the  church’s  doctrine  is 
attested  also  by  the  experience  ( experientia )  of  the  pious  (xxi. 
420;  xii.  426;  cf.  Luther,  supra,  p.  256  ff.). 

6.  This,  therefore,  is  the  truth  :  The  teachings  of  the  Bible,  as 
understood  and  summarized  by  the  ancient  doctrinal  standards, 
Luther  and  the  Wittenberg  theology.  To  the  understanding 
and  presentation  of  this  truth  all  other  sciences  minister  as 
“handmaids”  of  theology  (xi.  394),  not  only  by  pedagogi- 
cally  sharpening  the  intellect  for  the  apprehension  of  Scrip¬ 
tural  truth,  but  also  by  furnishing  the  necessary  preliminary  sci¬ 
entific  knowledge.  Without  scientific  education,  the  theologian 
could  produce  only  unconnected  and  confused  statements,  which 
would  beget  innumerable  errors  and  a  “  cyclopian  ”  monster 
(xi.  280).  Hence  the  church  needs,  not  only  grammar  and 
dialectics,  but  also  physics  and  philosophy.  “  Not  only  for  the 
sake  of  method  ...  is  philosophy  necessary,  but  also  many 
things  must  be  taken  ( assumenda )  by  the  theologian  from 
physics.”  Thus  the  theologian  derives  his  physiological,  psy¬ 
chological,  and  logical  definitions  from  the  sphere  of  the  arts  and 
sciences  ( orbis  artium )  (ib.  281,  934).  It  is,  in  other  words, 
the  popularized  philosophy  of  Aristotle,  which  theology  requires 
as  a  prerequisite  and  support.  To  this  naturally-acquired  knowl¬ 
edge  it  adds  that  derived  from  the  Scriptures.  The  light  of 
reason  {lumen  naturale ,  xii.  514,  577,  648)  furnishes  every  man 
with  a  number  of  innate  moral  and  religious  ideas.  It  plays  as 
important  a  role  in  Melanchthon’s  line  of  thought  as  the  “  law 
of  nature  ’  ’  in  the  later  Middle  Ages.  In  the  application  of 
this  principle,  he  follows  largely  the  example  of  Cicero.  There 
is  a  natural  religion,  a  natural  morality,,  and  a  natural  law. 
Although  sin  may  have  beclouded  this  light,  it  yet  remains  as  an 
endowment  of  human  nature.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  a  dan¬ 
gerous  tendency  is  thus  inaugurated.  Theology  appears  to  be  the 
product  of  a  combination  of  the  cosmology  of  the  ancient  world  and 
the  “articles  of  faith  ”  derived  from  the  Scriptures.1 2  Cf.  Dilthey, 

1  The  co-ordination  of  “  Gottes  Wort  und  Luther’s  Lehr”  is  perfectly  in 
accord  with  Melanchthon’s  feeling.  See  already  Anton  Otto,  C.  R.  viii. 
460  :  “  the  faith  ( sententia )  of  Luther,  that  is,  of  Christ.” 

2  This  combination  reminds  us  of  Thomas  (supra,  p.  100  f. ),  but  DiLTHEY 

23 


354 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Archiv.,  etc.,  vi.  236  ff.  Troltsch,  1.  c.  Hartfelder,  Mel., 
p.  161  f. ,  181  f.,  240. 

7.  In  this  last  period  of  Melanchthon’ s  labors,  he  emphasizes 
with  great  energy  the  idea,  that  those  who  confess  the  correct  faith 
are  the  true  church — thus  following  Luther  also  in  the  conception 
of  the  Church  (p.  294b).  He  recognizes  the  altered  conditions — 
there  being  now  an  evangelical  church  organization,  having  as 
its  distinguishing  mark  the  possession  of  the  true  doctrine — in 
most  clearly  from  this  time  onward  designating  the  visible  as¬ 
sembly  of  the  called  ( coetus  vocatoruni)  as  the  church.  “  The 
visible  church  is  the  assembly  of  those  embracing  the  gospel  of 
Christ  and  rightly  using  the  sacraments,  in  which  God  through 
the  ministry  of  the  gospel  is  efficacious  and  regenerates  many  to 
eternal  life,  in  which  assembly,  nevertheless,  are  many  unregen¬ 
erated,  but  assenting  to  the  true  doctrine  ”  (xxi.  826,  and  con-J 
stantly.  See  Neue  kirchl.  Ztschr.,  1897,  154,  n.  1).  This  defi¬ 
nition  and  the  connection  of  thought  in  which  it  is  found  very 
clearly  reveal  the  general  conception  of  Melanchthon.  The  true  \ 
church  under  any  circumstances  exists  only  where  the  true  doc¬ 
trine  is  found.  Thus  Zacharias,  Anna,  Elizabeth,  the  shepherds, J 
etc. ,  since  they  did  not  accept  the  official  teaching  of  their  age, 
but  remained  steadfast  in  the  true  doctrine,  constituted  the  true 
church  in  that  age.  God  provides  that  there  shall  always  be 
some  servants  of  his  word,  like  Zacharias,  as  faithful  representa¬ 
tives  of  this  true  doctrine.  Only  in  this  true  church,  in  which 
are  gathered  the  really  called,  may  believers  and  the  elect  be 
found,1  as  only  there  is  the  church,  in  which  God  is  known,  con¬ 
fessed  and  worshiped,  as  “  he  has  revealed  himself”  (xxi.  834). 2 
In  the  Middle  Ages  the  church  existed  only  where  the  doctrines 
of  an  Augustine  and  Bernard,  a  Tauler  and  Wessel,  were  taught 
(xxi.  837;  xxiv.  309  ;  xxv.  862b).  They  only,  according  to  the 
Scriptures,  are  churches,  “  which  hold  the  pure  doctrine  and  are 
in  harmony  with  it”  (in  ea  consentiunt ,  xi.  273).  Only  in*\ 
this  church  are  to  be  found  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  justifica- 

(p.  238)  very  properly  points  out  the  difference — that  Melanchthon  does  not, 
like  Thomas,  unite  faith  and  philosophy  in  the  construction  of  a  system  of  meta¬ 
physics,  but  only  makes  the  natural  consciousness  his  point  of  departure. 
Nevertheless,  this  Melanchthonian  combination  led  historically  to  the  ortho¬ 
doxy  of  the  seventeenth,  as  well  as  to  the  illumination  of  the  eighteenth  cen¬ 
tury. 

•> 

1  This  is  the  “church  of  the  elect,’’  xxi.  913  ;  xii.  678  :  the  “church  of 
the  regenerate  ;  ”  xii.  589,  431  ;  xxiii.,  p.  xxxv.:  the  “eternal  church;”  xi. 
760  :  the  “  elect  ’  ’  alone  in  this  “  army  of  the  called  ;  ”  xii.  567.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  term,  true  church  ( ecclesia  vera),  is  used  to  designate  the  church 
which  holds  the  true  doctrine  ;  but  only  in  this  are  the  “  true  members  of  the 
church,”  i.  e.,  the  “saints” — see  xxiii.  599. 

2  Cf.  xi.  273  ;  xii.  567  ;  ix.  557  ;  xxv.  220  f.,  325,  640  ;  xxiii.  597  f. 


THEOLOGY  OF  MELANCHTHON. 


355 


lion  (xi.  400).  But  those  who,  like  the  Romish  church,  do  not 
hold  the  central  principle  of  the  true  doctrine,  but  persecute  the 
real  church,  do  not  belong  to  the  true  church.1  Yet  Melanch-  | 
thon  also  maintains  the  conception  of  the  church  as  an  object 
of  faith ,  since  it  is  only  by  faith  that  we  can  be  assured  that  there 
is  really  in  this  visibly  assembly  ( coetus )  a  number  of  elect  per¬ 
sons  (xii.  368  b;  xxiv.  365,  368,  400,  405  ;  xxv.  148b,  221, 
677;  viii.  284).  The  marks  which  attest  the  existence  of  the 
“  true  visible  church,”  and  at  the  same  time  assure  to  faith  the 
presence  of  a  “  church  of  the  regenerate  ”  within  the  former, 
are  therefore  the  true  evangelical  doctrine  and  the  proper  admin¬ 
istration  of  the  sacraments — to  which  Melanchthon  afterward 
habitually  added — reverence  (Kreverentia') ,  or  obedience,  to  the  s 
ministry  ( obedientia  ministerif) . 2  *<  • 

Such  is  the  church.  In  it  the  divine  purpose  is  being  accom¬ 
plished  in  the  world.  It  is  the  realization  of  the  aim  of  the 
work  of  Christ.3  But  this  it  is,  because  in  it  alone  the  truth  of 
God  is  apprehended  by  men  and  becomes  effectual  through  them. 
To  maintain  this  doctrine  in  its  simplicity  and  purity  is  the  task 
of  theology,  as  well  as  of  every  branch  of  science.  This  end  is 
to  be  served  by  universities,  princes,  and  states  (xi.  272,  326  b; 
iii.  198;  viii.  401;  vii.  666.  Hartfelder,  p.  437).  It  may  be 
said  that  the  maintenance  and  spread  of  “  pure  doctrine  ”  is  the 
great  motive  which  inspired  Melanchthon’s  life-work,  as  a  Re¬ 
former  of  the  church  and  of  the  universities,  as  a  theologian,  phil- 
ologian,  and  teacher.4  This  involved  again,  as  compared  with 
Luther,  a  narrowing  of  the  horizon,  resulting  not  merely  from 
the  great  importance  attached  to  the  “  pure  doctrine,”  but  from 
the  fact  that  the  life-giving  energy  of  the  church  was  attributed 

1  XII.  526,  628  ;  xxiii.;  p.  xxxvii.;  xxiv.  781,  855  :  “There  is  the  church 
where  are  the  fountains  of  Israel.  .  .  .  The  Turks  are  not  the  church,  neither 
are  the  Papists.” 

2  XII.  599,  433,  602,  65-5  ;  xxiv.  367,  401,  502  ;  xxv.  129,  685,  etc.  The 
peculiar  importance  attached  to  the  clerical  office  (see  also  xxv.  692)  marks 
one  of  the  materializing  features  of  Melanchthon’s  later  writings.  The 
church,  he  holds,  is  neither  a  tyranny  nor  a  democracy,  but  an  honorable 
aristocracy  fionesta  aristocratia),  xii.  367,  496;  cf.  also  ii.  274,  284,  334, 
376  ;  iii.  942. 

3  XXI.  345  ;  xxiv.  307  ;  xii.  520:  “  To  this  end  he  established  the  human 
race,  that  there  might  be  a  church  obeying  God  and  worshiping  him,”  566  ; 
xiii.  199  ;  xxiii.  198  ;  xii.  339,  539,  616,  634,  etc. 

4  This  explains  his  severity  toward  heretics  (<?.  g.,  Servetus),  ii.  18;  iii. 

197  b,  199,  241b;  viii.  520  fb;  iv.  739;  xii.  696;  xxiv.  375,  501.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  may  thus  also  understand  his  fatal  attitude  toward  the  Interim, 
vii.  382  f.,  322  f.,  and  toward  Calvin  and  his  party  ;  for,  aside  from  the  devi¬ 
ations  which  had  separated  himself  as  well  from  Luther,  he  believed  himself 
to  be  in  doctrinal  accord  with  Calvin — and  everything  to  his  mind  depended 
upon  doctrine. 


356 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


directly  to  the  latter.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  in  these  views 
of  Melanchthon  are  to  be  found  the  germs  of  the  errors  of  the 
orthodoxy  of  the  seventeenth  century.1  Melanchthon  even  de¬ 
fined  faith,  as,  in  the  first  instance,  an  “  assent,”  with  which  in¬ 
tellectual  act,  the  voluntary  act  of  trust  is  necessarily  associated 
(xxi.  790).  But  this  is  only  a  passing  remark,  trust  still  remain¬ 
ing  for  him  the  first  and  controlling  element  of  faith.  “  This 
consolation  is  trust,  by  which  the  will  acquiesces  in  the  promise 
of  mercy  granted  for  the  sake  of  the  Mediator.  But  trust  in  the 
mercy  embraces  also  a  knowledge  of  the  history,  because  it  looks 
upon  Christ,  whom  it  is  necessary  to  know  as  the  eternal  Son, 
crucified,  arisen,  etc.,  for  us.  And  the  history  must  be  brought 
into  relation  with  the  promise,  or  effect,  which  is  presented  in 
the  article:  ‘I  believe  in  the  forgiveness  of  sins’  ”  (ib.  p. 
743  ;  vi.  910).  None  of  these  passages  must,  of  course,  be  in¬ 
terpreted  as  making  the  salvation  of  the  individual  dependent 
upon  the  possession  of  the  pure  doctrine.  “  Although  the  true 
church  .  .  .  preserves  the  articles  of  faith,  nevertheless  that 
true  church  may  itself  hold  the  articles  of  faith  with  obscurity 
on  account  of  erroneous  conceptions  of  them.  ’  ’  If  very  much 
in  the  teaching  even  of  the  Fathers  is  overlooked,  if  they  have 
only  held  fast  to  the  fundamental  truth,  how  much  more  must  be 
forgiven  weakness  and  errors  found  among  the  laity  (ib.  p.  837  f. ; 
cf.  xii.  433  b;  xxiii.  599,  601,  207).  The  important  matter 
is  only  that  the  proper  foundation  be  laid  in  the  acceptance  of 
the  chief  doctrine.  He  does  not  regard  all  separate  doctrinal 
statements  as  of  equal  importance,  but  expressly  recognizes  a 
gradation  of  doctrines.  “  But  this  faith  embraces  all  the  arti¬ 
cles  of  the  Creed,  and  refers  the  others  to  this  one  :  ‘  I  believe 
in  the  forgiveness  of  sins  ’  ”  (xii.  406,  540  ;  xxi.  422).  There 
are  chief  articles,  which  are  important  above  everything  else. 
The  chief  article  is  that  concerning  the  blessings  of  Christ, 
or  justification.2  In  this  lies  the  whole  practical  comfort  of  the 
Christian  religion,  and  it  is  in  their  relationship  to  it  that  all  the 

1  This  remark  is  not  a  novel  one.  See  G.  Arnold,  Kircben  u.  Ketzer- 
historie,  ii.  Bk.  16,  c.  9,  4  ff.  Zierold,'  Einleitung  zur  Kirchenhistorie 
(Leipzig  u.  Stargard,  1700),  i.  387  ff.,  384;  recently  RlTSCHL,  Die  Entste- 
hung  der  luth.  Kirche,  in  Ztschr.  f.  Kirchengesch.  i. 

2  Cf.,  e.  g.,  xxiii.  600,  280;  v.  582  (original  sin,  grace,  faith,  works,  sac¬ 
raments);  vi.  1 16;  vii.  1 17  f.,  532,  433;  xxv.  863.  Cf.  also  similar  lists  in 
Luther  (supra,  p.  297,  n.  3).  But  note  also,  in  a  disputation  held  under 
Melanchthon,  the  remark  in  reference  to  the  Athanasian  Creed  :  “  When  they 
say,  ‘  This  is  the  Catholic  faith  ’  (Jides),  they  do  not  mean  this  trust  (  fiducia ). 
But  nevertheless  the  principal  good  work  and  destruction  of  the  kingdom  of 
Satan  is  to  think  rightly  ( recte  sentire )  concerning  God,  to  confess  God,”  etc. 
(in  Haussleiter,  p.  51). 


THEOLOGY  OF  MELANCHTHON. 


357 


other  doctrines  receive  their  position  and  significance.  It  may, 
perhaps,  be  correctly  said,  that  Melanchthon  in  this  really 
means  to  say  no  more  than  that  spiritual  life  can  be  aroused  and 
flourish  only  when  the  gospel  is  actually  preached.  But  it  would 
be  an  error,  in  view  of  such  a  remark  concerning  Melanchthon’ s 
personal  sentiment  in  the  matter,  to  minimize  the  historical  re¬ 
sults  traceable  to  the  form  in  which  he  expressed  that  sentiment. 
And  it  will  scarcely  suffice  to  interpret  him  as  holding  merely 
that  the  church  has  in  the  pure  doctrine  a  substantial  means  for 
the  effectual  proclamation  of  the  gospel.  This  was  certainly 
essentially  what  Melanchthon  meant.1  But  he  said  more  than 
this.  Only  they  are  members  of  the  church  who  preserve  ‘ 1  the 
doctrine  uncorrupted,”  i.  e.,  the  foundation,  namely,  all  the 
articles  of  faith  and  the  teachings  of  the  decalogue.2  And  it  is 
just  in  the  uncompromising  one-sidedness  of  this  position  that  its 
power  and  significance  lie.  It  was  in  the  sphere  of  doctrine,  as 
including  the  ideal  of  practical  life,  that  the  issue  had  been 
joined  with  Rome.  Under  the  circumstances  of  the  age,  it  could 
have  occurred  in  no  other  sphere.  The  ‘  ‘  pure  doctrine  ’  ’  was 
the  only  legal  title  to  existence  held  by  the  youthful  evangelical 
church.  This  was  a  controlling  factor  in  her  political  fortunes  ; 
it  opened  the  nations  to  the  new  church.  Hence  the  duty  of  pro¬ 
claiming  the  pure  doctrine  must  be  constantly  impressed  upon  her 
preachers,3  for  the  age  was  full  of  echoes  of  the  scholastic  teachings 
and  superstitions  of  the  past.  There  was  still  a  strong  tendency  to 
disputations  upon  doctrine  and  its  forms,  and  it  was  needful  to  de¬ 
cline  many  a  hand  outstretched  to  the  Reformers  with  proffers  of 
assistance  or  of  sworn  alliance.  The  practical  conditions  of  the 

1  See  the  fundamental  definition,  supra,  p.  354;  ‘‘those  embracing  the 
gospel”  and  the  “true  doctrine.”  We  may,  perhaps,  say,  that  when  Me¬ 
lanchthon  speaks  of  the  evangelical  doctrine,  he  thinks  primarily  of  saving 
truth  in  the  narrower  sense  of  the  term  (cf.  xxiii.  6oo).  As  in  his  first  edi¬ 
tion  of  the  Loci,  the  Trinity  and  Christology  were  regarded  rather  as  matters 
for  reverent  contemplation  than  for  teaching,  so  it  is  known  that  shortly  be¬ 
fore  his  death  he  still  hoped  to  gain  clear  ideas  in  regard  to  these  objects  of 
faith  only  in  a  higher  world. 

2  XII.  433  :  “  It  is  necessary  that  those  who  receive  the  uncorrupted  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  gospel  .  .  .  retain  the  foundation,  all  the  articles  of  faith,  and 
the  doctrine  of  the  decalogue.”  The  text  of  the  C.  R.  places  the  “and,” 
not  after  faith,  but  as  follows  :  et  omnes  articulos  fidei  doctrinam  decalogi , 
which  can  hardly  be  correct,  as  it  is  said  in  almost  immediate  connection  : 
“  By  the  term  consensus  in  funda??iento  is  required  agreement  in  the  articles 
of  faith  and  in  the  decalogue.” 

3  Cf.  the  catalogue  of  doctrines  in  the  “  Examen  ordinandorum,”  and  the 
remark  :  “that  they  upon  opportunity  present  these  questions  in  an  orderly 
way  in  their  sermons,  so  that  the  people  may  among  themselves  reflect  and 
meditate  upon  a  clear  and  fundamental  outline  of  the  Christian  doctrine  which 
is  necessary  ...  to  (lead  them  to)  conversion  and  to  faith,”  xxiii.,  p.  xl. 


353 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


age  gave  birth  to  the  formula  of  Melanchthon,  and  it  in  turn 
reacted  upon  the  age.  We  may  to-day  recognize  its  one-sided¬ 
ness  without  calling  in  question  its  historical  justification.  It 
undoubtedly  fixed  upon  the  Lutheran  church  for  a  long  time  to 
follow  something  of  the  character  of  a  school ;  but  it  was  also 
the  legal  title  upon  which  that  church  based,  maintained, 
and  justified  its  existence.  Cf.  Seeberg,  Begriff  d.  Kirche,  i. 
104  ff. 

8.  The  Church  of  the  Pure  Doctrine — this  is  the  one  focal  point 
in  the  intellectual  horizon  of  the  later  Melanchthon.  The  other 
is  Justification,  or — which  is  the  same  thing  (supra,  p.  235  ff.  ) — 
the  substitute  for  the  sacrament  of  repentance.  It  appears  at  first 
but  an  illustration  of  the  lack  of  strict  systematic  order  in  Me¬ 
lanchthon,  that  the  terms  discussed  under  the  heading  of  repent¬ 
ance,  such  as  faith,  works,  justification,  etc.,  have  all  been  already 
exhaustively  treated  in  an  earlier  portion  of  the  Loci.  But  it 
is  also  an  evidence  that  these  religious  processes  are  not  to  his 
mind  limited  to  the  praxis  of  confession,  but  that  the  latter  praxis 
merely  includes  also  these  processes.1 

Melanchthon’ s  starting-point  is  the  Law.  The  law  is  the  im¬ 
mutable  wisdom  of  God,  a  rule  for  discrimination  between  good 
and  evil.  It  teaches  men  that  there  is  a  God,  and  what  is  his 
character,  that  he  has  placed  all  men  beneath  this  rule  of  life  and 
will  punish  all  who  do  not  live  in  accordance  with  it  (xii.  614, 
658  f. ;  xxi.  421,  685,  741,  885).  Since  now  all  men  are  from 
their  birth  guilty  and  subject  to  condemnation,  the  law  brings 
primarily  to  all  men  judgment  and  condemnation  ;  it  leads  us  to 
recognize  that  we  are  under  the  wrath  of  God  (xxi.  692  f. ;  xxv. 
777).  But  since  even  the  regenerate  still  commit  sin,  the  law 
awakens  in  them  also  a  sense  of  the  wrath  of  God.  To  this  are 
to  be  added  reflections  upon  the  misery  of  life  in  this  world, 
future  punishments,  and  the  necessity  for  the  atoning  death  of 
Christ  (xxi.  876,  883  f.).  The  result  of  this — faithfully  pros¬ 
ecuted — preaching  of  the  law  is  contrition.  The  latter,  however, 
would  but  drive  man  to  despair,  if  preaching  of  the  law  were  not 
at  once  accompanied  with  the  proclamation  of  the  gospel.  The 
gospel,  as  the  announcement  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  teaches  us 
to  know  Christ  and  the  blessings  which  he  bestows  (xii.  605). 2 

1  We  cannot  fail  to  note  here  a  formal  approach  to  the  Romish  model,  es¬ 
pecially  when  we  remember  the  importance  again  attaching  to  the  confessional 
in  the  latter  half  of  the  century.  Cf.  Von  Zezschwitz,  Katechetik,  i.  570  : 
“  Thereby  (i.  e.,  through  the  combination  of  private  confession  and  examina¬ 
tion  upon  doctrinal  points)  the  Lutheran  Church  substantially  readopted  the 
pedagogical  system  of  the  Middle  Ages  in  a  purified  form.  Cf.  also  Ritschl, 
Gesch.  d.  Pietismus,  ii.  201  f. ,  539  f. 

2  Parallel  with  this  narrower  definition  of  the  Gospel,  Melanchthon  recog- 


THEOLOGY  OF  MELANCHTHON. 


359 


At  this  point  the  doctrine  of  the  Atonement  is  considered.  If 
we  are  to  speak  of  mercy  to  the  sinner  who  is  alarmed  at  thought 
of  the  divine  justice,  so  there  must  be  some  means  of  accounting 
for  this  change  of  the  divine  attitude  toward  him.  This  require¬ 
ment  Melanchthon  meets  by  substantially  reproducing  the  satis¬ 
faction  theory  of  Anselm,  to  whom  he  expressly  refers,  thus  ex¬ 
hibiting  both  the  divine  and  the  human  natures  of  Christ  in 
their  connection  with  human  salvation.  In  this  alone  lies  the 
significance  of  Christ’s  redeeming  work  :  “  Christ  has  a  ministry 
of  teaching,  but  this  is  not  his  principal  office.  He  was  sent 
chiefly  to  be  the  victim  for  the  human  race,  to  be  their  Redeemer, 
to  free  us  from  the  curse  of  the  law.”1  The  tempering  of  justice 
with  mercy  was  brought  about  by  Christ’s  bearing  the  punishment 
for  us,  or  bringing  a  sacrifice  and  an  “equivalent  price,”  and 
thereby  satisfying  the  justice  of  God.  As  such  service  could  be 
rendered  only  by  a  man,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  only  God  could 
offer  a  “  price  equivalent  ’  ’  for  the  “  infinite  wickedness  ’  ’  of  the 
race  (xxiv.  78  f.,  569,  579;  xxv.  171,  776;  xii.  577  593, 
446  f. ;  616,  424,  428;  xxi.  733,  743,  904).  The  obedience  of 
Christ  was  the  price  rendered  for  us  (xii.  424,  607  ;  xxiii.  45 1).2 
Christ  is  now  standing  before  the  Father  and  interceding  ( inter - 
pellirt')  for  us,  for  the  whole  church,  as  for  everyone  who  prays 
to  him.  “We  are  righteous  on  account  of  Christ,  his  righteous¬ 
ness  which  he  discharged  in  doing  and  bearing  being  imputed  to 
us”  (xxiv.  216).  His  “merit”  and  “intercession”  are 
the  foundation  of  the  Christian  faith  (xii.  426).  The  effect 
of  this  redeeming  work  is  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  the  imputa¬ 
tion  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  the  impartation  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  of  love  and  righteousness  and  of  the  new  eternal  life  (xxiv. 
80.  216,  654  f.,  656,  748,  775,  798,  873,  864,  875;  xxiii. 
452  ;  xv.  895). 3 

Faith  lays  hold  upon  the  consolation  which  the  gospel  pro- 

nizes  also  a  broader  conception,  according  to  which  it  is  “the  preaching  of 
repentance  and  the  promise”  (following  Lk.  24.  47);  xii.  589,  640  ;  xxi.  732  f. 

1  XXV.  171  f. ;  xxiv.  78  :  “The  final  cause  of  the  incarnation  of  the  Son  is 
that  he  may  be  a  victim,  the  placator  of  the  wrath  of  God.”  But  in  xxiv. 
694,  the  object  of  the  sending  of  Christ  is  said  to  have  been  the  gathering, 
preservation,  and  sanctification  of  the  church.  In  xv.  133,  teaching  and  atone¬ 
ment  are  co-ordinated. 

2  According  to  xxiv.  242  ;  xxv.  1 75,  the  fulfilling  of  the  law  by  Christ  had 
also  a  vicarious  significance. 

3  “  Eternal  life,”  as  Melanchthon  often  insists,  begins  in  the  present  life, 
xxiv.  625  :  “  The  beginning  of  eternal  life  is  in  this  life,  i.  e .,  by  faith  to  know 
this  eternal  God  who  has  sent  his  Son,  and  it  is  to  know  him  to  be  reconciled 
through  the  Son,  and  to  call  upon  him,  to  ask  and  expect  consolation  in  alt 
tribulations.  This  faith  and  consolation  in  genuine  griefs  is  a  taste  of  eternal 
life.” 


36° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


claims,  i.  e.,  it  appropriates  justification,  or  the  forgiveness  of 
sins.  But  with  justification  there  is  at  the  same  time  given  the 
Holy  Spirit,  who  begets  a  new  life.  Thus  upon  contritio  and 
Jides  follows  justification  and  together  with  the  latter  is  effected 
regeneration  or  renovatio  (xxi.  427  f. ).  “  And  when  God  remits 

sins,  he  at  the  same  time  gives  to  us  the  Holy  Spirit,  who  begins 
new  powers  ( virtutes )  in  the  pious  ”  (742).  Justification  is  con¬ 
ceived  strictly  as  a  forensic  act,  and  hence  clearly  discriminated 
from  renewal.  Justificatio  is  a  “  forensic  term,”  and  indicates 
the  “  remission  of  sins  ”  and  “  reconciliation  or  personal  accept¬ 
ance”  ( acceptatio  personae ,  742).  In  this  consists  the  essential 
work  of  grace.  “  Let  this  therefore  be  the  definition  of  grace. 
Grace  is  the  remission  of  sins,  or  mercy  promised  for  Christ’s 
sake,  or  gratuitous  acceptance,  which  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
necessarily  accompanies.”  Even  here,  in  the  doctrine  of  justifi¬ 
cation,  Melanchthon’s  conception  varies  from  Luther’s  form  of 
presentation.  According  to  Luther,  the  Spirit  works  faith 
through  the  word.  Faith  is  both  the  principle  of  a  new  life  and 
the  organ  for  apprehending  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  To  justifica¬ 
tion  belongs  the  begetting  of  faith  and  the  new  life,  as  well  as  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  (supra,  p.  260  f. ).  This  was  also  the  position 
taken  by  Melanchthon  in  the  Augsburg  Confession  and  the 
Apology  (supra,  p.  336).  Now  faith  seems  to  arise  before  the 
bestowal  of  the  Spirit  and  before  regeneration.1  Faith  appre¬ 
hends  the  purely  forensic  decree  of  justification.  And  because 
this  occurs,  the  Spirit  is  also  granted  to  the  individual  for  his 
regeneration.  The  inseparable  connection  which  is  in  Luther 
always  maintained  between  regeneration,  justification,  and 
sanctification  is  thus  broken.  These  are  the  ideas  which 
underlie  the  thoroughgoing  revision  of  the  Articles  IV.  and 
V.  in  the  Variata  Edition  of  the  Augsburg  Confession.2 
Whether  the  complete  separation  (“  reinliche  Scheidung ”  )  of 
justification  and  sanctification  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  step  in  ad¬ 
vance  or  not,  can  only  be  decided  by  dogmatical  and  exegetical 
study.  We  here  merely  call  attention  to  the  fact,  that  Melanch¬ 
thon,  under  this  new  grouping  of  the  conception  referred  to,  was 

1  There  is  here  a  peculiar  lack  of  clearness  in  Melanchthon,  since  faith  is 
for  him  on  the  one  hand  a  product  of  the  Holy  Spirit  working  through  the 
word  (xii.  607,  426  f. ),  and  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  is  supposed  to  precede 
the  bestowal  of  the  Spirit.  Faith  is  accordingly  a  prerequisite  of  justification 
and  begotten  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  yet,  according  to  the  recognized  formula, 
the  Holy  Spirit  is  imparted  only  as  a  consequence  of  justification,  e.  g.,  xxi. 
742,  421,  427.  Cf.  Herrlinger,  p.  54. 

2  If  the  Augsburg  Confession  is  to  be  interpreted  in  accordance  with  the 
Apology,  then  the  prevalent  formula  of  the  Lutheran  doctrine  of  justification 
finds  its  symbolical  support  in  the  Variata  ! 


THEOLOGY  OF  MELANCHTHON. 


361 


not  able  to  make  the  ethical  motive  power  of  faith  as  manifest  as  in 
Luther’s  theory.  Faith  is  now  for  him  essentially  nothing  more 
than  the  organ,  by  which  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  apprehended. 
It  is  not,  indeed,  merely  a  historical  knowledge,  but  the  repose 
of  the  will  in  the  proffered  gracious  acceptance — confidence  in 
the  grace  of  God.  From  this  practical  experience  (faith  as  con¬ 
fidence,  fiducia ,  applying  this  benefit  to  ourselves)  of  the  effects 
of  the  history  and  the  doctrine,  may  be  understood  the  intellec¬ 
tual  conviction  of  both  the  history  and  the  doctrine  (xxi.  422, 
743,  746,  785,  8 86  ;  xii.  431).  “  Faith  signifies  to  asse?it  to 

the  promise  of  God  (which  is  in  the  intellect ),  and  with  this  assent 
is  necessarily  connected  confidence  (which  is  in  the  will),  willing 
and  accepting  the  promised  reconciliation  and  acquiescing  in  the 
Mediator  set  forth  ”  (xxi.  790). 1  Since  the  sinner  now  desires 
above  everything  else  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  justification  takes 
place  (xxi.  742).  But,  as  the  impartation  of  the  Spirit  renews 
the  man,  reconciliation  must  necessarily  be  followed  by  good 
works  and  a  righteousness  of  a  good  conscience.  Upon  a  de¬ 
tailed  examination  of  the  nature  of  good  works  as  represented  by 
Melanchthon  we  need  not  enter.  They  are  necessary,  since 
without  them  faith  would  be  lost  (for  it  is  not  compatible  with 
sinful  thoughts  or  deeds),  and,  further,  since  they  have  been 
commanded  by  God  and  are  in  keeping  with  the  dignity  of  the 
Christian  calling  (xxi.  429,  762,  775  ff. ).  They  are  works 
which  are  really  good  on  account  of  the  faith  which  prompts 
them,  and  which  may  also  be  spoken  of  as  “  meritorious,”  but 
not  in  the  sense  that  they  merit  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  They, 
however,  merit  other  spiritual  and  material  blessings  (xii.  448, 

454)* 

It  will  be  observed  that  we  have  here  a  combination  in  a  fixed 
order  of  all  the  elements  which  are  of  prime  importance,  in  the 
view  of  Melanchthon,  for  the  development  of  the  religious  life. 
But  it  is  just  as  evident  also  that  this  entire  general  theory  finds 
its  closest  parallel  in,  the  Reformer’s  doctrine  of  repentance. 
Contrition,  faith,  and  new  obedience  are  for  him  the  constituent 
elements  of  poenitentia ,2  to  which  he  adds  confession  and 
absolution.3  There  can  be  nothing  suspicious  in  this,  unless  re- 

1  XXI.  759  enumerates  :  notitia ,  assensus,  fiducia  ;  but  the  last  two  terms 
are  used  as  equivalents  (see  also  Haussleiter,  p.  22)  :  “  Faith  is  to  assent  to 
every  word  of  God  given  to  us  and  in  this  promise  of  the  gospel,  and  it  is  con¬ 
fidence  acquiescing  in  the  Mediator.” 

2  XXI.  877  ;  xxv.  62  ;  xxiv.  426.  Melanchthon  at  first  enumerated  only 
contritio  and  fides.  C.  A.  12  ;  Apol.  12,  28  ff. ;  xii.  506  f. ,  510  ;  Erl.  23.  39. 

3  P'rom  the  contrition  which  precedes  faith  must  be  discriminated  the  con¬ 
tritio  cum  fide ,  which  awakens,  not  like  the  former  a  servile,  but  a  filial  fear 
( timor ),  and  which  has  a  purer  sorrow  for  sin  ( purior  dotor).  It  does  not 


36  2 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


pentance  and  justification  were  again  limited  to  the  confessional, 
and  the  first  Thesis  of  Luther  thereby  discredited.  Of  itself,  it 
is  ground  for  neither  criticism  nor  surprise  that  the  doctrine  whose 
definition  started  the  whole  reformatory  movement  should  fur¬ 
nish  the  frame-work  for  the  systematic  construction  of  the  entire 
compass  of  religious  truth  won  by  the  Reformation. 

It  would  be  an  error  to  infer  from  Melanchthon’s  method  of 
arranging  his  doctrinal  views  in  separate  ‘ 1  Loci ,  ’  ’  that  he  has 
transmitted  his  religious  ideas  in  a  confused  and  unconnected 
form.  On  the  contrary,  he  summarized  all  the  results  of  his*| 
religious  study  under  two  headings  :  the  Church  and  Justification 
by  Grace.  The  former  of  these  is  most  intimately  associated" 
with  the  conception  of  “pure  doctrine,”  and  the  latter  with 
that  of  the  law  and  the  gospel.  This  double  complex  of  ideas 
presents,  in  the  theology  of  Melanchthon,  a  substitute  both 
for  the  conception  of  the  church  which  dominated  the  ecclesi¬ 
astical  life  and  for  the  sacrament  of  repentance  which  regulated 
the  practical  piety  of  the  Middle  Ages.  This  furnishing  of  new 
guiding  principles  for  both  ecclesiastical  and  individual  religious 
life  is  a  matter  of  such  immense  historical  significance  as  to 
abundantly  atone  for  any  defect  in  his  method  of  presentation. 

In  formulating  his  definition  of  the  empirical  church,  he  fixed  a*^ 
goal,  toward  which  not  only  all  the  gracious  dealings  of  God 
were  seen  to  tend,  but  toward  which,  as  well,  all  human  effort 
might  be  directed.  As  no  one  might  hope  for  salvation  outside 
of  this  church,  all  the  moral  and  scientific  energies  of  the  age 
were  pressed  into  the  service  of  this  supreme  aim.  This  con- 
ception  impressed  a  uniquely  ecclesiastical  character  upon  the 
intellectual  and  practical  life  of  more  than  two  centuries.  But 
the  conception  of  the  “pure  doctrine”  was  the  boundary -line 
within  which  the  self-consciousness  of  this  church  was  developed 
and  confirmed.  Although  modern  theologians  may  deem  the 
limits  thus  affixed  too  narrow — there  were  historical  reasons  for 
allowing  them  no  wider  scope — it  cannot  be  denied  that  the 
consciousness  of  having  in  possession  the  pure  doctrine  became 
one  of  the  most  powerful  coefficients  in  the  expansion  and 
preservation  of  the  church  thus  endowed. 

§77.  The  Theological  Controversies  in  the  Lutheran  Church 
from  the  Death  of  Litther  to  the  Adoption  of  the  Formula 
of  Concord. 

Literature.  Schlusselburg,  Haereticorum  catalogus,  13  parts,  1597  ff. 

flee  from  God,  but  seeks  him  and  his  forgiveness  with  the  acknowledgment  of 
its  sin  (xxi.  886  f. ). 


CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE  LUTHERAN  CHURCH. 


363 


Walch,  Einleitung  in  d.  Religionsstreitigkeiten  innerh.  u.  ausserh.  d.  Luth. 
Kirche,  io  parts,  1730  ff.  Planck,  Gesch.  d.  prot.  Lehrbegriffes,  6  vols.,. 
1781  ff.  (i*3ined.  2,  1791  ff-).  Heppe,  Gesch.  des  deutschen  Protestant¬ 
ism.  1 555-8 1 ,  4  vols. ,  1852  ff.  Frank,  Theol.  der  CF.,  4  vols.,  1858  ff. 
Thomasius-Seeberg,  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  425  ff.  Loofs,  DG.,  438  ff.,  422  ff. 

1.  The  significance  of  Melanchthon  for  the  History  of  Doc¬ 
trines  may,  in  accordance  with  the  foregoing  review,  be  sum¬ 
marized  in  three  particulars  :  (1)  He  gave  permanent  form  to 
the  ideas  of  Luther,  thus  laying  the  foundation  for  the  theology 
of  the  following  period  and  determining  the  direction  of  its 
progress.  Luther  created  a  new  church  ;  Melanchthon  estab¬ 
lished  a  theology  in  harmony  with  it.  (2)  He  laid  down  the 
lines  within  which  the  spiritual  life  of  the  ensuing  centuries  was 
to  be  developed,  obtaining  a  secure  position  for  secular  learning 
and  the  natural  sciences  by  setting  them  in  an  auxiliary  relation  to 
the  church  of  the  “  pure  doctrine.”  Thus  the  maintaining  and 
the  proclamation  of  the  pure  doctrine  became  more  and  more 
the  essential  and  constituent  function  of  the  church.  Doctrine 
threatened  to  swallow  up  life.1  (3)  He  advocated  a  number  of 
theological  doctrines  of  his  own,  at  variance  more  or  less  with 
those  of  Luther.  Although  he  proceeded  cautiously  in  this 
direction  during  Luther’s  life-time,  it  is  important  to  observe 
that  the  latter  allowed  these  divergences  of  his  associate  to  pass 
unchallenged.  They  assume  importance,  although  supported 
by  very  many  of  Melanchthon’ s  disciples,  only  in  view  of  the 
strict  definition  of  “pure  doctrine”  and  of  the  authority  of 
Luther,  which  had  been,  by  the  efforts  of  Melanchthon  himself, 
carried  to  the  highest  point  and  stamped  as  dogmatic.  The 
practical  application  of  these  principles  and  views  led  to  the 
lamentable  doctrinal  controversies  in  the  period  from  the  death 
of  Luther  to  that  of  Melanchthon.  Both  the  unfortunate  waver¬ 
ing  of  Melanchthon  in  connection  with  the  Interim — when  the 
doctrine  appeared  to  him  to  be  sufficiently  guarded — and  the 
bitter  assaults  made  upon  him  by  the  so-called  Gnesio-Luth- 
erans  for  his  lack  of  firmness  upon  that  occasion  and  for  his 
doctrinal  divergences  find  explanation  in  the  one-sided  character 
of  his  later  conceptions  of  the  church  and  of  doctrine.2 * 

The  great  prophetic  age  of  Protestantism  was  followed  by  a 
didactic  age.  We  can  understand  the  necessity  for  the  tran- 

1  But  it  is  unfair  to  ascribe  this  onesidedness  entirely  to  the  influence 
of  Melanchthon  (Arnold,  Ritschl,  and  others),  for  (1)  The  same  thoughts  are 
found  not  seldom  in  the  writings  of  Luther,  and  (2)  Melanchthon  only  gave 
expression  to  a  tendency  which  dominated  the  period  and  characterized  its 
particular  stage  of  cultural  development. 

2  With  the  above  compare  also  my  article,  Die  Stellung  Mel.  in  d.  Gesch. 

der  Kirche  u.  der  Wiss.,  ed.  2,  Erlang.,  1897. 


364 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


sition  ;  but  it  proved  a  retrogression  similar  to  that  from  the  days 
of  the  old  prophets  of  Israel  to  the  great  Synagogue  !  We  must 
glance  briefly  at  the  leading  controversies  of  the  period. 

2.  The  Interim  and  the  Adiaphoristic  Controversy. 
Melanchthon  and  the  Wittenberg  theologians  announced  them¬ 
selves  prepared  (see  Bieck,  Das  dreifache  Interim,  Leipz.,  1721, 
p.  361  ff.)  to  accept  the  so-called  Leipzig  Interim,  A.  D.  1547. 
In  this  document,  justification  was  modified  and  made  to  signify 
“  that  man  is  renewed  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  can  fulfill  right¬ 
eousness  with  his  works  (  Gerechtigkeit  mit  dem  werk  vollbringen 
harin'),  and  that  God  will  for  his  Son’s  sake  accept  in  believers 
this  weak  beginning  of  obedience  in  this  miserable  frail  nature  ’  ’ 
(Bieck,  372).1  In  addition  to  this,  the  episcopal  jurisdiction  was 
restored,  and  almost  all  the  Romish  ceremonies  were  to  be  again 
introduced  (p.  377  f.,  380  ff. ).  It  is  not  surprising  that  on  every 
hand  a  most  bitter  conflict  was  precipitated.  Melanchthon  by 
his  course  on  this  occasion  forfeited  the  confidence  of  wide 
circles  of  his  former  friends.  The  controversy  is  known  as  the 
Adiaphoristic ,  because  the  chief  question  at  issue  was,  whether  it 
is  morally  permissible  to  yield  in  unessential  external  matters, 
provided  the  chief  matter,  i.  e.,  pure  doctrine,  be  conserved. 
To  this  the  Wittenbergers  answered  in  the  affirmative.  Their 
opponents  (esp.  Flacius,  vid.  Preger,  Flac.  i.  142  ff. )  applied 
the  principle:  “Nothing  is  indifferent  (ddtd<popov)  in  a  matter 
of  confession  and  abuse  (in  casu  confessionis  et  scandali ).” 

3.  The  Majoristic  Controversy.  Luther  was  accustomed, 
upon  occasion,  to  employ  the  paradox,  that  good  works  are  a  hin¬ 
drance  to  justification  (supra,  p.  264,  n.  1).  Melanththon,  on  the 
contrary,  declared  them  to  be  necessary.  (<2)  George  Major 
(A.  D.  1552),  following  the  latter  suggestion,  maintained  that 
good  works  are  necessary  to  salvation,  since  no  one  is  saved  by 
wicked  works  and  no  one  without  good  works.  He  then  further 
explains,  that  they  are  necessary  for  retaining  salvation  (ad 
retinendam  salutem).  Justus  Menius,  after  A.  D.  1554  (vid. 
Thomasius,  ii.  473  ff. ),  held  a  similar  view.  These  ideas  were 
by  no  means  meant  to  be  understood  in  a  Catholic  sense,  but 
were  simply  designed  to  establish  the  profound  connection 
between  faith  and  a  new  life,  and  were  therefore  genuinely 
Lutheran  in  their  tendency.  But  Amsdorf  and  Flacius  raised  a 
vigorous  opposition.  The  former  declared,  that  anyone  who 
would  defend  the  statement  that  good  works  are  necessary  to 
salvation  was  a  “  Pelagian,  a  Mameluke,  and  denier  of  Christ  ” 

1  Free  will  is  treated  in  harmony  with  Melanchthon’ s  views  (p.  362  f. ).  It 
is  asserted  that  “  God  does  not  deal  with  man  as  with  a  log,  but  draws  him  in 
such  a  way  that  his  own  will  also  co-operates.” 


CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE  LUTHERAN  CHURCH.  365 

(Schlusselburg,  Catal.  vii.  210).  The  latter  argued,  that,  if 
faith  alone  justifies  and  saves,  this  cannot  be  said  in  any  sense  of 
works  (Wider  den  Evangelisten  des  h.  Chorrocks,  1553,  form 
C. ) .  And  in  the  same  way  the  preservation  of  the  state  of  grace 
can  be  based  only  upon  faith.  In  the  whole  course  of  the 
Christian  life,  faith  must  maintain  its  dominant  position  and 
dare  not  share  the  latter  with  good  works  (vid.  Schliisselb.  vii. 
162  if.,  534  If. ,  572  ff. ).  This  criticism  did  not  indeed  apply 
to  the  tendency  of  Major  and  Menius.  Melanchthon  wished  to 
rest  in  the  proposition  :  ‘  ‘  New  obedience  is  necessary,  ’  ’  and 
advised  that  the  qualifying  words,  “  to  salvation,”  on  account  of 
the  possibility  of  interpreting  them  as  involving  the  idea  of 
merit,  be  used  only  in  connection  with  faith  (C.  R.  ix.  498  f., 
405  ff. ,  474  ;  viii.  410  ff.).  (£)  But  the  opposing  party  now 

went  further.  They  asserted  that  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is 
only  “  an  appendage,  consequence,  and  supplement  of  grace” 
(Synod  at  Eisenach,  A.  D.  1556,  in  Flacius,  De  voce  et  re  fidei , 
p.  199)  or,  “  Renewal  is  an  entirely  separate  thing  from  justi¬ 
fication”  (Flac.,  De  justify  182).  This  position  was  really 
only  a  logical  inference  from  the  Melanchthonian  conception 
of  the  doctrine  of  justification  (supra,  p.  360).  But  while 
Melanchthon  himself  had,  in  his  theory  of  the  ethical  necessity  of 
good  works,  a  certain  corrective  for  the  severance  of  justification 
and  renewal,  Amsdorf  pressed  on  to  the  bold  assertion,  that 
“good  works  are  injurious  to  salvation,”  and  in  other  declara¬ 
tions  threatened  to  carry  out  the  idea  of  freedom  from  the  law 
to  the  extreme  statement:  “God  does  not  care  for  works” 
(cf.  C.  R.  viii.  411).  But  not  only  Melanchthon  and  his 
school  opposed  these  excesses  in  doctrinal  statement  (“in  the 
divine  order  man  owes  obedience,”  C.  R.  ix.  370,  474;  cf. 
den  Endlichen  Bericht  vnd  Erklerung  der  Theologen  beider 
Vniversiteten  Leipzig  u.  Wittemberg,  1570),  but  Gnesio- 
Lutherans  also  recognized  the  necessity  of  the  new  obedience  as 
proceeding  from  the  inward  impulses  of  the  new  heart  (vid. 
Schliisselb.  vii.  572  ff. ,  603,  615,  617  ff. ). 

4.  The  Antinomistic  Controversy  is  most  intimately  con¬ 
nected  with  the  foregoing.  At  the  Synod  at  Eisenach,  Amsdorf 
had  proposed  the  thesis  :  ‘  ‘  Good  works  are,  even  in  the  forum 
of  the  law  and  in  the  abstract  ( de  idea),  not  necessary  to 
salvation  (Salig,  Gesch.  d.  Augsb.  Conf.  iii.  56  f.).  In  en¬ 
dorsing  this,  Andreas  Poach  maintained,  that  it  is  the  office  of 
the  law  only  to  accuse  and  condemn,  and  that  the  gospel  alone 
leads  to  the  doing  of  good  :  “  After  grace  has  been  obtained 
and  remission  of  sins  and  salvation  accepted,  we  cease  to  do  evil 
and  begin  to  obey  God  ”  (Salig,  iii.  58  f.  Schliisselb.  iv.  265  ff.r 


366 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


338  ff.,  342,  344).  Anton  Otto  advanced  to  crass  Antinomi- 
anism,  affirming  that  there  is  do  u  third  use  of  the  law  ;  ”  that 
the  new  obedience  belongs  not  to  the  kingdom  of  Christ,  but  to 
the  world,  as  to  Moses  and  the  supremacy  of  the  pope  ;  that  the 
Christian  is  “  above  all  obedience.”  We  should  pray  God  that 
we  may  remain  steadfast  to  our  end  in  faith  without  any  works 
(cf.  Planck,  v.  i.  62  f. ).  It  was  the  old  ideas  of  Agricola 
which  were  thus  continually  reappearing,  although  Luther  had 
refused  to  countenance  them  (supra,  p.  251). 

5.  The  Eucharistic  Controversy.  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  the 
Lord’s  Supper  (vid.  sub)  was  enabled  for  some  time  to  prose¬ 
cute  a  silent  propaganda  in  Germany,  as  Melanchthon  and  his 
followers  maintained  a  friendly  attitude  toward  it.  In  A.  D. 
1 5  5  2,  Joachim  Westphal,  the  Hamburg  pastor,  raised  his  voice 
against  it.  He  pointed  out  that  Calvin’s  view  of  the  Lord’s 
Supper  was  not  that  held  by  Luther.  Immediately  there  was 
great  excitement.  Wild  conflicts  were  waged  in  Bremen  (Har- 
denberg  and  Timann),  in  Heidelberg  (Tilmann,  Hesshusen,  and 
Klebitz),  in  the  Palatinate  (cf.  Schmid,  Der  Kampf  d.  luth. 
Kirche  um  Luther’s  Lehre  v.  Abendmal,  1868,  p.  151-225). 
Under  the  leadership  of  Brenz,  the  church  of  Wlirtemburg 
(Synod  at  Stuttgart,  1559)  pronounced  in  favor  of  the  Lutheran 
doctrine.  Melanchthon  anxiously  avoided  a  public  deliverance.1 
He  died  in  1560.  The  Wittenbergers,  at  the  request  of  their 
Electors,  temporized,  condemning  Zwingli  and  defending  them¬ 
selves  against  “Flacian  innovations.”  The  atmosphere  was  clar¬ 
ified  by  the  ‘  ‘  Exegesis  perspicua  et  fer?7ie  integra  de  sacra  coena ,  ’  ’ 
1574,  written  by  Joh.  Cureus  in  Glogau  (ed.  Scheffer,  Marburg, 
1853).  In  this  document  the  doctrine  of  the  ubiquity  of  the 
body  was  controverted,  with  keen  polemic  against  the  Lutheran 
conception  of  the  communicatio  idiomatum .2  Christ  is  present 
for  believers  only  according  to  his  divine  nature  and  personally. 
“The  substance  of  this  Supper  is  communion  (xotvuivia)  with 
Christ.  As  now  this  ingrafting  ( insertio )  cannot  be  effected,  as 
we  have  often  declared,  without  faith,  so  the  sacraments  have 
been  instituted  for  believers,  and  not  for  the  ungodly  ”  (p.  24k). 
The  book  thus  summarizes  the  author’s  view  :  “  Believers  are, 

1  “  I  beg  of  you,”  he  wrote  to  Hardenberg,  “dissimulate  much  ( rnulta 
dissimules )  ”  (C.  R.  viii.  736?  cf-  ix.  15  ff-,  960  :  “  To  answer  is  not  diffi¬ 
cult,  but  dangerous.”  Against  Brenz,  ib.  1034  f. ). 

2  This,  it  was  held,  destroys  the  true  corporeality  of  Christ  and  is  Euty- 

chian  {e.  g.,  p.  41 ).  “  The  body  of  Christ  is,  as  it  were,  abducted  from  us  ; 

therefore  no  part  of  his  substance  ( substantiae )  is  infused  into  us  ”  (p.  11). 
“  We  think,  indeed,  of  no  magical  nor  physical  binding  of  Christ  to  the  word 
or  sacraments,  but  we  say  that  he  is,  according  to  his  covenant,  most  freely 
efficacious  in  believers  through  the  word  and  sacraments”  (p.  10). 


CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE  LUTHERAN  CHURCH.  367 

in  the  use  of  the  bread  and  wine,  made  by  faith  true  and  living 
members  of  the  body  of  Christ,  who  is  present  and  efficacious 
through  these  symbols,  as  through  a  ceremonial  agency  ( ministe - 
riutti),  inflaming  and  renovating  our  hearts  by  his  Holy  Spirit. 
But  unbelievers  are  not  made  participants  or  communicants 
(xojmwij),  but  are  guilty  of  the  body  of  Christ  on  account  of 
their  contempt  ”  (p.  26).  This  document  became  the  occasion 
for  a  severe  condemnation  of  the  Saxon  Crypto- Calvinism, and  the 
express  rejection  of  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper. 
Melanchthon’s  doctrine  was  pronounced  in  harmony  with  that  of 
Luther,  but  the  doctrine  of  the  ubiquity  was  disapproved 
(Torgau,  A.  D.  1574). 1  Cf.  Heppe,  Gesch.  d.  deutschen  Prot. 
ii.  431  ff. 

6.  The  Synergistic  Controversy,  (a)  Pfeffinger  in  Leipzig 
had  in  A.  D.  1555,  following  Melanchthon  (supra,  p.  349),  taught 
in  his  Quaestiones  de  libertate  voluntatis  humanae,  that  man  is  in 
conversion  not  “  purely  passive,”  as  a  statue,  but  must  also  do 
his  part.  The  ability  to  give  assensio  must  in  him  be  called  into 
exercise  for  the  actualizing  of  conversion.  Against  this  Ams- 
dorf  and  Flacius  protested.  Two  startling  events  then  sur¬ 
prised  the  church.  Victorin  Strigel,  at  the  very  seat  of  Gnesio- 
Lutheranism,  suddenly  announced  himself  as  a  Synergist  (A.  D. 

1 5 5 9)  >  and  Flacius,  the  fanatical  champion  of  the  pure  doctrine, 
in  combating  him,  fell  into  the  grossest  of  all  heresies.  In  A.  D. 
1560,  a  disputation  was  held  at  Weimar  between  Strigel  and 
Flacius  (see  Disput.  de  originali  peccato  et  lib.  arb.  inter  M. 
Flac.  Ill.  et  Viet.  Strigel,  1562.  Also,  Salig,  Gesch.  d.  Augsb. 
Conf.  iii.  587  ff.).  ( b )  Strigel  taught:  No  man  can  be  con¬ 
verted  to  God  by  his  own  power  without  the  Holy  Spirit. 
But  neither  can  conversion  occur  by  magic  nor  by  compul¬ 
sion.  God  takes  into  consideration,  among  other  things,  the 
nature  of  man,  as  a  creature  endowed  with  a  will.  The  nat¬ 
ural  difference  existing  between  a  free  agent  ( liberum  agens')  and 
a  natural  agent  (natura liter  agens')  (Disput.,  p.  22,  210)  is  the 
ground  of  a  special  divine  agency  adapted  to  the  peculiar  char¬ 
acter  of  man.  “  The  will  cannot  be  coerced,  ...  if  the  will 
could  be  coerced  it  would  not  be  will,  but  rather  non-will  ”  (vo¬ 
luntas,  p.  82,  25,  73,  176).  Sin  has  not  abolished  and  de- 

1  We  may  mention  also  the  superstitious  conception  of  the  consecration 
taught  by  Joh.  Saliger  and  Fredeland  in  Liibeck  and  carried  by  the  former 
to  Rostock  :  The  body  is  present  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  immediately  after  the 
consecration  and  before  the  distribution  (A.  D.  1568-69).  Similiar  supersti¬ 
tions  spring  up  elsewhere  (hair  of  the  beard  upon  which  a  little  of  the  wine 
has  hung  is  plucked  out ;  stones  upon  which  it  falls  are  crushed  and  the  pow¬ 
der  gathered  up  and  preserved  ;  the  upsetting  of  the  cup  is  regarded  as  a  seri¬ 
ous  offense).  See  Heppe,  Gesch.  des  Prot.  ii.  385  ff. 


368 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


stroyed  free-will,  but  depraved  it1  (p.  49).  Nor  does  grace 
move  this  will  in  a  mechanical  or  natural  way.  “  The  conver¬ 
sion  of  man  differs  from  a  violent  and  natural  movement  (of  an 
object).  And  the  will  acts  in  its  own  way  in  conversion,  and  is 
not  a  statue  or  a  log  in  conversion  ”  (p.  73).  Strigel  means, 
therefore,  that  even  in  conversion  man’s  peculiar  “  mode  of 
action  ’  ’  must  be  preserved,  i.  e. ,  that  no  inward  transformation 
can  be  real  except  the  will  has  also  given  its  assent.  But  he 
combined  with  this  mode  of  action  also  features  of  a  material 
freedom  of  will.  He  conceives  of  the  natural  man  as  only  bound, 
wounded,  and  hindered  by  sin,  and  hence  teaches  a  material  co¬ 
operation  of  the  will  in  conversion.  Although  it  be  but  weakly, 
yet  the  will  of  man  co-operates  ;  its  attitude  toward  grace  is  not 
simply  passive,  but  only  ‘  ‘  more  passive  than  active  ’’(p.232).  At 
this  point,  Flacius  parts  company  with  him.  A  co-operation  of 
the  will  is  acknowledged  also  by  the  latter,  but  only  as  beginning 
after  the  actual  moment  of  conversion.  This  was  with  him  the 
only  question  :  “  I  ask  whether  you  say  that  the  will  co-operates 
before  the  bestowal  of  faith,  or  after  faith  has  been  received  ? 
Whether  you  say,  that  it  co-operates  by  its  natural  powers,  or  in 
so  far  as  (the  power)  to  will  well  has  been  granted  to  it  by  the 
renewal  of  the  Holy  Spirit  ?  ”  (p.  43,  71,  100,  178,  233).  But 
to  this  clear-cut  question  Strigel  did  not  give  a  precise  answer. 2 

(<r)  According  to  Flacius,  the  sinner  is  corhpletely  dead  to 
good  impulses.  His  attitude  in  the  (momentary)  act  of  con¬ 
version  is  “merely  passive;”  yea,  before,  in,  and  after  con¬ 
version,  his  attitude  is  purely  one  of  resistance  (ib.,  p.  131).3 
Thus  he  asserts,  that  “  man  is  converted  (while)  willing  and  re¬ 
sisting  ( vole?item ,  repugnanteni)\','>  and  that  he  “is  converted, 
not  only  when  his  natural  free  will  co-operates,  but  even  when  it 
raves  and  howls  ”  (p.  131  and  thesis  4).  “  God  alone  converts 

man — he  does  not  exclude  the  will,  but  every  efficacy  or  oper¬ 
ation  of  it  ”  (p.  1 18).  As  Flacius,  reversing  Strigel’s  method, 
starts  with  the  material  bondage  of  the  will,  he  loses  sight  of  its 

1  Strigel  is  here  evidently  thinking  of  the  formal  freedom  of  the  will. 

2  What  he  had  in  view  is  evident  from  the  following  illustration  :  “  A  child 
cannot  seek  nourishment  from  its  mother  unless  the  mother  gives  it  to  him. 
She  must  even  turn  his  mouth  in  the  proper  direction.  But  the  child  must  it¬ 
self  draw  the  milk  from  the  mother’s  breast”  (p.  131  f. ).  The  fundamental 
mistake  of  Strigel  was  that,  while  he  had  a  proper  sense  of  the  personal  char¬ 
acter  of  conversion,  he  failed  to  give  proper  expression  to  his  conviction,  be¬ 
cause  the  natural,  formal  freedom  of  choice  was  transformed  under  his  hand 
into  a  material  and  ethical  freedom.  He  was,  accordingly,  unable  to  ascribe 
the  ground  and  beginning  of  conversion  absolutely  to  God. 

3  Cf.  Amsdorf :  “God  deals  with  willing  and  knowing  men  just  in  the 
same  way  as  with  all  other  created  things,  a  stone  or  a  log,  through  his  own 
sole  willing  and  decreeing  (velle  et  dicere)”  See  Schlusselburg,  v.  547. 


CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE  LUTHERAN  CHURCH.  369 

formal  freedom.  Conversion  thus  becomes,  in  the  etid,  a  trans¬ 
formation  of  man’s  nature.  From  this  point  Flacius  went  a 
step  further,  and  maintained  that  sin  is  not  an  attribute  ( acci¬ 
dentia ),  but  of  the  essential  substance  of  man.  He  was  guided 
by  the  Aristotelian  definition  of  an  attribute  :  “  That  which  is 
present  or  wanting  without  destruction  of  the  subject.  ’  ’  Accord¬ 
ing  to  this,  original  sin,  regarded  as  an  attribute,  would  appear 
to  be  only  an  accidental  trait.  But  in  the  view  of  Flacius,  the 
essential  nature  of  man  has  been  itself  transformed  by  sin. 
Although  Flacius  may  have  used  the  term,  substance  (substanz)y 
rather  in  the  sense  of  formal  nature  ( essentia  formalis ),  or  sub¬ 
stantial  form  ( forma  sub  st anti  alls') ,  there  yet  remained  the  idea 
of  a  transformation  of  man’s  nature  by  sin.  A  “  horrible 
metamorphosis  ’  ’  has  taken  place  ;  the  image  of  God  has  been 
replaced  by  the  “true  and  living  image  of  the  devil.”  Man’s 
nature  has  been  distorted  into  a  diabolic  nature,  and  every  point 
of  attachment  for  divine  influences  has  been  lost.  For  the 
advocacy  of  these  ideas  Flacius  sacrificed  his  position  and  the 
fortunes  of  his  life  (see  esp.  Theil.  ii.  of  the  Clavis,  p.  651  ff.,. 
and  “  De  essentia  justitiae  originalis  et  injustitiae,”  1568). 
(, d )  The  Lutherans  persisted  in  their  external  and  mechanical 
conception  of  conversion,  and  the  Philippists  also  maintained 
their  position.  To  the  latter,  the  conceptions  of  the  purely 
passive  attitude  of  man  in  conversion,  his  resistance  to  it,  and 
the  illustrations  of  the  animating  of  a  stone  or  log,  appeared 
overdrawn  and  enthusiastic  (see  the  Endl.  Bericht,  1570). 
They  were  anxious,  on  the  other  hand,  to  retain  in  some  way 
the  personal  and  psychological  element  in  the  process  of  con¬ 
version.  But  it  is  of  the  greatest  significance  that  they  clearly 
and  plainly  deny  “any  kind  of  ability  or  a  free  will  for  their 
own  conversion  ’  ’  in  the  unregenerate.  Man  can,  they  held,  do 
nothing  whatever  toward  his  own  conversion  (Endl.  Bericht, 
form  Ii,  1  b;  4b;  4a).  This  acknowledgment  opened  the 
way  for  a  possible  understanding  with  the  theologians  of  the 
former  group.  The  controversy  therefore  effected  a  positive 
clearing  of  the  atmosphere. 

7.  The  Osiandrian  Controversy.  ( a )  In  A.  D.  1850  and 
the  following  years  attention  was  drawn  to  a  new  theory  of  justi¬ 
fication  taught  by  Andreas  Osiander  (Disput.  de  justificatione, 
1550;  Von  dem  einigen  Mitler  Jhesu  Christo  vnd  Rechtferti- 
gung  des  Glaubens,  1551;  Widerlegung  der  vngegrundten  vn 
dienstlichen  Antwort  Phil.  Melanthonis,  1552).  “  They  teach 

(doctrines)  colder  than  ice,  that  we  are  accounted  righteous, 
only  on  account  of  the  remission  of  sins,  and  not  also  on  account 
of  the  righteousness  of  the  Christ  dwelling  in  us  by  faith.  God- 

24 


37° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


is  not  indeed  so  unjust  as  to  regard  him  as  righteous  in  whom 
there  is  really  nothing  of  true  righteousness”  (De  justif.  thes., 
73  f. ).  This  citation  reveals  his  aim.  Justification  as  con¬ 
nected  solely  with  imputation  is  to  his  mind  an  irreligious  con¬ 
ception.  Justification  is  more  than  a  mere  declaring  the  sin¬ 
ner  to  be  righteous.  But  the  talented  man  now  placed  these  ideas 
in  a  wider  setting.  To  understand  him,  we  must  briefly  repro¬ 
duce  his  entire  scheme  of  thought.  Man  was  created  in  the 
image  of  God.  This  image  of  God  is  in  the  Son,  and  in  the  Son, 
furthermore,  as  from  eternity  appointed  to  become  incarnate. 
Accordingly,  the  appointed  goal  of  human  nature  can  be  realized 
only  by  the  indwelling  of  God  in  it.  This  was  actualized  in 
the  case  of  Adam,  as  in  him  the  Son  of  God  already  dwelt 
before  the  fall.1  Through  this  indwelling  he  became  righteous, 
Through  sin  this  “  original  righteousness”  was  lost.  The 
renewal  of  the  race  is  now  effected  by  Christ’s  entering  it  in  the 
incarnation.  But  Christ  is  brought  to  the  individual  soul 
through  the  word.  He  is  himself  the  “  inner  word  ”  (accord¬ 
ing  to  Jn.  i.);  but  the  latter  enters  the  human  soul  in 
and  through  “the  outer  word.”  The  words  of  Jesus  and 
his  apostles  are  thus  the  vehicle  through  which  the  Logos 
takes  up  his  abode  within  us  (Von  d.  Mitler,  C.  i).  It 
is,  therefore,  through  this  indwelling  that  man  becomes  right¬ 
eous.  Righteousness  is  “no  work,  no  act,  no  endurance;” 
“but  it  is  the  character  (die  Art)  which  makes  him  who 
receives  and  possesses  it  righteous  and  moves  him  to  act  and 
endure  aright”  (ib.  H.  4).  It  is  the  piety  ( Frommbkeit ) 
which  makes  the  man  absolutely  a  new  man.  Thus  the  righteous¬ 
ness  of  man  is  a  condition,  but  a  condition  which  is  and  will  be 
effected  by  God  himself.  This  righteousness  is  God  himself.  As 
the  humanity  of  Christ  became  righteous  through  its  union  with 
God  as  the  essential  righteousness,  so  we  also  become  righteous 
by  virtue  of  such  a  union  with  Christ  (H.  3  b). 

But  this  union  depends  upon  Christ’s  mediatorial  work  as  its 
prerequisite.  The  latter  has  two  aspects  :  redemptio  and  justi- 
jicatio.  Redemption  embraces  two  things.  The  sinner  is 
under  obligation  to  bear  the  eternal  penalty  of  his  sin,  or 
the  wrath  of  God,  and  also  to  fulfill  the  law.  By  his  innocent 
sufferings,  Christ  endured  the  wrath  of  God  and  obtained  for  us 
the  forgiveness  of  sins.  And  since  we,  even  after  regeneration, 
are  unable  to  fulfill  the  law  perfectly,  he,  in  order  that  the 
law  might  not  further  accuse  us,  “  fulfilled  it  purely  and 
perfectly  for  us  and  for  our  benefit,  in  order  that  it  might 


1  See  already  Methodius,  supra,  Vol.  I.,  p.  174. 


CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE  LUTHERAN  CHURCH. 


371 


not  be  imputed  to  us,  nor  we  be  accursed  because  we  do 
not  in  this  life  perfectly  fulfill  the  law”  (ib.  A.  3  b; 
4  a).  By  both  of  these  aspects  of  redemption1  our  ob¬ 
jective  salvation  is  effected.  Everyone  who  belongs  to  the 
church  of  Christ  is  by  it — without  regard  to  his  subjective 
attitude — objectively  saved.2  But  this  reconciliation,  or  for¬ 
giveness  of  sins,  is  not  yet  by  any  means  our  righteousness.  The 
relation  of  justification  to  redemption  is  to  be  conceived  of  as 
that  of  a  consequent  :  “That  righteousness  is  granted  because 
sin  has  been  before  forgiven  ”  (Widerleg.  J.  4  a).  We  are 
righteous  only  in  so  far  as  we  become  alive ;  but  we  become  alive, 
or  righteous,  only  through  the  indwelling  of  Christ.  Justifica¬ 
tion  is  therefore  not  to  be  conceived  forensically,  but  as  a 
making-righteous  (B.  2  a).  Justificare  is  “from  an  ungodly  to 
make  a  righteous  man,  /.  e. ,  to  recall  the  dead  to  life  ”  (De  justif. , 
thes.  3).  This  indwelling  of  the  divine  nature  of  Christ,  with 
which  at  the  same  time  the  Triune  God  dwells  in  us,  is  our  right¬ 
eousness  before  God.  Still  more  precisely,  “  his  divine  nature 
is  our  righteousness  ”  (Widerleg.  L.  2  a  ;  Von  d.  Mitler,  B.  ib). 
It  is  therefore  perfectly  clear,  that  justification  is  the  renewal  of 
man  wrought  by  the  presence  of  Christ,  or  at  least  that  it  em¬ 
braces  this  as  its  chief  element.  If  the  Scriptures  make  right¬ 
eousness  dependent  upon  faith,  faith  is  thus  mentioned  by  them 
because  its  content  is  Christ  (J.  1  b),  i.  e. ,  “  Jesus  Christ,  true 
God  and  man,  who  dwells  in  our  hearts  by  faith  ”  (J.  2  b).  In 
this  connection,  Osiander  acknowledges,  after  all,  a  certain  im¬ 
putation.  When  we  are  united  with  Christ  by  faith,  we  are 
“overwhelmed  and  filled”  with  divine  righteousness.  And 
although  sin  indeed  still  clings  to  us,  yet  it  is  only  as  an  impure 
drop  compared  with  a  whole  pure  ocean,  and,  on  account 
of  Christ’s  righteousness  which  is  within  us,  God  will  not  regard 

1  /.  e.,  the  passive  and  the  active  obedience  of  Christ,  cf.  Luther  supra, 
p.  268.  This  discrimination  became,  as  a  result  of  the  present  controversy,  a 
permanent  feature  of  the  accepted  doctrine  of  the  church.  See,  e.  g. ,  Flacius, 
Von  d.  Gerechtigk.  D  2  :  “  The  essential  righteousness  of  God  .  .  .  demands 
two  kinds  of  righteousness  :  the  first  is,  that  we  make  full  satisfaction  for  the 
transgression  and  sin  which  we  have  committed  ;  the  other,  that  we  thereafter 
be  also  perfectly  obedient  to  his  law  in  heart  and  works.”  Cf.  Thomasius,  Das 
Bek.  d.  Luth.  Kirche  v.  d.  Versonung,  1857,  p.  56  ff.  Osiander  also  gave  a 
peculiar  coloring  to  this  double  obedience  of  Christ  by  representing  the  active 
obedience  as  filling  out  the  deficiencies  in  the  incipient  righteousness.  The 
original  idea  associated  by  Luther  with  the  two  terms  was,  that  by  the  suffer¬ 
ings  of  Christ  the  penalties  of  the  law  were  nullified,  and  by  his  active  fulfill¬ 
ing  of  the  law  the  whole  economy  of  law  (which  as  the  “law  of  nature”  held 
sway  over  all  men)  was  abrogated  for  us.  See  citations,  supra,  p.  27 1  f. 

2  But,  despite  this,  man  remains  under  the  wrath  of  God  until  repentance 
and  justification  take  place  (Von  d.  Mitler,  B.  4  a  ;  2  b). 


372 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


it  (X.  4  b).  “  When  he  dwells  in  us  by  faith,  he  brings  with 

him  into  us  his  righteousness,  which  is  his  divine  nature,  and  this 
is  then  also  imputed  to  us,  as  though  it  were  our  own  ”  (Q.  3  a). 

The  theory  of  Osiander  is  thus,  briefly  stated,  as  follows  : 
Christ  through  his  sufferings  appeased  the  wrath  of  God,  and 
through  his  fulfillment  of  the  law  made  satisfaction  for  our  con¬ 
tinuing  disobedience.  We  are  thereby  objectively  redeemed. 
Salvation  becomes  ours  subjectively  in  this  way  :  In  the  preached 
word  the  Logos  enters  us,  and  he,  embraced  by  faith,  begets  in 
us  a  new  life.  Thus  is  our  righteousness  really  begun,  and  yet  it 
is  righteousness  only  because  Christ’s  abiding  presence  in  us 
maintains  it  and  leads  God  to  regard  our  beginning  of  righteous¬ 
ness  in  the  light  of  his  (Christ’s)  perfection.  This  theory  is  evi¬ 
dently  not  Roman  Catholic  ;  for  it  neither  takes  any  account  of 
merit  upon  our  part,  nor  does  it  really  base  justification  upon  our 
new  life,  the  ground  of  the  latter  being,  on  the  contrary,  the  power 
of  Christ.1  Penetrating  to  the  heart  of  Osiander’ s  contention, 
it  cannot  be  denied  that  he  was  endeavoring  to  reproduce  the 
early  Protestant  doctrine  of  justification,  and  in  this  he  had 
a  right  to  make  appeal  to  Luther.  Like  the  latter,  he  intoned 
with  unwearying  energy  the  indwelling  of  Christ  within  us,  and, 
like  him,  he  saw  the  believer’s  righteousness  and  goodness  in 
faith  because  of  its  content,  i.  e.,  Christ  (supra,  p.  260).  And 
yet,  if  we  compare  with  him  the  entire  Luther,  we  will  observe 
a  distinct  difference.  Osiander  was  distinctively  a  scholar — 
dominated  by  thoughts,  and  not  by  experience — and  he  wrote 
also  under  the  stimulus  of  a  visible  opposition.  This  made  him 
one-sided.  He  was  not  able  by  his  train  of  connected  ideas  to 
combine,  as  did  Luther,  the  legality  and  the  consolation  of  the 
imputed  righteousness.  The  accent  is  differently  placed  by  the 
two  men.  According  to  Luther,  the  Christ  for  us  is  our  con¬ 
solation  and  is  the  effectual  power  of  the  Christ  in  us ;  while 
according  to  Osiander,  the  former  is  but  the  logical  prerequisite 
for  the  latter.  The  practical  result  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is 
for  Luther  above  all  else  faith  ;  for  Osiander,  the  power  of  doing 
the  good.  But  we  should  not  on  this  account  minimize  the  ser¬ 
vice  which  Osiander  rendered  by  advocating  ideas  embraced  in 
original  Lutheranism  as  against  Melanchthonianism.2 

1  The  connection  between  redemptio  and  jtistificatio ,  the  objective  and  sub¬ 
jective  aspects  of  the  work  of  salvation,  remains  for  Osiander  thoroughly  be¬ 
clouded.  His  most  serious  fault  is  his  placing  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  in  the 
background.  In  this,  he  reminds  us  somewhat  of  Duns. 

2  A  broad  systematic  instinct  permeates  the  discussions  of  Osiander.  He 
had  a  connected  general  theory  of  Christianity,  such  as  no  other  among 
the  theologians  succeeding  Luther  possessed  until  Calvin  appeared.  Among 
the  men  of  second  rank  in  the  Reformation  period,  he  was  perhaps  the 


CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE  LUTHERAN  CHURCH. 


373 


Cf.  Moller,  A.  Os.,  1870.  Thomasius,  ii.  ed.  2,  437  ff.  Frank,  Theol. 
d.  CF.  ii.  5  ff.  Ritschl,  Rechtf.  u.  Vers,  i.,  ed.  2,  235  ff.  Loofs,  DG.  423  ff.1 

(<£)  Both  Philippists  and  Lutherans  at  once  arose  with  one 
accord  against  the  theory  of  Osiander.  There  was  no  appre¬ 
ciation  of  the  relative  (historical)  justification  of  his  contention.2 
His  charge,  that  under  the  doctrinal  formulas  sufficient  emphasis 
was  not  laid  upon  man’s  renewal,  was  indignantly  resented 
(Mel.  C.  R.  vii.  895).  The  chief  objections  to  his  theory 
were  the  following.  He  depreciated,  it  was  said,  the  forgive¬ 
ness  of  sins,  by  separating  it  from  justification,  and  laid  the 
emphasis,  not  upon  the  revealed  gracious  disposition  of  God 
toward  us,  but  upon  the  “  gift  ”  ( donum )  of  grace  (Mel.  C.  R. 
vii.  899.  Menius,  Von  d.  Gerechtigk.,  E.  4  a).  He  thus 
reverses  the  proper  order,  regarding  renewal  as  the  ground  in¬ 
stead  of  the  result  of  justification.  But  this,  it  was  further  said, 
was  connected  with  his  second  chief  error,  namely,  that  he  tears 
asunder  redemption  and  justification.  The  obedience  of  Christ, 
by  virtue  of  which  he  both  made  atonement  for  our  sins  and  ful¬ 
filled  the  law  in  our  stead,  is  at  the  same  time  our  righteousness 
and  our  redemption  (see  esp.  the  Censur  of  the  theologians  of 
Electoral  Saxony,  B.  4  b,  C.  2  b,  and  Flacius,  Von  d.  Gerech¬ 
tigk.  wider  Os.,  Magdeb.,  1552,  D.  4  a).  “  In  such  a  way  that 

this  obedience  of  the  Mediator,  Jesus  Christ,  at  the  same  time 
delivers  and  justifies  the  poor  sinner  and  reconciles  God  who  has 
been  angry”  (Menius,  1.  c. ,  E.  2.  Flac.,  1.  c.,  D.  3  a).  As 
we  lay  hold  upon  this  righteousness  of  Christ  in  faith,  it  becomes 
ours,  and  the  objective  certainty  of  this  righteousness  secures  us 
the  comfort  of  the  assurance  of  salvation.  Osiander,  on  the 
contrary,  bases  our  righteousness  and  salvation  upon  our  own 
state,  or  condition,  and  thus  the  assurance  of  salvation  is  stolen 
from  “  poor  distressed  consciences  ”  (Lauterwald,  Fiinf.  Schlus- 
spriiche  wider  Os.,  1552,  A.  3  b.  C.  R.  viii.  583.  Flacius, 
Verlegung  Os.,  J.  3  a).  These  objections  were  certainly  well 

greatest.  Viewed  historically,  his  attempt  constitutes  the  contemporaneous 
counterpoise  to  the  doctrine  of  justification  taught  by  the  later  Melanchthon. 
Both  men  gave  one-sided  interpretations  of  ideas  of  Luther’s  ;  the  latter, 
through  undue  emphasis,  upon  the  imputed,  the  former  by  exalting  out  of 
proper  proportion  the  effective,  righteousness  of  faith.  But  it  must,  after  all, 
be  accounted  a  blessing,  that  the  Melanchthonian  and  not  the  Osiandrian 
scheme  met  the  approval  of  the  church. 

1  My  estimate  of  Osiander  agrees,  so  far  as  I  can  see — up  to  a  certain 
point — with  that  of  Loofs.' 

2  Brenz  opposed  an  express  condemnation  of  Osiander  at  Worms  in  1557 
(see  G.  Wolf,  Gesch.  d.  deutsch.  Protestanten,  1555-9,  1888,  p.  334,  339, 
363).  Calvin  also  most  vigorously  combated  his  views  (Institut.  iii.  11.  5 

cf.  ii.  12.  5  f. ;  i.  15.  3). 


374 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


taken.  Osiander’s  method  of  presenting  the  doctrines  involved 
was  in  fact  liable  to  the  serious  peril  of  making  the  redemption 
wrought  by  the  historical  Christ  but  a  comparatively  unim¬ 
portant  precursor  of  the  effective  agency  of  the  Logos,  and  of 
confusedly  mingling  our  righteousness  and  that  of  Christ.  But 
was  not  the  Melanchthonian  doctrine  also  liable  to  the  perilous 
misconception,  that  man  may  by  simply  giving  intellectual 
assent  to  the  theory  of  satisfaction  become  sure  of  his  salvation  ? 

(V)  In  opposition  to  Osiander,  Franz  Stancar,  appealing  to 
the  Lombard,  for  whom  he  entertained  an  exceedingly  warm  re¬ 
gard,  maintained  P  “  Christ  is  (our)  righteousness  only  accord¬ 
ing  to  his  human  nature  ’  ’  (sent.  iii.  dist.  19.  7).  Since  it  was  the 
mission  of  the  Mediator  to  reconcile  men  to  God  and  to  die  for 
them,  his  works,  because  mediatorial,  were  human  (<?.  g.9 
Schlusselburg,  ix.  244).  And  the  human  voluntary  acts  of 
the  Mediator  cannot  be  attributed  to  the  immutable  God  (ib. 
277).  He  thus  moved  in  the  direction  of  Nestorianism. 

8.  The  Christological  conflicts  belong  to  a  later  period.  (0) 
The  Heidelberg  theologians  assailed  the  Lutheran  Christology 
(see  esp.  Griindl.  Bericht,  v.  h.  Abendm.,  1566)  by  denying 
the  ubiquitas  and  the  communicatio  idiomatum  (Thomasius,  ii. , 
ed.  3,  603),  and  the  Wtirtembergers,  especially  Brenz  (De  per- 
sonali  unione  duarum  naturum,  1561  ;  De  divina  maj estate  dom- 
ini  nostr.  Ies.  Chr. ,  1562),  appeared  in  its  defense.  According 
to  Brenz,  the  entire  fullness  of  the  divine  attributes  was  at  the 
moment  of  the  incarnation  infused  into  the  human  nature  of 
Christ.  And  Christ,  even  during  his  life  on  earth,  actually  ex¬ 
ercised  these  divine  attributes,  although  secretly.  Whilst  he 
lay  dead  in  the  tomb,  he  was  filling  and  ruling  heaven  and  earth  ; 
whilst  he  was,  at  the  time  of  the  death  of  Lazarus,  outwardly  far 
from  Bethany,  he  was  according  to  his  divine  nature  present  at 
his  death-bed.1 2  Cf.  Thomasius,  Christologie,  ii.,  ed.  2,  384  fL 
H.  Schultz,  Gottheit  Christi,  p.  216  ff. 

(Jd)  A  similar  conflict  of  views  was  developed  in  Saxony. 
The  Crypto-Calvinists,  P.  Eber,  G.  Major,  Krell)  also  rejected 
the  communicatio  idiomatum  (Von  der  Person  vnd  Menschwer- 
dung  vnseres  HEerrn  J.  Christi,  der  waren  christi.  Kirchen 
Grundfest,  1571).  The  “  great  and  high  gifts  and  glories” 

1  Thus  already  Augustine  (Vol.  I.,  pp.  260,  361  n. )  as  well  as  Thomas 
and  the  other  Scholastics. 

2  Brenz  based  his  theory  upon  ideas  developed  by  Luther  in  the  contro¬ 
versy  upon  the  Lord’s  Supper.  The  interests  of  Christology  are  for  him  en¬ 
tirely  wrapped  up  in  the  communicatio  idiomatum  ;  but,  measured  by  the  his¬ 
torical  career  of  Christ,  his  theory,  framed  entirely  in  conformity  with  the 
ubiquity  idea,  proves  insufficient. 


CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE  LUTHERAN  CHURCH. 


375 


which  the  humanity  of  Christ  received  are  ‘  ‘  not  eternal,  infinite 
attributes  of  the  divine  nature  ”  (1.  c.,  23,  25).  Each  of  the  two 
natures  retains  its  own  peculiar  attributes  and  energies  unmingled 
with  those  of  the  other  nature.  Against  this,  Martin  Chemnitz 
directs  his  treatise,  De  duabus  naturis  in  Christo ,  157 1.1  If  we 
compare  the  ideas  here  presented  with  those  of  Brenz,  we  are 
favorably  impressed  with  his  strict  adherence  to  the  scriptural 
terms,2  his  familiarity  with  the  historical  development  of  doc¬ 
trine  and  his  dogmatic  carefulness ;  but  he  lacks  the  broad, 
pacific  temper  which  impresses  the  reader  so  favorably  in  the 
works  of  Brenz.  He  holds  that  the  human  nature  of  Christ  re¬ 
ceives  infused  gifts,  qualities,  and  habitus  {dona,  qualititates , 
habitus ,  p.  253  ff. ,  267,  40)  from  the  divine  nature.  It  re¬ 
ceives  these  in  the  fullest  measure  possible  to  a  finite  nature,3  and 
its  susceptibility  is  thereby  increased,  so  that  it  is  enabled  by 
virtue  of  the  hypostatic  union  to  receive  the  essentially  divine 
attributes  (c.  20  f. ).  This  leads  to  a  real  manifestation  of  divine 
attributes  in  the  human  nature.  The  human  nature  is  permeated 
by  the  divine  as  iron  by  fire  (c.  23,  6).  An  interpenetration 
(^rspr/cbprjot^')  takes  place.  But — and  this  is  a  significant  thought 
— Chemnitz  very  frequently  conceives  of  this  relationship  as  an 
exertion  of  the  energy  of  the  divine  will  in  the  human  nature 
and  its  natural  powers.  The  divine  will  with  its  energy  consti¬ 
tutes  the  divine  nature  in  Christ ;  the  human  nature  is  the  ap¬ 
propriate  Organ  for  the  actualizing  of  its  operationes .  “  He 
wished  to  assume  as  an  organ  our  nature,  taken  up  into  the  com¬ 
munion  of  his  divine  energies  {operationes') ,  particularly  in  the 
work  of  the  Messiah/’  p.323.  The  human  nature  is  the  intelligent 
and  self-determining  Organ  through  which  Christ  accomplishes  his 
redeeming  work.  There  is  a  co-operation,  since  the  powers  of 
the  human  nature  have  an  organon  co-operans  in  the  divine  na¬ 
ture,  and  vice  versa  (p.  224,  363,  261).  The  will  of  the  Logos 
guides  the  human  will,  and  the  latter  willingly  accepts  the  leader¬ 
ship.  The  human  will  in  Christ  desires,  craves,  wills,  and  ap¬ 
proves  what  Christ  performs  in  his  offices  by  his  divine  power 
(p.  224).  “For  this  soul  ( anima )  of  Christ  willed  those  things 
which  the  divine  will  of  the  Logos  willed  that  it  should  will  ’  ’ 
(p.  473).  As,  according  to  this,  the  divine  nature  of  Christ 
consists,  in  the  last  analysis,  in  the  omnipotent  Loving-will  which 
is  revealed  in  the  works  of  Jesus  ;  the  whole  character  of  the 

1  The  citations  are  from  the  Leipzig  edition  of  1578. 

2  P.  328  :  “  For  concerning  God  we  should  neither  think  nor  speak  other¬ 
wise  than  as  he  has  in  the  very  word  (employed)  revealed  himself  in  the 
Scriptures.  ” 

3  lie  sees  a  parallel  in  the  indwelling  and  operating  of  God  in  the  believer. 


376 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


life  and  sufferings  of  Jesus  must  be  traced  to  the  will  of  the 
Logos  (p.  39,  72,  227,  46).  With  this  connection  of  ideas  the 
Ubiquity  appears  in  a  new  light.  It  is  now  the  power  of  the 
God -man  to  determine  to  be  bodily  present  where  he  will  (mul- 
tivolipresence) :  4 ‘That  the  Son  of  God  is  by  virtue  of  the  hy¬ 
postatic  union  able  to  be  present  with  his  assumed  nature  wher¬ 
ever,  whenever,  and  in  whatsoever  way  he  will,  i.  e.,  wherever 
he  has  in  a  positive  word  taught  and  promised  that  he  desires  to 
be  present  with  it  ’ 5  (p.  517,  477,  479,  480,  496).  Upon  this 
basis,  Chemnitz  secures  more  room  for  the  human  development  of 
Jesus  and  for  discriminating  between  the  states  of  humility  and 
exaltation.  The  divine  nature  refrains  from  exercising  its  energy 
upon  the  human  nature  {paullisper  retr aliens  et  retinens') ,  although 
the  latter  has  from  the  moment  of  the  conception  really  possessed 
and  had  at  command  the  fullness  of  the  divine  nature.1  Thus  the 
sufferings  and  death  of  Christ  became  possible,  and  we  can  thus 
understand  also  that  the  divine  nature  should,  during  the  state 
of  humiliation,  deliberately  refrain  to  a  certain  extent  from  the 
exercise  and  revelation  of  its  full  glory,  in  order  to  again  bring 
into  action  the  fullness  of  its  divine  glory  in  the  state  of  exalta¬ 
tion.  But  as  Jesus,  from  the  commencement  of  his  human  ex¬ 
istence,  really  possessed  the  whole  compass  of  the  divine  attri¬ 
butes,  or  the  divine  nature  itself,  this  refraining  was  also  a  conceal¬ 
ing.  The  human  nature  therefore  possessed  the  fullness  of  the 
divine  nature  ( plenitudo  divinitatis') ,  but  “did  not  always 
exercise  and  apply  it”  (p.  57).  This  is  the  meaning  of  the 
term  exinanition:  “He  concealed  and  withdrew  and  made 
quiescent  the  employment  and  display  of  his  divine  glory  and 
power  in  the  flesh  and  through  the  flesh  ”  (p.  353).  Chemnitz 
further  declares:  “He,  as  it  were,  restrained  and  withdrew 
the  rays  of  the  indwelling  fullness  of  the  divine  nature,  not 
only  in  order  that  they  might  not  shine  forth  from  him,  but 
that  they  might  not  always  be  fully  and  perfectly  cast  even 
upon  the  nature  assumed,  .  .  .  but  slowly  and  gradually,” 
making  a  growth  possible  (p.  553).  As  the  exercise  of  the 
divine  glory  was  thus  restricted  in  the  state  of  humiliation,  so  in 
his  state  of  exaltation  should  the  plenary  and  manifest  posses¬ 
sion  and  employment  of  his  majesty  be  reassumed  (p.  58,  295, 

1  Chemnitz  was,  therefore,  by  no  means  a  Kenotist  in  the  modern  sense  of 
the  term.  Every  form  of  alteration  in  the  divine  nature  in  the  sense  of  dimi¬ 
nution  or  accretion  is  excluded  (p.  163,  250,  252).  On  the  other  hand,  all 
the  attributes  of  the  divine  nature,  as  essentialia,  are  inseparable  from  the  divine 
essentia ,  or  nature  (p.  253  ff.,  267,  14,  23,  279  f.,  328).  Christ,  therefore, 
as  God,  retained  the  full  possession  of  these  attributes  and  placed  a  voluntary 
limitation  only  upon  their  employment  and  manifestation. 


CONTROVERSIES  IN  THE  LUTHERAN  CHURCH. 


377 


346).  These  ideas  are  all  combined  in  the  exposition  of  the 
£ ommunicatio  idiomatwn.  Chemnitz  discriminates  three  forms  of 
the  latter,  a  classification  which  had  an  important  influence  in 
the  shaping  of  Lutheran  dogmatics :  (1)  Each  of  the  two  na¬ 
tures  imparts  its  attributes  to  the  One  person  (p.  161  f. ).  (2) 

The  action  of  the  two  natures  is  always  a  combined  action  ;  the 
person  effects  salvation  ‘  ‘  according  to  both  natures.  The  Son  of 
•God  did  not  wish  to  operate-  in  one  nature  alone,  but  in  both, 
with  both,  and  through  both  ”  (p.  162).  (3)  The  human  nature, 

since  it  cannot  of  itself  perform  all  the  works  necessary  to  our 
salvation,  is  illuminated  in  every  part  by  the  divine  light,  and  is 
the  Bearer  and  Organ  of  the  operations  of  the  Logos  (p.  163  f. )  } 
Inasmuch  as  this  mode  of  presenting  the  subject  does  not  deal 
merely  with  quiescent  “  substances,  ”  but  sets  forth  the  two  na¬ 
tures  of  Christ  as  actively  engaged  (in  the  work  of  redemption), 
it  proved  successful  in  preserving  some  important  elements  in 
Luther’s  conceptions  of  Christology.1  2  Cf.  Thomasius,  Christol. 
ii.,  ed.  2,  383  ff.  H.  Schultz,  Gotth.  Christi,  223  ff. 

But  the  Wiirtemberg  theologians  also  gradually  learned  to 
think  more  specifically  than  formerly  of  the  state  of  humiliation. 
Christ  as  a  child  “  did  not  know,  did  not  see,  did  not  hear,  did 
not  do  all  things,  although  the  power  of  God,  of  which  he 
became  partaker  through  the  personal  union,  is  infinite  and  un¬ 
circumscribed.  ”  His  condition  while  his  body  lay  in  the 
sepulchre  is  to  be  compared  with  that  of  a  sleeping  person.  As 
the  union  of  body  and  soul  continues  during  sleep,  although  the 
sleeper  does  not  see,  hear,  nor  do  anything,  so  the  soul  of  Christ 
was  also  in  the  state  of  death  without  detriment  to  its  union  with 
the  divine  nature  (Wiirtemberg  Theologen,  Bekenntn.  v.  d. 
Majestat  des  Menschen  Christi,  1585,  p.  37  ff.  Cf.  Thomasius, 
Ghristol.  ii.,  ed.  2,  365  ff. ).3 

1  The  later  dogmatics  discriminated  the  genus  idiomaticum ,  majestaticum , 
and  apotelesmaticum ,  see  Schmid,  Dogmatikd.  luth.  Kirche,  ed.  7,  p.  226  ff.; 
English  Transl.,  Hay  and  Jacobs,  ed.  3,  p.  312  ff. 

2  But  the  concentration  of  the  divine  and  human  life  under  the  category  of 
the  will  is,  after  all,  less  energetic  than  might  have  been  expected.  Contrast 
with  Luther,  supra,  p.  253. 

3  Mention  may  be  here  made  of  the  controversy  upon  the  Descensus  ad 
inferos ,  started  by  Johann  Aepinus  (from  A.  D.  1549).  In  his  view, 

I  Pet.  3.  18  refers,  not  to  a  preaching  after  the  descent  of  the  soul  of  Christ 
into  Hades,  but  to  a  proclamation  made  by  Christ  in  his  divine  nature  before 
the  Incarnation.  The  Descensus,  as  a  part  of  the  obedience  rendered 
by  Christ,  must  be  considered  as  the  final  act  of  his  humiliation.  The  soul  of 
Christ  descended  into  Hades  while  his  body  lay  in  the  grave  ;  but,  although 
the  obedience  thus  rendered  by  Christ  certainly  vanquished  hell,  this  was  not 
a  manifestation  of  the  power  of  the  Risen  Saviour.  Cf.  Frank,  Theol.  d. 
C.  F.  iii.  398  ff.,  434  ff. 


378 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


9.  A  Controversy  upon  Predestination  arose  in  Strass- 
burg,  A.  D.  1561,  between  Hieronimus  Zanchi  and  Johann 
Marbach,  Hesshusen  having  already  in  1560  assailed  the  Cal- 
vinistic  view  of  that  doctrine.  The  controversy  was  precipitated 
by  the  request  of  the  Lutheran,  Marbach,  that  his  Calvinistic 
colleague  should  base  the  certainty  of  election  not  a  priori  upon 
the  eternal  counsel  of  God,  but  upon  the  will  of  God  as  revealed 
in  the  word.  It  was  not  until  later  that  Marbach  attacked  the 
doctrine,  that  God  grants  faith  but  once  to  the  elect  and 
that  they,  by  virtue  of  the  “  gift  of  perseverance,”  cannot  lose 
it  (Loscher,  Hist,  motuum,  iii.  30).  The  way  was  opened  for  a 
settlement  of  the  conflict  by  the  adoption  of  a  formula  of  com¬ 
promise  in  1563  (vid.  Loscher,  ii.  286  ff. ).  According  to  this, 
everyone  who  believes  on  Christ  obtains  grace.  The  promises 
are  universal,  and  everyone  may  therefore  lay  claim  to  them. 
Why  the  divine  call  does  not  work  faith  in  all,  or  why  God  does 
grant  faith  to  all,  is  a  mystery.  Into  this  mystery  we  should  not 
seek  to  pry,  but  confine  our  attention  to  the  gracious  will  of 
God  as  revealed  in  Christ.  These  explanations  lay  along  the  line 
of  the  Lutheran  development.  Cf.  Schweizer,  Die  prot.  Cen- 
traldogmen,  i.  418  ff. 

§  78.  The  Formula  of  Concord. 

Literature.  Planck,  Gesch.  des  protest.  Lehrbegriffs,  vol.  vi.  Frank- 
Seeberg,  PRE.  x.,  ed.  3,  732  ff.  Frank,  Die  Theolg.  der  C.  F.,  4  parts, 
1858  ff.  Thomasius,  Das  Bek.  d.  ev.  luth.  Kirche  in  der  Consequenz  s. 
Princips.,  1848,  and  DG.  ii.,  ed  2,  425  ff.  Heppe,  Gesch.  d.  deutsch.  Prot., 
vol.  iii.,  1857  ;  Die  Entstehung  u.  Fortbildung  d.  Luthertums  u.  die  kirchl. 
Bek.-schriften  desselben,  1548,  1576,  1863.  G.  Wolf,  Zur  Gesch.  d. 
deutschen  Protestanten,  1555-59,  1888.  K.  Muller,  Die  Symbole  des 
Luthertums  in  Preuss.  Jarbb.,  vol.  63,  129  ff.  Moller-Kawerau,  KG.  iii., 
265  ff. 

1.  The  pernicious  principle,  that  religious  differences  pro¬ 
hibit  even  political  combination,  gave  a  double  importance  to 
the  embittered  controversies  above  reviewed.  When  the  Gnesio- 
Lutherans  at  the  Religious  Colloquy  at  Worms,  in  1557,  denied 
to  the  Philippists  the  right  to  claim  adherence  to  the  Augsburg 
Confession,  thus  excluding  them  also  from  the  benefits  of  the 
Religious  Peace  secured  at  Augsburg  in  1555,  the  Protestant" 
princes  felt  themselves  compelled  to  place  all  possible  restraint 
upon  the  theological  conflicts  which  were  dominating  all  other 
interests.  The  passion  displayed  and  the  worship  of  formulas 
reminded  of  the  worst  periods  of  the  dogmatic  struggles  upon 
Byzantine  territory.  As  then,  the  attempt  was  made  to  restore 
peace  either  by  prohibiting  contention,  or  by  constructing 


THE  FORMULA  OF  CONCORD. 


379 


formulas  upon  which  all  could  agree.  The  movement  origin¬ 
ated  indeed  among  the  theologians,  but  its  direction  and  the 
fixation  of  definite  ideas  as  legally-authorized  dogmas  was, 
as  heretofore,  taken  in  hand  by  the  princes,  and  political  con¬ 
siderations  also  influenced  the  course  of  thought.  The  first 
attempt  to  restore  peace  was  made  in  the  Frankfort  Recess  of 
1558  (C.  R.  ix.  489  ff.).  The  princes,  “asa  Christian,  pious 
civil  government,  to  which  has  been  solemnly  committed  and 
commanded  the  protection  and  secure  establishment  of  divinely- 
revealed  truth,  ’  ’ 1  here  affirm  that  they  desire  always  to  support  the 
“pure  true  doctrine  ”  as  contained  in  the  Scriptures  “  and  also 
in  the  three  chief  symbols  and  likewise  in  the  Augsburg  Confes¬ 
sion,  together  with  its  Apology”  (494).  It  is  then  asserted  in 
detail:  that  righteousness  consists  in  “the  forgiveness  of  sins 
and  imputed  righteousness”  (495);  that  new  obedience  and 
good  works  are  indeed  necessary  for  the  begetting  of  faith,  but 
that  no  one  should  place  his  trust  in  them  (498);  that  Christ 
“is  true,  living,  substantial,  and  present  ”  in  the  Lord’s  Supper, 
or  that  “the  bread  is  communion  (die  Gemeinschaff)  with  the 
body  of  Christ  ”  (499  f.  ).2  Non-essential  ( mittelmassige )  cere¬ 
monies  are  to  be  conducted  in  so  far  as  possible  in  harmony  with 
the  word  of  God,  and  local  differences  in  their  celebration  are  to 
be  tolerated  without  quarreling  (501).  In  cases  of  “  conflicting 
opinions,”  the  counsel  of  the  learned,  “gently  and  kindly” 
given,  as  will  readily  be  done  by  the  consistories  and  superin¬ 
tendents,  should  be  followed.  No  “writing  nor  booklet  in 
religious  matters”  should  be  printed  “  which  has  not  first  been 
examined  by  the  constituted  authorities  and  found  in  accord 
with  the  true  confession  of  our  faith  ”  (502).  This  document — 
which  is  instructive  as  showing  the  spirit  of  the  incipient  secular 
ecclesiasticism — accomplished  nothing.  The  strict  Lutherans 
published  in  response  to  it  in  1559  the  Weimar  Confutation , 
which  vigorously  condemned  the  Philippists.  The  conflict  in 
regard  to  the  Invariata  and  Variata  editions  of  the  Augsburg 
Confession 3  first  appeared  at  the  Imperial  Diet  of  Naumburg,  in 
1561,  leading  at  that  time  to  no  results.  It  was  the  controver- 

1  P.  492.  This  is  the  conception  of  the  “Christian  government  ”  (p. 

-  495),  when  just  upon  the  verge  of  transformation  into  the  secular  “  ecclesias¬ 
tical  government.” 

2  Here,  as  in  what  precedes,  the  Melanchthonian  basis  is  traceable, 
cf.  C.  R.  ix.  407,  409  f. 

3  It  was  the  edition  of  1531  which  was  subscribed.  Of  the  editions  of  1540 
and  1542  it  is  said,  that  they  “reproduce  the  above-named  Confession  in  a 
somewhat  more  becoming  and  detailed  form  ;  also,  explained  and  enlarged 
upon  the  basis  of  the  Holy  Scriptures.”  It  is  the  “Amended  (■ verbesserte ) 
Confession,”  i.  e .,  an  exposition  and  development  of  the  Invariata. 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


38o 

sies  upon  the  Lord’s  Supper  (p.  366)  which  now  proved  the 
chief  obstacle  in  the  way  of  conciliatory  movements.  The 
authority  of  Luther  was  here  arrayed  too  distinctly  against 
Melanchthon.  So  long  as  the  Philippists  would  not  agree  to 
reject  the  Melanchthonian  view  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  there 
could  be  no  thought  of  reconciliation.  On  the  other  hand, 
some  progress  was  made  toward  a  comparative  unity  of  doctrine 
in  the  separate  territorial  churches  by  the  introduction  of  Bodies 
of  Doctrine  ( corpora  doctrinae').  The  first  of  these,  the  so- 
called  “Corpus  Philippicum,”  or  “  Misnicum,”  was  a  private 
undertaking  of  the  book-dealer,  Vogelein,  in  Leipzig,  who 
in  1560,  shortly  after  the  death  of  Melanchthon,  edited  a 
collection  of  the  latter’s  doctrinal  writings,  which  contained,  in 
addition  to  the  three  ancient  symbols,  the  Augsburg  Con¬ 
fession,  the  Apology,  the  Confessio  Saxonica,  the  Loci 
(ed.  1556),  the  Examen  ordinandorum,  and  the  Respon- 
siones  ad  impios  articul.  Bavaric.  inquisitionis.  This  collection 
was  not  only  introduced  into  Electoral  Saxony,  but  was 
received  with  favor  in  other  regions  (<?.  g.,  in  Hesse  and  Pom¬ 
erania).  There  at  once  appeared  in  opposition  to  it  a  number  of 
strictly  Lutheran  Corpora  docti'inae.  There  were  commonly 
found  in  these — besides  the  three  ancient  symbols,  the  Augsburg 
Confession  and  the  Apology — only  writings  of  Luther,  such  as 
the  two  catechisms,  the  Smalcald  Articles,  various  smaller  pub¬ 
lications,  and  extracts  from  controversial  works.1 

2.  A  fixed  doctrine  was  thus  secured  for  the  separate  terri¬ 
torial  churches.  The  plan  of  uniting  the  various  churches  by  a 
common  confession  seemed  now  more  feasible.  The  efforts  to 
promote  concord  which  Jacob  Andreae  had  been  making  since 
A.  D.  1569  (see  Johannsen  inZtschr.  f.  hist.  Theol.  1853,  344  ff. ) 
were  at  first  fruitless.  But  the  times  were  constantly  becoming 
more  auspicious.  A  new  generation  had  succeeded  the  earlier 
leaders  of  the  Gnesio-Lutherans,  less  deeply  involved  in  the  old 
doctrinal  controversies,  and  hence  able  to  pass  calmer  judgment 
upon  their  merits.  In  the  general  apprehension  of  evangelical 
doctrine,  as  well  as  upon  many  separate  points,  the  Melanch¬ 
thonian  views  prevailed.  But  the  only  reformatory  authority 
was  Luther,  as  Melanchthon  had  himself  maintained.  Wher¬ 
ever  they  openly  differed,  the  views  of  Luther  were  accepted. 
The  specific  Lutheranism  of  this  circle  really  consisted,  there- 

1  E.g .,  the  city  of  Brunswick,  1563;  Prussia,  1567;  Brunswick-Wolfen- 
biittel,  1569;  also  the  so-called  Corpus  Julium,  1576;  the  dukedom  of 
Saxony,  1570;  Brandenburg,  1572  ;  Luneburg,  1576.  Vid.  the  first  collection 
•of  the  documents  in  the  Book  of  Concord  of  1580,  in  the  Corpus  of  Brunswick - 
Wolfenbiittel,  which  was  also  composed  by  Chemnitz  and  Andreae. 


THE  FORMULA  OF  CONCORD. 


381 


fore,  only  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  in  connection 
with  the  communicatio  idiomatum ,  and  in  the  rejection  of  Syner¬ 
gism.1  On  the  other  hand,  the  specific  Philippism  was  dying 
out.  There  were  no  conspicuous  leaders  to  carry  forward  the 
work  of  Melanchthon.  The  great  Reformer  had  two  souls,  one 
of  which  was  orthodox  Lutheran  and  the  other  Humanistic.  The 
heirs  of  his  Humanism  had  since  A.  D.  1574  (cf.  p.  367)  been 
branded  as  Crypto-Calvinists  and  regarded  with  suspicion,  and 
they  were  also  the  supporters  of  the  positions  in  which  Melanch¬ 
thon  differed  from  Luther.  Some  of  them — influenced  in  part 
by  the  adoption  of  the  Formula  of  Concord — went  over  to  Cal¬ 
vinism.2  The  peculiar  characteristics  which  marked  German 
Calvinism  in  many  particulars  may  be  at  least  partly  accounted 
for  by  this  commingling  of  Humanistic-Melanchthonian  and  of 
Calvinistic  elements.3  Other  followers  of  Melanchthon,  drift¬ 
ing  away  from  the  peculiar  teachings  of  their  master,  became 
Lutherans  from  conviction  (V.  g. ,  Chemnitz,  Selnecker,  Chy- 
traeus).  They  were  at  heart  in  harmony  with  the  new  group 
of  Lutherans,  although  always  characterized  by  the  dogmatic 
caution  of  their  great  teacher  (cf.  Chemnitz,  supra,  p.  375). 
It  was  not  accidental  that  two  such  men  as  Chemnitz,  an  original 
Melanchthonian,  and  the  Wiirtemburger  Andreae,  who  came 
from  a  church  which  had  attested  its  Lutheranism  especially  by 
its  fidelity  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  (Brenz,  supra, 
p.  366),  were  found  to  lead  in  the  interest  of  concord.  The 
consensus  aimed  at  was,  in  its  essential  aspects,  here  already 
actualized — a  Melanchthonian  Lutheranism.4 

The  movement  for  concord  must,  in  view  of  the  circumstances, 
address  itself  to  a  two-fold  task.  It  must  ( 1 )  Construct  a  Body 
of  Doctrine  which  should  find  acceptance  with  all  Lutherans, 

1  This  course  of  historic  events  explains  the  fact  that  the  general  estimate 
of  Lutheranism  has  been  more  and  more  restricted  to  these  two  points. 

2  Cf.,  e.  g .,  the  biographies  of  Widebram,  Pezel,  Hyperius,  Fink,  Ursinus, 
and  the  younger  Cruciger. 

3  This  furnishes  Heppe  and  others  the  point  of  attachment  for  their  con¬ 
struction  of  history,  in  which  a  great  general  reformatory  movement,  embrac¬ 
ing  Melanchthonianism,  a  humanistic  undercurrent,  and  Calvinistic  elements, 
is  represented  as  crushed  out  by  the  domineering  spirit  of  the  Gnesio- Lutherans. 

4  It  furnishes  an  instructive  illustration  of  the  confusion  which  existed  in  re¬ 
gard  to  the  divergences  between  the  teachings  of  Luther  and  Melanchthon — 
apart  from  their  views  of  the  Lord’s  Supper — that  at  the  colloquy  at  Alten- 
burg  in  1569,  the  Lutherans  charged  the  Melanchthonians  with  holding  “that 
we  become  righteous  before  God  alike  by  imputatio  and  by  inchoatio,  i.  e. , 
from  imputed  righteousness  and  obedience  begun  ”  (Heppe,  Gesch.  des  Prot. 
ii.  217).  They  were  here  thinking  of  the  Interim  (vid.  supra,  p.  364).  They 
thus  seized  in  an  entirely  superficial  way  upon  Melanchthon’ s  formula  of  good 
works,  although  this  very  error  might  have  been  charged  upon  Luther  instead, 
at  least  with  an  appearance  of  justice  (supra,  p.  260). 


382 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


and  (2)  Formulate  its  consensus  with  due  regard  to  the  contro¬ 
versies  of  the  preceding  decennium  ;  for  only  thus  could  there 
be  any  hope  of  finally  disposing  of  them  (see  Pref.  Form.  Cone. ). 
The  former  of  these  requirements  was  met  by  including  in  the 
Book  of  Concord  a  collection  of  the  normative  documents  (the 
three  ancient  symbols,  the  Augsburg  Confession,  the  Apology, 
the  Smalcald  Articles,  and  Luther’s  Catechisms);  the  latter,  by 
the  second  portion  of  the  work,  viz. :  the  Formula  of  Concord. 
The  Formula  of  Concord  thus  at  once  assumed  a  position  among 
the  regulative  symbols  of  Lutheranism.  It  would  lead  us  too  far 
from  our  purpose  to  attempt  in  this  connection  a  history  of  the 
genesis  of  this  important  composition. 1  It  was  published  officially 
at  Dresden,  June  25,  1580.  Fifty-one  princes,  counts,  and  barons, 
thirty-five  cities,  and  more  than  eight  thousand  theologians  had  sub¬ 
scribed  to  it.  The  book  was  not  accepted  by  Brunswick-Wolfen- 
biittel  (because  of  hostility  to  Chemnitz),  Schleswig-Holstein, 
Hesse,  Pomerania,  Anhalt,  Pfalz-Zweibriicken,  Nassau,  Ben- 
theim,  Tecklenburg,  Solms,  Magdeburg,  Nordhausen,  Bremen, 
Dantzic,  Frankfort,  Worms,  Strassburg,  Spires,  Nuremberg, 
Weissenburg,  Windsheim.2 

In  forming  our  estimate  of  the  Formula  of  Concord,  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  it  is  based  upon  the  fundamental  symbols 
of  the  Lutheran  Church  ;  that  the  problems  with  which  it  deals 
were  dividing  the  church  in  that  age ;  that  it  actually  gave  ex¬ 
pression  to  a  consensus  already  inaugurated  ;  and  that  it  conse¬ 
quently  succeeded  in  gradually  restoring  the  peace  of  the  church. 
The  detailed  theological  definitions  of  the  pure  doctrine  which 
it  presented  were  in  keeping  with  the  spirit  that  had  prevailed  in 
the  church  it  represented  for  about  a  century  and  a  half.3  We 

1  The  process  of  its  development  is  regulated  by  the  following  documents  : 
Six  controversial  sermons  of  Andreae  (in  Heppe,  iii. ,  suppl.  3  ff. );  the  Tubin¬ 
gen  Book,  orSchwabian  Concord,  1574  (Ztschr.  f.  hist.  Theol.  36.  234  ff. );  the 
Schwabian  Saxon  Concord  (in  Heppe,  suppl.  75  ff. );  the  Maulbronn  Formula, 
1576  (Jarbb.  f.  deutsche  Theol.  II.  640  ff. ) ;  the  Torgau  Book,  1576;  the 
Bergen  Book,  1577  (see  Heppe,  Der  Text  d.  Bergischen  C.  F.  verglichen 
mit  dem  Text  der  Schwab.  Cone.,  der  Schwab. -sachs.  Cone.  u.  des  Torgauer 
Buches,  1857).  The  original  plan  of  having  the  work  adopted  by  a  great  as¬ 
sembly  of  the  churches — such  as  was  often  spoken  of — was  afterward  abandoned. 
Such  an  assembly,  modeled  after  those  of  the  ancient  church,  had  been  de¬ 
sired  by  the  Jena  theologians  as  early  as  1560  (Heppe,  i. ,  suppl.  124).  The 
Formula  of  Concord  is  composed  of  the  Epito7ne  and  the  Solida  declaratio. 
The  latter  is  the  Bergen  Book  ;  the  former  a  summary  of  the  Torgau  Book, 
prepared  by  Andreae  and  revised  at  Bergen. 

2  Silesia  took  no  part  in  the  proceedings.  Strassburg  accepted  the  Formula 
in  1597.  Pomerania  in  1593  added  to  an  edition  of  the  Corpus  Philippicuin, 
enlarged  by  a  volume  of  Luther’s  writings,  some  parts  of  the  Formula  of 
Concord. 

3  I  cannot  agree  with  the  opinion  of  KawerAU  (Moller,  KG.  iii.),  p.  268, 


THE  FORMULA  OF  CONCORD. 


383 


can,  therefore,  as  little  ignore  the  historical  necessity  of  the  enter¬ 
prise,  as  we  can  fail  to  be  impressed  with  the  tactful  and  ener¬ 
getic  literary  labor  which  it  reveals.  The  Formula  of  Concord 
did  indeed  make  final  the  breach  between  the  Lutheran -Melanch- 
thonian  and  the  Calvinistic-Melanchthonian  types  in  the  evangel¬ 
ical  church  of  Germany  ;  but  this  breach  was,  under  the  existing 
circumstances,  unavoidable.  No  reproach  can  be  cast  upon  a 
confession  for  giving  expression  to  a  condition  of  affairs  already 
existing. 

We  must  note  the  leading  doctrinal  statements  of  the  Formula. 

3.  Articles  I.  and  II.  are  devoted  to  Original  Sin  and  Free 
Will.  (<z)  The  Formula  opposes  Flaeius’  theory  of  original  sin 
and  every  view  which  does  not  acknowledge  that  man  is  “  utterly 
corrupted  and  dead  toward  good”  (p.  589.  7).  There  yet  re¬ 
mains,  indeed,  in  the  natural  man  a  certain  knowledge  of  God  and 
the  capacity  of  “ civil  righteousness”  (589.  9).  This  makes  him 
capable  of  experiencing  conversion  (593.  22).  (3)  Accordingly, 
God  does  not  deal  with  man  as  with  a  log  or  a  stone  (603.  61). 
He  does  not  coerce  man  (602  f. ),  although  the  latter  does  not 
possess  the  “  power  of  applying  himself  to  grace  ”  (590,  594). 
In  this  respect,  it  may  be  said  that  “  not  even  a  spark  of  spiritual 
strength  remains  ”  (589.  7),  and  “no  more  than  a  stone,  log, 
or  lump  of  clay;”  even  “in  this  particular  he  is  worse  than  a 
block,  because  he  is  rebellious  and  hostile  to  the  divine  will  ’  ’ 
(578.  23;  591  ff. ;  599.  46).  (<r)  The  only  cause  of  con¬ 

version  is  therefore  the  Holy  Spirit,  who  through  the  word  lays 
hold  upon  the  heart  and  works  faith,  “  new  spiritual  emotions, 
regeneration  and  renovation,  and  new  obedience.”  Man  is 
“  merely  passive  ”  in  conversion  (530.  22).  But  this  dare  not 
be  so  represented  as  when  “a  seal  is  impressed  upon  wax,”  but 
in  such  a  way  that,  in  the  very  moment  of  the  beginning  of  the 
divine  operation  within  us  (“until  the  Holy  Spirit  has  first 
.  .  .  begun  in  us  .  .  .  his  work  of  regeneration”),  the  will, 

that  the  Formula  of  Concord  abandons  Luther’s  conception  of  faith.  He  ap¬ 
peals  in  its  support  to  the  passage:  “The  gospel  is  properly  the  doctrine 
which  teaches  .  .  .  what  that  most  miserable  sinner  ought  to  believe  in  order 
that  he  may  obtain  the  forgiveness  of  sins  before  God  ”  (Muller,  p.  637.  20). 
This  sentence  is  certainly  unfortunately  framed,  but  the  context  shows  clearly 
what  is  meant:  “  For  whatever  consoles  fearful  minds,  whatever  offers  the 
favor  and  grace  of  God  to  transgressors  of  the  law,  this  is,  properly  and  cor¬ 
rectly  speaking,  the  gospel,  i.  e.,  the  most  joyful  announcement  that  the  Lord 
God  does  not  wish  to  punish  our  sins,  but  for  Christ’s  sake  to  forgive  them. 
Wherefore  penitent  sinners  ought  to  believe,  that  is,  they  should  place  their 
entire  confidence  in  Christ  alone,  i.  e. ,  because  he  was  offered  up  on  account  of 
our  sins,”  etc.  (ib.  $2if. ).  We  are  here  told  what  evangelical  faith  is.  The 
“rightly-believing”  are  those  “who  have  true  and  living  faith  in  Christ”  (p. 
534.  39).  Similarly  also  Luther  (supra,  p.  225,  n.  1). 


384 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


impelled  by  God,  engages  according  to  its  own  nature  in  active 
Synergy  (“we  are  able,  and  ought,  to  cooperate  ”  (604.  65). 
Hence  it  is  said  :  The  man  who  is  of  himself  absolutely  unfree 
for  the  doing  of  good  is  by  the  Spirit  of  God  made  free 
(, liberatum  arbitrium ,  604.  67),  and,  in  the  moment  of  the 
effectual  touch  of  the  Spirit,  the  will  is  able  to  co-operate 
actively  in  the  work  of  renewal. 

4.  Article  III.  treats  of  Justification.  (<z)  It  is  asserted,  in 
opposition  to  Osiander  and  Stancar,  that  our  righteousness 
depends  exclusively  upon  neither  the  divine  nor  the  human 
nature  of  Christ,  but  :  “in  his  whole  person,  who,  as  both  God 
and  man,  is  alone  in  his  entire  and  most  perfect  obedience 
our  righteousness”  (622.  55;  629).  The  personally  ren¬ 
dered  obedience  is  thus  the  point  of  view  under  which  the 
work  of  Christ  is  regarded.  This  obedience  was  manifested 
“  in  doing  and  suffering  ”  (612.  14,  15).  It  was  a  “  most  per¬ 
fect  obedience,  by  which  he  fulfilled  the  law  for  us.”  It  con¬ 
stitutes  the  merit  of  Christ,  which  God  imputes  to  us  for  right¬ 
eousness  (618.  30).  That  man  now  receives  grace,  is  based 
upon  the  fact  that  Christ  by  his  double  obedience  has  first  nulli¬ 
fied  both  the  penalties  and  the  demands  of  the  law  (supra,  p. 
371,  n.  1).  {b')  Justification  consists  in  this  imputation  of  the 

righteousness  (/.  e.,  the  obedience)  of  Christ  (611.  4;  612.  15; 
613.  17).  The  result  of  this  imputation  is  forgiveness  of  sins, 
reconciliation  with  God,  adoption,  and  the  inheritance  of 
eternal  life  (615.  25  ;  613.  16).  But  this  justification  is  appre¬ 
hended  by  faith,  not  because  the  latter  is  the  beginning  of 
a  new  life,  but  because  it  is  the  receptive  organ  for  the  appro¬ 
priation  of  the  merit  of  Christ  (612.  13;  616.  31).  The 
genesis  of  faith  is  expressly  traced  to  the  operation  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  in  the  gospel  (619.  41).  (e)  Faith  and  Justification  are 

therefore  the  central  acts.  They  must  be  preceded  by  “true 
and  not  simulated  contrition,”  for  only  thus  can  faith  exist 
(614  f.,  23,  26). 1  The  Holy  Spirit  now  works  faith.  “And 
this  apprehends  the  grace  of  God  in  Christ,  by  which  the  person 
is  justified.”  But  the  believer  is  also  “  renewed  and  sanctified 
by  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  renewal  and  sanctification  are  then 
followed  by  good  works.”  But  this  “inaugurated  righteous- 

1  615.  36:  “Contrition  precedes,  and  justifying  faith  exists  in  those  who 
truly,  not  fictitiously,  exercise  repentance.’’  The  last  term  here  has  a 
narrower  signification  (= contrition ,  penitence)  than  in  the  earlier  confessions, 
cf.  also  the  remark,  p.  634.  7  ff.  This  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
original  parallel  with  the  sacrament  of  penance  was  gradually  fading  from 
memory  and  in  its  stead  such  passages  as  Mk.  1.  15  regulated  the  usage  of  the 
term. 


THE  FORMULA  OF  CONCORD. 


385 


ness  of  the  new  obedience  ’  ’  dare  never  be  taken  into  consider¬ 
ation  as  influencing  justification  itself,  since  no  one  can  stand 
before  God  upon  the  ground  of  this  yet  “  incomplete  and 
impure  ’  ’  righteousness.  Justification  has  to  do  only  with  the 
‘  ‘  righteousness  of  the  obedience,  sufferings,  and  death  of  Christ, 
which  is  imputed  to  faith”  (617.  32;  cf.  620.  44  ff.).  By 
means  of  this  exposition,  the  Melanchthonian  construction  of 
justification  secured  definite  ascendancy.1 

5.  Article  IV.  discusses  Good  Works.  (#)  There  was  here 

a  general  agreement  upon  the  following  points  :  That,  according 
to  the  will  of  God,  believers  should  perform  good  works ;  that 
good  works  are  not  such  as  are  self-chosen,  but  such  as  are  com¬ 
manded  by  God  ;  that  works  are  pleasing  to  God  in  so  far  as  the 
person  of  the  one  performing  them  is  acceptable  to  him  ;  that 
faith  is  the  ‘  ‘  mother  and  original  source  of  good  works  ’  ’ 
(625  f. ).  (^)  It  was  pointed  out  how  dangerous  and  liable  to 

misunderstanding  was  the  position  assumed  by  Amsdorf  (supra,  p. 
364).  Against  Major  it  was  argued  (supra,  p.  364),  that  works 
dare  in  no  wise  be  introduced  into  the  “  article  of  justification 
and  salvation,  ’  ’  as  otherwise  “  assailed  and  distressed  consciences 
will  be  robbed  of  the  consolation  of  the  gospel  ”  (629.  23).  The 
thesis  of  Major  concerning  the  necessity  of  works  to  salvation  is 
therefore  untenable  (632.  37).  (^)  The  doctrine,  positively 

stated,  is  that  faith  brings  with  it  good  works,  as  the  determination 
to  persevere  in  evil-doing  is  inconceivable  as  cherished  along 
with  faith  (627.  15);  2 3 *  and  that  these  works  are  voluntarily 
performed  (628.  18). 

6.  Articles  V.  and  VI.  treat  of  the  Law  and  the  Gospel.  ( a ) 
The  law  is  the  “  divine  doctrine,  in  which  is  revealed  the  most 
just  and  immutable  will  of  God,  as  to  what  manner  of  person 
man  ought  to  be,  ’  ’  together  with  the  threatening  of  temporal  and 
eternal  penalties  (636.  17).  The  gospel,  in  the  “ proper 
understanding”  of  it,  is  the  preaching  of  the  grace  of  God 
(634.  6;  637.  21).  The  law  teaches  us  to  recognize  our  sin 
and  the  wrath  of  God.  But,  in  order  that  man  may  not  fall  into 
despair,  the  preaching  of  the  gospel  must  follow  (635.  9  f .  ).5 

1  Yet  the  presentation  of  the  Formula  is  to  be  preferred  for  lucidity  and 
well-considered  statement  to  that  of  Melanchthon.  A  number  of  problems 
were  allowed  to  remain  unsolved,  e.  g. ,  the  genesis  of  contrition,  the  relation 
of  the  operations  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  begetting  of  faith  and  works,  etc. 

2  Many  erroneously  hold  a  dead  faith,  or  a  certain  empty  persuasion,  which 
is  without  repentance  and  good  works,  in  place  of  true  faith. 

3  It  is  therefore  not  only  the  office  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  administer  comfort, 

but  he  also,  as  a  “strange  work,”  administers  rebuke  (635.  11).  This 
is  analogous  to  Christ’s  taking  the  law  into  his  own  hands  and  interpreting  it 

spiritually  (ib.  10). 

25 


386 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


This  works  faith,  and  through  it  righteousness  (637  f. ).  (b) 

If  the  law  is  thus  necessary  at  the  beginning  of  the  Christian 
life,  it  is  none  the  less  so  during  its  progress  :  First,  because  sin 
and  infirmity  still  cling  to  the  regenerate,  and  they  therefore 
still  require  “instruction  and  admonition,  warning  and  threat¬ 
ening”  (641  f. );  secondly,  in  order  “that  they  do  not  fall 
into  a  holiness  and  worship  of  their  own,”  and  may  be  preserved 
from  imagining  that  their  “  work  and  life  are  entirely  pure  and 
perfect  ”  (644.  20  f.).  Yet  it  must  ever  be  borne  in  mind  that 
the  Christian  “  fulfills  the  will  of  God,  in  so  far  as  he  is  regen¬ 
erate,  from  a  free  and  joyous  spirit  ”  (643.  17). 

7.  Article  VII.  discusses  the  Lord’s  Supper.  (a)  The  view 
of  Zwingli  is  rejected  (646.  4),  as  well  as  that  of  Calvin,  the  latter 
of  which  acknowledges  indeed  in  words  a  “  presence  of  the  body 
of  Christ,  ’  ’  but  means  by  this  only  a  ‘  ‘  spiritual  presence  ’  ’  and  that 
of  the  divine  nature  (647.  5  f. ).  Upon  the  basis  of  the  words 
of  institution,  the  bodily  presence  of  Christ  in  the  Lord’s  Supper 
is  taught  (646  ff. ,  656  f. ,  cf.  supra,  p.  14  f.) — in  harmony  with 
the  Augsburg  Confession,  the  Apology,  the  Wittenberg  Concord, 
the  Smalcald  Articles  (by  which  “all  evasions  and  loopholes 
are  stopped  up  ”  against  the  sacramentarianizing  interpretations 
of  the  Wittenberg  Concord),  and  the  catechisms.  Thus  it  is 
said  :  “  that  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ 
are  truly  and  substantially  present,  and  that  they  are  together 
with  the  bread  and  wine  truly  distributed  and  taken”  (539). 
From  this  follows  the  “oral  manducation,”  which  does  not 
mean  the  Capernaitic  eating  of  the  body  of  Christ,  but  which 
takes  place,  although  “  with  the  mouth  ”  (ore'),  yet  in  a  spiritual 
way  (modus  spiritualus)  (543-  661).  The  reception  by  the 
unworthy  (  manducatio  indignorum)  also  follows  as  a  logical  con¬ 
clusion  (666.  89).  (b)  It  is  therefore  to  be  confessed,  that 

“under  the  bread,  with  the  bread,  in  the  bread  is  present  and 
offered  the  body  of  Christ  ”  (654.  35).  Between  the  substance 
of  the  bread  and  the  substance  of  the  body  of  Christ  there  is  a 
union,  which  may  be  compared  to  the  union  of  the  two  natures  in 
Christ.  Yet  this  union  is  not  a  unio  personalis,  but  a  unio  sacra- 
mentalis  (654.  36  f. ).  The  possibility  of  this  union  is  based  upon 
the  Ubiquity,  which  is  defined  in  the  sense  of  Chemnitz  (supra,  p. 
376)  :  “  that,  namely,  even  according  to  that  assumed  nature  and 
with  it,  he  can  be  present,  and  is  indeed  present,  wherever  he 
wishes  to  be”  (692.  78).  (c)  This  furnishes  also  the  point  of  view 
from  which  may  be  understood  the  effect  of  the  reception  of  the 
Supper.  The  Formula,  with  a  fine  tact,  brings  out  the  leading 
ideas  of  Luther.  The  Lord’s  Supper  testifies  that  Christ  desires 
to  be  continuously  operative  in  believers  according  to  his  human 


THE  FORMULA  OF  CONCORD. 


387 


nature  (622.  79).  It  is  a  seal,  assuring  us  that  the  blessings 
which  Christ  obtained  for  us  in  his  body  are  through  it  present  for 
us(cf.  supra,  p.  287,  329).  “  And  the  pious,  indeed,  receive  the 

body  and  blood  of  Christ  as  an  infallible  pledge  and  assurance 
that  their  sins  are  surely  forgiven  them,  and  that  Christ  dwells 
in  them  and  wishes  to  be  efficacious  in  them  (661.  63;  655.  44). 
Thus  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  recognized  as  the  substantial 
result  of  participation  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  (661.  63). 1 2  (7/) 

“  Christians  who  are  weak  in  faith,  timid,  and  distressed,  who  are 
terrified  at  heart  on  account  of  the  magnitude  and  multitude  of 
their  sins  and  think  they  are  in  this  their  great  uncleanness  not 
worthy  of  this  noble  treasure  and  the  benefits  of  Christ  .  .  . 
these  are  the  truly  worthy  guests,  for  whom  this  sacrament  was 
principally  instituted  and  appointed  ”  (662.  69).  (e)  But  it  is 

only  as  a  tra?isaction  that  the  Lord’s  Supper  is  a  sacrament  :  the 
mere  consecration  makes  no  sacrament,  if  distribution  and  recep¬ 
tion  do  not  follow  (665.  83  f. ).  But  where  this  transaction 
occurs,  there  Christ  is  himself  present  as  the  real  transacting 
personage  (663.  75).  These  definitions,  which  follow  essentially 
in  the  line  of  Luther’s  views,  form  one  of  the  chief  dogmatic 
contributions  of  the  Formula. 

8.  Christology  is  presented  in  Article  VIII.  ( a )  The  Formu¬ 
las  of  Chalcedon  furnish  the  point  of  departure.  The  communi- 
catio  idiomatunf  is  based  upon  the  personal  unity  constituted  by 
the  combination  of  the  two  natures  (676.  11).  The  entire  glory 
of  God  has  entered  into  the  human  nature  and  manifests  this  glory 
in  and  through  it,  “  whenever  and  however  it  seems  good  to  it¬ 
self.  ’  ’  But  a  full  and  continuous  revelation  of  the  divine  glory 
occurs  only  after  the  laying  aside  of  the  “  form  of  a  servant,  ” 
in  heaven  (688  f. ,  679).  The  God-man,  as  it  were,  concealed 
the  glory  dwelling  in  him  :  “  he  held  it  secretly,  .  .  .  employed 
it  as  often  as  seemed  good  to  him  ”  (680.  26).  These  ideas  may 
be  traced  to  Chemnitz  (supra,  p.  376).  (£)  The  union  of  the 

two  natures  and  their  attributes  is,  here  also,  presented  under  the 
view-point  of  cooperation  (689.  66;  685.  51  f.).  But  in  this 
combined  operation,  the  relations  of  the  two  natures  are  not  strictly 
mutual,  since  the  divine  nature  can  be  subject  to  no  addition  nor 
diminution  (684.  49).  (e)  As  to  the  Ubiquity  of  Christ,  in 

addition  to  the  Multivolipresence  mentioned  in  paragraph  7,  he 
is  said  to  be  “  present  in  all  created  things  ’  ’  (547.  16  ;  cf.  682  ff., 
667  ff.  ).  The  presentation  of  this  topic,  regarded  as  a  whole, 

1  The  Formula  is  silent — and  certainly  rightly  so — in  regard  to  Luther’s 
occasional  references  to  effects  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  upon  the  body  (p.  329). 

2  It  presupposes  that  human  nature  is  capable  of  receiving  the  divine,  685. 
52  f.;  549.  14. 


388 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


leaves  the  impression  of  incompleteness.  It  is  hampered  by  the 
differences  of  opinion  existing  between  Brenz  and  Chemnitz. 
The  ideas  of  Luther  are  really  presented  in  a  connected  way  only 
in  the  discussion  of  the  Lord’s  Supper.  The  influence  of  Chem¬ 
nitz,  on  the  other  hand,  is  everywhere  felt. 

9.  In  regard  to  the  Descent  into  Hell,  it  is  said  in  Article  IX. 
“  that  the  entire  person  and  man  descended  after  the  burial  into 
hell,  vanquished  the  devil,  and  destroyed  the  power  of  hell  ’  ’ 
(696).  Yet  we  should  lay  aside  “  lofty  and  precise  thoughts  n 
as  to  the  manner  in  which  this  occurred. 

10.  Article  X.,  discussing  Adiaphora ,  asserts  that  the  church 
has  the  authority  at  any  time  to  change  ceremonies  and  church 
customs  (698.  9),  but  that  when  the  church  is  in  the  state  of 
confession  (in  statu  confessionis') ,  it  must  not  yield  to  its  oppo¬ 
nents  even  in  such  matters. 

11.  The  topic  of  Article  XI.  is  Predestination.  (a)  Ascon- 

trasted  with  foreknowledge  (  prescientia') ,  which  relates  to  both 
the  good  and  the  evil,  predestination  is  the  ordaining  to  salva- 
tioh  (705.  5).  Prescience  has  no  causative  character,  but  the 
cause  (  Ursache )  of  the  salvation  of  the  elect  is  the  divine  elec¬ 
tion  (554.  36).  But  prescience  includes  the  fact,  that  God  has 
“  set  bound  and  measure”  to  those  whose  wickedness  he  has 
foreseen  (705.  6).  It  is,  of  course,  to  be  understood  that  God, 
before  the  beginning  of  the  world,  foresaw  who  of  the  called 
should  believe  and  persevere  in  faith,  and  when  his  call  should 
reach  each  individual  and  nation,  and  when  it  should  be  with¬ 
drawn  from  them  (716.  54  fT. ;  708.  23).  (A)  But  the  Christian 

should  confine  his  attention  to  the  gracious  revealed  will  of  God 
and  avoid  all  speculation  in  this  field  (717  f. ;  719.  70;  715. 
5 2  ff . ;  706.  9  fT. ;  707.  13  f.).  He  should  further  remember  that 
the  “promise  of  the  gospel”  is  really  “universal,”  i.  e.,  it 
“  pertains  to  all  men  ”  (709.  28);  that  the  call  (vocatio')  is  there¬ 
fore  always  sincere  (710.  29;  257.  18);  and  that  the  Holy 
Spirit  is  always  operative  in  the  word  as  heard  (712.  39).  It  is 
not  the  divine  foreknowledge,  but  the  human  will,  which  is  to 
blame  if  the  word  does  not  attain  its  end  (713.  41).  The  divine 
will  aims  at  the  salvation  of  all,  and  does  not  desire  that  any 
should  perish  (555.  12;  722.  83  f.).  (<r)  There  is,  therefore, 

an  “eternal  predestination”  (717.  65).  It  is  the  active  will 
of  God,  that  all  men  who  believe  on  Christ  shall  be  saved  through 
the  gospel.  This  will  is  based  upon  the  merit  of  Christ,  not  upon 
our  works  (720.  75  ;  723.  88).  Upon  the  ground  of  this  eter¬ 
nal  will,  we  may  be  certain  of  our  salvation  ;  for  it  rests  in  the 
hands  of  God  (724.  90),  and  is  based  “  upon  his  eternal  pur¬ 
pose,  which  cannot  fail  nor  be  overthrown  ”  (714.  45).  There 


THE  FORMULA  OF  CONCORD. 


389 


is  thus  “  completely  and  fully  given  to  God  his  glory,”  since 
salvation  is  traced  alone  to  his  gracious  will  (556.  15;  723.  87). 

Of  these  propositions,  it  must  likewise  be  said,  that  they  do  not 
furnish  a  conclusion  in  all  respects  satisfactory.  Yet  their  logi¬ 
cal  consistency  is  not  so  obscure  as  is  often  thought.  God,  by 
virtue  of  his  foreknowledge,  knows  everything  which  shall  ever 
happen.  This  foreknowledge  enables  him  to  set  measure  and 
bound  to  that  which  is  to  happen.  We  must  distinguish  from 
this  the  gracious  will  of  God  to  save  through  Christ  all  who  shall 
believe.  If  this  aim  be  not  achieved,  the  fault  lies  with  man. 
This  view  can,  indeed,  scarcely  be  designated  predestination  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  term.1 

12.  Article  XII.  speaks  “  of  Other  Factions  and  Sects,”  and 
recounts  the  ‘  ‘  erroneous  articles  ’  ’  of  the  Anabaptists,  the 
Schwenkfeldians,  and  the  “new  Antitrinitarians. ”  Here  again, 
the  breach,  now  put  upon  record,  had  long  been  complete. 

13.  Such  are  the  doctrinal  articles  of  the  Formula  of  Con¬ 
cord.  They  record  the  conception  entertained  of  Lutheran  doc¬ 
trine  in  the  second  generation  of  the  Reformation  period,  or  the 
form  of  Lutheranism  which  became  the  basis  for  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  Lutheran  theology.  Historical  investigation  can  only 
record,  that  the  Formula  accomplished  the  purpose  which  it  had 
in  view.  It  presented  the  fixed  results  of  doctrinal  development, 
and  exhibited  in  connected  form  the  ideas  of  Luther  and  Mel- 
anchthon  which  were  influential  in  that  generation.  But,  when 
compared  with  the  entire  scope  of  Luther’s  religious  and  theo¬ 
logical  ideas,  the  decision  must  be,  that  the  Formula  of  Concord 
was  not  in  a  position  to  rescue  from  neglect  and  recoin  all  the 
valuable  truth — the  whole  historical  material — -which  Luther  had 
given  to  the  church.  The  contribution  which  Luther  brought  to 
the  church  still  furnishes  material  for  earnest  study.  Evangeli¬ 
cal  theology  must  continue  to  seek,  and  seeking  shall  yet  find,  in 

1  708.  23  :  “  And  God,  indeed,  by  this  his  counsel,  purpose,  and  ordination 
{i.  <?.,  that  all  who  believe  on  Christ  shall  be  saved,  vid.  $  18),  not  only  pro¬ 
cured  the  salvation  of  his  own  in  general,  but  also  mercifully  foresaw,  all  and 
each,  the  persons  of  the  elect  who  should  be  saved  through  Christ,  elected 
them  to  salvation,  and  decreed  that  ...  he  wished  through  his  grace  ...  to 
make  them  partakers  of  eternal  salvation  ...  to  strengthen  and  preserve 
them.”  Even  this  passage  does  not  lead  to  strict  predestination  ;  for,  in  the 
context  in  which  it  is  found,  it  can  scarcely  mean  more  than  the  following : 
God,  by  virtue  of  his  prescience,  knows  in  advance  what  particular  result  will 
be  accomplished  by  his  gracious  will,  which  is  in  itself  considered  universal 
in  its  application.  And,  just  as  his  prescience  in  general  guides  him  in  the 
ordering  and  directing  of  all  things  (vid.  supra),  so  also  in  this  particular 
instance,  since  God  takes  a  particular  interest  in  the  guidance  and  protection 
of  those  whom  he  foresees  as  believers.  The  connection  of  this  article  with 
the  Strassburg  Concord  should  not  be  overlooked  (supra,  p.  378). 


39° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


the  marvelous  intuitions  of  the  Reformer’s  ideas  view-points,  in¬ 
spiration,  energy,  and  a  renewal  of  her  strength. 


CHAPTER  II. 

COMPLETION  OF  DOCTRINAL  CONSTRUCTION  IN  THE  REFORMED 

CHURCH. 

§  79.  The  Theology  of  Calvin  and  its  Influence  Upon  the  History 

of  Doctrines. 

Sources.  Calvin,  Opp.  ed.  Baum,  Cunitz,  Reuss  (=  Corp.  Ref.  xxix.  ff. ). 
We  shall  have  occasion  to  refer  especially  to  vols.  xxix.  and  xxx.  (Institutio 
religionis  christianae),  vol.  xxxiii.  (the  catechism),  vol.  xxxvi.  (theol.  discus¬ 
sions),  vol.  xxxviii.  (ordonnances  ecclesiastiques).  Upon  the  life  of  Calvin, 
see  Henry,  3  vols.,  1835  ff.  E.  Stahelin,  2  vols.,  1863.  Kampschulte,  J. 
Calvin,  seine  Kirche  u.  jsein  Staayin  Genf. ,  vol.  i.,  1869.  A.  Lang,  De 
Bekehrung  joh.  Calv.,  1897  (Studien  z.  Gesch.  d.  Theol.  u.  Kirche,  ed. 
Bonwetsch  u.  Seeberg,  ii.  1).  Upon  his  theology,  vid.  Kostlin,  Caly.__In- 
stitutio,  in  Stud.  u.  KriL,  1868,  7  ff. j  410  ff.  Rjtschl, RechtlUu.  Vers,  i., 
ed.  2,  203,  227 ff.  Seeberg  (Thomasius,  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2),  p.  638  ff.  Loofs, 
DG.,  ed.  3,  427  ff.  A.  Lang,  Die  altesten  theol.  Arbeiten  Calv.,  in  Neue 
Jarbb.  f.  deutsche  Theol.  ii.  273  ff.  Schweitzer,  Centraldogmen,  i.  i5off. 
Muller,  De  Godsleer  von  Calvijn,  1881.  Scheibe,  Calv.  Praedest.-lehre, 
1897.  Usteri,  Calv.  Sakraments  u.  Tauflehre,  Stud.  u.  Krit. ,  1884,  417  ff. 
Seeberg,  Begriff  d.  Kirche,  i.  H9ff.  Lobstein,  Die  Ethik  Calvins,  1877. 
Dilthey,  in  Archiv.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Philos,  vi.  528  ff.  Elster,  Calv.  als 
Staatsmann,  Gesetzgeber  u.  Nationalokonom,  in  Jarbb.  fiir  Nationalokonom, 
vol.  31.  163  ff. 

i.  As  Zwingli’s  political  plans  were  frustrated  by  his  death, 
so  the  direct  influence  of  his  theology  also,  within  a  comparatively 
short  time,  ceased  to  be  felt.  Even  men  who  stood  so  near  to 
him  as  Bullinger  accepted  his  doctrinal  views  only  in  their 
general  outline,  and  proceeded  to  “deepen  ”  and  develop  them 
(see  Pestalozzi,  H.  Bull.,  1858,  and  cf.  Usteri,  in  Stud.  u. 
Krit.,  1883,  p.  730  ff. ).  In  the  circles  in  Southwestern  Ger¬ 
many  in  which  Zwingli’s  influence  had  been  particularly  felt 
arose  a  new  theological  type,  which,  with  a  close  adherence  to 
the  principles  of  Luther,  combined  a  certain  leaning  toward 
ideas  of  Zwingli.  The  most  important  and  active  representa¬ 
tive  of  this  group  was  the  great  compromise  theologian,  Martin 
Bucer  (-j*  1551).  Its  characteristic  features  were  the  following  : 
“  The  fundamental  ideas  of  the  Reformation  upon  sin,  grace, 
justification,  and  sanctification  were  reproduced  in  harmony  with 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


391 

Luther  and  Melanchthon.  The  relation  to  Luther  is  incompara¬ 
bly  more  intimate  and  evident  than  was  Zwingli’s.1  The  assurance 
of  salvation  was  commonly  based  upon  predestination,  or  the  “  gift 
of  perseverance.  ’  ’  In  the  doctrine  of  the  sacraments,  and  espe¬ 
cially  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  the  attempt  was  made  to  find  a  me¬ 
dian  ground  between  the  views  of  Luther  and  Zwingli.  The 
men  of  this  group  very  earnestly  insisted  upon  referring  every¬ 
thing  to  the  Scriptures  in  a  somewhat  legalistic  way,  the  state¬ 
ments  of  the  latter  being  regarded  as  fixed  formulas  of  doctrine 
and  of  ecclesiastical  life.  With  this  tendency  is  closely  associated 
the  marked  biblical  character  of  the  theology  in  question,  as  well 
as  the  effort  by  the  fuller  application  of  biblical  ideas  to  carry 
out  the  principles  of  the  Reformation  more  completely  than 
had  been  done  upon  more  strictly  Lutheran  territory.  Stand¬ 
ing  upon  the  historic  ground  of  the  earlier  ideas  of  reform, 
and  inspired  by  Erasmian  ideals,  it  was  sought  to  realize  the 
practical  ideas  of  reform  by  a  strict  discipline  and  by  benevo¬ 
lent  operations  and  careful  church  organization,  in  so  far  as  this 
appeared  possible  and  desirable  within  the  scope  of  the  evangel¬ 
ical  reformation.  The  church  was  regarded  as  the  “  kingdom  of 
Christ,”  in  which  there  exists  a  new  covenant  ( foedus )  with 
God.  Living  under  the  sovereignty  of  God,  it  is  proper  for  us 
to  minister  to  his  glory.  As,  on  the  one  hand,  the  entire  Chris¬ 
tian  life  became,  in  the  light  of  this  conception,  one  of  active 
service,  so,  too,  it  was  thought  that  the  glory  of  God  demands 
that  he  alone — and  not  our  works  nor  any  agency  other  than 
divine — be  recognized  as  effecting  the  salvation  and  life  of  the 
church.2  Hence  their  advocacy  of  predestination.  Not,  in¬ 
deed,  in  the  form  of  a  connected  theological  system,  but  as  a 
practically  influential  combination  of  opinions  and  sentiments, 
this  tendency  secured  adherents  and  became  a  recognized  power 
in  the  church, 

It  may  be  studied  most  readily  in  the  writings  of  Bucer.  His 
last  publication  treats  of  the  Kingdom  of  Christ,  De  regno 
Christi  (vid.  in  Scripta  Anglicana,  Basil,  1577,  p.  3-173)* 
This  kingdom  is  an  administratio  populi  (p.  3).  ‘‘The  kingdom 
of  our  Servitor,  Jesus  Christ,  is  an  administration  and  procuring 

1  This  is  plainly  seen  in  Bucer’ s  first  publications.  The  Summary  of  his 
sermons  of  1523  presents  in  its  positive  explanations  an  excellent  outline  of 
the  fundamental  religious  conceptions  of  Luther. 

2  In  Bucer,  as  in  Zwingli  (supra,  p.  312),  the  thought  of  the  glory  of  God 
constantly  recurs.  How  practically  pervasive  was  this  idea  is  indicated,  e.  g.y 
in  the  subscription  appended  by  the  citizens  of  Strassburg  to  a  petition,  A.  D. 
1527,  for  the  complete  abolition  of  the  mass  :  “  The  obedient  citizens  of  your 
Excellencies,  who  desire  the  advancement  of  the  glory  of  God  and  of  the  king¬ 
dom  of  Christ”  (in  Baum,  Capito  u.  Butzer,  p.  393). 


392 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


of  the  eternal  salvation  of  the  elect  of  God,  by  which  he  himself, 
our  Lord  and  the  King  of  heaven,  by  his  doctrine  and  discipline 
administered  through  special  ministers  appointed  for  that  purpose, 

.  .  .  gathers  his  elect  to  himself  and  incorporates  them  in  himself 
and  his  church,  and  in  it  so  governs  them  that,  daily  purged  more 
fully  from  their  sins,  they  may  live  well  and  blessedly”  (p.  31). 
The  elect  allow  themselves  to  be  guided  and  governed  by  the 
*  ‘  ministry  regularly  constituted  (p.  34) .  The  ministry  teach,  con¬ 
fining  themselves  strictly  to  the  Holy  Scriptures  (p.  36). 1  The 
first  marks  of  the  true  church  are  scripturalness  of  doctrine  and  of 
the  administration  of  the  sacraments  ;  the  third  is  discipline  (p. 
40  ff. ),  to  which  is  added  care  for  the  poor  (p.  50).  The  second 
Book  contains  a  fully  detailed  plan  for  the  introduction  of  the 
Kingdom  into  England.2  In  the  Introduction  to  the  exposi¬ 
tion  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans  is  found  a  brief  statement  of 
Bucer’s  Soteriology.3  He  here  also  presents  at  length  his  view 
of  predestination  (vid.  excurs.,  p.  358  If.).  This  is,  in  the 
proper  sense,  an  election  to  salvation.  The  practical  import¬ 
ance  of  the  doctrine  lies  in  its  making  known  to  us  “this 
certain  and  immovable  will  of  God  concerning  our  salvation, 
which  no  creature  is  able  to  prevent”  (p.  358a,  360b). 
If  salvation  is  based  upon  the  eternal  counsel  of  God,  we 
may  then  be  sure  of  it.  Predestination  leads  to  the  measures 
for  attaining  its  end,  i.  e .,  vocation,  justification,  and  glori¬ 
fication.  He  to  whom  the  call  is  given  may,  therefore,  be 
sure  of  his  election  (p.  359  b).  In  a  wider  sense,  predestina¬ 
tion  in  general  is  traced  to  the  divine  pre-determination  (  prae- 
finitio );  in  which  sense  we  may  also  speak  of  a  “  predestination 
of  the  wicked.”  They,  too,  have  an  appointed  place  in  the 
divine  plan  of  the  world.  God  knows  in  advance  for  what  pur¬ 
pose  he  will  use  them  :  “  He  then  ordained  and  destined  them 
to  these  ends,  ad  e  a"  (p.  358  b).  “  God  foresaw  and  destined 
even  these  to  this  lot  before  he  created  them.  For  he  does  all 
things  by  predeterminate  and  infallible  counsel  ”  (p.  359  a).  Pre¬ 
destination  is  thus  utilized  in  a  purely  practical  way  as  a  means 

1  Cf.  in  the  Einleitung  zur  Enarratio  ep.  ad  Roman.  ( Argentorat.  1536),  p. 
19  a  :  “To  this  republic  the  Scriptures  are  instead  of  law,  for  they  set  forth 
and  appoint  the  will  of  its  head  concerning  all  the  duties  of  life.” 

2  See  also  the  interesting  suggestions  for  the  advancement  of  farming,  in¬ 
dustry,  and  commerce  in  England,  p.  136-140. 

3  JustiJicare=  absolvere.  We  are  assured  of  this  pardon  of  sins,  secured 
through  Christ,  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  who  begets  faith  in  us,  but  at  the  same 
time  subdues  evil  lust  and  calls  into  being  a  new  will  (vid.  Enar.  in  ep.  ad 
Rom.,  p.  11  ff.).  Faith  is  a  “ persuasio  (=  niarig,  p.  22  a)  of  the  mercy  of 
God  toward  us,”  p.  14  b,  or  an  assensus ,  not  only  with  the  intellect,  but  also 
with  the  will,  p.  15  f.  See  also  briefly  in  the  Epitome  doctr.  eccles.  Argento- 
xat.,  in  Scripta  anglicana,  p.  173  ff. 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


393 


in  establishing  the  certainty  of  salvation.  Zwingli ’s  speculative 
method  of  theorizing  on  the  subject  is  foreign  to  Bucer,  nor  does 
he  follow  Luther’s  deductions  as  to  the  enslavement  of  the  will. 
As  to  his  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  vid.  supra,  p.  331,  n.  i.1 

These  excerpts  from  Bucer  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  above - 
noted  characteristics.  The  theological  type  which  they  repre¬ 
sent — which  may  be  briefly  styled  Bucerism — is  the  contempo¬ 
raneous  pendant  of  Melanchthonian  Lutheranism.  The  ideas  of 
Luther  were  by  Bucer,  as  by  Melanchthon,  recast  in  the  forms  de¬ 
manded  by  his  practical  aims.  The  parallel  may  readily  be 
carried  out  in  detail.  In  neither  of  these  men,  with  the  tendencies 

which  they  represented,  was  the  process  developed  without 
omissions  and  displacements  in  the  Lutheran  complex  of  ideas.2 
But,  while  it  was  the  fortune  of  Melanchthon  to  construct 
formulas  which  should  dominate  the  thought  of  two  centuries, 
Bucerism  became  but  the  stepping-stone  to  Calvinism.  Bucer’ s 
mediating  theology  was  almost  everywhere  merged  in  Calvinism. 
This  did  not  involve  any  violence  to  the  former,  but  was  but  the 
transition  from  a  lower  to  a  higher  form.  Calvin,  like  Bucer, 
drew  his  first  inspiration  from  Luther.  Luther’s  ideas  moulded 
him  in  a  general  way  as  a  theologian,  and  also  in  his  views  of 
particular  doctrines.3  Yet  he  was  a  Lutheran  only  in  the  same 
sense  as  Bucer.  Or,  we  may  say,  the  impulses  which  made 
Calvin  a  theologian  and  churchman  proceed,  not  only  from  the 
influence  of  Luther,  but  also  from  that  conception  of  religion 
and  of  the  church  and  her  duty  which  prevailed  at  Strassburg  and 
which  pervades  the  writings  of  Bucer.  Not  only  his  ethical  appre¬ 
hension  of  the  work  of  reformation,  but  his  views  upon  a  number 
of  important  doctrines — as  of  the  sacraments,  particularly  the 
.  Lord’s  Supper,  of  predestination,  and  of  faith — point  distinctly 
to  this  source.  Calvin  starts  therefore,  not  with  Zwingli,  but  with 
Luther,4  and  promotes  that  conception  of  the  work  of  the  Refor- 

1  For  the  biography  of  Bucer,  see  Baum,  Capito  u.  Butzer,  i860.  A 
worthy  presentation  of  his  theology  has  recently  been  published  by  A.  Lang. 
Vid.  Das  Evangelienkommentar  M.  Butzers,  u.  die  Grundziige  seiner  Theologie 
(Bonwetsch-Seeberg,  Studien  zur  Gesch.  der  Theol.  u.  der  Kirche,  ii.  2),  1900. 

2  In  the  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  Melanchthon  and  his  school  draw 
from  Bucer. 

3  See  Lang,  Bekehrung  Calvins,  p.  47  ff.,  and  the  same  author’s  collection 
of  utterances  of  Calvin  concerning  Luther  in  Deutsch-Evang.  Blatter,  1896, 
322  ff. 

4  Zwingli’ s  significance  for  the  History  of  Doctrines  really  consists  therefore 
only  in  the  fact,  that  he  by  his  energetic  opposition  prevented  the  complete 
dominance  of  the  Lutheran  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper.  The  statement  of 
DlLTHEY  (Archiv.  vi.,  529,  531),  that  Calvin  drew  his  inspiration  from 
Zwingli’s  “  freely  breathing  religious  animation  ”  and  from  his  spiritual  wealth 
( Seelenfulle ),  is  historically  untenable. 


394 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


mation  which  originated — not  indeed  without  Zwinglian  influences 
— in  Southwestern  Germany,  particularly  at  Strassburg.  These  his¬ 
torical  facts  explain  the  divergence  of  view  from  that  of  the 
Wittenbergers  upon  methods  of  practical  reform  (supra,  p.  391), 
and  also  the  phenomenon,  that  a  Calvinistic  church  should  arise 
upon  German  soil,  and,  as  is  acknowledged,  win  the  allegiance 
of  a  number  of  Melanchthonian  Lutherans.1  As  the  Calvinistic 
type  became  the  dominant  one  in  the  Reformed  church,  it  falls, 
to  the  province  of  the  History  of  Doctrines  to  present  an  outline 
of  his  teachings.  As  to  their  historical  relations,  the  above  must 
for  the  present  suffice. 

2.  It  is  of  the  first  importance,  for  a  proper  appreciation 
of  Calvin,  to  remember  that  he  is  a  man  of  the  second  gener¬ 
ation  of  this  great  period.  He  received  his  ideas  and  program 
of  action  by  tradition  in  an  essentially  complete  form.  It  was 
his  task,  in  the  church  as  in  theology,  to  complete  and  organize — 
and  for  this  his  special  talents  also  fitted  him.  Calvin  was  not 
a  genius  like  Luther,  nor  did  he  possess  the  happy  balance 
of  endowment  which  distinguished  Zwingli.  Neither  was  he  a 
scholar  unskilled  in  the  ways  of  the  world,  like  Melanchthon. 
He  possessed  the  wonderful  talent  of  comprehending  any  given 
body  of  religious  ideas  in  its  most  delicate  refinements  and 
giving  appropriate  expression  to  the  results  of  his  investigations. 
This  made  him  the  greatest  exegete  of  the  Reformation  period, 
and  enabled  him  to  accomplish  a  remarkable  work  in  organizing 
the  dogmatic  materials  within  reach.  As  a  dogmatician,  he 
furnished  no  new  ideas,  but  he  with  most  delicate  sense  of  per¬ 
ception  arranged  the  dogmatic  ideas  at  hand  in  accordance  with 
their  essential  character  and  their  historical  development.  If 
we  compare  Melanchthon  and  Calvin,  for  example,  in  their  views 
upon  the  appropriation  of  salvation,  we  shall  observe  that  the  former 
constructs  tenable  formulas,  while  the  latter  traces  the  inner  rela¬ 
tions  of  spiritual  experience.  His  was  a  keen  and  delicate,  but  not 
a  creative  mind.2  With  these  intellectual  gifts  was  combined  the 
will  of  a  nature  born  for  organizing — the  tenacious,  imperial 
spirit  and  govermental  skill  of  the  ancient  Roman.  But  this  was 
held  in  check  and  guided  by  the  obedience  which  dedicates  the 
life  to  the  glory  of  God,  without  regard  to  the  demands  of  the 
world.3  Thus  Calvin  was  just  the  man  to  represent  most 

1  At  this  point  must  begin  the  study  of  the  interesting  question  of  the 
genesis  of  the  Reformed  Church  in  Germany. 

2  We  may  compare  Melanchthon  and  Calvin  as  dogmaticians,  separately  and 
in  their  mutual  relationship,  with  the  Lombard  and  Thomas  Aquinas. 

3  Cf.  C.  R.  xliii.  738  :  “I  am  not  ignorant  of  what  is  pleasing  or  offensive 
to  the  world,  but  nothing  is  of  more  concern  to  me  than  to  follow  the  rule 
prescribed  by  the  Master.” 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


395 


worthily  and  effectively  the  second  type  of  reformatory  character 
which  sprung  from  Luther’s  prolific  principles.  That  its  pecu¬ 
liar  characteristics  were  due  in  measure  to  the  influence  of  earlier 
ideals  of  reform,  has  been  already  observed  (p.  391). 

3.  Our  study  of  the  theology  of  Calvin  must  be  confined 
to  the  points  bearing  particularly  upon  the  history  of  doctrinal 
development.1  Beginning  with  the  source  of  Christian  truth, 
we  find  this  to  be  the  Holy  Scriptures,  and  they  alone.  “  For 
the  Scriptures  are  a  school  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  which,  as 
nothing  necessary  or  useful  to  know  is  omitted,  so  nothing  is 
taught  except  what  it  is  profitable  to  know  ”  (iii.  21.  3). 2  God 
has  deposited  in  them  the  “oracle”  of  his  truth,  and,  since 
they  come  from  heaven,  they  are  endowed  with  full  authority 
( plena  autoritas )  among  men  (i.  7.  1).  “  Belief  ( fides )  of  the 

doctrine  is  not  established  until  we  have  been  indubitably 
persuaded  that  God  is  its  author"  (ib.  4).  God  first  revealed 
the  law,  “  then  followed  the  prophets,  through  whom  God  pub¬ 
lished,  as  it  were,  new  oracles.”  By  divine  command,  the 
prophets  recorded  the  latter,  all  of  which  served  for  the  expla¬ 
nation  of  the  law.  “  With  these  came  at  the  same  time  the  his¬ 
tories,  which  are  themselves  also  productions  from  the  pens  of  the 
prophets,  but  composed  under  the  dictation  of  the  Holy  Spirit” 
(dictante  spiriiu  sancto,  iv.  8.  6).  Then  followed  the  New 
Testament  (ib.  8).  Of  the  authors  of  these  writings,  it  is  said  : 
“They  were  infallible  and  authentic  amanuenses  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  and  therefore  their  writings  are  to  be  held  to  be  oracles 
of  God”  (ib.  9).  The  truthfulness  of  these  scriptural  oracles 
is  therefore  established  from  the  fact,  that  they,  together  with  the 
historical  narratives,  were  dictated  and  inspired  by  the  Spirit  of 
God  (cf.  i.  18.  3). 3  This  conviction  as  to  the  origin  of  the 
Scriptures  is  confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
which  is  effectually  given  through  them,  and  through  the  divine 
majesty  which  characterizes  them  (i.  7.  4).  Through  this 
unique  testimony  we  become  certain  of  the  character  of  the  word  > 
(i.  8.  1  ;  9.  3).  Thus  Calvin  establishes  the  authority  of  the 
Scriptures  partly  upon  their  divine  dictation,  and  partly  upon 
the  testimony  of  the  Holy  Spirit  working  through  them.  His-  ( 

1  We  depend,  in  so  doing,  chiefly  upon  the  last  revision  of  the  Institutio 
religionis  Christianae ,  A.  D.  1559.  We  shall  occasionally  quote,  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  comparison,  from  the  first  edition,  A.  D.  1536,  and  from  other  doctrinal 
writings  of  Calvin. 

2  These  and  similar  references  indicate  books,  chapters,  and  paragraphs  of 
the  last  edition  of  the  Institutio. 

3  Heppe’s  remark  in  referring  to  Calvin  (Die  Dogmatik  d.  ev.-ref.  Kirche,, 
1861,  p.  16  f. ):  “  He  is  not  speaking  of  any  real  inspiration  in  the  recording,” 
is  not  well  founded. 


396 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


torically  considered,  he  thereby  combines  the  later  medieval 
conception  of  inspiration  (supra,  p.  192)  with  the  theory  of 
Luther.  Calvin  is  therefore  the  author  of  the  so-called  inspir- 

|  ation  theory  of  the  older  dogmaticians.1  Of  the  ancient  symbols 
and  decrees  of  the  councils,  Calvin  says,  that  they  formulated 
Biblical  truth  more  exactly  in  opposition  to  the  heretics  (i.  13. 

3  f. ):  “For  they  contain  nothing  but  pure  and  native  inter¬ 
pretation  of  the  Scriptures”  (iv.  9.  8).  He  set  a  high  value 
upon  pure  doctrine  for  the  church  2  (ii.  2.  7),  but  acknowledged 
also  that  no  one  should  forsake  his  church  for  the  sake  of  ‘  ‘  any 
little  differences  of  opinion  ’  ’  (iv.  1.  12). 

4.  In  the  doctrine  concerning  God,  the  Reformation  concep¬ 
tion  of  the  Divine  Being  as  omnipotent  Will  is  the  controlling 
thought.  The  divine  omnipotence  is  not  to  be  represented  as 
alternating  between  action  and  non-action,  but  as  in  “  continual 
action.”  It  is  manifested  in  the  divine  providence  which  rules 
all  things  (i.  16.  3).  Calvin  meets  the  charge  of  Stoic  fatalism 
by  pointing  out  that  the  latter  rests  upon  the  inviolability  of  the 
natural  order  of  cause  and  effect,  while  Christian  faith,  on  the 
contrary,  refers  all  events  to  the  determination  of  the  divine 
will :  “  We  acknowledge  God  as  the  arbiter  and  director  of  all 
things,  who,  according  to  his  wisdom,  decreed  from  the  most  re¬ 
mote  eternity  what  he  would  do,  and  now  by  his  power  performs 
what  he  has  decreed  ”  (ib.  8).  Accordingly,  the  totality  of  all 
events,  as  well  the  course  of  nature  as  all  that  men  endure  or  do, 
is  referred  back  to  the  eternal  counsel  of  God.  In  other  words, 
everything  that  happens,  happens  as  it  does  because  God  so  wills. 

I  1  It  is  just  this  combination  which  constitutes  the  theory  in  question  : 
Because  there  proceeds  from  the  Scriptures  an  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
which  attests  their  contents  to  the  heart  as  truth,  their  origin  must  be  traced  to 
the  Holy  Spirit.  This  combination,  in  itself  considered,  is  open  to  no 
objection.  But,  since  the  inspiration  is  conceived  of  as  a  dictation  of  the  entire 
historical  material,  the  proof  of  it  from  religious  experience  cannot  be  sus¬ 
tained,  because  this  experience  can  by  no  means  attest  all  the  separate  words  of 
Scripture.  We  need  not  here  refer  to  the  objections  raised  against  the  theory 
by  historical  criticism.  Calvin  writes  :  “  I  know  how  some  obscure  men 
clamor  in  their  little  corners  to  show  the  keenness  of  their  talents  in  assailing 
the  truth  of  God.  For  they  inquire,  Who  will  make  us  very  sure  that  these 
things  which  are  read  under  the  names  of  Moses  and  the  prophets  were 
written  by  them  ?  For  they  even  dare  to  raise  the  question  whether  there  ever 
was  any  Moses  ?  But  if  anyone  should  raise  a  doubt  as  to  whether  there  ever 
was  any  Plato  or  Aristotle  or  Cicero,  who  would  not  say  that  he  deserved  to 
be  thrashed  with  cuffs  or  lashes?  ’ ’  (i.  8.  9). 

2  This  is  attested  by  the  sworn  confession  of  faith,  based  on  his  catechism, 
to  be  required  of  thecitizensof  Geneva  (C.  R.  xxxiii.  355-362).  This  contains 
in  a  nutshell  a  system  of  dogmatics  in  a  plain  and  practical  form.  No  attempt 
is  made  to  present  the  doctrines  of  the  Trinity  or  Christology  in  a  scholarly 
way. 

J 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


397 


What  transpires  in  the  world  serves  the  interest  of  man,  of  the 
church,  and  of  salvation  (ib.  6  ;  i.  17.  1);  but  its  final  purpose 
is  the  revelation  of  the  glory  and  honor  of  God  (i.  16.  iff.): 
“  That  our  salvation  was  a  matter  of  concern  to  God  in  such  a 
way  that,  not  forgetful  of  himself,  he  kept  his  glory  primarily  in 
view,  and  therefore  created  the  whole  world  to  this  end,  that  it 
might  be  the  theatre  of  his  glory”  (C.  R.  xxxvi.  294).  The 
purpose  of  God  therefore  extends  beyond  the  salvation  of  the 
human  race.  It  follows  from  the  above  that  even  the  actions  of 
the  wicked  must  be  referred  to  the  divine  will.  Calvin  rejects 
as  frivolous  the  explanation  of  these  as  due  to  divine  permissio 
(i.  18.  2).  It  is  to  be  said,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  will  of 
God  “not  only  exerts  its  power  in  the  elect,  who  are  controlled 
by  the  Holy  Spirit,  but  also  compels  the  reprobate  to  obedience  ” 

'  (ib.).  The  application  of  these  principles  in  the  sphere  of  the 
religious  life  leads  to  the  theory  of  a  double  election  (vid.  sub), 
namely,  that  the  divine  will  leads  the  elect  to  the  goal  by  caus¬ 
ing  duly  appointed  means  to  work  upon  them  in  a  determinative 
way.  The  elect,  accordingly,  do  not  die  until  they  have  been 
regenerated  and  sanctified  (iv.  16.  18).  We  have  thus  here, 
as  in  Thomas  or  Zwingli,  a  religious  determinism  carried  out  to 
its  logical  conclusions.  The  cosmic  system  has  been  established 
by  God  as  a  complex  of  means  inwardly  adapted  to  the  realiza¬ 
tion  of  the  end  in  view.  Thus  regarded,  the  adoption  of  the 
particular  means  employed  may  be  maintained  as  being  a  rational 
necessity.  Or,  where  there  is  an  election,  the  redemption 
through  Christ,  the  church,  and  her  means  of  grace  are  involved 
in  it  as  necessary  means  for  its  realization.  This  explains  the 
energy  of  the  adherents  of  these  views  in  prosecuting  the  work 
of  the  church,  with  her  means  of  grace  and  her  morality ;  for 
these  are  the  means  requisite  to  the  carrying  out  of  the  divine 
purpose,  which  can  only  thus  be  realized.  But  now,  as  in 
Luther’s  treatise  upon  the  Enslaved  Will,  this  logical  structure  is 
apparently  buttressed,  but  really  broken  down,  by  the  introduc¬ 
tion  of  the  Scotist  idea  of  the  irresponsibility  of  the  divine  will. 
The  reason  for  the  introduction  of  this  idea  is,  as  in  Luther,  easily 
discovered.  By  the  association  of  the  divine  will  with  a  system 
of  earthly  means,  its  absolute  freedom  and  its  exalted  majesty 
appear  to  be  endangered.  Hence  the  inner  necessity  of  these 
means  is  called  in  question,  and  their  employment  looked  upon 
as  a  fixed  rule  indeed,  but  their  selection  regarded  as  accidental, 
and  the  original  possibility  of  the  adoption  of  other  means  or 
of  the  abolition  of  all  means  asserted  :  “  which  means  he  cer¬ 
tainly  employs  in  the  calling  of  many,  upon  whom  he  be¬ 
stows  a  true  knowledge  of  himself  by  the  illumination  of  the 


398 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Spirit  in  an  internal  way  without  the  intervention  of  preaching  ’  ’ 
(iv.  16.  19;  1.  5  in.).  Even  of  Christ’s  work  it  must  accord¬ 
ingly  be  said  :  “  not  except  by  the  good  pleasure  of  God  could 
it  merit  anything”  (ii.  17.  i).1  The  aim  of  Calvin  is  clear 
from  such  passages  as  iii.  23.  2  :  “  For  so  truly  is  the  will  of  God 
the  highest  rule  of  right,  that  whatever  he  wills  is,  just  because 
he  wills  it,  to  be  accounted  right.  Therefore  when  it  is  asked, 
why  the  Lord  did  thus,  the  response  must  be,  Because  he  wished 
to  do  so.  ’  ’  God  is  not,  indeed,  to  be  considered  lawless  (ex lex), 
for  his  will  is  the  “  law  of  all  laws ;  ”  but  all  seeking  for  the 
ground  of  any  divine  appointment  is  forbidden.  Its  ground  lies 
simply  in  the  will  of  God,  as  otherwise  we  would  have  to  ac¬ 
knowledge  something  superior  to  the  divine  will  (ib. ,  cf.  §  5,  C. 
R.  xxxvi.  115).  Hence,  the  election  of  some  men  and  rejec¬ 
tion  of  others  must  be  traced  simply  to  the  unrestrained  will  of 
God2  (iii.  22.  1).  But  just  at  this  point  this  second  line  of 
thought  falls  into  the  first.  The  will  of  God  is  alone  the  ground 
of  all  events.  As  the  ultimate  end  of  all  things  is  fixed  by  this 
Will,  so  also  the  means  by  which  that  end  is  to  be  attained  ;  but 
a  rational  necessity  for  the  latter  cannot  from  our  point  of  view 
be  proved  or  maintained.  This  conclusion  confirms  our  view  of 
the  relation  existing  between  the  two  lines  of  thought,3  a  point 
to  which  we  shall  recur  (®j  7  e). 

5.  The  Sin  of  Adam  consisted  in  disobedience  (ii.  1.4).  His 
sinful  character  was  handed  down  to  his -posterity  :  “  From  a 
corrupt  root  have  sprung  corrupt  branches.  ’  ’  But  no  good  end 
can  be  served  by  brooding  over  specific  possibilities.  It 
is  the  divine  appointment,  that  the  sin  of  Adam  should 
become  the  sin  of  his  posterity  :  4  ‘  The  cause  of  the  con¬ 

tagion  lies  neither  in  the  substance  of  the  flesh,  nor  in  that  of 
the  soul ;  but  because  it  has  been  thus  ordained  by  God,  that 
man  should  hold  or  lose  at  the  same  time  both  for  himself  and 
for  his  posterity  whatever  gifts  God  had  at  first  conferred  upon 

1  This  passage  taken  alone  is  not  sufficient  to  appear  in  evidence,  as  we 
must  grant  to  Scheibe  (Calv.  Prad.-lehre,  p.  nof. ),  for  it  merely  asserts 
that  Christ  was  “  foreordained  to  the  end  that  he  might  appease  the  wrath  of 
God  by  his  sacrifice.”  But  it  must  be  studied  in  the  light  of  Calvin’s  general 
apprehension  of  the  subject  (vid.  ii.  12.  i)  and  the  parallels  in  Luther’s 
writings  have  weight  in  deciding  upon  its  proper  interpretation  (vid.  supra, 
p.  271). 

2  Calvin  rejects  in  this  connection  the  “profane”  idea  of  “absolute 
power.”  But  what  have  we  in  the  above-cited  passage,  iv.  16.  19,  but  an 
application  of  this  idea  that  goes  even  beyond  the  position  of  Duns  ? 

3  This  doctrinal  conception  of  God  is  inferior  to  that  of  Luther  in  anima¬ 

tion  and  consistent  force,  if  for  no  other  reason,  because  Calvin  assumes  a 
two-fold  source  of  our  knowledge  of  God,  i.  e.,  in  the  course  of  nature  and 
in  Christ  (i.  2.  I  ;  v.  I  f.  ). 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


399 


him”  (ii.  i.  7).1  Original  sin  is  defined  as  “the  hereditary 
depravity  and  corruption  of  our  nature  .  .  .  which  first  makes 
us  subject  to  the  wrath  of  God,  then  also  produces  in  us  works 
which  the  Scriptures  call  works  of  the  flesh  ”  (ib.  8).  Thus  the 
entire  man  is  depraved:  “From  the  crown  of  the  head  to  the 
sole  of  the  foot,  not  a  spark  of  good  can  be  found  ”  (iii.  14.  1). 
The  natural  freedom  of  the  will  yet  remains,  but  not  as  though 
it  had  an  equally  free  choice  of  good  and  evil,  but  because  it 
commits  evil  by  free-will  and  not  from  coercion”  (ii.  2.  7). 
There  still  remain  the  natural  talents,  which  are  requisite  for 
the  prosecution  of  political  affairs,  science,  and  art,  although 
they  have  also  become  depraved  (ii.  2.  12.  ff. ).2 

6.  The  consideration  of  this  our  natural  condition,  combined 
with  the  stress  of  the  law  (ii.  7.  2  f. ,  6  ff. ),  awakens  in  man  the 
sense  of  helplessness  (ii.  2.  11).  Grace  alone  saves  us,  through 
Christ.  The  purpose  of  God  is  the  “  first  cause  r’  of  ouFsalvationT 
He  appoints  his  only-begotten  Son  to  be  a  “  fountain  of  grace  ” 
(ii.  17.  1).  Since  now  it  was  to  be  the  mission  of  Christ,  both 
to  convince  men  of  the  gracious  disposition  of  God  toward  them, 
making  them  his  children,  and  to  render  satisfaction  to  the 
Father  in  our  stead,  it  was  necessary  that  the  Son  of  God  should 
become  man,  since  for  both  the  purposes  indicated  both  divine 
ancTTiuman  nature  would  be  required  in  him  (ii.  12.  1-3;  iii. 
11.  9).  Yet  we  cannot  speak  here  of  an  “absolute  necessity,” 
but  only  of  the  divine  decree  by  which  this  was  made  the 
method  of  our  salvation  (ii.  12.  i).3  With  this  general  pre¬ 
mise,  Calvin  presents  the  mediatorial  work  of  Christ  under  the 
three  aspects  of  the  prophetic,  royal,  and  high-priestly^offices 
(ii.  15).  According  to  Hebr.  1.  1,  Christ  is  the  last  and  per¬ 
fect  revelation  of  God  fii.  15.  1,  2).  Endowed  by  God  with 
eternal  power,  he  exercises  spirituaL  and  eternal  dominion  over 
the  church.  “  Such  is  the  character  of  his  government,  that  he 

1  Even  here  we  can  trace  the  influence  of  the  Scotist  element  in  Calvin’s 
conception  of  God  ;  but  he  rejects  as  insufficient  the  Scotist  definition  of  origi¬ 
nal  sin,  and  frames  his  positive  statement  of  the  subject  upon  Augustinian 
lines. 

2  But  conscience  remains  to  man  as  the  organ  of  innate  natural  law  :  “  It  is 
affirmed  that  the  law  of  God,  which  we  call  the  moral  law,  is  nothing  else 
than  the  testimony  of  the  natural  law  and  the  inner  sense  ( conscientiae )  of  it 
which  has  been  inscribed  by  God  upon  the  hearts  of  men”  (iv.  20.  16.  Cf. 
Luther,  supra,  p.  247,  243,  n.  2).  Similarly  (ii.  8.  1),  where  its  ope¬ 
ration  is  thus  described  :  “  it  sets  before  us  the  discernment  between  good  and 
evil,  and  thus  accuses  us  when  we  depart  from  duty.” 

3  Calvin  warns  against  “vain  speculations,”  as  to  whether  Christ  would 
have  become  man  if  there  had  been  no  need  of  redemption,  since  the  Scrip¬ 
tures  present  the  incarnation  as  subordinate  to  the  purpose,  “that  he  should, 
as  a  victim,  make  satisfaction  to  the  Father  for  us  ”  (ii.  12.  4). 


400 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


may  share  with  us  whatever  he  has  received  from  the  Father  ” 
(ib.  4).  As  priest,  finally,  he  procures  for  us  the  grace  of  God 
by  making  atonement  for  us  through  his  sacrifice  and  appeasing 
the  wrath  of  the  Father  (ii.  12.  3;  15 .  6,  ad  placandam  iram 
dei').  “  He  poured  out  his  sacred  blood  as  the  price  of  redemp¬ 
tion,  by  which  was  extinguished  the  wrath  ( furor )  of  God 
burning  against  us,  and  our  iniquities  also  were  purged  ”  (C.  R. 
xxxiii.  339).  But  this  result  was  achieved  by  the  obedience 
covering  his  entire  earthly  life  (according  to  Rom.  5.  19).  The 
latter  was  manifested  both  in  his  sufferings  and  death,  and 
(according  to  Phil.  2.  7)  in  “  the  other  part  of  obedience  which 
he  rendered  in  this  life”  (ii.  16.  5).  In  the  course  of  this 
obedience,  he  became  an  atoning  sacrifice  ( victima  satisfactoria) , 
the  condemnation  merited  by  our  sins  being  visited  upon  him 
(ib.  6.  5).1  The  enduring  of  the  wrath  of  God  included  also’ 
the  struggle  with  eternal  death  and  condemnation :  “  Whence  it 
was  necessary  for  him  to  wrestle,  as  it  were,  hand  to  hand  with 
the  powers  of  hell  and  with  the  horror  of  eternal  death” 
(ib.  10).  Not  alone  his  body  was  the  price  of  our  deliverance, 
“  but  there  was  another  greater  and  more  excellent  price,  that 
he  endured  in  his  soul  the  dire  agonies  of  condemned  and  lost 
man  ”  (ib.).  Discrimination  is  made  between  the  effects  of  the 
death  and  of  the  resurrection  of  Christ.  By  the  former,  “sin 
is  abolished  and  death  destroyed,”  while  by  the  latter  “  right¬ 
eousness  is  restored  ( reparata )  and  life  established”  (ib.  13). 
The  ascended  Lord  ministers  in  heaven  as  our  advocatus  et 
intercessor,  attracting  the  eye  of  the  Father  from  our  sins  upon 
his  righteousness.  He  also  sanctifies  us  from  heaven  by  his 
Spirit  (ib.  16). 

If  we  disregard  the  three-fold  division  of  the  work  of  Christ, 
which,  in  Calvin’s  discussions  as  elsewhere,  does  not  prove 
helpful  in  elucidating  the  subject,  we  may  trace  a  clear  line  of 
thought.  The  human  race  was,  as  sinful,  subject  to  the  wrath 
and  curse  of  God.  The  God-man  endured  this  wrath  and  curse 
-in  obedience  to  the  divine  will,  without  perishing  beneath  the 
burden.  He  thereby  secured  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  aboli¬ 
tion  of  all  penalties,  as  well  as  the  positive  bestowal  of  grace 
upon  man,  which  he  now,  as  the  Ascended  Lord,  administers 
through  the  Spirit.  This  leaves  only  the  question  of  the  existence 
of  wrath  and  love  together  in  God.  It  is,  says  Calvin,  a  peda¬ 
gogical  mode  of  speech,  when  the  Scriptures  represent  God  as  the 

1  The  dominant  idea  in  this  connection  is  that  of  satisfaction.  It  is  only 
incidentally  that  he  introduces,  in  ii.  17,  the  idea  of  merit,  without  at  all 
designing  thereby  to  change  the  general  conception  of  the  subject.  Cf. 
RlTSCHL,  Rechtf.  u.  Vers,  ii.,  ed.  2,  228. 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


401 


enemy  of  the  sinner  (ii.  16.  2).  It  is  however  fully  justified  ; 
for  as  God  is  righteousness,  he  cannot  love  sin.  As  sinners,  we 
rest  under  his  wrath.  Yet  even  thus  we  are  still  his  creatures, 
and  his  love  therefore  goes  out  toward  us,  so  that  his  love  became 
the  motive  (Eph.  i.  4)  for  the  mission  of  Christ  (ii.  16.  3,  4).1 
Love  is  accordingly  the  fundamental  attitude  of  God  toward  the 
elect  of  the  race.  On  account  of  sin,  wrath  is  also  awakened,  but 
this  is  dissipated  by  the  work  of  Christ  which  was  planned  and 
executed  by  love  (ii.  17.  2).  It  might  here  easily  have  occurred 
to  Calvin  to  make  this  work  of  Christ  also  the  principle  of  the 
effectual  renewal  of  the  race,  but  he  does  not  broach  this  idea.2 
On  the  contrary,  it  was  clearly  his  conception,  that  “  God,  to 
whom  we  were  odious  on  account  of  sin,  was  reconciled  by  the 
death  of  his  Son,  so  that  he  is  propitious  toward  us”  (ii.  17.  3). 
Thus  the  objective  reconciliation  of  God  is  the  ground  of  the 
effectual  bestowal  of  grace.  This  type  of  doctrine  forms  an 
average  presentation  of  the  ideas  upon  the  atonement  in  the 
Reformation  period.3 

7.  From  the  work  of  Christ,  Calvin  turns  to  the  Application  of 
Redemption  to  the  individual  soul.  As  he  describes  the  course 
of  man’s  renewal  and,  in  this  connection,  develops  the  idea  of 
justification,  he  not  only  brings  into  play  his  great  systematic 
talent,  but  reveals  especially  his  profound  appreciation  of  the 
original  aims  of  Luther.  Christ  is  the  Head  of  the  human  race. 
What  he  by  his  sufferings  and  works  secured  from  the  Father 
becomes  ours  by  virtue  of  fellowship  with  him  (iii.  1.  1).  This 
occurs,  however,  through  the  imparting  of  his  Holy  Spirit  to  us: 
“by  the  grace  and  virtue  of  his  Spirit  wre  are  made  members  of 
him,  so  that  he  holds  us  in  union  with  himself  {sub  se),  and  we 
in  turn  possess  him  ”  (ib.  3).  (#)  The  essential  thing  which 

the  Spirit  works  in  us  is  Faith  (ib.  4).  By  faith  we  apprehend 
Christ  and  his  kingdom  (iii.  2.  1,  6):  “  Faith  itself  is  a  certain 
infallible  and  secure  possession  of  those  things  which  have  been 
promised  us  by  God”  (ib.  41;  cf.  iii.  3.  1).  It  is  not  “a 
certain  assent  to  the  evangelical  history,”  but  the  apprehending 
of  God  revealed  in  Christ  (ib.  1);  not  the  regarding  as  true  that 


1  Calvin  here  follows  Augustine.  See  in  Joh.  tract.,  no.  6. 

2  Cf.  the  rejection  of  the  idea,  that  Christ’s  righteousness  is  given  to  us  only 
as  an  example  for  imitation,  ii.  1.  6. 

3  The  theological  difficulties  connected  with  this  conception  are  not  over¬ 
come  by  Calvin.  This  will  be  the  more  evident,  if  we  remember  that  here  too 
the  idea  of  the  irresponsibility  of  the  divine  action  appears  as  a  disturbing 
feature,  and  if  we  have  in  mind  the  complications  inevitably  attending  the 
conception  of  a  predestination  according  to  which  the  work  of  Christ  is  avail¬ 
able  only  for  the  elect. 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


402 

which  the  church  instructs  us  to  believe,1  but  the  recognition  of 
the  fact  that  God  is  through  Christ  gracious  to  us  (ib.  2), 
together  with  the  repose  of  the  heart  in  this  assurance  (7).  We 
believe,  not  only  with  the  understanding,  but  from  the  bottom  of 
our  hearts  (36).  Faith  is  a  “knowledge  of  the  divine  will 
toward  us,”  united  with  a  firm  conviction  of  the  truth  of  revela¬ 
tion.  “But  the  foundation  of  this  (knowledge)  is  a  presumed 
conviction  concerning  the  truth  of  God  ”  ( praesumta  de  veritate 
dei  persuasio)  (6.  14,  15).  Thus  is  derived  the  definition  of 
faith  :  “We  may  say  that  it  is  a  firm  and  certain  knowledge 
(< cognitio )  of  the  divine  benevolence  toward  us,  which,  the  truth 
of  the  free  promise  in  Christ  having  been  established,  is  through 
the  Holy  Spirit  revealed  to  our  minds  and  sealed  to  our  hearts  ’  ’ 
(7).  Faith  is  the  firm  conviction  of  the  grace  of  God,  together 
with  the  sense  of  repose  and  security  begotten  of  such  con¬ 
viction.  “  In  short,  no  one  is  truly  a  believer  unless,  assured 
by  firm  conviction  that  God  is  to  him  a  propitious  and  benevo¬ 
lent  Father,  he  promises  to  himself  all  things  from  the  divine 
goodness”  (16). 2  Upon  the  ground  of  this,  “  it  is  a  firm  and 
solid  confidence  ( fiducia )  of  the  heart,  by  which  we  securely 
acquiesce  in  the  mercy  of  God  promised  to  us  through  the 
gospel  ”  (C.  R.  xxxiii.  333  f. ).  Since  this  faith  is  the  appro¬ 
priation  of  Christ,  it  not  only  assures  to  man  the  forgiveness  of 
sins,  but  also  constitutes  the  beginning  of  a  new  life  in  him. 
“  Christ  cannot  be  known  except  in  connection  with  the  sancti¬ 
fication  of  his  Spirit.  It  follows,  that  faith  can  by  no  means  be 
separated  from  pious  affection  ”  (iii.  2.  8).  Thus  by  faith  we  are 
united  to  Christ  and  become  partakers  of  all  his  gifts  and 
blessings  (ib.  35).  It  follows,  that  faith  essentially  lays  hold  of 
the  promises  of  God;  but  it  also  “  obediently  accepts  his  com¬ 
mandments  ”  (29).  It  is  noticeable,  further,  that  Calvin  lays 
more  stress  than  Luther  upon  the  intellectual  element  of  faith. 

(IP)  Faith  leads  to  Repentance  (iii.  3.  1),  i.  e.,  with  faith  a 
new  moral  condition  is  inaugurated  (ib.  2). 3  But  repentance  is 
conversion  and  regeneration  extending  through  the  whole  life  of 
the  believer.  “Thus  repentance  might  be  defined  to  be  the 

«r  <* 

1  This  excludes  implicit  faith  in  the  Catholic  sense.  Yet  Calvin  acknowl¬ 
edges  a  kind  of  implicit  faith,  in  that  there  may  be,  as  in  the  case  of  the  dis¬ 
ciples,  some  belief  before  full  enlightenment,  though  of  course  only  as  a  fidei 
praeparatio ,  or  initium.  See  1.  c. ,  $  4  f. 

2  The  term  persuasio  (conviction)  is  characteristic  of  Calvin’s  expositions  of 
faith — and  was  so  from  the  beginning — see  C.  R.  xxix.  56  ;  xxxiii.  334.  It 
appears  to  have  been  derived  from  Bucer  (supra,  p.  392  n.  3). 

3  We  are  therefore  not  to  insert  a  “space  of  time”  between  faith  and 
repentance.  Nor  is  repentance  to  be  confused  with  the  timor  initialis  which 
-often  precedes  the  reception  of  grace,  n.  3.  2. 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


403 


true  conversion  of  our  life  to  God,  proceeding  from  a  sincere  and 
serious  fear  of  God,  and  consisting  in  the  mortification  of 
our  flesh  and  of  the  old  man,  and  in  vivification  by  the  Spirit  ” 
(iii.  3.  5).  “I  interpret  repentance  therefore  with  one  word 
..  .  .  regeneration,  whose  scope  is  nothing  else  than  that  the 
image  of  God  ...  be  re-formed  in  us”  (ib.  9).  Repentance 
is  therefore  the  state  of  regeneration,  and  one  of  its  essential  ele¬ 
ments  is  faith.  Without  faith,  there  can  be  no  repentance 
(ib.  5).  This  repentance  consists  in  mortification,  or  anguish 
of  soul,  in  view  of  recognized  sin,  together  with  the  crucifying  of 
the  old  man,  and  vivification,  or  the  “  effort  to  live  holily  and 
piously  ”  (ib.  3.  8).  Both  are  results  flowing  from  fellowship 
with  Christ  (9).  Both  penitence  and  the  new  moral  striving  in 
repentance  are  wrought  through  Christ  and  the  blessings  of  his 
kingdom  (19).  The  antecedent  fear  ( timor  initialis')  which  fre¬ 
quently  precedes  this  state  is  not  to  be  included  under  repent¬ 
ance  (2).  These  statements  lead  us  in  the  path  which  Luther 
followed  during  the  controversy  upon  confession  and  absolution 
(supra,  p.  238  f.).1  There  is  no  thought  in  this  connection  of  the 
influence  of  the  law.2  But  the  Christian  possesses  this  new  life 
only  in  a  constant  conflict  of  self-preservation  (ib.  10.).  The 
goal  toward  which  he  strives  is  the  actual  manifestation  of  the 
filial  character  bestowed  upon  him  (iii.  8.  1).  As  an  external 
means  to  the  attainment  of  his  goal,  the  law  is  mentioned  (ii. 
7.  12  f.;  iii.  19.  2),  as  also  the  example  of  Christ.  “  He  adds, 
that  Christ  has  been  set  before  us  as  an  example,  whose  image  we 
should  express  in  our  lives  ”  (iii.  8.  3).  But  the  goal  of  “  evan¬ 
gelical  perfection  ’  ’  Christians  cannot  attain  in  this  life  ;  yet  it  is 
their  duty  to  strive  earnestly  to  advance  upon  the  road  which 
leads  toward  it  (ib.  5)  and,  in  this  way,  in  obedience  to  the 
divine  will,  to  promote  the  glory  of  God  (iii.  7.  1,  2). 3 

(<:)  Now  only  does  Calvin  treat  of  Justification.  This  arrange¬ 
ment  of  topics  does  not,  however,  by  any  means  imply  that  justi¬ 
fication  is  to  be  understood,  as  in  the  Roman  Catholic  system,  as 

-  Vv  \  \  *  \  v  }  0  n 

1  Differently  conceived  in  the  first  edition  of  the  Institutio ,  where  Calvin 
limits  repentance  to  “mortification  of  the  flesh,”  denying,  however,  that  the 
latter  can  exist  without  faith  (xxx.  149). 

2  In  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  the  law,  we  are  taught  that  the  law  fills  the  sinner 
with  a  sense  of  his  unrighteousness,  in  order  that  he  may  feel  his  need  of 
grace  (iii.  7.  6,  8).  Since  this  influence  of  the  law  is  exerted  upon  such  as 
yet  lack  faith  (ib.  11.  12),  there  is  always  in  Calvin’s  mind  a  stage  of  con¬ 
scious  condemnation  under  the  law  as  an  experience  preparatory  to  evangelical 
repentance — a  stage  which  finds  a  parallel  in  the  Catholic  attrition  (cf. 
supra,  p.  251  n.). 

3  In  this  connection,  Calvin  treats  of  evangelical  asceticism,  iii.  3.  16; 
iii.  8,  cf.  iv.  12.  15.  See  also  his  critique  of  Stoic  ethics,  iii.  8.  9. 


404 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


a  result  of  effectual  grace.  The  meaning  is,  that  the  fellowship 
with  Christ  which  we  secure  in  faith  brings  to  us  a  double  grace. 
First,  on  account  of  his  innocence  we  are  reconciled  to  God  ; 
and,  secondly,  “  that,  sanctified  by  his  Spirit,  we  may  practice 
innocence  and  purity  of  life  ’  ’  (iii.  n.  i).  In  thus  understand¬ 
ing  justification  as  intimately  connected  with  the  new  life  spring¬ 
ing  from  faith,  Calvin  falls  back  into  the  original  channel  of 
early  Reformation  thought.  Justification  and  sanctification  can¬ 
not  be  separated  de  facto  :  for,  since  God  really  renews  for  the 
practice  of  righteousness  those  whom  he  graciously  regards  as 
righteous,  he  combines  that  gift  of  regeneration  with  this  gra¬ 
cious  acceptance.  ’  ’  But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  the  two 
j  conceptions  dare  be  confounded,  as  was  done  by  Osiander  (ib. 
6;  cf.  iii.  n.  io  ;  16.  i).  Justification  is  God’s  regarding  of 
the  sinner  for  Christ’s  sake  as  righteous.  “He  is  justified  by 
faith  who,  shut  out  from  the  righteousness  of  works,  apprehends 
by  faith  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  clothed  in  which  he  appears 
in  the  sight  of  God,  not  as  a  sinner,  but  as  righteous.”  It  is  the 
“  acceptance  by  which  God  regards  us,  having  been  received  into 
his  grace  as  righteous.”  It  consists,  accordingly,  in  the  “re¬ 
mission  of  sins”  and  in  the  “  imputation  of  the  righteousness  of 
Christ”  (ib.  2).  :Jhe  consciousness  of  righteousness  does  not, 
therefore,  at  all  rest  upon  the  beginnings  of  the  new  life  or  its 
works  (3.  2),  but  solely  upon  the  gracious  imputation  of  the 
obedience  of  Christ.^  “  What  else  is  it  to  locate  our  righteous¬ 
ness  in  the  obedience  of  Christ,  than  to  assert  that  we  are  for  his 
sake  alone  accounted  righteous,  because  the  obedience  of  Christ 
is  said  to  be  accepted  for  us  as  though  it  were  our  own  ?  ”  (23). 
Although  it  is  thus  perfectly  clear  that  the  assurance  of  salvation  de¬ 
pends  solely  upon  divine  grace,  yet  it  dare  not  be  forgotten  that 
this  assurance  can  never  arise  nor  be  preserved  unless  there  is  first 
a  living  fellowship  with  Christ.  “We  may  distinguish  between 
them,  yet  Christ  contains  them  both  (justification  and  sanctifica¬ 
tion)  in  himself.  Dost  thou  desire  therefore  to  attain  righteous¬ 
ness  in  Christ  ?  It  is  necessary  for  thee  first  to  possess  Christ. 
But  thou  canst  not  possess  (him  )  unless  thou  becomest  a  partaker  of 
his  sanctification,  because  he  cannot  be  rent  asunder  and  made  of 
no  effect.  .  .  .  It  is  hence  clear  how  it  is  true  that  we  are  not  justi¬ 
fied  without  works,  nor  yet  by  works,  since  in  the  fellowship  ( par - 
ticipatio')  of  Christ,  by  which  we  are  justified,  is  contained  sanctifi¬ 
cation  no  less  than  justification  ”  (iii.  16.  1;  xxxiii.  335).  As 
thus  with  faith  the  new  life  is  effected  in  man  by  the  Spirit,  there 
is  at  the  same  time  implanted  in  him  an  active,  ethical  principle, 
as  the  organ  with  which,  despite  all  the  imperfections  and  defects 
of  the  incipient  new  life,  to  apprehend  the  pardoning  grace  of 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


40  5 


God.  Believers  attain  assurance  and  confidence  in  God  not 
through  the  “gift  of  regeneration — which,  as  it  is  always  muti¬ 
lated  in  this  flesh,  so  also  contains  in  itself  mutiform  material  to 
awake  doubt” — but,  t(  because  they  are  implanted  in  the  body  of 
Christ,  they  are  freely  accounted  righteous.  For,  so  far  as  justi¬ 
fication  is  concerned,  faith  is  a  merely  passive  thing,  contributing 
nothing  to  our  conciliating  of  the  grace  of  God,  but  receiving 
from  Christ  what  is  lacking  in  us  ”  (iii.  13.  5  ;  cf.  11.  11  ;  14. 
9  ff . ) .  This  way  of  regarding  the  matter  is  said  to  give  the 
glory  to  God,  as  well  as  to  actually  assure  rest  and  peace  to  us  (iii. 
iJTTTTjr~  It  is  just  as  evidently  in  harmony  with  the  pro- 
foundest  impulses  of  the  teaching  of  the  Reformation  as  it  sur¬ 
passes  the  formulas  of  the  later  Melanchthonian  doctrine. 

(d)  For  a  proper  understanding  of  the  evangelical  doctrine 

of  justification,  it  is  further  necessary  to  note  the  significance  of 
Christian  liberty,  which,  for  Calvin,  implies  three  things:  (1) 
That  from  our  conception  of  justification  we  exclude  all  thought 
of  legal  righteousness  (iii.  19.2).  (2)  That  we  obey  God,  not 

under  the  pressure  of  the  law,  l?ut  willingly  (ib.  4  ;  cf.  ii.  7.  14). 
(3)  That  we  do  not  allow  the  religious  life  to  be  bound  or  de¬ 
termined  by  any  external  things  or  adiaphora  whatsoever  (ib.  7); 
although  the  law  teaches  us  to  recognize  really  good  works 
(ii.  8.  5). 

(e)  Calvin  concludes  this  presentation  of  the  order  of  salva- 
tiorr*  with  a  discussion  of  Election.  The  place  thus  assigned 
in  itself  reveals  the  practical  interest  which  he  felt  in  this  doc¬ 
trine.  Man  can  be  certain  of  his  salvation  only  if  the  latter  is 
founded  upon  the  eternal  will  of  God  ;  and  this  certainty  is  but  in¬ 
creased  by  the  fact,  “  that  he  does  not  choose  all  for  the  hope  of 
salvation,  but  gives  to  some  what  he  denies  to  others  ”  (iii.  21. 
1).  But  with  this  is  combined  another  thought,  arising  from  the 
conception  of  the  divine  nature.  According  to  the  doctrine  of 
Determinism,  all  things  that  occur  must  be  understood  as  caused 
by  the  divine  determination.  But  the  call  to  salvation  fails  en¬ 
tirely  to  reach  some,  and  with  others  it  is  ineffectual.  In  both 
cases,  the  cause  must  be  located  in  the  divine  will  (ib.  1  init.). 
This  explains  the  importance  attached  by  Calvin  to  the  doctrine 
of  predestination.  He  defines  the  term  as  follows:  “We  call 
the  eternal  decree  of  God  by  which  he  has  determined  with  him- 


1  The  efficient  cause  of  salvation  is,  therefore,  the  mercy  of  God  ;  the  mate¬ 
rial  cause,  Christ  with  his  obedience  ;  the  formal  or  instrumental  cause,  faith, 

iii.  14.  17. 

2  Prayer  is  treated  of  (iii.  20),  between  Liberty  and  Election,  as  the  princi¬ 
pal  exercise  of  faith  ”  and  as  the  daily  means  for  the  reception  of  divine  bless¬ 
ings. 


406 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


self  what  he  wishes  to  have  come  to  pass  concerning  every  man, 
predestination.  For  not  all  are  created  under  the  same  condi¬ 
tion  ( condicio ),  but  to  some  eternal  life  is  foreordained,  and  to 
some  eternal  damnation.  Therefore,  accordingly  as  anyone  has 
been  formed  for  one  or  the  other  end,  we  say  that  he  has  been 
predestinated  to  life  or  to  death  ”  (ib.  5).  When,  therefore,  God 
wins  for  himself  particular  men  by  calling,  justification,  and  sanc¬ 
tification,  this  achievement  accomplished  in  time  is  an  expression 
of  his  eternal  will.  But  it  is  just  as  truly  an  expression  of  his 
will,  when  this  does  not  occur  in  the  case  of  others,  but  in  its  place 
a  devoting  to  destruction  ( exitio  devovere)  (ib.  7).  But  it  is  im¬ 
possible  to  refer  the  election  and  not  the  reprobation  to  a  posi¬ 
tive  act  of  the  divine  will  (iii.  23.  1  ;  ib.  8  :  “  Why  do  we  say 
‘  permit  *  unless  because  he  wills  ?  ’  ’  ) ,  which  is  evident  enough  in 
view  of  the  determinism  of  the  system.  Just  as  God  has  chosen 
some,  he  has  also  rejected  all  those  whom  he  has  seen  fit  (C.  R. 
xxxvi.  109).  On  the  other  hand,  the  Scotist  element  in  the 
conception  of  God  (supra,  p.  397)  here  asserts  itself,  since  the 
only  reason  which  can  be  assigned  for  the  election  of  some  and 
the  reprobation  of  others  is  the  purely  arbitrary  will  of  God 
(ib.  2.  5).  But  if  God  thus  foreordains  the  final  destiny,  together 
with  the  means  which  bring  it  about,  then  must  the  first  occasion 
for  this  evil  destiny  of  man  have  also  been  foreordained  by  him, 
i.  e.:  “God  not  only  foresaw  the  fall  of  the  first  man  and  the 
ruin  of  his  posterity  in  him,  but  appointed  it  by  his  own  will.” 
In  general,  it  is  his  special  prerogative  “  to  rule  and  govern  all 
things  by  his  hand”  (ib.  7).  His  will  is  “the  necessity  of 
things.”  He  willed  that  Adam  should  fall,  and  that  all  the 
misery  of  sin  should  descend  upon  his  posterity.  Why  he  so 
wills  we  know  not.  This  does  not,  however,  in  Calvin’s  view, 
exclude  the  opinion  that  man  of  himself  found  occasion  for  the 
fall,  and  by  it  became  guilty  :  “  Therefore  man  fell,  the  provi¬ 
dence  of  God  so  ordaining;  but  he  fell  by  his  own  fault  ”  (8  ; 
cf.  xxxvi.  no).  All  attempts  to  cast  reproach  upon  God  in 
view  of  this  double  election  must  fail,  because  no  one  has 
authority  to  coerce  the  divine  will,  and  because  no  wrong  is 
done  to  sinners  by  their  reprobation.  The  justice  of  God  is 
made  manifest  in  them,  as  his  mercy  in  the  elect  (11  f. ). 

Calvin’s  theory  of  predestination  goes  beyond  that  of  Bucer  in 
that  it  lays  special  stress  upon  the  double  predestination.  His 
view  embraces  chiefly  the  following  points  :  (1)  The  idea  that 
everything  which  occurs  on  earth  is  a  direct  result  of  divine 
causality.  Hence  the  divine  call  with  its  results  is  but  the  carry¬ 
ing  out  of  predestination  (iii.  24.  1,  10).  Only  the  elect  attain 
to  real  faith  (iii.  2.  11);  and  they  alone  receive  the  gift  of  per- 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


407 


severance  and  gain  the  assurance  of  salvation  (iii.  24.  6).1  In 
this  way  the  sole  sovereignty  of  God  and  his  glory  and  honor  are 
displayed  in  all  earthly  events  (vid.  citations  in  Scheibe,  C’s 
Praedestinationslehre,  p.  115  ff. ).  (2)  Thus  our  salvation,  being 
based  upon  the  eternal  will  of  God,  is  absolutely  assured.  (3) 
Predestination  embraces  a  double  election :  that  in  some  men 
only  the  divine  justice,  while  in  others  his  mercy  also  is  made 
manifest,  has  no  other  ground  than  the  will  of  God.  At  this 
point  we  observe  a  Scotist  influence  moulding  the  thought.2 

If  we  now  seek  to  estimate  the  significance  of  this  doctrine  in  the 
Calvinistic  theology,  it  is  not  correct  either  to  see  in  it  his  “  central 
dogma”  (Schweizer,  Centraldogmen,  i.  57),  or  to  pronounce  it 
an  “  appendage  ”  attached  to  the  doctrine  out  of  regard  for  the 
authority  of  Paul  (Ritschl,  Jarbb.  f.  deutsche  TheoL,  1868, 
108).  It  is  not  the  former,  as  the  doctrines  of  redemption  and 
justification  are  not  deduced  from  it ; 3  nor  the  latter,  as 
exegetical  considerations  have  but  a  subordinate  place  in  this  con¬ 
nection.  It  is,  however,  true  that  this  doctrine  has  for  Calvin  an 
entirely  different  significance  than  for  Luther.  For  both  it  is  a 
subsidiary  conception.  Calvin  bases  upon  it  the  certainty  of  sal¬ 
vation  ;  Luther,  the  sinner’s  lack  of  liberty.4  But  this  conception 
found  in  Calvin  an  important  point  of  attachment  in  his  idea  of 
God  as  the  Almighty  Lord,  who  works  all  things,  and  to  whose 
glory  all  things  minister.  The  God  of  Luther  is  the  Almighty 
Loving-will  revealed  in  Christ.  As  Calvin’s  thought  was  mot 
controlled  by  Luther’s  vivid  sense  of  Christ,  so,  in  his  conception 
of  God,  sovereignty  and  omnipotence  assumed  the  place  of 
prominence  rather  than  love.  It  was  to  him  not  an  intolerable 
thought,  that  God,  for  the  display  of  his  justice,  never  felt  any 
love  whatsoever  for  a  portion  of  the  human  race.  From  this,  it 
may  be  readily  understood  that  predestination  should  have  con- 


1  At  this  point  is  seen  the  injustice  of  the  charge  brought  against  Calvin,, 
that  this  doctrine  leads  to  moral  indifference  ;  for  God  is  represented  as  work¬ 
ing  effectually  in  the  predestinated  to  the  end  of  the  sanctification,  so  that  pre¬ 
destination  is  the  most  powerful  stimulus  to  the  new  life,  iii.  23.  12. 

2  This  is  the  case  when  Calvin  appeals  only  to  the  divine  will  as  such  (iii. 
23.  2);  but  he  also  at  times  pointed  to  the  inscrutability  of  the  divine  purposes- 
to  the  human  intelligence  (<?.  g.,  iii.  21.  1  ;  C.  R.  xxxvi.  10).  This  is  evi¬ 
dently  another  thought.  In  the  former  case,  the  course  of  events,  being  de¬ 
termined  by  the  will  of  God,  is  without  cause  and  incomprehensible  :  here, 
being  divine,  it  is  inscrutable  by  the  finite  reason.  In  the  one  instance,  Calvin 
may  be  said  to  be  Scotist  in  conception  ;  in  the  other,  Thomistic  or  Augus- 
tinian. 

3  Let  it  be  observed,  e.  g. ,  that  predestination  is  not  in  itself  justification, 
but  the  latter  becomes  a  reality  only  in  those  who  believe. 

4  Luther  used  predestination  chiefly  as  an  argument  against  the  Pelagian 
doctrine  of  sin  ;  Calvin,  against  the  Pelagian  doctrine  of  grace. 


408 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


V 


tinually  grown  in  importance  for  him,  and  that  the  theologians 
who  attached  themselves  to  him  should  have  made  it  the  first  prin¬ 
ciple  of  their  theology.1  Compare  Scheibe,  C’s  Praedestinations- 
lehre,  p.  117  f. 

8.  The  doctrine  of  the  Church  logically  follows  the  discussion 
of  the  redemption  wrought  by  Christ  and  its  attainment  through 
the  Holy  Spirit.  ( a )  The  Church  is  the  totality  of  all  the  pre¬ 
destinated  (iv.  1.  2,  7  :  “  it  comprehends,  not  only  the  sancti¬ 
fied  who  dwell  upon  earth,  but  all  the  elect  who  have  existed 
from  the  beginning  of  the  world  as  well  as  also  the  totality 
of  all  those  who  have  been  led  by  the  Holy  Spirit  to  fellowship 
with  Christ  (ib.  3  fin.,  7).  This  coordination  of  the  elect  and 
the  sanctified  may  be  understood  when  we  remember  that  elec¬ 
tion  is  realized  in  the  individual  through  sanctification.  The 
elect  have  now  a  desire  to  influence  one  another.  In  this  way 
the  church  becomes  also  a  communion:  “in  order  that  they 
may  mutually  distribute  among  themselves  whatever  blessings 
God  confers  upon  them”  (ib.  3).  This  takes  place  through 
external  means,  i.  e.,  word  and  sacrament,  which  human  weak¬ 
ness  requires  and  which  God  has  therefore  bestowed  upon  the 
church  (ib.  1)  :  “  God  inspires  faith  in  us,  but  by  the  agency 
( orgqho )  of  his  gospel.”  In  harmony  with  this,  the  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  believer  is  secured  only  “by  the  tuition  of  the 
church  ”  (5).  Thus  the  entire  empirical  activity  of  the  church  is 
brought  into  the  relation  of  a  means  to  the  work  of  salvation  im¬ 
plied  in  predestination.  ( b )  The  church,  as  the  totality  of  the  elect, 
is  invisible  and  an  object  of  faith.  But,  inasmuch  as  the  elect  are 
found  in  an  empirical  communion,  which  has  its  marks  in  the  pro¬ 
fession  of  faith  in  God  and  the  true  doctrine,  in  a  common  par¬ 
ticipation  in  baptism,  the  Lord’s  Supper,  and  works  of  love,  as 
well  as  in  the  maintenance  of  the  office  of  the  ministry,  we  are 
to  acknowledge  also  a  visible  church,  which  includes  hypocrites 
among  its  members.  We  are  to  believe  in  the  former ;  of  the 
latter,  it  is  said  :  “we  are  commanded  to  respect  it,  and  to  culti¬ 
vate  its  communion  ”  (  7  ) .  Since  this  attitude  toward  the  visible 
church  is  required  on  account  of  its  recognized  aim,  the  title 
“  church  ”  in  the  creed  may  also  be  applied  with  some  reserva¬ 
tion  (jaliquatenus )  to  the  visible  church  (3  init. ) .  Further,  we 
may  always  from  the  presence  of  word  and  sacrament  infer  the 
presence  of  an  actual  church,  as  the  former  can  never  remain  fruit¬ 
less  (ib.  9,  10).  Severance  from  the  (visible)  church  is,  there¬ 
fore,  also  a  denial  of  God  and  Christ  (10).  This  view  of  the 


1  This  point  requires  further  elucidation  through  historical  research ; 
Ritschl’s  investigations  are  here  not  satisfactory. 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


409 

•church  approaches  that  of  Luther,  as  the  attempt  is  here  also 
made  to  deduce  from  the  presence  of  the  means  of  grace  the  as¬ 
surance  that  the  true  church  is  likewise  present.  But  there  remains 
the  difference,  that  for  Luther  grace  is  always  effectually  present 
with  the  means  of  grace,  whereas  Calvin — influenced  by  his  con¬ 
ception  of  God — regards  the  external  means  of  grace  as,  after  all, 
merely  symbols  of  a  possibly  accompanying  divine  influence  (ib. 
6;  iv.  14.  8  ;  16.  19).  Since  there  is,  accordingly,  such  a  thing 
as  a  proclamation  of  the  word  without  an  accompanying  influence 
of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  motto:  “  Where  the  word,  there  the 
church, '  ’  has  not  the  profound  basis  for  Calvin  which  it  finds  in  the 
teaching  of  Luther. 

(V)  But  Calvin  always  antagonized  with  the  greatest  energy 
the  conclusion  which  sectarian  leaders  might  easily  deduce  from 
his  premises,  that  the  external  organization  of  the  church  is  of 
small  importance.  He  emphasized  the  necessity  of  ecclesiastical 
forms  and  ordinances  more  strongly  than  Melanchthon  himself. 
The  administration  of  the  means  of  grace  and  the  preservation  of 
pure  doctrine  necessitated  the  divine  appointment  of  definite 
ecclesiastical  offices.  “For  this  reason  it  has  seemed  good 
that  the  spiritual  government,  such  as  our  Saviour  has 
indicated  and  appointed  by  his  word,  should  be  reduced  to 
good  form.  .  .  .  First,  there  are  four  orders,  or  kinds  of 
offices,  which  our  Saviour  has  appointed  for  the  government  of 
his  church  :  namely,  pastors  ;  then  teachers  ;  after  that,  elders  ; 
fourthly,  deacons”  (xxxviii.  a.  92b;  cf.  1 5  ff . ).  Christ  has, 
therefore,  instituted  “  a  ministry  of  men  .  .  .  as  it  were  a  vica¬ 
rious  work”  (iv.  3.  1);  “he  has  shown  the  human  ministry 
which  God  employs  for  the  governing  of  the  church  to  be  the 
•chief  nerve  by  which  believers  are  held  together  in  one  body  *  ’ 
(iv.  3.  2).  It  is  not  an  ideal  plan  of  organization,  resulting  with 
historical  necessity  from  the  nature  of  the  tasks  assigned,  which 
here  confronts  us,  but  a  divine  commandment,  i.  e.,  a  precept  of 
the  old  divinely-ordained  ecclesiastical  law.  It  must  be  remem¬ 
bered,  further,  that  these  officers  have  not  only  the  duty  of 
preaching,  teaching,  and  the  care  of  the  poor  ;  but,  above  all,  the 
duty  of  exercising  Christian  discipline.  “  Just  as  the  saving 
doctrine  of  Christ  is  the  soul  of  the  church,  so  this  discipline 
stands  for  its  strength  (pro  nervis').'"  Discipline  restrains  the 
opponents  of  Christian  doctrine  ;  it  is  the  goad  for  the  indolent 
and  the  rod  for  the  erring  (iv.  12.  1).  The  consistorium,  com¬ 
posed  of  spiritual  and  lay-elders,  or  the  •“  assembly  of  the 
elders,”  exercises  the  disciplinary  power,  which  includes  that  of 
excommunication  (ib.  2).  Upon  the  particulars  of  this  author¬ 
ity  it  is  not  the  province  of  the  History  of  Doctrines  to  enter. 


4io 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


But  it  is  important  to  recognize  clearly  the  fact,  that  Calvin 
believed  in  a  divinely-appointed  form  of  church  government.  Cf. 
Sohm,  Kirchenrecht,  i.  648  ff.  Cornelius,  in  Abhandl.  d.  bayr. 
Akad.  der  Wiss.  Hist.  CL,  vol.  xx.,  1893,  251  If. 

(d)  Since  the  church  has,  in  this  way,  a  form  of  government 
given  by  God  himself  and  therefore  immutable,  the  sphere  of  her 
independence  of  the  state  is  a  wider  one  than  upon  the  territory 
of  the  Saxon  reformation.  But  even  in  Geneva  the  idea  of 
Calvin  was  but  imperfectly  carried  out,1  since  the  state  retained 
in  its  hand  as  well  the  regulation  of  the  ecclesiastical  judicatory 
as  the  confirmation  of  the  election  of  clergymen  ;  and  further¬ 
more,  the  extension  of  moral  discipline  required  an  enlarged 
co-operation  of  the  state  in  the  sphere  of  religion  and  morals. 
Calvin,  therefore,  found  it  possible  to  carry  out  his  ideas  of  re¬ 
form  only  by  regarding  the  civil  authority  as  the  agency  for  the 
exercise  of  Christian  discipline,  or  by  ascribing  to  the  state  the 
duty,  in  its  service  of  God,  of  putting  into  execution  the  ideals 
of  the  church  even  by  worldly  means.2  “And  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  chief  magistrates  to  consider  whom  they  serve  in  their 
office,  and  not  to  permit  any  harm  to  the  ministers  and  vicars 
of  God.  But  their  whole  care  should  properly  lie  in  this,  that 
they  may  preserve  the  public  form  of  religion  unpolluted,  that  they 
may  mould  the  life  of  the  people  by  the  best  laws,  and  that 
they  may  secure  the  prosperity  and  tranquillity  of  their  realms 
both  publicly  and  privately  M  (C.  R.  xxxiii.  354  ;  cf.  iv.  20.  3, 
2).  The  state  is  therefore  under  obligation  to  punish  every 
uprising  against  the  recognized  religion,  and  to  be  solicitous  for 
the  observance  of  the  commandments,  not  only  of  the  second 
table  of  the  decalogue,  but  of  the  first  table  as  well.  This  is 
attested  not  only  by  the  history  of  the  Israelites,  but  even  by  the 
view  of  heathen  nations,  which  makes  the  guarding  of  piety  the 
first  duty  of  the  state  (iv.  20.  3,  9).  Of  course,  in  so  doing  the 
state  dare  make  no  change  in  the  divine  law  (ib.  3).V"In  reality, 
it  will  therefore  only  be  required  to  carry  out  what  is  prescribed 
by  the  incumbents  of  the  spiritual  offices.  From  this  point  of 
view  we  can  understand  the  personal  attitude  assumed  by  Calvin 
in  Geneva,  as  well  as  the  drastic  rigor  of  the  government  and  its 
administration  under  his  leadership.  Since  every  sin  is  an  act 

1  “The  consistent  application  of  Calvin’s  ideas  of  church  government  first 
became  possible  in  those  Reformed  churches  which  were  compelled  to  develop 
their  polity  in  opposition  to  the  authority  of  the  State.”  Sohm,  KR.  i. 
655  f. ;  cf.  Weber,  Geschichtl.  Darstellung  d.  Calvinism,  im  Verhaltnis  zum 
Staat,  1836. 

2  It  must  here  be  borne  in  mind  that  Calvin  most  strenuously  discriminated 
in  principle  between  the  “spiritual  kingdom  of  Christ”  and  the  “civil 
government.” 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


4ir 

of  rebellion  against  the  divine  majesty,  it  is  also  to  be  visited 
with  the  severest  civil  penalties  (cf.  Elster,  Jarbb.  f.  National- 
okon.,  vol.  31,  p.  182  ff. ,  207  ff.).1  Hence,  Calvin’s  reforma¬ 
tion  was  conducted  after  the  manner  of  the  theocracy.  God  is 
the  Lord,  whose  worship  the  church  desires  and  the  state  com¬ 
pels.  But,  inasmuch  as  this  attitude  of  the  civil  government 
toward  the  church  in  the  end  coincides  with  the  ecclesiastical 
office  endued  with  divine  authority,  the  coincidence  of  Calvin’s 
ideal  ol  the  church  with  the  conceptions  of  the  Middle  Ages  is 
yet  far  more  evident  than  in  the  case  of  Zwingli.2  And  in  this 
parallel  we  are  confirmed  by  observing  the  narrow  spirit,  hostile 
to  all  natural  enjoyment  and  social  pleasure,  which  marked  the 
civil  administration  of  Calvin  (vid.,  e.  g.,  the  laws  concerning 
luxury  in  Gaberel,  hist,  de  l’eglise  de  Geneve,  i.,  1858,  p. 
339  ff. ).  It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  the  enlarging  of  the 
reformatory  aims  of  Luther  was  accomplished  only  by  re-adopt¬ 
ing  the  ideals  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

9.  We  are  led  to  consider,  finally,  the  doctrine  of  the  Sacra¬ 
ments.  Calvin  defines  a  sacrament  as  an  “  external  symbol  by 
which  the  Lord  seals  to  our  consciences  the  promises  of  his  be¬ 
nevolence  toward  us,  and  we,  in  turn,  .  .  .  testify  our  piety  to¬ 
ward  him”  (iv.  14.  1).  The  sacrament  itself  is  thus  a  symbolic 
confirmation  of  the  grace  announced  in  the  words  of  insti¬ 
tution  (ib.  4).  But  it  is  more — a  sure  pledge  of  his  grace  (7). 
It  confirms  to  us  what  the  word  has  taught  us  (8).  But  the 
sacrament  in  itself  is  just  as  little  accompanied  by  the  Spirit  of 
God  as  is  the  word.  The  Spirit  follows  the  word  and  sacra¬ 
ment,  and  only  where  this  inner  teacher  ( interior  magister')  in¬ 
wardly  opens,  moves,  and  enlightens  the  heart,  do  they  bring 
grace  to  man  (ib.  8-12  ;  cf.  Consens.  Tigur.  16).  Hence,  for 
the  unbelieving,  they  are  merely  signs  without  content  (15). 
Here  again  the  idea  of  predestination  asserts  itself — only  the  pre¬ 
destinated  receive  anything  through  the  sacrament.  In  them 
God  works  immediately,  just  as  all  things  are  only  means 

1  C.  R.  xli.  76  :  “  The  great  and  enormous  corruptions  which  I  see  every¬ 
where  constrain  me  to  beseech  you  to  have  solicitude  that  men  may  be  kept  in 
strict  and  honest  discipline.  Above  all,  the  honor  of  God  is  maintained  in 
punishing  the  crimes  of  which  men  have  not  been  accustomed  to  take  much 
account.  I  say  it,  since  larcenies,  fightings,  and  extortions  will  sometimes  be 
severely  punished,  because  men  are  injured.  Yet  they  will  suffer  lewdness, 
adultery,  drunkenness,  and  blasphemy  of  the  name  of  God,  either  as  lawful 
things  or  as  of  very  little  importance.  Now  we  see,  on  the  contrary,  in  what 
esteem  God  holds  them.  He  declares  how  precious  his  name  is  to  him.  It 
is  not  possible  then  that  he  should  allow  such  wrongs  to  be  unpunished.” 

2  Although,  of  course,  even  in  Calvin’s  view  this  office  has  no  authority  to  do 
more  than  maintain  and  execute  the  commandments  of  the  Bible.  But  this 
does  not  essentially  transcend  the  limits  of  the  theory  of  the  Middle  Ages. 


412 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


through  which  his  agency  is  exerted.  Not  to  them,  but  to  God 
alone,  belongs  the  glory  (12). 

(£)  Baptism  is  “  like  some  sealed  diploma  ”  and  testifies  to 
us  the  forgiveness  of  sins  (iv.  15.  1).  The  recollection  of  his 
baptism  serves  the  believer  therefore  as  a  standing  testimonial, 
that  God  will  forgive  us  our  sins  (3).  It  thus  takes  the  place  of 
the  Romish  sacrament  of  repentance  (4).  Baptism,  further, 
introduces  us  into  fellowship  with  Christ,  with  his  death  and 
resurrection,  for  our  mortification  and  vivification  (5).  Through 
it  we  become  partakers  of  all  the  blessings  of  Christ  (6).  As  in 
his  general  view  of  the  sacraments,  so  also  here  in  his  doctrine 
of  baptism,  which  is  in  thorough  harmony  with  the  former, 
Calvin  goes  further  than  Zwingli.  While  the  latter  regarded 
the  sacraments  as  purely  symbolical,  there  was,  in  the  view  of 
Calvin,  a  real  divine  energy  connected  with  the  administra¬ 
tion  of  these  symbols.1  But  this  energy  is  not  involved  in  the 
mere  external  ceremony,  but  accompanies  it — only,  however,  in 
the  case  of  the  predestinated.  This  view  thus  becomes  in  form 
*  analogous  to  the  Scotist  theory  of  the  sacraments  (see  p.  127), 2 
except  that  with  Calvin  the  accompanying  divine  energy  is 
limited  to  the  elect. 

(c)  We  find  that  in  Calvin  also,  as  so  frequently  in  other  cases, 
the  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  oversteps  to  a  certain  extent 
the  limits  of  the  general  definition  of  the  sacraments.  In  this 
sacrament  we  receive  the  body  of  Christ,  “  in  order  that,  as  we 
see  ourselves  made  partakers  of  it,  we  may  assuredly  believe  that 
the  virtue  of  his  vivifying  death  shall  become  efficacious  in  us.” 
It  is,  as  it  were,  a  reminder  of  the  covenant  established  through 
the  blood  of  Christ  (iv.  17.  1).  As  bread  and  wine  become 
one  with  us  and  nourish  our  bodily  life,  so  the  Lord’s  Supper 
effects  a  real  spiritual  fellowship  with  Christ,  which  nourishes  our 
soul  (ib.  3.5).  As  we  receive  the  body  of  Christ,  we  experience 
the  continuous  efficacy  of  his  sacrifice,  and  his  blood  as  a  u  per¬ 
petual  drink.  ’  ’  There  is,  therefore,  here  a  real  presence  of 
Christ,  even  a  presence  of  his  corporeal  nature  ( Leiblichkeif) : 

1  An  evidence  of  this  is  seen  in  Calvin’s  idea,  that,  in  the  case  of  children, 
regeneration  is  effected  in  an  initial  way  by  baptism  without  the  word  :  “  We 
confess  that  the  word  of  the  Lord  is  the  one  and  only  seed  of  regeneration  ; 
but  we  deny  that  it  is  to  be  inferred  from  this  that  infants  cannot  be  regener¬ 
ated  by  the  power  of  God,  which  is  to  him  as  easy  and  plain  as  it  is  to  us  in¬ 
comprehensible  and  wonderful”  (iv.  16.  18).  Why  should  not  God,  since 
he  can  awaken  faith  even  without  the  word,  bestow  also  upon  children  “some 
share  of  his  grace,”  or  a  certain  knowledge  of  God,  “  the  full  abundance  of 
which  they  are  soon  after  to  enjoy  ?  ”  (ib.  19).  Cf.  Luther,  supra,  p.  285,  n.  2. 

2  As  Duns  denies  that  God  binds  his  power  to  the  sacraments  (p.  127),  so 
Calvin  says  :  “  No  power  is  by  us  located  in  created  things  ”  (iv.  14.  12). 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


413 


“  I  declare  that  in  the  mystery  of  the  Supper  through  the  sym¬ 
bols  of  bread  and  wine  Christ  is  truly  offered  to  zis,  even  as  to 
his  body  and  blood  ’  ’  (n).  It  is  not  sufficient  to  speak  merely 
of  a  spiritual  fellowship  with  Christ,  since  he  has  designated  his 
flesh  and  his  blood  as  veritable  food  (7).  Christ,  coming  from 
heaven,  has  infused  into  his  flesh  his  life-givingenergy,  “  in  order 
that  thence  the  communication  of  life  might  extend  to  us” 
(8).  From  his  flesh,  life  flows  into  us  as  from  a  gushing  foun¬ 
tain  (9).  But  the  body  of  Christ  is  now  far  removed  from  us  in 
space  :  how  then  can  his  flesh  come  to  us  and  serve  us  as  food  ? 
This  occurs  through  the  “secret  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit: 
therefore  what  our  mind  does  not  comprehend,  faith  accepts,  i.  e., 
that  the  Spirit  truly  unites  things  which  are  separated  in  locali¬ 
ties.”  We  must,  therefore,  believe  that  where  the  visible  sym¬ 
bols  are  offered  to  us,  “  the  body  itself  is  also  certainly  given  to 
us”  (10;  cf.  C.  R.  xxxvii.  72).  The  reception  of  the  body 
takes  place  therefore  by  means  of  faith  (5,  n,  32). 

Accordingly,  Calvin  teaches  a  real  presence  of  Christ,1  which 
is  mediated  through  the  symbols  of  the  bread  and  wine — he  even  ‘ 
speaks  of  a  presence  and  energy  of  the  body  of  Christ.  But  it 
is,  according  to  1  Cor.  x.  16,  a  xotvwvia  of  the  body  of  Christ  : 

“  but  a  communication  is  something  different  from  the  body  it¬ 
self  ”  (22).  We  do  not  receive  the  body  of  Christ,  “but  all 
the  blessings  which  Christ  has  offered  to  us  in  his  body  ”  (C.  R. 
xxix.  123).  If  we  would  understand  this  view,  as  contrasted 
with  that  of  Luther,  we  must  bear  three  things  in  mind:  (1) 
That  the  “substance”  of  the  sacrament  is  “Christ,  with  his 
death  and  resurrection.  ”  (  2  )  That  the  ‘ ‘  prodigious  ubiquity  ’  ’ 

is  unconditionally  excluded.  If  we  do  not  wish  to  volatilize  the 
body  of  Christ  into  a  phantasm,  we  must  firmly  maintain  his  cir¬ 
cumscribed  local  existence  in  heaven  (12,  26,  29,  30).  (3) 

That,  in  strict  consistency  with  the  above,  the  presence  of  the 
body  of  Christ  is  to  be  represented  as  a  presence  mediated  by 
the  Spirit  to  faith,  yet  in  such  a  way  that  “  the  flesh  itself  of 
Christ  does  not  enter  into  us”  (10,  32).  Calvin’s  view  is, 
therefore,  clear.  Christ  is  present  in  the  Supper  as  he  who  in  his 
body  and  through  it  has  accomplished  our  salvation  :  his  power 
(potential)  and  efficacy  ( virtus )  as  Redeemer  is  present.  “  He  is 
always  present  with  his  own,  breathing  into  them  his  life  ;  he 
lives  in  them,  sustains  them,  confirms  them,  quickens  them, 
keeps  them  safe,  not  otherwise  than  if  he  were  present  in  body : 
finally,  indeed,  he  feeds  them  with  his  very  body,  the  commu- 

1  He  expressly  guards  himself  against  the  misunderstanding  :  “As  though, 
when  I  say  that  Christ  is  received  by  faith,  I  should  wish  to  be  understood  as 
meaning  only  by  the  mind  and  the  imagination  ”  (ib.  11). 


414 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES.. 


nion  of  which  he  infuses  into  them  by  the  power  of  his  Spirit. 
In  this  way  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  are  offered  to  us  in  the 
sacrament”  (18).  The  difference  between  this  doctrine  and  that 
of  Luther  is  manifest.  However  emphatically  Calvin  maintains 
the  earlier  position  of  Luther,  that  the  significance  of  the  body  of 
Christ  consists  in  the  presence,  as  a  pledge  to  us,  of  him  who  has  suf¬ 
fered  for  us  (supra,  p.  287  f. ),  yet  the  difference  is  always  equally 
manifest — Calvin  having  in  mind  the  spiritual  influence,  and 
Luther  the  real  bodily  presence.  When  the  question  is  raised, 
whether  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  is  nearer  to  that 
of  Luther  or  to  that  of  Zwingli,  the  decision  is  usually,  under 
confessional  bias,  given  in  favor  of  the  latter  opinion.1  But  when 
it  is  remembered  that,  in  contrast  with  Zwingli’ s  purely  subjective 
commemorative  view,  Calvin  maintains  both  a  special  “  presence 
of  the  living  Christ”  (Apol.,  vid.  supra,  p.  342)  and  the  relig¬ 
ious  influences  exerted  by  it,  quite  in  the  spirit  of  Luther,2  the 
conclusion  may,  nevertheless,  be  reached,  with  due  account  of 
the  differences  above  noted,  that  in  his  religious  conception  of 
the  sacrament  Calvin  stands  nearer  to  Luther  than  to  Zwingli.3 
Calvin  himself  pronounced  Zwingli ’s  theory  of  the  sacraments 
profane  (C.  R.  xxxix.  438).  The  words  of  institution  are,  ac¬ 
cording  to  Calvin,  to  be  understood  as  a  metonomy,  somewhat 
as  circumcision  is  called  a  covenant ;  the  Rock,  Christ ;  the  Old 
Testament  sacrifices,  atonements.  But  “  it  does  not  only  repre¬ 
sent,  as  a  bare  and  empty  token,  but  also  truly  offers”  (ib.  21). 
Such  is  Calvin’s  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper.  It  affords  addi¬ 
tional  evidence  of  his  dependence  upon  Luther  in  his  apprehen¬ 
sion  of  religious  truth. 

10.  The  significance  of  Calvin  for  the  History  of  Doctrines 
lies  in  the  fact,  that  his  view  of  Christianity  and  the  church  ex¬ 
presses  in  classical  completeness  the  conception  of  the  Reforma¬ 
tion  which  prevailed  in  Switzerland  and  Southwestern  Germany. 
To  the  wide  acceptance  which  this  type  of  doctrine  gradually 

1  Schweizer,  Glaubenslehre  d.  ev.-ref.  Kirche,  ii.  656.  Hagenbach, 
DG.,  ed.  6,  556.  Thomasius,  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  550,  554  f. 

2  The  sacrament  not  only  brings  the  fullness  of  the  gifts  of  Christ  and  fills 
us  with  the  assurance  of  eternal  life,  “but  it  even  makes  us  secure  in  regard  to 
the  immortality  of  our  flesh”  (ib.  32);  it  also  lays  upon  us  the  duty  of 
brotherly  love  (44). 

3  This  also  throws  light  upon  the  relation  of  Bucer’s  theory  and  the  later 
teaching  of  Melanchthon  to  Luther.  For  Luther’s  mild  judgment  of  Calvin 
and  his  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  vid.  Stahelin,  C.  Leben,  i.  226  f. 
Luther  firmly  maintained  his  own  position  to  the  last,  notwithstanding  the 
well-known  utterance  said  to  have  been  made  to  Melanchthon.  See  KoSTLlN, 
Luther,  ii.,  ed.  4,  627  f.,  and  Stud.  u.  Krit.,  1875,  373  ff  >  as  also  Diestel- 
mann,  Dieletzte  Unterredung  Luther’s  mit  Mel.  lib.  d.  Abendmalsstreit,  and 
especially  Haussleiter,  Neue  kirchl.  Ztschr.,  1898,  831  ff. 


THEOLOGY  OF  CALVIN. 


415 


attained,  we  can  here  merely  refer  in  passing.1  The  close  con¬ 
nection  between  Calvin’s  conception  of  the  central  ideas  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  and  Luther’s  underlying  thoughts  need  not  be  further 
emphasized.  We  must  not  allow  the  confessional  conflict  of  the 
following  century  to  obscure  for  us  the  important  fact,  that  the 
two  types  of  Reformation  doctrine  which  gained  ascendancy  in 
Protestantism,  i.  <?.,  the  type  of  Luther  and  Melanchthon  and 
that  of  Bucer  and  Calvin,  are  in  essential  accord  in  their  under¬ 
standing  of  faith  and  works,  of  justification  and  atonement,  of 
repentance  and  sanctification,  in  their  recognition  of  the  dogmas 
of  the  ancient  church,  as  well  as  in  their  rejection  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Pelagianism  and  hierarchism.  At  the  same  time,  the 
differences  must  not  be  overlooked.  But  it  is  not  correct,  so 
far  as  I  am  able  to  judge,  to  attribute  these  differences  to  a 
religious  conception  begotten  upon  the  territory  of  the  church  as 
remoulded  by  the  Reformation.  Rather  are  they  sufficiently 
explained — when  studied  from  the  purely  historical  point  of 
view — as  the  preservation  and  propagation,  upon  the  territory  of 
the  so-called  Reformed  Church,  of  ideals  and  doctrines  of  the 
pre-reformation  period.  This  is  true,  for  example,  (1)  of  the 
aim  and  scope  of  the  assumed  task  of  practical  reform,  which  in¬ 
cluded  a  reformation  of  the  moral  life,  to  be  enforced  with 
stringency  and  finding  its  justification  in  positive  biblical  ordi¬ 
nances,  and  also  a  thorough  revision  and  revolution  of  the 
ecclesiastical  system.  (2)  In  this  undertaking,  the  ecclesiastical 
offices  ordained  of  God  come  into  prominence ;  a  covenant 
must  be  formed  between  the  civil  authority  and  the  church, 
which  involves  a  subordination  of  the  former  to  the  ordinances 
of  the  latter.  (3)  The  prevalent  ideal  of  a  practical  life  fre¬ 
quently  betrays  a  relationship  with  the  medieval  renunciation  of 
the  world  and  of  the  natural  impulses.  (4)  The  Scriptures,  as  the 
source  of  authority  for  the  conduct  of  the  reformation  sought, 
are  verbally  inspired  ;  both  ideas  being,  as  we  have  seen  (supra, 
p.  169  172,  192,  ff. ),  embraced  in  the  theory  of  the  later 
Middle  Ages.  (5)  The  conception  of  the  sacraments  is  related 
to  the  ideas  of  Erasmas,  and  reminds  us  of  the  Scotist-Nominalist 
theory.  (6)  The  difference  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s 
Supper  rests  chiefly  upon  the  adherence  to  the  Augustinian  and 


1  The  influence  of  Calvin  as  a  theologian  upon  his  church  exceeds  that 
exerted  by  Melanchthon,  and  even  by  Luther,  in  a  similar  respect  upon  their 
followers  ;  for  it  may  be  said,  that  his  theology  has  become  the  accepted  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Reformed  Church .  Nearly  all  the  later  confessions  reproduce  his 
formulas,  and  we  may  hence  pass  them  by  with  slight  notice.  Calvin  did  not 
leave  behind  him  questionable  coins,  as  did  Melanchthon  ;  nor,  on  the  other 
hand,  like  Luther,  uncoined  gold. 


4i  6 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


Scholastic  idea  of  the  corporeal  nature  of  Christ  as  transported  to 
a  heavenly  place.  (7)  Even  the  determinism,  which  is  a 
natural  outcome  of  the  conception  of  God,  is  no  new  discovery, 
but  is  the  common  factor  in  a  number  of  reformatory  movements 
appearing  in  the  Western  church  since  the  days  of  Augustine. 
We  need  but  briefly  point  to  the  Thomistic  and  Scotist  elements 
which  appear  concurrently. 

It  is  precisely  in  this  conception  of  the  nature  of  God — more 
in  the  practical,  unwritten  conception  than  in  the  theoretical 
formulas — that  we  find  the  basis  of  the  peculiar  character  of  the 
Reformed  view,  and  at  this  point  accordingly  begins  the  diver¬ 
gence  from  the  Lutheran  view.  God  is,  to  pious  minds  in  the 
Reformed  church,  the  Lord  who  rules  omnipotently.1  The  de¬ 
velopment  of  the  universe  is  the  product  of  his  sovereign  will ; 
its  goal  his  honor  or  glory.  But  the  sovereignty  of  God  is  dis¬ 
played  above  all  through  the  u  Law,”  which  controls  all  life 
and  all  its  ramifications.  All  that  is  and  is  done  in  the 
world,  everything  personal  and  natural,  must  subserve  this  end. 
Obedience  is  the  whole  content  of  life.  Natural  inclinations  are 
bent  and  crushed  beneath  the  pressure  of  the  “  law  the  state 
and  society  at  large  are  agencies  for  its  enforcement.  There  is 
something  ‘ 4  unmodern  ”  in  this  magniloquent  portrayal  of  the 
energy  of  obedience  and  the  fanaticism  of  submission.  W  e  always, 
when  we  allow  the  system  as  a  whole  to  make  appeal  to  us, 
receive  an  impression  of  a  piety  in  keeping  with  that  of  Augus¬ 
tine  and  the  Middle  Ages.  This  impression  is  often  confirmed  in 
a  startling  way  by  the  history  of  the  Reformed  Church.  This 
history  rests  upon  a  foundation-wall  of  holy  zeal,  and  a  cloud  of 
strong-willed  witnesses  overshadows  it.  But  the  gospel,  as  it 
appears  in  Paul  and  John,  we  find  in  clearer  and  brighter  form 
in  Luther  than  in  Calvin.  The  God  of  Calvin  is  the  omnipotent 
Will,  ruling  throughout  the  world ;  the  God  of  Luther  is  the 
omnipotent  energy  of  Love  manifest  in  Christ.  In  the  one  case, 
we  have  acts  of  compulsion  even  in  the  heart,  subjection,  law, 
service  ;  in  the  other,  inward  conquest  by  the  power  of  love, 
free  self-surrender,  filial  love  without  compulsion.  The  one 
does  not  necessarily  exclude  the  other ;  but  the  tone  and 
emphasis  give  rise  to  the  differences  which  undeniably  exist. 
From  the  practical  energy  of  the  Reformed  ideals — with  which 
praxis  has  not  always  been  able  to  keep  pace — the  Lutheran 
church  may  learn  a  valuable  lesson.  But  when,  in  any  age  of 

1  E.  g.,  Heidelb.  Cat.,  Niemeyer,  p.  398  :  What  dost  thou  understand  by 
the  providence  of  God  ?  The  almighty  and  ever-present  power  of  God,  by 
which  he  still  upholds  and  also  governs  heaven  and  earth,  together  with  all 
created  things,  as  with  his  hand. 


Calvin’s  doctrine  of  the  lord’s  supper.  417 

evangelical  Christianity,  faith  grows  dim,  and  love  grows  cold, 
and  it  seems  as  though  the  gospel  were  no  longer  sufficient 
to  satisfy  the  advanced  spirit  of  the  ‘ ‘  modern  ’  ’  world,  then  will 
deliverance  be  found,  not  in  the  views  of  Calvin,  but  in  return 
to  the  gospel  and  the  faith  of  Luther.1  Evangelical  Christianity 
has  yet  much  to  learn  from  her  Luther. 


§  80.  The  Triumph  of  Calvin' s  Doctrine  of  the  Lord' s  Supper. 

Literature.  Niemeyer,  Collect,  confessionum  in  ecclesiis  reformatis, 
1840.  Hundeshagen,  Conflikte  des  Zwinglianismus,  Lutherturas  u.  Calvin- 
ismus  in  d.  bern.  Landeskirche,  1842.  Pestalozzi,  Bullinger,  1858,  p. 
229  ff.,  373  ff.  Stahelin,  Calvin,  ii.  91  ff. 

1.  Luther’s  severe  condemnation  of  Zwingli  in  his  “  Kurz.  Be- 
kenntnis  vom  h.  Sakr. ,”  1545,  induced  Bullinger  to  revive  the 
Zwinglian  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  in  the  baldest  form 
( ‘ ‘  Warhaftes  Bekenntnis  der  Diener  der  Kirche  zu  Zurich J  ’ ) .  At 
about  the  same  time,  a  series  of  conflicts  arose  in  the  church  at 
Berne  in  consequence  of  the  demand  of  the  Council  that  all  pas¬ 
tors  should  accept  the  Zurich  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper. 
Calvin  took  a  hand  in  the  controversy,  as  he  had  a  large  number 
of  adherents  in  the  territory  of  Berne.  Under  his  influence,  the 
Consensus  Tigurinus  appeared  in  A.  D.  1549,  setting  forth  the 
doctrine  as  agreed  upon  between  Bullinger  and  Calvin.2 

2.  The  Consensus,  while  bringing  the  doctrine  in  outward  form 
nearer  to  the  position  held  by  Zwingli,  is  in  substance  Calvin- 
istic.  The  sacraments  are  signs  of  recognition  and  commem¬ 
oration  (art.  7).  Yet  these  signs  are  not  empty,  but  accom¬ 
panied  by  God  with  special  exertions  of  his  energy.  With  the 
sacramental  signs  the  believer  also  really  receives  Christ  with  all 
spiritual  gifts  (9).  More  precisely  speaking,  this  is  true  only  in 
the  case  of  the  elect  (16,  17).  A  bodily  presence  of  Christ  is 
to  be  rejected  (21,  24).  The  words  of  institution  are  to  be 
understood  figuratively  (  figurate ,  22). 

3.  The  Reformed  Confessions  did  not  here  depart  from  the 

1  I  cannot  therefore  agree  with  K.  Muller  (Symbolik,  54°) ,  who  regards 
it  as  “  certain”  that  in  the  evangelical  church  of  the  future  “  the  spirit  of  the 
general  Evangelical  Reformed  Church  will  be  in  the  ascendancy,”  since 
Luther’s  contributions  to  the  church  “  were  substantially  already  adopted  in 
the  sixteenth  century.”  Miiller has  moreover  acknowledged  that  in  a  certain 
sense  the  Reformed  Church  stands  nearer  to  Roman  Catholicism  than  does  the 
Lutheran  (p.  387  A.). 

2  This  document  is  pronounced  by  E.  Stahelin  (Calv.  ii.  121):  “  the  solemn 
act  by  which  the  Zwinglian  and  Calvinistic  reformations  were  joined  in  ever¬ 
lasting  wedlock  as  the  one  great  Reformed  church. 

27 


418 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


teachings  of  Calvin.  The  sacraments  are  efficacious  signs  (effi- 
cacia  signa)  of  grace  (39,  art.  35).  Accordingly,  with  the  recep¬ 
tion  of  the  bread  and  wine,  there  is  an  impartation  of  grace,  not 
only  in  that  we  are  thereby  enabled  to  realize  the  sacrifice  of 
Christ  upon  the  cross,  but  also  :  “  that  he  himself  feeds  and  re¬ 
freshes  my  soul  to  eternal  life  with  his  crucified  body  and  shed 
blood  as  certainly  as  I  receive  .  .  .  the  bread  from  the  hand  of 
the  administrator  ’ ’  (Heidelb.  Cat.,  Niemeyer,  p.  409).  Be¬ 
lievers  “  through  the  Holy  Spirit  receive  also  the  flesh  and  blood 
of  the  Lord,  and  are  by  these  nourished  (  pascuntur )  unto  eter¬ 
nal  life  ”  (Conf.  Helv.  poster,  a.  21).  The  body  and  blood  of 
Christ  are  thus  really  received,  but  by  the  soul  in  faith,  their 
presence  being  secured  by  an  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit. 
When,  e.  <g.,tlie  Gallican  Confession  (a.  36)  teaches  :  “  nourishes 
and  vivifies  us  with  the  substance  ( substantia )  of  his  body  and 
blood,”  this  is  at  once  (a.  37)  explained  to  mean  that  the 
body  and  blood  are  food  and  drink  of  the  soul,  as  the  bread  and 
wine  of  the  body  (cf.  Westminster  Conf.  c.  29.  7  ;  39  a.  28. 
Conf.  Belg.,  Scot,  i.,  Niemeyer,  p.  386,  352).  This  is  the  Cal- 
vinistic  doctrine. 

§81.  Fundamental  Evangelical  Principles  in  the  Later  Confes¬ 
sions  of  the  Reformed  Church. 

Sources.  Cf.  Niemeyer,  1.  c.  K.  Muller,  Symbolik,  1896,  p.  415  ff., 
445  ff- 

1.  The  later  Reformed  Confessions  all  distinctly  display  the 
controlling  influence  of  the  spirit  of  Calvin  (cf.  Conf.  Gallicana, 
1559.  Conf.  Czengerina,  1557.  Conf.  Belgica,  1566.  The 
39  Articles,  1562.  Conf.  Scoticana prior,  1560.  Conf.  Helve¬ 
tica  posterior,  1566.  Heidelberg  Catech. ,  1563.  Westminster 
Conf.,  1646.  Declaratio  Thoruniensis,  1645).  Of  these  vari¬ 
ous  confessions,  the  Heidelberg  Catechism,  the  Westminster  Con¬ 
fession,  and  the  Later  Helvetic  Confession  attained  the  greatest 
authority. 

2.  The  fundamental  evangelical  ideas  find  clear  expression  in 
these  writings.  For  the  sake  of  the  satisfaction  and  obedience  of 
Christ,  God  forgives  the  sins  of  those  who  believe  on  Christ  and 
regards  them  as  righteous  :  “  God,  without  any  merit  of  mine, 
out  of  pure  grace,  bestows  upon  and  imputes  to  me  the  perfect 
satisfaction,  righteousness,  and  holiness  of  Christ,  as  though  I 
had  never  committed  any  sin  and  had  myself  rendered  all  the 
obedience  which  Christ  has  rendered  for  me,  if  I  only  accept 
such  benefit  with  a  believing  heart  ’ ’  (Heidelb.  Cat.,  p.  405  f. ; 


LATER  CONFESSIONS  OF  THE  REFORMED  CHURCH. 


419 


cf.  Helv.  15,  16.  West.  Conf.  8.  5;  11.  1,  3).1  God  works 
faith  through  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  elect  “  by  means  of  the 
preaching  of  the  gospel  and  the  prayer  of  the  believer”  (Helv. 
post.  16.  Westm.  Conf.  14.  1).  Faith  is  44 *  not  only  a  sure 
knowledge  by  means  of  which  I  regard  as  true  everything  which 
God  has  revealed  to  us  in  his  word,  but  also  a  heartfelt  confi¬ 
dence”  (Heid.  Cat.  396).  It  is  an  assured  acknowledgment  of 
the  divine  truth  44  presented  (  proposita )  in  the  Scriptures  and  the 
Apostles’  Creed  ”  (Helv.  16).  Since  faith  accepts  the  contents 
of  the  Scriptures  as  true  4 ‘on  account  of  the  authority  of  God 
himself  speaking  therein,”  it  embraces  obedience  to  the  com¬ 
mandments,  as  well  as  the  acceptance  of  the  promises  and  repose 
in  Christ  (Westm.  Conf.  14.  2).  These,  too,  are  Calvinistic 
ideas,  which  deviate  from  the  view  of  Luther.  Faith  is  not  only 
acceptance  of  Christ,  but  also  the  obedient  subjection  to  God  and 
the  reception  of  the  doctrines  revealed  by  him.2  The  emphasis 
laid  upon  penitential  discipline  is  also  to  be  traced  to  Calvin 
(Heid.  Cat.  412.  Westm.  Conf.  15).  The  Helvetic  Confes¬ 
sion  defines  repentance  as  follows  :  “a  change  of  mind  in  man 
the  sinner,  incited  by  the  word  of  the  gospel  and  the  Holy  Spirit, 
and  accepted  by  true  faith.”  It  is  4 4  conversion  ”  to  God  and 
to  all  good,  and  “aversion”  from  the  devil  and  evil  (a.  14. 
Heid.  Cat.  413  f. ). 

3.  The  recognition  of  the  spiritual  nature  of  the  church  is 
epitomized  in  the  formula  :  The  church  is  the  fellowship  of  the 
predestinated  (<?.  g.,  Westm.  Conf.  25.  1.  Heid.  Cat.  404). 
This  definition  stands  by  the  side  of  a  strong  emphasizing  of  the 
visible  church,  with  its  offices,  and  discipline,  and  the  obligation 
to  submit  to  the  latter  and  diligently  use  the  means  of  grace 

1  Upon  Original  Sin  and  the  Enslaved  Will,  vid.  Helv.  8.  Gal.  10,  11. 
Scot.  3.  Heid.  Cat.  393.  Belg.  15,  39,  art.  9,  10.  Westm.  Conf.  c.  6  and  9. 

2  We  in  this  connection  naturally  recall  the  strong  emphasis  upon  the  in¬ 
spiration  of  the  Scriptures  and  the  enumeration  of  the  books  of  the  canon  in 

the  Reformed  confessions,  e.  g. ,  Helv.  1  :  “We  believe,  therefore,  that  from 
these  Scriptures  are  to  be  sought  true  wisdom  and  piety  ;  also,  the  reformation 
and  government  of  churches,  and  the  institution  of  all  the  duties  of  piety.” 
The  West.  Conf.,  I.  I  and  2,  after  enumerating  the  canonical  books,  says: 

“  Which  have  all  been  given  by  divine  inspiration  as  the  rule  of  faith  and  life.  ” 
In  4:  “  The  authority  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  .  .  .  depends  .  .  .  alone  upon  their 
author,  God.”  In  5  :  “A  full  persuasion  and  certitude,  as  well  of  their  in¬ 
fallible  truth,  as  of  their  divine  authority,  is  not  otherwise  begotten  than  by 
an  internal  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  testifying  through  the  word  and  with 
the  word  in  our  hearts.”  Thus  the  Small  Catechism  of  the  Puritans,  in 
Niem.,  p.  98  :  “  There  are  two  things  which  the  Scriptures  teach  first  of  all  : 
what  man  should  believe  concerning  God,  and  what  duty  God  demands  of 
man.”  Gal.  2-5.  Belg.  3-7  ;  39  art.  6  (8  :  the  three  symbols,  the  Nicene, 
Athanasian,  and  what  is  commonly  called  the  Apostles',  are  to  be  entirely  re¬ 
ceived  and  believed). 


420 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


(e.g.,  Heid.  407.  Helv.  1.  17,  18.  Westm.  Conf.  25.  2  f. ). 
It  is  precisely  the  predestinarian  determinism  and  the  represen¬ 
tation  of  God  as  the  Lord  who  does  all  things  that  are  done, 
which  afford  the  explanation  of  the  strictness  and  severity  of 
Reformed  church  life.  All  that  is  done  by  the  church  and  its 
members  is  but  the  carrying  out  of  the  divine  Will.  Through 
vocatio  and  justificatio  predestination  is  realized  (Westm.  10.  1  ; 
11.  i).1  Thus  God  alone  works,  and  all  human  action  serves 
his  ends.  These  ideas  find  utterance  in  the  term,  “  the  divine 
glory”  (cf.  supra,  pp.  312,  391,  416,  and  Muller,  Symbolik,  p. 
445  ff. ).  We  are  thus  brought  to  the  doctrine  of  predestination. 

§82.  Triumph  of  the  Doctrine  of  Predestination. 

Literature.  Schweizer,  Centraldogmen,  2  vols. ,  1854-6.  Seeberg- 
Thomas.  ,  ed.  2,  660  ff.  Linsenmann,  A.  Pighius  u.  sein  theol.  Standpunkt, 
in  Tub.  Quartalschr. ,  1866,  571  ff.  Upon  Bolsec,  vid.  C.  R.  xxxvi.  145  ff. 

1.  In  harmony  with  his  fundamental  religious  temper,  and  in 
opposition  to  foolish  opposers,  Calvin  developed  the  doctrine  of 
predestination  with  constantly  increasing  clearness  and  distinct¬ 
ness.  Albert  Pighius  had  in  A.  D.  1542  made  a  vigorous 
assault  upon  this  doctrine  in  his  publication,  De  libero  ar bitrio 
et  divifia  gratia ,  11.  10.  To  this  Calvin  replied  in  his  De  libero 
arbitrio  (C.  R.  xxxiv.  233  ff. ).  He  here  develops  the  ideas 
grown  familiar  to  us  :  that  God  alone  works  salvation,  but  to  a 
certain  extent  includes  his  working  in  the  church’s  means  of 
grace  (252  ff. );  that  the  sinner  himself  is  to  blame  (256  f. ); 
that  the  doctrine  of  predestination  is  not  equivalent  to  Stoic 
fatalism  (257).  If  Pighius  had  employed  against  the  doctrine 
the  common  arguments,  that  it  leaves  no  room  for  morality  and 
human  responsibility,  nor  for  merits,  etc.,  Jerome  Bolsec, 
who  came  to  Geneva  in  A.  D.  1551,  endeavored  to  find  the 
source  of  faith  in  grace  alone,  but  with  the  exclusion  of  election. 
God,  he  held,  works  faith  through  efficacious  grace  (< gratia 
efficax).  That  it  is  not  always  produced,  is  to  be  attributed  to 
rebellio  in  man,  and  not  to  the  decree  of  God  (C.  R.  xxxvi. 
217,  213).  But  he  taught  also  “that  man  has  not  been 
entirely  deprived  of  free-will  .  .  .  but  his  will  remains,  wounded 
and  corrupt”  (ib.  218).  Though  Bolsec  by  no  means  questioned 
salvation  by  grace,  he  strongly  opposed  the  idea  of  a  pretemporal 
election  (vid.  also  1.  c.,  p.  179  f. ). 

1  Vid.  esp.  3,  6  :  “  But,  just  as  God  has  destined  the  elect  to  glory,  so  he 
has  foreordained  all  the  means  by  which  they  shall  attain  it.  Wherefore  the 
elect,  after  they  had  fallen  in  Adam,  have  been  redeemed  by  Christ,  are  by 
the  Holy  Spirit  efficaciously  called  to  faith  in  Christ,  justified,  sanctified,  and 
by  his  power  kept  through  faith  unto  salvation.” 


TRIUMPH  OF  DOCTRINE  OF  PREDESTINATION.  42 1 

An  appeal  issued  from  Geneva  to  the  other  Swiss  theologians 
awakened  but  a  lukewarm  response,  instead  of  the  clear  and 
incisive  testimony  in  favor  of  the  double  predestination  which 
the  Genevans  expected  (cf.  Schweizer,  i.  218  ff. ).  The 
Consensus  Genevenis,  De  aete?'na  dei praedestinatione ,  in  which 
Calvin,  in  A.  D.  1552,  again  presented  his  view  (C.  R.  xxxvi. 
249  if.,  in  Niemeyer,  Coll,  conf.,  218  ff. ),  was  hence  officially 
accepted  only  in  the  Genevan  church. 

2.  The  doctrine  is  treated  in  the  most  of  the  Reformed  con¬ 
fessions  in  a  very  moderate  way.  God  elects  some  in  Christ  and 
leaves  others  to  perdition  (Belg.  16;  Gal.  12).  The  Heid. 
Cat.  passes  over  the  subject  of  predestination  entirely  (but  see 
404:  the  elect  church,  ausserwelte  gemeiri).  The  Helv.  recog¬ 
nizes  it,  indeed,  but  warns  :  “  Nevertheless  we  should  hope  well 
for  all,  nor  is  anyone  to  be  rashly  counted  among  the  repro¬ 
bates,”  and  also  :  “  It  is  to  be  considered  as  beyond  doubt,  if 
thou  believest  and  art  in  Christ,  that  thou  art  elect”  (a.  10; 
cf.  Schweizer,  i.  290  f. ).*  The  definitions  of  the  Westm. 
Conf.  are  more  positive ;  but  even  there  the  doctrine  of  pre¬ 
destination  serves  only  to  enforce  the  certainty  of  salvation, 
since  it  is  the  basis  underlying  the  entire  soteriological  activity 
of  God  (3.  8,  6,  also  1  :  “  Neither  is  liberty,  or  the  con¬ 
tingency  of  second  causes,  taken  aw'ay,  but  rather  more  firmly 
established”).  But,  in  contrast  with  this  moderation,  in  the 
theology  of  the  leaders  of  the  second  generation  (Beza,  Peter 
Martyr,  Musculus,  Zanchi)  the  doctrine  of  predestination  is 
advocated  in  its  most  extreme  supralapsarian  form.  This 
emphasis  upon  predestination  became  but  the  more  pronounced 
in  the  course  of  the  development,  and  thus  this  doctrine,  i.  <?., 
of  the  divine  decrees,  gradually  became  the  starting-point  of 
Reformed  dogmatics. 

3.  The  growing  prominence  of  this  doctrine  is  reflected  in  the 
decrees  of  the  Synod  of  Dort,  A.  D.  1618-9,  which  was  devoted 
to  its  consideration  (cf.  Acta  synodi  Dortrechti  habitae  Lugd. 
Bat.,  1620,  Niemeyer,  690  ff.  Graf,  Beitrage  zur  Kenntnis  d. 
Synode  v.  D.,  1825.  Schweizer,  ii.  141  ff. ).  The  occasion 
for  the  holding  of  this  Synod  was  the  Arminian  controversy. 
Jacob  Arminius,  from  A.  D.  1603  professor  at  Leyden,  was 
brought,  in  consequence  of  his  freer  views  upon  the  subject,  into 
conflict  with  his  colleague,  Francis  Gomarus,  who  held  to  the 
strict  doctrine  of  predestination.  His  death  occurring  A.  D. 
1609,  James  Uytenbogaart  and  Simon  Episcopius  became  the 

1  In  the  Confessio  Sigismundi  (A.  D.  1614),  salvation  is  indeed  traced  to 
the  pretemporal  election,  but  it  is,  on  the  other  hand,  denied  “  that  he  (God) 
does  not  desire  to  have  all  saved  ”  (Niemeyer,  p.  650). 


422 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


leading  champions  of  the  modified  position.  In  A.  D.  1610 r 
the  Arminian  leaders,  branded  as  heretics  by  their  opponents, 
united  in  a  protest,  the  Remonstrantia  (Schaff.,  The  Creeds 
of  Christendom,  iii.  545  ff. ),  whose  positions  are  the  following  : 
God  determined,  before  the  foundation  of  the  world,  to  save 
through  Christ  those  of  the  fallen  human  race  who  should  believe 
on  him.  Man  does  not  by  the  power  of  his  free  will  attain 
saving  faith,  but  he  is  born  and  renewed  to  such  faith  by  Christ 
through  his  Holy  Spirit.  As  the  beginning,  so  also  the  progress 
and  completion  of  good  in  man,  is  dependent  upon  grace,  but 
grace  does  not  work  irresistibly.  Those  who  have  received  the 
Spirit  and  faith  are  able,  through  the  assistance  of  grace,  to- 
struggle  against  all  temptations  and  come  off  victorious.  The 
question,  whether  the  regenerated  can  fall  from  grace,  is  left 
undecided. 

The  Remonstrants  were  at  once  confronted  by  the  Contra- 
remonstrants.  The  agitation  increased,  and  it  was  decided  to 
settle  the  dispute  by  a  synod,  to  which  nearly  all  the  Reformed 
national  churches  were  invited.  It  was  held  at  Dort,  lasting 
from  November  13,  1618,  till  May  9,  1619.  Delegates  were 
present  from  the  Palatinate,  Hesse,  Nassau,  East  Friesland, 
Bremen,  Emden,  England,  Scotland,  Geneva,  and  German 
Switzerland.  It  was  a  council  which  has  no  parallel  in  the  his¬ 
tory  of  Protestantism.  In  view  of  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
the  Contra-remonstrants,  the  result  could  not  be  doubtful,1  and 
it  is  not  surprising  that  the  Remonstrants  were  from  the  first 
placed  in  the  position  of  defendants.  The  canons  of  the  synod 
cast  a  strong  light  upon  the  significance  of  the  doctrine  of  pre¬ 
destination  for  the  later  Reformed  church.  We  reproduce  the 
leading  thoughts :  The  fact  that  only  some  of  the  race  of  sinful 
men  come  to  faith  must  be  attributed  to  the  eternal  counsel  of 
God.  God  elected  a  definite  number  of  men  in  Christ  to 
salvation,  whilst  in  his  justice  leaving  the  others  to  perdition. 
But  the  election  is  realized  in  the  mission  of  Christ,  the  effectual 
call,  the  bestowal  of  faith,  justification,  sanctification,  and  glori¬ 
fication  (c.  1.  6,  7).  Hence  man  is  assured  of  his  election  by 
its  infallible  fruits.  Faith,  the  fear  of  God,  sorrow  for  sin, 
hunger  and  thirst  after  righteousness,  constitute  thus  the  basis  of 
our  recognition  of  predestination  ;  or,  the  latter  is  the  real  basis 
of  the  entire  new  life  (1.  12).  The  activity  of  God  in  the  in¬ 
terest  of  human  salvation  is  therefore  regarded  as,  in  its  entire 
scope,  nothing  more  than  the  actualizing  of  predestination. 

1  The  assembly  decided  for  the  infralapsarian  view  of  the  doctrine,  only 
Gomarus  still  adhering  to  the  supralapsarian  formula. 


TRIUMPH  OF  DOCTRINE  OF  PREDESTINATION. 


423 


Consequently,  the  sacrifice  of  Christ,  or  the  satisfaction  rendered 
by  him,  which  is  in  itself  considered  of  infinite  value  and 
abundantly  sufficient  for  the  salvation  of  all  men,  effects  only 
the  salvation  of  the  elect  (2.  3,  8).  Hence,  God  accompanies 
the  calling  through  the  word  with  illumination  through  the  Holy 
Spirit  and  the  agency  of  regenerating  grace  :  “  He  infuses  new 

qualities  into  the  will  and  makes  it  from  dead,  living ;  from  evil, 
good;  from  unwilling,  willing”  (3.  10,  n).1  This  regener¬ 
ation  is  a  creative  act  of  God,  like  the  recalling  of  the  dead  to 
life.  It  is  not  accomplished  by  means  of  moral  persuasion,  and 
it  does  not  impart  to  man  the  mere  possibility  of  conversion  ; 
but  it  is  a  wonderful  work  of  divine  agency  :  “In  order  that  all 
those  in  whose  hearts  God  operates  in  this  wonderful  way  may 
certainly ,  infallibly  and  efficaciously  be  regenerated  and  actually 
believe  ”  (3.  12).  In  the  case  of  the  elect,  therefore,  the  call 
certainly  produces  regeneration  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
also  held  that  “  as  many  as  are  called  through  the  gospel  are 
seriously  ferio')  called,”  so  that  it  is  to  be  ascribed  only 
to  their  unwillingness  if  they  are  not  converted  (3.  8,  9).  As 
this  latter  position  is  evidently  out  of  accord  with  the  former, 
so,  if  strictly  interpreted,  it  carries  us  entirely  beyond  the 
bounds  of  the  determinism  which  otherwise  pervades  the  docu¬ 
ment.2 

The  certainty  of  the  salvation  of  the  elect  is  secured  finally  by 
the  Perseverance  of  the  Saints.  Although  the  elect  may  fall  into 
grave  sins,  and  thereby  lose  for  a  time  the  consciousness  of  grace 
(5.  1-5),  yet  God  so  preserves  his  Holy  Spirit  in  them  that  they 
can  never  fall  entirely  out  of  the  state  of  grace  nor  commit  the 
sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost  (5.  7).  The  unchangeableness  of 
the  divine  decree  excludes  the  possibility  that  they  should  entirely 
fall  away  or  be  lost  (5.  8). 

4.  In  this  document,  the  later  Reformed  view  attained  ade¬ 
quate  expression.3  Predestination  was  exalted  to  the  position  of 
a  dogma,  and  its  opponents  defeated.  But  the  decrees  of  Dort 

1  It  is  necessary  merely  to  contrast  with  this  the  prudent  remarks  of  the 
Formula  of  Concord  (supra,  p.  383)  in  order  to  understand  the  benefit  of  the 
Philippistic  ideas. 

2  For,  according  to  the  leading  principles  here  maintained,  the  call  is- 
an  effectual  expression  of  the  divine  will  only  in  the  case  of  the  elect.  Upon, 
these  it  must  have  its  effect ;  upon  others  it  cannot  have  any  inward  efficacy  at 
all.  The  idea  expressed  above  is  hence  a  concession,  similar  to  the  other  one 
already  noted,  i.  e.,  that  the  death  of  Christ  was  sufficient  to  effect  the  salva¬ 
tion  of  all  men,  although  it  is  intended  to  actually  benefit  only  some. 

3  The  decrees  of  Dort  were  officially  recognized  by  the  Netherlands  ;  but 
they  were  received  largely  also  in  Switzerland,  France,  and  the  Palatinate,  as 
well  as  by  the  Puritans. 


424 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


— as  also  the  Westminster  Confession  (supra,  p.  419) — indicate 
a  displacement  of  the  original  order  of  thought  in  the  sphere  of 
soteriology.  Predestination  was  once  a  support  for  the  assurance 
of  salvation  ;  now  it  has  itself  been  made  the  fundamental  con¬ 
ception.  The  course  was  once  from  below  upward,  i.  e.,  from 
justification  to  predestination  ;  now  it  is  from  above  downward, 
i.  e.,  from  predestination  to  justification.1  This  transformation 
indicates  something  different  from  a  victory  for  the  theoretical 
idea  of  Calvin  ;  for  the  Institutio  did  not  observe  the  order  fol¬ 
lowed  in  the  later  statements  of  the  doctrine,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Confession  of  Dort  did  not  fully  reproduce  the  rigor 
of  the  Calvinistic  ideas.  It  was  rather  that  practical  conception 
of  God  which  marks  the  writings  of  Calvin — God,  the  all -work¬ 
ing  Lord,  who  rules  all  things  for  his  own  glory — which  was  here 
victorious.  This  practical  point  of  view  must  be  kept  in  view  in 
order  to  understand  the  later  form  and  relationship  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  predestination. 

But  the  definitions  of  Dort  are  also,  in  another  direction,  of 
the  greatest  historical  significance,  since  they  mark  the  breach 
between  ecclesiastical  Calvinism  and  its  humanistically-inclined 
followers.  Among  the  adherents  and  forerunners  of  the  Refor¬ 
mation  in  the  spirit  of  Zwingli  and  Calvin  were  not  infrequently 
found  representatives  of  the  Erasmian  ideals  of  reform.  Practi¬ 
cal  ethical  reforms,  a  large-hearted  undogmatic  Christianity,  and 
scholarly  tastes  were  often  combined  in  these  circles.  It  was 
among  them  especially  that  the  Arminians  found  recruits.  Their 
opposition  by  no  means  signified  merely  dissent  from  a  single 
doctrine,  but  it  was  rather  a  protest  against  the  enlargement  of 
the  sphere  of  dogma  and  against  the  limitation  of  exegetical 
freedom  by  dogmatic  formulas.  This  is  proved  by  the  further 
history  of  Arminianism.  As  against  this  tendency,  the  Synod 
of  Dort  marks  the  victory  of  strict  orthodoxy  within  the  Re¬ 
formed  church. 

5.  This  may  be  seen,  as  well  as  the  important  place  occupied 
by  the  doctrine  of  predestination  in  the  theological  thought  of 
the  age,  in  the  discussions  called  forth  by  the  modifications  of 
this  doctrine,  in  themselves  of  no  great  moment,  suggested  by 
Moses  Amyraldus  in  Saumur  (vid.  Traite  de  la  predestination 
et  de  ses  principes,  1634;  cf.  Schweizer,  ii.  280  ff. ).  He 
maintains  firmly  the  Reformed  doctrine  of  predestination,  that 
God  has  elected  some  to  salvation,  but  has  purposed  to  leave 
others  to  perdition.  He,  however,  modified  this  position  at  two 

1  The  original  view  may  be  expressed  in  the  formula  :  Because  there  is 
justification,  there  is  predestination  ;  the  later  view  reverses  this  :  Because 
there  is  predestination,  there  is  justification. 


TRIUMPH  OF  DOCTRINE  OF  PREDESTINATION. 


425 


points  in  a  way  which  was  out  of  harmony  with  the  prevalent 
view.  In  the  first  place,  he  held,  upon  the  ground  that  the  will 
always  follows  the  intellect,  that  the  irresistible  working  of  God 
upon  the  will  of  man  is  effected  through  the  illumination  of  the 
intellect.1  The  process  of  conversion,  he  claimed,  was  thus 
made  psychologically  more  intelligible.2 *  Secondly,  he  intro¬ 
duced  the  idea  of  the  so-called  hypothetical universalism  of  grace. 
In  order  to  throw  some  light  upon  the  rejection  of  the  reprobate 
— acknowledging,  as  he  did,  the  absolute  inscrutability  of  the 
grounds  upon  which  the  divine  election  is  based — he  conceives 
that  there  is  in  nature  and  history,  independent  of  the  gospel 
message,  a  certain  dim  revelation  of  the  grace  of  God.  Both 
forms  of  revelation  have  been  made  possible,  however,  only  be¬ 
cause  satisfaction  has  been  rendered  to  the  divine  justice  by  the 
sacrifice  of  Christ.  But  neither  this  general  revelation,  nor  the 
preaching  of  the  gospel  in  itself,  can  bring  salvation  to  the  sin¬ 
ner.  This  depends  upon  the  divine  election.  Yet  since,  upon 
this  theory,  a  certain  announcement  of  the  grace  of  God  has 
in  some  way  reached  all  men,  the  destruction  of  such  multitudes 
is  more  easily  accounted  for,  since  all  have  been  guilty  of  reject¬ 
ing  either  the  general  or  the  special  offer  of  grace. 

Whether  Amyraldus  succeeded  in  establishing  his  positions, 
may  well  be  doubted.  But  he  was  certainly  justified  in  defend¬ 
ing  his  position  as  within  the  bounds  of  orthodoxy.  A  French 
national  synod,  at  Alen^on,  in  A.  D.  1637,  certified  to  this,  and 
simply  advised  him  to  avoid  such  unusual  and  startling  forms  of 
expression.  Another  synod  in  A.1  D.  1645  (vid.  Aymon,  Tous 
les  synodes  nationaux  des  eglises  reformees  de  France,  1710,  vol. 
ii.  571  ff . ,  663),  pronounced  the  same  judgment.  But  the 
Swiss  theologians  were  also  greatly  disturbed  by  the  teachings  of 
Amyraldus.  They  feared  that  they  might  thus  become  4 ‘the 
sport  of  the  exultant  Papists,  Luthoromanites,  and  Arminians,  to 
whose  doctrines  the  windows  were  thus  opened,”  and  they  felt 
themselves  under  obligation  to  construct  a  new  symbol  in  the 
interest  of  orthodoxy.  Thus  originated,  after  many  conferences 
and  conflicts,  the  Formula  Consensus  Helvetica,  composed  by 
Heidegger,  and  adopted  as  a  symbol,  A.  D.  1675  (Niemeyer,  p. 
729  ff. ).  This  document  rejects  the  view  of  Amyraldus  (c.  6), 
teaches  the  strictest  particularism  in  the  election  (4),  and  main¬ 
tains  with  emphasis,  that  Christ  died  only  for  the  elect  and  recon - 

1  Just  as  sin  began  in  the  intellect  and  passed  thence  into  the  will.  Am¬ 
yraldus  in  this  follows  John  Camero  in  Montauban  (f  A.  D.  1625);  vid. 
SCHWEIZER,  ii.  235  ff. 

2  Cf. ,  on  the  other’  hand,  the  severe  formulas  of  Dort  upon  the  transformation 

of  the  will,  supra,  p.  423. 


426 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


died  them  alone  to  God  (13).  Only  the  elect  come  through 
the  external  call,  which  is  serious  and  sincere  ( seria  et  sincera), 
to  faith.  “  But  that,  by  the  will  of  God,  in  the  call  thus  univer¬ 
sally  announced,  only  the  elect  are  led  to  faith,  but  the  reprobate 
are  hardened — this  proceeds  from  the  discriminating  grace  of 
God  alone  ’  ’  (19).  The  theory  of  predestination  in  its  strict  form 
is  thus  formally  proclaimed  as  the  doctrine  of  the  church.1 

In  view  of  the  above,  we  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the 
theology  of  Calvin  has  become,  in  its  essential  points,  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Reformed  church.  What  has  been  said  in  Section 
79,  10  is,  therefore,  here  equally  applicable. 

1  It  is  here  also,  in  view  of  the  controversy  of  L.  Capella  with  Buxtorf,  de¬ 
clared,  that  the  Hebrew  text  of  the  Old  Testament  “  is  inspired  (dedTrvEvcTog) 
both  as  to  the  consonants  and  as  to  the  very  vowels  or  points,  or  as  to  the 
force  and  power  of  the  points,  and  both  as  to  the  subject-matter  and  as  to 
the  words  ”  (2). 


PART  III. 


COMPLETION  OF  DOCTRINAL  CONSTRUCTION  IN  THE  ROMAN 

CATHOLIC  CHURCH. 

§83.  Establishment  of  Medieval  Theology  as  the  Doctrine  of 
the  Church  by  the  Council  of  Trent. 

Sources.  Canones  et  decreta  Cone.  Trid.,  ed.  Richter  et  Schulte, 
1853.  Doctrinal  formulas  also  in  Streitwolf  et  Klener,  Libri  symbol, 
eccl.  Rom.  i.,  and  in  Denzinger’s  Enchiridion,  in  Mirbt,  Quellen  z.  Gesch. 
d.  Papstt.,  124  ff.  A.  Theiner,  Acta  genuina  cone.  Trid.,  2  vols.,  1874. 
Le  Plat,  Monum.  ad  histor.  cone.  Trid.,  7  vols.,  1781  ff.  V.  Dollinger, 
Ungedruckte  Berichte  u.  Tagebb.  z.  Gesch.  d.  Cone.  v.  Tr. ,  1872.  Con¬ 
cilium  Tridentinum,  diariorum,  epistularum  tractatuum  novacollectio,vol.  i. ,  ed. 
Merkle,  Freiburg,  vol.  1.,  1901  ff.  This  work  when  completed  will  include  the 
protocols  and  a  comprehensive  collection  of  all  other  original  documents  bear¬ 
ing  upon  the  work  of  the  Council ;  vid.  Seeberg,  inTheol.  Litt.-bl.,  1903,  6  ff. 
Paoli  Sarpi,  Istoria  del  cone.  Trid. ,  1619,  Germ,  translation  by  Rambach, 
6  vols.,  1761  ff.  Sforza  Pallavicini,  Tstoria  del  cone,  di  Trid.,  1656, 
Latin  translation,  Antwerp,  1673,  cf.  Ranke,  WW. ,  vol.  39,  append., 
p.  25  ff.  Salig,  Vollst.  Hist.  d.  trid.  Cone.,  3  parts,  1741  ff.  Mendham, 
Memoirs  of  the  Counc.  of  Trent,  1834.  Ranke,  vol.  37,  129  ff.  Mauren- 
brecher,  in  Hist.  Taschenbuch,  1886,  147  ff.;  1888,  305  ff.  Moller- 
Kawerau,  KG.  iii.  215  ff.  Upon  the  doctrines,  vid.  Chemnitz,  Exam, 
cone.  Trid.,  1566.  Seeberg,  Beitr.  z.  Entstehungsgesch.  d.  Lehrdekrete  v. 
Tr.,  in  Ztschr.  f.  k.  Wiss.,  1889,  p.  546  ff.,  604  ff.,  643  ff.,  and  in  Thomasius 
ii.,  ed.  2,  688  ff. 

1.  The  Reformation  made  astonishing  progress  during  its  first 
decades.  The  intellectual  activity  of  the  closing  Middle  Ages 
had  prepared  the  way  before  it  both  positively  and  negatively. 
The  old  church  was  incapable  of  damming  the  current.  This 
can  be  plainly  seen  in  the  course  of  the  early  antagonists  of  the 
new  movement.  In  the  general  consternation,  the  Catholic  theo¬ 
logians  accepted  the  challenge  of  their  opponents,1  defended 
with  half-heartedness  the  worst  outgrowths  of  medieval  Chris- 

1  E.  g.,  the  defense  of  indulgences  by  Tetzel  and  Eck.  Dietenberger’s 
publication,  “  Der  leye,  ob  der  gelaub  allein  selig  mache.”  Berthold  of 
Chiemsee,  Tewtsche  Theologey  (ed.  Reithmeyer,  1852).  Schatzgeier’s 
works  (1543).  A  review  of  the  positions  maintained  in  this  pre-Trentine 
theology  is  given  by  Lammer,  Die  vortrid.  kath.  Theologie,  1858.  Our 
space  forbids  a  fuller  delineation,  but  a  further  study  of  this  literature — from 
a  wider  historical  point  of  view  than  Lammer  (Schul-  und  Ordens-Theo- 
logie) — would  yield  valuable  results. 

(427) 


428 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


tianity  assailed  by  the  latter,  fell  back  upon  the  “  authority  ” 
of  the  church,  and  relied  for  protection  and  victory  in  the  great 
intellectual  confiicthipon  politicsandmeasures  of  external 
force.  It  was,  indeed,  a  difficult  task  to  defend  the  ancient 
positions  at  large.  The  theologians  were  soon  divided  into  a 
number  of  hostile  groups.  In  every  important  point  of  doctrine, 
the  differences  of  the  ancient  schools  of  theology  came  to  light. 
The  Thomistic,  and  the  Scotist,  or  Nominalist,  views  were  still 
zealously  advocated.  The  confusion  was  increased  by  the  fact 
that  the  age  looked  with  misconception  and  contempt  upon  the 
technicalities  and  methods  of  theology.  Finally,  it  must  not  be 
overlooked  that  in  their  own  camp,  the  champions  of  Roman 
Catholicism  were  compelled  to  hear  clamorous  demands  for 
reform  (Spain,  Italy,  the  Oratorium,  the  Theatines,  etc.).  And 
yet  all  these  tendencies — advocates  of  reform  and  strict  adherents 
of  the  curia,  mystics  and  dogmaticians  of  every  class — consti¬ 
tuted  from  one  point  of  view,  i.  <?. ,  their  common  opposition  to 
Protestantism,  a  compact  unity.  The  will  was  present,  and  a 
way  was  found.  We  can  understand  therefore  how  it  came  to 
pass  that  the  internal  differences  were  reconciled,  and  that,  in  the 
compromise,  the  ruder  and  coarser  ideas  and  tendencies  held  the 
ascendant. 

It  is  not  our  task  to  trace  the  reforms  in  the  ecclesiastical 
life  which  were  forced  upon  the  Romish  church  by* the  Refor¬ 
mation.  We  are  concerned  only  for  the  theological  develop¬ 
ment.  The  Thomistic  theology  again  assumed  the  lead  in  this 
post-reformation  age.  There  had  at  an  earlier  period  been  a 
disposition  to  regard  it  as  the  specifically  ecclesiastical  doctrine. 
It  now  became  a  necessary  equipment  of  the  church.  It  was  free 
from  the  foreign  skepticism  and  critical  temper  of  Duns  Scotus, 
and  it  was  simpler — a  compacted  system.  Authority  and  dogma 
were  here  securely  fixed  and  rationally  established,  and  curialism 
found  here  a  valiant  champion.  This  theology  was  the  destruc¬ 
tion  of  the  ideals  and  the  faith  which  prevailed  in  the  thirteenth 
century,  at  the  time  of  the  church’s  greatest  power.  We  are 
not  surprised  that  appeal  should  be  constantly  made  to  this 
earlier  period.  But  in  every  attempted  repristination  of  the 
former  doctrines,  the  original  accurate  adaptation  to  actual  cir¬ 
cumstances  has  vanished,  and  the  ideas  are  in  consequence 
eviscerated  and  vulgarized.  The  system  of  Thomas,  once  a  lofty 
conception  of  ecclesiastical  idealism,  was  forced  into  the  narrow 
limits  of  ecclesiastical  positivism  as  fixed  by  Duns.  There  was 
no  use  in  this  age  for  the  keen  criticism  of  the  Nominalists, 
their  impertinent  skepticism,  and  their  remorseless  dialectics — 
and  they  became  a  thing  of  the  past.  But  there  was  need  now 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT.  429 

of  implicit  faith  and  subjection  to  formulas — and  these  were  re¬ 
tained.  That  which  was  great  and  imposing  in  Thomas  and 
Duns  must  be  eliminated  from  them,  and  the  dregs — their 
formulas — remain . 

2.  But  if  medieval  theology  had  been  shattered  by  its  contact 
with  the  spirit  and  the  religious  needs  of  the  modern  man,  then 
no  victory  could  be  permanent  which  should  fail  to  take  due 
account  of  this  spirit.  Here  the  Jesuits  found  their  field  (cf. 
Gothein,  Ignat,  v.  Loyola  u.  die  Gegenreformation,  1895). 
They  required  obedience  and  subjection  to  the  church  as  strictly 
as  had  ever  been  done  in  the  Middle  Ages ;  but  they  were 
shrewd  enough  to  adapt  the  form  of  this  requirement  to  the 
spirit  and  temper  of  the  modern  man.  The  old  theology  was 
adopted,  but  it  was  adorned  with  the  embellishments  of  modern 
humanistic  learning.  The  authors  wrote  in  elegant  style,  and 
exegetical  and  historical  studies  were  pursued  with  diligence. 
But  it  was  in  the  Sacrament  of  Repentance  that  the  force  of  the 
movement  was  most  distinctly  felt.  It  was  here  that  the  Jesuit 
praxis  gained  its  greatest  triumph — it  constructed  the  modern 
Roman  Catholic  sacrament  of  repentance.  The  penitential  dis¬ 
cipline,  which  in  the  closing  period  of  the  Middle  Ages  had 
been  so  often  utterly  neglected  (vid.  Dollinger  and  Reusch, 
Gesch.  d.  Moralstreitigkeiten  in  d.  r5m. -kath.  K.,  1889,  i., 
p.  20  n.),was  revived  and  enlarged  (ib.  i.  19  ff. ,  61  ff.  Gothein, 
1.  c.,  p.  324  ff. ).  It  became  again,  with  its  attrition  and 
probabilism,  its  intentionalism,  and  mental  reservations,  the 
dominant  force  in  the  church,  forming  the  historical  counterpart 
to  justification  by  faith  and  the  new  life  of  faith  among  Pro¬ 
testants.  And  it  was  at  this  point  that  the  worst  elements  in  the 
theology  of  Duns  and  the  Nominalists  poured  in  a  great  flood 
upon  the  church,  viz. :  the  minimizing  of  sin  and  the  fondling  of 
the  sinner ;  the  dialectic  trifling  with  the  intentions,  the  will,  and 
the  sensuous  impulses;  the  juggling  with  the  authorities  (cf. 
Luthardt,  Gesch.  d.  chr.  Ethik,  ii.  120  ff. ).  But  it  was  just 
in  this  way  that  the  chasm  between  the  church  and  the  world 
was  spanned.  In  the  confessional  was  learned  the  art  of  living 
in  the  world,  continuing  to  cherish  the  spirit  of  the  world,  and 
yet  being  sure  of  salvation.  This  was  the  “ devotion  aisle," 
the  compact  of  the  church  with  the  world.  Dogmas  no  longer 
formed  the  theme  of  the  pulpit — that  remained  dangerous 
ground — but  preachers  discoursed  eloquently  upon  the  beauty 
of  virtue  and  the  repulsiveness  of  vice.  Thus  the  minds  of  men 
were  diverted  from  the  burning  questions  of  the  day.1  But  a 

1  Cf.  Gothein,  p.  319  ff.,  who  very  correctly  says  :  “  The  preaching  of  the 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


43° 

compromise  was  effected  also  in  the  sphere  of  dogma.  A  new 
definition  of  faith  was  framed.  Even  the  old  faith  of  assent 
seemed  to  require  too  much — and  it  had  no  really  practical 
object.  It  was  therefore  replaced  by  the  faith  of  silent  obedience. 
It  is  sufficient  that  one  do  not  publicly  oppose  the  formula  of  the 
church.  Thus  the  dogma  appeared  to  be  saved,  and  faith  made 
possible  to  everyone.  In  this  way,  the  freest  modern  spirits 
could  submit  to  the  rule  of  the  church.  Everyone  now  became 
churchly  again.  As  the  art  of  the  confessor  met  the  wants  of  the 
great  masses,  so  the  change  in  the  ascetic  method  was  carried 
out  in  a  way  to  suit  the  modern  man.  The  age  of  merely 
sensuous  discipline  was  past,  as  was  that  of  simple  obedience  to 
authority.  Ignatius  accordingly  attached  little  importance  to 
outward  asceticism.  In  its  place  came  the  inwardly  transforming 
meditations  of  spiritual  exercises  ( exercitia  spiritualia) .  Ascetic 
exercises  in  the  outward  form  were  but  means  to  an  end  (cf. 
Gothein,  p.  227  ff. ,  240,  416  ff. ).  In  accordance  with  this, 
the  aim  of  obedience  is  to  be  seen,  not  only  in  the  outward  sub¬ 
jection  which  it  manifests,  but  in  the  regulation  of  the  life 
according  to  one’s  own  convictions.1  And  even  though  this 
aim  should  in  separate  instances  not  be  attained,  yet  it  would 
still  have  a  suggestive  influence  upon  the  inward  disposition. 
The  deed  thus  prompted  was  done  from  obedience ;  but  it  was 
done  by  the  man  himself,  and  was  done  to  further  the  glory  of 
God.2 

Such  are  some  of  the  ideas  which  stirred  Roman  Catholicism 
after  the  Reformation.  First  of  all,  the  return  to  Thomas,  the 
ancient  dogma  and  curialism,  together  with  the  rejection  of  all 
critical  and  skeptical  elements  in  theology.  In  the  sphere  of 
dogma  and  ecclesiastical  politics,  Thomism  appeared  to  gain  a 


Jesuits,  dealing  with  things  near  and  comprehensible,  was  well  calculated  to 
wean  the  Catholic  masses  from  their  anxiety  about  the  dogmas  ;  it  was  for 
them  a  soothing  potion”  (p.  321).  This  method  has  become  characteristic 
of  the  preaching  of  the  Roman  Catholic  church. 

1  Upon  this  obedience,  vid.  Dollinger  and  Reusch,  Moralstreitigkeiten  i. 
623  ff.  Gothein  (p.  332)  finds  a  contradiction  between  the  emphasizing  of 
the  will  and  the  will-less  obedience.  This  is  scarcely  justified,  since  the 
obedience  is  supposed  to  be  rendered  with  delight  and  devotion  (vid.  ib.  455) 
as  a  voluntary  personal  act.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  just  in  this  refined  adap¬ 
tation  of  all  requirements  to  the  temper  and  spirit  of  the  modern  man  that  the 
power  of  the  Jesuits  lies. 

2  Ignatius,  too,  speaks  frequently  of  the  relation  of  obedience  to  the  “  glory 
of  God”  (vid.  Gothein,  p.  334,  426,  452,  455).  If  we  would  find  upon 
the  so  widely  different  territory  of  Protestantism  a  parallel  to  this  remarkable 
man,  we  must  look  for  it  not  in  Luther,  despite  the  inner  struggles  which  con¬ 
stitute  a  feature  of  similarity — but  in  Calvin,  the  fellow-student  of  Loyola  at 
Paris. 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT. 


431 


decisive  victory.  But  as  its  energy  was  lost  under  the  pressure 
of  the  positivism  of  Duns,  so  in  the  sphere  of  practical  Chris¬ 
tianity,  the  emasculating  of  the  conceptions  of  sin  and  grace  and 
the  refinement  of  the  dialectics  that  excuses  all  things  and  makes 
all  things  possible — for  which  Duns  was  also  responsible — gained 
ascendancy  in  the  church.  Much  was  borrowed  from  the  two 
great  leaders  of  medieval  theology,  but  no  way  was  found  to 
make  use  of  that  which  was  best  in  either.  The  legacy  which 
they  had  left  was  deftly  woven  into  the  texture  of  the  practical 
church  politics  of  the  Jesuits.  In  a  word,  it  was  Jesuitism — the 
history  of  its  spread  being  the  history  of  the  counter-reforma¬ 
tion — which  accomplished  the  great  task  of  making  the  tradi¬ 
tions  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Middle  Ages  acceptable  to  the 
Spirit  of  the  modern  age.  In  this  consists  its  historic  signifi¬ 
cance,  and  in  this  way  it  became  the  counterpart  of  the  Refor¬ 
mation. 

3.  The  Council  of  Trent  (A.  D.  1545-63)  discharged  the 
difficult  task  of  marking  out  a  median  course  between  the  con¬ 
flicting  views  of  scholastic  theology,  which  was  then  proclaimed 
as  the  official  doctrine  of  the  church.  Only  with  great  difficulty 
was  the  result  attained.  The  contradictory  principles  of  the 
opposing  schools  came  into  prominence  in  the  discussion  of 
nearly  every  question.  It  was  possible  to  preserve  an  outward 
unity  only  by  the  employment  of  the  most  studied  diplomatic 
arts.  The  points  of  controversy  were  either  avoided  altogether 
or  carefully  veiled.  Thus,  to  the  student  familiar  with  the  his¬ 
tory  of  the  formation  of  the  doctrinal  definitions  of  the  council, 
the  latter  but  too  often  appear  as  the  deliberate  productions  of 
church  politics  and  diplomatic  refinements.  The  decrees  do  not 
present  to  us  a  vigorous  and  joyous  confession  of  sincere  faith, 
but  formulas  of  compromise  artfully  welded  together,  bent  to 
this  side  or  that  with  great  labor  and  pains,  and  then  finally  filed 
into  proper  dimensions. 

4.  Turning  now  to  the  doctrinal  decrees  of  the  Council  of 
Trent,  we  must  first  observe  their  attitude  toward  the  Scriptures 
and  Tradition  (session  4).  We  note  at  the  outset  the  complete 
co-ordination  of  the  two.  The  council  receives  the  Holy  Scrip¬ 
tures  and  the  traditions  of  the  church  “with  equal  feeling  of 
reverence”  ( pari  pietatis  affectu).  The  former  have  God  for 
their  author;  the  latter  have  been  “dictated  by  Christ  or  by 
the  Holy  Spirit.”  The  opposition  to  this  co-ordination  of  tra¬ 
dition  with  Scripture  was  in  vain.  The  council  distinctly  rec¬ 
ognized  the  ecclesiastical  traditions,  being  inspired  as  truly  as 
the  Scriptures,  as  of  equal  dignity.  It  carefully  avoided,  how¬ 
ever,  any  designation  of  the  particular  traditions  to  which  this 


4  32 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


principle  was  to  be  applied.  “We  receive  those  which  we  wish, 
but  reject  altogether  those  which  displease  us  ’  ’  (acta,  i.  71b) 
— these  naive  words  of  a  bishop  betray  the  general  attitude. 
The  Vulgate  is,  with  appeal  to  tradition,  established  as  the  au¬ 
thentic  translation.  The  apocryphal  books  of  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment  are  also  acknowledged.  The  attempt  to  co-ordinate  Scrip¬ 
ture  and  tradition  here,  as  always,  results  in  the  actual  subordi¬ 
nation  of  the  former  to  the  latter.  But  it  might  now  be  rightly 
claimed  that  the  church  had  gone  half-way  in  the  right  direction.1 

5.  The  5th  session  established  the  doctrine  of  Original  Sin. 
Here,  too,  the  contrary  principles  of  the  opposing  schools  were 
manifest,  the  one  party  wishing  to  locate  original  sin  in  con¬ 
cupiscence,  while  the  other  regarded  it  as  merely  the  lack  of 
righteousness.  The  subject  was  at  once  complicated  by  the 
question  as  to  the  relation  of  the  Virgin  Mary  to  original  sin 
(acta,  i.  145  f. ).  The  doctrine  finally  adopted  is,  in  brief,  as 
follows  :  (a)  The  first  man,  through  his  own  fault,  lost  the 
righteousness  and  holiness  into  which  he  had  been  inducted 
(constitutus)2  in  paradise,  and  thereby  fell  under  the  wrath  of 
God  and  the  power  of  the  devil.  There  was,  in  consequence,  a 
deterioration  of  the  whole  man.  ‘  ‘  The  whole  Adam  was  by  that 
offense  of  transgression  changed  for  the  worse  according  to  body 
and  soul.”  Yet  this  is  true  only  in  the  sense  :  “Although  free¬ 
will  had  by  no  means  been  extinguished  in  them,  yet  it  was  weak¬ 
ened  in  its  power  and  perverted”  (ses.  6,  c.  1).  (/;)  The  sin 

and  guilt  of  Adam  passed  over  upon  the  whole  human  race, 
(c)  Since  the  sin  of  Adam  passed  over  upon  his  descendants 
“  by  propagation,  not  by  imitation,”  human  means  are  notable 
to  release  from  it.  ( d )  Even  children  can  be  purified  from 
their  inherited  condition  only  by  the  regeneration  of  baptism. 

( e )  Not  only  is  original  sin  forgiven  by  imputation  through  bap¬ 
tism,  but  the  latter  actually  renews  the  sinner.  There  remains 
in  him,  however,  concupiscence  ( concupiscentia )  or  the  tinder  of 

1  Cf.  th e  Profess,  fid.  Trid.:  “  I  most  firmly  acknowledge  and  embrace  the 
apostolic  and  ecclesiastical  traditions  and  other  observances  and  appointments 
of  the  same  church.  Also  the  Holy  Scripture,  according  to  that  sense  which 
the  holy  mother,  the  church,  has  held  and  holds,  whose  (part)  I  acknowledge 
it  to  be  to  judge  concerning  the  true  sense  and  interpretation  of  the  Holy 
Scriptures,  nor  will  I  ever  accept  and  interpret  them  except  in  accordance 
with  the  unanimous  consensus  of  the  Fathers.  ”  In  these  declarations  the 
Scriptures  are  not  only  assigned  a  place  second  to  tradition,  but  they  are  also 
bound  and  gagged.  At  the  same  time  all  attempts  to  attain  a  profounder 
religious  or  scientific  knowledge  of  the  Scriptures  were  excluded. 

2  Instead  of  constitutus ,  the  original  draft  of  the  decree  had  creatus  (acta, 
i.  130  b).  The  words  occurring  in  the  original  draft  :  “no  part  of  the  soul 
remaining  uninjured,”  were  also  stricken  out.  The  first-mentioned  change, 
was  required  by  the  doctrine  of  the  donum  superadditum  (supra,  p.  1 1 5 ) . 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT. 


433 


evil  {fanes').  Concupiscence  is,  indeed,  sometimes  spoken  of 
by  the  apostle  as  sin,  but  this  must  not,  according  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  church,  be  understood  in  the  sense  4  4  that  it  is  in  the  re¬ 
generate  truly  and  really  sin,  but  because  it  comes  from  sin  and. 
inclines  to  sin.  ”  (/)  These  definitions  do  not  apply  in  the  case 

of  the  Virgin  Mary. 

6.  The  6th  session  undertook  to  treat  of  Justification.  Upon 
this  topic  much  time  and  labor  were  expended.  Sarpi  relates 
that  at  least  a  hundred  sessions  were  devoted  to  it,  and  that  the 
second  president  of  the  council,  Cervino,  made  emendations  of 
the  decree  daily  in  order  to  meet  all  demands  and  make  it  ac¬ 
ceptable  to  all  parties.  This  may  be  readily  understood.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  opposition  of  the  Protestants  made  a  precise 
definition  necessary  ;  on  the  other  hand — and  in  this,  as  Cervino 
pointed  out,  lay  the  difficulty — the  scholastic  tradition  afforded  no 
material,1  as  in  it  justification  was  treated  only,  and  that  but  briefly, 
as  an  element  in  the  sacrament  of  repentance.  The  specific  doc¬ 
trine  of  justification,  as  it  was  now  framed,  was  forced  from  the 
Roman  Catholic  church  by  the  pressure  of  Protestantism.  It  was 
modeled  upon  the  pattern  found  in  Thomas.  The  doctrine  was 
at  the  council  divided  originally  into  three  sections  :  (i)  How 
one  may  attain  justification  ;  what  part  God  has  to  do  in  it,  and 
what  part  man  ;  what  is  the  significance  of  faith  in  relation  to  it. 

(2)  How  one  may  preserve  the  justification  attained.  (3) 
How  one  may  again  secure  justification  when  it  has  been  lost. 
The  first  was  the  decisive  section.  Agreement  was,  indeed,  soon 
reached  upon  certain  definite  fundamental  points,  i.  e .,  (1) 
That  the  call  comes  through  the  law  and  the  gospel,  to  the  preach¬ 
ing  of  which  man  gives  assent  through  faith.  (2)  That  grace  is 
a  new  disposition  of  the  soul,  which  is  attested  by  good  works. 

(3)  Accordingly,  there  are  everywhere  traces  of  a  certain  syner¬ 
gism,  and  faith  is  the  condition  of  justification,  because  the  latter 
presupposes  the  acceptance  of  the  teachings  of  the  church.  But 
within  the  lines  of  these  fundamental  Roman  Catholic  ideas, 
which  all  held  in  common,  there  were  not  lacking  marked  dif¬ 
ferences.  The  Thomistic  tradition  made  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
dependent  upon  the  previous  effectual  equipment  with  grace 
(supra,  pp.  1 2 1,  201);  the  Scotist  view,  on  the  contrary, 
placed  forgiveness  first,  to  be  followed  by  the  infusion  of  grace 
(supra,  pp.  161,  201).  Under  the  influence  of  the  Pro¬ 
testant,  or  Pauline,  doctrine  of  justification,  the  latter  way  of 
viewing  the  subject  had  come  to  have  a  significance  which  by  no 

1  Note  also  the  obscurity  in  the  decree  upon  justification  (c.  1),  according 
to  which  all  men  are  “servants  of  sin,  although  free-will  had  by  no  means 
been  extinguished  in  them,  yet  it  was  weakened  in  its  power  and  perverted.’” 


434 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


means  attached  to  it  when  understood  in  the  sense  of  its  greatest 
medieval  advocate.1  Both  points  of  view  were  advocated  at  the 
council.  The  one  party  maintained  :  “  The  imputation  of 

Christ  effects  in  us  that  sins  are  not  imputed,  yet  it  does  not  jus¬ 
tify  ;  but,  after  the  remission  of  sins,  God  justifies  us  ;  and  justifi¬ 
cation  is  not  remission  of  sins,  because  remission  occurs  before 
justification  ’ ’  (acta  i.  176  a);  the  other  party  held  that  “  God 
first  infuses  grace,  then  remits  sins”  (ib.  180  b).  Finally,  we 
meet  in  some  of  the  fathers  of  the  council  a  certain  sympathy 
for  the  evangelical  view.2  Another  difference  appears  in  the 
fact,  that  one  party  (e.g.,  acta  i.  179  b,  176  b,  180  a)  would 
ascribe  a  meritorious  character,  disposing  to  the  reception  of 
grace,  to  works  done  under  the  general  influence  of  the  grace  of 
the  call  {gratia  vocationis')  ,3  whereas  others  would  attach  import¬ 
ance  only  to  the  works  wrought  through  grace  (ib.  181  a;  cf. 
Sarpi,  ii.  366  ff. ).  There  were  divergent  opinions  also  as  to  the 
measure  of  the  divine  influence  and  of  human  liberty  in  the  be¬ 
stowal  and  reception  of  grace. 

As  to  the  second  section  in  the  statement  of  the  doctrine,  the 
use  of  the  sacrament,  prayer,  and  good  works  were  mentioned  as 
the  means  by  which  justification  once  secured  was  to  be  retained. 
He  who  is  in  a  state  of  grace  can  secure  for  himself  by  worthi¬ 
ness  {de  condig?io )  eternal  life  (acta  i.  195).  The  restoration 
of  the  state  of  justification,  when  lost — treated  of  in  the  third 
section  of  the  doctrinal  statement — is  accomplished  through  the 
sacrament  of  repentance,  just  as  that  condition  was  in  the  first 
instance  attained  through  baptism.  There  is,  however,  this  dif¬ 
ference  in  the  two  transactions,  that  if,  in  the  latter  case,  the 
lapsed  one  has  not  lost  his  faith,  there  is  no  necessity  for  the  re- 


1  We  are  reminded  here  of  Pighius  and  Gropper,  both  of  whom  repre¬ 
sent  the  imputed  righteousness  of  Christ  as  preceding  the  infused  righteous¬ 
ness  and  place  the  emphasis,  for  the  practical  religious  consciousness,  upon  the 
former.  Cf.  Linsenmann,  Tub.  Quart. -schr.,  1866,  641  ff.  Brieger,  in 
Ersch.  and  Gruber’s  Encycl.,  sect,  i.,  vol.  92,  p.  135.  Dittrich,  Gasp.  Con- 
tarini,  p.  660  ff.  If  I  am  not  mistaken,  this  view,  which  was  advocated  also 
by  Seripando  at  Trent  (Seeberg,  Ztschr.  f.  kirchl.  Wiss.,  1889,  671  ff. ), 
points  back  to  the  Scotist  scheme.  I  have  proved  the  Thomistic  and  unevan¬ 
gelical  character  of  Cardinal  Contarini’s  theory  of  justification,  1.  c. ,  657  ff. ; 
cf.  676  f.  In  this  Kawerau  agrees  with  me  (Moller,  KG.  iii.  129). 

2  Here  may  be  mentioned  Jul.  Contarini  (nephew  of  the  well-known 
cardinal),  Thomas  Sanfelice,  Bishop  of  Cava,  and  the  Augustinian  Genera. 
Seripando.  We  must  be  on  our  guard,  however,  against  the  error  of  pro 
nouncing  the  opinions  of  these  men — without  large  reservation — as  “  evangel' 
ical.”  Yid.  Seeberg,  1.  c.,  652  ff.;  also  the  Archbishop  Bandini  of  Siena 
(Pallavicini,  viii.  4.  7). 

3  Upon  this  term,  vid.  supra,  p.  122. 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT. 


435 


establishment  of  this  (ib.  188  b).1  Furthermore,  the  lapsed 
one  must  himself  satisfy  the  temporal  penalties  of  sin  by  works 
of  penance,  since  the  sacrament  of  repentance  releases  him  only 
from  the  eternal  penalties  ;  whereas  by  baptism  both  the  tem¬ 
poral  and  the  eternal  penalties  are  removed. 

The  first  draft  of  the  decree  was  rejected  (i.  203  ff. ).  While 
a  new  formula  was  being  prepared,  a  number  of  questions  arose 
for  discussion,  upon  which  no  agreement  could  be  reached  :  for 
example,  whether  the  inherent  “  righteousness  ’  ’  imparted  to  man 
is  sufficient,  through  the  works  which  it  produces,  to  merit  eternal 
life,  or  whether  there  is  needed  in  addition  the  imputation  of  grace 
for  the  completing  of  the  human  works.  Very  many  prelates 
maintained  the  former  view,  e.  g.,  i.  258b:  “The  justified 
man,  if  he  shall  have  retained  his  inherent  righteousness  and 
done  good  works,  is  able  with  this  to  appear  before  the  tribunal 
'Of  God  without  any  other  imputation  of  righteousness.”  Simi¬ 
larly,  in  regard  to  the  assurance  of  salvation,  some  held  it  to  be 
unattainable  without  a  special  revelation,  while  others  maintained 
that  one  may,  by  virtue  of  his  reception  of  the  sacraments  and 
fulfillment  of  the  commandments,  be  sure  of  his  salvation.  The 
former  is  a  Thomistic,  the  latter  a  Scotist  theory  (supra,  pp.  121, 
202).  The  discussions  upon  Justification  by  Faith  are  espe¬ 
cially  instructive.  Both  the  fide  and  the  sine  operibus  gave  rise 
to  difficulties.  There  were  not  wanting  some  who  desired  to 
.strike  out  the  last  words  from  the  decree  (1.  340  f. );  and  they 
were  finally  suppressed.  Faith  was  conceived  as  a  completed  faith 
(  fides  format  a),  or  as  another  designation  of  the  Christian  re¬ 
ligion  ( religio  Christiana) ,  or  as  an  inclination  ( dispositio )  toward 
justification.  Cf.  my  studies  in  Ztschr.  f.  k.  Wiss.,  1889,  649-700. 

We  now  turn  our  attention  upon  the  finally  accepted  Decree. 
We  note  traces  of  the  original  three-fold  division  of  the  material, 
both  in  the  positive  statement  of  the  decree  and  in  the  canons 
condemning  the  contrary  teachings  (cap.  1-9,  10-13,  I4~I6,  and 
can.  1-22,  23-26,  27-33).  (a)  Of  justification,  it  is  said  : 

“  That  it  is  a  translation  from  that  state  in  which  man  is  born  a 
son  of  the  first  Adam  into  the  state  of  grace”  (c.  4).  The 
order  of  salvation  begins,  in  the  case  of  adults,  with  prevenient 
grace  (gratia  praeveniens) ,  i.  e.,  with  the  call  and  the  awaken¬ 
ing  (, excitans )  and  assisting  ( adjuvans )  grace  which  accompanies 
it.  Man  himself  now,  by  consenting  to  the  work  of  God  and 
working  with  him  (eidem  gratiae  liber e  assentiendo  et  co-operando ) 
prepares  himself  for  justification  (c.  5).  There  is  thus,  on  the 

1  At  this  point  the  utterly  unevangelical  conception  of  faith,  which  pervades 
the  whole  discussion,  is  clearly  revealed. 


436 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


one  hand,  a  recognition  of  a  cooperation  preceding  justification, 
and  an  acknowledgment  that  the  works  preceding  justification 
are  not  altogether  sinful  (can.  7);  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
call  comes  before  any  merit  exists  ( nullis  eorum  existentibus 
mentis ).  With  this  both  the  Thomistsand  the  advocates  of  the 
7?teritinn  de  congruo  could  be  satisfied.  The  preparation  for  justi¬ 
fication  produced  by  this  general  influence  of  grace  embraces, 
first  of  all,  faith  :  “  Receiving  faith  by  hearing,  they  of  free-will 
draw  near  to  God,  believing  those  things  to  be  true  which  have 
been  divinely  revealed  and  promised,”  above  all,  that  God  out 
of  grace  will  justify  the  sinner  in  Christ.1  From  fear  of  the 
divine  justice,  they  rise  in  faith  to  the  contemplation  of  the 
mercy  of  God:  “  believing  that  God  will  for  Christ’s  sake  be  pro¬ 
pitious.”  Now  begins  love  to  Christ  as  being  the  source  of  right¬ 
eousness,  “  and  afterward  they  are  impelled  against  sins  by  a  cer¬ 
tain  hatred  and  detestation,  ’  ’  and  this  is  followed  by  the  resolution 
to  lead  a  new  life  (c.  6).  Thus  faith,  the  beginnings  of  love  to 
God  and  abhorence  of  sin,  and  the  resolution  to  obey  the  com¬ 
mandments  of  God — are  all  wrought  by  the  word  before  the  actual 
infusion  of  grace. 

( b )  Upon  this  inclination  (dispositio) ,  or  preparation,  now 
follows  justification  itself :  “  which  is  not  the  bare  remission  of 
sins,  but  also  sanctification  and  renewal  of  the  inner  man  through 
the  voluntary  reception  of  grace  and  of  gifts,  whence  the  man 
from  unrighteous  becomes  righteous”  (c.  7).  The  opinion  is 
expressly  condemned  :  ‘  1  that  men  are  justified  by  the  bare  impu¬ 
tation  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  or  by  the  bare  remission  of 
sins,  the  grace  and  love  being  excluded  which  are  shed  abroad  in 
their  hearts  by  the  Holy  Spirit  and  abide  in  them  ;  or,  that  the 
grace  by  which  we  are  justified  is  only  the  favor  of  God  ”  (can. 
11).  Justification  consists  in  the  renewal  of  the  inner  man, 
which  occurs  through  baptism.  By  this,  faith,  hope,  and  love 
are  imparted  to  man  at  the  same  time  as  the  forgiveness  of  sins. 
This  impartation  is  granted  in  such  measure  as  seems  good  to  the 
Holy  Spirit,  and  “according  to  the  peculiar  inclination  and  co¬ 
operation  of  each  individual”  (c.  7). 2  The  decree  differs  from 
Paul  so  widely  as  to  understand  by  the  term,  “  by  faith  ”  (  per 
Jidem),  only  that  faith  is  “  the  basis  and  root  of  all  justification,” 
and  by  the  term  “freely”  (gratis),  that  the  faith  and  works 

1  Even  here  the  expression  is  not  clear:  “Christ  died  for  the  sins  of  the 
whole  world,  for  all  ;  but  only  they  receive  the  benefit  of  his  death  to  whom 
the  merit  of  his  passion  is  communicated  ”  ( communicatur ,  c.  2,  3). 

2  Here  again  all  is  designedly  left  in  uncertainty.  It  is  not  clear  whether 
the  infusian  precedes  forgiveness  or  follows  it.  Similarly,  the  free  imparting 
of  grace  is  at  once  corrected  by  this  “  cooperation.” 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT. 


437 


preceding  justification  do  not  merit  grace.  As  to  the  term, 
“  without  works  ’ ’  (sine  operibus'),  nothing  is  said  (c.  8).  Just 
as  artfully  is  the  question  as  to  the  assurance  of  salvation  evaded, 
while  at  the  same  time  a  thrust  is  made  “  against  the  empty  con¬ 
fidence  of  the  heretics.”  Certainly  sins  are  forgiven  through 
grace,  but  if  any  man  boasts  of  the  certainty  of  this  forgiveness, 
or  trusts  in  it  alone,  his  sins  are  not  forgiven  !  It  is  not  desira¬ 
ble  that  all  who  are  justified  should  be  sure  of  their  justification. 
We  dare  not,  of  course,  have  any  doubts  as  to  the  efficacy  of 
Christ  and  the  sacraments;  but  everyone  “may”  have  some 
fear  as  to  “his  grace”  in  view  of  his  own  weakness  (c.  9).1 
This  basal  section  of  the  document  is  a  combination  of  two  lines 
of  thought  :  (1)  The  word  is  accompanied  by  a  general  prepar¬ 
atory  influence  of  grace,  which,  in  a  psychological  way,  begets 
faith  and  a  striving  after  the  good.  (2)  The  power  to  pursue 
the  good — faith,  hope,  and  love — is  infused  into  man  by  the  sac¬ 
rament  of  baptism.  He  here  receives  justification  as  an  impar- 
tation  of  grace,  together  with  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  Although 
the  former  of  these  ideas  appears  to  approximate  the  Protestant 
position,  yet  the  difference  is  very  evident,  since  the  influence 
here  accorded  to  the  word  does  not  embrace  the  gracious  accept¬ 
ance  of  the  individual,  and  since  the  emphasis  in  the  discussion 
is  laid,  not  upon  the  word  and  faith,  but  upon  the  sacrament  and 
the  inherent  grace.2 

(e)  The  gift  of  justification  is  preserved  by  obeying  the  com¬ 
mandments  and  by  good  works.  By  this  means  there  is  effected 
also  an  increase  of  the  justification  :  “Through  the  keeping  of 
the  commandments  of  God  and  of  the  church,  faith  cooperating 
By  good  works,  they  grow  in  that  righteousness  itself  received 
through  the  grace  of  Christ,  and  are  more  justified'1  ’  (c.  10). 
Justification,  as  a  creative  act  of  God,  is,  indeed,  a  momentary 
act  (vid.  Thomas,  supra,  p.  121);  but,  since  it  also  establishes  a 
moral  condition,  an  advance  in  it  is  yet  possible,  as  is  indicated 
by  the  above  citation.  Man  ought  to  and  can  obey  the  divine 
commandments,  since  God  gave  them  to  him  for  that  purpose. 
If  the  justified  man,  in  seeking  to  render  this  obedience,  fall  into 
venial  sin,  he  does  not  on  that  account  cease  to  be  righteous,  or 
justified  (c.  11).  No  one  dare  be  secure  in  view  of  his  supposed 
predestination  (c.  12  ;  can.  15,  16).  The  fundamental  spirit  of 

1  This  chapter  is  a  laboriously-constructed  composition.  The  decision  of 
points  at  issue  is  avoided,  but  it  inclines  more  toward  the  Thomists,  since 
the  opposition  of  the  Protestant  position — which  is  horribly  caricatured — 
drove  its  authors  in  that  direction. 

2  How  the  process  is  realized  in  the  case  of  those  baptized  in  infancy  is  not 
explained. 


438 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


the  Christian  life  is  fear,  which  can  never  do  enough  to  satisfy" 
itself  in  the  works  of  the  prescribed  devotion  in  the  Roman 
Catholic  church  :  “  With  fear  and  trembling  let  them  work  out 
their  salvation  in  labors,  in  vigils,  in  alms,  in  prayers  and. 
oblations,  in  fasting  and  chastity  ;  for  they  ought  to  fear,  know¬ 
ing  that  they  have  been  regenerated  to  the  hope  of  glory  and  not 
yet  to  glory  ”  (c.  13).  To  one  reading  these  declarations  in  a. 
central  position  in  the  formal  statement  of  the  church’s  doctrine, 
it  must  appear  as  though  there  had  never  been  an  Augustine  in 
the  Western  church.  The  decree,  in  its  practical  aspects,  moves* 
in  the  circuit  of  Cyprian’s  ideal  of  piety,  with  its  legal  observ¬ 
ances  and  its  servile  fear  (Vol.  I.,  p.  194  ff.,  308).  The  moral, 
life  is  dominated  by  this  idea  of  merit.  Whoever  doubts  this, 
falls  under  the  anathema  (can.  26).  It  is  insisted,  indeed,  that 
these  merita ,  being  wrought  in  the  members  by  the  power  of 
Christ,  the  Head  of  the  church,  and  being  a  product  of  the  in¬ 
herent  righteousness,  are  gifts  of  God  (c.  16).  But  “  the  good, 
works  of  a  justified  man  ”  are  also  “  merits  of  the  justified  him¬ 
self”  and,  as  such,  merit  eternal  life  (can.  32).  It  is  evident 
enough — the  old  positions  must  be  preserved  unchanged  ! 

(d)  But  the  grace  of  justification  may  be  lost,  not  only  through 
unbelief,  but  by  any  mortal  sin  (c.  15).  Those  who  have 
mortally  sinned  may  again  be  justified  ( rursus  justificari  pote- 
runt ),  i.  e.,  by  the  sacrament  of  repentance,  and  not,  as  some 
fancy,  by  faith  alone  (can.  29).  But  to  secure  this,  there  is, 
need,  not  only  for  contrition ,  but  also  for  confession ,  at  least 
in  pledge  and  to  be  made  at  the  appropriate  time,  together  with 
absolution  and  the  works  of  satisfaction.  The  eternal  penalties,, 
as  well  as  the  guilt,  are  removed  by  absolution,  but  for  the  can¬ 
celing  of  the  temporal  penalties  {poena  temporalis')  there  must 
be  works  of  satisfaction  (c.  14).  The  practical  experience  of 
justification  can  be  realized,  accordingly,  only  within  the  limits; 
of  the  sacrament  of  repentance. 

This  is  doctrinally  but  a  reproduction  of  the  average  scholastic- 
views  (cf.  Chemnitz,  Examen  cone.  Trid.,  i.  369).  But  the 
reception  of  this  teaching  is  now  the  necessary  antecedent  of  jus¬ 
tification  ;  “which  (i.  e.,  the  Roman  Catholic  doctrine  of 
justification)  unless  anyone  shall  faithfully  and  firmly  accept  he 
cannot  be  justified  ”  (c.  16  fin.).  In  the  apprehension  of  the 
Christian  life  here  set  forth,  it  is  no  longer  a  matter  of  the 
adoption  of  theological  views,  but  of  the  acceptance  of  the  fixed 
doctrines  of  the  church,  which  are  absolutely  necessary  to  salva¬ 
tion. 

7.  Tlfb  7  th  session  was  devoted  to  the  doctrine  of  the  Sacra¬ 
ments.  The  scholastic  conflict  was  here  also  at  once  renewed — 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT. 


439 


the  one  party  maintaining  that  the  sacraments  include  in  them¬ 
selves  grace,  the  other  regarding  them  as  signs,  which  God,  in 
view  of  his  covenant,  accompanies  with  his  own  energy  (vid. 
supra,  p.  126  f. ).  This  question  was  not  solved,  nor  was  that 
of  the  4  ‘  indelible  character.  ’  ’  1  There  was  essential  agreement 
in  the  general  doctrine  of  the  sacraments,  and  as  the  discussion 
of  the  differences  might  have  led  to  the  revival  of  profounder 
points  of  opposition  between  Thomists  and  Scotists,2  it  was 
decided  to  frame  no  decree  upon  the  subject,  but  merely  to  con¬ 
demn  the  teaching  of  the  adversaries  by  appropriate  canons.  It 
is  possible,  however,  to  gather  from  the  discussions  the  positive 
views  which  found  general  acceptance.  They  were  essentially 
as  follows  :  The  seven  sacraments  were  instituted  by  Christ 
(can.  1).  They  are  necessary  to  salvation,  since  without  them 
the  gratia  justificationis  cannot  be  secured  (4).  They  do  not 
merely  serve  for  the  nourishment  of  faith  (5),  nor  are  they  only 
external  signs  and  badges  of  discipleship  ;  but  they  contain 
grace  (6). 3  They  work  ex  opere  operato ,  and  they — and  not 
only  faith — bring  grace  (8).  Three  of  them  impress  a  character 
upon  the  soul,  4 4  that  is,  a  certain  spiritual  and  indelible  mark 
(signum)”  (9). 

8.  In  regard  to  Baptism  also,  the  council  contented  itself 
with  the  framing  of  canons.  The  baptism  of  heretics  is  valid, 
provided  it  is  administered  44  with  the  intention  of  doing  what 
the  church  does”  (4).  Baptism  does  not  release  from  the 
obligation  to  obey  the  law  of  Christ  and  all  the  commandments 
of  the  church  (7,  8).  Sins  committed  after  baptism  are  44  not 
forgiven  simply  by  the  remembrance  and  the  faith  of  the  bap¬ 
tism,”  i.  e.,  are  not  venial  (10).  Finally,  the  Anabaptists  are 
condemned  (12-14). 

9.  In  the  discussion  of  Confirmation,  anathemas  are  pro¬ 
nounced  upon  the  views  :  that  it  is  not  a  true  sacrament ;  that 
it  4 4  was  formerly  nothing  more  than  instruction  ”  (1);  that  it 
may  be  administered  by  a  44  simple  priest,”  and  not  only  by  a 
bishop  (3). 

10.  It  was  not  until  the  13th  session,  that  dogmatic  utterances 
were  again  attempted.  The  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper  was 
now  the  topic  of  discussion,  (a)  Here  again  we  meet  the  con¬ 
flicting  scholastic  principles  (Sarpi,  iii.  240  ff. ).  The  positive 

1  This  theory  never  recovered  from  the  shattering  criticisms  of  Duns  (vid. 
supra,  p.  128). 

2  Cf.  Pallavicini,  ix.  7.  1,  and  Sarpi,  ii.  597  ff. 

3  Continere  gratiam — is  the  ancient  formula  (vid.  supra,  p.  126).  Here 
Zwingli  is  rejected,  but  at  the  same  time  the  way  is  paved  for  fhe  Scotist 
theory. 


440 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


dogma  is  as  follows  :  Under  the  form  ( species )  of  the  elements, 
Christ,  the  God-man,  is  really  and  substantially  ( realiter  et  sub- 
stantialiter')  present.  He  is,  indeed,  seated  at  the  right  hand 
of  God  “according  to  the  natural  mode  of  existing,’ ’  which 
does  not,  however,  exclude  a  “way  of  existing”  ( existendi 
ratio')  which  we  cannot  indeed  express,  but  which  we  can 
recognize  as  possible,  in  accordance  with  which  Christ,  “  sacra¬ 
mentally  present  in  many  other  places,  may  be  in  his  substance 
(sua  substantia)  present  with  us”  (c.  i).  By  means  of  the 
consecration,  there  is  a  “conversion  ( conversio )  of  the  entire 
substance  of  the  bread  into  the  substance  of  the  body  of  Christ  ’  ’ 
(c.  4).  The  entire  Christ  ( totus  et  integer  Christus)  is  present 
under  the  form  of  the  bread  and  in  every  portion  of  it  (c.  3). 
Whereas  in  all  other  sacraments  the  sanctifying  power  ( vis 
sanctijicandi)  enters  only  in  the  moment  of  the  administration, 
in  the  eucharist  the  body  of  Christ  is  present  already  before  the 
reception  of  the  elements  by  the  communicant,  since  the  Lord 
called  his  body  bread  before  the  disciples  had  received  it  (c.  3). 
These  views  naturally  led  to  the  defense  of  “  the  worship  of 
adoration  ( latriae  cultus)  which  is  due  to  the  true  God,”  for  the 
host,  and  to  the  advocacy  of  the  festival  of  Corpus  Christi  (c.  5). 
The  blessing  of  the  sacrament  consists  in  the  forgiveness  of 
venial  sins  and  in  preservation  from  mortal  sins.  The  sacrament 
is,  further,  a  pledge  of  future  blessedness  and  glory,  and  a  symbol 
of  the  unity  of  Christ’s  body  (c.  2). 

The  following,  among  other  positions,  are  condemned  :  That 
the  substance  of  the  bread  remains  the  same  after  consecration 
(can.  2);  that  Christ  is  present  in  the  celebration,  while  it  is 
being  received  (in  usu ,  dum  sumitur ),  but  not  before  nor  after 
(4);  that  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  the  chief,  or  even  the  only, 
fruit  of  the  eucharist  (5);  the  rejection  of  self-communion  by 
the  priest  (10);  the  characterizing  of  faith  as  a  “sufficient 
preparation  ”  for  the  reception  of  the  sacrament  (n).1 

(b)  It  was  not  until  the  21st  session  (A.  D.  1562),  that 
action  was  taken  upon  the  demand  for  the  granting  of  the  cup 
to  the  laity,  although  this  had  been  often  urged  upon  the 
attention  of  the  council.  It  was  then  decided,  that  the  institu¬ 
tion  of  the  Supper  does  not  require  that  all  believers  must 
receive  it  in  both  forms  (c.  1.),  and  that  the  church  has 
authority  to  introduce  changes  “in  the  administration  ( dispen¬ 
sation )  of  the  sacraments,  their  substance  being  preserved.” 
This  was  done  when  it,  “  led  by  weighty  and  just  reasons,”  ex- 

1  In  the  original  draft  of  the  canons,  the  demand  of  the  cup  for  the  laity  is 
also  anathematized  (8.  10  ;  act.  i.  520  b).  But  political  considerations  led  to 
the  postponement  of  a  decision  upon  this  point  (act.  i.  503  a,  521  b,  528  b). 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT. 


441 


eluded  the  laity  from  the  cup  (c.  2).  And  there  is  the  less 
occasion  for  objection  to  this  upon  internal  grounds,  since  the 
entire  Christ  is  present  under  each  of  the  two  forms,  and  hence 
no  one  is  robbed  of  a  blessing  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  cup 
(c.  3).  Those  are  accordingly  condemned  who  doubt  that  the 
church  for  just  reasons  withdrew  the  cup  from  the  laity  (can.  2). 
Finally,  consideration  of  the  question,  whether  the  church  must 
always  exclude  the  laity  from  the  cup,  or  whether  “  under  any 
conditions  ’  ’  it  might  grant  the  cup  to  a  particular  nation  or 
kingdom,  was  postponed.  It  was  afterward  decided  that  the 
matter  should  “  be  referred  to  our  most  holy  lord  ”  ( ad  sanctis - 
simian  dominant  nostrum ,  act.  ii.  96  ff. ).  No  decision  was 
given. 

{/)  In  this  connection  we  naturally  consider  the  Mass,  which 
was  the  subject  treated  at  the  2  2d  session.  Christ,  the  Mel- 
chizedekian  High-priest,  in  order  that  his  sacrifice  might  not  be 
obliterated,  instituted  in  the  Lord’s  Supper  a  sacrifice  to  be  re¬ 
peated  by  his  disciples,  “by  which  that  bloody  (one)  once 
offered  on  the  cross  should  be  represented  ”  {repraesentaretur) . 
The  repetition  of  the  sacrifice  is  commanded  by  the  words : 
“  This  do  in  remembrance  of  me  ”  (c.  1).  Whoever  questions 
this  exegesis,  is  anathematized  (can.  2).1  The  same  Christ  who 
offered  himself  up  upon  the  cross  is  here  in  the  mass  sacrificed  in  an 
unbloody  way.  The  anathema  is  pronounced  upon  everyone  who 
questions  the  reality  of  this  sacrifice  (can.  1).  By  this  offering 
God  is  reconciled,  and  grants  grace  and  the  gift  of  repentance,  and 
forgives  even  great  sins  (  peccata  etiam  ingentia') P  This  sacrifice 
avails  also  for  the  dead.  Its  efficacy  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
it  is  in  content  identical  with  the  sacrifice  upon  the  cross,  “  only 
the  method  of  offering  being  different”  (c.  2).  The  entire 
Romish  praxis  in  connection  with  the  mass  is  thus  dogmatically 
stated:  Masses  “in  honor  and  memory  of  the  saints”  and 
private  masses  ( missae  privatae )  (c.  36);  the  mixing  of  water 
with  the  wine  (c.  7);  the  canon  of  the  mass  (c.  4);  the  cere- 

1  This  theory  involves  a  complete  confusion  of  thought.  The  sacrifice  of  the 
mass  is  said  to  be  merely  a  copy,  or  representation,  of  the  offering  upon  the 
cross  ;  but  yet  it  is  to  preserve  the  priesthood  of  Christ  in  the  world  and  to  re¬ 
peat  the  sacrifice  made  upon  the  cross.  We  may  easily  understand  what  diffi¬ 
culties  this  must  have  occasioned  in  the  debates.  If  the  Lord’s  Supper — 
already  in  the  first  celebration — is  the  sacrifice  of  Christ,  for  what  purpose 
then  the  subsequent  death  upon  the  cross?  (e.  g.,  act.  ii.  78  b,  82  b,  81  a,  83. 
Dollinger,  Berichte  u.  Tagebiicher,  ii.  81). 

2  Here,  too,  the  decree  is  full  of  contradictions.  According  to  this  passage 
(c.  2),  the  mass,  as  a  sacrifice  of  Christ,  blots  out  all  sins — even  mortal  ;  but 
in  c.  I  it  is  said  :  “  the  virtue  of  this  is  applied  for  the  remission  of  those  sins 
which  are  daily  committed  by  us.”  In  view  of  these  diffiulties,  weoan  under¬ 
stand  the  origin  of  the  theory  mentioned  szpra,  p.  203,  n.  1  ;  cf.  p.  335. 


442 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


monies  and  garments ;  the  alternation  of  the  ‘ 1  lowered  and  elevated 
voice  ’ ’  (c.  5).  Anathemas  are  pronounced  upon  all  variations 
from  these  positions  (c.  5-9).  There  was  thus  again  adopted  a 
feature  of  the  popular  Christianity  of  the  Middle  Ages,  with  all 
its  murkiness  and  fallacies.  The  work  of  Christ  was  committed 
to  the  hands  of  the  church,  i.  e.,  the  priests,1  which  was  in  per¬ 
fect  keeping  with  the  entire  tendency  of  the  medieval  doctrine 
of  the  sacraments. 

11.  The  14th  session  treats  exhaustively  of  the  Sacrament  of 
Repentance.  This  is  said  to  have  been  instituted  by  Christ 
(Jn.  20.  22  f.)  for  the  forgiveness  of  the  sins  of  those  who  have 
lost  the  grace  of  their  baptism  (c.  1,  2).  Its  essence  consists  in 
the  priestly  absolution  (cf.  supra,  p.  136,  140  n.).  It  embraces 
contrition ,  confession ,  and  satisfaction.  It  works  reconciliation 
with  God,  which  is  at  times  followed  in  the  case  of  the  pious  by 
peace  of  conscience  and  the  comfort  of  the  Holy  Spirit2  (c.  3). 
The  opinion  that  repentance  consists  in  ‘ ‘  terrors  of  conscience  ’  ’ 
and  faith  is  condemned  (ib.).  The  decree  then  treats  of  Con¬ 
trition  (c.  4).  This  embraces  sorrow  for  past  sins  and  the  de¬ 
termination  to  sin  no  more.  It  obligates  itself  to  the  right 
reception  of  the  sacrament,  “with  confidence  in  the  divine 
mercy  and  with  a  vow  to  perform  the  things  remaining.  ’  ’  Even 
when  the  contrition,  being  combined  with  love,  is  perfect,  it 
does  not  itself  work  reconciliation,  but  does  so  only  by  virtue  of 
the  “vow  of  the  sacrament  ”  connected  with  it.3  “  Imperfect 
contrition,”  which  is  called  attrition,  not  only  does  not  make 
man  a  hypocrite,  but  is  a  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  by  the  help  of 
which  the  sinner  “  prepares  for  himself  a  way  to  righteousness.” 
It  is  not  indeed  able  per  se  to  lead  the  sinner  to  justification,  but 

1  Observe  also  the  crass  conception  of  the  effect  of  the  sacrifice  of  Christ 
which  was  perpetuated  by  the  sacrifice  of  the  mass  (vid.  already  Gregory, 
supra,  p.  24).  It  would  be  a  profitable  exercise  to  trace  historically  the  mutual 
influences  of  the  theory  of  satisfaction  and  the  doctrine  of  the  sacrifice  of  the 
mass.  The  ecclesiastical  sacrifice  was  not  seldom  the  counterpart  of  the 
sacrifice  of  Christ. 

2  The  language  is  instructive:  “Reconciliation  with  God,  which  some¬ 
times  {inter dum\ in  pious  men  and  those  receiving  this  sacrament  devoutly, 
peace  of  conscience  and  serenity,  with  great  consolation  of  spirit,  are  accus¬ 
tomed  to  follow.”  The  opus  operatum  is  of  itself  sufficient,  and  its  “  objec¬ 
tive  ”  result,  the  peace  of  repentance,  is  an  accessory  which  sometimes  in  the 
case  of  the  “  pious”  follows  !  Luther’s  comment  was,  that  this  “  objective  ” 
result  was  not  sufficient,  but  that  a  way  should  be  sought  by  which  the  “  inter- 
dum'n  might  become  the  rule.  The  5th  canon  pays  its  respects  to  this  pro¬ 
posed  search  by  condemning  the  view,  that  a  man  will  by  simply  recounting 
his  sins  become  a  hypocrite. 

3  This  requirement,  in  itself  considered,  removes  a  difficulty  of  the  medieval 
system,  but  it  is  no  more  consistent  with  the  connection  in  which  it  is  found 
than  was  the  position  of  Thomas.  Yid.  supra,  p.  136. 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT. 


443 


it  “  disposes”  him  toward  the  sacrament.  This  is  essentially 
the  popular  medieval  doctrine.  But  it  is  now  further  asserted 
with  emphasis,  that  no  impartation  of  grace  is  granted  “  without 
a  good  motive  of  the  recipients,”  and  that  the  Ninevites 
advanced  from  the  imperfect  penitence  of  one  beneficially 
alarmed  ( utiliter  concussus')  to  “repentance  full  of  terrors.” 
Thus  contrition  again  appears  to  be  necessary,  but  it  will  be 
observed  upon  careful  examination  that  even  this  presentation  of 
the  matter  does  not  indicate  any  real  advance  upon  the  popular 
medieval  view,  as  the  latter  also  required  a  transformation  of  the 
attrition  into  contrition — by  means,  it  is  true,  of  the  sacrament 
(vid.  supra,  p.  137,  175). 1 

Upon  contrition  follows  Confession,  in  which  all  mortal  sins 
which  can  be  remembered — and  that  not  only  in  general  (in 
genere ),  but  in  particular  (in  specie') — must  be  confessed, 
together  with  a  detailing  of  all  the  circumstances  which  may  be 
essential  to  a  correct  judgment  of  the  offense.  Only  thus  can 
the  priest  form  a  correct  opinion  and  find  the  appropriate 
penalty  (c.  5).  The  priest  has  not  merely  the  “  ministry  .  .  . 
of  declaring  that  sins  are  forgiven ;  but  after  the  manner  of  a 
judicial  act,  in  which  sentence  is  pronounced  by  him  as  by  a 
judge  ”  (c.  6).  Sins  of  particular  gravity  are  “  reserved  ”  for 
the  decision  of  the  higher  authorities  (bishop,  pope)  (c.  7). 

Works  of  Satisfaction  are  designed,  first  of  all,  as  a  pedagogic 
measure,  to  restrain  the  sinner  from  future  sins  :  “  As  by  a  kind 
of  rein,  these  satisfactorial  penalties  make  penitents  more 
cautious  and  vigilant  in  the  future.”  In  the  second  place,  they 
make  the  sinner  like  Christ,  “since  in  making  satisfaction  we 
suffer  for  our  sins.”  This  determines,  thirdly,  their  atoning, 
satisfactorial  character,  in  which  connection,  however,  emphasis  is 
laid  upon  the  fact,  that  it  is  only  from  the  satisfaction  rendered 
by  Christ  that  “all  our  sufficiency  comes.”  Of  the  design  of 
satisfaction,  it  is  said  :  “  It  is  not  only  for  the  guarding  of  the  new 
life  and  a  medicine  for  infirmity,  but  also  for  a  punishment  and 
castigation  of  past  sins  ”  (c.  8).  Finally,  it  is  observed,  that 

1  But  the  matter  is  not  clear.  The  original  draft  of  the  decretal  said 
of  attrition  :  “  but  it  suffices  for  the  constitution  of  this  sacrament”  (act.  i. 
584  a).  These  words  were  indeed  afterward  stricken  out,  but  the  other  state¬ 
ments  in  regard  to  attrition  were  allowed  to  stand  (vid.  PALLAVICINI,  x.  12. 
25,  26).  But  Dollinger-Reusch,  Moralstreitigkeiten,  i.  72,  go  too  far  in 
their  attempt  to  acquit  the  Tridentine  Confession  of  the  charge  of  attritionism. 
Here,  too,  there  was  doubtless  a  deliberate  avoidance  of  clear  definition.  The 
Constitution  designates  Pius  VI.  as  the  “Promoter  of  the  faith”  ( auctor 
Jidei )  and  describes  the  “  fear  of  Gehenna  ”  as  a  donum  supernaturale  and  as 
a  “way  (modus)  inspired  by  God,  preparing  for  the  love  of  righteousness  ” 
(Denzinger,  Enchirid.  n.  1388). 


444 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


there  is  a  satisfactorial  significance,  not  only  in  the  penalties  im¬ 
posed  by  the  priest,  but  also  in  the  patient  endurance  of  the 
temporal  chastisements  which  are  appointed  by  God  (c.  9). 
But  as  to  the  relation  of  the  latter  penalties  to  the  former — a 
point  often  assailed  by  the  later  criticism  (vid*.  supra,  p.  210) — 
nothing  is  said. 

The  canons  condemn  the  Protestant  doctrine,  e.  g.f  that  bap¬ 
tism  contains  the  sacrament  of  repentance  (2);  that  repentance 
consists  of  only  penitence  ( terrores )  and  faith  (4);  that  con¬ 
trition  alone  leads  to  hypocrisy  (5);  that  the  sacramental  con¬ 
fession  and  the  extension  of  its  scope  to  cover  “  all  and  separate 
mortal  sins,  which  can  be  held  in  memory  by  due  and  diligent 
premeditation,  even  those  which  are  secret” — are  not  “of 
divine  right”  (6,  7);  that  the  priestly  absolution  is  not  a 
“judicial  act  ”  (9);  that  Matt.  16.  19  and  Jn.  20.  23  give  to 
all  Christians  the  authority  to  pronounce  absolution  (10);  that 
bishops  do  not  have  the  “  right  of  reserving  cases  to  themselves” 

(11) ;  that  satisfaction  is  nothing  more  than  faith  in  forgiveness 

(12) ;  that  satisfactions  are  merely  human  traditions  (14);  that 
it  is  a  “  fiction,”  that,  after  the  removal  of  the  eternal  penalties, 
temporal  penalties  often  remain  to  be  discharged  (15).1 

Indulgences  were  considered  at  the  25th  session  (Dec.  4, 
1563).  The  impatient  haste  with  which  all  business  was  trans¬ 
acted  toward  the  close  of  the  council  did  not  admit  of  a 
thorough  discussion  of  this  subject  (act.  ii.  676  b.  Sarpi,  vi. 
368  f. ).  But  in  order  not  to  pass  over  the  topic  entirely,  a 
sketch  was  prepared  in  the  last  night  (act.  ii.  680  a).  Since 
Christ,  it  is  held,  gave  indulgences  to  the  church,  this  “prac¬ 
tice  very  salutary  for  the  people  ”  is  to  be  retained.  Those  who 
pronounce  indulgences  useless,  or  challenge  the  right  of  the 
church  to  grant  them,  are  condemned.  But  in  the  granting  of 
them  moderation  should  be  exercised,  in  accordance  with  the 
ancient  and  approved  custom  of  the  church,  in  order  not  to 
weaken  ecclesiastical  discipline.  The  abuses  which  have  at¬ 
tached  themselves  to  the  system  of  indulgences  and  have  given 
to  the  heretics  an  occasion  for  blasphemy  against  “this  noble 
name  of  indulgences,”  are  to  be  corrected — especially  “all  un¬ 
worthy  ( pravos )  gains  in  return  for  the  securing  of  these, 
whence  has  come  the  greatest  cause  of  abuses  among  the  Chris¬ 
tian  populace,  are  to  be  entirely  abolished.”2  Furthermore,  the 
bishops  are  to  take  notice  of  the  abuses  and  make  report  of  them 
to  Rome.  The  pope  would  then  see  to  it,  “  that  thus  the  favor 

1  As  to  public  repentance,  vid.  sess.  24,  De  reformat,  c.  8. 

2  Here,  too,  in  the  last  minute  it  may  be  said,  there  was  an  alteration  which 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT. 


445 


( munus )  of  the  holy  indulgences  may  be  sacredly  and  without 
corruption  dispensed  to  all  believers.”  Even  here,  it  will  be 
observed,  there  was  no  surrender  of  any  part  of  the  traditional 
dogmatic  position.1 

Purgatory  was  also  here  discussed  (ses.  25).  The  decretal 
drawn  up  in  great  haste  (vid.  ses.  6,  can.  30)  affirms  that  help 
may  be  given  to  souls  in  purgatory  by  the  intercession  of  the 
saints  and  the  sacrifice  of  the  mass.  This  doctrine  is  to  be 
preached  without  entering  into  discussion  of  the  difficult  ques¬ 
tions  connected  with  it.  Masses,  prayers,  alms,  and  “  other 
pious  works  ’  ’  should  be  ‘ 4  piously  and  devoutly  ’  ’  rendered  in 
behalf  of  the  dead. 

12.  Extreme  Unction  (ses.  14)  is  said  to  remove  the  remains 
of  sin  in  the  dying  and  to  lighten  and  confirm  the  heart  (c.  2) — 
again,  it  will  be  observed,  a  reaffirmation  of  traditional  doctrine. 

13.  The  sacrament  of  Ordination,  it  is  affirmed  (ses.  23),  was 
instituted  in  connection  with  the  New  Testament  sacrifice.  It 
was,  therefore,  instituted  by  Christ,  who  thereby  committed  to 
the  apostles  and  their  followers  the  ‘  ‘  power  of  offering  and  admin¬ 
istering  his  body  and  blood  both  for  the  remitting  and  for  the  re¬ 
taining  of  sins  ”  (c.  1).  In  view  of  the  sacredness  of  the  mat¬ 
ter,  it  was  appropriate  that  there  should  be  in  the  church  “  more 
and  diverse  orders  of  ministers.”  The  Scriptures  attest  the 
priesthood  and  the  diaconate,  and  the  other  ranks  have  been 
appointed  from  time  to  time  since  the  early  days  of  the  church 
(c.  2  ) .  But  since,  according  to  the  Scriptures,  apostolic  tradition, 
and  the  harmonious  consensus  of  the  Fathers,  grace  is  conferred  in 
ordination  by  words  and  outward  signs,  it  is  without  doubt  to  be 
counted  among  the  sacraments  of  the  church  (c.  3).  Whoever 
denies  this,  or  that  the  “  character  ”  is  impressed  by  ordination, 
falls  under  the  anathema  (can.  4).  The  universal  priesthood  of 
believers  is  directly  rejected.  Not  all  have  the  same  spiritual 
power  {spiidtualis  potestas') .  Priests  are  discriminated  from  the 
laity  not  only  by  a  “  temporary  power.  ”  All  these  opinions 
are  refuted  by  Eph.  4.  11  and  1  Cor.  12.  28  ff.  The  hierarch¬ 
ical  government  of  the  church  is  of  divine  appointment  ( divina 
ordinatione )  ( can.  6).  Bishops  are  superior  to  presbyters  ( pres - 
byteris  superiores')\  to  them  are  reserved  confirmation  and  ordi- 

was  not  in  the  interest  of  lucidity.  “  Nevertheless,  in  this  there  were  then 
stricken  out  certain  words,  which  expressly  forbade  that  certain  large  sums  be 
imposed  for  the  securing  of  indulgences  ”  (act.  ii.  680  b);  vid.  Pallavicini, 
xxiv.  8.  1. 

1  Cf.  the  condemnation  of  the  theses  of  the  Synod  of  Pistoja  in  the  Consti¬ 
tution,  “  Auctorem  fidei  ”  (1794),  where  the  doctrine,  that  indulgences  effect 
the  forgiveness  of  temporal  penalty,  is  presupposed  (Denzinger,  Enchirid.  n.. 

1403). 


446 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


nation  ‘  ‘  and  many  other  things.  ’  ’  Ordination  thus  confers  the 
spiritual  office.  The  approval  of  the  civil  government,  its  call 
and  authority,  are  not  required  in  the  sense  “  that  without  this 
ordination  would  be  invalid.”1  On  the  other  hand,  all  who  are 
called  and  inducted  into  office  only  by  the  people  or  the  civil 
authority  are,  like  those  who  arrogate  a  spiritual  office  to  them¬ 
selves,  “  thieves  and  robbers  ”  (Jn.  io.  i)  (c.  4). 2 

14.  The  discussion  of  Marriage  (ses.  24)  is  in  very  general 
terms,  treating  of  its  nature  and  the  grace  which  Christ  has  won 
for  it.  As  by  the  latter,  Christian  marriage  is  made  superior  to 
that  of  earlier  times,  it  must  now  be  reckoned  among  the  sacra¬ 
ments.  The  canons  discuss  a  number  of  canonical  questions,  forbid 
marriage  to  clerics  and  monks  (can.  9),  and  condemn  the  view, 
that  “it  is  not  better  nor  more  blessed  to  remain  in  virginity,  or 
celibacy,  than  to  be  joined  in  marriage  ”  (can.  10).  Thus  the 
medieval  ideal,  of  life  is  transported  into  modern  times,  which, 
aside  from  the  practical  ecclesiastical  situation  of  the  period, 
constitutes  the  historical  significance  of  these  canons. 

15.  Although  the  defenders  of  the  old  church  placed  the  defi¬ 
nition  of  the  church  at  the  centre  of  discussion — and  rightly  so 
— it  was  yet  deemed  prudent  at  Trent  to  refrain  from  a  full  dis¬ 
cussion  of  this  topic.3  The  debates  occasioned  by  the  presenta¬ 
tion  of  the  section  upon  ordination  reveal  the  grounds  for  this 
caution.  The  highest  officials  desired  a  recognition  of  the  papal 
system ;  but  a  great  number  of  the  bishops  were  thoroughly 
episcopal  in  their  ideas.  The  original  draft  of  the  decretal  upon 
ordination  gave  quite  open  expression  to  papalistic  premises,  the 
hierarchical  organism  being  described  as  standing  “  under  one 
supreme  hierarch,  the  vicar  of  Christ  on  earth  ;  ”  or  (according  to 
the  second  draft)  the  bishops  standing  under  the  pope  being  said 
to  be  “  called  to  participation  in  care  (in  partem  sol/ieitudinis) , 
but  not  to  plenitude  of  power”  (in  plenitudinem  potestatis)  (act. 
ii.  152  a,  155  b,  with  can.  7,  156  a).  It  was  but  logically  con¬ 
sistent,  when  in  the  subsequent  proceedings  it  was  maintained, 
that  all  ecclesiastical  authority  belongs  primarily  to  the  pope, 
who  can  appoint  and  endow  bishops  at  his  will — he  the  sun,  they 
the  rays.  The  pope  is,  accordingly,  the  “vicar  of  Christ”  in 
an  absolute  sense  (e.  g.,  act.  ii.  158  b,  175  a,  168  a  :  “Bishops 
are,  therefore,  not  directly  from  Christ,  but  from  the  pontifex  ”  ). 

1  Observe  the  prudent  selection  of  language  which  would  permit  in  praxis 
many  interpretations.  The  entire  conception  is  only  a  deduction  from  the  sac¬ 
ramental  character  of  ordination. 

2  The  8th  canon  also  deserves  mention  :  “If  anyone  shall  say  that  bishops 
appointed  by  the  authority  of  the  Roman  pontiff  are  not  legitimate  and  true 
bishops,  but  a  Roman  figment,  let  him  be  anathema.”  Cf.  act.  ii.  155  f. 

3  Eck’s  Loci,  e.  g .,  begin  with  a  section,  De  ecclesia. 


MEDIEVAL  THEOLOGY  AT  COUNCIL  OF  TRENT. 


447 


In  opposition  to  this  it  was,  however,  maintained  by  many,  that 
the  pope  is  only  “  the  chief  vicar  (summus  vicarius')  of  Christ  ” 
(act.  ii.  157  a,  165  a,  170  a,  193  b,  et  pas.).  The  apostles  re¬ 
ceived  their  power,  not  from  Peter,  but  from  Christ.  Not  Peter, 
but  Christ,  selected  the  substitute  for  Judas.  Thus  the  bishops 
also  receive  the  “  power  for  ruling  and  for  governing  the  church 
of  Christ  ”  directly  from  Christ,  and  not  from  the  pope  (ib.  ii. 
188  f. ).  Primacy  is  ascribed  to  the  pope  only  for  the  sake  of 
earthly  order  :  “  Therefore  the  bishops  have  (their)  power  orig¬ 
inally  from  God,  but  from  the  pope  as  a  second  cause  ’  ’  (ii.  165). 
The  episcopal  power  (  potestas )  comes  from  Christ ;  the  specific 
earthly  territory  within  which  it  is  to  be  exercised  is  assigned  by 
the  pope  (ii.  168  f. ,  191  b,  192  f.,  etc.).  Hence  the  constantly- 
recurring  controversy  as  to  the  introductory  clause  of  the  decre¬ 
tals,  i.  e. ,  whether  to  the  word  synodus  should  be  added  the  words 
univer salem  ecclesiain  representans.  Under  these  circumstances, 
it  was  certainly  the  most  practical  course  to  follow  the  counsel  of 
those  who  advised  an  avoidance  of  this  point  of  the  controversy. 
The  final  draft  of  the  decretal  presents,  therefore,  in  an  almost 
unrecognizable  form  the  original  curialistic  conception. 

This  clashing  of  views  is  historically  intelligible ;  but  it 
appeared  impossible  in  the  situation  then  existing  to  find  any  way 
of  harmonizing  the  antagonistic  parties.  Both  agreed  in  ac¬ 
knowledging  a  double  tradition.  To  the  bishops  belongs,  jby 
virtue  of  the  apostolic  succession,  a  peculiar  power  over  the 
church,  and — the  popes,  as  the  successors  of  Peter,  are  the  rulers 
of  the  church.  The  episcopal  party  reasoned  :  If  the  bishops 
have  apostolic  power  by  divine  right,  then  the  papal  primacy 
must  have  reference  only  to  the  external  economy  of  the  church. 
But  no  one  ventured  to  draw  the  further  inference,  that  the 
papacy  must  then  exist  only  by  human  right  (cf.  supra,  p.  167  f. ), 
since  the  primacy  of  Peter  was  also  instituted  by  God.  Here 
lies  the  fault  of  the  system.  At  this  point  the  logic  of  the 
Curialists  is  brought  to  bear,  the  actual  conditions  in  the  church 
constituting  an  argument  in  their  favor.  If  the  papal  primacy 
exits  jure  divino,  then  the  pope  is  the  lord  of  the  church  ;  to 
him  belongs  all  power  in  the  church  ;  and  the  bishops  are  only 
called  by  him  to  a  share  in  his  practical  oversight  (in  partem 
sollicitudinis') .  They  possess  the  apostolic  succession  only  in  the 
form — illustrated  in  the  apostolic  age — of  dependence  upon 
Peter.  But,  in  this  case,  can  the  power  of  the  bishops  be 
described  as  of  divine  right  ? 1  Does  it  not  fall  merely  under 

1  Cf.  the  definition  of  the  “  divine  right  ”  oy  the  Jesuit  Salmeron  :  “  That 
is  of  divine  right  which  God  himself  does  directly  through  himself”  (Le  Plat, 
Monument,  v.  524). 


44§ 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


the  category  of  canon  law,  or  jus  humanum  ?  This  neither 
party  could  or  would  acknowledge.  There  was  at  this  point  a 
very  patent  failure  of  logical  consistency.  The  apostolic  succes¬ 
sion  bound  the  hands  of  the  Curialists,  while  Peter  stood  in  the 
path  of  the  Episcopalists ;  and  neither  of  these  obstacles  could 
be  cast  aside. 

That  which  the  council  could  not  do  was  accomplished  at  a 
later  day  by  the  Catechismus  Romanus.  The  doctrine  of  the 
church  is  here  treated  on  the  basis  of  Thomas  (cf.  supra,  p. 
144  f. ).  The  church  is  the  assembly  of  believers  ( congregatia 
jidelium ,  i.  c.  10).  Pious  and  wicked  live  in  it  side  by  side, 
possessing  in  common  “  the  profession  of  faith  and  the  commu¬ 
nion  of  the  sacraments.”  The  pious  are  united  to  one  another 
“by  the  spirit  of  grace  and  the  bond  of  love  ”  (ib.  quaest.  6). 
But  in  this  fellowship  there  must  prevail  obedience  to  that  rank 
which  is  not  only  entrusted  with  the  proclamation  of  the  gospel, 
but  is  also  judge  and  physician  for  the  sinful  (c.  7,  q.  2,  28). 
But  all  this  power  is  concentrated  in  the  pope.  “  For  there  is 
indeed  one  ruler  and  governor  of  it  (the  church),  the  invisible 
Christ ;  but  also  that  visible  (one)  who  occupies  the  Roman 
chair  as  the  legitimate  successor  of  Peter,  the  chief  of  the  apos¬ 
tles  ”  (c.  10,  q.  10 ;  cf.  7,  q.  24).  Christ,  who  rules  the 
church,  “appointed  a  man  as  vicar  and  minister  of  his  power  ; 
for,  since  the  visible  church  needs  a  visible  head,  therefore  our 
Saviour  established  Peter  as  the  head  and  pastor  of  the  whole 
race  of  believers”  (c.  10,  q.  11).  The  papalistic  theory  here 
finds  a  positive  recognition  which  it  could  not  have  secured  at 
the  council. 

The  Professio  fidei  Tridentina  contains,  as  a  component 
part  of  the  Catholic  faith — “outside  of  which  no  one  can  be 
saved”  —  the  assertion  :  “I  promise  and  swear  true  obedience 
to  the  Roman  pontiff,  successor  of  the  blessed  Peter,  the  chief 
of  the  apostles,  and  the  vicar  of  Jesus  Christ.” 

16.  The  council  preserved  intact  the  Christianity  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  Nothing  of  importance  in  it  was  overlooked.  Even  the 
worship  of  saints  and  the  veneration  of  images  and  relics  are  com¬ 
mended  (ses.  25).  Medieval  theology  was  exalted  to  the  posi¬ 
tion  of  ecclesiastical  dogma.  In  this  lies  the  chief  significance 
of  the  Confession  of  Trent.  We  cannot  but  regard  with  amaze¬ 
ment  the  great  work  which  was  here  accomplished.  Out  of  the 
innumerable  array  of  contradictory  formulas  and  theories,  a  re¬ 
duction  was  made  which,  in  a  most  masterly  way,  presents  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  Scholastic  theology.  True,  many 
things  are  passed  over  or  concealed,  and  others  are  expressed 
ambiguously  ;  but,  viewed  as  a  whole,  the  result  was  a  self- 


REVIVAL  OF  AUGUSTINIAN  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE. 


449 


consistent  system  of  doctrine  such  as  the  Roman  Catholic  church 
had  not  hitherto  possessed.  By  this  means  the  medieval 
theology  was  made  independent  of  the  shifting  favor  or  disfavor 
of  the  schools.  The  Tridentine  Confession  rescued  the  Schol¬ 
astic  theology  from  the  Scholastics,  by  placing  it  upon  an  eleva¬ 
tion  beyond  their  reach.  But,  comprehensive  as  was  this  doc¬ 
trinal  scheme  in  general,  in  particular  points  it  was  just  as  notice¬ 
ably  capable  of  indefinite  expansion  and  modification.  Many 
variant  tendencies  and  shades  of  opinion  might  be  gathered 
beneath  it,  and  interpret  their  views  into  its  language.  In  fact, 
Thomists  and  Scotists,  Augustinian  mystics  and  Jesuits  im¬ 
mersed  in  practical  politics,  did  just  this,  and  did  it  without  re¬ 
buke.  It  is  only  the  gospel,  as  understood  by  Protestantism, 
to  which  there  is  no  bridge  from  the  Tridentine  theology.  In 
this  direction  only  its  declarations  are  clear,  sharp,  unyielding, 
and  enclosed  in  a  hedge  of  innumerable  anathemas.  The 
supremacy  of  tradition,  the  sacramental  infusion  of  grace,  faith 
as  an  assent  or  subjection  to  formulas,  the  hierarchy  as  the 
almoner  of  supernatural  powers  and  gate-keeper  of  the  celestial 
world,  the  ascetic  ideal  of  life — upon  these  points  there  is  no 
wavering  and  no  uncertain  sound.  It  is  here,  therefore,  that  the 
ways  part.  The  anathemas  of  the  Tridentine  canons  branded 
as  heresy  the  Protestant  teaching  in  its  entire  compass,  as  the 
decretals  elevated  the  Roman  Catholic  theories  to  the  position 
of  dogmas.  This  constitutes  the  two-fold  significance  of  the 
Council  of  Trent. 


§  84.  Revival  of  the  Augustinian  Doctrine  of  Grace  and  Its 

Ecclesiastical  Rejection. 

Literature.  Linsenmann,  Mich.  Bajus,  1867.  Moller-Seeberg, 
PRE.  ii.,  ed.  3,  363  ff.  Sainte-Beuve,  Port-Royal,  ed.  3,  6  vols.,  Paris,  1867. 
Reuchlin,  Gesch.  v.  Port-Royal,  2  vols.,  1839-44.  Schneemann,  Entste- 
hung  u.  Entwicklg.  d.  thomist. -molinist.  Controverse,  2  parts,  1879-80. 
Schrockh,  KG.  seit  der  Reformat,  iv.  310  ff.  Henke,  Neuere  KG.,  ii. 
98  ff.  Ranke,  Franzos.  Gesch.,  vols.  iii.  and  iv.  Schill,  Die  Constitution 
Unigenitus,  1876.  Reusch,  Index  der  verbotenen  Biieher,  ii.  457  ff.,  539  ff. , 
552  ff,  724  ff.  Thomasius-Seeberg,  DG.  ii.,  ed.  2,  717  ff.  Harnack,  DG. 
iii.,  ed.  3,  647  ff. 

i.  The  Augustinian  doctrine  of  grace  found  recognition  at 
Trent  in  but  a  mutilated  form.  More  emphasis  was  laid  upon  it 
in  the  Romish  Catechism,  as  the  latter  was  influenced  by 
Thomas.  But  the  ethics  and  dogmatics  of  the  Jesuits  soon 
banished  this  doctrine  entirely  from  the  regnant  theology. 
There  were  not  lacking,  indeed,  some  theologians  of  Augustin¬ 
ian  tendencies  to  oppose  this  growing  Pelagianism.  They 

29 


45° 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


asserted  themselves  in  Belgium  and  France,  being  influenced  also 
by  humanistic  predilections.  Their  distinguishing  character¬ 
istic  was  merely  the  advocacy  of  the  Augustinian  doctrine,  their 
orthodoxy  being  unassailable  in  all  other  points.  More  import¬ 
ant,  therefore,  than  their  views  is  the  papal  condemnation  which 
was  visited  upon  them,  as  this  falls  with  all  its  force  upon 
Augustine  himself.  They  were  accordingly  in  the  right  who,  in 
A.  D.  1563,  laid  before  the  pope  the  complaint  :  “  Under  a 
mask,  they  condemn  the  doctrine  of  Augustine,”  or:  “  O 
grief !  Augustine  is  condemned  under  the  name  of  the  Jan- 
senists  ”  (Reusch,  Index  ii.  469).  We  must  trace  the  course 
of  the  controversies  induced  by  Baius,  Jansen,  and  Quesnel. 

2.  Michael  Baius  (De  Bay,  A.  D.  1513-89),  a  professor  in 
Louvain,  advocated  the  Augustinian  doctrine  of  grace.  Original 
righteousness,  as  the  subjection  of  the  sensuous  nature  to  the  spirit 
united  with  God,  is  not  to  be  designated  as  an  added  endowment 
{donum  superadditum) .  If  man  was  created  good  by  God,  then 
concupiscence,  as  the  rebellion  of  the  flesh  against  the  spiritual 
nature,  is  really  sin.  Man  is  utterly  depraved  by  sin  :  ‘ 4  free¬ 
will  without  the  assistance  of  God  avails  for  nothing  except  for 
sin.”  As  the  entire  man,  so  also  the  entire  race  has  become 
subject  to  sin.  _  The  justification  of  the  sinner  takes  place  through 
the  transformation  of  his  will  by  God  :  ‘ 1  Our  evil  will  is  trans¬ 
formed  into  a  good  (will).”  This  new  will  man  now  employs 
in  good  works:  “Righteousness  is  properly  obedience  to  the 
law.  ’  ’  1  But  since  this  righteousness  wrought  in  man  upon  earth 
by  grace  can  never  be  flawless,  God  here  grants  as  supplementary 
the  forgiveness  of  sins.  “Justification  is  nothing  else  than  a 
certain  continuous  progression  both  in  the  practice  of  virtues  and 
in  the  remission  of  sins.”  This  whole  structure  of  thought  is 
thoroughly  Catholic.2  Nevertheless,  the  79  theses  of  Baius  were 
condemned  by  Pope  Pius  V.  in  the  bull,  Ex  oi?mibus  afflictioni- 
bus.  Thus  genuinely  Augustinian  ideas  were  rejected,  e.  g.  : 
That  the  will  without  grace  can  only  sin  ;  that  even  the  con- 

1  This  is  a  definition  strongly  emphasized  by  Bajus,  <?.  g.,  in  his  theses  con¬ 
demned  by  the  pope,  n.  42  :  “  Righteousness,  by  which  the  man  is  justified 
by  faith,  consists  formally  in  obedience  to  the  commandments  69  :  “  The 
justification  of  the  wicked  man  occurs  formally  through  obedience  to  the  law, 
but  not  through  a  secret  communication  and  inspiration  of  grace  which  causes 
those  who  are  justified  to  fulfill  the  law  through  it.” 

2  The  independent  role  here  attributed  to  the  forgiveness  of  sins — which  is 
not,  as  in  Thomas,  the  recognition  of  an  act  of  making  righteousness  already 
accomplished — reminds  us  of  Pighius  and  Gropper  (supra,  p.  434,  n.  1 ).  Let 
it  not  be  overlooked,  however,  that  forgiveness  removes  only  the  guilt 
( rcatus )  of  sin,  whereas  grace  in  the  proper  sense  atones  for  or  transforms  the 
act  itself. 


REVIVAL  OF  AUGUSTINIAN  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE.  45 1 

cupiscence  that  is  contrary  to  the  will  is  sin  ;  that  the  sinner  is 
moved  and  animated  by  God  alone,  and  not  by  the  ministrations 
of  the  priest;  that  merits  are  bestowed  upon  men  gratuitously.1 
Bajus  recalled  his  assertions. 

3.  The  controversy  associated  with  the  name  of  the  Jesuit, 
Tudwig  Molina  (f  A.  D.  1600),  ran  its  course  without  produc¬ 
ing  any  permanent  result.  In  his  work,  Liberi  arbitrii  cu?n 
gratiae  donis ,  div.  praescientia ,  providentia ,  praedestinatione  et 
repi'obatione  concordia  (A.  D.  1588),  an  acute  attempt  is  made 
to  reconcile  Pelagianism,  Semipelagianism,  and  Augustinianism. 
Man  is  even  in  his  sinful  state  free  to  perform,  not  only  natural, 
but  also  surpernatural  works,  the  cooperation  of  grace  being  pre¬ 
supposed.  Grace  elevates  and  stimulates  the  soul,  making  it  ca¬ 
pable  of  supernatural  works ;  but  the  real  act  of  decision  is  not 
wrought  in  the  will  by  grace,  but  is  made  by  the  will  itself,  the 
will  being,  however,  in  union  with  grace.  Thus,  as  the  free  de¬ 
cision  of  the  will  and  the  capacitating  of  the  soul  for  the  super¬ 
natural  (grace)  in  their  cooperation  mark  the  beginning  of  the 
state  of  acceptance  with  God  {Heilsstand') ,2  so  both  combined 
in  simultaneous  combination  ( concur su  simultaneo')  produce  the 
supernatural  acts.  They  work  together  like  two  men  who  tug  a 
vessel  with  one  rope.  Now  the  thoroughgoing  cooperation  thus 
attained  becomes  a  mere  illusion  if  all  the  free  acts  of  created 
beings  are  really  recognized,  as  among  the  Thomists,  as  willed 

0 

1  A  few  of  the  important  theses  (vid.  the  Bull  in  Denzinger,  Enchiridion, 

881  fif. )  are  as  follows  :  20.  “  No  sin  is  by  its  nature  venial,  but  every  venial 

sin  merits  eternal  punishment.”  25.  “All  works  of  unbelievers  are  sins, 
and  the  virtues  of  the  philosophers  are  vices.”  27.  “  Free-will  without  the 
assistance  of  the  grace  of  God  avails  only  for  sin.”  28.  “  It  is  a  Pelagian 
error  to  say  that  free-will  avails  for  the  avoiding  of  sin.”  35.  “  Everything 
which  the  sinner,  or  servant  of  sin,  does  is  sin.”  51.  “Concupiscence,  or 
the  law  of  the  members  and  its  depraved  desires,  which  men  now  willingly  feel, 
is  a  real  disobedience  of  the  law.”  73.  “  No  one  except  Christ  is  without 
original  sin  ;  hence  the  blessed  virgin  is  mortal  on  account  of  sin  contracted 
from  Adam,  and  all  her  afflictions  in  this  life,  just  as  those  also  of  other  right¬ 
eous  persons,  were  avengingsof  actual  or  original  sin.”  58.  “  The  penitent 
sinner  is  not  vivified  by  the  ministration  of  the  absolving  priest,  but  by  God 
alone,  who,  suggesting  and  inspiring  (his)  repentance,  vivifies  and  resuscitates 
him;  but  by  the  ministration  of  the  priest  guilt  alone  is  removed.”  8.  “In 
those  redeemed  by  the  grace  of  Christ,  no  good  merit  can  be  found  which  is 
not  conferred  gratuitously  upon  the  unworthy.”  77-  “  Temporal  satisfactions 
do  not  avail  to  expiate  de  condigno  temporal  punishment  remaining  after  sin 
has  been  pardoned.”  10.  “The  remitting  of  the  temporal  punishment, 
which  often  remains  after  sin  has  been  pardoned,  and  the  resurrection  of  the 
body,  are  properly  to  be  ascribed  to  nothing  but  the  merits  of  Christ.” 

2  Molina  gains  a  place  for  prevenient  grace  by  maintaining  that,  in  the  first 
act  (actus primus),  before  the  advent  of  the  second  act  (actus  se cun dus)  of 
the  will,  i.  e.,  in  the  habituality  of  the  will  while  not  as  yet  realized  in  acts, 
grace  alone  acts.  The  cooperation  is  posited  only  of  the  actus  secundi. 


452  •  HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 

by  God  himself  of  his  own  original  motion.  At  this  point, 
Molina’s  theory  of  a  “  median  knowledge”  ( scientia  media) 
is  introduced.  God,  he  maintains,  foresees  what  his  free 
creatures  under  any  given  circumstances  will  do  or  not  do. 
The  scientia  media  is,  therefore,  a  knowledge  of  the  contin¬ 
gent  future.  By  means  of  it  God  beholds  the  entire  future,  and 
he  orders  the  course  of  the  world  in  accordance  with  the  knowl¬ 
edge  thus  in  his  possession.  In  contrast  with  the  theory  of  a 
causal  connection  of  events  strictly  determined  by  divine  decree, 
there  is  here  retained  a  place  for  human  freedom.  Upon  the 
metaphysical  questions  which  are  thus  left  unanswered,  it  is  not 
needful  for  us  to  enter.  The  aim  of  Molina  is  clear.  Grace  and 
human  freedom  are  to  be  combined  with  one  another  in  a  peace¬ 
ful  union.  The  ancient  problems  are  to  be  thus  solved  in  a  very 
simple  way.  Predestination  and  reprobation  may  be  readily  ac¬ 
counted  for  by  the  scientia  media ,  by  virtue  of  which  God  fore¬ 
saw  which  men  would  cooperate  with  grace,  and  which  of  them 
would  not  do  so.  But  this  foreseen  free  activity  of  man  is  to  be 
regarded  only  as  a  means,  and  not  as  a  cause,  of  predestination, 
as  the  latter  idea  would  be  Semipelagian. 

It  is  true,  a  critical  eye  will  readily  discover  that  the  combina¬ 
tion  thus  assumed  is  only  apparent,  and  that  the  Augustinian- 
Thomistic  conception  of  grace  is  here  torn  out  by  the  roots.  It 
is  not  the  all-working  power  of  the  divine  will  which  effects  sal¬ 
vation  ;  but  the  hands  of  God  and  man  work  together  as  coordi¬ 
nate  factors.  Synergism  in  its  boldest  form  is  the  confessed  first 
principle  of  this  theology.  But  the  opposition  to  it  inaugurated 
by  the  Dominicans  was  crippled  by  the  championship  of  the 
Jesuits,  who  adopted  this  theory  of  grace  as  the  official  doctrine 
of  their  order.  The  popes  did  not  dare  to  give  decision  against 
the  powerful  order,  and  hence  the  whole  matter  was  buried  in  the 
sessions  of  the  commission  of  the  congregatio  de  auxiliis  gratiae 
without  the  promised  papal  declaration.  As  a  result,  the  Jesuits 
were  allowed  to  propagate  their  doctrine  without  opposition  from 
the  church.  Cf.  Schneemann,  1.  c.  Morgott,  in  Kirchenlex. 
viii.,  ed.  2,  1737  ff.,  and  iii.,  ed.  2,  897  ff. 

4.  The  most  powerful  reaction  against  the  lax  and  Pelagianiz- 
ing  moral  principles  of  the  Jesuits  came  from  circles  which  centred 
about  the  abbey  Port  Royal,  situated  not  far  from  Paris.  The  medie¬ 
val  form  of  piety  was  indeed  preserved  in  these  circles,  but  they 
drewtheir  inspiration  from  Augustinian  Mysticism,  and  in  this  they 
believed  themselves  to  possess  the  means  of  rescuing  all  serious- 
minded  persons  from  the  nets  of  the  Jesuits.  Hence  it  was  that 
this  party  could  find  its  program  in  a  work  which  professed  to  be, 
and  really  was,  nothing  else  than  a  revived  Augustine.  This  was 


REVIVAL  OF  AUGUSTINIAN  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE. 


453 


the. publication  of  the  Bishop  of  Ypres,  Cornelius  Jansenius 
(f  A.  D.  1638):  Augustinus  seu  doctrina  Augustini  de  kumanae 
naturae  sanitate ,  aegritudine ,  medicina  adv .  Pelagianos  et  Massi- 
l ienses .  It  was  published  in  A.  D.  1640,  Jansen  having  completed 
it  shortly  before  his  death.  As  Bradwardina  had  done  at  an 
earlier  day,  Jansen  holds  up  as  a  mirror  before  his  age,  sunken  in 
Pelagianism,  the  genuine  teachings  of  Augustine.  This  is  done 
with  historic,  fidelity,  and  not,  as  was  the  case  with  the  English 
theologian,  in  order  to  establish  a  deterministic  system.  Origi¬ 
nal  sin,  he  taught,  has  filled  the  entire  human  race  with  lust  and 
ignorance.  The  sinner  is  now  free  in  the  domain  of  sip.  Justi¬ 
fication  by  grace  is  by  no  means  to  be  identified  with  the  forgive¬ 
ness  of  sins,  as  is  done  by  the  Protestants.  Christ  brings  the 
“medicinal  aid  of  the  Saviour.”  Irresistible  grace,  and  this 
.alone,  works  the  good  in  men  :  it  “  makes  them  will  ”  ( facit  ut 
velint').  Grace  consists  essentially  in  the  inspiration  of  good 
concupiscence,  or  love.  Grace  aims  at  love  as  its  goal,  and  love 
is  crowned  with  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  These  ideas  are  mar¬ 
shaled  within  the  lines  of  the  Augustinian  doctrine  of  predesti¬ 
nation. 

The  Augustinian  character  of  Jansen’s  teaching  cannot  be 
called  in  question.  He  in  reality  simply  reproduced  Augustine. 
Yet  this  book  precipitated  a  bitter  conflict,  which  convulsed  all 
France  for  more  than  a  century.  Upon  the  suggestion  of  the 
Jesuits,  Pope  Urban  VIII.  in  A.  D.  1642  in  the  bull,  In  Emin- 
enti ,  called  attention  to  the  condemnation  of  the  doctrine  of 
Bajus,  of  which  it  declares  the  teaching  of  Jansen  to  be  a  revival. 
This  was  the  signal  for  the  strife.  Protests  were  uttered 
against  the  moral  principles  of  the  Jesuits,  the  secularized  Chris¬ 
tianity  of  the  age,  and  the  smothering  of  liberty  by  the  church. 
The  contestants  strove  with  flaming  words  and  glittering  irony, 
not  only  for  dogmatic  formulas,  but  for  the  genuine  Christian 
religion — for  the  rights  of  the  inner  life  and  personal  conviction 
(V.  g.,  Anton  Arnauld,  Blaise  Pascal).  Nevertheless,  they 
thought  it  still  possible  to  remain  good  Catholics,  and  no  attempt 
was  made  to  assail  the  infallibility  of  papal  deliverances.  Out¬ 
wardly  less  untrammeled,  and  with  a  fuller  inward  apprehension 
of  the  truth,  than  the  representatives  of  the  great  reformatory 
movement  upon  the  same  territory  in  the  fifteenth  century,  the 
Jansenists  were  at  one  with  their  predecessors  in  the  idealism 
which  thought  it  possible  to  mend  and  make  available  for  practi¬ 
cal  purposes  the  old  garment  by  sewing  upon  it  the  great  patch  of 
a  reform  conducted  upon  the  ancient  ecclesiastical  and  national 
basis.  When  this  attempt  at  the  restoration  of  the  church  with¬ 
out  tearing  down  any  part  of  her  structure  collapsed,  Jansenism 


454 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


fell  with  it ;  not,  indeed,  without  contributing  its  share  to  induce 
the  great  calamity  which  overwhelmed  its  adversary  in  the  Revo¬ 
lution. 

But  the  doctrine  of  Augustine  never  again  gained  the  ascen¬ 
dency.  Five  theses  selected  from  Jansen’s  book  by  the  Sor- 
bonne  were  condemned  by  Innocent  X.  in  the  bull,  Cum  occa- 
sione  (A.  D.  1663).  They  were  as  follows:  1.  “Some  com¬ 
mandments  of  God  are  impossible  to  righteous  men  willing  and 
striving  according  to  the  present  powers  which  they  have  :  there 
is  lacking  also  to  these  the  grace  by  which  they  would  be  made 
possible.”  2.  “  Resistance  is  never  offered  to  inward  grace  in 
the  state  of  fallen  nature.”  3.  “  For  meriting  or  demeriting  in 
the  state  of  fallen  nature,  there  is  not  required  in  man  freedom 
from  necessity,  but  freedom  from  coercion  suffices.”  4.  “  The 
Semipelagians  admitted  the  necessity  of  prevenient  inward  grace 
for  single  acts,  even  for  the  beginning  of  faith,  and  they  were 
heretics  because  they  maintained  that  this  grace  was  of  such 
a  nature  that  the  human  will  was  able  either  to  resist  it  or  to  con¬ 
form  to  it.”  5.  “  It  is  Semipelagian  to  say  that  Christ  died, 
or  shed  his  blood,  for  all  men  whatsoever.”1 

Inasmuch  as  the  Jansenists  did  not  wish  to  call  in  question  the 
papal  authority,  they  attempted  to  extricate  themselves  from 
their  embarrassing  position  by  discriminating  between  the 
“question  of  fact”  and  “the  question  of  right,”  maintaining 
that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Jansen  had  not  advocated  the  theses 
which  the  pope  thus — and  rightly — condemned.  The  com¬ 
promising  position  of  the  Jansenists  soon  brought  them  into 
further  difficulty,  as  Pope  Alexander  VII.  plainly  declared,  that 
the  five  theses  had  been  condemned  “  in  the  sense  intended  by 
the  same  Cornelius  Jansen”  (Constitut.  Ad  sand.  Petri  sedem, 
A.  D.  1665)  !  The  five  theses  remained  therefore  under  con¬ 
demnation,  and  even  the  “obsequious  silence”  observed  by 
Clement  IX.  (A.  D.  1668)  was  declared  insufficient  by  Clement 
XI.  (1705).  Port  Royal  was  destroyed,  A.  D.  1710.  The 
particulars  must  be  referred  to  Church  History. 

5.  Yet  once  again  the  embers  of  the  strife  were  rekindled. 
The  occasion  was  the  publication  by  the  Oratorian,  Paschasius 
Quesnel  (f  A.  D.  1719),  of  his  Meditations  upon  the  New 
Testament  {Le  nouveau  test,  en  frangais  avec  des  reflexions 

1  These  theses,  although  torn  from  their  context  and  therefore  difficult  to 
fully  comprehend,  no  doubt  reproduce  the  doctrine  of  Jansen.  The  first  thesis 
means  to  maintain,  that  for  each  separate  good  work  there  is  necessary  a  recep¬ 
tion  of  efficacious  grace  (gracia  eflicax).  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  also  that 
beneath  them  all  lies  as  a  premise  the  predestinarian  gratia  irresistibilis.  Cf. 
Henke,  ii.  103  f.  Reuchlin,  Port-Roy.  i.  761,  778  f. 


REVIVAL  OF  AUGUSTINIAN  DOCTRINE  OF  GRACE.  455 


morales  sur  chaque  verset').  At  the  instigation  of  the  Jesuits, 
the  notorious  constitution,  Unigenitus ,  condemned  no  fewer 
than  101  theses  of  this  biblical  commentary.  With  terrific 
directness,  not  only  the  Augustinian  theology,  but  the  entire 
structure  of  Augustinian  Christianity  was  here  condemned.  It 
is  heretical  to  teach  :  that  the  natural  man  is  only  sinful ;  that 
faith  is  a  gift  of  God ;  that  grace  is  given  only  through  faith  ; 
that  faith  is  the  first  grace,  and  the  first  grace  is  the  forgiveness 
of  sins  ;  that  grace  is  needed  for  all  good  works ;  that  grace 
works  in  us  what  God  has  commanded.1  But,  in  reality,  this 
condemnation  strikes  at  a  higher  authority  than  Augustine.  It 
is  directed,  in  the  last  instance,  against  Paul,  who  had  occa¬ 
sioned  the  Council  of  Trent  so  many  laborious  hours  (cf.  supra, 
p.  436);  for  Quesnel  was  influenced  not  only  by  Augustine,  but 
also  by  Paul  ( e .  g.,  thesis  26).  Intense  excitement  was  awak¬ 
ened  (the  Appellants  versus  the  Acceptants),  but  it  subsided 
without  result  when  compelled  to  face  the  firm  alliance  of  the 
papal  infallibility  (to  which  the  Appellants  could  at  best  submit. 

1  We  cite  a  few  of  the  most  important  theses  :  38.  “  The  sinner  is  not  free, 
except  toward  evil,  without  the  grace  of  the  Redeemer.”  62.  “  He  who- 
does  not  abstain  from  evil  except  from  fear  of  punishment,  commits  it  in  his 
heart,  and  is  already  guilty  before  God.”  48.  “  What  else  can  we  be  than 
darkness,  than  error,  than  sin — without  the  light  of  faith,  without  Christ,  and 
without  his  love  ?  ”  39.  “The  will  which  grace  has  not  anticipated  (prae- 

venit)  has  no  light  (lamp)  except  for  erring,”  etc.  29.  “Outside  of  the 
church  no  grace  is  granted.”  73.  “  What  is  the  church,  except  the  assembly 
of  the  sons  of  God,  abiding  in  his  bosom?”  74.  “  The  church,  or  the 
entire  body,  has  Christ  the  incarnate  Word  as  its  head,  but  all  the  saints  as  its 
members.”  76.  “  Nothing  is  broader  than  the  church  of  God,  since  all  the 
elect  and  righteous  of  all  ages  compose  it.”  79.  “  It  is  useful  and  necessary 
for  every  age,  every  place,  and  every  class  of  persons  to  study  and  know  the 
spirit,  piety,  and  mysteries  of  the  Holy  Scriptures.”  80.  “The  reading  of 
the  Holy  Scriptures  is  for  all.”  82.  “  The  Lord’s  day  ought  to  be  sanctified 
by  Christians  by  readings  of  piety  and,  above  all,  of  the  Holy  Scriptures.” 
85.  “  To  forbid  to  Christians  the  reading  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  especially 
of  the  gospel,  is  to  forbid  to  the  children  of  light  the  use  of  the  lamp,  and  to- 
make  them  suffer  a  kind  of  excommunication.”  69.  “  Faith,  the  practice, 
increase  and  reward  of  faith — all  is  a  gift  of  the  pure  generosity  of  God.” 
26.  “No  graces  are  given  except  through  faith.”  27.  “Faith  is  the  first 
grace  and  the  fountain  of  all  others.”  28.  “  The  first  grace  which  God  grants 
to  the  sinner  is  the  remission  of  sins.”  51.  “  Faith  justifies  when  it  works, 
but  it  does  not  work  except  through  love.”  2.  “  The  grace  of  Jesus  Christ, 
the  efficacious  source  of  every  kind  of  good,  is  necessary  for  every  good  work  • 
without  it,  not  only  is  nothing  done,  but  neither  can  anything  be  done.” 
3.  “  In  vain,  O  Lord,  dost  thou  command,  unless  thou  thyself  dost  also  give 
what  thou  commandest.”  II.  “Grace  is  nothing  else  than  the  will  of  the 
omnipotent  God,  commanding  and  effecting  what  it  commands.”  Are  not 
these  almost  literally  Augustinian  propositions  ?  And  how  remarkable  is  the 
condemnation  of  the  29th  thesis  !  To  the  naturalistic  Pelagianism  of  thisbulL 
even  Cyprian  appears  dangerous  ! 


456 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


only  against  the  protest  of  their  consciences)  with  the  influence 
of  the  court  and  the  Jesuit  interpretation  of  the  gospel.  Bene¬ 
dict  XIV.  finally  decided,  that  the  Constitution,  Unigenitus , 
must  be  regarded  as  legally  valid,  but  that  no  one  was  to  be 
persecuted  who  did  not  publicly  assail  it  (A.  D.  1756).  We  note 
here  the  intrusion  of  that  worst  of  all  the  externalizations  of  faith 
effected  by  the  Jesuits,  viz. :  the  theory  that  assent  to  dogma 
is  not  necessary,  but  silent  submission  is  sufficient.  Within  the 
whole  range  of  the  History  of  Doctrines,  there  is  no  official  docu¬ 
ment  which  so  richly  merits  condemnation  as  scandalous  as  does 
this.  And  yet  it  has  not  only  been  confirmed  by  a  great  num¬ 
ber  of  popes,  but  accepted  by  several  French  councils  and  “  by 
the  entire  Catholic  world  ”  (vid.  Denzinger,  ante  n.  1216).  It 
marks  the  definite  expulsion  of  Augustinian  piety  from  the 
official  Roman  Catholic  church. 

6.  Here  may  be  mentioned  the  dogmatization  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Immaculate  Conception  of  the  Virgin  by  Pius  IX. 
in  the  Constitution,  Inejfabilis  deus  (8.  dec.,  1854).  In  pro¬ 
portion  as  the  strict  logical  consistency  of  the  Augustinian  doc¬ 
trine  of  sin  and  grace  was  impaired,  did  it  become  possible  to 
give  to  the  doctrine  of  tne  immaculate  conception  dogmatic  au¬ 
thority,  especially  as  the  masses  of  the  populace  had  long  regarded 
Mary  as  miraculously  endowed  and  holy.  The  pope  now  pro¬ 
claimed  : 

“  We  declare,  pronounce,  and  define,  that  the  doctrine  which 
holds  that  the  most  blessed  Virgin  Mary  was  in  the  first  moment 
of  her  conception,  by  the  peculiar  grace  and  privilege  of  the 
omnipotent  God,  in  view  of  the  merits  of  Christ  Jesus  the 
Saviour  of  the  human  race,  preserved  immune  from  all  pollution 
of  original  sin,  has  been  revealed  by  God,  and  is  therefore  to  be 
firmly  and  constantly  believed  by  all  the  faithful,”  etc.  Thus, 
here  too,  a  doctrine  of  the  Scotist  and  Jesuistic  theology 
triumphed. 

§85.  Completion  of  the  Romish  Dogma  of  the  Church.  The 

Vatican  Council. 

Sources.  Planck,  Neueste  Religionsgesch.,  vol.  i.  2,  1787  ff.  V. 
Munch,  Vollst.  Sammlg.  aller  alteren  u.  neueren  Konkordate,  2  vols. , 
1830!.;  ib. ,  Gesch.  des Emser  Kongressesu.  seiner  Punktate,  1840.  Nippold, 
Handb.  d.  neuesten  KG.,  ed.  3,  vols.  i.  and  ii.  Meier,  Zur  Gesch.  d.  rom.- 
deutschen  Frage,  2  vols.,  1871-3  ;  ib.,  Febronius,  ed.  2,  1885.  H.  Schmid, 
Gesch.  d.  Kath.  Kirche  Deutschlands,  1874.  Henke,  Neuere  KG. ,  vol.  iii. 
Nielsen,  Gesch.  d.  Papstt.  im  19  Jarh.  i.,  ed.  2,  1880  ;  ib.,  Aus  dem  inneren 
Leben  d.  kath.  Kirche  im  19  Jarh.  i. ,  1882.  Friedberg,  Sammlg.  von 
Aktenstiicken  zum  Vat.  Cone.,  1872.  Die  Constitutiones  d.  Cone.,  also  in 
Denzinger,  Enchirid.  n.,  1630  ff.,  and  Mirbt,  Quellen,  p.  255  ff.  Fried¬ 
rich,  Gesch.  d.  Vat.  Cone.,  3  vols.,  1877,  1883,  1889.  Quirinus,  Rom. 


COMPLETION  OF  ROMISH  DOGMA  OF  THE  CHURCH.  457 

Briefev.  Cone.,  1870.  Acton,  Zur  Gesch.  d.  Vat.  Cone.,  1871.  Frommann, 
Gesch.  u.  Krit.  d.  Vat.  Cone.,  1872.  Janus,  Der  Papst  u.  d.  Cone.,  1871. 

1 .  The  ancient  struggle  between  the  curial  and  the  episcopal 
systems  was,  as  we  have  seen,  not  brought  to  a  conclusion  at  the 
Council  of  Trent.  The  episcopal  view  subsequently  asserted  it¬ 
self  with  great  energy  in  both  France  and  Germany.  The  in¬ 
consistencies,  which  had  always  been  involved  in  this  view  (vid. 
supra,  p.  446),  were  even  now  not  eliminated.  Despite  the  re¬ 
sort  to  rationalistic  and  illuministic  principles  in  support  of  it, 
the  advocates  of  the  episcopacy  did  not  yet  venture  to  draw  the 
final  conclusions  to  which  their  theory  logically  pointed.  In  the 
nineteenth  century,  it  was  definitely  vanquished. 

In  France,  under  Louis  XIV. ,  the  Declaration  du  clerge  de 
France  had  plainly  asserted  the  liberties  of  the  Gallican  church. 
It  contains  the  following  propositions  :  i.  “  The  power  of  Peter 
and  his  successors  extends  only  to  spiritual,  but  not  to  secular 
and  temporal  things,  so  that  in  matters  of  the  latter  kind  princes 
are  in  no  way  subject  to  the  spiritual  government.”  2.  The 
“full  power  ( plena potestas')  of  spiritual  things”  inheres  in  the 
popes  in  such  a  way  that  at  the  same  time  the  decrees  of  tne 
Council  of  Constance,  “  upon  the  authority  of  the  general  coun¬ 
cils,”  recognized  by  the  popes  and  the  entire  church,  also  remain 
in  force.  3.  The  papal  power  is,  therefore,  to  be  circumscribed  : 
“  The  rules,  customs,  and  institutions  adopted  by  the  Gallican 
kingdom  and  church  are  also  valid.”  4.  “  In  questions  of  faith 
also,  the  chief  parts  belong  to  the  supreme  pontiff,  and  his  de¬ 
crees  pertain  to  all  churches  and  every  church  ;  nevertheless,  his 
decision  is  not  irreversible  ( irreformabile )  unless  the  consensus 
of  the  church  shall  have  been  added  to  it  ”  (in  Mirbt,  209  f. ). 

These  articles  were  at  various  times  condemned  at  the  instiga¬ 
tion  of  Rome.  Louis  XIV.  did  not  dare  to  maintain  them  with¬ 
out  modifications.  It  was  Napoleon  I.  who,  in  A.  D.  1810,  made 
them  a  part  of  the  civil  law.  But  since  he,  without  regard  to  the 
French  episcopate,  in  the  Concordat  of  A.  D.  1801,  combined 
with  the  pope  in  regulating  the  affairs  of  the  French  church,  he 
in  reality  brought  the  latter  again  under  the  dominion  of  the 
pope.  The  despot  used  the  pope  for  the  furtherance  of  his 
own  plans  (“if  there  had  not  been  a  pope,  we  would  have  had 
to  invent  one  ’  ’ ),  but  he  incidentally  increased  the  latter’s  power. 

2.  In  Germany,  the  suffragan,  Nicholas  of  Hontheim,  in 
Treves,  impressively  advocated  the  episcopalistic  theory  in  his 
work  published  under  the  pseudonym,  Febronius,  De  statu 
ecclesiae  et  legitima  potestate  Romani  pontificis ,  .  .  .  Bullioni , 
1763d '  All  the  apostles,  he  maintained,  were  on  an  equality, 
and  all  were  entrusted  with  the  same  power  of  the  keys.  The 


458 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


bishops  have  their  authority  directly  from  Christ.  The  papal 
primacy  dare  not  claim  to  exceed  that  of  Peter  himself.  The 
papacy  is  designed  only  to  serve  for  the  promotion  of  church 
order.  It  is  not  the  pope,  but  the  general  council,  which  repre¬ 
sents  the  church.  The  pope  is  subordinate  to  the  whole  council, 
and  is  merely  on  a  parity  with  its  separate  members.  These 
principles,  it  was  held,  must  be  carried  out  with  all  energy. 

Occasion  was  given  for  the  practical  application  of  these  ideas 
by  the  controversy  in  regard  to  the  nunciatures.  A  part  of  the 
episcopal  functions  had  been  unlawfully  assigned  to  the  papal 
nuncios. 1  When  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  now  applied  for  a  nuncio, 
the  archbishops  of  Cologne,  Mayence,  Treves,  and  Salzburg  at¬ 
tempted  to  break  the  curial  system.  Their  representatives  pre¬ 
pared  at  Ems  the  so-called  “Punctation  of  Ems”  (vid.  Von 
Munch,  Emser  Kongr.,  103  ff. ).  In  this  it  is  acknowledged  that 
the  pope  is  ‘  ‘  the  chief-overseer  and  primate  of  the  whole  church — 
the  central  point  of  her  unity,  and  endowed  by  God  with  the 
jursidiction  requisite  to  this  end.”  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
bishops  are  the  immediate  successors  of  the  apostles,  and  hold 
directly  from  Christ  the  power  to  bind  and  loose  and  te  make 
laws,  as  well  as  to  grant  dispensations  from  the  latter  (<?.  in 
regard  to  hindrances  to  marriage).  Romish  bulls  and  breviaries 
are  therefore  valid  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  acknowledged  by 
the  bishops.  By  these  principles,  the  ground  is  torn  from  beneath 
the  nunciatures. 

But  Bavaria  persevered  in  her  request,  and  the  pope  in  his 
claims.  The  attempt  to  exalt  the  episcopacy  based  upon  divine 
right  above  the  primacy  based  only  upon  human  appointment 
was  met  by  Rome  with  the  exaltation  of  faith  in  the  divine  right 
of  the  papacy  :  “  And  that  this  is  the  power  of  primacy,  which 
he  holds  by  divine  right  in  order  that  he  may  outrank  other 
bishops,  not  only  in  the  degree  of  honor,  but  also  in  the  fullness 
of  supreme  power.”  The  theory,  that  Christ  gave  to  all  the 
apostles  equal  authority,  and  that  all  bishops  have  the  same  claim 
as  the  pope  to  participation  in  the  government  of  the  church,  is 
rejected  as  folly  (vid.  the  brief,  Super  soliditate,  1786,  in  Denzin- 
ger,  n.  1363). 2  The  old  title  of  Peter  as  the  rock  did  good 
service  also  in  this  modern  age. 

3.  It  must  be  noticed,  finally,  that  at  the  Synod  of  Pistoja 
(A.  D.  1786),  under  the  leadership  of  Recci,  a  reform  program 

1  Vid.  Meier,  Die  Propaganda,  ihre  Provinzen  und  ihr  Recht,  ii.  i8off. 
The  Nunciatures  are  the  incorporated  claims  of  the  curial  system,  in  which  the 
latter,  against  law  and  order,  seeks  to  encroach  upon  the  episcopal  jurisdiction. 

2  The  brief  condemns  the  book  of  Eybel,  “  Was  ist  der  Papst  ?  ”  1782.  Cf. 
Kirchenlex.  iv. ,  ed.  2,  1152  f. 


COMPLETION  OF  ROMISH  DOGMA  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


was  prepared,  which  also  included  a  recognition  of  episcopal  prin¬ 
ciples.  But  the  constitution,  Auctorem  jidei  (A.  D.  1794),  con¬ 
demned,  in  connection  with  the  whole  program,  particularly  the 
theses  :  4  4  That  the  Roman  pontifex  is  the  ministerial  head  ;  7  ’ 
44  that  the  bishop  has  received  from  Christ  all  necessary  rights 
for  the  good  government  of  his  diocese  ;  ”  44  that  the  rights  of 
the  bishop,  received  from  Jesus  Christ  for  the  governing  of  the 
church,  can  neither  be  altered  nor  impeded”  (Denzinger,  n. 
1366,  1369,  1371).  The  French  Revolution  at  this  point  dis¬ 
tracted  the  growing  interest  in  these  plans,  associated  as  they  were 
with  the  general  movement  of  the  Illumination. 

4.  On  the  other  hand,  the  conditions  prevailing  in  the  age  of 
the  Restoration  were  as  favorable  as  possible  for  the  papacy. 
Talented  advocates  arose  for  its  defense,  who  skillfully  directed 
the  thought  of  the  age,  impressed,  as  it  now  was,  with  its  need 
of  authority,  toward  Christianity,  identifying  Christianity  at  the 
same  time  indissolubly  with  the  papacy.  The  kingdom  of  the 
devil  must  be  destroyed  and  the  old  order  of  things  restored. 
Two  citations  may  serve  to  exhibit  the  spirit  in  which  this  pro¬ 
gram  was  carried  out :  44  If  it  were  permitted  to  establish  degrees 
of  importance  among  the  things  of  divine  institution,  I  would 
place  the  hierarchy  before  the  dogma,  so  much  is  it  indispensable 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  faith  ”  (de  Maistre).  44  The  company 
of  the  devil  cannot  but  recoil  before  the  company  of  Jesus” 
(Ronald).  With  the  open  and  sinister  reactionary  ecclesiastical 
tendencies  was  combined  a  romantic  enthusiasm  for  the  rock  of 
Peter,  which  had  defied  the  storms  of  the  Reformation  and  the 
floods  of  the  Illumination,  and  a  deep  interest  in  the  political 
reaction.  It  was  imagined  that  these  drifts  of  sentiment  might 
now  be  encouraged  without  danger,  since  the  Illumination  had 
ensured  absolute  security  against  all  Romish  attempts.  This  was 
a  sad  mistake.  At  scarcely  any  period  since  the  great  days  of 
the  Middle  Ages  has  the  Curia  ever  displayed  such  a  susceptibil¬ 
ity  to  the  whole  course  of  events,  such  a  ready  adaptation  in 
tactics  and  in  speech,  such  zeal  in  well-considered  action — as  in 
the  past  century.  The  results  are  clearly  manifest.  The  con¬ 
cordats,  for  which  Napoleon  had  set  the  example,  and  which 
were  from  A.  D.  1816  concluded  with  many  states,  subjected 
the  church  to  the  pope  as  her  lord.  Their  significance  consisted 
less  in  that  which  they  contained  than  in  the  fact  that  they  were 
concluded,  and  that,  too,  with  the  pope  directly,  without  any 
recognition  of  the  bishops.  The  course  of  action  deliberately 
chosen  by  the  curia  with  a  view  to  the  achievement  of  the  end  in 
view  was  acquiesced  in  by  the  states  and  nations.  No  more  is 
henceforth  to  be  heard  of  the  episcopalistic  ideas  of  reform  which 


460 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


agitated  so  many  minds  before  the  Revolution.  Curialism  has 
triumphed. 

5.  The  Vatican  Council  (1869-70)  really  did  no  more  than 
give  dogmatic  form  to  the  conquest  thus  long  before  achieved. 
There  was  at  the  outset  laid  before  the  council  an  outline  of  the 
faith  ( Schema  de  fide ).  This  was  approved  April  24th,  1870 
(vid.  Mirbt,  Papsturkunden,  p.  255  ff.  Denzinger,  n.  1630  ff. ). 
This  summary  contains  nothing  new.  In  opposition  to  Ration¬ 
alism  and  Naturalism,  the  pope  declares  with  the  assent  of  the  bish¬ 
ops,1  ‘  ‘  relying  upon  the  word  of  God  written  and  handed  down,  ’  ’ 
what  is  the  true  doctrine.  First  of  all,  God —  ‘  ‘  an  entirely  simple 
and  unchangeable  spiritual  subsistence  ” — is  acknowledged  as 
the  Creator  and  Ruler  of  the  world  (ses.  3,  c.  1).  Secondly,  it  is 
taught,  that  God  has  revealed  himself.  This  revelation  “is 
contained  in  written  books  and  traditions  without  writing.  ” 
The  latter  come  from  Christ  or  the  apostles  ;  the  former  em¬ 
brace  the  books  approved  at  the  Council  of  Trent,  which  are  to 
be  found  in  the  Vulgata.  These  books  are  canonical,  not 
because  they  contain  the  revelation  without  error,  “  but  for  this 
reason,  that,  written  by  inspiration  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  they  have 
God  as  their  author,  and,  as  such,  they  have  been  handed  down 
to  the  church.”  The  church  establishes  the  meaning  of  the 
Scriptures  :  “That  is  to  be  considered  as  the  true  sense  of  the 
Sacred  Scriptures,  which  the  holy  Mother,  the  church,  whose  office 
it  is  to  judge  concerning  the  true  sense  and  interpretation  of  the 
Holy  Scriptures,  has  held  and  holds  ”  (c.  2). 2  To  this  revela¬ 
tion  we  are  to  render  obedience  in  faith:  “We  are  under 
obligation  to  render  obedience  of  intellect  and  will  in  faith.” 
Faith  consists  in  this  :  “  that  we,  the  grace  of  God  inspiring  and 
assisting,  believe  the  things  revealed  by  him  to  be  true.  ’  ’  This 
“  assensus  ”  pertains  to  all  things  “  which  are  contained  in  the 
written  or  handed-down  word  of  God,  and  which  are  by  the 
church,  either  by  solemn  decision  or  in  her  ordinary  and  uni¬ 
versal  ministrations,  pronounced  worthy  to  be  believed  as 
divinely  revealed  ”  (c.  3). 

6.  But  these  were  merely  incidental  matters.  More  and  more 
plainly  the  real  object  had  in  view  by  the  curia  and  a  consider¬ 
able  number  of  the  members  of  the  council  was  revealed.  The 

1  Ses.  3,  c.  1  :  “The  bishops  of  the  whole  world,  assembled  to  this, 
ecumenical  synod  by  our  authority  in  the  Holy  Spirit,  sitting  and  judging  with 
us  ” — these  words,  as  indeed  the  very  superscription  of  the  “  Constitution  :  ” 
“Bishop  Pius,  servant  of  the  servants  of  God,  the  holy  council  approving,” 
assume  as  granted  the  curial  conception. 

2  Vid.  this  view  of  inspiration  and  the  interpretation  of  Scripture  also  in  the 
apostolic  circular  letter  of  Leo  XIII.  (A.  D.  1894),  in  Mirbt,  Quellen, 
p.  280. 


COMPLETION  OF  ROMISH  DOGMA  OF  THE  CHURCH.  46 1 

pope  was,  in  a  formal  address,  requested  to  present  a  paper  upon 
the  Infallible  Authority  of  the  Pope.  A  smaller  party  made 
some  opposition,  expressing  themselves  no  opinion  upon  the 
subject,  but  pronouncing  the  definition  of  the  new  dogma  as 
inopportune  and  ill-timed.  The  pope  “  felt  ”  his  infallibility.1 
An  appendix  upon  the  infallibility  was  added  to  the  outline 
previously  presented  to  the  delegates  (in  Friedberg,  Akten- 
stiicke,  p.  572).  What  difference  did  it  make,  that  the  public 
opinion  of  Europe  arose  in  amazement  against  the  new  dogma : 
that  the  anti-infallibilists  assailed  the  document  before  them  with 
well-grounded  arguments;  that  they  besought  the  pope  to  with¬ 
draw  or  modify  the  passages  in  question  in  the  new  paper  laid 
before  the  Council  on  May  10th  ?  The  pope  held  to  his  opin¬ 
ion.  The  Infallibilists  produced  a  mass  of  arguments — some 
of  them  most  astonishing — for  their  theory.2  Many  of  its  oppon¬ 
ents  left  the  city.  On  July  18th,  the  vote  was  taken,  of  the  535 
bishops  present  only  two  voting  “  Non  placet.” 

The  constitution,  Pastor  aeiernus ,  defines  the  new  dogma.  In 
order  that  there  might  be  one  episcopate,  and  that  the  multitude 
of  believers  might  by  it  be  held  together  in  harmony,  Christ 
placed  Peter  above  the  other  apostles  :  ‘  ‘  In  him  he  established 
both  a  perpetual  source  of  unity  and  a  visible  foundation  upon 
whose  stability  should  be  constructed  the  eternal  temple” 
(Pref. ).  The  “  primacy  of  jurisdiction  over  the  universal 
church  of  Christ  ’  ’  was  imparted  by  Christ  directly  and  imme¬ 
diately  to  Peter  and  to  Peter  alone.  It  conflicts  with  the  teach¬ 
ings  of  the  Scriptures  to  say  that  “  this  same  primacy  was  con¬ 
ferred,  not  immediately  and  directly  upon  the  blessed  Peter  him¬ 
self,  but  upon  the  church,  and  through  it  upon  him  as  a  minister 
of  this  church”  (c.  1).  This  power  has  passed  from  Peter 
upon  his  successors  :  “  Whence  whoever  succeeds  in  this  chair 
of  Peter,  he,  according  to  the  institution  of  Christ  himself, 
obtains  the  primacy  over  the  universal  church  ”  (c.  2  ) .  Accord¬ 
ing  to  this  doctrine,  which  is  demanded  by  the  Scriptures  and 
tradition,  the  pope — as  the  Florentine  decretal  has  taught —  is  to  be 
recognized  as  the  successor  of  the  prince  of  the  Apostles,  “  the 

1  Cf.  his  declarations  :  “As  for  infallibility,  being  the  priest  Mastai,  I 
always  believed  it  ;  now,  being  the  pope  Mastai,  I  feel  it;”  and  with  this, 
his  pendant  to  the  well-known  saying  of  Louis  XIV. :  “  The  tradition  I  am  ” 
(Quirinus,  p.  107,  555). 

2  Among  the  “proofs”  were  the  passages,  Lk.  22.  32  ;  Iren.  iii.  3  ;  the 
title,  Vicar  of  Christ ;  the  fact  that  Peter  was  crucified  with  his  head  down¬ 
ward,  his  head  thus  bearing  the  burden  of  his  body  ;  that  Peter  himself 
in  Sicily  claimed  for  himself  infallibility ;  and  that  Mary,  being  asked, 
declared  that  Christ  had  indeed  granted  this  plenary  authority  to  Peter.  Vid. 
Quirinus,  p.  412  ff. 


462 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


true  vicar  of  Christ  and  head  of  the  whole  church  and  father 
and  teacher  ( pater  et  doctor')  of  all  Christians.  ’  ’  To  him  belongs 
the  actual  “  power  of  jurisdiction”  ( potestas  jurisdictionis). 
This  power  is  “  ordinary  ”  and  “  immediate,”  and  extends  to 
every  single  believer,  i.  e.,  the  pope  exercises  such  power,  not 
only  in  special  cases  as  a  last  resort,  but  he  can  employ  it  at  all 
times  and  under  all  circumstances.  It  is  a  “  truly  episcopal  ” 
power,  inasmuch  as  the  pope  is  authorized  to  perform  all  episco¬ 
pal  functions  in  all  places.  Every  individual  is  therefore  bound 
to  render  direct  obedience  to  the  ordinances  of  the  pope  in  all 
things  affecting  faith  and  life,  or  the  discipline  and  government 
of  the  church:  “This  is  the  doctrine  of  Catholic  truth,  from 
which  no  one  can  deviate  without  forfeiting  faith  and  salvation.” 
The  pope  is  the  supreme  judge  of  believers  (the  faithful).  It  is 
an  error  to  desire  to  appeal  from  his  decision  to  a  council  as  a 
higher  authority  (c.  3).  The  popes  have  always  been  acknowl¬ 
edged  as  the  supreme  authority  in  matters  of  faith.  A  “  char- 
ism  of  never-failing  truth  and  faith  ’  ’  has  been  bestowed  upon 
Peter  and  his  followers,  in  order  that  the  church  may  remain 
free  from  error  and  the  pure  doctrine  be  preserved  in  power. 
Since  in  our  time  many  oppose  this  authority,  the  new  dogma 
is,  for  the  glory  of  God  and  the  salvation  of  the  nations,  formu¬ 
lated  as  follows : 

“Therefore  we  .  .  .  the  holy  council  approving,  teach  and 
declare  to  be  divinely  revealed  the  dogma  :  That  the  Roman 
pontiff,  when  he  speaks  from  the  chair  ( ex  cathedra ),  that  is,  when 
he,  exercising  the  office  of  pastor  and  teacher  of  all  Christians 
by  virtue  of  his  supreme  apostolic  authority,  defines  the  doctrine 
concerning  faith  or  morals  (  fide  vet moribus )  which  is  to  be  held  by 
the  universal  church,  he  acts,  through  the  divine  assistance  prom¬ 
ised  to  the  blessed  Peter  himself,  with  that  infallibility  by  which 
the  divine  Redeemer  wished  his  church  to  be  instructed  in  the 
defining  of  doctrine  concerning  faith  and  morals  ;  and  therefore 
the  definitions  of  such  Roman  pontiff  are  ofi  themselves ,  but  not 
by  virtue  of  the  co?isent  of  the  church  f  beyond  revision  ( irre - 
formabiles) .  If  anyone  (which  may  God  prevent)  shall  presume 
to  contradict  this  our  definition,  let  him  be  anathema”  (c.  4). 

7.  The  excitement  caused  by  the  Vatican  Council  subsided 
within  a  remarkably  short  period.  A  small  party  of  pious  Idealists 
protested  vigorously,  but  few  listened  to  them.  There  was  no  op¬ 
portunity  for  a  popular  demonstration  upon  the  part  of  Old  Cath- 

1  The  words:  “  non  autem  ex  consensu  ecclesiae ,n  which  in  as  crass  a 
form  as  possible  express  the  personal  infallibility,  were  not  placed  before  the 
council  until  July  15th  (Friedrich,  Documenta  ad  illustr.  cone.  Vat.  ii. 
318). 


COMPLETION  OF  ROMISH  DOGMA  OF  THE  CHURCH.  463 

olicism.  The  unexampled  rapidity  with  which  the  aims  of  the 
council  were  secured  may  be  understood  when  we  remember  that 
the  whole  world  had  long  since  become  accustomed  to  think  of  the 
pope  as  the  legitimate  lord  of  the  Roman  Catholic  church,  and 
that  the  very  ancient  claims  of  the  popes  to  be  the  bearers  of 
divine  truth  had  ever  since  the  days  of  the  Counter-reformation 
been  constantly  gaining  a  firmer  foothold  in  Catholic  circles. 
That  which  in  the  days  of  the  reform-councils  would  have  ap¬ 
peared  inconceivable  could  become  a  reality  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century — the  acknowledgment  of  the  infallibility  of  the  pope  as 
over  against  and  superior  to  that  of  the  council.  The  Vatican 
Council  caused  but  little  excitement  in  the  church  because  it  pro¬ 
duced  nothing  new.  But  there  was  also  another  reason.  The 
influence  of  Jesuitical  teaching  had  long  since  dissipated  the 
interest  of  the  Catholic  masses  in  doctrine  as  such.  Their  atti¬ 
tude  toward  the  dogmas  of  the  church  was  very  largely  the  same 
as  toward  the  Scriptures — they  have  them  as  though  they  had 
them  not.  Obedient  submission  to  the  formulas,  i.  <?. ,  refraining 
from  criticism  of  them,  is  sufficient.  Or,  the  dogmas  might  be 
used  for  an  ascetic  disparagement  of  the  “reason.”  But  the 
real  sources  of  religious  life  do  not,  for  the  Roman  Catholic 
masses,  lie  in  the  realm  of  doctrine.  Sacraments  and  good 
works,  relics  and  scapularies,  the  sacrifice  of  the  mass  and  all 
kinds  of  holy  water,  the  mother  of  God  with  her  appearances 
and  her  adoration,  the  worship  of  the  heart  of  Jesus  and  that  of 
the  Virgin,1  etc. — bring  grace  and  regulate  the  intercourse  of  the 
soul  with  God.  The  most  of  these  customs  could  not  well  stand 
the  test  of  dogmatic  authorization.  But  there  was  no  need  of 
this  as  long  as  the  dogma  and  the  church  but  left  room  for  them. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  it  was  only  at  the  Council  of  Trent 
— and  then  only  under  the  pressure  of  the  opposition  of  the 
Protestant  church  and  its  Augustana — that  Roman  Catholicism 
secured  any  consistent  system  of  ecclesiastical  doctrine.  It  is, 
therefore,  not  difficult  to  understand  that,  now  that  the  strain  of 
the  conflict  has  been  moderated  by  time,  the  church  should  gradu¬ 
ally  sink  back  into  the  medieval  forms,  although  a  somewhat  differ¬ 
ent  shading  may  be  given  by  the  influence  of  Jesuit  skill  upon  the 
character  and  temper  of  the  modern  church  life.  In  the  Orien¬ 
tal  churches,  dogma  has  become  a  mystery  and  a  relic  (supra, 
Vol.  I.,  p.  306);  the  mystagogy  of  worship  is  to  produce  life. 
In  the  West,  it  has  become  chiefly  a  means  for  discipline  and  an 
incentive  to  obedience ;  but — at  least  in  the  present  age — it  ap- 

1  Vid.  esp.  Reusch,  Die  deutschen  BischSfe  u.  der  Aberglaube,  1879. 
For  Italy  material  is  furnished  in  Trede,  Das  Heidentumin  der  kath.-Kirche, 
1889  ff. 


464 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


pears  to  represent  as  little  vital  influence  in  the  church  as  in  the 
Middle  Ages.  And  yet  the  Roman  Catholic  church  has  of  late 
again — not  without  some  effort — urged  the  study  of  Thomas  and 
prescribed  it  as  a  panacea.  Truly  it  is  possible  to  adorn  the 
graves  of  the  prophets  without  catching  their  spirit !  But  no 
one  can  deny  that,  even  in  Catholic  theology,  the  spirit  of  serious 
labor  and  earnest  effort  has  not  died  out.  Are  there  still  lurk¬ 
ing  here  the  elements  which  are  yet  to  infuse  into  Roman  Cathol¬ 
icism  the  “  principle  of  progress”  (Schell)?  Shall  scientific 
culture — as  Thomas  understood  it — or  shall  the  ecclesiasticism  of 
the  Ultramontanes  assume  the  spiritual  leadership  in  the  further 
doctrinal  development  of  Roman  Catholism  ? 


Be  that  as  it  may,  the  Protestant  student  of  the  History  of 
Doctrines  cannot  turn  from  the  subject  without  calling  attention 
to  the  different  conception  of  Dogma  which  prevails  in  his  own 
church  as  contrasted  with  the  positions  which  the  churches  of  the 
East  and  of  Rome  have  finally  assigned  to  their  dogmatic  utter¬ 
ances.  It  was  the  church  of  the  “pure  doctrine  ”  which  made 
Dogma  again  a  vital  and  powerful  factor  in  history.  Luther  put  new 
life  into  the  ancient  dogma.  It  had  become  a  toy  of  theology ; 
he  made  it  a  sword  of  the  Spirit.  The  ideas  embodied  in  divine 
revelation,  not  mysticism  nor  magic,  are  to  give  birth  and  guid- 
ance  to  the  church  of  the  gospel.  “  Doctrine  ”  and  “  dogma  ” 
have  their  source  in  the  ideas  grasped  by  faith.  The  evangelical 
church  as  such  cannot  sink  into  “  undogmatic  Christianity”  — 
there  is  always  in  the  individual  soul  an  eternal  “  undogmatic  ” 
life — without  losing  its  very  life.  But  while  the  church  clings 
steadfastly  to  her  doctrine,  she  does  it,  and  must  ever  do  it,  in 
the  spirit  of  Luther.  This  will  mean  :  ( 1 )  That  the  dogma 
which  she  proclaims,  and  which  regulates  her  preaching,  must  be 
the  evangelical  doctrine  of  salvation.  Her  doctrines  must  find 
their  source  in  the  redemption  which  is  in  Christ,  and  their  goal 
must  be  faith  in  Christ.  They  must  be  from  faith  and  for  faith. 
The  significance  of  this  may  be  most  clearly  seen  in  the  teach¬ 
ings  of  Luther  himself,  above  all  in  the  manifest  relation  of  his 
interpretation  of  the  Creed  to  the  Creed  itself.  (2)  That  the 
evangelical  church  must  always  continue  to  labor  upon  her  dog¬ 
matic  statements,  always  ready — not  only  in  principle  and  in  word 
— to  prove  and  improve  them  upon  the  basis  of  the  divine  revela¬ 
tion  given  in  the  Scriptures.  From  this  it  follows,  (3)  That  the 
evangelical  church  highly  values  a  free  theology,  in  the  assured 
conviction  that  such  a  theology  has  a  vital  function  to  perform  in 


COMPLETION  OF  ROMISH  DOGMA  OF  THE  CHURCH. 


the  church  of  the  pure  doctrine.  The  immense  accumulations  of 
dogmatic  tradition  will  otherwise  rest  heavily  upon  her,  as  upon 
the  Romish  and  the  Oriental  churches.  She  cannot  pass  around 
this  mountain  by  any  arts  of  interpretation  or  of  silence,  but  must 
surmount  it.  It  is  true,  life  itself  will  here  silently  and  unob¬ 
served  accomplish  much.  The  course  of  the  ages  alters  the  accen¬ 
tuation  placed  upon  various  parts  of  the  traditional  doctrinal 
structure.  Some  members  of  the  organism  become  rudimentary 
and  others  attain  fuller  development.  But  all  of  this  will  not 
suffice.  If  evangelical  theology  is  not  to  become  merely  an  epi¬ 
sode  of  the  “  History  of  Religion,”  if  it  is  to  remain  a.11  eccle¬ 
siastical  science — and  who  will  seriously  doubt  that  it  shall  sore- 
main  ? — then  must  it  in  the  future,  as  in  the  past,  recognize  its 
calling  to  study  the  treasures  of  tradition  with  all  the  means 
which  God  has  given  to  man,  with  all  the  watchfulness  and  keen 
criticism  which  the  importance  of  the  subject  demands  (biblical 
and  historical  theology),  and,  upon  the  basis  of  this  earnest  and 
conscientious  study,  seek  the  forms  and  formulas  which  the  age 
may  require  for  a  proper  comprehension  of  the  gospel  (syste¬ 
matic  theology).  The  “  ancient  truth”  remains;  the  method 
of  presenting  it  will  change,  as  it  has  constantly  changed  in  the 
past.  From  this  may  be  readily  understood  the  entirely  different 
attitude  which  the  Protestant — Luther  himself  being  an  illustri¬ 
ous  example — assumes  toward  the  dogma  of  the  church  from  that 
which  the  Roman  Catholic  must  hold.  Even  the  thought  of  a 
“new  dogma  ”  has  for  him — however  fully  he  may  realize  the 
immense  historical  difficulties  which  such  a  proposition  would 
have  to  face,  since  all  the  forms  of  the  church’s  life  are  attached 
to  the  ancient  dogma1 — nothing  repulsive  in  principle,  so  long 
and  in  so  far  as  this  should  be  a  true  expression  of  the  divine 
revelation  in  the  Scriptures. 

But  against  one  stupendous  error  must  the  spirit  of  the  Protes¬ 
tant  world  be  ever  scrupulously  upon  its  guard,  viz. :  the  delu¬ 
sion  so  readily  embraced  by  the  ecclesiastical  politician,  that 
sufficient  honor  has  been  accorded  to  the  dogma  of  the  church 
when  it  is  publicly  confessed  and  silence  maintained  as  to  the 
points  in- which  it  contradicts  the  convictions  personally  held.  We 
may  in  our  day  hear  voices  openly  raised  in  defense  even  of  the 
ancient  delusion  of  66  implicit  faith.  ’  ’  The  principles  above  stated 
protest  with  united  voice  against  this  thoroughly  unevangelical 
position,  and  the  protest  is  abundantly  confirmed  by  the  History 
of  Doctrines.2  What  we  Protestants  need  is  a  living  and  life- 

1  Cf.,  e.  g .,  Lasson,  Zur  Theorie  des  Dogmas,  1897,  p.  18  ff.,  100  f.,  112, 
120. 

2  The  demand  might  at  this  point  be  made,  that  the  History  of  Doctrines 

3° 


466 


HISTORY  OF  DOCTRINES. 


producing,  an  intelligible  and  convincing  system  of  doctrine 
(dogma) — not  a  relic  of  the  past  nor  a  manual  of  ascetic  prac¬ 
tices  (supra,  463,  430).  Such  a  system  of  doctrine  the  evan¬ 
gelical  church  possesses  in  the  ancient  symbols  and  the  Confes¬ 
sion  of  the  Reformation.  To  comprehend  and  give  proper  ex¬ 
pression  to  the  religious  depth  and  the  wealth  of  practical  sug¬ 
gestion  of  these  inherited  treasures,  with  unhesitating  return,  if 
need  be,  to  the  ideas  of  the  original  sources  of  evangelical  truth 
— the  ritornar  al  segno — is  the  task  of  the  Protestant  theology 
of  the  present,  and,  in  a  measure  also,  of  the  History  of  Doctrines. 

should  trace  the  development  of  Christian  teaching  down  to  the  present  time 
(cf.  the  works  of  Baur  and  Hagenbach  upon  the  subject,  and  Kruger  : 
Was  heisst  and  zu  welchem  Zweck  studirt  man  DG.  ?  1895).  But,  although 
the  possibility  of  thus  extending  the  scope  of  the  History  of  Doctrines  must  be 
granted,  yet  we  must  maintain  also  the  scientific  propriety  of  the  presentation 
of  the  publicly  acknowledged  and  binding  statements  of  the  church’s  official 
doctrine.  It  is  a  historical  fact,  to  be  recognized  by  the  historian — whether  or 
not  it  be  in  accord  with  his  own  preferences — that  the  church  of  the  present 
knows  and  acknowledges  such  a  public  doctrine  ( doctrine  publica,').  Our 
position  is  confirmed  by  the  consideration,  that  in  any  such  “  History  of 
Modern  Theology”  there  would  be  lacking  the  organic  principle  of  the  proper 
History  of  Doctrines,  viz. :  the  relation  of  the  views  therein  delineated  to  the 
Dogma  of  the  future  ;  for  who  shall  to-day  venture  to  say  which  of  the  nega¬ 
tions  and  affirmations,  which  of  the  buttressing  arguments  and  destructive 
criticisms,  which  of  the  omissions  and  supplements  registered  in  the  progres¬ 
sive  history  of  theology,  shall  lead  to  the  completer  Dogma  of  the  future  ?  The 
history  of  theology  may  be  represented  as  the  history  of  the  varying  experiences 
of  Dogma;  but  to  attempt  to  treat  it  as  “Prolegomena  to  any  and  every 
future”  dogma  is  a  most  indefinite  and  uncertain  task.  The  writing  of  a  his¬ 
tory  of  modern  theology — when  one  considers  the  state  of  the  investigations 
which  must  necessarily  precede  such  delineation — is  in  itself  an  undertaking 
sufficiently  great,  without  the  complication  of  keeping  ever  in  mind  the  relation 
of  the  theological  views  of  the  present  to  the  yet  unknown  official  statements  of 
the  future. 

Finally,  even  a  history  of  the  Union  (cf.  Loofs,  DG.  462  f . )  does  not,  in 
my  opinion,  strictly  speaking,  lie  within  the  province  of  the  History  of  Doc¬ 
trines  ;  for  the  Union,  as  known  to  history,  did  not  effect  any  transformation 
or  reconstruction  of  the  dogmas  of  the  church.  The  original  aim  to  accomplish 
something  of  this  character  spent  its  force  in  a  comparatively  short  time.  Cf. 
the  decree  of  the  Cabinet,  February  28,  1S34:  “The  Union  indicates  and 
effects  no  surrender  of  the  previous  confession  of  faith,  nor  is  the  authority 
which  has  been  hitherto  enjoyed  by  the  confessional  writings  of  the  two  evan¬ 
gelical  confessions  destroyed  by  it.  Adherence  to  it  is  merely  an  exhibition 
of  the  spirit  of  moderation  and  mildnes's,”  etc.  The  details  of  the  move¬ 
ment  lie  within  the  sphere  of  Symbolics. 


INDEX. 


A. 

Abelard,  estimate  of,  56,  57  f. ,  62, 
64,  96,  98,  100  n.,  185  ;  opposi¬ 
tion  to,  60  ;  on  reason,  faith,  tra¬ 
dition,  Scriptures,  58 ;  Trinity,  58  f. ; 
sacraments,  59,  72,  79  ;  knowl¬ 
edge,  60  ;  person  of  Christ,  64, 155  ; 
atonement,  70,  no;  love,  71  ; 
Lord’s  Supper,  77  n.;  repentance, 
81  f. ;  contrition,  forgiveness,  81  ; 
confession,  81,  92  n.;  purgatory, 
81  ;  satisfaction,  82  ;  communion 
of  saints,  144. 

Ability,  human.  In  Gregory,  21  f . ; 
Semi-Augustinians,  32  f. ;  Thomas, 
118  f. ;  Bonaventura,  ]  20  ;  Biel, 
138;  Duns,  159;  Bradwardina, 
207  ;  Luther,  243  f.,  256  ;  Zwingli, 
3X3  ;  Augsburg  Confession,  335  ; 
Melanchthon,  349 ;  Synergistic 
controversy,  367  f. ;  Formula  of 
Concord,  383  ;  Calvin,  399  ;  Armi- 
nius,  421  ;  Remonstrants,  422  ; 
Amyraldus,  425  ;  Council  of  Trent, 
433  f-5  Quesnel,  455  n. 

Absolution.  In  Gregory,  24  ;  Early 
Middle  Ages,  44  ;  Hugo,  82,  92  ; 
Pullus,  83  ;  Lombard,  83,  92 ; 
Gratian,  92  ;  Council  of  Treves, 
92  n. ;  Thomas,  Duns,  137  f . ; 
Bonaventura,  137  f. ,  142  n.;  Du¬ 
rand,  142  n.;  John  of  Baltz,  176  ; 
Wessei,  210  ;  Luther,  234,  240  ; 
Augsburg  Confession,  342  ;  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Trent,  438,  442,  444. 

Acceptants.  In  Unigenitus  contro¬ 
versy,  455. 


Adiaphora,  388. 

Adiaphoristic  controversy,  364. 

Adoptionist  controversy,  27  f. 

Advent,  Second,  344. 

Aegidius  of  Colonna,  works  of,  187  ; 
on  sin  and  grace,  187  ;  immaculate 
conception,  188  n. 

Aepinus.  On  descent  into  hell,  377. 

Agobard,  works  of,  27  ;  on  Scriptures, 
101  n. 

Agricola.  On  law  and  gospel  ,251,366. 

Alanus  ab  Insulis.  On  attrition,  con¬ 
trition,  136  f. ;  preaching,  92  n. 

Albert,  The  Great.  Works  of,  96, 
98  ;  philosophy  of,  99,  105  ;  in¬ 
fluence  of,  99  ;  on  original  state, 
1 14;  infused  grace,  1 1 5  ;  sacra¬ 
ments,  128;  confirmation,  130; 
Lord’s  Supper,  134  ;  extreme 
unction,  140  ;  marriage,  143. 

Albert  of  Padua,  philosophy  of,  187. 

Alberus,  Zwingli’ s  letter  to,  319. 

Alcuin,  w'orks  of,  27,  29  ;  on  Adop- 
tionism,  28  ;  Lord’s  Supper,  35. 

Alexander  III.  On  Nihilianism,  65  ; 
and  Jansenists,  454. 

Alexander  of  Hales,  estimate  of, 
98  f. ;  on  person  and  work  of 
Christ,  no  f.  ;  original  state,  syn- 
teresis,  1 1 4  ;  original  sin,  116; 
indelible  character,  128;  sacra¬ 
ments,  125  f.,  126  n.;  Lord’s  Sup¬ 
per,  131  f.,  133  ;  repentance,  135  f.; 
attrition,  contrition,  136  f. 

Alger.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  76  f. 

Alloeosis.  In  Zwingli,  321  ;  Luther, 
324- 


(467) 


468 


INDEX. 


Almsgiving,  91,  92. 

Amolo,  works  of,  30  ;  on  predestina¬ 
tion,  32. 

Amsdorf.  In  Majoristic  controversy, 
364  k;  in  Synergistic  controversy, 
367  f.;  on  conversion,  367  f. 

Amyraldus.  On  predestination,  424  f. ; 
revelation,  human  ability,  conver¬ 
sion,  425. 

Anabaptists,  opposition  to,  in  Luther, 
292  ;  Zwingli,  316  ;  Augsburg  Con¬ 
fession,  339  ;  Formula  of  Concord, 
3S9  ;  Council  of  Trent,  439. 

Andreae,  Jacob,  sermons  of,  382  n. ; 
on  concord,  380. 

Angels.  In  Gregory,  17,  25. 

Anselm,  estimate  of,  56,  58,  64,  98  ; 
legalism  of,  69  ;  on  immaculate 
conception,  34 ;  universals,  56 ; 
faith,  person  of  Christ,  57  ;  atone¬ 
ment,  66  ff. ,  200;  sin,  67,  110; 
satisfaction,  67  f.  ,267,  n.  2  ;  forgive¬ 
ness,  68  ;  God,  69  ;  devil,  67,  70  ; 
example  of  Christ,  sacraments,  72. 

Antinomian  controversy,  365. 

Apocalypse,  300. 

Apocrypha.  In  Luther,  300  ;  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Trent,  432. 

Apology  of  Augsburg  Confession,  as 
standard,  332  ;  on  justification,  338  ; 
repentance,  342  ;  sacraments,  343. 

Appellants.  In  Unigenitus  contro¬ 
versy,  455. 

Arabic  Philosophy,  96. 

Aristotle,  study  of,  55,  96  f. ;  in¬ 
fluence  of,  98  ;  philosophy  of,  95  ; 
Luther  on,  224  n.;  Melanchthon 
on,  348,  n.  3;  on  attributes,  369. 

Arminian  controversy,  421  f.  ,424. 

Arminius.  On  predestination,  421  f. 

Arnauld,  Anton,  vs.  Jesuits,  453. 

Arno,  philosophy  of,  60  ;  on  real 
presence,  66. 

Asceticism.  In  Mystics,  179  f. ;  Sa¬ 
vonarola,  190  n. ;  Luther,  276  n.; 


Augsburg  Confession,  339  ;  Calvin, 
403,  n.  3,  441  ;  Reformed  church, 
415,  420;  Jesuits,  430;  Council 
of  Trent,  438,  449. 

Assurance.  In  Gregory,  23  ;  Thomas, 
1 21  ;  Biel,  Duns,  202  ;  Formula 
of  Concord,  388  ;  Calvin,  404, 
407  ;  Synod  of  Dort,  422,  435  ; 
Council  of  Trent,  435,  437. 

Atonement.  In  Gregory,  19  ff.; 
Anselm,  66  ff. ,  200  ;  Abelard,  70  f. , 
no,  267,  n.  2;  Bernard,  72> 
III  n.;  Honorius,  Flugo,  Pullus, 
73  ;  Alexander,  Bonaventura,  no; 
Thomas,  in  f. ;  Duns,  156  ;  Wick- 
lifife,  198  ;  Later  Middle  Ages,  198  ; 
Luther,  261,  266  ff. ;  Melanch¬ 

thon,  359;  Zwingli,  310;  Calvin, 
400  ;  Synod  of  Dort,  423  ;  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Trent,  442,  n.  I  ;  Later 
Reformed  Confessions,  418. 

Attribute,  definition  of,  369. 

Attrition.  In  Alanus,  Alexander, 
William  of  Paris,  136  f . ;  Biel,  138, 
199,  201  f. ;  Duns,  160;  John  of 
Paltz,  175  f . ;  Luther,  222,  237; 
Council  of  Trent,  442. 

Augsburg,  Religious  Peace  of,  332, 
333>  37S. 

Augsburg  Confession,  estimate  of, 
332>  344,  466  ;  genesis  of,  334  ; 
aim  of,  335  ;  and  Zwingli,  334  ;  on 
sin,  human  ability,  nature  and 
work  of  Christ,  335  ;  faith,  336  ff., 
342:  justification,  336  ff.,  343; 
regeneration,  337  k;  merit,  337; 
marriage,  monasticism,  Christian 
life,  339  5  good  works,  339,  343  ; 
church,  340;  bishops,  341,  344; 
ministry,  human  ordinances,  civil 
power,  341  ;  baptism,  341  ;  Lord’s 
Supper,  341,  35 1  ;  repentance, 

contrition,  absolution,  342  ;  con¬ 
fession,  342,  344  ;  law  and  gospel, 
342  ;  power  of  keys,  341,  343 ; 


INDEX. 


469 


sacraments,  341  f.;  worship  of 
Mary  and  saints,  mass,  meats, 
vows,  hierarchy,  second  advent, 
344- 

Augsburg  Confession,  Variata.  On 
Lord’s  Supper,  351  ;  justification, 
36°. 

Augustine,  influence  of,  15,  16,  52, 
97  f. ,  189  ;  on  church,  85  ;  Trin¬ 
ity,  306  n. 

Augustinianism,  revival  of,  449  f., 
and  Jansenists,  453  f. 

Aureolus,  works  of,  187  ;  on  work  of 
Christ,  187,  198. 

Averroes,  philosophy  of,  187. 

Avicenna,  philosophy  of,  105. 

B. 

Bacon,  Roger,  philosophy  of,  105. 

Baconthorp,  John  of,  philosophy  of, 
187  ;  on  work  of  Christ,  198. 

Bajus,  Michael,  theses  of,  450, 
451  n.;  on  original  state,  grace, 
free-will,  sin,  justification,  good 
works,  450. 

Bandini,  Archbishop,  evangelical 
views  of,  434,  n.  2. 

Baptism.  In  Gregory,  22  ;  Lombard, 
74,  80,  83,  130  ;  thirteenth  cen¬ 
tury,  129  f . ;  Eugene  IV.,  130; 
Thomas,  Bonaventura,  Duns,  1 30  ; 
Luther,  283  f. ;  Zwingli,  316  ; 
Augsburg  Confession,  341  ;  Re¬ 
formed  Confessions,  345  ;  Calvin, 
412  ;  Council  of  Trent,  432,  434, 
436,  439,  444  ;  benefits  of,  22,  80, 
129  f.,  283,  345,  412,  432,  434; 
of  infants,  22,  130,  284,  285,  315, 
3 l6,  34L  4!2  ;  by  heretics,  439. 

Basel,  confession  of,  344  f. ;  council  at, 
166. 

Beatus.  In  Adoptionist  controversy, 

28. 

Bee,  school  at,  5 5>  9^- 


Begards,  95. 

Benedict  of  Aniane,  works  of,  27. 

Benedict  XI.  On  papacy,  165. 

Benedict  XIV.  On  Unigenitus,  456. 

Berenger,  works  of,  74,  76 ;  phi¬ 
losophy  of,  55  ;  on  Lord’s  Supper, 
75  f- 

Bergen  Book,  382  n. 

Bernard,  influence  of,  88,  96 ;  on 
papacy,  52  ;  imitation  of  Christ, 
53,  54,  72;  good  works,  53; 

work  of  Christ,  72,  no;  sacra¬ 
ments,  79  ;  heresy,  92,  n.  3  ; 
person  of  Christ,  155. 

Berthold  of  Ratisbon.  On  sacraments, 

93- 

Beza.  On  predestination,  421. 

Biel,  Gabriel,  works  of,  186;  Nomi¬ 
nalism  of,  186 ;  Luther  on,  224 ; 
on  sacraments,  127,  187,  200; 

church  and  state,  128;  Lord’s 
Supper,  132  n.,  134  f.,  204;  re¬ 
pentance,  134  f.,  138,  201  ;  con^ 
trition,  136  f.,  201  ;  attrition,  138, 
199,  201  f . ;  purgatory,  139;  in¬ 
dulgences,  139,  176;  Scriptures. 
192  f. ;  faith,  1 95  f. ;  original  state, 
sin,  free-will,  197  ;  work  of 
Christ,  predestination,  198  ;  merit, 
199,  202;  grace,  201  f. ;  social 

problems,  202  n. 

Bishops,  authority  of.  In  Early  Mid¬ 
dle  Ages,  41  ;  scholastic  age,  50, 

86  f. ;  Hugo,  86;  Innocent  III., 

87  ;  Thomas,  Bonaventura,  Duns, 

141  f.,  145  f. ;  Marsilius,  Occam, 
167  ;  Augsburg  Confession,  341, 
344  ;  Leipzig  Interim,  364  ;  Council 
of  Trent,  439,  443,  444,  445, 

446  fi,  449  ;  Gallican  church,  457  ; 
Bavaria,  458;  synod  at  Pistoja,  459 
(see  Hierarchy). 

Blaurer.  On  Lord’s  Supper, 331,  n.  2. 

Blessedness,  148. 

Boetius,  philosophy  of,  56. 


470 


INDEX. 


Bohemian  Brethren.  On  Lord’s 
Supper,  288. 

Bolsec.  On  grace,  divine  call,  pre¬ 
destination,  420. 

Bonaventura,  works  of,  100  ;  mys¬ 
ticism  of,  89  f.,  100  ;  influence  of, 
98  ;  philosophy  of,  1 00 ;  on 
Scriptures,  101  ;  communicatio 
idiomatum,  no  ;  person  and  work 
of  Christ,  1 10  ;  original  state,  1 15  ; 
original  sin,  116;  infused  grace, 
115,  119;  free-will,  120;  justifi¬ 
cation,  120  f.,  201  ;  human  merit, 
122;  monastic  life,  124;  sacra¬ 
ments,  125  f. ;  indelible  character, 
128;  baptism,  1 30;  repentance, 
134  f. ;  absolution,  137  f . ,  142  n.; 
purgatory,  139  ;  extreme  unction, 
140;  ordination,  14 1  ;  marriage, 
143  ;  communion  of  saints,  144. 

Boniface  VIII.  On  hierarchy,  88, 
165  ;  pope,  88,  97,  165. 

Bradwardina,  Thomas  of.  On  per¬ 
son  of  Christ,  1 10  ;  predestination, 
189,  207. 

Brenz  and  Osiander,  373,  n.  2  ;  on 
Lord’s  Supper,  320;  person  of 
Christ,  374. 

Brethren  of  Poor  Life,  88  f. 

Brotherhoods,  173. 

Bruno.  On  communion  of  saints,  144. 

Bucer  and  Melanchthon,  393,  n.  2, 
350  ;  and  Luther,  393  ;  and  Cal¬ 
vin,  393  ;  and  Reformed  Confes¬ 
sions,  344 ;  on  kingdom  of  Christ, 

391  ;  church,  divine  call,  faith, 

392  ;  justification,  392,  n.  3  ;  pre¬ 
destination,  392  f.;  free-will,  393. 

Bull,  unam  sanctam,  88,  165  ;  porro 
subesse,  97  ;  exultate  deo,  125  ; 
pastor  aeternus,  166,  461  ;  ex 

omnibus  afflictionibus,  450,  451  n. ; 
in  eminenti,  453  ;  cum  occasione, 
454  ;  ad  sancti  Petri  sedem,  454  ; 


unigenitus,  455,  456  ;  ineflabilis 
deus,  456  ;  auctorem  fidei,  459. 

Bullinger  and  Zwingli,  390 ;  and 
Luther,  417. 

Buridan,  philosophy  of,  186. 

C. 

Cajetan,  commentaries  of,  187. 

Call,  the  divine.  In  Henry,  122 ; 
Luther,  244  ;  Formula  of  Concord, 
388  ;  Bucer,  392  ;  Calvin,  405  f. ; 
Bolsec,  420  ;  Later  Reformed  Con¬ 
fessions,  420  ;  Synod  of  Dort,  423  ; 
Consensus  Helveticus,  425  ;  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Trent,  433,  435. 

Calvin,  works  of,  390,  395  nn.;  and 
Bucer,  393  ;  and  Luther,  393,  394, 
401,  414  f.,  416  ;  and  Loyola, 
430,  n.  2  ;  and  Melanchthon,  394  ; 
and  Osiander,  373,  n.  2  -r  and 
Zwingli,  393,  n.  4,  394,  412,  414  ; 
estimate  of,  394,  407,  415  n.; 
on  Lord’s  Supper,  366,  386, 

412  f.,  417  ;  Scriptures,  395, 

396  n. ;  ancient  symbols,  396  ; 
God,  396  f.,  407  ;  Trinity,  396, 
n.  2  ;  will  of  God,  396  ff. ;  glory 
of  God,  397  ;  predestination,  397, 
405  ff. ,  420  ;  original  sin,  398  ; 
conscience,  399  n.;  free-will,  397, 
399  >  grace,  399  5  person  and  work 
of  Christ,  399  ;  wrath  of  God, 
400;  Holy  Spirit,  395,  401,411; 
faith,  401  f.,  405  ;  renewal,  sanc¬ 
tification,  402,  404  ;  repentance, 
402  f. ;  contrition,  403  ;  regenera¬ 
tion,  justification,  403  f. ;  law,  403  ; 
asceticism,  403,  n.  3,  4 1 1  ;  Chris¬ 
tian  life,  403,  405  ;  communion 
with  Christ,  good  works,  404  ; 
prayer,  405  n. ;  divine  call,  405  f. ; 
assurance,  405,  407  ;  fall,  406 ; 
church,  408  ;  ministry,  discipline, 
409  ;  church  and  state,  410;  ideas 


INDEX. 


of  reform,  41 1  ;  sacraments,  41 1  ff. ; 
baptism,  412  ;  ubiquity,  413. 

Calvinism.  In  Germany,  381,  394  ; 
and  Synod  of  Dort,  424. 

Calvinists,  energy  of,  397,  407,  n.  I, 
416. 

Camero.  On  will,  425  n. 

Canterbury,  Council  of,  93. 

Capito.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  319. 

Capocci,  philosophy  of,  187. 

Capreolus,  works  of,  186  ;  on  work 
of  Christ,  198. 

Carlstadt.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  288, 
322. 

Catechismus  Romanus.  On  church 
and  papacy,  448  ;  on  Augustinian- 
ism,  449. 

Cathari,  94. 

Celibacy,  173  ;  of  priesthood,  142. 

Ceremonies.  In  Frankfort  Recess, 
379  >  Formula  of  Concord,  38S  ; 
Romish,  at  Leipzig  Interim,  364. 

Character,  indelible.  In  Alexander, 
Eugene  IV.,  Innocent  III.,  128  ; 
Lombard,  Bonaventura,  Duns,  130  ; 
Trent,  439,  445. 

Charlemagne,  works  of,  29  ;  on 
papacy,  40. 

Chemnitz,  works  of,  375  ;  estimate 
of,  375,  381  ;  on  person  of  Christ, 
375  f-5  Lord’s  Supper,  377  L ; 
communicatio  idiomatum,  375  ff. ; 
ubiquity,  multivolipresence,  376, 
388  ;  exinanition,  376  ;  states  of 
Christ,  376,  387. 

Chiersy,  Council  at,  32,  33. 

Children,  unbaptized,  22,  117,  245. 

Christ,  as  head  of  race,  401  ;  as  ex¬ 
ample,  19,  21,  53,  68,  70,  71,  73, 
90,  91,  1 12,  158,  198,  200,  270, 
310,  31 1  f.,  401,  n.  2,  403  ;  as 
teacher,  53,  71,  72. 

Christ,  body  of,  in  Lord’s  Supper. 
In  Later  Middle  Ages,  203  ff. ; 
Luther,  286  ff.,  322  f. ;  Zwingli, 


471 

318  ff.;  Augsburg  Confession,  341, 
351  ;  Eucharistic  controversy, 
366  f. ;  Consensus  Tigurinus,  417. 
Christ,  indwelling  of,  53,  230  f.,  270, 
370  f. 

Christ,  intercession  of.  In  Gregory, 
1 9  f. ;  Thomas,  1 1 3  ;  Luther,  269  ; 
Melanchthon,  359  ;  Calvin,  400. 
Christ,  merit  of.  In  Gregory,  20 ; 
Abelard,  71  ;  Anselm,  72  ;  Lom¬ 
bard,  73  f. ;  Alexander,  Bonaven¬ 
tura,  no,  in;  Thomas,  113; 
Duns,  154  f.,  156  f.,  199  ;  Later 
Middle  Ages,  198  ff;  Melanch¬ 
thon,  359  ;  Formula  of  Concord, 
384- 

Christ,  active"  and  passive  obedience 
of.  In  Luther,  371  n.;  Osiander, 
37111.;  Menius,  Flacius,  373; 
Calvin,  400. 

Christ,  offices  of,  399. 

Christ,  omnipresence  of,  66  (see 
Ubiquity). 

Christ,  person  of.  In  Gregory,  18, 
19  ;  Synod  of  Toledo,  28,  n.  I  ; 
Roland,  Omnebene,  Lombard,  65, 
74;  Anselm,  57,  66  f. ;  Gerhoh, 
66  ;  thirteenth  century,  109  ;  Alex¬ 
ander,  Bonaventura,  1 10  ;  Thomas, 
nof. ;  Duns,  154  k;  Bernard, 
155  ;  Luther,  229  f.,  235,  253, 
266,  n.  3,  298,  304  k,  323,  324  n.; 
Zwingli,  321,  323  ;  'Augsburg 

Confession  335  ;  Fleidelberg  the- 
ology,  374  ;  Brenz,  Ivrell,  Eber, 
Major,  374  ;  Chemnitz,  375  ; 
Formula  of  Concord,  387  ;  Calvin, 

399- 

Christ,  states  of,  325  n.,  376  f.,  377  f. 
Christ,  sufferings  of.  In  Gregory,  19  ; 
Bernard,  53  ;  Anselm,  69 ; 
Thomas,  112  f . ;  Duns,  156  k; 
Luther,  266  f.  (see  Atonement, 

Work  of  Christ). 

Christ,  work  ok  In  Gregory,  19  ff; 


472 


INDEX. 


Gottschalk,  31  ;  Anselm,  66  f. ; 
Bonaventura,  72  f. ;  St.  Florian, 
Honorius,  Hugo,  Pullus,  73  ; 
Lombard,  73  f . ,  91  ;  Alexander, 
Bonaventura,  1 10  ;  Thomas,  1 1 1  f . ; 
Duns,  154  f. ;  Mystics,  179;  Later 
Middle  Ages,  198  ff. ;  Aureolus, 
187,  198;  Biel,  198;  Capreolus, 
Baconthorp,  Durand,  198  ;  Luther, 
230,  261,  266  ff. ;  Zwingli,  309  f. ; 
Melanchthon,  359 ;  Augsburg 
Confession,  335  ;  Osiander,  370  ; 
Eber,  Stancar,  374 ;  Formula  of 
Concord,  384  ;  Calvin,  399  ; 
Synod  of  Dort,  423  ;  Council  of 
Trent,  436. 

Christian  Life,  in  Middle  Ages,  16  ; 
Gregory,  24,  26  ;  Later  Middle 
Ages,  178  f. ,  202  ;  Luther,  256, 
273>  275>  296;  Zwingli,  312; 
Augsburg  Confession,  339  ;  Osian¬ 
der,  370;.  Formula  of  Concord, 
386  ;  Calvin,  403,  405  ;  Reformed 
Theology,  415;  Jesuits,  430; 
Council  of  Trent,  438. 

Chronicles,  Luther  on,  300. 

Church,  The.  In  Gregory,  25  ;  Au¬ 
gustine,  Hugo,  Pullus,  John  of 
Salisbury,  Alanus,  85  f. ;  Gregory 
VII.,  50,  85,  86  ;  Waldenses,  94  ; 
Thomas,  144P ;  Duns,  144  b,  149; 
Occam,  192  f. ;  Huss,  21 1,  290; 
Wickliffe,  Wesel,  Wessel,  21 1; 
Luther,  226,  235,  289  f.,  291  ff. ; 
Bucer,  392  ;  Zwingli,  315  ;  Augs¬ 
burg  Confession,  340 ;  Melanch¬ 
thon,  340,  351,  354  f.,  362;  Cal¬ 
vin,  408  ;  Later  Reformed  Confes¬ 
sions,  419  ;  Council  of  Trent,  446  ; 
Catechismus  Romanus,  448  ;  Ques- 
nel,  455  n. ;  Vatican  Council,  460  ; 
as  kingdom  of  heaven,  25  ;  as  com¬ 
munion  of  saints,  25,  85,  144,  212, 
29L  292,  315,  340,  455  n. ;  as  as¬ 
sembly  of  the  called,  354  ;  as  as¬ 


sembly  of  the  predestinated,  21 1, 
290,  408,  419  ;  necessary  to  salva¬ 
tion,  26,  293,  362,  408  ;  unworthy 
members  of,  294,  354  ;  authority 
of,  18,  149,  163,  170,  192  f.,  21 1, 
226,  235,  289  ;  infallibility  of,  50, 
149,  192  ;  rulers  and  subjects 

in,  26,  86,  145,  21 1  f. ;  seculariza¬ 
tion  of,  52,  97  ;  visible  and  invisi¬ 
ble,  235,  291  f.,  293  f.,  315,  317, 

340,  345,  355,  408,  419  ;  marks 
of  the  true,  294,  340,  341,  352, 

354,  355,  357,  4°8 ;  and  secular 
learning,  353,  362,  363. 

Church  and  State.  In  Gregory,  28  ; 
scholastic  age,  50  f. ;  John  of  Salis¬ 
bury,  86;  Innocent  III.,  87  f. ; 
Louis  of  Bavaria,  165  ;  Marsilius, 
Occam,  167,  170;  Savonarola,  190 
n.,  318  ;  Zwingli,  317  f. ;  Reforma¬ 
tion  era,  332  f. ;  Frankfort  Recess, 
379  ;  Calvin,  410  ;  Reformed  the¬ 
ology,  415  ;  Augsburg  Confession, 
341  ;  Council  of  Trent,  446  ;  Gal- 
lican  Church,  457. 

Chytraeus,  Lutheranism  of,  381. 

Civil  Life,  273  f. 

Classics,  study  of  the,  213. 

Clement  XI.  and  Jansenists,  454. 

Clermont,  council  at,  45. 

Clergy,  orders  of  the,  141  ;  and  laity, 
170. 

Cluny,  reformatory  ideas  at,  49. 

Colet.  On  faith,  justification,  grace, 
215,  216  n. 

Comester,  on  Lord’s  Supper,  77. 

Communicatio  idiomatum.  In 
Thomas,  Bonaventura,  1 10;  Oc¬ 
cam,  192  ;  Luther,  323  ;  Cureus, 
366 ;  Brenz,  Heidelberg  theolo¬ 
gians,  374;  Chemnitz,  375  ff.; 
Gnesio-Lutherans,  381. 

Communion  with  Christ.  In  Luther, 
231  ;  Calvin,  404  (see  Mysticism, 


INDEX. 


473 


Imitation  of  Christ)  ;  of  saints,  144 
f.,  212,  235,  286  f.,  291  ff. ,  408. 
Communism,  182  f. 

Conception,  carnal,  21  f. ;  immacu¬ 
late,  81,  91  n.,  155,  188  n.,  456. 
Concomitance.  In  sacraments,  127  ; 

in  Lord’s  Supper,  132. 

Concord,  attempts  to  secure,  380  ; 
Formula  of,  genesis  of,  378  f. ,  382  ; 
estimate  of,  382,  389  ;  on  original 
sin,  free-will,  conversion,  383 
>.  faith,  383  n.,  384,  385  ;  synergism, 
justification,  forgiveness,  work  and 
merit  of  Christ,  384  ;  Holy  Spirit, 
383  f. ,  385  nn.;  contrition,  384,  n.  v 
v  I  ;  renewal,  384,  423  n.;  good 

*  works,  384  f. ;  Christian  life; 
Lord’s  Supper,  386;  person  of 
Christ,  387  ;  predestination,  word, 
divine  call,  assurance,  descent  into 
hell,  adiaphora,  388  ;  Book  of,  382  ; 
the  Schwabian,  382  n. ;  the  Schwa- 
bian-Saxon,  382  n.;  the  Witten¬ 
berg,  321,  386. 

Concordat  of,  A.  D.  1S01,  457. 
Concupiscence  (see  Sin,  original). 
Confession.  In  Gregory,  24;  Early 
Middle  Ages,  43  f. ;  Abelard,  81, 
92  n.;  Hugo,  82,  92  ;  Pullus,  83  ; 
Lombard,  83,  92  ;  Gratian,  92  ; 
Innocent  III.,  93  ;  Alexander, 
Albert,  130;  Thomas,  William  of 
Paris,  137  ;  Eugene  IV.,  140 ; 
Durand,  140  m ;  Luther,  234,  240; 
Zwingli,  316  n.;  Augsburg  Con¬ 
fession,  342,  344  ;  Council  of 

Trent,- 438,  442. 

Confession,  private,  93,  174,  234, 
240,  358  n. 

Confirmation.  In  Hugo,  Roland,  81  ; 
Later  Middle  Ages,  130  ;  Eugene 
IV.,  131  ;  Council  of  Trent,  439. 
Congregation,  rights  of  the,  294,  333, 

334. 

Conscience,  171  n.,  243  n.,  399  n. 


Consensus  Genevensis,  421  ;  Hel¬ 
vetica,  425  ;  Tigurinus,  41 7. 
Conservatism.  In  Middle  Ages,  15b 
Consistorium,  409. 

Constance,  Council  at,  166. 
Constantine,  Donation  of,  40,  213. 
Constantinople,  councils  at,  18,  29. 
Contarini,  Cardinal,  on  justification, 
434,  n.  1. 

Contarini,  Julian,  evangelical  views 
of,  434,  n.  2. 

Contemplation  of  Christ,  53,  54,  72, 
124,  179  f. 

Contingency,  150. 

Contra-remonstrants.  On  predestina¬ 
tion,  422. 

Contrition,  Gregory,  24 ;  Early 
Middle  Ages,  43  ;  Abelard, 
Epitome,  Roland,  81  ;  Gratian, 
92  ;  Alexander,  Thomas,  Alanus, 
William  of  Paris,  136  f. ; 
Biel,  136  f.,  201  ;  Luther,  222, 
234,  237  ff.;  Augsburg  Confession, 
342  ;  Melanchthon,  358,  361  ; 

Formula  of  Concord,  384,  385,  n. 
1  ;  Calvin,  403  ;  Council  of  Trent, 
43s,  442,  444- 

Conversion.  In  Melanchthon,  349  ; 
Synergistic  controversy,  367  ff. ; 
Ambrose,  Strigel,  Flacius,  367  f. ; 
Formula  of  Concord,  383  ;  Later 
Reformed  Confessions,  419  ;  Amy- 
raldus,  425. 

Co-operation.  In  divine  nature,  375, 
387  ;  between  God  and  man  (see 
Synergism). 

Corpora  doctrinae,  380. 

Corpus  Christi,  1 34. 

Corpus  Philippicum,  380. 

Council,  at  Nice  (A.  D.  325),  18; 
(A.  D.  787),  29;  Constantinople 
(A.  D.  553),  18  ;  (A.  D.  754),  29; 
Ratisbon  (A.  D.  794),  29J  Frank¬ 
fort  (A.  D.  794),  29  ;  Aachen  (A. 
D.  799),  29  ;  (A.  D.  809),  30; 


474 


INDEX. 


(A.  D.  836),  84;  Rome  (A.  D. 
799),  29;  (A.  D.  1050,  1059, 
1079),  7^5  Toledo  (A.  D. 

444),  30;  (A-  D-  633,  638,  675), 
28;  Gentilly  (A.  D.  767),  30; 
Mayence  (A.  D.  848),  31  ; 

Chiersy  (A.  D.  849),  32;  (A.  D. 
853),  33  ;  Valence  (A.  D.  853), 
33;  Toucy  (A.  D.  860),  33; 
Chalon  (A.  D.  813),  42  ;  Tribur, 
(A.  D.  895),  45  ;  Clermont  (A. 
D.  1095),  45;  Soissons  (A.  D. 
1121),  61;  Sens  (A.  D.  1141), 
61  ;  Fourth  Lateran  (A.  D.  1215), 
78,  93,  95,  108  ;  Piacenza  (A.  D. 
io95),  78;  Treves  (A.  D.  1227), 
92,  93;  Narbonne  (A.  D.  1227), 
93  ;  Lauterberg  (A.  D.  1236), 
93  ;  Toulouse  (A.  D.  1229),  93  ; 
London  (A.  D.  1237),  125  ;  Con¬ 
stance  (A.  D.  1414-17),  92,  n.  3, 
166,  290;  Second  Lyons  (A.  D. 
1274),  146 ;  Florence  (A.  D. 

1439),  125  ;  Third  Lateran  (A.  D. 
1179),  125;  Pisa  (A.  D.  1409), 
166  ;  Basel  (A.  D.  1431-47),  166  ; 
Trent  (A.  D.  1545-63),  431  5  Vat¬ 
ican  (A.  D.  1869-70),  460. 
Councils,  authority  of,  166,  289,  290 
f-,  293,  3°3,  457  ;  the  four  pri¬ 
mary,  18. 

Counsels,  evangelical,  124,  274. 
Counter-reformation,  428  ff. 
Creationism,  22,  117. 

Creed,  Apostles’.  In  Thomas,  Bona- 
ventura,  102  ;  Later  Middle  Ages, 
174  ;  Luther,  303  f. 

Creed,  Nicene,  102  n. 

Crisis,  at  close  of  Middle  Ages,  173, 
181,  213,  216,  221. 

Criticism,  biblical,  300  f . ;  of  dogmas, 
192  ff. 

Cross,  sign  of,  79. 

Crusades,  45. 

Crypto-Calvinism,  367,  381. 


Cup,  withholding  of,  132,  440. 

Cureus.  In  Eucharistic  controversy, 
366. 

D. 

D’Ailli,  philosophy  of,  186  ;  on 
Scriptures,  192  f. ;  Lord’s  Supper, 
204. 

Dead,  masses  for  the,  25,  441,  445. 

Decalogue,  174. 

Decretals,  papal,  50,  n.  2,  52,  290; 
Pseudo-Isidorean,  41. 

Descent  into  hell,  135,  377  n.,  388. 

Devil,  claim  of,  on  man,  67,70  ;  con¬ 
quest  of,  68,  74  ;  outwitting  of,  21, 
74,  267,  n.  2. 

Devils,  faith  in,  17,  173,  246  n. 

Dialectics.  In  Middle  Ages,  60,  96. 

Dionysius,  Areopagita.  On  God,  107. 

Discipline,  church.  In  Calvin,  409  ; 
Later  Reformed  Confessions,  419. 

Doctrine,  the  pure,  295,  330,  351  ff., 
396  ;  and  the  Lutheran  Church, 
358,  379  ;  Protestant  construction 
of,  347  ff. 

Doctrines,  gradation  in,  356. 

Dogma.  In  ancient  church,  332  ;  in 
Middle  Ages,  15,  17,  55,  332  ;  in 
Reformation  era,  333  f. ,  347  ff. ; 
Luther,  302  ff. ;  modern  Roman 
Catholic  church,  46 ;  Protestant 
and  Roman  Catholic  churches, 
464  f. ;  provisional,  347. 

Donation  of  Constantine,  40,  213. 

Donum  superadditum.  In  Gregory, 
21,  n.  I.;  Henry,  Thomas,  Bona- 
ventura,  1 15;  Duns,  153;  Biel, 
197  ;  Council  of  Trent,  432  n.; 
Bajus,  450. 

Dort,  Synod  of,  estimate  of,  422  ;  in¬ 
fluence  of,  423,  n.  3  ;  and  Calvin¬ 
ism,  424  ;  on  Arminianism,  predes¬ 
tination,  421  ff. ;  faith,  grace,  elec¬ 
tion,  422  ;  will,  423,  425  n.;  work 
of  Christ,  divine  call,  regeneration, 


INDEX. 


475 


perseverance,  423  ;  justification, 
God,  424  ;  assurance,  422,  435. 

DunsScotus,  works  of,  147  ;  estimate 
of,  9 7,  106,  146,  162  f. ;  influence 
of,  428  f. ,  431  ;  philosophy  of,  98, 
147  ;  on  sacraments,  127  f.,  161  ; 
indelible  character,  128;  baptism, 
130;  Lord’s  Supper,  131  f.,  133, 
150;  confession,  absolution,  137  f. ; 
satisfaction,  indulgences,  pur¬ 
gatory,  139  ;  extreme  unction,  140  ; 
ordination,  14 1  ;  marriage,  142  ; 
communion  of  saints,  144;  church, 
144  f. ,  149;  will,  148  f. ;  blessed¬ 
ness,  148  ;  faith,  150,  160;  God, 
150  f.,  163  f.;  predestination,  151, 
156,  164 ;  original  state,  153  ; 

original  sin,  153,  154  n.,  163; 
person  of  Christ,  154  f . ;  work  of 
Christ,  156  f. ;  merit  of  Christ, 
154  f.,  156  f.,  199  ;  immaculate 
conception,  155  ;  grace,  158  ;  at¬ 
trition,  justification,  forgiveness, 
160  f. 

Durand,  philosophy  of,  1S6  ;  on 
Lord’s  Supper,  76  f. ,  203  ;  public 
repentance,  93  ;  confession,  140, 
142  n.;  work  of  Christ,  198; 
grace,  20 1  f. 

E. 

Eber.  On  person  of  Christ,  374. 

Ecclesiastes,  Luther  on,  300. 

Eck,  theses  of,  334. 

Eckhart,  works  of,  178  ;  on  imitation 
of  Christ,  178  f. 

Ecstasy,  180  f. 

Eisenach,  synod  at,  365. 

Elipandus,  works  of,  27  ;  in  Adoption- 
ist  controversy,  27. 

Episcopacy  (see  Bishops)  vs. 
papacy,  457. 

Episcopus.  On  predestination,  421. 

Epitome,  The,  382  n. ;  on  repentance, 

81. 


Eremites,  Augustinian,  187. 

Esther,  Luther  on,  300. 

Etherius.  In  Adoptionist  contro¬ 
versy,  27. 

Eucharistic  controversy,  366. 

Eugene  IV.  On  sacraments,  125  ; 
indelible  character,  128  ;  baptism, 
130;  confirmation,  13 1  ;  repent¬ 
ance,  extreme  unction,  140  ;  ordi¬ 
nation,  142  ;  marriage,  143. 

Ex  opere  operante,  129. 

Ex  opere  operato,  128,  343,  439. 
Excommunication,  168,  210,  21 1, 

409- 

Exorcism,  130  n. 

Eybel,  work  of,  458,  n.  2. 

F. 

Faber  Stapulensis.  On  Lord’s  Sup¬ 
per,  205  n. 

Faith.  In  Gregory,  17,  22;  Early 
Middle  Ages,  15,  46,  n.  3  ;  Rad- 
bertus,  37  ;  Anselm,  57  ;  Abelard, 
58;  Innocent  IV.,  90;  Thomas, 
103,  120  f. ;  Lombard,  123  n.; 
Duns,  150;  Biel,  Occam,  195  f. ; 
Erasmus,  215  n. ;  Colet,  216  n.; 
Innocent  III.,  196;  Luther,  223, 
225,  232  fif.,  240,  241,  252  ff., 
275  f.,  296,  297  f.,  302,  328  ;  Cal¬ 
vin,  401  f. ,  405  ;  Zwingli,  310  f. , 
313  ;  Augsburg  Confession,  336  ff., 
342  ;  Reformed  Confessions,  344  ; 
Melanchthon,  356,  360  f. ;  Osian- 
der,  371  f. ;  Formula  of  Concord, 
383  n.,  384,  385;  Bucer,  392; 
Later  Reformed  Confessions,  419  ; 
Remonstrants,  Synod  of  Dort,  422  ; 
Jesuits,  430  :  Council  of  Trent, 

4 33,  435,  436,  437,  44°,  449  ; 
Quesnel,  455  n. ;  Unigenitus,  455  ; 
Vatican  Council,  460  ;  as  trust, 
215  n.,  233,  235,  254,  310,  356, 
361,  365,  401,  419  ;  as  conviction, 


476 


INDEX. 


402,  419 ;  as  disposition  toward 
grace,  435  f. ;  implicit  and  explicit, 
90,  103,  104,  150,  170,  195  f.,  255, 
402,  429;  infused,  103,  150,  195, 
254;  acquired,  232  f.,  254;  and 
love,  103,  1 21,  209,  436  ;  and 

sacraments,  80,  282,  328  ;  and 

Lord’s  Supper,  413. 

Fall,  The.  In  Gregory,  21  ;  An¬ 
selm,  1 16;  Duns,  153;  Biel, 
Occam,  197  ;  Luther,  242  ; 
Zwingli,  309  ;  Osiander,  370  ;  Cal¬ 
vin,  398,  406  ;  Council  of  Trent, 
432. 

Fasting,  92. 

Faustus.  On  grace,  23. 

Fear,  province  of,  26,  136,  138,  249, 
438  (see  Law). 

Felix  of  Urgellis.  On  Adoptionism, 

27. 

Filioque,  30. 

Flacius.  In  Adiaphoristic  and 
Majoristic  controversies,  364 ;  in 
Synergistic  controversy,  367  f . ;  in 
Osiandrian  controversy,  373. 

Florence,  council  at,  125. 

Florian,  St.,  work  of,  59  ;  on  work 
of  Christ,  73  ;  Lord’s  Supper,  77  ; 
sacraments,  79. 

Florus,  works  of,  30  ;  on  predestina¬ 
tion,  32. 

Foreknowledge  (see  Prescience). 

Forgiveness  of  Sins.  In  Gregory, 
24  ;  Radbertus,  37  ;  Early  Middle 
Ages,  46;  Anselm,  68;  Abelard, 
81  ;  Lombard,  83  ;  Gratian,  92  ; 
Thomas,  112  f.,  121  ;  Duns, 

160  f. ;  Luther,  260  f. ,  283,  284, 
372  ;  Melanchthon,  356,  358,  360  ; 
Osiander,  372  ;  Formula  of  Con¬ 
cord,  384  ;  Council  of  Trent,  433, 
437  ;  Bajus,  450,  n.  2  ;  Jansen, 
453  5  Quesnel,  455  n. 

Francis  of  Assisi,  estimate  of,  89,  96  ; 


mysticism  of,  89  ;  order  of,  90  ;  on 
Virgin  Mary,  91  n. 

Franciscans,  95. 

Frankfort  Recess,  379. 

Fredeland,  consecration  of  host, 
367  n. 

Free-will.  In  Gregory,  20  f. ; 

Rabanus,  31  f . ;  Hincmar,  32; 
Councils  of  Chiersy  and  Valence, 
33;  Thomas,  1 18  f . ;  Bonaven- 
tura,  120;  Biel,  138,  197;  Duns, 
148  ;  Occam,  1 97  ;  Bradwardina, 
208  ;  Wickliffe,  208 ;  Luther, 

243  b;  Zwingli,  313  f. ;  Melanch¬ 

thon,  349  ;  Leipzig  Interim,  3640.; 
Synergistic  controversy,  Strigel, 

3676;  Flacius,  367  f.,  383;  For¬ 
mula  of  Concord,  383  ;  Bucer,  393  ; 
Calvin,  397,  399 ;  Bolsec,  420  ; 
Remonstrants,  422  ;  Synod  of 
Dort,  423,  425  n.;  Council  of 
Trent,  433  f . ;  Bajus,  450,  45 1  n.; 
Molina,  451  f. ;  Jansen,  454  f. ; 
Quesnel,  455  n. 

G. 

Gallican  Church,  struggles  of,  457. 
Gelasius.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  34. 
Gendulph,  Sentences  of,  63. 

Genesis,  Luther  on,  300. 

Gentilly,  council  at,  30. 

Gerbert.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  39. 
Gerhard  of  Sienna,  philosophy  of, 
187. 

Gerhoh,  philosophy  of,  60  ;  on  per¬ 
son  of  Christ,  66. 

Germanic  church,  15  f. 

Germanic  legal  system,  69.  „ 
Germanus  of  Paris.  On  Lord’s  Sup¬ 
per,  77. 

Gerson.  Reformatory  ideas  of,  188  ; 

on  communion  of  saints,  144. 
Glory,  the  divine,  397,  420. 
Gnesio-Lutheranism,  380,  381,  n.  3. 
Goch,  Pupper  of,  and  Augusfinian- 


TNDEX. 


477 


ism,  190  ;  on  grace,  208  f. ;  Scrip¬ 
tures,  evangelical  liberty,  209. 

God,  conception  of.  In  Gregory,  18; 
Germanic,  29  n.;  in  Anselm,  69, 
107  ;  Thomas,  ICO,  107  ;  Augus¬ 
tine,  Dionysius,  107  ;  Duns,  150, 
163  f.;  Luther,  253,  265,  298,  407, 
416  ;  Zwingli,  314  ;  Calvin,  396  b, 
407;  Reformed  theology,  416; 
Synod  of  Dort,  424 ;  Vatican 
Council,  460;  existence  of,  56; 
as  love,  107,  151,  164,  253,  265, 
401,  407,  416  ;  relation  to  the 
world,  107;  wrath  of,  229  n.,  245, 
249>  358>  37°  f.,  4°°;  glory  of, 
397>  420. 

Gnosticism,  94. 

Goddam,  philosophy  of,  186. 

Gomanus.  On  predestination,  421, 
422  n. 

Gospel,  The,  228,  246,  248  f. ,  250 
251,  31  L  342,  35s)  366,  385. 

Gospels,  the  Synoptic,  Luther  on, 
3°°. 

Gottschalk,  works  of,  30  ;  con¬ 
demned,  32  ;  on  predestination, 
Trinity,  work  of  Christ,  31. 

Grace.  In  Gregory,  22  f. ;  Faustus,  23; 
Council  of  Chiersy,  33  ;  Thomas, 
1 1 5 ,  128;  Lombard,  118;  Biel, 
John  of  Paltz,  Durand,  201  f. ; 
Bonaventura,  115,  1 1 9  ;  Duns, 

1 5  8  ;  Goch,  208  f. ;  Wesel,  Wessel, 
209  ;  Colet,  216,  n.  I  ;  Luther, 
231  f.,  263  ff.,  297  ;  Zwingli,  314  ; 
Melanchthon,  360 ;  Southwestern 
Germany,  390;  Calvin,  399;  Bol- 
see,  420  ;  Remonstrants,  Synod  of 
Dort,  422 ;  Council  of  Trent,  433, 

435)  439)  449  5  Bajus,  450;  Mo¬ 
lina,  451  f. ;  Jansen,  453  ;  Quesnel, 
455  nri  Unigenitus,  455  5  creata 
and  increata,  11S,  158,  208,  232 
n.,  264  ;  gratum  facie  ns,  115,  119, 
122,  127,  128,  129,  338;  gratia 


data ,  122,  128,  209  ;  infused,  78, 
80,  1 15,  1 19,  120,  123,  137  f., 
153,  160  f.,  190,  201  f.,  208  f., 
216  n.,  232,  239,  n.  2,  240,  263, 
265,  n.  1,  297,  433,  449  ;  opera¬ 
ting  and  co-operating,  1 1 9  ;  irre¬ 
sistible,  23,  422,  453,  454  (see 
free-will);  prevenient,  22,  32,  208, 
435,  454  ;  in  sacraments,  80,  85, 
126;  in  ordination,  84;  means  of, 
293)  336,  4°9- 

Gratian,  and  Lombard,  62  f. ;  on  con¬ 
trition,  confession,  absolution,  for¬ 
giveness,  92. 

Greek  Church.  In  Middle  Ages,  16. 

Gregory  the  Great,  works  of,  17,  25  ; 
estimate  of,  17,  26;  theology  of, 
15,  16;  and  Augustine,  26,  32; 
Melanchthon  on,  26  n. ;  on  Trinity, 
17;  angels,  17,  25;  God,  18; 
homousia,  18  ;  Holy  Spirit,  18,  20 
n.,  30;  incarnation,  19  n.;  person 
of  Christ,  18  f . ;  work  and  interces¬ 
sion  of  Christ,  19  ff.;  Scriptures, 
18,  19;  church,  ancient  symbols, 
18  ;  example  of  Christ,  19,  21  ; 
saints  and  martyrs,  20 ;  original 
state,  21  n.;  demons,  17;  devil, 

21  ;  faith,  17,  22  ;  free-will,  21, 

22  ;  sin,  21  f. ;  fall,  guilt,  21  ;  vices, 

21  n.;  carnal  conception,  21  f . ; 
Creationism  and  Traducianism,  22  ; 
unbaptized  children,  22 ;  grace, 

22  f. ;  justification,  predestination, 
co-operation,  merit,  23  ;  baptism, 
22  ;  repentance,  contrition,  confes¬ 
sion,  absolution,  satisfaction,  good 
works,  forgiveness,  24;  Lord’s 
Supper,  mass,  purgatory,  24  f. ; 
church,  18,  25  ;  Christian  life,  24, 
26. 

Gregory  VII.,  estimate  of,  96;  on 
church,  papacy,  50,  85,  86  ;  state, 
51,  85,  86  ;  Lord’s  Supper,  75. 

Gregory  of  Rimini,  philosophy  of, 


478 


INDEX. 


1 88  ;  on  immaculate  conception, 
188  n. ;  Luther  on,  242. 

Gropper,  imputed  righteousness, 

434  n. 

Grosseteste,  philosophy  of,  98 ;  theol¬ 
ogy  of,  164  n. 

Guibert.  On  preaching,  92  ;  Lord’s 
Supper,  39. 

Guilt,  2i,  81,  1 17. 

Guitmund.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  76  f. 

H. 

Habitus,  103,  13 1  f.,  150,  158  f., 
195  (see  Faith,  Grace). 

Hadrian.  On  Adoptionism,  29. 

Haimo.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  39. 

Ilardenberg.  In  Eucharistic  contro¬ 
versy,  366. 

Heathen,  salvation  of.  In  Zwingli, 

315- 

llebrews,  Epistle  to  the,  Luther  on, 

3°°. 

Heidelberg  Catechism.  On  Lord’s 
Supper,  418;  predestination,  421. 

Heidelberg  theologians.  On  person 
of  Christ,  ubiquity,  374. 

Helvetic  Confession,  estimate  of,  344  ; 
on  predestination,  421. 

Henry  of  Ghent,  works  of,  106  ; 
philosophy  of,  98,  106  ;  on  uni¬ 
versal,  106;  will,  106;  original 
state,  1 1 5  ;  divine  call,  122;  in¬ 
dulgences,  purgatory,  139. 

Heretics  and  sacraments,  50,  51, 

142  ;  and  baptism,  439  ;  and  ordi¬ 
nation,  142. 

Hervaeus  Natalis,  philosophy  of,  186. 

Hierarchy.  In  Early  Middle  Ages, 
40  f.,  50,  87  f.,  96;  Nicholas,  40; 
Donation  of  Constantine,  40  f . ; 
Pseudo- Isidorian  decretals,  41  ; 
Boniface  VIII.,  88,  165  ;  Wal- 
denses,  94 ;  Later  Middle  Ages, 
165  ft.;  Marsilius,  Occam,  167  ft.; 
Wesel,  21 1  ;  Augsburg  Confession, 


344  ;  Luther,  290,  294  ;  Council 
of  Trent,  445,  449. 

Hincmar,  works  of,  30  ;  on  Trinity, 
31  ;  predestination,  32. 

Hildebert.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  77. 

History  of  Doctrines,  method  of, 
55  ;  scope  of,  466. 

Hoi kot,  philosophy  of,  186. 

Holy  Spirit.  In  Gregory,  18,  30; 
Luther,  248  n.,  256,  263,  280  f., 
305  ;  Zwingli,  31 1  ;  Melanchthon, 
360  ;  Majoristic  controversy,  365  ; 
Formula  of  Concord,  383  f. ,  3S5 
nn.;  Calvin,  395,  401,  41 1  ;  pro¬ 
cession  of,  18,  30  ;  intercession  of, 
20,  n.  2  ;  work  of,  385. 

Ilomousia,  303  ;  of  Christ,  18  (see 
Christ,  Person  of);  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  18,  30. 

I  Ionius.  On  Lord’ s  Supper,  28S,  319. 

Ilonorius.  On  systematic  theology, 
61  ;  work  of  Christ,  73  ;  Lord’s 
Supper,  77  ;  public  repentance,  93. 

Host,  desecrated,  77  n.,  132  ;  adora¬ 
tion  of,  440. 

Flugo  of  Langres.  On  Lord’s  Sup¬ 
per,  76,  77. 

Hugo  of  St.  Victor,  estimate  of,  64  ; 
and  Lombard,  62  ;  on  systematic 
theology,  61  ;  sacraments,  19,  80, 
61  ;  work  of  Christ,  73  ;  confirma¬ 
tion,  81  ;  repentance,  confession, 
absolution,  satisfaction,  82,  92  ; 
extreme  unction,  ordination,  84 ; 
church,  85  f. ;  state,  86. 

Humanism,  213  ff. 

IIuss,  influence  of,  185,  289  n.;  on 
church,  21 1,  290. 

Hussites.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  206  f. 

I. 

Images,  worship  of,  29,  94,  448  ; 

adoration  vs.  veneration  of,  29. 

Imitation,  of  Christ.  In  Bernard,  54, 
72  ;  Francis,  Ludolf,  89  ;  Tauler, 


INDEX. 


479 


Eckhart,  178  f . ;  Wickliffe,  184; 
Erasmus,  215  ;  Luther,  270  ; 
Zwingli,  312  ;  of  parents’  sins,  21, 

n.  I. 

Impanation,  75. 

Impulses,  natural.  In  Luther,  273  ; 
Reformed  theology,  415. 

Indulgences.  In  Middle  Ages,  92 ; 
Biel,  139,  176 ;  Alexander, 

Thomas,  Duns,  Henry  of  Ghent, 
139;  Later  Middle  Ages,  165, 
173  ;  John  of  Paltz,  176;  Wick¬ 
liffe,  Wesel,  Wessel,  210;  Luther, 
234,  236,  241;  Zwingli,  316  n.; 
Council  of  Trent,  444  ;  for  money, 
177- 

Indwelling,  of  God,  231,  270,  370  f . ; 
of  Christ,  53,  230  f.,  270,  370  f. 

Infallibility,  of  church,  50,  149,  192  ; 
of  pope,  169,  170,  461,  462  f . ; 
decree  of,  462  f. 

Innocent  III.,  estimate  of,  96  ;  on 
papacy,  church  and  state,  87  ; 
private  confession,  93  ;  indelible 
character,  128  ;  faith,  196. 

Innocent  IV.  On  faith,  90. 

Ino.  On  communion  of  saints,  I44  n. 

Intention.  In  sacraments,  125  ;  in 
baptism,  439. 

Intercession,  of  Christ,  19,  1 1 3,  269, 
359,  400  ;  of  saints  and  martyrs, 
20,  n.  2,  309  ;  of  the  church,  20, 
n.  2  ;  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  20,  n.  2. 

Interim,  Leipzig,  estimate  of,  355  n. ; 
and  Melanchthon,  363,  364 ;  on 
justification,  bishops,  Romish  cere¬ 
monies,  364;  free-will,  364  n.; 
righteousness,  381,  n.  4. 

Interpretation,  allegorical,  15,  19. 

Isidore,  works  of,  16;  on  predestina¬ 
tion,  30. 

J- 

James,  Epistle  of,  Luther  on,  300. 

Janduno,  philosophy  of,  187. 


Jansen,  work  of,  453  ;  theses  of, 
454  ;  and  Augustinianism,  453 ; 
and  Bradwardina,  453  ;  on  original 
sin,  will,  justification,  forgiveness, 
love,  predestination,  453  ;  irresist¬ 
ible  grace,  453,  454. 

Jansenists,  estimate  of,  453  f. 

Jesuits,  estimate  of,  429  f. ;  condem¬ 
nation  of,  453  ;  on  repentance, 
429 ;  faith,  asceticism,  preaching, 
Christian  life,  430 ;  grace,  449. 

Joachim  of  Floris,  apocalyptic  visions 
of,  95,  183  ;  on  Trinity,  108. 

John,  Gospel  of,  Luther  on,  299. 

John  of  Damascus,  influence  on  Lom¬ 
bard,  63. 

John  of  Paltz,  works  of,  179,  n.  3, 
201,  175  f . ;  theology  of,  188;  on 
attrition,  175  f. ;  absolution,  indul¬ 
gences,  176;  grace,  201  f . ;  justifi¬ 
cation,  201. 

John  of  Paris.  On  Lord’s  Supper, 
203  n. 

John  of  Ruusbroec,  works  of,  178. 

John  of  Salisbury,  philosophy  of,  60  ; 
on  church,  85  f. 

Joslenus.  On  communion  of  saints, 
144- 

Jubilee  indulgences,  176. 

Jude,  Epistle  of,  Luther  on,  300. 

Justification.  In  Gregory,  23  ;  .Scho¬ 
lastics,  120  ff. ;  Bonaventura,  120 
f.,  201;  Thomas,  120  f. ;  Lom¬ 
bard,  123  n.;  Middle  Ages,  175; 
Duns,  160;  John  of  Paltz,  201  ; 
Wessel,  209;  Colet,  216  n.; 

Luther,  233,  235,  260  f.;  Zwingli, 
307,  310  ;  Augsburg  Confession, 
336  ff.;  Apology,  338;  Early  Re¬ 
formed  Confessions,  344  ;  Me¬ 
lanchthon,  351,  356,  358,  360  f., 
362,  372,  n.  2  ;  Leipzig  Interim, 
364  ;  Majoristic  controversy,  365  ; 
Osiandrian  controversy,  369  f., 

373  ;  Formula  of  Concord,  384 ; 


480 


INDEX. 


Southwestern  Germany,  390 ; 
JBucer,  392,  n.  3  ;  Calvin,  403  f. ; 

'  Later  Reformed  Confessions,  420  ; 
Synod  of  Dort,  424  ;  Council  of 
Trent,  433  ff.,  435,  436,  437  ; 
Contarini,  434,  n.  I  ;  Bajus,  450  ; 
Jansen,  453  ;  Quesnel,  455  n.; 
progressive,  437. 

K. 

Kempis,  Thomas  a,  works  of,  178  ; 

mysticism  of,  178  f. 

Kenotism,  376  n. 

Keys,  power  of  the.  In  Gregory,  26, 
51  ;  Hugo,  86;  Thomas,  145  ; 
Marsilius,  Occam,  168 ;  Luther, 
293  ;  Augsburg  Confession,  341, 
343  ;  Council  of  Trent,  444. 
Klebitz,  in  Eucharistic  controversy, 
366. 

Krell.  On  person  of  Christ,  374. 
Kilwardby,  philosophy  of,  98. 
Kingdom  of  Christ,  266,  277,  292, 
340,  39 L  4io,  n.  2. 

Kings,  Books  of  the,  Luther  on,  300. 
Knowledge,  median,  451  f . ;  original, 

1 1 5  ;  theory  of,  in  Boetius,  56; 
Thomas,  104  f . ;  Albert,  Anselm, 
105  ;  xALelard,  60 ;  Duns,  148 ; 
Occam  and  his  school,  186  f. , 
190  f. ;  Henry  of  Ghent,  106. 

L. 

Lanfranc,  works  of,  74 ;  on  reason, 
55  ;  Lord’s  Supper,  76  f. 
Lauterwald,  Osiandrian  controversy, 
373- 

Law,  The.  In  Luther,  239,  246  ff. ; 
Zwingli,  311  ;  Melanchthcn,  358  ; 
Augsburg  Confession,  337  ;  Osi- 
ander,  370  f . ;  Calvin,  403;  Re¬ 
formed  theology,  416;  preach¬ 
ing  of  the,  248  f.,  250. 


Law  and  Gospel.  In  Luther,  228, 
246,  248  f.,  250;  Agricola,  251, 
366  ;  Augsburg  Confession,  342  ; 
Zwingli,  311  ;  Formula  of  Con¬ 
cord,  385  ;  Antinomian  contro¬ 
versy,  365. 

Law,  natural,  52,  55,  17 1  f.,  183, 

184  n.,  246  f.,  309,  399. 

Legalism.  In  Middle  Ages,  46  ;  An¬ 
selm,  69. 

Leipzig  Disputation,  225,  289  f. ,  291, 
298. 

Leo  I.  In  filioque  controversy,  30. 

Leo  III.  On  Adoptionism,  29  ;  fil¬ 
ioque  controversy,  30. 

Leo  X.  On  councils,  166  ;  bull  of, 

166. 

Leo  XIII.  On  inspiration  of  Scrip¬ 
tures,  460,  n.  2. 

Liberty,  evangelical.  In  Later  Middle 
Ages,  182  f . ;  Goch,  209  ;  Luther, 
275- 

Life,  civil,  273  f . ;  eternal,  359;  the 
new,  231,  256  f.,  337,  360. 

Lombard,  Peter,  estimate  of,  62,  64, 

185  ;  system  of,  63  ;  and  Abelard, 
59  ;  Luther  on,  224  ;  on  person  of 
Christ,  65,74  ;  work  of  Christ,  73  f. , 
91;  sacraments,  63,  80;  Lord’s 
Supper,  78  ;  repentance,  74,  80, 
83,  92  ;  confession,  absolution,  sat¬ 
isfaction,  83,  92  ;  forgiveness,  pur¬ 
gatory,  83  f. ;  extreme  unction,  or¬ 
dination,  84  ;  Trinity,  108  ;  orig¬ 
inal  sin,  1 1 6  ;  grace,  1 1 8  ;  faith, 
justification,  123  n.;  baptism,  130; 
marriage,  143. 

Lord’s  Supper.  In  Middle  Ages, 
16,  34;  Gregory,  24  f . ;  Gelasius, 
34  ;  Carlovingian  period,  34  ;  Al¬ 
enin,  35  ;  Radbertus,  35,  37,  76  ; 
Rabanus,  37,  39  ;  Ratramnus,  38  ; 
Guibert,  Haimo,  39  ;  Gregory  VII., 
75  ;  Durand,  76,  203  ;  Berenger, 
75  f . ;  Lanfranc,  Hugo  of  Langres, 


INDEX. 


481 


Alger,  Guitmund,  76  f. ;  Comester, 
Hildebert,  St.  Florian,  Roland, 
Honorius,  Omnebene,  77  ;  Abe¬ 
lard,  77  n.;  Pullus,  Lombard, 
Rupert,  78  ;  Duns,  Alexander, 
131  f-,133;  Biel,  132,  134 f.,  204; 
Thomas,  133  ;  Occam,  133,  202, 
327  ;  Albert,  134  n.;  Eugene  IV., 
134;  John  of  Paris,  203  n.; 
Thomas  of  Strassburg,  Wesel,Wes- 
sel,  D’Ailli,  204;  Faber,  205  n.; 
Wickliffe,  206;  Erasmus,  215  n. ; 
Luther,  235,  286  ff. ,  322  fif. ;  Bo¬ 
hemian  Brethren,  288  ;  Brenz, 
320,  366;  Zwingli,  318  ff. ;  IIo- 
nius,  288,  319  ;  Oecolampadius, 
3X9,  3225  Bucer,  319,  331; 
Capito,  319;  Carlstadt,  2  88, 
322  ;  Pirckheimer,  320 ;  Blaurer, 
Schnepf,  331  n.;  Schwabach  Ar¬ 
ticles,  330;  Augsburg  Confession, 
341;  Variata,  35 1 ;  Reformed 
Confession,  345  ;  Chemnitz,  377  ; 
Melanchthon,  350,  366,  380  ;  Cal¬ 
vin,  366,  386,  412  f. ,  417  ;  Hess- 
husen,  366 ;  Eucharistic  contro¬ 
versy,  366  ;  Westphalia,  366 ; 
Saliger,  Cerveus,  367  n. ;  Frank¬ 
fort  Recess,  379  ;  Gnesio-Luther- 
ans,  381  ;  Formula  of  Concord, 
386  ;  Southwestern  Germany,  391  ; 
Reformed  theology,  415  ;  Bull- 
inger,  417;  Consensus  Tigurinus, 
417  ;  Heidelberg  Catechism,  Hel¬ 
vetic  Confession,  418  ;  Council  of 
Trent,  439  f. ;  as  bond  of  unity, 
33 1  f. ;  as  food  for  the  soul,  134,  345, 
418 ;  as  a  memorial,  134,  319, 
322,  345,  412;  as  a  pledge  of 
fidelity,  322  ;  as  a  sacrifice,  1 34, 
441,  et  passim  (see  Mass);  as  a 
symbol,  36,  38,  39,  75,  126,  206, 
286  f. ,  318,  320,  340  ;  matter  and 
form  in,  135  ;  elements  in,  289, 
440  ;  in  usu ,  386,  440  ;  spiritual 

31 


reception  of,  36,  207,  328,  330 ; 
worthy  and  unworthy  reception  of, 
77,  329  n.,  366,  386  ;  miracles  ac¬ 
companying,  35,  76  ;  and  immor¬ 
tality  of  the  body,  36,  329,  387, 
414,  n.  2  ;  and  the  unbelieving, 
36,  38,  206  n.,  328  n.,  331,  386; 
benefits  of,  25,  36,  37,  38,  78,  133, 
134,  287  f.,  327  f.,  329,  345,  386  f., 
440,  441,  442  (  see  Christ,  Body 
of). 

Loyola,  estimate  of,  429,430  n.;  and 
Calvin,  430,  n.  2. 

Louis  XIV.  and  papacy,  457. 

Louis  of  Bavaria,  and  papacy,  165  ; 
on  papacy,  165,  167  f.,  174. 

Ludolf  of  Saxony,  mysticism  of,  89. 

Lullus.  On  logical  demonstration, 
105. 

Lupus,  Seratus,  works  of,  30 ;  on 
predestination,  32. 

Luther,  works  of,  221,  225  n.,  226 
nn.,  227  ;  theses  of,  236  ;  scholas¬ 
tic  training  of,  223  ;  estimate  of, 
221  f.,  225  f.,  296  f.,  348,  389, 
417  ;  and  Bucer,  393  ;  and  Calvin, 

393,  394,  401,  4H  f-,  416;  and 
Melanchthon,  349,  352,  363,  381, 
n.  3;  and  Osiander,  372,  373  n.; 
and  Southern  Germany,  320  ;  and 
Southwestern  Germany,  391  ;  and 
Zwingli,  303,  308  n.,  319  f., 

323  n.;  on  Aristotle,  Lombard, 
Thomas,  Biel,  224 ;  on  attrition, 
222,  237  ;  contrition,  222,  234, 
237  ff. ;  repentance,  224,  234,  235, 
241,  251  n.,  272,  35$!  confession, 
240 ;  absolution,  234,  240 ;  satis¬ 
faction,  2 3^  241,  265  f . ;  indul¬ 
gences,  234,  236,  241,  267,  n.  2, 
268  n.;  law,  239,  246  ff. ;  law  and 
gospel,  228,  246,  248  f.,  250; 

Scriptures,  226,  228,  290  fi,  298  f., 
301  f. ;  Apocrypha,  300;  criticism 
of  Scriptures,  300 ;  Word,  234, 


482 


INDEX. 


279  f.,  299  f.,  322  ;  Books  of  the 
Bible,  300 ;  reason,  224,  243, 

247,  299  n. ;  personal  experience, 

224,  225,  228  f.,  230,  233,  235, 

256  f.,  281  n.,  296,  298,  301, 
304 ;  human  merit,  229,  264  ; 

synteresis,  229,  n.  2  j  sin,  229, 
242  f.,  297,  309  ;  free-will,  243  f . ; 
will  of  man,  256,  243  f. ,  255,  n. 
4;  fall,  212;  conscience,  243  n. ; 
conception  of  God,  253,  265,  298, 
407,  416  ;  will  of  God,  244  ;  Trin¬ 
ity,  303,  305  f.;  wrath  of  God, 
229  n.,  245,  249  ;  predestination, 
244,  407;  person  of  Christ,  229  b, 
235>  253,  266,  n.  3,  298,  304  f., 
323,  324  n.;  work  of  Christ,  230, 
261,  266  ff. ;  intercession  of  Chiist, 
269;  indwelling  of  Christ,  231, 
270;  Holy  Spirit,  248  n.,  256, 
263,  280  f.,  305;  grace,  231  ff., 
263  ff.,  297  ;  love  of  God,  245, 
253,  265,  407,  416  ;  justification, 
233 ,  235>  260  f-J  forgiveness, 

260  f.,  283,  284,  372  ;  faith,  223, 

225,  232  ff.,  240,  241,  252  ff, 

275  f-,  296,  297  f.,  302,  328; 
regeneration,  283  f. ;  sanctification, 
new  life,  256  f.,  284,  231,  337, 
360  ;  Christian  life,  256  f.,  273, 
275  f.,  296  ;  imitation  of  Christ, 
270  ;  good  works,  234,  240,  247, 
258,  264,  274,  277,  364  ;  love  to 
fellow-man,  238  f. ,  275  f.,  248  ; 
devil,  267,  n.  2  ;  devils,  246  n.; 
communion  of  saints,  235,  286  fi, 
291  ff. ;  Virgin  Mary,  235;  Sab¬ 
bath,  246,  247  n. ;  sacraments, 

235,  279,  2§2;  baptism,  283  f., 
285  ;  Lord’s  Supper,  235,  286  ff., 
322  ff. ;  alloeosis,  324  ;  right  hand 
of  God,  325  ;  ubiquity^ 288,  320 
n.,  323  f. ;  kingdom  of  God,  277  ; 
church,  226,  235,  289,  291  ff. ; 
keys,  293  ;  hierarchy,  290,  294  ; 


Romish  Church,  295,  289  ;  creed, 
303  f.;  “chief  article,”  297  n.; 
preaching,  281,  293  ;  councils, 

291,  3°3  5  tradition,  291,  302  ff. ; 
mass,  235,  289  ;  monasticism, 

274  ;  asceticism,  276  n. ;  civil  life, 
273  f.;  natural  impulses,  273  ; 
social  problems,  27S ;  the  state, 
274,  290. 

Lutheranism,  and  Calvinism,  415  ; 
and  Catholicism,  417,  n.  I  ;  Me- 
lanchthonian,  381,  383. 

Lychetus,  philosophy  of,  186. 

Lyons,  second  council  at,  146. 

M. 

Major.  In  Majoristic  controversy, 
364  ;  on  person  of  Christ,  374 ; 
good  works,  364,  385. 

Majoristic  controversy,  364  f. 

Manducation,  oral,  327,  350,  386. 

Marbach.  On  predestination,  378. 

Marburg  colloquy,  330. 

Marriage.  In  Lombard,  80,  143  ; 
scholasticism,  85,  125  ;  Bonaven- 
tura,  143  ;  Council  of  Trent,  446. 

Marriage  of  priests.  In  Thomas, 
Duns,  147  ;  Albert,  Eugene  IV., 
143  ;  Augsburg  Confession,  339  ; 
Council  of  Trent,  446. 

Marsilius  of  Inghen,  philosophy  of, 
186. 

Marsilius  of  Padua.  On  hierarchy, 
167. 

Martyr.  On  predestination,  421. 

M  ass,  The.  In  Gregory,  24  f.; 
Luther,  235,  289;  Zwingli,  309; 
Marburg  colloquy,  330  ;  Augsburg 
Confession,  344;  Council  of  Trent, 
441,  445  ;  modern  Roman  Cath¬ 
olic  church,  463. 

Massa  perditionis,  33. 

Maulbronn,  Formula  of,  382  f. 

Mayence,  council  at,  31. 


INDEX. 


483 


Meats,  distinction  of,  344. 

Melanchthon,  works  of,  348,  351  fif. ; 
estimate  of,  348,  363  ;  and  Prot¬ 
estant  doctrine,  348  ;  and  ancient 
symbols,  352  ;  and  Bucer,  350, 
393,  n.  2  ;  and  Calvin,  394 ;  and 
hyper-orthodoxy,  356;  and  In¬ 
terim,  355  n.,  363,  364  ;  and  Lu¬ 
ther,  349,  352,  363,  381,  n.  3  ; 
and  Majoristic  controversy,  365  ; 
and  Oecolampadius,  350 ;  and 
Osiander,  372  n.,  373 ;  and 

Zwingli,  350;  on  Luther,  352  ;  fun¬ 
damental  ideas  of,  35i;'on  church, 
340,  35  L  354  f-,  362  ;  Scriptures, 
348,  351  f. ;  ancient  symbols,  348, 
352;  speculation,  348;  reason, 
science,  353  ;  Aristotle,  348,  n.  3  ; 
free-will,  sin,  predestination,  con¬ 
version,  349  ;  Lord’s  Supper,  350, 
366,  380;  repentance,  351,  358, 
361  ;  experience,  353  ;  justifica¬ 
tion,  351,  356,  358,  360  f.,  362, 
372,  n.  2;  pure  doctrine,  352  f., 
354  ff- ;  s  Romish  Church,  355; 
ministry,  355  n.;  law,  wrath  of 
God,  358;  contrition,  358,  361; 
faith,  356,  360  f. ;  regeneration, 
360;  merit,  361;  gospel,  358; 
work,  merit  and  intercession  of 
Christ,  fruits  of  redemption,  eternal 
life,  359  ;  grace,  Holy  Spirit,  360  ; 
new  life,  360;  good  works,  361, 
364- 

Mendicants,  146. 

Menius.  In  Majoristic  controversy, 
364  ;  in  Osiandrian  controversy, 

373- 

Merit,  human.  In  Gregory,  23; 
Albert,  116;  Thomas,  116,  12 1  f., 
124,  136;  Bonaventura,  116,  121  f., 
124;  Duns,  158;  Occam,  192; 
Biel,  199,  202;  Luther,  229,  264; 
Zwingli,  313;  Augsburg  Confes¬ 
sion,  337;  Melanchthon,  361; 


Council  of  Trent,  434,  438;  of  fit¬ 
ness  and  worthiness,  112,  1 1 5, 
123,  138,  160,  199,  202,  229,  337, 
434,  436. 

Migetius.  On  Trinity,  27. 

Ministry,  The.  In  Luther,  293  f., 
Zwingli,  316  n. ;  Augsburg  Con¬ 
fession,  341 ;  Melanchthon,  355 
n.;  Calvin,  409;  Council  of  Trent, 
445- 

Miracles,  35,  76,  91. 

Molina,  work  of,  450;  on  grace  and 
free-will,  451  f. ;  median  divine 
knowledge,  452. 

Monastic  life,  124,  274. 

Monastic  vows,  344. 

Monastic  works,  339. 

Money,  abuse  of,  in  the  church,  165, 
n.  I,  177,  203. 

Moralism.  In  Middle  Ages,  91. 

Multivolipresence,  376,  386,  387, 

388. 

Musculus.  On  predestination,  421. 

Mysticism.  In  Bernard,  52  f.,  88; 
Bonaventura,  88  n.,  89  f.,  100 ; 
Hugo,  Richard,  88  n.,  89  f. ;  Fran¬ 
cis,  Ludolf,  89 ;  Scholastics,  124; 
German,  178  fr.,  280. 

N. 

Napoleon  I.  In  Gallican  church, 
457;  on  pope,  457. 

Narbonne,  council  at,  43. 

Naumburg,  diet  at,  379. 

Nestorianism.  In  thirteenth  century, 

66. 

Netter  vs.  Wickliffe,  189. 

Nice,  councils  at,  29,  290. 

Nicholas  of  Clemanges.  On  greed 
of  papacy,  1 66  n. 

Nicholas  of  Hontheim,  work  of,  457; 
on  episcopacy,  457;  papacy,  458. 

Nicholas  I.  On  papacy,  40,  41  n. 

Nihilianism,  65. 


484 


INDEX. 


Niphus,  philosophy  of,  187. 

Nominalism,  56,  186,  188,  190  ff., 
428,  429. 

Nunciatures,  papal,  458. 

O. 

Obedience.  In  Jesuitism,  430. 

Obedience  of  Christ,  371,  373,  400. 

Objective  vs.  subjective,  191. 

Obstacle,  in  sacraments,  129. 

Occam,  estimate  of,  185  f.,  1 9 1  ;  on 
communion  of  saints,  144  ;  Scrip¬ 
tures,  162,  172,  192  f. ;  hierarchy, 
167  ;  natural  law,  183  ;  Nominal¬ 
ism,  190  ff. ;  Trinity,  communicatio 
idiomatum,  192;  transubstantiation, 
church,  192  b ;  faith,  1 95  f. ;  sin, 
free-will,  197. 

Oecolampadius.  On  Lord’s  Supper, 
319,  322. 

Offices  in  church,  Calvin,  409. 

Omnebene,  work  of,  59  ;  on  person 
of  Christ,  65  ;  Lord’s  Supper,  77  ; 
sacraments,  79. 

Omnipresence  of  Christ’s  body,  66, 
77,  288  (see  Ubiquity). 

Opus  operatum,  46. 

Ordinances,  human,  341. 

Ordination.  In  Gregory,  51  ;  Hugo, 
Roland,  Lombard,  84  ;  Scholastic¬ 
ism,  125  ;  Thomas,  Bonaventura, 
Duns,  141  ;  Eugene  IV.,  142; 
Council  of  Trent,  445. 

Osiander,  works  of,  369  ;  estimate  of, 
372 ;  and  Brenz,  373,  n.  2  ;  and 
Calvin,  373,  n.  2  ;  and  Melanch- 
thon,  372  n.;  and  Luther,  372, 
373  n. ;  on  justification,  369  ff., 
373  >  person  and  work  of  Christ, 

370  f. ;  inner  word,  faith,  right¬ 
eousness,  obedience  of  Christ, 

371  n.;  forgiveness,  372  f. ;  re¬ 
newal,  Christian  life,  370,  373  ; 
symbolic  subscription,  352  n. 


Osiandrian  controversy,  366  ff. 

Otto,  Anton.  Antinomianism  of,  366. 

Otto  of  Freising.  On  papacy,  146. 

Otto  the  Great.  On  papacy,  40. 

P. 

Palude,  Petrus  de,  philosophy  of, 
186. 

Pantheism,  95. 

Papacy,  greed  of,  166  n. 

Pascal  vs.  Jesuits,  453. 

Paternoster,  92. 

Paul  of  Venice,  philosophy  of,  187. 

Paulinus,  works  of,  27. 

Peckham,  philosophy  of,  98. 

Penance,  forms  of,  45  ;  redemption 
of,  44  f. 

Penitence,  compulsory,  24  n. 

Penitential  books,  42. 

Perfection,  Christian.  In  Francis, 
Ludolf,  89  f. ;  Thomas,  124  ;  Bona¬ 
ventura,  89  f.,  124;  Luther,  275  f. ; 
Augsburg  Confession,  339  ;  Cal¬ 
vin,  403. 

Perseverance,  378,  391,  406,  423. 

Peter,  Epistles  of,  Luther  on,  300  ; 
primacy  of,  168. 

Pfeffinger.  On  Synergism,  367. 

Philippism,  381. 

Philosophy  of  Aristotle,  95  ;  Arabian, 

95- 

Piacenza,  council  at,  78. 

Pictaviensis,  Petrus,  works  of,  64. 

Pighius.  On  predestination,  420, 
righteousness,  434  n. 

Pilgrimages,  173. 

Pirckheimer.  On  Lord’s  Supper 
32°. 

Pisa,  council  at,  166. 

Pistoja,  synod  at,  445,  n.  I,  458. 

Pius  IX.  On  immaculate  con  cep 
tion,  456  ;  Vatican  Council,  460. 

Poach.  On  law  and  gosnel,  365. 

Polygamy,  142,  n.  3. 


INDEX. 


4*5 


Pope,  authority  of.  In  Nicholas  I., 
Donation  of  Constantine,  40 ; 
Humbert,  Gregory  VII.,  50  f.; 
Hugo,  Pullus,  86  ;  Innocent  III., 
87;  Boniface  VIII.,  88,  97,  165  ; 
Thomas,  102,  145  f. ;  2d  Council 
of  Lyons,  146,  165  f. ,  167  f . ; 

Wickliffe,  21 1;  Luther,  225  b, 
289  f.,  298  n. ;  Council  of  Trent, 
440,  446  f.,  448  ;  Catechismus 

Romanus,  448  ;  Louis  XIV.,  457  ; 
Gallican  church,  Nicholas  of  Hont- 
heim,  457  ;  Punctation  of  Ems, 
458  f. ;  modern  church,  459  ;  Vati¬ 
can  Council,  461. 

Porphyry,  philosophy  of,  56  n. 

Port  Royal,  abbey  at,  452,  454. 
Poverty,  Book  of  Spiritual,  178. 
Prayer,  405  n.,  419. 

Preaching.  In  Middle  Ages,  91  f. ; 
Guibert,  92  ;  Later  Middle  Ages, 
174;  Luther,  281,  293;  Jesuits, 
430- 

Predestination.  In  Gregory,  23  ; 
Florus,  30  f. ;  Isidore,  30  ;  Gotts- 
chalk,  31  ;  Rabanus,  31,  32  ; 

Council  of  Mayence,  31  ;  Councils 
of  Chiersy  and  Valence,  32,  33  ; 
Prudentius,  Remigius,  Ratramnus, 
Lupus,  Hincmar,  Amolo,  Scotus, 
32  ;  Council  of  Toucy,  33  ;  Duns, 

1 5 1  f ,  156,  164;  Biel,  198; 

Bradwardina,  207  ;  Wickliffe,  208  ; 
Luther,  244,  407  ;  Zwingli,  313  f-, 
315;  Melanchthon,  349;  Calvin, 
397,  405  ff.,  420;  Zanchi,  378, 
421  ;  Marbach,  Hesshusen,  378; 
Formula  of  Concord,  388  ;  South¬ 
western  Germany,  391  ;  Bucer, 
392  f. ;  Reformed  theology,  416, 
421  ;  Later  Reformed  Confessions, 
419,  421;  Pighius,  Bolsec,  420; 
Gomarus,  421,  422  n.;  Beza, 

Martyr,  Musculus,  421  ;  Synod  of 
Dort,  421  ff.  ;  Arminius,  Uyten- 


bogaart,  Episcopius,  421  ;  Re¬ 
monstrants  and  Contra-remon¬ 
strants,  422  ;  Consensus  Helvetica, 
425  ;  Amyraldus,  424  f. ;  Jansen, 
453  f. ;  Helvetic  Confession,  Heid¬ 
elberg  Catechism,  Westminster 
Confession,  421. 

Presence,  mode  of,  in  Lord’s  Supper, 

I33»  2°4>  326>  329,  440;  sacra¬ 
mental,  350,  440  ;  Real  (see 
Christ,  Body  of). 

Prescience.  In  Gottschalk,  31  ; 
Counci1  of  Valence,  33  ;  Formula 
of  Concord,  388  f. ;  Bucer,  392. 

Prophecies,  Luther  on,  300. 

Prosper  of  Reggeo,  Eremite,  187. 

Prudentius,  works  of,  30 ;  on  pre¬ 
destination,  32. 

Pullus.  On  work  of  Christ,  73 ; 
transubstantiation,  78  ;  sacraments, 
79;  confirmation,  81  ;  confession, 
absolution,  purgatory,  83  ;  church, 
85  f. ;  state,  86. 

Punctation  of  Ems,  458. 

Purgatory.  In  Gregory,  24  f. ;  Early 
Middle  Ages,  44 ;  Abelard,  Ro¬ 
land,  81  ;  Lombard,  Pullus,  83  f. ; 
Waldenses,  94  ;  Alexander,  Bona- 
ventura,  Biel,  Henry,  Duns,  139; 
Luther,  241  ;  Zwingli,  316  n. 

Purification.  In  Mysticism,  179  f. 

Q- 

Quesnel,  work  of,  454  ;  theses  of, 
455  n.;  on  Scriptures,  church,  will, 
faith,  forgiveness,  justification, 
grace,  455  n. 

R. 

Rabanus,  M  auras,  works  of,  16,  30  ; 
on  predestination,  31,  32  ;  Lord’s 
Supper,  37,  39. 

Radbertus,  works  of,  16,  34;  on  Virgin 


486 


INDEX. 


Mary,  34  ;  faith,  37  ;  Lord’s  Sup¬ 
per,  35,  37,  76. 

Rationalism.  In  Abelard,  58  ;  Fred¬ 
erick  II.,  91  ;  thirteenth  century, 
60. 

Ratramnus,  works  of,  30,  34  ;  on  pre¬ 
destination,  32  ;  Virgin  Mary,  34  ; 
Lord’s  Supper,  38. 

Realism.  In  William  of  Champeaux, 
60 ;  William  of  Auverne,  Alex¬ 
ander,  98  ;  Duns,  147  ;  Later 
Middle  Ages,  186  f. 

Reason.  In  Scotus,  15  ;  Abelard, 
58  ;  Anselm,  57,  68  ;  Berenger, 
Lanfranc,  55  ;  Thomas,  Bonaven- 
tura,  104  ;  Luther,  224,  243,  247, 
299  n. ;  Pullus,  62  ;  Melanchthon, 

353- 

Recarred,  Confession  of,  30. 

Redemption.  In  Hugo,  61  ;  Mystics, 
1 19  ;  benefits  of,  in  Lombard,  14  ; 
Thomas,  1 1 3  ;  Duns,  106  f. ; 
Melanchthon,  359  ;  Osiander,  370 
(see  Christ,  Work  of). 

Reformation,  attempted,  49  f. ;  need 
of,  188  f. ;  forerunners  of,  190. 

Reformation,  The,  217,  222,  225  n., 
308  f.,  41 1,  415. 

Reformed  Church,  asceticism  in,  415, 
420. 

Reformed  Confessions,  Earlier, 
344  f.;  Later,  345  f.,  418  f. 

Reformed  Theology,  pre- reformation 
ideals  of,  415;  and  Roman  Catho¬ 
licism,  417,  n.  I;  and  Calvin,  426; 
on  sacraments,  415,  418;  predesti¬ 
nation,  416,  421,  422. 

Regeneration.  In  Luther,  283  f. ; 
Augsburg  Confession,  337  f. ;  Me¬ 
lanchthon,  360;  Calvin,  403  f. ; 
Synod  of  Dort,423  (see  Renewal). 

Relics,  worship  of,  91,  94,  173. 

Religion,  natural,  353. 

Remigius,  works  of,  30;  on  predesti¬ 
nation,  32. 


Remonstrants.  On  predestination, 422. 

Renaissance,  The,  27. 

Renewal.  In  Luther,  231,  256  f., 
284,  337  f.,  260;  Majoristic  con¬ 
troversy,  365;  Osiander,  370  ff. ; 
Formula  of  Concord,  384,  423  n.; 
Calvin,  402  f.,  404. 

Repentance.  In  Middle  Ages,  16, 
41  to  47;  Durand,  92;  Waldenses, 
94;  Biel,  134  f.,  138,  201;  Later 
Middle  Ages,  175  ff. ;  Mystics, 
179;  John  of  Paltz,  201 ;  Luther, 
251  n.,  272,  358;  Augsburg  Con¬ 
fession,  Apology,  342;  Melanch¬ 
thon,  351,  358,  361;  Later  Re¬ 
formed  Confessions,  419;  public 
vs.  private,  42,  93. 

Repentance,  sacrament  of.  In  Gre¬ 
gory,  24,  47;  Abelard,  81  f. ;  Epit¬ 
ome,  Roland,  81 ;  Hugo,  82,  92; 
Pullus,  83;  Lombard,  83,  92; 

Thomas,  Alexander,  Bonaventura, 
Biel,  134  ff.;  Eugene  IV.,  140; 
John  of  Paltz,  174  n.,  175  f., 

201  n.;  Wickliffe,  Wesel,  Wessel, 
210;  Luther,  222,  224,  234  ff., 

241 ;  Calvin,  402  f. ;  Jesuits,  429; 
Council  of  Trent,  434,  438,  442, 
444- 

Revelation  of  grace,  in  Amyraldus, 
425- 

Reward,  23,  91  (see  Merit). 

Richard  of  Middleton,  philosophy  of, 
98;  on  will,  106. 

Richard  of  St.  Victor.  On  Trinity, 
108;  communion  of  saints,  144. 

Rickel,  philosophy  of,  187. 

Righteousness,  actual,  259  f.,  338, 
370  f.,  381,  n.  4,  384,  438;  im¬ 
puted,  260  f.,  337  f-,  359,  370  f-, 
379,  381,  n.  4,  384,  404,  418, 
43  f.,  et  passim;  original,  114,  1 5  3, 
370. 

Right  Hand  of  God,  325,  413,  440. 

Roland,  work  of,  59;  on  person  of 


INDEX. 


487 


Christ,  65  ;  Lord’s  Supper,  77; 
sacraments,  79;  repentance,  con¬ 
trition,  confirmation,  ordination, 
purgatory,  81. 

Roman  Catholic  Church  before  the 
Reformation,  146  ;  reformation 
within,  428  ;  modern  condition  of, 
463  f. ;  Luther  on,  289,  294;  Me- 
lanchthon  on,  355. 

Ionian  Catholic  Theology,  sources 
for,  427  ;  estimate  of,  427  f.,  430, 
431  ;  Thomistic  character  of,  428  ; 
influence  of  Duns  upon,  428,  431  ; 
and  Paul,  455  ;  and  opposing 
schools,  428,  431,  432,  433,  438, 
439- 

Romans,  Epistle  to,  Luther  on,  301. 

Rome,  councils  at,  29,  76. 

Roscellin,  philosophy  of,  56 ;  on 
Trinity,  56. 

Rupert.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  78  n. 

S. 

Sabbath.  In  Erasmus,  215  n.;  Lu¬ 
ther,  246,  247  n.;  Zwingli,  31 1, 
n.  I. 

Sacraments.  In  Abelard,  59,  72,  79  ; 
Hugo,  61,  79,  80;  Lombard,  63,80; 
Anselm,  72;  Bernard,  Roland,  Pul- 
lus,Omnebene,  St. Florian, 79;  Ber- 
thold,  93  ;  Later  Middle  Ages,  98, 
124b;  Eugene  IV.,  125  ;  Thomas, 
Bonaventura,  1 25  f . ;  Alexander, 
125,  126  n.;  Duns,  127  b,  161  ; 
Albert,  128  ;  Biel,  187,  200  ; 
Luther,  235,  279,  282  Zwingli, 
316  ;  Augsburg  Confession,  341  f. ; 
Apology,  343;  Calvin,  41 1  fb; 
Reformed  theology,  415,  418  ; 

Consensus  Tigurinus,  417  ;  Re¬ 
formed  Confessions,  345  ;  Council 
of  Trent,  438  f.;  definition  of,  79, 
80,  93,  125,  41 1  ;  number  of, 
37  n.,  63,  79,  80,  93,  125,  135, 


282,  316,  439  ;  place  of,  in  dog¬ 
matic  system,  59  ;  validity  of,  94  ; 
matter  and  form  of,  126  ;  inten¬ 
tion  in,  125  ;  as  symbols,  126, 
12 7  f.,  282,  316,  411,  417,  439  ; 
as  pledges,  41 1  ;  and  word,  78, 
123  n.,  285  f. ,  41 1  ;  administered 
by  heretics,  50,  51,  142  ;  benefits 
of,  80,  93,  127,  345. 

Saints,  communion  of,  144  f. ,  212, 
235,  286  f.,  291  fb,  408. 

Saints,  intercession  of.  In  Early 
Middle  Ages,  44,  91  ;  Waldenses, 
94  ;  Thomas,  124  ;  Later  Middle 
Ages,  173  ;  Augsburg  Confession, 
344  ;  Council  of  Trent,  445. 

Saliger.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  367  n. 

Salmeron.  On  divine  right,  447  n. 

Salvation,  causes  of,  405,  n.  I  ;  of 
souls,  94,  225. 

Sanctification,  in  Apology,  338  ;  Lu¬ 
ther,  Melanchthon,  360  ;  South¬ 
western  Germany,  390 ;  Calvin, 
402,  404  (see  Life,  New). 

Sanfelice,  evangelical  views  of,  434, 
n.  2. 

Satisfaction.  In  Early  Middle  Ages, 
43,  47;  Anselm,  67  f.;  Roland, 
81  ;  Abelard,  Hugo,  82;  Lom¬ 
bard,  83,  92  ;  council  at  Aachen, 
84  ;  Thomas,  Duns,  139  ;  Eugene 
IV.,  140;  Wessel,  210;  Luther, 
234,  241,  265  f.,  267,  n.  2,  268, 
n.  1  ;  Council  of  Trent,  435,  438, 
443 >  444  5  Bajus,  451  n. 

Savonarola.  On  asceticism,  church 
and  state,  198  n.;  politics,  318. 

Scepticism,  Abelard,  58 ;  thirteenth 
century,  60;  Frederick  II.,  91. 

Scholasticism,  estimate  of,  54  fb ,  57, 
105,  146,  196,  214;  in  Luther, 
223  ;  Luther  on,  224. 

Schnepf.  On  Lord’s  Supper,  331  n. 

Schwabach  Articles,  330, 

Schwabian  Concord,  382  n. 


488 


INDEX. 


Scliwenkfeldians,  389. 

Scotus  Erigena,  works  of,  30 ;  on 
predestination,  32. 

Scriptures,  authority  of.  In  Gregory, 
18;  Abelard,  58;  Thomas,  100; 
Bonaventura,  101  ;  Duns,  149  ; 
Occam,  169,  172,  192;  Wickliffe, 
184;  D’Ailli,  Biel,  192  f. ;  Goch, 
209;  Erasmus,  215  n.;  Luther, 
226,  228,  290  f.,  298k,  301  f.; 
Zwingli,  308,  309  n.;  Reformed 
Confessions,  344 ;  Melanchthon, 
348,  351  f. ;  Southwestern  Ger¬ 
many,  391;  Calvin,  395>  39^  n. ; 
Later  Reformed  Confessions,  419 
n.;  Council  of  Trent,  431  ;  Bajus, 
45°>  45 1  n-5  Jansen,  453  ;  Ques- 
nel,  455  n. 

Scriptures,  criticism  of,  301,301  n. 

Scriptures,  inspiration  of.  In  Gregory, 
18  ;  Abelard,  58  ;  Thomas,  101  ; 
Agobard,  101  n. ;  Occam,  Biel, 
192;  Erasmus,  301  f.;  Luther, 
Calvin,  395  ;  Reformed  theology, 
415,  419  n.;  Consensus  Helvetica, 
426  ;  Council  of  Trent,  431  ;  Vat¬ 
ican  Council,  460;  Leo  XIII., 
460  n. 

Scriptures,  interpretation  of,  15,  19. 

Scriptures,  reading  of.  In  Gregory, 
19,  455  n- 

Secular  learning  and  religion,  353, 
362,  363. 

Secular  life,  273  f. 

Self-communion,  440. 

Selnecker,  Lutheranism  of,  381. 

Seini-Augustinianism,  32. 

Semi-Pelagianism,  16,  63. 

Sens,  council  at,  61. 

Setipando,  evangelical  views  of,  434, 
n.  2. 

Seuse,  works  of,  178. 

Sigismund,  confession  of,  421  n. 

Silent  Submission,  to  doctrine,  456, 

463,  465. 


Simon  Baringundus,  Eremite,  187. 

Simony,  50. 

Sin.  In  Gregory,  21  f . ;  Anselm,  67, 
no;  Luther,  229,  242  f. ;  Augs¬ 
burg  Confession,  335  ;  Zwingli, 
309,  3J7  >  Biel,  Occam,  197;  as 
disease,  defect,  22,  1 1 7,  309; 

venial  vs.  mortal,  43  f.,  92,  135 
et  passim;  propagation  of,  1 17  ; 
results  of,  117,  118. 

Sin,  original.  In  Gregory,  21  ;  An¬ 
selm,  Lombard,  Alexander,  Bona¬ 
ventura,  Thomas,  1 16  f . ;  Duns, 
153,  154,  i63;  Biel,  Occam,  197; 
Luther,  229,  242  f. ,  297;  Me¬ 
lanchthon,  349  n.;  Zwingli,  309, 
317  ;  Augsburg  Confession,  335  ; 
Earlier  Reformed  Confessions, 
345  n.;  Formula  of  Concord,  383  ; 
Southwestern  Germany,  390  ;  Cal¬ 
vin,  398  ;  Later  Reformed  Confes¬ 
sions,  419  ;  Council  of  Trent,  432  ; 
Bajus,  451  n.;  Jansen,  453. 

Sins,  actual,  154,  242  ;  enumeration 
of,  443. 

Social  Problems,  182,  202  n.,  278, 
292  n.  2. 

Soissons,  council  at,  61. 

Solida  Declaratio,  382  n. 

Southwestern  Germany,  theology  in, 
390  ff.,  414. 

Spires,  diet  at,  333. 

Stancar.  On  Osiandrian  controversy, 
374- 

State,  The.  In  Gregory  VII.,  51,  85, 
86;  Pullus,  Hugo,  Innocent  III., 
86  f. ;  Boniface  VIII.,  88;  Louis 
of  Bavaria,  165  ;  Marsilius, 
Occam,  167,  170  ;  Luther,  274, 
290;  Zwingli,  317  f. ;  Augsburg 
Confession,  341  ;  Calvin,  410. 

State,  original.  In  Gregory,  21  n.; 
Alexander,  Bonaventura,  Albert, 
Thomas,  1 14  f. ;  Henry,  1151 


INDEX. 


489 


Duns,  153  ;  Biel,  197  ;  Council  of 
Trent,  432  n.;  Bajus,  450. 

States  of  Christ,  325  n.,  376  f.,  387. 

Stephen  of  Paris,  philosophy  of,  98. 

Strigel.  In  Synergistic  controversy, 
367  f. 

Stuttgart,  synod  at,  366. 

Subjective  vs.  objective,  191. 

Sufferings  of  Christ.  In  Gregory,  19, 
53  ;  Anselm,  69  ;  Thomas,  112  f. ; 
Duns,  156  f . ;  Luther,  266  f.  (see 
Atonement,  Work  of  Christ). 

Supererogation,  works  of,  23,  1 24, 
139. 

Superstition,  49. 

Symbols,  estimate  of,  466  ;  the  an¬ 
cient,  in  Gregory,  18 ;  Thomas, 
Bonaventura,  Anselm,  Alexander, 
Richard,  Durand,  102  ;  Duns, 
149;  Luther,  303;  Zwingli,  317  ; 
Melanchthon,  348,  352  ;  Calvin, 
396  ;  later  Reformed  theology, 
419  n. 

Synergism,  controversy  upon,  267  ff. ; 
in  Formula  of  Concord,  384;  Coun¬ 
cil  of  Trent,  433,  435  f. ;  Molina, 
451  f. 

Syngramma,  320. 

Synod,  at  Alengon,  425  ;  Dort  421  ; 
Eisenach,  365  ;  France,  425  ; 
Pistoja,  445  n.  1,  458  ;  Stuttgart, 
366  ;  Torgau,  367  (see  Council). 

T. 

Tauler,  works  of,  178  ;  on  word  and 
sacraments,  128  ;  imitation  of 
Christ,  178  f. 

Tetrapolitan  Confession,  344  f. 

Theodulf.  On  filioque ,  30. 

Theology,  Systematic.  In  Abelard, 
59  ;  Honorius,  Hugo,  61  ;  John 
of  Damascus,  Lombard,  63  ;  Mid¬ 
dle  Ages,  96,  189,  214;  Albert, 
Thomas,  99 ;  Gerson,  189  ;  Me¬ 


lanchthon,  348,  362,  363  ;  nature 
of,  104  n.,  149,  15011.;  German, 
178. 

Thomas  of  Aquino,  estimate  of,  96, 
97,  98,  99,  100,  146,  185,  224; 
method  of,  99;  on  God,  100,  107; 
revelation,  100  f. ;  Scriptures,  101  ; 
faith,  103,  121  ;  will,  103;  uni¬ 
versal,  104 ;  Trinity,  100,  109  ; 
communicatio  idiomatum,  1,10  ; 
person  of  Christ,  1 10  f. ;  work  of 
Christ,  ill  f . ;  intercession  of 

Christ,  1 1 3  ;  fruits  of  redemption, 
1 13  ;  synteresis,  114  ;  original 
state,  1 14  f. ;  infused  grace,  1 1 5, 

1 19;  original  sin,  1 1 6  ;  forgive¬ 
ness,  1 12  f.,  121  ;  free-will,  1 1 9  f. ; 
justification,  120  f. ;  faith,  103, 
120  ;  guilt,  1 1 7  ;  grace,  115,  11S  ; 
good  works,  116,  12 1  ;  human 

merit,  116,  121  f.,  124;  merit  of 
Christ,  1 13;  monastic  life,  124; 
sacraments,  125  f. ;  indelible  char¬ 
acter,  1 28  ;  baptism,  130  ;  Lord’s 
Supper,  133;  repentance,  134k; 
contrition,  136k;  confession,  abso¬ 
lution,  137  k;  indulgences,  satis¬ 
faction,  139  ;  extreme  unction,  140; 
ordination,  14 1  ;  marriage,  142  ; 
church,  144  k;  pope,  102,  145  k; 
blessedness,  148. 

Thomas  of  Bradwardina.  On  person 
of  Christ,  no;  predestination, 
189,  207. 

Thomas  of  Strassburg,  philosophy  of, 

187  ;  on  immaculate  conception, 

188  n.;  Lord’s  Supper,  204. 

Thomas  sel  Vio  (see  Cajetan). 

Tilmann.  On  Eucharistic  contro¬ 
versy,  366. 

Timann.  On  Eucharistic  controversy 
366. 

Torgau,  synod  at,  367. 

Torgau  Book,  382  n. 

Toucy,  council  at,  33. 


49° 


INDEX. 


Toulouse,  council  at,  93. 

Tours,  council  at,  76;  school  at,  55, 
98. 

Tradition.  In  Middle  Ages,  17; 
Abelard,  58;  Luther,  291,  302  ff.; 
Council  of  Trent,  431  f.,  449; 
Vatican  Council,  460;  Protestant 
Church,  464  f. 

Traducianism,  22. 

Transubstantiation.  In  Radbertus, 
35;  Rabanus,  37;  Haimo,  39; 
Rerenger,  76;  Comester,  Hilde- 
bert,  Roland,  St.  Florian,  Omne- 
bene,  Honorius,  Hugo,  77;  Ger- 
manus,  Stephen,  William  of 
Thiersy,  77  n. ;  Pullus,  Lombard, 
Fourth  Lateran  Council,  78;  Later 
Middle  Ages,  127,  205;  Thomas, 
Alexander,  Duns,  13 1  f.,  150; 

Occam,  192  b;  Wickliffe,  Hussites, 
206;  Luther,  235,  286  n.,  287; 
Zwingli,  318;  Augsburg  Confes¬ 
sion,  Apology,  342;  Council  of 
Trent,  440. 

Treasure,  of  the  church,  139,  236, 
241. 

T rent,  Council  of,  estimate  of,  43 1 , 448, 
463;  history  of,  431  ff. ;  and  scho¬ 
lasticism,  55;  and  modern  theology, 
448;  on  Scriptures,  43 1 ;  tradition, 
43  L  449;  Apocrypha,  432;  origi¬ 
nal  state,  432  n.;  sin,  fall,  Virgin 
Mary,  432;  baptism,  432,  434,  436, 
439,  444;  concupiscence,  donum 
superadditum,  432;  divine  call,  433, 
435;  faith,  433,  435,  436,  437,  440, 
449;  grace,  433,  435,  439,  449;  jus¬ 
tification,  433  ff.;  435,  436,  437; 
imputed  and  infused  righteousness, 
434;  merit,  434,  438;  free-will, 
434;  repentance,  434,  438,  442, 
444;  satisfaction,  435,  438,  443, 
444;  assurance,  435,  437;  good 
works,  434,  435,  437,  443;  love  to 
God,  436;  work  of  Christ,  436, 


442,  n.  1;  forgiveness,  433,  437; 

asceticism,  438,  449;  Christian 

life,  438;  contrition,  438,  442,  444; 
confession,  absolution,  438,  442, 

443,  444;  sacraments,  438  f. ; 
Lord’s  Supper,  439  f . ;  mass,  441, 
445;  hierarchy,  443,  444,  446  f., 
445 >  4495  indulgences,  444;  purg¬ 
atory,  extreme  unction,  ordination, 
priesthood,  445;  marriage,  church, 
446;  pope  446  f.,  448,  449;  and 
Augustinianism,  450. 

Treves,  council  at,  92,  93. 

Tribur,  council  at,  45. 

Trinity.  In  Gregory,  17;  Migetius, 
27;  Gottschalk,  Plincmar,  31 ; 
Roscellin,  56;  Abelard,  58  f. ; 
Thomas,  100,  109;  Richard,  Lom¬ 
bard,  Joachim,  Fourth  Lateran 
Council,  108;  Occam,  192;  Luther, 
3 °3>  3°5  f-  5  Augustine,  306  n. ; 
Calvin,  396,  n.  2. 

Tubingen  Rook,  382. 

U. 

Ubiquity,  of  body  of  Christ.  In  Al¬ 
ger,  77;  Occam,  204;  Luther,  288, 
320,  n.  2,  322  ff. ;  Melanchthon, 
350;  Cureus,  366;  synod  at  Tor- 
gau,  367;  Heidelberg  theologians, 
374;  Chemnitz,  376,  388;  Formula 
of  Concord,  386  f , ;  Calvin,  413. 

Unbelief,  243. 

Unction,  extreme,  84,  140,  445. 

Unification  with  God,  180  f.,  328. 

Union,  mystical,  328. 

Union,  sacramental,  of  elements  and 
body  of  Christ,  326  f.,  386. 

Union,  the  Protestant,  relation  to  dog¬ 
mas,  466  n. 

Universals,  56,  60,  104  b,  147,  190  f. 

Urban  of  Rologna,  philosophy  of,  187. 

Urban  VIII.  and  Jansenism,  453. 

Uytenbogaart.  On  predestination, 
421. 


INDEX. 


491 


V. 

Valence,  council  at,  33. 

Valla,  Lorenzo.  On  spurious  docu¬ 
ments,  213. 

Vatican  Council,  456  ff. ;  sources  on, 
estimate  of,  463;  and  scholastic¬ 
ism,  55;  on  God,  Scriptures,  tra¬ 
dition,  church,  faith,  460;  infalli¬ 
bility  of  pope,  461. 

Vercelli,  council  at,  76. 

Vices,  the  principal,  21  n. 

Vincent  of  Lerius.  On  tradition,  304. 

Virgin  Mary,  immaculate  conception 
of,  18,  19  n.,  155,  456,  188  n.; 
intercession  of,  44,  91,  173;  par¬ 
turition  of,  33  f.;  worship  of,  235, 
344;  and  original  sin,  432,  451  n.; 
in  modern  Roman  Catholic  church, 

463- 

Vorillon,  philosophy  of,  186. 

Vows,  monastic,  344. 

Vulgate,  432,  460. 

W. 

Waldenses.  On  repentance,  church, 
saints,-  images,  purgatory,  94  ; 
good  works,  95. 

Walther  of  St.  Victor,  philosophy 
of,  60. 

Weimar  Confutation,  379. 

Wesel,  relation  to  Augustine,  190  ; 
on  Lord’s  Supper,  204  ;  grace, 
209 ;  repentance,  absolution,  in¬ 
dulgences,  210;  church,  21 1. 

Wessel,  relation  to  Augustine,  190  ; 
on  Lord’ s  Supper,  204  ;  grace,  jus¬ 
tification,  209  ;  repentance,  indul¬ 
gences,  satisfaction,  excommunica¬ 
tion,  210  ;  church,  21 1  f. ;  commu¬ 
nion  of  saints,  212. 

Westminster  Confession.  On  predesti¬ 
nation,  421, 

Wickliffe,  works  of,  183  ;  influence 
of,  183  n.,  189  n.;  on  “evangeli¬ 


cal  law,”  Scriptures,  imitation  of 
Christ,  184  ;  work  of  Christ,  198  ; 
Lord’s  Supper,  206;  predestina¬ 
tion,  108  ;  repentance,  indul¬ 
gences,  210 ;  church,  pope,  ex- 
communication,  21 1. 

Will,  of  God.  In  Richard,  106  ;  Duns, 
15 1,  156,  163;  Luther,  244; 

Zwingli,  313;  Calvin,  396  ff.; 
405  ff. ;  Reformed  theology,  416  ; 
secret  and  revealed,  244. 

Will,  of  man.  In  Middle  Ages,  97  ; 
Thomas,  1 03  ;  Henry,  Richard, 
106  ;  Duns,  148,  159,  163  ;  Biel, 
Occam,  197  ;  Luther,  243  f., 

255,  n.  4,  256 ;  Synergistic  con¬ 
troversy,  367  f. ;  Formula  of  Con¬ 
cord,  383  ;  Camero,  425  ;  Jansen, 
453  f-;  Quesnel,  455  n. 

William  of  Auverne.  On  sacraments, 

98. 

William  of  Champeaux,  philosophy 
of,  60. 

William  of  Paris.  On  attrition,  contri¬ 
tion,  136  f. 

William  of  St.  Thierry.  On  Lord’s 
Supper,  77  n. 

Wittenberg,  disputation  at,  349. 

Wittenberg  Concord,  386. 

Word,  The.  In  Gregory,  23  ; 
T aider,  178;  Luther,  234,  279  b, 
299  f.,  322  ;  Formula  of  Concord, 
388 ;  Calvin,  409 ;  Osiander, 
370  f. ;  significance  of,  123  ;  outer 
and  inner,  23,  279  f.,  280  f. ,  370  f. ; 
and  sacraments,  78,  123  n., 

285  f.,  41 1. 

Words  of  Institution.  In  sacraments, 
126  ;  in  Lord’s  Supper,  1 3 1 ,  132, 
135,  322.  328,  414- 

Worms,  colloquy  at,  378. 

Works,  good.  In  Gregory,  24  ; 
Early  Middle  Ages,  43  ;  Bernard, 
53  ;  Waldenses,  95  ;  Thomas  and 
followers,  116,  12 1  ;  Luther,  234, 


492 


INDEX. 


240,  247,  258,  264,  274,  277,  364; 
Zwingli,  31 1  ;  Augsburg  Confes¬ 
sion,  339,  343  ;  Reformed  Confes¬ 
sions,  345  ;  Melanchthon,  361, 
364  ;  Major,  Amsdorf,  Menius, 
364,  385;  Flacius,  364;  Antino- 
mian  controversy,  Poach,  365  ; 
Otto,  Agricola,  366 ;  Frankfort 
Recess,  379  ;  Formula  of  Concord, 
384  f. ;  Calvin,  404;  Council  of 
Trent,  434,  435,  437,  443 ;  Bajus, 
450  ;  Unigenitus,  455. 

Worship  of  Christ,  65,  66;  of  images, 
29,  94,  448;  of  relics,  91,  94,  173; 
of  saints,  94,  344;  of  Virgin  Mary, 
235,  344. 

Wurtemberg  theologians.  On  person 
of  Christ,  374  ;  state  of  humilia¬ 
tion,  377. 

Z. 

Zanchi.  On  predestination,  378,  421. 

Zwingli,  works  of,  306,  319  f. ;  esti¬ 
mate  of,  307,  317,  390,  393,  n.  4; 


reformatory  ideas  of,  308,  318  ; 
and  Augsburg  Confession,  and  Bul- 
linger,  390  ;  and  Calvin,  393,  n.  4, 
394,  412,  414  ;  and  Erasmus,  307, 
3X7,  3l8;  and  Luther,  303,  308  n., 
319  f.;  and  Reformed  Confessions, 
345  ;  and  Savonarola,  318  ;  on 
Scriptures,  308,  309  n.;  justifica¬ 
tion,  307,  310;  sin,  309,  317; 
mass,  work  of  Christ,  309  f. ;  per¬ 
son  of  Christ,  317,  321,  323; 
faith,  310  f.,  313;  Holy  Spirit, 

31 1  ;  experience,  good  works,  law 
and  gospel,  3 1 1  ;  Sabbath,  3 1 1  n.  I  ; 
Christian  life,  imitation  of  Christ, 

312  ;  divine  will,  human  merit, 
313;  predestination,  313  f.,  315; 
God,  grace,  314;  church,  salvation 
of  heathen,  315  ;  sacraments,  bap¬ 
tism,  316;  confession,  indulgences, 
purgatory,  priesthood,  316  n.;  an¬ 
cient  symbols,  317  ;  church  and 
state,  317  f. ;  Lord’s  Supper, 
318  ff. ;  alloeosis,  321. 


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